ML20217H519

Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-400/98-02.Corrective Actions:Access for Three of Subject Individuals Was Suspended Pending Completion of Required Access Elements

ML20217H519
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	04/23/1998
From:	Morehead R CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Lieberman J NRC OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT (OE)
References
50-400-98-02, 50-400-98-2, EA-98-020, EA-98-20, PE&RAS-98-022, PE&RAS-98-22, NUDOCS 9804290405
Download: ML20217H519 (8)

Text

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pas 3 9p CP&L Carolina Power & Light Company Robert D. Esi M PO Box 1551 Vice President Raleigh NC 27602 Corporate Services April 23,1998 PE& RAS-98-022 Mr. James Lieberman Director, Office of Enforcement United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT NO.1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 / LICENSE NO. NPF-63 NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-400 / 98-02 REPLY TO A NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY - $55.000 (EA 98 - 020)

Dear Mr. Lieberman:

The attachment to this letter provides Carolina Power & Light Company's (CP&L) reply to the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (EA-020) for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (SHNPP), Unit No.1, transmitted by NRC letter dated March 26,1998. The violations involve two examples ofinappropriate granting of unescorted access to the protected and vital areas of the plant (Level III) and 14 examples of granting unescorted access with missing or incomplete documentation of the review and adjudication of derogatory / missing information (Level IV). Additional details of the

' NRC inspection are provided in Inspection Report No. 50-400/98-02, dated January 23, 1998.

In accordance with the Notice of Violation, the attachment restates the violations, l followed by the SHNPP reply. Also enclosed is a check (#55804, dated April 22,1998) drawn on the Wachovia Bank of Georgia, N.A. and payable to the Treasurer of the United States, in the amount of $55,000 for payment of the civil penalty.

D fb ill Foyetteville Street Mall Tel 919 546 2139 Fox 919 546-6750 l

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Document Control Desk PE& RAS-98-022 / Page 2 Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Ms. Donna B. Alexander at (919) 546-6901.

Sincerely, f h Cu s Robert D. Morehead Vice President - Corporate Services PNM/pnm Attachment cc: USNRC Document Control Desk Mr. J. B. Brady, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector - SIINPP, Unit No.1 Mr. S. C. Flanders, NRR Project Manager - SIINPP, Unit No.1 Mr. L. A. Reyes, Regional Administrator - Region II State of North Carolina County of Wake R. D. Morehead, having been first duly sworn, did depose and say that the information contained herein is true and correct to the best of his information, knowledge and belief; and the sources of his information are officers, employees, contractors, and agents of Carolina Power & Light Company. e s'"f'"

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ATI'ACHMENT TO PE& RAS-98-022 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-400 / LICENSE NO. NPF-63 REPLY TO VIOLATIONS NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-400/98-02 Reported Violation I:

10 CFR 73.56(b) requires the licensee to establish and maintain an Access Authorization Program granting individuals unescorted access to protected and vital areas with the objective of providing high assurance that individuals granted unescorted access are trustworthy and reliable, and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public including a potential to commit radiological sabotage.

10 CFR 73.56(b)(3) requires that the licensee base its decision to grant,~ deny, revoke, or continue an unescorted access authorization on review and evaluation of all pertinent information developed.

License Condition Amendment No. 75 requires the licensee to fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved Physical Security Plan.

Nuclear Worker Screening Program for Unescorted Access, SEC-MGGC-2101, Paragraph 9.8.1, Revision 6, dated February 28,1997, implements part of the security plan for access authorization. It states, "When considering unescorted access, the Company shall examine infonnation obtained as a result of the background investigation and psychological evaluation process." The following conditions are sufficient to disqualify the individual from unescorted access:

- Illegal use or possession of a controlled substance A psychologica; evaluation which indicates that the person is a risk in terms of trustworthiness or reliability.-

Contrary to the above, the licensee did not follow procedure SEC-NGGC-2101 in the two examples below:

a. On March 31,1997, disqualifying information associated with illegal use or possession of a controlled substance on the Personnel History Questionnaire (PHQ)  ;

was not properly reviewed and evaluated. As a result, an individual was inappropriately granted unescorted access to protected and vital areas from April 5, 1997 through May 15,1997.

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b. On March 31,1997 results of a psychological evaluation determined that unescorted

' access for three individuals should be held in abeyance, pending further review.

