ML20216F475
| ML20216F475 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/13/1997 |
| From: | Stoiber C NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| SECY-97-184, SECY-97-184-01, SECY-97-184-1, SECY-97-184-R, NUDOCS 9709110265 | |
| Download: ML20216F475 (133) | |
Text
a a saa..................
- as p g<, RELEASED TO THE PDR lp-
- 9Mlt') Ek) ;
5
-l n date
- g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .in'tials POLICY ISSUE August 13, 1997 SECY-97-184 EQB: The Commissioners EBQM: Carlton R. Stoiber, Director Office of International Program
SUBJECT:
PROPOSED REACTOR EXPORT LICENSES TO COMBUSTION ENGINEERING, INC.
TO SUPPLY MAJOR COMPONENTS AND EQUIPMENT FOR FOUR NUCLEAR REACTOR UNITS IN THE REPUBLIC 0F KOREA -- APPLICATIONS XR162 AND XR163 PURPOSE:
' To request Commission review of the proposed issuance of two export licenses to Combustion Engineering, Inc. for the supply of nuclear reactors to South Korea. The applications are being referred to the Commission in accordance with 10 CFR 5110.40(b)(1).
DISCUSSION:
This paper addresses two pending license applications by Combustion Engineering, Inc. (CE) for nuclear power reactor equipment exports to South Korea: XR162, filed in 1991 and amw.ded in 1995, for supply of major components and equipment for two 1000 MWe pressurized water reactors (PWRs) for Yonggwang Units 5 and 6 (Attachment 1); and XR163, filed in 1995, for supply of similar components and equipment for Ulchin Units 5 and 6 (Attachment 2). The applications have been pending, awaiting action by the government of South Korea to award the contracts and provide formal assurances to the United States that the prospective exports will Le received under the terms of the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) Agreement for the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.
J ,3 *f'~p b
p \--)c'y i
py
- C O \
yVUo 3 . n , t , 3-2,us -
)<
lilllll!Bil]Illl!!Illiill!Illl!
CONTACT: B. L. Wright, 0IP/NEMR 415-2342 SECY NOTE: TO BE MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE WIIEN THE FINAL SRM IS 9709110265 970813 MADE AVAILABLE
-18 PDR
E 4 Yonggwang Units 5 and 6 will be located in Chollanam province on the southwestern coast =of the Korean peninsula. Ulchin Units 5 and 6 will be located in Kyungsang Buk-Do province on the east coast.
CE will supply reactor internals, reactor coolant pumps, reactor instrumentation, monitoring and control equipment, reactor auxiliary equipment, some emergency core cooling system (ECCS) components, and various related equipment, software, and technical support services. Reactor vessels, steam generators and some ECCS e or supplied from other sources. quipment will be manufactured in South Korea CE has requested that export licenses XR162 and XR163 be made valid until March 18, 2014 to correspond to the expiration date of the U.S./ROK Agreement for Cooperation and permit continued exports of replacement and spare parts.
In response to our request for views on XR162 and XR163, the Executive Branch (Executive Branch), in a letter dated March 18, 1997 (Attachment 3),
recommends that the licenses be issued. The letter notes thac the proposed exports would take place pursuant to the Agreement for Cooperation Between the U.S. and the Republic of Korea (R0K), as amended, and as confirmed to the Department of State in a letter dated February 12, 1997 from the Ministry of Science and Technology. The Executive Branch response also notes that the ROK has adhered to-the provisions of its Agreement for Cooperation with the U.S.
The Executive Branch concludes that the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, have been met and that the proposed exports would not be inimical to the common defense and security of the United States.
The Executive Branch submitted a detailed analysis for the ROK on May 6,1980 for export license XR133 (SECY-80-336, dated July 21,1980). Since that time, the ROK has taken significant steps to strengthen its commitment to nu.i-proliferation, including undertakings not to engage in enrichment or reprocessing, and its membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Non-Proliferation Treaty exporters committee. The Executive Branch concludes that there has been no other material change in circumstances since the May 1980 submission. -
The Executive Branch also notes that the nuclear steam supply systems proposed for export under these applications are similar in design and power level to the units authorized for export to the ROK under NRC license XR133. The units under this application are expected to be collocated with previously exported nuclear power reactors covered by existing concise Executive Branch environmental reviews, the most recent of which was prepared in 1986 (Attachment 4) for NRC export license XR150 (SECY-87-87, dated March 30, 1987). The Executive Branch view is that E.0. 12114 does not require a new review, given no material change in circumstances.
t 4 Prior to issuing the export license for Korea Nuclear Units 7 and 8 in 1980, NRC staff prepared an evaluation (Attachment 5) of the potential radiological impact of the two units on the global commons. The evaluation concluded that there would be no significant increase in the risk to the public health and safety. NRC staff also reviewed the proposed export of Korea Units 11 and 12 in 1987 and found no material change in circumstances. Recently, the staff reassessed its 1980 evaluation to determine whether there were changes to the environmental impacts on the global commons. The staff concluded, as a result of the reassessment (Attachment 6) that it is not aware of new and significant information regarding the proposed facilities' designs or proposed operation, or new requirements or teconical insights, that would change the conclusions previously found. Consequently, NRC staff reviewed the current proposed export licenses in light of the earlier evaluations.
The staff believes the Executive Branch analysis and views provide an adequate basis for finding that the proposed exports meet the applicable export licensing criteria of the Atomic Energy Act.
The ROK is a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and, as such, accepts IAEA safeguards on all source and special nuclear material in its nuclear activities. Since construction has not started, there is no need yet for IAEA Facility Attachments for these reactors. The ROK has historically negotiated Facility Attachments in a timely manner, and we expect that such negotiations for these new reactors will occur in a like manner.
With regard to physical protection, an evaluation was performed during a visit to Korea in May 1997. The conclusion of this review was that the physical protection program was consistent with the recommendations of IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev.3 for this export.
GE10SION:
The staff concurs with the Executive Branch judgment that the proposed exports would not be inimical to the common defense and security and do net constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety in the United States, and concludes that all criteria required for the issuance of licenses XR162 and XR163 are met. The Office of the Executive Director for Operations concurs.
The Office of General Counsel has no legal objections.
The staff notes that favorable Executive Branch views also have been received on export license application XSNM02642 for fuel for Yonggwang Units 5 and 6.
The staff will defer final action on that license until the Commission's review of the Yonggwang 5/6 reactor export license application (XR162) has been completed.
'In the Philippine reactor export case, the Commission decided as a matter of discretion that NRC would review generally available literature to assess the impacts on the global commons of NRC authorized reactor exports.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . ___.m _ - _ _ . - _ . . - . _ _ _ _ _-__
e a 1
RECOMMENDATION:-
That the Commission authorize the issuance to CE of export licenses XR162 and XR163, with expiration dates of March 18, 2014.
i ! 1
- )
Carlton R. Sto ber, Director Office of International Programs -!
- Attachments
- 1. 08/02/91 CE License Application (XR162) 4 05/04/95 CE License Application Amendment i 2. 08/10/95 CE License Application (XR163) 1
- 3. 03/18/97 Executive Branch views FMcGoldrick to CStoiber
- 4. 08/28/86 A Concise Environmental Review
- 6. 07/21/97 NRR's Review and Update of 1980 Concise Environmental Review Commiscioners'-comments or consent.should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by c.o.b. Thursday, August 28, 1997.
Commission staff office comments, if any, should be submit.ted to the
- Commissioners NLT Thursday, August 21, 1997, with an'information copy
- to the Office of the Secretary. If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional review and comment, the Commissioners and
- the. Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.
DISTRIBUTION:
i Commissioners i OGC OIG OPA j OIP
, OCA ^
i- CIO '
, CFO-EDO SECY i
i J
E
?
. . l ABB ASEA BROWN BOVERI 3
August 2, 1991 Q }&si
//ggf$
4 LD-91-042 Mr. Ronald D. Hauber Assistant Director, MS 3-H-5 International Security, Exports, and Material Safety Office of International Programs U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
License Application, Export of Nuclear Utilization Facility to South Korea
Dear Mr. Hauber:
Combustion Engineering, Inc. requests a license to export two nuclear utilization facilities to South Korea (Republic of Korea). As required in 10 CFR 110.31, the following information is provided:
(a) Name and Addreso combustion Engineering, Inc.
of Applicant 1000 Prospect Hill Road Windsor, CT 06095-0500 (b) Country of Origin United States (c) Intermediate Korea Heavy Industries and Consignees Construction Company 555 Guygok-Dong, Changwon, Republic of Korea 641-420 Ultimate Consignees Korea Electric Power Company 87 Samsung-Dong, Kangnam Gu Seoul, Republic of Korea (d) Date of Propos,ed December 1992 First Shipment Date of Proposed March 18, 2014 (See Note 1)
Last Shipment (f) (1) Maximum Quantity Combustion Engineering is of Material, '
- -iO93dEmltlfdng an Export License Maximum Weight - M ANWcition for the initial Percent of core under separate cover Enriched U-2g [g g.gC grm 7)
,kSWml 9C YR.
E ABB Combustion Engioserng Nuclear Power ryg y ,,4 j Comeos e-Eng e 'es me 1 ospect ca: Te 3 688 1911 Wresor Connecice 06095 0$00 . Tee 5 9929? COMBEN WSOA
______ ._- .--------- r ' ' ' ' _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ - - - - _ - - - - - -
August 2, 1991 Paga 2 W/L:$
l
/:: /' R0 (2) Total Dollar Not yet fixed; approximately value
$300 million (U.S.)
(3) Name of gecisar Snits'15 6 16 Facilities and p roximately 4800 MWe Design Power Level (4) Description of end use: 1
)
I Korea Electric Power Company Commercial Generation of Electricity expected by the early 2000's; replacement spare parts.
(Note 1: It is requested that the license extend until the expiration of the Agreement for Cooperation with the Republic of Korea in order to cover the export of replacement and spare parts for these units. The current Agreement expires on March 18, 2014.)
The systems, license should allow shipment of nuclear steam supply including Reactor Vessels, Reactor Internals, Pressurizers, Steam Generators, Reactor Coolant Pumps, Reactor Instrumentation, Monitoring and Control Equipment, Reactor Auxiliary Handling Equipment, Emergency Core Cooling Systems, Fuel Equipment, and various equipment and technical support services. Some of this equipment may be manufactured in whole or in part in South Korea.
We understand that, because this export license application is being submitted before the August 9, 1991, effective date of revisions to 10CFR1~10, fees will not be assessed for processing this application.
If you have any questions, please call me or Mr. G. D. Hess of ny staff at (303) 285-5218.
Very truly yours, COMBUSTION ENGINEERING, INC.
77199LlVCl.pl ' .Jub f er Kennedy 5
'Mhnager Nuclear Systems Licensing LO: llV S- 09V (6.
EHK:lw cc: B. Wright (NRC) ~,]
i .
L' ABB um((.d.TO 7 May 4,1995 LD 95-019 h w Yjg. Mr. Ronald D. Hauber O-3HS Director for Nonproliferation, Exports, and Multilateral Relations Office of International Programs U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
Export License for Yonggwang S&6 Nuclear Utilization Iw dies
Reference:
License Application; C-E letter LD 91-042, E.H. Kennedy to R.D.Hauber, dated August 2,1991. [XR 162]
Dear Mr. Hauber:
ne Reference le:ter submitted an application for export of two nuclear production units, designated KNU 15 & 16, for construction in South Korea. This letter requests that the Reference application be approved, and the unit name updated from KNU 15 & 16 to Yonggwang 5 & 6. C-E recently signed the contract for Yonggwang Units 5 & 6 with Korea Electric Power Corporation. Applicant information for these units is provided on the attached table. The reactor and steam generators for the 1000 MWe YGN 5 & 6 units will be manufactured by Hanjung in the Republic of Korea. Combustion Engineering. Inc. will supply reactor internals; reactor coolant pumps; reactor instrumentation, monitoring and control equipment; reactor auxiliary equipment; emergency core cooling systems; and various related equipment, software, and technical support services. Approval for export of four similar 1000 MWe nuclear production facilities to the Republic of Korea has been granted to C-E Inc. in NRC Licenses XR 150 and XR 153. Please feel free to call me or Virgil Paggen of my staff at 203 285-4700 if there are any questions. Very truly yours, COMBUSTION ENGINEERING, INC. C- $ C. B. Brinkman g'; x Director e g ~; Nuclear Systems Licensing Lc -< CBB.vap r- c'c 5 cc: B.L. Wright [NRC)
~
ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Power P og :1 H,0 RO & O1 Winosor. CT 06095
Anchment ta Laoscio usy4, sees 6 Information for Yonggweng 546 Export License Application 10CFR Section hem Description 110.32(a) Name and Andress Combustion Engineering, Inc. of Applicant 1000 Prospect Hill Road Windsor, CT 06095 4500 110.32(b) Name and Address of Korea Heavy industries & Construction, Ltd. Supplier of Equipment [Hanjung); Changwon, Repubiic of Korea or Material Combustion Engineering, Inc. Windsor, CT 06095 0500; plus various other suppliers and subcontractors to Ucensee. 110.32(c) Country of Origin of Republic of Korea; Equipment or Material United States of America 110.32(d) Intermediate Consignee Korea Heavy Industries & Construction Co. [Hanjung); 555 Guygok-Dong. Changwon, Republic of Korea. Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon, Republic of Korea. 110.32(d) Ultimate Consignee Korea Electric Power Corporation 1671 Samsung-Dong; Gang Num-Ku Seoul. Republic of Korea 110.32(e) Date of Proposed December 1997 First Shipment 110.32(e) Date of Proposed March 18,2014 [ Expiration of Agreement for i.ast Shipment Cooperation wtth the Republic of Korea: This expiration date is requested to permit export of replacement and spare parts for these units.] 110.32(f)(1) Maximum Quantity of Combustion Engineering does not expect to Material and its chemical supply the initial core for these units. and physical form 110.32(f)(2) For Enriched Uranium, the U-235 enrichment is less than 5% by weight. maximum weight percentage initial core wat be composed of less than of enrichment and maximum 8500 kBograms of U 235 contained in less than weight of contained U 235 225,000 klograms of uranium dioxide. 110.32(f)(3) Total Dollar Value of Approximately $200 mIllon USD, Nuclear Equipment total for both units. 110.32(f)(4) Name and Location of Plant Name: Yonggwang 5 & 6 Facility; Location: Chollanam province; Republic of Korea. Design Power Level Power level: 1000 MWe 110.32(f)(5) Description of End Use Commercial generation of electricity.
ABB E bo3 '
% A5015 P6 :Ti Mr. Ronald D. Hauber 0-3HS ,
Director for Nonprohferabon, Exports, and Multilateral R$tiorts br C , g* n Omoe of intemational Programs . U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C, 20555 .
/[p[
Subject License Apphcabon for Export of Ulchin 5 & 6 Nuclear UJ12ation Facihties
/
Dear Mr. Hauber:
/ / 4 6 W . b7 Combusbon Engineering, Inc. (CE), a Delaware corporabon, requests authonzabon to export two nuclear utilcabon facihbes that it will suppy to be constructed in Kyungsang Buk-Do province of the Repubhc of Korea as U6 chin units 5 & 6. Each utileation facihty is a nominal 1000 MWe pressunzed water reactor that will be used for the commercial generation of electrierty. The ultimate consignee and owner of the utileadon facihties is Korea Electne Power Corporation,1671 Samsung Dong, Gang Num-Ku, Seoul, Repubhc of Korea, intermediate consignees include Korea Heavy industnes & Construction Co.,555 Guygok Dong, Changwon, Repubhc of Korea, and Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon, Repubhc of Korea The date of contract award for Ulchin 5 & 6 is anterpated to be November,1995 The export beense should allow shipment of all NSSS components, including but not hmited to rasctor intemals; reactor coolant pumps; reactor control rod systems, reactor instrumentation, monttonng and control equipment; reactor auxihary equipment, emergency core cookng systems; and vanous related equipment, software, and technical support services Equipment and material will be supphed by CE, Korea Heavy industnes & Construction Co , and by vanous other suppliers and subcontractors Note that some of the NSSS equipment is expected to be manufactured in whole or in part in South Korea The first shipment is proposed for December 1998; this hcense should permit exports for these units through March 18,2014, the expiration date of the Agreement for Cooperation with the Repubhc of Korea.
The expected dollar value of exports is identified in the attachment which should be protected as confidenbalinformabon of the apphcant. NRC Licenses XR 150, XR 153, and (pending heense) XR 162 cover the export by CE of six similar 1000 MWe nuc'is3Ntil2ation facilrties to the Repubhc of Korea As required by 10 CFR 170.21, a check in the amount of $7500 is enolosed to support this heense apphcation. Please feel free to cali me or Virgil Paggen of my staff at 203-285-4700 if there are any questont - Very truly yours, s C. B. Bnnkman Director, Nuclear Licensing cc: B.L.Wnght (NRC) ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Power g y C"" E"S*"'S "* @ " L ,m DETbT" Wresor CT 06095
. $ ,. , , United States Department of State i .
radington, D.C 20520
.v 1 i
i March 18,1997 i Mr. Cartton R. Stoiber i Director, intomational Programe ! United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission i Rockville, Maryland l
Dear Mr. Stoiber:
i i 4 i refer to the letters from your office dated May 15, and August 30,1995, root.ssting the views of the Executive Branch as to whether issuance of export licenses in accordance j with the applications hereinafter described meets the applicable criteria of the Atomic Energy . Act of 1954, as amended by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978: NRC No. XR162 - Application by ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Power for authorization to export to the Republic of Korea (ROK) two 1,000 MWe nuclear utilization facilities for Yonggwang Nuclear Power Units 5 and 6. The proposed export includes reactor ' intemais, coolant pumps, instrumentation, monitoring and control equipment, auxiliary ' equipment, emergency core cooling systems and other related equipment, software and technical support services.
.. . The applicant
! _ requests that the license be made valid until March 18,2014 to correspond to the expiration i date of the U.S.-ROK Agreement for Cooperation and permit continued exports of j- replacement and spare parts.
- NRC No. XR163- Application by ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Power for i authorization to export to the ROK two 1,000 MWe nuclear utilization facilities for Ulchin Nuclear Power Units 5 and 6. The' proposed export includes reactor intemais, coolant
[ pumps, instrumentation, monitoring and control equipment, auxiliary equipment, emergency l core cooling systems and other related equipment, software and technical support services. + The applicant requests that the license be made valid until March 18, 2014 to correspond to the expiration date of the U.S.-ROK l Agreement for Cooperation and permit continued exports of replacement and spare parts.
