ML20217G742
| ML20217G742 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 10/02/1997 |
| From: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217G739 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9710140181 | |
| Download: ML20217G742 (3) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES s
j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINoTON, D.C. 30666 0001
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SAFETY EVALVATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT N0. 151 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-49 NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY. ET AL.
MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION. UNIT NO. 3 DOCKET NO. 50-423
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated July 18, 1997, the Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al.
(the licensee), submitted a request for changes to the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 Technical Specifications (TS). The proposed amendment adds a new TS and associated Bases to address the operability of the steam generator atmospheric relief bypass valves (SGARBVs).
2.0 EVALUATION In its letter dated July 18, 1997, the licensee stated that the proposed revisior to the Millstone Unit 3 TS provides a new TS 3/4.7.1.E and its associated Bases Section 3/4.7.1.6 for the SGARBVs.
The licensee stated that the operability of the SGARBV lines provides a method to recover from a steam generator tube rupture event during which the operator is required to perform a limited cooldown to establish adequate subcooling as a necessary step to limit the primary-to-secondary break flow into the ruptured steam generator.
For other design events, the SGARBVs provide a safety grade method for cooling the unit to residual heat removal entry conditions should the preferred heat sink via the steam bypass system or the steam generator atmospheric relief valves be unavailable.
FSAR Section 10.3.3 states that four main steam pressure relieving bypass valves (SGARBVs) are provided to ensure a secure path around the main steam pressure relieving valves in the event that the primary path is no longer available due to tornado missile or seismic damage to the discharge silencers, or loss of pc,or or air to the main steam pressure relieving valves. These valves provide the capability to dump steam to the atmosphere remotely from the control room following a safe shutdown earthquake coincident with loss of power. Thus, a cold shutdown can be achieved with dependence upon only safety grade components.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's proposed changes and has determined that the addition of the TS for the EGARBVs is acceptable since the SGARBVs are part of a primary success path that functions to mitigate a Design Basis Accident or Transient that either assumes the failure of or present;; a 9710140181 971002 ADOCK0500g3 DR
- . I challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. This is consistent with criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36. Therefore, since the proposed TS regarding the SGARBVs satisfies one of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.36, the operability requirements must be incl.uded in the TS.
The NRC staff has reviewed the TS action statements and surveillance requirements for the SGARBVs and has determined that they are consistent with the Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Plants (NUREG-1431).
In addition, the licensee stated that a review of the work orders for the l
SGARBVs was completed and showed there were no functioital failures associated l
with the valves.
Therefore, the licensee concluded that the proposed surveillance frequency is acceptable.
Bued on the above, the staff has determined that the TS action statements and surveillance requirements for the SGARBVs are acceptable, in addition, the staff has reviewed the proposed Bases section and i.n no l
objection to the wording.
3.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Connecticut State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment.
The State official had no comments.
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendment changes requirements with respect to installation or use of a facility component locatert within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (62 FR 43370 dated August 13,1997). Accordingly, the arendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
5.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above.
that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety' of the
-public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor: J. Andersen Date: October 2, 1997 i
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