However, one individual, not able to satisfy the psychological criteria, was granted unescorted access to the protected and vital areas from April 8,1997 through May 13, 1997. The other two individuals, subsequently determined to satisfy psychological criteria, also were granted unescorted access prior to additional psychological evaluation.

This is a Severity Level 111 Violation (Supplement 111).

Admission or Denial of Violation:

CP&L admits this violation.

-Reason for the Violation:

As clarification to example a of Violation I above, CP&L notes that Disqualifying information received on March 31,1997, associated with illegal use or possession of a j controlled substance on the Personnel History Questionnaire (PHQ) was not properly rev: awed and evaluated.

As clarification to example b of Violation I above, CP&L notes that on March 28 and 31, and April 4,1997, CP&L received results ofpsychological evaluations stating that unescorted access for three individuals should be held in abeyance, pending further review. )

The events cited in Violation I were caused by human error due to inattention to detail.

Contributing causes were identified as perceived emphasis on deadlines, failure to establish and utilize adequate performance indicators to assess organizational performance, and a lack of effective management of changes in the Security Access Program.

Corrective Stens Taken and Results Achieved:

A. These discrepancies were self-identified. Two were identified while reviewing the Background Investigation (BI) file documentation received during the process of bringing a temporary clearance to full. The other two discrepancies were identified j through a review initiated in response to the identification of the first two discrepancies. The following immediate corrective actions were taken:

1) Access for three of the subject individuals was suspended pending completion of required access elements. The fourth discrepancy was resolved the same day as discovery. Two of the four individuals were subsequently favorably adjudicated.

2) The events were logged in the Harris Nuclear Plant Safeguards Event Log. l 2

3) The records of the two individuals denied access were annotated in CP&L's computer system to prevent future access, indicating denial of access based on falsification of CP&L's PHQ and failure to meet the psychological evaluation requirements, respectively.

4) The records of the two individuals denied access were flagged in the nuclear industry's Personnel Access Data System (PADS), indicating " additional information subsequent to termination".

5) The work history was reviewed for the two individuals who were denied access. ' Adverse consequences were not identified. j

6) Files of workers with temporary clearances for the 1997 Harris Nuclear Plant spring outage were immediately reviewed for similar psychological evaluation (MMPI) or PHQ errors. Results of the review indicated no similar occurrences.

7) Files of workers granted unescorted access during the 1997 Harris Nuclear Plant spring outage were reviewed. Fourteen additional files were identified  !

with missing or incomplete documentation of the review and adjudication of derogatory / missing information. These fourteen errors were logged in the Harris Nuclear Plant Safeguards Event Log and the associated files were subsequently reviewed by a second reviewer. The second review determined that the derogatory information/ discrepancies would not have precluded the granting of unescorted access.

B. - The following actions have been taken to prevent recurrence:

1) Disciplinary action was taken for involved personnel.

2) The interview results form used by the psychologist was redesigned to more clearly differentiate between recommendations to grant unescorted access and recommendations to deny or hold in abeyance unescorted access.

3) Access Authorization procedures were revised to require a first and second ,

(independent) review of background files prior to the granting of unescorted Access.

4) The Personnel History Questionnaire form was enhanced.

L 5) . Corporate Security hired additional experienced Access personnel.

6) The practice of having the Supervisor-Access Authorization (or designee) audit samples of background reviewers' completed BI reviews has been L proceduralized.

l 7) Errors identified during the independent reviews and management reviews are

!- I documented and evaluated for trends and personnel performance.

8) The formal Access Authorization (AA) training program has incorporated discussions oflessons learned from the event occurrences (reviewer errors) and management emphasis on the importance of quality job performance over other non-quality affecting factors, including quality of access file reviews over badge need dates.

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Corrective Steos That Will Be Taken To Avoid Further Violations:

No additional actions required.

Date When Full Compliance Was Achieved:

CP&L achieved full compliance on July 3,1997 when access authorization for three of the subject individuals was suspended in CP&L's Access computer system and flagged in PADS to prevent unescorted access to other nuclear plants and the discrepancy was promptly resolved for the fourth individual.