' NRC No XSNM02642 - Application by ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclea'r Power for authorization to' export to the ROK 2,750 kilograms of U-235 in 55,000 kilograms of l uranium ranging from natural to a maximum enrichment of 5% in the form of uranium dioxide l' in fabricated fuel assemblies. The proposed export also includes gram quantities of special i nuclear material and byproduct material contained in instruments, detectors and sources
, needed for the reactors.
- 81 2 Nd 12 gg ful e
[ ' \
&Lc hmeni ~S
. e o
2 The proposed exports to the ROK would take place pursuant to the Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and the ROK, as amended, as confirmed in a letter dated February 12,1997 from the Ministry of Science and Technology, a copy of which has already been provided to your office. The ROK has adhered to the provisions of its Agreement for Cooperation with the United States. The Executive Branch has reviewed the applications and concluded that the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended by the Nuclear Non Woliferation Act of 1978, have been met and that the proposed exports would not be inimical to the common defense and security of the United States. A detailed analysis for the ROK was submitted May 6,1980 for application XR133. Since that time, the ROK has taken significant steps to strengthen its commitment to non-proliferation, includirig undertakings not to engage in enrichment or reprocessing and membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee. There has been no other material change in circumstances since that submission. The nuclear steam supply systems proposed for export under these applications are similar in design and power level to the units authorized for export to the ROK under license XR133. Moreover, the units under this application are expected to be collocated with previously exported nuclear power reactors covered by existing concise environmental reviews, the most recent of which is dattd August 28,1986 for case XR150. Therefore, it is the view of the Executive Branch that the concise environmental reviews prepared for power reactor projects in ROK pursuant to Executive Order No.12114 of January 4,1979 apply equally to the current export license requests and that no new concise environmental review is necessary. On the basis of the foregoing, the Executive Branch recommends that the licenses be issued. Sincerely, . C Fred McGo drick, A ing Director Office of Nuclear Energy Affairs
Enclosure:
assurance letters. 81 2 E! IE U;;l !Cl d ! O G I ; ,; I L
03/1Ev97 15:06 NO. MS PN9/012
- 202 583 1340 03/14/87 E _13:54 FAI 202 586 1346 DOE /%43 EIPORT Co.YrROL *** NRC 2003 4
r MIMSTRY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OovERNtMKT co0# LEX X OWACHEON, KYUNGGFDo,427-790 IEruaucOF KOfEA T e1 : (82) 903 CS47 Fes : (02) 807-0344 12 Febntary 1997 Ms. Trisha Dedik
*
- t*'
Nkfbk Nuclear Transfer and Supplies Policy Division eV (z. I G 3 Office of Arms Contreal and Non prohferation Department of Energy, U. S. A.
)( $W d 1 b N 1
Dear Ms. Dedak:
In refemnce to your letter of 23 December 1996, addressed to Mr. You-Hyum Moon. Science Attache of the Embassy of Korea in Washington, D.C., I hereby assure you that the Government of the Republic of Korea confirms the following partaculars on the international transfer of nuclear utilization facilities Younggwang 5 and 6 (XR-162) and Unchin 5 and 6 (XR-163), and on reload fuel and on special nuclear and by-product material for use in the Younggwang 5 and 6 (XSNM-2642): (a) The transfer of"nuerear utilizatidn facilities and matedals will be subject to all terms and conditions of the Agreement for Cooperation Concerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Gover.unent of
. the United States, as amended, which entered into force on March 19, 1973; (b) The Koma Heavy Industrials and Construction Company and the Korea Nuclear Fue) Company, intermediate consignees, and the Korea Electric Power Corporation, the ultimate consignee, as identified on the application, are authorhed by the Government of the Republic of Korea to receive and posSels2 tid: ifateriaHjitnd equipment. . . , _ ._
, CIL U0/.!i c:_
CLv1867 15:06 to.149 Pa10412 282 596 1348
, 93/18/C7 MT 13:54 FAI 202 588 2348 DOE /NN-43 EIPORT CONTROL *** NRC 0004 I
. l U you have any questions or comments on this matter, please let me know.
Thank you for your continuous cooperation and assistr.nce.
-e ..
Sincerely yours, Mun-Ki LEE Dimetor Nuclear Control Division ese e , 9 00 diC G2!d3L - 6
. _ . . . . . . . . . . . - _ . - . ~ . - - ... . -. . . . _ .
I_ . O O P l A Concise Environmental Review Addressing Issues Pertinent to the Potential Construction of Nuclear Power Generating Facilities in the Republic of Korea Final Report August 28, 1986 Prepared for: The U.S. Department of State Washington, D.C. 20520 Prepared by: Energetics, Incorporated Columbia, MD 21045
, i GC \ LAY
\/ ./ o f
- O O -
TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE I. INTRODUCTION . ........................ 1 II. THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... 2 A. Geography. . . . . . . . . . . . ...... ...... 2 B. Vital Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 III. THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA'S ENERGY SUPPLY SYSTEM . . . ...... 4 l IV. THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 'S NUCLEAR POWER PROGR AM. . . . . . . . . 8 A. Program Origins. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B B. Structure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... 9 C. Program Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 D. Nuclear Fuel Supply. . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . .. 13 E. Manpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 F. Nuclear Waste Management . .. ........ ..... 16 V. LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING NUCLEAR POWER FACILITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. ........ ..... 19 A. Laws Governing Nuclear Power Plants. . . . . . . . . . . 19 B. Development and Application of Codes and Standards . . . 20 C. Domestic Licensing . . . . . . ............. 20 D. Inspection Procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . ...... 24 E. Emergency Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3G F. Interactions with Foreign Organizations. . . . . . . . . 31 VI. ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSED PROJECT. . . . . . . . 35 A. S it e L oc a t ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 B. Geologic Features. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
- 1. Physiography of the Plant Site . . . . . . . . . . . 35
- 2. Subterranean Characteristics . . . . . . . ..... 36
- 3. Structural Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 4 Assessment of Stability and Foundation Engineering, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 C. Seismic Characteristics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
- 1. Seismic-related Geologic Characteristics . . . . . . 37
- 2. Recorded Seismic Events. ....... . . . .-. . . 37
- 3. Activity Potential of the Site . . . . . . . . . . . 38 D. Hydrology. . . . . ...... ...... ....... 38 E.
F. Climatic Conditions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nearby Population Centers. . 41
. . .... . . . . . . . ._ 42
O o 4 a TABLE OF COIITENTS (Continued) PAGE
- 0. Radiation Impacts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . .
H. 46 The United States. Other Countries . and Global Commons . . . . . . . . . .,. . .the .. 47 I. Uniq ue Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. .. ... . 48 REFERENCES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ..... 49 l BIBLIOGRAPHY. . .-. . . . . ,
, ,,.. . . .... .. ..... 50 l
l I I l ?
A
- 1. INTRODUCTION This Concise Environmental Review (CER) is to examine factors
=affecting the proposed export of materials for construction of a nuclear power facility in the Republic of Korea. Preparation of this CER has I
I considered the following guidancet a i o Executive Order 12114;l o Procedures delineated by the U.S. Department of State;2 and ,' o U.S. Department of Energy guidance.3 . 4 1 l This review provides general information about the proposed site, factors to j be considered in locating the nuclear plant, and the status of nuclear regulation in the Republic of Korea. i 1 i-i l -, i i i 1 t 1 I t I I .'- _ . . _ . _ , ._ .- . , . . . . _ . _ -__ .
p n *
- V b II. THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA "
A. Geography The Republic of Korea (ROK) is found on the southern half of the Korean peninsula in eastern Asia. This nation occupish an area of over 38,000 square miles, roughly the site of Indiana. Th: bulk of the ROK's boundaries are natural ones: the Sea of Japan on the east and the Yellow Sea on the west. Only one border is shared with another nation: the 38th parallel separates the ROK from North Korea. Since the 1945 establishment of this boundary, the relationship between the two natieas has been an anxious one. The Korean peninsula is predominantly mountainous, an extension of the mountains of southern Manchuria. The spine of the mountains runs from northeast to southwest, but remains close to the peninsula's eastern coast. There are many scenic peaks, particularly to the north. The western coastal regions contain level plains interspersed frequently with rivers. This is the peninsula's agricultural belt, where rice predominates; raised in wet paddies, two crops are harvested each year. There are numerous islands off the western coast, remnaats of a mountain I chain. B. Vital Statistics ~ i The population of the ROK is estimated at 42.3 million people. Over 35 percent of the population lives in four cities: Seoul (8.4.million). Pusan (3.2 million), Inchon (1.8 million), and Taegu (1.6 million). The ROK is an ethnically homogeneous country undergoing the often difficult transition from agrarianism to industrialism. 2
O O The ROK's leading industries include the followings o Agriculture - rice, barley, wheat, cotton, livestock; o Manufacturing - textiles, steel, electronics, plastics, chemicals; o Forestry and lumbering; o Fishing; and o Mining - coal, iron ore, graphite, tungsten.
- The Republic had one of the most rapidly expanding ecor. amies in the world from 1960 to 1979, averaging an annual growth in Gross National Product (GNP) of B.2 percent. The ROK's GNP grew from $2.27 billion in 1962 to an estimated $80 billion in 1984 In 1980, Korea experienced an unprecedent fall in GNP which was directly linked to the 1979 oil crisis. This decline was short-lived; in 1983-84 the ROK's econori enjoyed an annual growth rate of roughly 9 percent, one of the highest in the world.
The Nation's economic performance is especially impressive in light of the ROK's dearth of mineral resources. Of particular concern to the ROK's planners is the scarcity of domestic energy resources: no oil or natural gas and only limited quantities of coal, uranium, and firewood are available. As shown by the 1979 oil crisis, Korea is vulnerable to the consequences of its reliance on imported energy resources. 3
l III. THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA'S ENERGY SUPPLY SYSTEM Korea's rapid economic growth has led to rapid increases in electric energy consumption. Table 1 compares the ROK's annual economic and energy grawth rates to those experienced by the world's developed and developing countries. These data clearly illustrate the Korean economy's remarkable vitality. Korea's economy is relatively energy-intensive compared to other countries at a similar level of income. The principal reasons for this high energy intensity are the elevated share of manufacturing in the Korean economy; the rapid growth of energy-intensive heavy industries over the past l ten years; and the relatively cold climate, resulting in substantial space I heating requirements. In a technical sense, energy use in Korea is already quite efficient, and further improvements in energy-intensity will come about mostly through structural changes in the economy. To ensure development, government planners determined that a first priority was supplying stable and inexpensive energy to tha industrial sector. As the Korean power industry grew, it became increasingly vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the international energy resource market. The nation's rapid growth spawned an expanding reliknee on petroleum. In 1966, petroleum accounted for 16 percent of the ROK's total energy supply. In 1974, 1978, and 1983, these percentages were 50, 53, and 55, respectively. crude oil imports tripled over that time frame. As noted earlier, reliance on foreign oil supplies is complete; the ROK has no known oil resources and only-a
- 5 percent probability of discovering offshore reserves. An added discomfort is that over half of the ROK's oil imports come from the Middle East; Korea intends to lower its dependence on Middle East oil by increasing its imports from Indonesia and Malaysia.
4 I
g TABLE 1 A Comparison of Annual Growth Rates of Economy and Electricity
-in the World (1960 - 1980) f, Unit t 5/ year) I l Region i l l l
!_ l l l l Developed 1 Developing l World I l l Korea -l Countries l Countries l Total l l I I I l i I It s I l l I I ! I I l i I I l Gross l l l 1 l l-Domestic I 9.4 1 4.5 l 6.0 1 5.1 1 I Product i I I I i i 1 I I i 1 l l 1 I l-Electric l l l l l l Installed l 17.1 1 6.2 1 9.5 1 6.9 I l Capacity 1 I I I I l 1 I I I I l l 1 I i 1 Electric l l l l l 1 Energy -l 16.9 l 59 l 9.8 I 6.6 1 1 Generation i I l l l 1 1 1 l i I I I l l I I l Per-Capita l l l 1 1 I Electrio l l l l l 1 Energy 1 14.4 l 4.9 l 7.1 1 4.6 I I consumption i I I I i 1 1 I I I I
! I I I I I 5
Jh The ROK has placed increased emphasis on coal use. Korean use of coal will increase greatly in the 19BO's and beyond as steel, coment, and electric power production grow with Korea's expanding economy and as coal is substituted for oil. Use of bituminous coal, all of which must be imported, is expected to jump from 9.4 million- tons in 1983 to 24.0 million in 1991 and 55.4 million in 2001. In 1983, Korea imported about 11.4 million metric tons of coal: 10.4 of- bituminous and 0.9 of anthracite. The bulk of Korea's anthracite needs are provided by domestic production, which has peaked and is expected to decline. Another approach to reducing dependence on foreign oil is the use of natural gas. Korea has no domestic gas reserves, but there are companies producing gas by catalytic conversion of naphtha and LPG; these supplies are used by residential and commercial consumers. In 1983, Korea signed a long-term LNG contract with Indonesia which will supply 2 million metric tons annually for 20 years (1987-2006). At the same time, Korea is pushing ahead with construction of an LNG terminal, storage facilities and pipelines to be completed by the end of 1986. At the end of 1986, 403 thousand tona of Indonesian LNG will be shipped to Korea for test operations. Korea's new five-year plan indicates possible imports of LNG of 5-6 million tons by the year 2001. Korea converted two oil burning power plants (total capacity of 700 MW) to LNG in 1983, and plans to convert two more by 1986. Korea is also seeking to increase gas use in industry and in private households. Among renewable energy resources, firewood contributes less than 10 percent and hydropower less than 1 percent of the ROK's primary energy supply. Deforestion problems.will reduce future use of firewood. There is potential for solar energy, wind energy, tidal power. and additional hydropower, but renewable resources do not show great promise as influential facets of Korea's energy system. The most ambitious plans for energy system growth has been in nuclear power systems. Government planners expect a dramatic increase in nuclear generation, as shown by Table 2. Five nuclear facilities currently are in
. operation and four more are expected to be in operation by 1989. Several additional nuclear units are in the planning stage. A more detailed discussion of Korea's nuclear power program can be found in section IV of this report.
6
~ TABLE 2 KOREA'S 1984 FIVE-YEAR ENERGY PLAN WITil PROJECTIONS TO 2001 Energy Consumption Plan - Physical Volumes 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 ,1991 2001 Fuel Unit 011 000' barrels 496 528 541 551 578 687 924 ;
)
per day Anthracite 000' tons 20065 21305 21908 22110 22156 19846 17022 Bituminous 000' tons 8503 9383 12100 15033 15152 23995 55355 2005 2551 2524 2375 2533 3484 4420 flydro GWII GWII 3777 8929 10774 13991 21822 48212 106180 Nuclear 000' tons 8633 8443 8257 8075 7896 2211 2211 Wood LNG 000' tons - - - - 403 2000 5000 l Total 000 toe 45974 49540 52494 55663 59410 79608 150358 Electric 37880 42500 46838 51595 56820 N/A N/A Power GWH 000' toe 38886 41534 43553 45642 48201 N/A N/A Final Fnergy Energy /GNP Toe /Million 1.195 1.087 1.071 1.166 1.049 N/A N/A Ratio toe = tons of oil equivalent
)
k l l IV. THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA'S N0 CLEAR POWER PROGRAM ; 4 I A. Program Origins j l Nuclear activities in the ROK were initiated in 1957 when Korea became i a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); in 1959, the ; government established the Office of Atomic Energy. I l The uncertainty concerning foreign oil supply and the lack of domestic 1 energy resuurces made it essential for Korea to diversity its sources of energy. Government planners elected to develop nuclear power. In the ROK, as in many developing countries without oil, nuclear power is considered the j tuost reliable energy source capable of meeting the rising energy demand that j parallels economic development. Korea has, consequently, developed nuclear power as a major alternative energy source and established a nuclear energy development plan. Under the government's power development program, nuclear " power is to become a major energy source by 1991. To carry out such an ambitious program successfully, Korea has stressed the development of domestic nuclear power plant design, component and equipment manufacturing, and nuclear fuel cycle technologies. Nuclear projects are expected to increase rapidly in Korea and its technical capability build-up is the most important prerequisite of such a program. It has been necessary to import advanced technology under diverse international cooperation programs. Like Japan twenty years earlier, Korea's goal has been to maximize the domestic engineering contributions to her nuclear facilities. Japan, however, has built up a total capability to design, construct, and commission complete nuclear power generators and has made substantial investments in research and development. The ROK's approach has been to pursue manufacturing licenses with established companies in North America and Europe. Still, with each new nuclear order, Korea has sought to secure a greater share of the work for domestic industries, resulting in a variety of manufacturing license agreements between Korean groups and the main foreign suppliers. 8
I *
- O D B. Structure Several particularly important groups operate under the umbrella of the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST). The first of these, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), is the highest nuclear authority in the ROK.
The AEC is made up of nine members: a chairman, vice chairman, two standing commissioners and five non-stknding commissioners. The Minister and the Vice Minister of MOST are Chairman and Vice Chairman, respectively. The Commission acts as the deliberating and decision-making body for virtually all nuclear activities in Korea. Also within MOST is the Atomic Energy Bureau (AEB), which is responsible for the detailed planning of nuclear energy facilities and relations with overseas nuclear organizations. The AEB has three divisions: the Atomic Energy Planning Division, the Atomic Energy R&D Divir, ion, and the Atomic Energy International Cooperation Division. MOST's Nuclear Regulatory Bureau (NRB) is responsible for safety and the implementation of safeguards. Activities within the NRB include the following: o authorization for acquisition, production, import and export, ownership, purchase and sale, control and management of radioisotopes and nuclear material; o inspection and review of safety procedures for nuclear material and nuclear fuel cycle; o inspection, audit, and preparation of accounting reports concerning nuclear materials and facilities in accordance with bilateral and international safeguards agreements; 9
-- - - - ~ - - . . - - . - . . _ - - . . - - -- O e o establishment of aarety regulations applying to nuclear materials and nuclear facilitiest and o nuclear damage compensation measures. This group is represented at each nuclear site within the ROK. The principal nuclear research and development organization within MOST is the Korea Advanced Energy Research Institute (KAERI). The history is this group dates back to the late 1950s. A reorganization of the Office of Atomic Energy resulted in the formation of the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, an independent corporate body solely responsible for nuclear research and development projects; the administrative work of the Office was transferred to the Atomic Energy Bureau which was newly established within MOST. At the end of 1980, however, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute and the Korea Nuclear Fuel Development Institute were merged into KAERI. This group maintains laboratories in Seoul and Daeduk. KAERI's missions center on the development of nuclear reactor technology, nuclear fuel technology, nuclear-grade components technology together with test and evaluation technology, advanced reactor technology, and nuclear safety research. Emphasis is also being placed upon the development of radiatian applications technology, nuclear-related basic research, ar l the development of nuclear manpower. The Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), a government-owned and controlled company, is the sole electric power utility in Korea and is - responsible for generation, transmission and distribution of electricity. In 1981, the Korea Electric Company (KECO) purchased all the outstanding private stock and reorganized itself under the name of the Korea Electric Power Corporation. KEPCO operates 35 fossil fuel-fired plants,13 hydro-plants and 5 nuclear plants with a total installed capacity of over 13,000 MWe, and also owns transmission centers, construction camps and various facilities related to the electricity business. 10 w w
D D The engineering subsidiary to KEPCO is the Korea Power Engineering Co., Inc. (KOPEC). KOPEC, formerly Korea Nuclear Engineering Services, Inc. (KNE), Vas established in 1975 in line with governmental policy to foster self-reliance in nuclaar power technology. In 1980, KOPEC become KEPCO's engineering cubsidiary and was assigned responsibility for power engineering in implementing the nation's long-term power development program. KOPEC has made continuous efforts to achieve technological self-reliance in the power engineering field through every available means including manpower training, project participation, system development, facility improvement and technical collaboration with foreign companies. As a result of these efforts, KOPEC has been able to perform over 100 major engineering tasks on Korea's nuclear power plant projects, and was named as the prime architect engineers on Korea Nuclear Units No.11 & 12 in 1982. KOPEC engineers provide a full range of architect engineering services for i.s utility and other clients on nuclear, fossil and hydropower plants as well as other related structures and facilities. C. Program Status As noted earlier, Korea's nuclear power program is an ambitious one. Government planners have set a goal of nine nuclear power plants in operation by 1981, and thirteen by 1991; other facilities are in the planning stage. Table 3 provides a summary of Korea's operating and planned nuclear power projects. The first nuclear unit of 587 MWe, known as Kori Unit No.1, was put into commercial operation in April 1978, and has been operated satisfactorily since then. Its plant capacity factors were 46 percent in the first year, 61 3 percent in the second year; 67.8 percent in 1980, 56.3 percent in 1981, and 73.5 percent in 1982, respectively. The second nuclear unit of 650 MWe, designated as Kori Unit No. 2, is located just next to the first one, and began operation in June 1983 Both of these facilities include pressurized water reactors (PWR) supplied by Westinghouse, 11
_ _ _._ - _ _ . _ . .m.__-m._.m____.___ . - - ~ _ . . . . . . - _ . . O O ' 3 TAtt.t ) seCLaan PoWes Paoisets zu Tur asPosLIC or t0stA f 1 l 4 i i i i I tarea l ! I d, I i l l Supe 11ers l Nuclear l l Copacity, I teactor l Tear of i NSSS, i i 1 I i Uett No. I tacation i MWe I type i Opera;1on I Fuel i i l Ft/G I A/t I construttoe I l . I l I i i i i
) p, p i 1' I tori. I 587 i PWR 4/78 y l 6 1 1 I ctC l CA! I Hy unda l , !
I. l Tangeon. con. 1 I l l i C a, lh W 'I I ore ms Sang i i l i i l (UK) i I Dong.Ah I I mas Do i i 1 i 1 1 1 I I h"U # .I i I I I I I I I I l I i l 1 i i ! i y' p< O r/ I* I i l . t' l Saoe as the 1 650 1 PWR I 6/83 1 y I ctC i cat i a i 1 1 # 1 above i I I i I (UK) i I7 I b,W VI I l i I 1 I I i I I l i l ) i l I i l l l 38 l Woleung.Cun, I 678 i PilWR I 4/83 i AECL l B8H/WT! l CAVATOM l a l ll4g l 1 Cyeong Sang i l Bd Do l l l i l l l i l Persons l 1 l i l 1 1 l 1 1 I i 1
~~ 1 1 1 l i l i i e i i i
.V't? j ~'s l l 6,68 I tori l 950 i PWR I B5.86 l g I ctC l Dechtel l Hyundat 1
I 1 I I I I i (Ut >
>/ ]0 74 l _3 ep;cl*+, , I l l l i I 1
I 1 i 1 1 1 i i l i l i i i n 4 Y g{ .' 3 3 1 7.8 1 reongswang. I 950 1 PWR I 86.87 i y I y I sechtel I = i 1 I cun. Jeolla i l I i i i i . ) 8) f b, i K'IJi) I am h l I I I I i
/ I Idl 1 1 1 I I I I I I
I I i i i i i i i 1 I I Ig,9,10 l Uljin.Cun, l 950 1 PWR l 88,89 i FRAM/ l AA I tbasco I Dong.Ah, 1 IM... 1 Oyeong Sang i l l l COGEMA l 1 (Consultant) l KNIC i l i sur Do I i l l I i
- t I*11 I I I I I I
I i 1 L El l l 1 I i i i i 1 1
. )# [ } h' Oi 11,12 l Toongsvang. I 900 1- t I *Vrt*3 I t I t 1 1 1 I I g y y . I Cun, Jeolla l Class i i ggn j e w R l gW-
' ! I l 1 l
- / < r,- i m gl - o-i . / g <, l c ', l l l l
. lWW sW l
~
l I i i i i I L 13,14 ,1 ? I t I t I t I t t ? I ? I I i 15,16 I I i l 1 1 l 1 1 I I I I I I I I I I
- a Plants in Operation PWR e Pressurised Water Reactor 4
PifWR e Pressurized Hes.vy Water Reactor W e Westinghouse AA e Alsthan.Atlantique I f a 4 12
O O A third nuoloar plant, built us Wolsung, initiated commercial operations in April 1983. The reactor, supplied by AECL, is a CANDU pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWh). This reactor type was selected due to its greater diversity of supply sources. The use of natural uranitse as l fuel and on-power refueling are unique advantages to this reactor type. In the past year, nuclear unit nos. 5 and 6 have gone into operation. These units, also built at the *Iori site, are the first non-turnkey projects in Korea, applying a component approach with an upscaled unit capacity of 950 l MWe, as opposed to the preceding projects which were constructed by turnkey contracts. These pressurised water reactors were supplied by Westinghouse. The owner of .h> plants takes full responsibility for overall project t:anagement and plant performance. The balance-of-plant equipment and components are directly purchased by KEPC0 tosed on the specifications furnished by its techiteot-engineers. D. Nuclear Fuel Supply The ROK has some low-grade uranius resources in its Okchun system black shale. About 43.6 million metric tons of uranium ore reserves with an average grade of 0.04 percent have been found through an intensive survey begun in 1970 of the Okehun system area which extends from Chungja to Keumsan. The distribution of uranium resources is shown in Figure 1. Even though . domestic uranium ore is not economically worth developing now, the technology for uranium recovery has been developed by the Korea Institute of Energy and ' Resources (KIEN) for future use. Aside nom uranium, there are about 700,000 metric tons of monazite deposits contattiing thorium distributed along the rivers of South Korea, but these have not been developed to date as uses for this material are very limited. Since the ROK's power development program gives priority to nuclear power, timely nuclear fuel procurement at suitable prices is of paramount importance. Korer.'s small quantity of low-grade uranium resources makes it 13 At
. ~
q e - l
~
a
.Y.
g. hg
. ;. . '] . ' .
u- n
- o y
>. * ,P s #, . -s
~
n -. 1
/
* . 4i
,> . ..~.
A , F. - F 0 . F O
.- 2 [" .
C - I. T B t . 1
*E e9. :
F E 1
#hg:
7 ' n.v i r T u@' I S T E I , i S l 0 O
- I E F D 1
P n l g u l i n h d e M t o y c n r i i T p i J i o F a p 0 G x 1
- a e O e r e I
p. T U a b B n o u I R t T h a S I c e r D k O A e.- r E lfl!l l.!!iI; I?!Ii , Ilp ! ,It ll i 1l
e. necessary to rely on imports for almost all of its uranium requirements. Bf 1990, the ant.aal requirement will be over 2,000 metrio tons (MT) of U 30s and in 2000 it will be fron 5,000 to 9,000 MT U 308 Uranium demand has been ! filled via long-tors contracts with reliable suppliers combined with spot ; purchasing. Diversification of supply sources as well as the maintaining of
)
an adequate inventory also is being considered to further ensure a stable supply. Joint exploration programs in Paraguay and Gabon were implemented in ; early 1978 and 1980. The Anschutz Corp., a U.S. company Taiwan Power Corp. , l and KEPC0 have ests.blished the venture in Paraguay) C00EMA, a French company, the Cabon Government, and KEPCO are cooperating in the joint venture in Gabon. For the senrichment of "ranium, ten enrichment service contracts have , been signedt eight with the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and two , with COGEMA. E. Manpower A key elenent in the implementation of the ROK's nuclear program is manpower. In addition to educational institutions with nuclear engineering departments, there are two other organizations where nuclear technology coursework is offered the Nuclear Training Center within KAERI and the Nuclear TraininE Center within KEPCO. The first offers courses such as QA/QC, Welding, Seismic Analysis, Mechanical Design, Project Management, Concrete Engineering, Safety Analysis, water Chemistry, Site Evaluation, and ~ other specialized courses. On the other hand, the latter is organized for the training of KEPCO employees in the fields of Plant Operations and Maintenance, Radiation Protection, Instrumentation & Control, Water
- Chemistry, QA/QC, In-core Management, etc. KEPCO uses a 3-loop PWR simulator and other training devices during their courses. Two more simulators are planned to be addedt one-is to simulate nuclear units nos. 7 & 8 and the other is to simulate nuclear units nos. 9 & 10. The simulator facilities are open to outsider's use.
15
) > ' '
F. Nuclear Waste Management Radioactive wastes and effluents are created during the operation of nearly all nuclear fuel cynle activities. Fortunately, nuclear facilities can estinate the quantity and nature of its wastes well in advance of their actual production. Plans then can be made to ensure that acceptable waste treatment and disposal methods are applied. Of particular concern is the management of spent fuel. Spent fuel elements are unchanged in appearance, but are highly radioactive and continue
- to generate heat from radioactive decay after their removal fror. the reactor.
The fuel must therefore be shielded and cooled, and its further treatment has to be carefully planned. There are at present only two options available: reprocessing, or interim storage ovwr a period of years pending a final decision on reprocessing or diaposal. The first step in both cases is a period of temporary storage, for one or more years, at the reactor. Most reactors are designed with water pool s.orage capacity for one full core plus space for an average of two years' operating discharges, to give time for the fuel to cool and some of its activity to decay before it is removed. Spent fuel can be stored in water pools for longer periods, and by using compact storage racks and neutron absorbers the storage capacity at the reactor site can be increased to hold five to ten years of operational discharges. Central storage of spent fuel off-site is also an option. Table 4 summarizes the current on-site spent fuel storage capacities for eight nuclear power plants that are either in operation or under construction in the ROK. As shown by these data, projections indicate that spent fuel storage problems will occur from about 1992 when on-site storage capacity at Kori unit no.1 will be exceeded. If spent fuel assemblies discharged from Kori unit no. 1 after 1992 were to be taken to and stored at Kori unit no. 2, the spent fuel problems can be relieved until 1997. These projections clearly indicate that the ROK planners must decide how to manage their spent fuel after 1997. As the spent fuel amounts annually discharged 16
4 A from the nuclear power plants will exceid 300 tons per year from early 1990 and accumulated amount by that time will be about 2,000 tons, the need to arrive at a decision regarding the ROK's approach to spent fuel management grows more urgent. i 17
- w wu s.: . s .
i I i TABLE 4 On-Site Spent Fuel Storage Capacities of Nuclear Power Plants ' Operating or Under Construction in the Republic of Koream / mitr rvei a.. eil..i 1990 1961 1982 1983 1964 1985 1996 1987 1999 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1996 1999 2000 393 353 313 273 233 193 153 113 73 33 -7 -40 -40 -40 -40 -40 -40 -40 -40 Unit 1 473 433 807 787 727 687 647 607 567 527 487 447 407 367 327 297 247 207 167 Unit 2 523 479 435 391 347 303 259 215 171 127 83 39 -5 -44 -44 -44 Unit 5 523 479 435 391 347 303 259 215 171 127 83 39 -5 -44 -44 Unit 6 479 435 391 347 303 259 215 17 1 127 83 39 -5 -44 -44 Unit 7 479 435 391 347 303 259 '215 171 127 83 39 -5 -44 Unit 8 471 419 367 315 263 211 159 107 55 3 -49 Unit 9 471 419 367 315 263 211 159 107 55 3 Unit 10 714 446 265 170 Ava11able Cap. 473 433 393 353 1643 1563 1439 2273 2540 2254 2499 2662 2309 1989 1569 1349 1029
-7 -40 -40 -40 -40 -45 177 -265 N Required Cap. (Ann.)
Reautred Cap. (Cum.) -7 -47 127 -167 -212 -306 -463 -740 124 212 256 256 308 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 Ann. Discharges 40 4~ 40 80 80 Cum. Discharges 43 83 123 163 243 323 447 659 915 1171 1479 1839 2199 2559 2919 3279 363s 3999 4359 4719 5079 m Only those facilities using pressurized water reactors are included in these projections. e o
h h V. LBOISLATION AND RIl0ULATIONS 00VERNING WDCLEAR POWER FACILITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA Planners associated with the ROK's energy supply system have assiduously pursued the development of a nuclear power program with extensive safety features. Critical aspects of a secure nuclear power facility are the legislative and regulatory programs governing plant operations. In addition, the ROK has implemented a comprehensive licensing program designed to ensure the orderly process of planning, construction, and operation. A. Laws Governina Wuclear Power Plants The Atonio Energy Act was promulgated in March 1958, as the basic law for utilization and safety regulation of atomic energy in the ROK. After several amendments due to the development of national-nuclear activities, the Act was significantly revised in April 1982, to keep up with the fast growing ' nuclear industry in Korea. Thir revised Act also provided the legal basis for the establishment and activities of the Nuclear Safety Center (NSC) within the framework of KAERI. Subject to this Act, the NSC was entrusted with the duty of safety regulations for the nuclear facilities and materials on behalf of most of the government authority. The Enforcement Dearea of the Atomic Energy Act is a Presidential Decree which provides the particulars necessary for the enforcement of the Atomic Energy Act. This Decree was enacted and promulgated as a single decree in September 1982, by combining previous 11 separate decrees. _ The Enforcement Regulation of the Atonio Energy Act is a Prime Ministerial Ordinance which provides the particulars called for by the Atomic Energy Act and the Enforcement Decree. This Regulation provides detailed specifications for the content of various applications and documents and the form for the accompanying material that is required. This Regulation was promulgated in April 1983. The Notice of the Minister of Science and Technology provides the particulars entrusted by the Atomic Energy Act, the Enforcement Decree and 19
6 the Enforossent Regulation. This Notice covers the detailed technical standards necessary for the construction and operation of nuclear facilities and for the use of nuclear satorials. B. Development and Application of Codes and Standards Although the ROK has its own codes and standards which were prescribed in the Atonio F,nergy Laws, some of them are not sufficiently detailed; therefore, the Standards Department of the NSC has developed various technical standards in collaboration with related government agencies, nuclear industries and experts from acadesio circles since 1983 Seventeen technical standards were developed by the NSC Center in 1983 and 1984 As for the technical standards on the location, structure, and equipment of the reactor facilities, Korea applies foreign codes and standards, generally those of the supplying nation. Especially, in applying technical standards on the structure and equipment of the reactor facilities, the standards of the reactor-supplying country can be applicable with the approval of MOST to the reactor facilities supplied if it is verified that the application of those standards will not cause any deficiency of reactor safety and performance. The ROK has adopted much of their regulatory program from the U.S. NRC safety standards are the foundation of Korea's regulations and standards. A consequenos of this has been MOST's use of engineering standards developed by U.S. organizations such as the American Society of Mechanical Engineers and the American Nuclear Society. It is critical to recognize that any nuclear facility built by a U.S. firm will satisfy all codes and standards applicable to U.S. facilities. To date, Korea has six nuclear units that are either in operation or under construction which satisfy U.S. codes and standards. This information is summarized in Table 5. C. Domestic Licensina The ROK has a licensing procedure that is based on procedures used by 20
J O TABLE 5 l l Codes and Standards Applicable to U.S. Built Nuolear Pao 111 ties in the Republic of Eorea Ites Code or Standard Construction Permit 10 CFR 50 l Design 10 CFR 50 App. A Manufacturing 10 CFR 55 Mechanical ASME Sec.III Electrical IEEE 279 Material ASME Sec.II/ASN Installation ASME Sec.III QA 10 CFR 50 App. B ANSI N45 2 Series ANSI /ASME NQA-1 NDT ASME Sec.III ASME Sec.V - ASNT Welding ASME Sec.III ASME Sec.IX AWS PSI /ISI ASME Sec.XI
-Operation License 10 CFR 50 Fire Protection NEPA 21
a , 3 O the NRC, with adaptations to local governmental organization. Features of the process are that power plants request siting and construction permits before applying for an operating license, quality assurance is required for plant construction and operations, and an emergency plan must be prepared. l It has the additional feature that specific construction releases are granted for construction of specific plant-related buildings. Figure 2 is a schematic of the licensing procedure governing the construction and operation of a nuclear power facility in the ROK. As can be seen in this illustration, the principal roles are played by MOST, KEPCO, and KAERI. The licensing process is initiated by KEPCO through submission of site-surveys and environmental studies to MOST. The two groups agree on the tentative acceptability of the site, contingent on further analysis documented in a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR). A similar report is required by the NRC for consideration of nuclear facilities seeking licensing in the U.S. KAERI takes an especially active role in reviewing KEPCO's submittal, providing a different perspective to MOST's decision-making process. MOST considers KAERI's review and recommends action on a limited work permit (LWP) or a construction permit (CP). Every applicant for a construction permit is required to include a description of the qLality assurance program to be applied to the design, fabrication, construction and testing of the facility's systems in the PSAR. If the reviewers have questions on the PSAR which require attention, the NRB will issue an LWP. Typically, this permit. is issued 9 months after PSAR submittal. The LWP allows KEPC0 to do everything on the site in preparation for pouring the first nuclear grade concrete while preparing responses to MOST's questions. The AEC decides on the CP after satisfactory resolution of the questions. Typically, the CP will be issued 11 months after the PSAR is submitted. The CP only authorizes the site and project. During construction, MOST's NRB releases building construction in phases by requiring design reports on each of the Facilities building. These building reports are prepared by the A/E Firm, then submitted-by KEPCO to the NRB, who provides a construction release for that building after a comprehensive review. 22
. es FIGURE 2 LICENSING PROCEDURES GOVERNING NUCLEAR POWER FACILITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
.i.i.se, .e a i .