Reported Violation II:

10 CFR 73.56(b) requires the licensee to establish and maintain an Access Authorization Program granting individuals unescorted access to protected and vital areas with the objective of providing high assurance that individuals granted unescorted access are trustworthy and reliable, and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public including a potential to commit radiological sabotage.

L 10 CFR 73.56(b)(3) requires that the licensee base its decision to grant, deny, revoke, or l continue an unescorted access authorization on review and evaluation of all pertinent

! information developed.

l License Condition Amendment No. 75 requires the licensee to fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved Physical Security Plan.

! Nuclear Worker Screening Procram for Unescorted Access, SEC-NGGC-2101, L Paragraph 9.8, Revision 6, dated February 28,1997, requires the licensee to review

! pertinent background investigation and psychological information prior to granting L unescorted access.

Contrary to the above, during March and April 1997, the licensee failed to follow g procedure SEC-NGGC-2101 in that 14 individuals were granted unescorted access prior to review / adjudication of all pertinent information listed on the PHQ.

This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement III).

l Admission or Denial of Violation:

r CP&L admits this violation.

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L Reason for the Violation:

As clarification to the description of Violation II above, CP&L notes that during March and April 1997, the licensee failed to follow procedure SEC-NGGC-2101 in that 14 l individuals were granted unescorted access with missing or incomplete documentation of the review andadjudication ofderogatory/ missing information.

The events cited in Violation II were caused by human error due to inattention to detail.

Contributing causes were identified as perceived emphasis on deadlines, failure to establish and utilize adequate performance indicators to assess organizational performance, and a lack of effective management of changes in the Security Access

! ' Program.

Corrective Steos Which Have Been Taken and Results Achieved: ,

A. The errors were self-identified during a file review of temporary clearances issued for

. the 1997 Harris Nuclear Plant spring outage. The file review was performed as part of the immediate corrective actions taken in response to the conditions identified in L Violation I discussed above. These fourteen documentation errors were logged in the i Harris Nuclear Plant Safeguards Event Log and the associated files were subsequently reviewed by a second reviewer. The second reviews determined that the derogatory L information/discrepencies for which specific adjudication documentation was missing L

or incomplete would not have precluded the granting of unescorted access. CP&L Review and Adjudication forms were completed or annotated with the missing documentation.

B. : The following actions have been taken to prevent recurrence:

1) Access Authorization procedures were revised to require a first and second

-(independent) review of background files prior to the granting of unescorted access.

2) Corporate Security hired additional experienced Access personnelc l

3) The practice of having the Supervisor-Access Authorization (or designee) l j_ audit samples of background reviewers' completed BI reviews has been  ;

L proceduralized. '

4) . Errors identified during the independent reviews and management reviews are l documented and evaluated for trends and personnel performance. l

5) The formal AA training program has incorporated discussions oflessons l l leamed from the event occurrences (reviewer errors) and management

. emphasis on the importance of qualityjob performance over other non-quality affecting factors, including quality of access file reviews over badge need dates.

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Corrective Steps That Will Be Taken To Avoid Further Violations:

( No additional actions required.

Date When Full Compliance Was Achieved:

CP&L achieved full compliance on August 5,1997 when CP&L Review and Adjudication Forms were either completed for the fourteen subject files or annotated with missing information.

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ENCLOSURE 1 RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-400/98-02 i

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT NO.1 i

NRC DOCKET NO. 50-400 / LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LIST OF REGULATORY COMMITMENTS The following table identifies those actions committed to by Carolina Power &

Light (CP&L) Company in this document. Any other actions discussed in the submittal represent intended or planned actions by CP&L. They are described to the NRC for the NRC's information and are not regulatory commitments. Please notify the Manager-Performance Evaluation & Regulatory Affairs at CP&L's Corporate office of any questions regarding this document or any associated regulatory commitments.

Commitment Committed Date or Outage Procedurally-required first and second (independent) reviews are Complete conducted on background files prior to the granting of unescorted access.

Supervisor-Access Authorization (or designee) audits samples of Complete background reviewers' completed BI reviews.

Errors identified during the independent reviews and management Complete reviews are documented and evaluated for trends and personnel performance.

The formal AA training program has incorporated discussions of Complete lessons learned from the event occurrences (reviewer errors) and management emphasis on the importance of quality job performance over other non-quality affecting factors, including quality of access file reviews over badge need dates.

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