.h. 1 8th. L t 8 4 4. h. ..t i i M i.. as.ly t.* pr.In.in.et am et )
1 lating autheels.tl.a w e.
.eer... 1 m ii.e ha
, *4 gin., ,, t_ 1
.u it..n.u. ....
.p .,.
- u. . .n. .... - .;.H.g. ,
i : . 1 1 .s e t e .. I neveni I ( u.s t.. use. T ( F.wie.t tena j b.4eena.at.4
***" *8 - -el a..se. I a .et w'* "osas g m ,,,, -
..~s f ao.it f.e Con.trustl.a P.c.it ; m.. s ., a...e t 1 i we..a ., .ec ] 1 mi..... ""
1 i ,,,,,, , am i, e., o..i.a : coa.oveu.a anei.e : .... i ' I i - . . . ~ . : c' ;.... .i cen teveu.a [g,',$ ".e, -
-il a-ia b
... n 1 i
-' a i ..... - . : ( :
. . .. .. . i l aw.s t i.a aw.s t i.a r si
**" 8 '
, t., er.-a..reu .i i..t. s sa.en u.a : u s .n.a. . i
..a
..EYO.
3"'" I 8 '"" """'
) amou.a m
t u,,, n . ,.,n,s
,
- s.. I
, ev ,.
I a .ia : a.ets f ee e e. tine us.n.. ; a.. .. n .,. I 1 .... * ' " [ ue..a e, .a c l l- ' c . u.. . .t.et i.a - a... u . i u. . . .. . >
.e. i , , ~.. - _ 4 ..,..
. . n ., r,
. . . . 1 i i .. : : ~ . ... ..,. ; i
....., i
- - . - I n .. .,,,,,,,, ,
u.....
.. a .. n.a
...et .,
i 5,
-.'a.- .u . =>>;,,;"- : ..... i 1
i o. . .. .. . i [ u . .. t .a. . : I
)
( c ,u.i op...n
) ,~;;,',
.p. , . p.. .. ..i 1 ;..
s : - . . . - . i In 8t8.A . t 6. a .st a.* are. .s 23
. l
*g r-( ,)T 4
I The Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) is submitted to obtain the Operating Permit. It too is reviewed by KAERI and HOST before a final decision on the permit is reached. A PSAR must include a discussion of preliminary plans for coping with amergencies. Revised and detailed plans to be implemented in the event of an amergency must be included in the applicant's FSAR. The ROK's licensing regulations require that operators be licensed and have college degrees. Licensing requirements are the same as U.S. requirements, ensuring that the training given by the vendor is of the detail and extent that prepares the operator to pass the NRC licensing examination. In the past, U.S. vendors of nuclear equipment have provided comprehensive operator training programs to local personnel. In addition to facility licensing, the ROK has established a licensing procedure for the manufacturing of nuclear facility components. Figure 3 illustrates this procedure. As can be seen, HOST and KAERI play key roles in this process. D. Inspection Procedures Inspection procedures are a funcamental facet of the ROK's nuclear regulatory program. The first major element is pre-operational inspection, which is based on the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act and its ancillary laws. The NSO performs the pre-operational inspections at the-authorized agency entrusted by MOST. As a prerequisite to the implementation of the pre-operational inspection, the licensee must submit the Notification Form of Design and Construction Methods, and the Application Form for Pre-operational Inspection to MOST. The NSC established the pre-operational inspection program which is submitted to MOST for approval. Upon governmental approval, the licensce is notified of the information required for the proper preparation such as inspection items, inspection organization, etc. Selected base inspection based on graded approach has beer applied; inspection depth varies depending on the importance to safety. For example, for items vitally important to 24
3 O FIGURE 3 Licensing Procedures Governing the Manufacture of
; Nuclear Components To Be Used in the Republic of Korea ,
Ministry of Science Manufacture KAER! and Technology 1
- Report on Technical Capaht11ty s
' g,yg,,
- - GA Progres _ _ _ _ _ Act 3e s, Maytow Apply for Manufacturing Permit , g,yg,, g,,,pg ( of Nuclear Componente l Act 37 Mee. tid 4 s Deelen Report s p,yg,, 3 Permit ' (Strees Analystal '
nee, as Manufacture GA Austt ,,
Apply for the Inspection
) gg,,,g,ng, on Component Manufacture Decree 117
- Supply nopection v
r Act IAtomic Energy Act Decree
- Implementation Decree of Atomic Energy Act Reg. Detelled Reguistione f or Implementation Decree 25
. , 1 3
1 0 l j safety, inspection covers 3 activities; test procedure review, test witness 4 and test result evaluation; for less bsportant itees, only one or two activities apply. i a j The objectives of the pre-operational inspection are to verify that the , nuclear facility can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety i l of the publio. More definitive objectives of tne pre-operational inspection include the following: 3 1 o To verify that the construction of the structures, systems, and , 4 components have been accomplished in accordance with design; o To verify that the structures, systems, and components can perform their functions satisfactorily in accordance with design; and o To verify that the plant can operate satisfactorily during the normal operating conditions and is capable of responding as designed to anticipated transients and postulated accidents. NSC performs these activities pursuant to the pre-operational inspection program. The program is divided into 3 major phases. The first phase is construction inspection, which begins at the ver/ early stages of construction - generally the excavation of the reactor building - and terminates with the hydrostatic testing for each system. The-selected inspection items examined during this phase are standard and include a total of 141 items; these are classified into 9 major facilities (1) Reactor vessel; (2) Reactor coolant system; (3) Instrumentation and control system; (4) Fuel handling and storage facility; (5) Radioactive waste disposal system; (6) Radiation protection facility; (7) Reactor containment; (8) Engineered safety features facility; and (9) Other facilities related to reactor safety. 26 __ _ _ _ . _ - ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ , -
. O k
l The report ot' the inspection results is submitted to MOST after the inspection activities are completed. The second phase is the pre-operational testing inspection. This inspection phase commences wit: 6.he system turn-over from construction and terminates just prior to the initial fuel loading. The selected 70 inspection items are classified into 15 major systems: (1) Reactor coolant system; (2) Residual heat removal system; (3) Chemical and volume control system; (4) Safety injection systes; (5) Containment spray system; ! (6) Process auxiliary system; 4 (7 ) Deergency diesel generator system; (8) Containment system; (9) Fuel handling and transfer system; (10) Radiation protection system; (11) Radioactive waste management system; (12) Fire protection system; (13) Secondary system; (14) Electrical power system; and (15) Instrumentation and control system. Again, results are submitted to MOST.
~
The final phase of pre-operational inspection is the initial start-up testing inspection. This inspection phase commences with the start of initial fuel loading and terminates with the completion of power ascension testing and the performance of warranty tests. The selected 30 inspection items are classified into 5 major testing phases (1) Initial fuel loading; (2) Precritical testing; (3) Initial criticality; (4) Low power physics testing; and (5) Power-ascension testing.
._ _ _- -_ _ .._ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ . _ ~ _ _ . . _ . _ _ -
g g o . i a A final inspection report is due to be submitted to MOST within 6 sonths J after plant consercial operation with the interia reports submitted as each i major testing phase is completed. l l The second major element of the ROK's organized inspection program is the annual outage inspection. Annual outage inspection is one of the l regulatory inspections perfonsed by the NSC on behalf of MOST during the j annual outage. It is conducted as a routine and announced inspection. This inspection verifies that asterials, components, systems and ) structures, as well as operational activities, processes, procedures and l personnel competence and performance are in accordance with regulatory requirements and good engineering practices. Special emphasis is placed on l the verification of safety performance of plant facilities. Extensive efforts are being placed on systems which decrease their performance due to wear or deterioration. In addition, to protect workers from undue radiation exposure, inspections of radiation protection / prevention are undertaken. Annual outage inspection is carried out by the Inspection Department of the NSC. In the NSC, there are 3 Inspection Departments. Inspection Department.I performs management control and coordination of all inspection activities. Other Departments provide necessary qualified personnel with assorted technical backgrounds. When the NSC is not self-sufficient in technical areas relevant to inspection, then it requests assistance from persons with specialized qualifications who work with research organizations' or technical societies. Normally, about 20 inspectors participate in an annual outage inspection. Inspectors are technically competent in the area which they inspect, have a thorough understanding of relevant regulations and guidance, and exhibit nature judgement. The qualification of NSC inspectors ist (1) university degree (B.S.) in a related field; (2) On-the-job training at plant site for 6 months; and (3) at least 2 years of relevant work experience. The procedure for performing an outage inspection includes mandatory characteristics. The major steps are as follows: 28
> s (1) Receipt of inspection itses provided by the utilityl (2) Subsission of inspection plan to MOST (3) Notification of inspection plan to KEPCO (4) Pre-meeting at inspection sitet (5) Inspection 1 l (6) Post-meeting to judge the adequacy of restart-up of the planti and (7) Reporting.
Annual outag inspections focus on 4 broad areas of licensee activities:
- 1. Surveillance test not to be performed during the normal operation
- 2. Maintenance activities of the safety _ related components or systems during outagel 3 In-service inspectioni and
- 4. Radiation protection / prevention.
The plant facilities inspected include the power reactor and its associated systems. These systems include the reactor, reactor coolant system, instrumentation and control system, reactor containment systes, fuel handling facilities, waste disposal facilities, radiation control facilities, reeotor safety system, energency power supply system and any equipment whose malfunction could result in safety problems. Particular attention is paid to equipment and systems that had problems or deficiencies during the plant's last operational period. Inspection techniques are generally classified under the following headings: (1) Examination of procedure, record and documentationi (2) Surveillance: (3) Interviews and consultations with plant personnels and (4) Test and measurements. 29
,g o .
Annual outage inspections emphasize the verification of safety performance of plan hardware through direct observation. These observations are tied to spJoirically designated components and systems or specifically designated scheduled activities and tests. I Normally, the inspection program includes provisions for direct j regulatory surveillance of structures, systems, components, tests and , activities at the planning stage. Handatory surveillance designates the predetermined hold or witness point in the quality plan of the utility.
' Physical tests and measurements are undertaken to inspect equipment and systems that- had problems as part of the special inspection.
The NSC has been developing guidance for inspectors to provide systematic and standardized approaches to inspections. The main purpose is to provide check points in the hardware performance of inspected facilities. ' Inspector guidance is being prepared for each nuclear power plant. After an inspection is completed, the inspector prepares the inspection report which contains information on areas inspected and facts of regulatory significance. It serves as a basis for enforcement action by W)ST. When an inspector finds that the licensee is in non-compliance with any regulatory requirement, this will be noted as violation with clear reference to the particular regulation. The inspector's comments on appropriate remedial action are also included in the record. Normally the comments are written after discussion with the ; supervisor or experts relating to the area. E. Emeraency Response Within the PSAR, the applicant is required to include a discussion of l preliminary plans for coping with emergencies. Revised and detailed plans to be implemented in the event of an emergency must be included > . the l applicant's FSAR. An emergency plan is required to satisfy requirements that l are essentially the same as those in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, l l 30
1 k k l and defined by the WRC. Figure 16 illustrates the emergency response I structure to be implemented in the svent of any nuclear facility mishap occurring in the ROK. F. Interactions with Foreian Ormanisations The ROK has placed heavy emphasis on international cooperation in the I field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and recognition of its importance { is demonstrated by the establishment of the Atonio Energy International i Cooperation Division within Atomic Energy Bureau. Since Korea joined the IAEA in 1957, about 2,000 Korean scientists and engineers have completed overseas training through the Agency's technical assistance program. These scientists and engineers have played an important role in Korea's nuclear power development plan. Interaction with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has included regular technical assistance to the ROK's nuclear power program. Korea has assured IAEA personnel that all safeguards are being observed. Issues that demonstrate the cooperative nature of the IAEA and the ROK's nuclear program include the following measurement system for determining of nuclear material quantities; physical inventory procedures; procedures for evaluating accumulations of unmeasured inventory and unmeasured loss; system of record; and reports showing the inventory of nuclear material and changes in that inventory; procedures for the submission of reports to IAEA; provisions to assure correct accounting procedures; provision of information on facilities and nucle.gr material; and domestic and IAEA inspection of nuclear material. There also exists a Regional Cooperative Agreement between the ROK and the
, 31
FIGURE 4 Nuclear Accident Emergency Response System in the Republic of Korea J 6' 488Sdeset-- Nuclear Energency
= ~j Managewent Committee (Minister of MOST)
T I Central Technical Advisory Team (TAT) Energency Operations (Director General Center (HQ) of KAERI/NSC) (President /KEPCO)
%l Site Emergency Emergency Operation Management Cents" (-------- On-Site TAT ------) Facilitles (Site Director /KEPCO) v Task Group
^^
s.. v v Accident Radiological Medical Analysis Protection Support Berup Group Group Order Advise E Recommend 32
IAEA for research, development, and training in nuclear science and technology; this agreement has been in effect since 1974. Finally, in 1975, the ROK signed an agreement with the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. U.S. involvement with the ROK's nuclear power program also has been signific.at. The Agreement for Cooperation between the ROK and the U.S. A. concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy has been in effect since 1956. A U. S. government grant for the acquisition of certain nuclear research and training equipment and materials has been in effect since 1973 HOST has signed a bilateral agreement with the NRC for the exchange of reactor operating experience and for the exchange of regulatory information. Under this agreement signed in 1976, the U.S. has been sending many kinds of reports, such as Licensee event reports, NUREGS, etc. and has been receiving Korean reports on operating history. This agreement was expanded upon in 1981. The 1981 Agreement is very similar to the 1976 version, although several of the provisions (including those covering cooperation during nuclear emergencies) have evolved into greater specificity, reflecting lessons learned from five years of experience with the program. The exchange of information takes the form of technical and operating experience reports, news releases, correspondence, visits and other such means as the parties agree. Nonproprietary information exchanges are allowed unrestricted dissemination; proprietary information, except as agreed, is protected from disclosure and is exchanged under existing national policies, laws, relations, and agreements. No proliferation-sensitive information will be exchanged. - The agreement with the NRC and arrangements with the IAEA have a direct relationship to the ongoing Oyeama Site project. iAEA was also of assistance through the above-mentioned Regional Cooperative Agreement for research, development and training in nuclear science and technology. It was through this agreement that NRB personnel have trained with the NRC for periods from two months to one year. These individuals have been assigned to work als gside the NBC staff to get a practical appreciation of reactor regulation. Two men spent a year in NRC regional offices for on-the-job-training in 33
-n.~- ,
I $ reactor construction inspection. Another worked in a regional office to learn inspection practices. Two others were at the NRC for two-month periods in physical security and material accounting offices. Cooperative programs between the ROK and the U.S. continue to bear fruit. In addition to these cooperativo efforts with the IAEA and the U.S. , the ROK has signed bilateral agreements with France, Japan, Canada, Australia, Spain and Belgiu:n. 11.
i VI. ENVIROInfENTAL ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSED PROJECT Huch of the information presented in this section has been discussed in i an earlier CER addressing issues related to KEPCO's nuclear units nos. 7 and 8, which are under construction at the site proposed for units nos. 11 and 12. Environmental data were collected and assessed by the assorted organizations involved in the project. For example, the firm of D'Appolonia Consulting Engineers, Inc., was contracted to perform geologic, geophysical, and geotech-nical studies. Additional work was conducted by local groups. A. Site Location The Gyeama site for proposed KEPCO nuclear units nos.11 and 12 is on-the ROK's southwestern coast. The site is in Hongnong Hyun, Yeonggwang Gun, Jeonlanando Province. The area is approximately 54 kilometers (km) northwest of Kwangju City and is bounded by the Yellow Sea to the west, by Jeonlabukdo Province to the north and northeast, and mountainous areas to the east and south. The site coordinates are 35'25N latitude and 129'25E longitude. B. Geologic Features Oyeama is located within Korea's Hanland physiographic division, which is subdivided into three regions: Gyeonggi, Ogcheon Taebaeksan and Oyeong-sang. The site lies within the Ogcheon Tacbaeksan subdivision and the physio-graphy _is based on Precambrian metasediments and granitic rocks.
- 1. Physiography of the Plant Site. The site area consists of'moun-tain masses dispersed within tidal lowlands. South of the site is a mountainous area (309 meters (m) maximum elevation) separated by the Beop Seong Po Estuary, which originates from a central moun-tainous area. The central mountainous area (264 m maximum eleva-tion) is separated by an unnamed estuary that originates within a 35
O s northern low-hill, tidal flat area (60-75 m maximum elevatten). The area east of the site consists of subdued hills (140 m maxtmum elevation) interspersed with lowlands.
- 2. Subterranean Characteristics. The subsurface within an 8 km radius of the site consists of volcanic and metamorphic / igneous rocks of Cretaceous and Precambrian age. The Cretaceous units have been mapped as the Neungju Group, which is part of the Oyeong-sang Supergroup. The Gyeonsang is a thick (up to 10,000 meters) sequence of post-orogenic, molasses-type sediment with lavar and volcanoclastic rocks deposited during the period. The Precambrian strata consist of coarse biotite schist (crystalline rock that can be split) and quartzofeldspathic gneiss (layered granite-like rock) assemblage that is intruded by igneous material. The Creta-l ceous and Precambrian rocks in the site are typical and widespread in the southern part of Korea.
3 Structural Characteristics. Based on borings conducted at the site, no notable faults or folds were observed within an 8-km radius of the site. The subsurface structure of the site consists of two foundation type rocks: Cretaceous volcanics and Precam-brian metamorphics and intrusives. The nearest major fault to the site, the Kwangju Fault, is located approximately 30 tu 35 km away and no evidence of cataclasis (violent geologic movement) was ob-served at this fault. 4 Assessment of Stability and Fout.dation Engineering. The architect-engineer conducting the assessment for the first two nuclear units at this site found that the subsurface material underlying all proposed Class I structures has sufficient strength for support and stability to comply with Korean regulatory standards. Analy-sis of the boringe provided evidence that no dynamic effects resul-ted from ground movement events, includingt collapses / subsidence, liquefaction, and upheavels. The analysis also indicated that withdrawal or addition of subsurface fluids and minerals beneath the plant site area has not occurred. 36
o o C. Seismic Characteristics Based on seismic data for this century, the ROK has been described as a
" comparatively quieta land mass. The mass is a stable area that is actually a shield extending into the eastern portion of mainland China. Korea has an l intraplate tectonic regime and capable faults have been neither reported nor j observed. The Kwangju Fault, which is the fault nearest the Gyeama site, is a structure extending approximately 40 km in a northeasterly direction. The fault is located approximately 21 km west of Kwangju City and approximately 30-35 km east of the site area. There are no known faults within an 8-km radius of the site.
1 Seismic-reinted Geologic Characteristics. Based on the proposed 1 location of the power block structures at the Gyeama site, the structures will be supported by Cretaceous volcanic rocks of the Neungju Group. The material consists essentially of dacite and anderite flows that are interbedded with subordinate rhyodacite and associated volcanoclastic rocks. This foundation rock, there-fore, is very stable and was found to teve high compressive strength and low permeability.
- 2. Recorded Seismic Events. While records of seismic activities in Korea exist as far back as 27 A.D., this information is sparse and subjective. Still, a review of these records suggests that the frequency and severity of seismic activities were greater about 300 years ago - from the 16th through the first half of the 18th centuries - than current activity.
Three major earthquakes have struck Korea during the twentieth century the Mt. Chiri earthquake of July 19361 the Hongseong earthquake of October 1978; and the Suweon earthquake of September 1978. The epicenters of the three earthquakes were approximately 135 to 200 kilometers north of the Gyeama site and their intensi-i 37
Q O, ties ranged from V to VII HK (Modified Mercalli scale). The Mt. Chiri earthquake caused minor damage and no damage was reported subsequent to the other two earthquakes. 3 Activity Potential of the Site. Based on the historical and analy-tical information, activity within an 8-km radius of the site and at the nearest fault (Kwangju) has not occurred during the past i century. Local geologists and geologists working for the I architect-engineer associated with nuclear units nos. 7 and 8 have estimated that the potential for a damaging earthquake to occur within the Gyeama site region over the course of the next century is very small. Despite this analysis, the plant is being designed to withstand the most damaging recorded earthquake to have affec-ted the ROK. D. Hydrology The hydrologic features and conditions of the Gyeama site area are addressed in two parts: surrece water and groundwater. The proposed facili-ties most likely would use water from the Yellow Sea, the predominant surface water feature in the area, for cooling and service water uses. The Yellow Sea extends between the northeast coast of China and the western coast of the ROK. The Sea is approximately 620 miles and 400 miles at its greatest width, comprising an area of approximately 113,500 square miles. Water depths reach 80 m. The surface temperature of the Sea, Ln the vicinity of the site, ranges from a maximum of 25'C during August and September to a minimum of 4'C-during February and March. The annual mean temperature is 14*C. Tides, which ebb and flow twice a day, govern the local circulation pat-tern of the Yellow Sea in the vicinity of the site. The mean high and low water levels observed during site studies were 1.9 m above the mean sea level (MSL) and 2.1 m below the MSL, respectively. The highest high-water level on record is 3 5 m (above MSL). The trend of the Sea's currents is way from the shore. Any seawater intakes would be designed to be well below the lowest low water level. 38
O o Since there is no record of a tsunami occurring on the west coast of Korea, wave runup resulting from tsunamis was not considered during the earli-er CER. Subsequent events provide no reason to examine this issue in this report. Surface salinity of the Yellow Sea near Gyeama does not vary widely. l Over a year, the lowest value observed was 315 parts per thousand (o/oo) the highest value observed as 32.2 o/oo. The mean salinity value is 32.0 o/oo. Materials to withstand seawater with this salinity were incorporated in the design specifications of nuclear units nos. 7 and 8. Similar provi-sions would be included in specifications for the proposed reactors. The site's drainage area is approximately 1 3 km2 A large fraction of the area is surrounded by subdued hills which have a maximum altitude of about 80 m. The natural drainage pattern from the mountainous areas is to-ward the Yellow Sea and away from the site. There are no streams, rivers, or lakes within an 8-km radius of tte site and flooding has been neither ob-served nor recorded. The nearest stream is approximately 15 km south or the site and flows is a southerly direction. In general, the site is considered hydrologically isolated. The degree of dispersion and dilution of pollutants in a water system depends on the magnitude and direction of nearshore currents. Dilution and dispersion of any pollutant discharged is enhanced by the turbulent mixing , characteristics caused by the Yellow Sea's tidal and current movements. The two plants under construction will have a complete waste collection and dispo-sal system that will process all waste before discharge or removal. All liquid wastes are to be sampled and analyzed to determine pollutant and radio-activity levels before release under controlled and diluted conditions. Re-leases of radioactive material will be kept within the limits specified in regulations promulgated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B. The proposed nuclear units also would be required to satisfy these requirements. 39
O . l The oceanographic and climate-related conditions of the Yellow Sea are influenced significantly by the strong weather systems prevailing over Korea. Heavy precipitation occurs during the summer months (May through September), usually related to the passage of typhoons and tropical storms. Annually, an average of two typhoons approach the coasts of the ROK. However, an average of less than one typhoon per year approaches the west coast area, minimizing the site's exposure to such weather systems. Still, the torrential rainfall accompanying the typhoons and storms, combined with high tide conditions, may result in flooding of the low lying arens along the coast. The finished plant grade for those facilities under construction at Oyeama is expected to be 10 m above HSL and will be high enough to eliminate the flooding hazard to plant structures. Based on KAERI studies, flooding of the site does not appear possible because the finished level of the site is still 2.2 m above the highest possible water conditions. De sign specifications, however, of structures and drainage systems take into account the probable maximum flooding and precipitation conditions. The plans for proposed nuclear units nos. 11 and 12 would consider flooding potential and include proper safeguards. For the plants under construction, the projected discharges of radioac-tive materials estimated by KAERI indicate that inadvertent or accidental releases to the Yellow Sea will have an imperceptible eff0ct on biota or po-tential water users. While this would appear to apply to a scenario includ-ing two additional nuclear reactors, potential accidents must be carefully-considered. However, application of the appropriate emergency safeguards would ensure satisfactory performance and accident response. The main heat dissipation systems of the reactor coolant systems under construction are the Condenser Circulating Water System (CWS) and the Service Water System (SWS). Both are once-through systems. CWS water requirements will be approximately 840,000 gallons / minute for each unit. This will result in a temperature increase of approximately 14*F across the condenser. SWS requirements will be approximately 30,000 gallons / minute. The temperature dif ferential is expected to be approximately 9'F. The amount of water needed 40
Q
- for these systems can be supplied by the Yellow Sea. The construction of two additional nuclear facilities at this site should not adversely affect water supply conditions, but a more detailed examination of water supply and demand should be performed.
Groundwater conditions at Gyeama were determined during subsurface geolo- l gic investigations done for the CER associated with unit nos. 7 and 8. The ; data revealed that the only subsurface aquirier of interert is the water table aquifier, which generally follows the surface contours of the site area. The plants under construction and the facilities will not require the use of groundwater. Plant needs will be met by existing surface water resour-ces. Furthermore, future use of groundwater by the nuclear plants or other l industrial development is not anticipated. Ongoing plant construction activities and future work are not expected to affect the water flow and use of nearby wells. In the event of an inadver-tent release of radioactive liquids or other liquid pollutant, no adverse effects on groundwater are expected. Since the site is considered hydrologi-cally isolated, all releases will flow seaward and there are no users between the facilities under construction, the proposed plants, and the Yellow Sea. Appropriate emergency response will uontrol any potential environmental dtmage. E. Climatic Conditions The climatology of the ROK's southwest region, where the Gyeama site is . located, can be described as continental in nature. This climatic regime is characterized by a short monsoon season and less intense rainfall along with a large seasonal variation of temperature. The average annual rainfall in the region is 1180 mm; approximately 505 of this amount falls during the months of June through August. The temperature of the region can range from a maximum of 38'C to a mini-mum of -19'C. The normal annual temperature range of the Gyeama area is -5'c to 31 *C, The normal monthly precipitation (rain or snow) ranges from a low 41
e - - - of approximately 30 mm to .a high of approximately 220 mm. The mean wind speeds range from 3.8 to 5.5 m/sec, prevailing mostly from a north-to-north-westerly direction during the winter and a south-to-southeasterly direction during the summer. About 20 typhoons have passed through the southwestern part of Korea and - within 100 km of the site over a 75-year period (1904-1978). Five of these typhoons had wind speeds greater than 30 m/sec (67 mph) and came within 50 km of the site; none, however, has hit the site. About 8 to 10 thunderstorm days per year can be expected to strike the Gyeama site; these occur most frequently during the months of July and August. In addition, approximately 30 hailstorm days can be expected over the course of a year; the greatest frequency of occurrence of thest events is in Novem-ber and December. No tornadoes, waterspouts, or freezing rainstorms have been observed within a 50-km radius of the site. The plants under construc-tion were designed to withstand the highest recorded windspeeds and typhoons conditions cecorded on the Korean peninsula; similar design criteria will be applied to the proposed facilities. Based on'the above information, the proposed site appears to have to appropriate climatic and meteorological characteristics to safely disperse and dilute s adioactive releases to the atmosphere. Periods of low mixing heights and ground base inversions are infrequent and wind conditions (speed, frequency, and distribution) observed and recorded at the site have resulted in satisfactory dispersion / diffusion factors (X/Q). In the event of acciden-tal- atmospheric release, radioactive material will be well dispersed and dilu-ted before deposition. F. Nearby Population Centers In 1978, the area within a 50-km radius of the site had a population of 1,845,300. There are two provinces, Jeonlabukdo and Jeonlanamdo, within a 20-km radius and 16 small rural townships known as "myuns." The most popu-lous myuns in Jeonlanamdo are Baegsu (22,900) and Yeonggwang (21,900). In Jeonlabukdo, the most populous myun is Haeri (14,000). 42
S #i i s The Gyemma site is located in the province of Jeonlanando and near the ayun of Hongnong. In 1978, Hongnong had a population of 16,400; this myun is located approximately 3 5 km east-southeast of the site. Five other myuns are located with 10 km of the site: Gongeum (12,700), Sangha (11,100), Haeri (14,000), Baegsu (22,900), and Beobseong (11,900). The current and projected population densities are based on demographic data prepared by KAERI. The 1978 population within a 10-km (6.2 miles) radius of the site was 94,600; the population projected for 2015 is 169,700. The resulting population densities are 301 persons per km2 (780/mi2 ) for 1978 and 540/km2 (1399/m12 ) for 2015. Within a 50-km radius, the 1978 and projected 2015 populations are 1,845.300 l and 3,439,100, respectively. The densities, therefore, are 235/km2 (609/mi2) for 1978 and 438/km2 (1134/mi 2 ) for 2015. IAEA has no specific guidelines for population densities in the vicinity of a uclear reactor site. However, approcches to radiation protection are' 1 surprisingly consistent all over the world. This is due in large part to the recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), an autonomous scientific group that has published recommendations for protection against ionizing radiation for more than fifty years. Based on ICRP suggestions, the IAEA and other international and regional agencies have issued radiation protection standards. Individual nations then evaluated these recommendations and adapt them to local conditions.. ICRP's perspective on radiation protection is based on four fundamental-tenets: o That each source of radiation exposure be justified in relation to its benefits or those of any available alternative; o That any necessary exposure be kept as low as reasonably achiev-able; 43
( - o That dose equivalents received do not exceed specified limits; and o That allowances be made for future development. In recommending dose limits, the ICRP recognizes two categories of individu-als: adults exposed in the course of their work, and individual members of the public. The principal limit recommended by the ICRP for the radiation protection of workers is that the annual effective dose equivalent should not exceed 50 millinieverts (mSv) .to any worker in any year. Average annual doses for radiation workers in practice are considerably lower. The corre-sponding limit recommended for members of the public is 5 mSv; in both cases exposure from natural sources and medical sources are excluded. The rigorous application of the principle of keeping all doses as low as is reasonably achievable is likely to result in an average dose equivalent exposure of indi-vidual members of the public of less than 0.5 mSv a year - considerably less than variations in natural background. Since the Three Mile Island accident, the IAEA has engaged in a major program for the development of nuclear safety standards (NUSS). Special attention has been paid to the strengthening of its program in emergency plan-ning and preparedness. A Safety Series publication entitled " Planning for Off-Site Response to Radiation Accidents in Nuclear Facilities" has recently been produced.5 Within the NUSS program, two Safety Guides have been published on the subject of the preparedness of public authorities and the operating organization for emergencies at nuclear power plants.6 A planning _ guide for transportation accidents involving radioactive material has been issued.7 Two new handbooks are currently under development: a Handbook on the Preparation, Conduct and Evaluation of Emergency Preparedness Exercises, and a Handbook for Assessment of Off-Site Radiological Consequences of an Accident in a Nuclear Facility. Other planned technical guidance handbooks include: Requirements for Emergency Response Facilities; Post-Accident Assessment and Recovery Operations; On-Site Habitability to Maintain Control of the Course of an Accident; and Emergency Reference Levels for Nuclear Facilities.
O O In addition, the Agency sends special missions to Member Nations, at their request, to help them develop emergency plans and to make use of the j published guidance. Such missions should be particularly u9eful to countries that have recently introduced nuclear power or to plan to do so in the near future. The development of a new Nuclear Accident Assistance Plan (NAAP) has been initiated by the IAEA to extend and improve the existing Radiological Emergency Assistance Plan. The NAAP program is aimed at upgrading the Agency's ability to respond to requests for aid in the event of a serious nuclear accident, establishing a check-list of special resources avar .ble internationally, and coordinating the supply of these resources in the event of an accident. Consideration has been given to the creation of a coster of specialists who would be immediately available to be sent upon request to the scene of an accident to participate in determining what assistance is re-quired. The ROK's affiliation with the IAEA has been marked by regular tech-nical assistance and interaction, including consideration of IAEA emergency response procedures when developing emergency plans for nuclear power plants. The estimated population density figures indicate that the current projected population densities are above U.S. guideline values, which state that if population densities exceed 500/mi2 within a thirty-mile radius at the time a plant goes into operation, altsrnate sites should be considered. There are no regulations governing population density as a limiting factor to be considered when siting a nuclear power plant. However, this guideline calls for the review of the rationale behind a site's selection. Site selection investigations in Korea began in 1968 and included six-teen sites. The Gyeama site was the most promising southwestern site. In the interest of public safety, an emergency plan covering evacuation of the population within a 10-mile radius of the plant was prepared by KEPCO. This plan reflects the recommendations promoted by the NRC in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E. The size of a nuclear facility's Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) is determined in relation to local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by topography , demography , access routes, and j urisdic-45
N
- tional limits. Generally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power plants with an authorized power level greater than 250 MW thermal is to include an area roughly 10 miles in radius. KEPCO, in preparing the emer-gency plan for the Gyeama site, has used this 10-mile radius in developing response procedures.
G. Radiation impacts The potential impact on public health of a release of small quantities of radioactive elements is also a major consideration in siting any nuclear power facility. However, insufficient data are available at this time to estimate the effects of any releases of low-level radioactive liquid wastes under normal operating conditions. Evaluation of the potential releases of airborne radiation requires an extensive data base on food chain and water resource consumption rates for the surrounding populations. These are not. as yet, a' vailable in sufficiently rigorous form to make any accurate esti-mates. However, if the KEPCO adopts NRC standards and procedures for the proposed plant, there do not appear to be any peculiar circumstances at the site that would lead to greater impacts that have been determined for most nuclear power stations in the United States. Any proposals submitted for consideration to the ROK by U.S. companies are based on the same U.S. standards and regulations that would be utilized in a domestic project. That is, in supplying plant equipment, installation, and services, an American company would comply with the applicable parts of Title 10 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, issued by the Nuclear Regu-latory Commission. Pertinent parts include the following: o 10 CFR Part 20. " Standards for Protection Against Radiation" and appendices; o 10 CFR Part 50. " Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities" and appendices; o 10 CFR Part 51. " Environmental Protection Regulations for Domes-tic Licensing and Related Regulatory Functions" and appendix; and o 10 CFR Part 100. " Reactor Site Criteria" and appendix.
O O The design and construction of the components supplied by U.S. companies also would be guided by all applicable standards and regulations, including those of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, the American Nuclear Soci-ety, the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, and the American Society for Testing and Materials. H. The United States. Other Countries, and the Global Commons The proposed construction of nuclear units nos.11 and 12 at the Gyeama site is not expected to result in adverse environmental impacts on the United States, Korea's neighboring nations, or the global commons. The potential effects of a nuclear power plant on the United States and global commons were considered by the NBC for the export of nuclear units to the Philippines. The NRC's comments, reported in several documents, were based upon generic information pertaining to the impacts of operation and those associated with the likelihood of a severe accident. These documents included Final Environ-mental Impact Statement of U.S. Nuclear Power Export Activity (ERDA-1542), dated April 1976; the Final Environmental Statement Related to Manufacture of Floating Nuclear Power Plants by Offshore Power Systems, Part III at 3.3.2.1 (NUREG-0502), dated December 1978; and the Liquid Pathway Generic Study (NUREG-0440), dated February 1978. The April 1976 Environmental Impact Statement (ERDA-1542) concluded, among other things, that the level of projected U.S. nuclear power export activities through the year 2000 is unlikely to entail significant or unaccep-table adverse environmental impacts on the United States and the global commons. The nature of U.S. nuclear power export activities, as they relate to potential environmental impacts, has not altered substantially since the issuance of ERDA-1542, except that the export activity levels have been lower than projected. Therefore, the environmental impact of such activities is expected to be less than those estimated in ERDA-1542. There is also no indi-cation that the nature of the activities described in ERDA-1542, as they re-late to environmental impacts, will change significantly in the foreseeable future. l l l l
I I NUREG-0502 concluded that' radiological impacts from the normal operation of a nuclear power plant or even froa "all but the most severe accidents" will not be detected in the U.S. Given the worst possible accident for a-land-based coastal nuclear power plant in which a core meltdown occurs and the melted fuel enters the groundwater beneath the plant and is transported to the surface waters, NUREG-0502 (based upon NUREG-0440) found that such an accident would have virtually no effect upon marine recreation, sport fish-ing, boating, commercial- fishing, and shipping that might ' occur in areas 12 miles from land. (U.S. . NRC Comments, Nuclear Regulation Reports, 30, 475.11). The nearest international border is approximately 160 miles from the . site. The IAEA has no standards defining the distance from an international border that a plant site might be considered to have an impact on a third country. A review of current practice around the globe shows that there are plants operating well within 100 miles of international borders. I. Unique Coe siderations There are no unique considerations which could pose a significant threat to the environment. The Gyeama' site is located in an area of relative re-source scarcity (especially fresh water) and of slow economic development. While the ROK has had previous experience in building and operating a nuclear power reactor, many of the site activities will cause temporary environmental and social effects similar to those associated with other large construction projects in rural and undeveloped areas. The siting and building of this power plant will depend on the ability of the Korean government to develop concurrently local social and economic infrastructures that can support such
' an advanced technology.- As for safety considerations, if standards and regulations similar to those of the NRC are met, the proposed nuclear. plants should be operated in an environmentally acceptable manner with minimal k threat to the public health.
48
O o REFEREllCES
'1. Executive Ordar 12114, " Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions," signed by President J. C;rter (January 4, 1979).
- 2. 44 3 65560 (1979)..
- 3. 46 3 1007 (1981).
4 Personal communication, information provided by Mr. S. Ceja, U.S. l Department of Energy (1986).
- 5. The-International Atomic Energy Agency, Safety Series No. 55. Vienna, Austria (1981).
- 6. , safety series Nos. 50-SG-06 and 50-S0-06, Vienna, Austria (1982).
- 7. , TECDOC No. 262, Vienna, Austria (1982).
49
O O - - BIBLIOGRAPHY Korea Advanced Energy Research Institute and Korea Electric Power Corporation, Overview of Korean Spent Fuel Management Programme (1982). Korea Advanced Energy Research Institute, Regulatory and Licensing Approaches in Korea in Focus on the Activities of Nuclear Safety Center (1985). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Arrangement Between the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) and the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), Republic of Korea, for the Exchange of Technical Information and Cooperation in Regulatory and Safety Research Matters, (1981). Ministry of Science and Technology,1981 Atomic Energy Activities in Korea, Seoul, Korea (1982). Jeffs, E., 'A Major Programme Underway," Nuclear Engineering International (1983). ! Office of International Energy Development Programs and Energy and Environmental Systems Division, Argonne National Laboratory, Republic of Korea / United States Cooperative Energy Assessment (1981). The International Atomic Encrgy Agency, The Annual Report for 1984, Vienna, Austria (1985).
, Nuclear Power, the Environment, and Man, Vienna, Austria s (1984).
, IAEA Services and Assistance in Nuclear Power Plant Safety, Vienna, Austria (1983).
, Governmental Orgarization for the Regulation of Nuclear Power Plants, Vienna, Austria (1978).
, Information to be Submitted in Support of Licensing Applications for Nuclear Power Plants, Vienna, Austria (1979).
, Safety in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, Vienna, Austria (1978).
10 CFR Part 20. 10 CFR Part 50. 10 CFR Part 51. 10 CFR Part 100. 40 CFR Part 61. 50
b7 ['h % L& pd'4,'* *
- cg'o,,
- 9e -
UNITED STATES [ g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ^L- *
' E, /n I WASHINGTON, D. C,20555
\*.,,,.*,) L l3/f . l JUL 1 1980 l'
3, NT & y MEMORANDUM FOR: James R. Shea, Director Office of International Programs FROM: Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
NRR STAFF ASSESSMENT OF STATE PREPARED DOCUMENT ON THE KOREAN NUCLEAR UNITS 7 AND 8 s Enclosed is an NRR staff assessment of the potential radiological effects of the Korean Nuclear Power Station on the global comcons. We believe that the assessment represents a reasonable upperbound appraisal potential of radioactive releases from that plant. This assessment was prepared by R. L. Gotchy, RAB/DSI, and S. Acharya, AEB/DSI. d - Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
A3 stated
.cc: E. Case T. Murphy B. Snyder F. Congel B. Grimes R. Gotchy D. Eisenhut S. Acharya R. Vollmer R. Houston S. Hanaeur E. Hanrahan R. Mattson H. Schecter D. Ross W. Pasadeg W. Kreger 3
T Xr!133 1] % L m e d Bi '
NRR STAFF EVALUATION OF THE POTENTIAL RADIOLOGICAL IMPACT ON THE GLOBAL COMMONS OF THE EXPORT OF KOREAN NUCLEAR UNITS 7 & 8 By order dated February 8,1980, the Commission invited comment upon: (a) the health, safety or environmental effects the proposed nuclear exports to the Phillipines would have upon the global commons or the territory of the l United States, and (b) the relationship of these effects to the common defense and security of the nited States. For purposes of these comments, the tem
" global commons"' kas defined to mean geographical areas such as the high seas, Antarctict., and the portions of the atmosphere that are not within the territorial jurisdiction of a single nation state; and the tem " United States" was defined t6imein territory of the 50 states, as well as U.S. trust territories r and posses-sions.
The scope of the evaluation requested by the Commission in its order concerning the proposed Phillipine export has also been to applied to the export to South Korea of Korean Nuclear Units 7 and 8 (KNU 7 & 8). Since the Commission 's Order in the Phillipines reactor export case confined the staff consideration to potential impacts outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Phillipines (i.e., the " global commons" and " United States"), the issue here is reduced . primar}ily to one of perfoming a reasonable upperbound analysis, i.e., of considering the potential impact of a core melt accident involving the loss
. of containment integrity. For th? purpose of this analysis, it was assumed that a 12-mile territorial limit off the outemost Korean coastal isiands would apply. In order to provide an approximate evaluation of the potential radiological impact on the global commons of a core melt accident at one of
2-I these units, numerous additional conservative assumptions and judgments were , made, based on other related models and studies.
- 4-Based on available evidence (NUREG-0002 or GESMO (1976)) , the staff has concluded that routine releases (gaseous and liquid) from individual nuclear power stations similar to the- proposed Kore0n reactors do not result in significant impacts on the global commons. The same would be true of core melts which do not escape into the atmosphere. Although the liquid releases from such accidents might cause local contamination of aquifiers, estuaries or oceans, the radiological and ecological impacts on the global commons would generally be small (NUREG-0440).
I The staff has also concluded that, in the event of a core melt accident at the '
' proposed Korean reactor, which would result in direct releases to the atmosphere (such as PWR case IB in in WASH-1400), it is very unlikely that there would be a single early fatality (occurring within a year) outside the assumed 12-mile territorial limit. The staff has also concluded that, in the event of such an accident, a large liquid pathway dose would_ be highly unlikely. . -
' Atmospheric Releases KNU 7 & 8 are Westinghouse PWRs with a power level of 950 MWe each. The reactor containment is a single containment system similar to that of the model PWR l
,- e
i
)
(based on the Surry plant, also built by Westinghouse) used in the Reactor Safety Study. The staff believes that the response of these two plants would be approximately comparable to the Surry Plant in the event of a core melt
- accident, and the staff has based this assessment on that assumption.
Rainfall exerts an important influence on the magnitude of global radiological impacts from atmospheric releases. In general, the greater the rainfall, the greater the local fallout and the lower the potential impacts on the global tommo ns. The rainf all rate in Korea is highest- for June through August (507, of total annual rainfall). The Environmental Review prepared by the Department of
~
State indicates an average anhual rainfall rate of 1,180 mm. In order to be reasonably conservative, the staff has also assumed that members of an exposed population would oe located outdoors without protection or shelter during the first 24 hours of the exposure (including plume passage and ground deposition). This would account for essentially all of the inhalation dose and the ground deposition dose (assuming no evacuation during that period). However, emergency measures, such as evacuation and - protective actions, could greatly reduce the doses.
~
1/ The results of the CRAC codo analysis of KNU 7 & 8 nuclear power stations, using the above assumptions, are shown in Table 1 on page 5. The results lead to the conclusion that it is very unlikely that there would be a single early fatality (occurring within one year) outside a 12-mile territorial boundary as a result of radiation dose's received. Whole body and thyroid doses at the asssumed 12-mile limit would be on the order of 65 and 370 rem, respectively. i
y These doses theoretically could be received by exposed persons on ships at
, sea or small, inhabited islands just beyond this 12-mile limit (assuming no evacuation or treatment). At that dose (and with no effort to seek shelter or to decontaminate), the total incremental lifetime risk of latent cancer mortality related to the postulated accident would be on the order of 14 chances
! in a thousand (36% of those hypothetical deaths would be from thyroid cancer), compared with the normal lifetime risk of cancer mortality in Korea of about 2/ 15 chances in a hundred! However, ships provide good shelter and can be decontaminated quickly by hosing.
- Furthermore, the staff is not eware of any inhabited islands outside South Korea within 100 miles of the plant site.
At a distance of 200 miles, whole body doses could be on the order of 0.5 rem, with thyroid doses <on the order of 10 rem assuming no evacuation. In such a case, the total incremental lifetime risk of latent cancer mortality attributable to the core meltdown would be on the order of 2 chances in ten thousand. Risk of genetic defects (not mortality) would
, be on the order of one chance in ten thousand over the subsequent five generations.
~
1/ See' App. VI, WASH-1400 (1975) for details. 2/ Assumes a 65-year life expectancy (based on 62-year life expectancy in 1966) , and 1972-73 Japanese cancer rates listed in " Cancer Facts and Figures-1979," American Cancer Society. Data for South Korea were unavailable. 3/ + It sho'uld be noted that South Korea extends over 170 miles to the north of the site and 150 miles to the south. Islands abound to the south-west to about 80 miles from the site. The nearest nation is Japan, 160 miles east of the plant. I
r ,t,. ..
.- . 4
.o
- 5-l
- The estimated somatic impacts are believed to be conservative, since they l
! 1 j; are based on cancer risks in nations generally han ag greater life expectancies 4_ than nations like Korea or many of its neighbors (i.e., more people would be _ expected to die at an earlier age of other causes, avoiding many of the very l high cancer risk years beyond age 60). t l -Liquid Releases i-From past analyses, it is concluded that a large liquid pathway dose from { , l, a core melt aci:ident would be highly unlikely. The radioactivity released in 'a core melt accident would first have, to travel through groundwater to ! get 'to ,the sea, affording responsible authorities time (e.g., years) .to 1 . interdict at the source. In the Liquid Pathway _ Generic Study (NUREG-0440), li -the maximum uninterdicted dose to an individual -(from all potential pathways including marine recreation, sport and commercial fishing,-boating, and (, shipping) at a generic coastal site from the worst core melt scenario was ! conservatively estimated to be about 50 to 90 rems, whole body.* The risk of { cancer mortality from such a dose would be on the order of seven to 12 chances in one thousand. - i j About_ half of the dose (approximately 20-40 rems) would be attributable i j to the consumption of fish caught near. the accident site.* No drinking i > F
*A range is given to allow for' potential variations in concentrations near
.the site. The coastal area around the site is noted for the many creeks, inlets and islands which could result in conditions analogous to 1 estuaries in terms of mixing, etc. .
I f.
.-m -, s--,,m.,,,e% -
-%... . -.r . . . . - . , ,-r.- .,e - ..c w w-w, .- - w
3..'
- water pathway would be involved since only sea water pathways would need to be considered for this plant site. The beach exposure portion of the -
dose would be important only for Souto Korean beaches near the site and would be negligible elsewhere. Therefore, the only potentially significant liquid pathway dose which could occur in the global canmons (i.e., to l individuals outside of South Korea) would be due to the consumption of seafood caught close to the accident site and exported elsewhere. It is highly likely that steps would be taken to interdict the radioactive liquid release before it entered the sea. Monitoring and conf,iscation of commercial seafood, if nece'ssary, would further reduce the dose estimate. While the generic site considered in NUREG-0440 does not duplicate exactly the conditions to be expected at the Korean site, the staff is of the opinion that the estimated maximum dose would be conservative (that is, an overestimate). Furthermore, doses and risks to individuals outside a 12-mile territorial boundary would be much lower. h
4... - 4 TABLE 1: Korean Nuclear Units 7 & 8 Average Thyroid Dose Whole Body Distance (miles) (remli/ (rem) 0.25 1.1E + O2 3.3E + O2 0.75 1.2E + O2 2.4E + 02 1.25 1.2E + O2 1.9E + O2 1.75 1.2E + O2 1.6E + O2 2.25 1.4E + O2 1.3E + 02 2.75 , 1.6E + O2 1.2E + O2 3.25 1.9E + O2 1.1E + O2 3.75 2.3E + O2 1.1E + 02 4.25 2.5E + O2 1.1E + O2 4.75 3.0E + O2 8.5E + 01
~
- 5. 5 3.4E + O2 8.1E + 01
- 6. 5 3.6E + O2 7.3E + 01 7.75 3.9E + O2 7.0E + 01 9.25 4.5E + O2 6.7E + 01 11.2 4.6E + O2 5.0E + 01 13.7 4.5E + O2 4.5E + 01 -
16.2 4.5E + O2 3.8E + 01 18.7 4.2E + 02 3.1E + 01 22.5 3.8E + O2 2.8E + 01 27.5 4.5E + O2 8.2E + 01 32.5 4.3E + O2 7.2E + 01 37.5 3.7E + O2 6.5E + 01 42.5 3.0E + O2 5.2E + 01 ,. 47.5 2.6E + O2 4.8E + 01 2 52.5 2.3E + O2 4.4E + 01 57.5 2.0E + O2 3.1E + 01 62.5 1.8E + O2 2.7E + 01 ~ 67.5 1.5E + 02 2.4E + 01 77.5 1.4E + O2 2.2E + 01 92.5 9.6E + 01 1.3E + 01 125 4.6E + 01 3. 6E + 00 175 '
-1.9E + 01 9.2E - 01
. 275 5.4E + 00 1.0E - 01 8.7E - 03 1.1E - 03 425
~
4/
~
Most of the calculated thyroid dose is from internally deposited radiciodine which can be reduced hy prophylaxis given within hours of the accident. 1.1E + 02 = 110 r-- _ _ -a , - ,
*I
'.'ONCISE ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW KOREAN NUCLEAR ITNITS 7 & 8 l
l l
~
March 1980 Y # IR Q
,- 1 e .
l. CONCISE ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW ROAEAN NUCLEAR UNITS 7 & 8 . 1 Table of Contents I. Project Description A. Recipient Country
- 1. Description
- 2. Population Statistics
- 3. . Project Purpose
- 4. Energy Program B. Physical Project
- 1. Nuclear Steam Supply System
- 2. Potential Radiologic Release
. 3. Spent Fuel
- 4. Project Responsibilities II. Environmental Considerations and Effects A. Site Location B. Geologic C. Seismic D. Hydrologic E. Climatic and Meteorologic F. Population ,
G. Unique Considerations H. U.S. and Global Commons I. Third Country _ III. Nuclear Development and Regulation A. History B. Cooperative Programs C. Regulatory Organization
- 1. General Organization and Policy Planning
- 2. Nuclear Regulatory Bureau
- 3. Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute
- 4. Advisory Committee on Reactor Safety
- 5. Korean Atomic Energy Committee Safety .
. c Table of contents (Continued)
D. Licensing Procedures
- 1. Summary Description
- 2. Power Plant Licensing
- 3. Quality Assurance
- 4. Inspection
- 5. Emergency Plan
- 6. ' Operator Licensing
- 7. Licensing Reviews Undertaken E. Standards and Regulations
- 1. Siting
- 2. Environmental
- 3. Emergency Plans
- 4. Operator Licensing
- 5. Quality Assurance 4
e
- r Concise Environmental Review Korean Nuclear Units 7 and 8 This document has been prepared in conformance with the unified procedures (U.S. Federal Register Vol. 44, No. 220, Tuisday, November 13, 1979) applicable to Major Federal Actions Relating to Nuclear Activities Subject to Executive order 12114. The document concisely reviews the enticipated (significant) environmental effects of the construction cnd operation of 'two 950 MWe nuclear power reactors proposed for export from the U.S. to the Republic of Korea. In addressing each of the points required by the unified procedures, the document is organized in three sections -- part I, Project Description; part II, Environmental I Considerations and Effects; and part III, Nuclear Development and R0gulation. Part I provides a description of the recipient country ,
cnd the project, including plans for spent fuel disposition (procedure items (1), (2), and (6) (c) ) . Part II gives a description of the en-vironmental effects of the site and the plant, how those effects are baing taken into account in the project planning, and an assessment of cny unique considerations which could pose a significant threat to the environment (procedure items (6) (a) and (b) and items (8) and (9)). Part III is a description of the recipient country's regulatory mechanism, cooperative programs relating to environmental or regulatory matters, cnd a discussion of environmental and quality assurahce standards (procedure items (3), (4), (S), and (7)). , I. PROJECT DESCRIPTION - A. Recipient Country A brief description of the recipient country, the Republic of Korea is presented in the following sections.
- 1. Description.
The Republic of Korea comprises the southern half of the Korean peninsula. The peninsula is approximately 600 miles long and 135 miles wide. It is bounded by the Yellow sea on the west and the Sea of Japan on the east. The land is generally moun-tainous on the east coast and gradually slopes to hills and valleys on the west coast. Approximately 23% of the land area of the Republic is trable, the remainder being newly reforested pine woods or scrub.
- 2. Pooulation Statistics.
The Government of the Republic of Korea estimates that the present population is 36.6 million which is increasing at a ; rate of 1.6% per year. While the average population density is 371 inhabitants per square mile, over 40% of the South l Korean population currently resides in rapidly growing cities which, in the order of size, include the capital city of Seoul (7,800,000), Pusan (2,900,000), Taegu (1,500,000) and Inchon (900,000). Forty two percent of the labor force is employed in agriculture, forestry and fishing, 22% in mining and manu- !. facturing, the major growth sectors, and 36% in social and other services. In 1976, capital stock, chemical and heavy industries accounted for approximately one-third of industrial production.
- 3. Project Purpose.
The Republic of Korea has experienced rapid economic devel-opment and GNP , growth rates which, over the past decade, have been among the highest of all non-oil producing developed and developing countries. Real rates of growth averaged 12 percent in 1972-76, 10 percent in 1977 and 12 percent in 1978. This rapid industrial growth has led to a continuing effort by the Republic of Korea to provide increated electrical generating capacity. The Ministry of Energy and Resources (MIR) plans the growth in generating capacity and tasks the Korea Electric Company (KICO) to provide it. KICO is a part of MER and is the only electric utility in Korea. e t 6 6
s . Power sales in Korea increased at an annual rate of 17.2 . i percent during the period of 1972 through 1976. Based on this
, rate and expected GNP growth the latest long-range power de-velopment p'rogram, formulated by KICO in conjunction with governmental planning agencies, forecasts that electricity demand will experience an annual growth rate of 16.4 percent between 1977 and 1981, decreasing to 13.1 percent during the 1982 to 1986 period. In order to assist in meeting these growth projections in the most economic manner, while also diversifying the fuel sources, KECO has decided to construct two additional nuclear power plants. These two plants are referred to as Korea Nuclear Units 7 & 8 (KNU 7 & 8).
l The proposed KNU 7 & 8 will be located at the Yeonggwang site l on the southwestern coast of the Korean peninsula. Each unit is rated at 950 MWe and are scheduled for commercial operation in 1986 and 1987. Korea Nuclear Units 1,2,5, and 6 are located at Ko-Ri on the southeastern coast of Korea and the nuclear unit at Weolsung is located approximately 50 km north of Ko-Ri. The map presented as Figure 1 indicates the locations of these plants.
- 4. Enercy Program Forecase power demand under KECO's power development program extends ten years, covering 1979 through 1988. At the end of 1978, total system installed electrical generating capacity
~
was 6919 MWe. Thermal plants (coal and oil) produced 67.8 percent of the total, with 10.3 percent coming from hydro, 13.4 percent from internal combustion plants, and 8.5 percent from KECO's single operating nuclear plant. 4 s
. ,, , Y w m '4
/ HIGANG
,/ A
%l M5 M
e y g , u
\
5 to
/ tat:iU
)t b
5
$ warm:m k tum .
EMNG gcRI 1&.n Y-IMMCU h.
; 9 o 2s so is wiLas p- '8' ". '
am
, se ion -
ggpcat.!C 7 PETEA W M D # U I-: [ FIGURE I Q Sc==e : DariM f=xn apep.tlic of Tersa Ma= ard Grasca Ri"
- Kcrua Elec W_: Co. .
- Ncte: Sita na:e c.anged fr::m Gyae a .4 to Yecnggvar.g ir. Oc:.1979.
.y .
Consumption at the end of the ten year planning period is expected to require 24,506 MWe of installed generating capacity. In order to meet this projected load requirement, 45 new elec-trical generating plants are to be constructed over the ten year planning period. Among these are 11 nuclear plants, four units currently under construction, one in operation, KNU 7 & 6 and four other nuclear units not yet ordered. Upon completion, thermal plants will contribute 48.1 percent, nuclear 37.2 percent, and hydro 14.7 percent of the load requirement. Indigenous resources of coal are limited and will not be used to fuel additional thermal plants, necessitating the purchase of fuel from foreign sources. Based on an economic analys.s done by KECO, the unit generation cost of the proposed nuclear plants is over 40 percent lower than an oil fired plant and over 20 percent lower than a coal-fired plant. B-. Physical Project
- 1. Nuclear Steam Supply System.
[ The Westinghouse Electric Corporation is under contract to supply KECO with two three-loop PWR reactors rated at 950 MWe each for operation in 1986 and 1987. KECO has already pur-chased Kori 1 and 2 and Korea Nuclear Units 5 and 6, all PWR's, from Westinghouse. Kori 1 is operating, while the others are at different stages of construction. The design of the KNU 7
& 8 plants is an updated version of reactors sold by Westinghouse.
Some examples of those built, under construction, and in five cases in operation, are as indicated below: Commercial Countrv (Plant) No. of Units Operation Taiwan (Maanshan 1 & 2) 2 1984, 1985 Korea-(KNU 5 & 6) 2 1984, 1985 United States Farley 1 & 2 2 1977, 1980 Surrey 1 & 2 2 1972, 1973 North Anna 1 & 2 2 1978, 1980 Beaver Valley 1 1 1977 f
' 2. Potential Radiologic Release.
All nuclear reactors release some radioactive materials during their normal operating life., In addition, releases could octur from abnormal operating incidents or accidents. Since the NSSS to be supplied for KNU 7 & 8 will be designed and built to U.S. standards, the potential radioactive releases are equivalent to those characteristic of similar plants operating in the United States.
- 3. Spent Fuel .
The quantity of spent fuel generated by KNU 7 & 8 over thei'r 30 year economic lives, at a rate of 25 metric tons per unit per year, will be approximately 750 metric tons each. KNU 7 & 8 will each have at-reactor storage sufficient to accommodate 4 cores of spent fuel. This will provide sufficient storage j for 12 years (9 years if space is always preserved to accomodate l one complete core). l Common to many countries, Korea has not yet developed any plans for the longer term handling of spent fuel nor any plans for waste disposal. It did, however, actively participate in the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) where (1) waste management and disposal and (2) spent fuel were some of j the key areas of international study.
- 4. Project Responsibilities,
- a. NSSS. Westinghouse Electric Corporation is supplying the NSSS and turbine generator, equipment, while the respon ~
sibility for the balance of plant belongs to the architect engineer. As part of its responsibility, Westinghouse will supply (1) staff to advise the erection sub-contractor on the erection of the NSSS and turbine, (2) design cri-teria for the balance of plant, and (3) technical support services and training related to NSSS design and operation. Additionally, Westinghouse has committments to a locali:ation
. (technology transfer) program for NSSS components. The Westinghouse program calls for the Koreans to manufacture .
s
various NSSS components, for which the list has not been finalised. .
- b. Architect Engineering, and Procurement The U.S. architect engineering firm, Bechtel Power Corporation is responsible for providing engineering, procurement rnd construction management services to KECO. Bechtel is also the AE for KNU 5 and 6.
9 As engineers, Bechtel (Los Angeles) will design all critical systems, Bechtel (Seoul) will advise and consult with the Korean firm, Korean Nuclear Engineering Services, L Inc. (KNE), and KICO in designing.some non-safety related I systems. Bechtel will alto provide field engineering services, assisting in the lay out of items most economically designed on site, such as cable trays, small piping and instrumentation location. As procurement agents, Bechtel will administer the pro-curement and provide quality assurance services for the items being manufactured in the U.S. However, Rechtel's contract with KICO requires some technology transfer in both supply and engineering of a nuclear plant. As a result, approximately 30% of the items will be from Korean sources. The Korean supplied items are principally standard hardware, steel plate, reinforcing bar and the_ like. Third country procurement will be limited,
- c. Construction. With KECO as the lead construction manager, Bechtel will assist KECO in managing other contractors.
KECO will select a general contractor who will hire local labor and subcontractors to perform all construction work. O s . . 1 I
- d. Consultants. The use of consultants on safety and on-
- vironmental matters is, principally for environmental data collection and assessment. These data are used for t't.e ;
safety analysis reports and to provide detailed information , to the architect engineer so it can design structures ; such as the ocean cooling intake and discharge. The data j collection required for preliminary safety analysis l report has been completed. l The U.S. consulting firm of D'Appolonia Consulting
.- Engineers, Inc. (Pittsburgh) was contracted to conduct l geologic, geophysical and geotechnical studies. The firm ,
conducted borings and preliminary siting studies in the , l general site area. When KECO firmed its site plans, it ! hired the Korean Research Inscitute of deoscience and j Mineral Resources (KIGAM) to do additional borings. KIGAM then hired D'Appolonia to work alongside KIGAM geologists to upgrade Korean skills. D'Appolonia reported the results ; of their studies in the Geology section of the Preliminary saf ety Analysis Report. $ other studies required for the PSAR, hyd ology and meteor-s ology, have been performed by the Korean Atomh; Energy Research Institute (KAERI) under contract to KECO. Additional ocean hydrologic data will be collected for the final design of the coo
- ant intake and discharge.
The results of these studies will be reported in the FSAR.
- e. IAEA. The IAEA has provided training to KECO, KAERI, and ,
industrial personnel in subjects pertinent to the nuclear , project. Courses have included quality assurance, safety analysis review, construction and operation management, siting and others. In addition, the IAZA has assisted with fellowships for Korean personnel to train at the r USNRC.
.g.
__ _ _ _ . _ ___,_ .._ _.._ _ ___ .___. _ . _ . _ _ __________.._a
- 22. ENVIRONMINTAL CONSIDERATIONS AND ETTECTS A. Site Location.
The Yeonggwang site for the KECO nuclear power station is on the southwestern coast of Korea. The site is in Hongnong l Myun, Yeonggwang Gun, Jeonlanamde Province. The area is ap-proximately 54 kilometers (km) northwest of Kwangju City and is bounded by the Yellow sea to the west, by Kum-Jung mountain to the north and mountainous areas to the east and south.
- 3. Geologie.
Yeonggwang is located within the Hanland physiographic division of Korea. The division is further subdivided into three regions which include: Gyeonggi, ogcheon Taebaeksan, and Gyeongsang. The site area lies within the ogcheon Taebaeksan subdivision and the physiography is based on Precambrian metasediments and granitic rocks.
- 1. Physiocraphv of the Plant Site. The site area consists of mountain masses dispersed within tidal lowlands. South of the site area is a mountainous area (309 meters (m) maximum elevation) separated by the Beop Seong Po Estuary which originates from a central mountainous area. The central mountainous area (264 m maximum elevation) is separated by another estuary (unnamed) which originates from a northern low hill, tidal flat area (60-75 m maxi-zum elevation). The area east of the site consists of -
subdued hills (140 m maximum elevation) interspersed with lowlands.
- 2. Subsurface Characteristics. The subsurface within an 8 km radius of the site consists of volcanic and metamorphic /
igneous rocks of' Cretaceous and Precambrian age. The cretaceous units have been mapped as the Neungju Group which is part of the Gyeongsang Supergroup. The Gyeongsang is a thick (up to 10,000 meters) sequence of ' 3
post-orogenic, molasses-type sediment with lavas and volcanoclastic rocks deposited during the period. The Precambrian strata consist of coarse biotite schist (crystalline rock that can be split) and quattrofeldepathic gneiss (layered granite-like rock) assemblage which is intruded by igneous material. The Cretaceous and Pre-cambrian rocks in the site are typical and widespread in ! the southern part of Korea. .
- 3. Structural characteristics. Based on borings conducted at the site, no faults or folds were observed within an 8 km radius of the site. The subsurface structure of the site consists of two foundation type rocks: Cretaceous volcanics and Precambrian metamorphics and intrusives.
The nearest major fault to the site, the Kwangju Tault, is located approximately 30 to 35 km away and no evidence of cataclasis (violent geologic movement) was observed at the fault.
- 4. Assessment of stability and Foundation Erigineering.
The geological consultant has found that the subsurface material underlying all proposed class I structures has sufficient strength for support and stability to comply with Korean regulatory standards. Analysis of the borings provided evidence that no dynamic effects resulted from ground movement occurrences, including: collapses /subsidenet, liquefaction events, and upheavals. The analysis also indicated that withdrawal or addition of subsurface fluids and minerals in the plant site area has not occurred. C. Seismie. Korea, overall, has been described as a " comparatively quiet" land mass seismically, based on twentieth century earthquake data. The mass is considered a stable area that is actually a shield extending into the eastern portion of mainland China. 4
.o .
Korea has an intraplate tectonic regime and no capable faults have been reported or observed.' The Kwangju Tault, which is the fault nearest the Yeonggwang site, is a northeast trending structure extending approximately 40 km. The rault is located approximately 21 km west of Kwangju City and approximately 30
- 35 km east of the site area.
- 1. seismic-related Geologie characteristics. Based on the l
proposed location of the power block structures at the Yeonggwang site, the structures will be supported by Cretaceous volcanic rocks of the Neungju Group. The material consists essentially of dacite and anderite flows that are interbedded with subordinate rhyodacite and associated volcanoclastic rocks. This foundation rock, therefore, is very stable and was found to have high compressive strength and low permeability. . -
- 2. Known Seismic Activities. Records of seismic activities L in Korea exist as far back as 27 A.D. but the information is sparse and subjective. These records, however, suggest that the frequency and severity of seismic activities were greater about 300 years ago, from the 16th through the first half of the 18th centuries, than in recent times.
Three major earthquakes occurred in Korea curing the twentieth century and include the following: The Mt. Chiri earthquake of Julyi 1936; The Hongseong earthquake of October, 1978 and the Suween earthquake of September! 1978. The epicenters of the three earthquakes were ap-proximately 135 to 200 kilometers north of the Yeonggwang site and the intensities ranged from V to VII MM (Modified Mercalli scale). Minor damage occurred in the Mt. Chiri earthquake and no damage was reported in the other two earthquakes.
- 3. Activity Potential of site. Activity within an 8 km radius of the site and at the nearest f ault (Kwangju) has not occurred during the past century, based on historical and analytical information. Geologists of the applicant have estimated that the potential for a damaging earth-quake to occur within the Yeonggwang site region in the next century is very small. In spite of this, the plant is being designed to safely withstand an earthquake equal in magnitude to the most damaging earthquake that has ever been recorded to have occurred in Korea.
D. Hydrologic. The hydrologic features and conditions of the Yeonggwang plant site area are divided and addressed in two parts: surface water and groundwater. The KECO plant will use water from the Yellow sea for cooling and service water uses.
- 1. surface Water. The Yellow Sea extends between the north-east coast of China and the western coast of Korea.
Characteristics of the Sea relevant to the dispersion and transport of pollutants, including radioactive materials, are presented in the following discussion. (a) Physical reatures. The sea, which is approximately 620 miles long and 400 miles at its greatest breadth comprises an area of approximately 113,500 square miles. Water depths range from 5 to 80 m. The surface temperature of the Sea, in the vicinity of. the site, ranges from a maximum of 250C during August and September to a minimum of 40C during February and March. The annual mean temperature is 140C. Tides, which ebb and flow twice a day, govern the local circulation pattern of the Yellow sea near the site. The mean high and low water levels observed were 1.9m above mean sea level (MSL) and 2.1m below
O MSL, respectively. The highest high-water level observed was 3.5m (above MSL). The trend of the currents of the Sea is away from the shore line. The seawater intake has not yet been designed but will be designed to be well below the lowest expected water level.
.Since there is no record of a tsunami occurring on the west coast of Korea, wave eunup resulting from tsunamis has not been considered in the design.
(b) Drainage and rioeding characteristics. The drainage area of the site is approximately 1.3 km2 A large fraction of the area is surrounded by subdued hills which have a maximum height of about 80 m. The natural drainaga pattern from the mountainous areas is toward the Yellow sea and away from the site area. There are no streams, rivers, or lakes within , an 8 km radius of the site and flooding events have not been observed or recorded. The nearest stream is approximately 15 km south of the site and flows in a southernly direction. In general, the site is considered hydrologically isolated. (c) salinity Measurements. Surface salinity of the Yellow sea near Yeonggwang does not vary widely from month-to-month. Over a year, the lowest value observed was 31.5 parts per thousand (t.) and the hightst value observed as 32.3 parts t.. The mean salinity value is 32.0 parts t.. Materials to with-stand seawater with this salinity have been incer-potated in the plant's design specifications. 4
(d) Estimated Requirements. The main heat dissipation systems of the reactor coolant system are the Condenser circulating Water system (cWs) and the Service Water System (SWS). Both systems are once through. The exact requirements have not yet been calculated, but CWs requirements will be approximately 040,000 gym for each unit. This will result in a temperature increase of approximately 14*r across the condenser. SWs requirements will be approximately l
'30,000 gym. The temperature differential has not I been calculated but is expected to be approximately l 90F. While thermal impacts have not been fully I determined, these differential temperatures are l
representative of U.S. P lants of equivalent sise. The amount of water needed for these systems can easily be obtained from the Yellow sea.
-(e) climate-related Characteristics. The oceanographic and climate-related conditions of the Yellow sea'are influenced significantly by the strong weather systems prevailing in Korea. Heavy precipitation occurs-during the summer months (May through September) and is usually associated with the passage of typhoons and tropical storms. An average of two typhoons each year approach the coasts of Korea. However, an average of less than one typhoon per year will approach the west coast area. The torrential rainfall accompanying the typhoons and storms, combined with high tide conditions, may result in flooding of the low lying areas along the coast.
The finished plant grade at Yeonggwang is expected to be 10 m above MSL, high enough to eliminate the hazard of flooding of safety-related plant structures. o , Based on KAERI studies, flooding of the site does not appear possible because the finished level of the site is 2.2m above the highest projected water level. However, the design specifications of safety-related structures and drainage system take account of the maximum possible flooding and precipitation conditions. (f) Fishing Characteristics. No specific information is available on fishing characteristics in the area of the Yellow sea adjacent to the site. However, the projected radioactivity discharges (source terms) estimated by KAERI indicates that inadvertant or accidental releases to the Yellow sea will have an imperceptible effect on biota or potential water users. (g) Dispersion and Transport. The degree of dispersion and dilution of pollutants (e.g. thermal, chemical, and radioactive material) in a water system depends on the magnitude and direction of nearshore currents. Dilution and dispersion of any pollutant discharged is enhanced by the turbulent mixing characteristics caused by the Yellow Sea's tidal and current movements. Actual modelling of these currents has not yet been undertaken but is required as part of the final design of the coolant intake and discharge structures. These studies will provide greater specificity to the estimates of impact from radioactive discharges and will develop thermal and chemical impacts. No adverse. impacts are expected to be revealed. The Yeonggwang plant will have a total waste collection and disposal system that will process all waste - before discharge or removal. All liquid waste will be sampled and analyzed to determine pollutant and
, radioactivity levels before release under controlled and diluted conditions. Releases of radioactive material will be kept within the limits specified in 10CTR20, Appendix B, which has been adopted by the Nuclear Regulatory Bureau as the Korean standard.
- 2. Groundwater. Groundwater conditions at Yeonggwang were determined during subsurface geologic investigations.
The data revealed that the only subsurface aquifer of interest is the water table aquifer, which generally i follows the surface contours of the site area. (a) Usage and Require'nents. The proposed Yeonggwang plant will not roquire the use of groundwater. Plant needs will be met by existing surface water resources. Furthermore, future use of groundwater by the Yeonggwang plant or other industrial development is not anticipated. (b) Assessment of Potential Effects. Plant construction activities are not expected to affect the water flow and use of nearby wells. In the event of an in-advertent release of radioactive liquids or other liquid pollutant, no adverse effects on groundwater are expected. Since the site is considered hydro-logically isolated, all releases will flow seaward-and there are no users between the proposed plant and the Yellow Sea. E. Climatic and Meteorologic. The climatology of the southwest region, where the Yeonggwang site is located, can be described as continental in nature. This climatic regime is characterized by a short monsoon season and less intense rainfall along with a large seasonal variation of temperature. The average annual
rainfall in the region is 1180 mm with approximately 50% of the amount occurring during the months of June through August. The temperature of the region can range from a maximum of 380c to a minimum of -190C.
- 1. Normal conditions. The normal annual temperature range i of the Yeonggwang area is -50c to 310c. The normal I monthly precipitation (rain or snow) rates range from a low of approximately 30 mm to a high of approximately 220 mm. The mean wind speeds range from 3.8 to 5.5 m/see, prevailing mostly from a north-to-northwesterly direction during the winter and a south-to-southeasterly direction during the summer.
- 2. Adverse conditions. About 20 typhoons have passed through the southwestern part of Korea and within 100 km of the site over a 75-year period (1904-1978). rive of these typhoons with wind speeds greater than 30 m/sec (67 mph),
have come within 50 km of the site but none of these have hit the site. About 8 to 10 thunderstorm days per year can be expected within the Yeonggwang site area and to occur most fre-quently during the months of July and August. In addition, approximately 30 hailstorm days can be expected with the. grectest frequency of occurrence in November and December. No tornadoes, waterspouts, or freezing rainstorms have been observed within a 50 km radius of the site. The plant is being designed to withstand the highest windspeeds and typhoon conditions recorded in the south-western portion of the peninsula.
- 3. Dispersion and Transport. From the foregoing, the proposed site, Yeonggwang, appears to have the ap-propriate climatic and meteorologic characteristics to safely disperse and dilute radioactive releases. Periods i
of low mixing heights and ground base inversions are ! infrequent and wind conditions (speed, frequency, and distribution) observed and* recorded at the site have resulted in satisfactory dispersion / diffusion factors (X/Q). In the event of accidental release, radioactive i material will be well dispersed and diluted before deposition. F. Population. The area within a 50 km radius of the site currently (1978) l l has a population of 1,845,300. There are two provinces, Jecnlabukdo and Jeonlanamdo, within a 20 km radius and 16 myuns (small rural townships). The most populous myuns in Jeonlanamdo are Baegsu (22,900) and Yeonggwang (21,900). For Jeonlabukdo, the most populous myun is Haeri (14,000), l l
- 1. Distribution Near the Site. The Yeonggwang site is lo-cated in the province of Jeonlanamdo and near the myun of Hongnong. Hongnong has a population of 16.400 (1978) and is located approximately 3.5 km east-southeast of the site. Six myuns are located within 10 km of the site and include: Gongeum (12,700), Sangha (11,100), Haeri (14,000),
Baegsu (22,900), Hongnong (16,400), and Beobseong (11,900). Gongeum is located east, Sangha and Haeri are northeast, and Baegsu, as well as Beobseong, are located southeast of the site. The total population within the 10 km radius, including the six myuns, is 94,600.
- 2. Current and Projected Densities. The curr'ent and pro-jected popul'ation densities are based on demographic data prepared by the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute.
l a - .. .
The 1978 population within a 10 km (4.2 miles) radius of the site is 94,600 and the population projected for 2015 is 169,700. The resulting densities are 301/km2 (780/mi2) for 1978 and 540/km2 (1399/mi2) for 2015. For the 50 km radius, the current and projected populations are 1,8,45,300 and 3,439,100, respectively. The den-sities, therefore, are 235/km2 (609/m12 ) for 1978 and 438/km2 (1134/mi 2
) for 2015.
4 The IAEA has no specific guidelines for population den-sities in the vicinity of a nuclear reactor site. The figures presented indicate that the current and projected populations are above the current U.s. guideline values. These guidelines are that if population densities exceed 500/mi2 in a thirty mile radius at the time of plant licensing, alternate sites should be considered. (Changes to this population density figure have been suggested in NUREG-0625 " Report of the Siting Policy Task Force" but the USNRC has not taken any action on them. Even if the recommendations were adopted, data of sufficient detail is not available to assess the result.) Site selection investigations in Korea began in 1968 and included sixteen sites. From the various criteria that were used to evaluate them, among which were demography and accessibility, the Yeonggwang site was concluded _ to be the most promising. Furthermore, an emergency plan covering evacuation of the population within a 10 mile radius of the plant is to be prepared by KECO. This plan is to reflect the recommendations in NUREG-0654 " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power". This document was prepared by the USNRC and Federal Emergency Management Agency as a result of the accident at Three Mile Island. 1 G. Unique Considerations. j j There are no unique considerations which could pose a sig-j nificant threat to the environment. j j R. U.S. and Global Commons. ~
; Effects on the U.S. and global commons have been considered in !
the Final Environmental Statement of U.S. Nuclear Power f j gxpotet Activities, (ERDA-1542) of April 1976, which covered a varie'ty of activities including those that are associated with j this type ~of facility. l ERDA-1542 concluded, among other things, that the level of 4 projected United states nuclear power export activities through the year 2000 should not entail significant and unacceptable I adverse environmental irapacts to the United States and global { commons. The nature of United States nuclear power export i activities, as they relate to potential environmental impacts, has not altered substantially since issuance of ERDA-1542 in l i April 1976, except that the export activity levels have proved , j lower than then projected. The conclusion of no significant adverse impacts was based on an assumed 1000 GWe total installed ) overseas capacity A ile KNU 7 & 8 represent 1800 MWe, a small i l fraction of that, therefore, the environmental impact of such , l activities is expected to be even less than estimated in ERDA- - ! 1542. There is also no reason to believe that the nature of l such activities described in ERDA-1542, as they relate to i environmental impacts, will significantly change in the fore-seeable future. ) I. Third Country. l The nearest international border is approximately 160 miles i from the site. While the IAEA har, no standards defining the distance from an international border that a plant site might f be considered to have an impact on a third country, some con- ] i clusions can be drawn from the studies done on local impacts. !' Although no studies have been made to evaluate the impact ,
' specifically of KNU 7 & 8 on third countries, studies thus far, '
j . 1
,~,--n. -..--,-c - , , , , -,n..,-n--- , ,,-..,, ,m, -n,-,-----.-.n,,,. n.--,,~ , , , . - . - ,,,n.v.,c + , , -, - . , _,,,--a.., ,,...-.n,- , = , , -.n--.-,- -
... ~
,[,
, ccepleted cn effects locci to the plcnt indicate thet discharges of pollutants from the plant will be well dispersed and diluted with no adverse local impacts expected, since local dispersion is highly likely, greater dispersion and dilution of the pollutants will occur before they reach a third countty.
III. NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AND REGULATIO!! A. History. Korea has pursued an aggressive nuclear energy program since ! it established the atomic energy section in the Ministry of Education in 1956. Quickly following this event was the form-ation of the office of Atomic Energy under the direct control of the President and the Atomic Energy Research Institute, both established in 1959. ' In 1967, the office of Atomic Energy became part of the Ministry of Science and Technology (HOST) and in 1973 it was , replaced by the Atomic Energy Bureau, also within MOST. The AEB performed regulatory and promotional functions until 1979 when the Nuclear Regulatory Bureau was established to perform reactor regulation while the Atomic Energy Bureau retained promotional responsibilities. In 1971, construction began on KORI I. It became operational in 1978, the same year that construction was started on KORI 2 and centracts were signed for nuclear plants 5 and 6. The previous year, 1977, construction started on Korea's only . heavy water reactor WOLSUNG Unit 1 (KNU-3). A second heavy water reactor was scheduled but has so far not been contracted for. As part of the Koretn nuclear program, the Fuel Development Institute and Korean Nuclear Engineering Services were formed in 1976 to build an indigenous fuel and reactor system capability. A full manufacturing capability is not yet in place, so the majority of equipment items will be produced in the United states.
t- . . , 50 Cooperative Programs International cooperation has played a key role in developing Korea's nuclear power program. In 1956, Korea and the United States entered into an Agreement for Cooperation in nuclear
. energy and in 1975 Korea ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Korea has also concluded Agreements for Cooperation with France, Spain, Canada, and Auctralia. Korea is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The U.S. embassy in Seoul includes a Scientific Attache who maintains close liaison with the Korean nuclear energy program. The current l occupant is a former staff member of the USNRC.
l l Seyond these actions, Korea (MOST) has completed a bilateral agreement with the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the exchange of reactor operating experience and for the exchange of' regulatory information. Under this agreement, the U.S. has been sending many kinds of reports, such as Licensee Event Reports, NUREGS, etc. and has been receiving Korean reports on operating history. The agree.9ent with the USNRC and arrangements with the IAEA have a direct relationship to the Yeonggwang Site project. IAIA was of assistance through a F.egional Cooperative Agreement (RCA) for research, development and training in nuclear science and technology since 1974. It was through this agreement that , NRB personnel have trained with the USNRC for periods from two months to one year. These individuals have been assigned to work alongside the NRC staff to get a practical appreciation of reactor regulation. Two men spent a year, each, in NRC regional offices for on-the-job training in reactor construction inspection. Another is currently in a regional office for three months to learn vendor inspection practices. Two others were at the NRC, one for six weeks and the other for two weeks, o to gain experience in safeguards practices and nuclear material control and accountability. Also, a USAID-funded IAEA training
course on reactor safety analysis review was conducted in Korea during July 1979, by A'rgonne National Laboratory's Center for Educational Affairs using NRC and other U.S. safety experts. In addition, U.S. perconnel have provided recent assistance in Korea. The IAEA recruited a USNRC health physicist to spend 15 months in Seoul on an IAEA technical assistance safety mission. Other USNRC employees, safeguard experts, have visited Korea to review and evaluate the final version of their State System of Accounting and control of nuclear materials. In the more distant past, two other NRC (and former AEC) regulatory experts served 1-2 year-IAEA assignments in Korea. C. Regulatory organization
- 1. General organization and Policy Planning.
The Ministry of Energy and Resources is responsible for plan-ning future electric generating capac~ity, defining the time schedule, type of plant and site. The Korea Electric Company is part of this ministry. The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) is responsible for regulatory activities of the nuclear units proposed and for considering the suitability of the site in accordance with the Korean requirements. Within MOST, the Nuclear Regulatory _ Bureau (URS), Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), and the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safety (ACRS) are involved in implementing regulatory requirements.
~.
- 2. Nuclear Regulatory Bureau.
The Nuclear Regulatory Bureau is responsible for the regulation of nuclear power activities in Korea. It is composed of public . servants having only a general technical background so it relies on the technical expertise of KAERI for the complete review of safety analysis reports. The NRB is staffed by approximately 30 professionals divided into the following four units:
- a. Safety and safeguards Division which deals with control of radioactive materials and the protection against ionizing radiation. This staff is approximately seven.
- b. Nuclear Reactor Division I which gives the authorization l
for acquisition, import, construction, and operation of, specifically, light water reactors. It also is the div-l 1sion responsible for regulatory review of design and construction and for conducting inspections of nuclear facilities. Its staff numbers approximately ten. Nuclear Reactor Division I relies on the technical ex-pertise of KAERI to do the review of the Safety Analysis Reports. To fulfill its inspection responsibilities, however, the NRB has sent three people through on the job training with the USNRC.
- c. Nuclear Reactor Division II is responsible for authorizing the licensing for the heavy water reactor and is re- ,
sponsible for the licensing of all nuclear reactor oper-ators. The staff of this division numbers approximately ten.
- d. Resident Office at tht KORI Nuclear Reactor Site. This staff normally numbers three. It is responsible for plant inspection during construction and operation and gives daily reports to MOST. -
- 3. Korean Atomic Energv Research Institute.
KAERI is a technically competent research organization that conducts research into reactor safety and environmental im-pacts. It is involved in the regulatory process as expert
, reviewers of the safety analysis reports and as part of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safety.
- 4. Advisory Committee on Reactor Safety.
The ACKS is an independent advisory board in existence since 1973 that reviews the KAERI assessment of the licensing I documents and advises the PR3 on what licensing action to take. The ACRS is composed of approximately thirty personnel qualified in four areas of reactor works a) quality assurance and standards development b) site and environmental evaluation including civil engineering and architectures c) reactor l design and' operation; and d) radiation safety control. Ap-proximately two-thirds of the members of the committee are drawn from the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute, while the rest are drawn from industry and universities. Even though the committee is advisory, it is tasked with the additional responsibility of developing standards, criteria, and guides for the licensing process as well as with conducting inspections l of nuclear facilities. l
- 5. Atomic Energy Commission. -
The AEC is a nine member body that approves licensing nuclear power plants based on the review of the safety Analysis Reports by KAERI and the recommendation from ACRS. Once the Commission approves the reactor construction or operating permit, it gives the NR3 the authority to notify KEco. The commission is composed of the Minister and vice-Minister of MOST, two standing commissioners and five non-standing commissioners. The five non-standing commissioners bring special areas of expertise to the commission and are selected depending on the needs of the Commission. In addition to approving reactor licenses, the Commission is a policy making body which
I (a) establishes the peaceful industrial and commercial use of nuclear onergy: , (o) establishes policy on utilisation, purchasing, disposition of nuclear fuels (c) monitors the nuclear regulatory measures of the NRBs 7 and (d) establishes safety and safeguards related policy. D. Licensing Procedures.
- 1. Summary Description.
Korea has a licensing procedure that is closely related to that used by the USNRC, with adaptations to their governmental organization, reatures of the process are that the applicant requests siting and construction permits (CP) for power p1&nts before applying for an operating license, a quality assurance plan is required for plant construction and operations, and an emergency plan must be prepared. It has the additional feature that specific construction releases are granted for construction of specific plant related buildings.
- 2. Power Plant Licensing.
To initiate the licensing process, the Korea Electric Company submits e.7vironmental studies on the site area to the Nuclear Regulatory Bureau. The two organ-izations agree on the tentative acceptability of the site, contingent on the further analysis to be documented in the Preliminarv safety Analysis Report. The contents of the PSAR ara Uefined in a Korean regulation which is the same as USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.70. To ensure thorough assessment, the NRB contracts with KAERI to conduct reviews of this technical submittal. The ACRS then reviews the KAERI review and recommends , ,
- action on a limited work permit or a construction b
- - . , _ . - . . . _ . , , ~ . _ ._,,...-..,_m. , , , . . . m.....__ r_ _ _ , _. . _ _ , , , _ , - - , , ,..,..,.._.,,_,_-.y...
.+ .
permit. If the reviewers have questions on the PSAR that need to be resolved, the NRB will issue a Limited Work Permit. Typically', the permit will be issued 7- . 9 months after PSAR submittal. This permit allows l KECO to do everything on the site in preparation for pouring the first concrete for a seismically qualified building. Meanwhile, KECO prepares responses to the questions and negotiates the resolution with the original questioner. l The AEC decides on the CP after satisfactory resolution l of the questions, as evaluated by KAERI and ACRS. Typically, the CP will be issued 11 months after the PSAR is submitted. The Construction Permit only authorizes the site and project. During construction, the NRB releases building construction in phases by requiring design reports on each of nine plant buildings. These reports are prepared by Bechtel then submitted by KECO to the NRS who provides a construction release for that building after the report has been reviewed by KAERI and the ACRS. The Final Safety Analysis Report is submitted to obtain the Operating Permit. It. too is reviewed by the KAIRI then the ACRS before the AEC decides on the permit. This licensing process has been applied to all of the reactors in Korea.
- 3. Quality Assurance.
Every applicant for a construction permit is required
, to include in its PSAR a description of the qual'ity o .. , ,
I assurance program to be applied to the design, fab-rication, construction and testing of the systems of the facility.
- 4. Inspection.
Inspection of the plant construction and operation to assure conformity with procedures and standards defined in the SAR's is the responsibility of the NRB. The ACRs will also conduct inspections and recommend action to NRB. NR3 has been training personnel with the USNRC in these two phases of inspection.
- 5. ,tmergency Plan.
Within the PSAR, the applicant is required to include a discussion of preliminary plans for coping with emergencies. Revised and detailed plans to be imp'vmented . l in the event of an emergency must be included in the applicant's Final safety Analysis Report. An important feature of the SAR's for KNU 7 & 8 is that RECO intends to continually review the lessons lectned from the U.S. Three Mile Island accident to determine applicability l to KNU 7 & 8. Rechtel will assist KECO in the preparation of the emergency plan. I
- 6. Operator L. censing.
Licensing Regulations require that operators be licensed and have college degrees. Licensing requirements are the same as the U.S. requirements so that the training given by the reactor vendor is of the detail and extent that' prepares the operator to pass the USNRC licensing examination. The U.S. reactor vendor is contractually obligated to provide operator training.
- 7. Licensing Reviews Undertaken.
- a. Preliminary site acceptability has been determined by NRB based on preliminary site assessment documents submitted by KECO.
-2S-
- b. The PSAR is due to be submitted in May, 1980.
E. Standards and Regulations The ACRS is responsible for establishing design criteria and reg-ulatory standards for nuclear power plants. USN.TC safety standards have been fully adopted, including those of the Code of Federal Rcgulations, regulatory guides and standard review plans. l As a consequence o'f using USNRC Guides, MOST has fully adopted the l ongineering society standards such as ASME, IEEE and ANSI, that cre part of the regulatory guide structure. 1
- 1. siting, standards for siting nuclear power-plants in Korea are the same as those used in the United States.
These Standards have been applied to all of Korea's reactors. The NRB depends on KAERI and the ACRS to review siting information to confirm the preliminary decision reached between the NRB and KECO. KAERI :end ACRS have academic and research skills in these areas as well as the experience of KORI 1 and 2 and KNU 5 and 6 applications. s.
- 2. Environmental.
Korea has adopted many of the U.S. laws and standards from the USNRC that apply to nuclear power plants, ~ although the latest requirements have not been adopted in every case. For example, the requirement that a separate environmental report be prepared in addition to SAR's is not yet adopted, although there will be a governmental organi:ation which will prepare the environmental reports for future plants. However, the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report is required to
, give a complete description'of the physical and en-vironmental characteristics of the site. A safety analysis report to the Korean requirements has been prepared for all of the reactors in Korea. Except for the discussion of geology, Korean companies are preparing the environmental sections of the PSAR to j Korean standards. The geology section was prepared by the U.S. consulting firm of D'Appolonia Consulting Engineers, Inc.
- 3. Emergency Plans.
An emergency plan is required to be written to re-quirements that are essentially the same as those in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations. The NRB (Reactor Division 1) staff has experience in reviewing emergency plans prepared for the KORI 1 and 2 and KNU 5 and 6
- plants, but for KNU 7 and 8, the emergency plan is to include Three Mile Island recommendations that aru relevant. The emergency plan will be prepared by KECO with help from Bechtel.
- 4. Operator Licensing.
The Korean Electric company is responsible for train-ing Korean operators to meet the requirements of the Korean reactor operator's license, which are the same . as those for U.S. operators, To this end, operators of KNU 7 and 8 will' tut given training under the long term training prograu contract between Westinghouse - and KECO. Westinghouse is providing training for KORI 2 and ENU 5 and 6 operators already, but the training program for KNU 7 and 8 operators is still not defined in detail. KICO has purchased its own simulator, so that the distribution of training to be provided in the U.S. and in Korea is still under consideration. 9
o< o, OFFCE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DCFENSE , ye W AsNINGToN. o.C. 70301 p , n icy
, 28 APR 1980 l
l l Mr. C.F. Helf rich, Olrector Of fice of Program implementation Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs Department of State Washington, D.C. 20520 Dear Mr. Helfrich This letter is to confirm the Departm.ent of Defense's earlier telephonic concurrence to Mr. Robin Del.aBarre concerning environmental Issues relating to the export of two nuclear p>er. plants to the Republic of Korea (KNU-7 & 8) as set forth in your 25 March 1980 memorandum. The DoD poses no objection to the document forwarded with your memorandum. Yours 1,n c e 'e l y ,
/
- 9. .. _ t Michadl G. Macdonald Assistant for Negotiations CDUSD (Policy Planning)
G 4 Y
.3 .
Department of Energy Washingion. D.C. 20585 APR 231980 Mr.MORANDUM FOR Gerard F. Relfrich, Director Nuclear Export ccetrol, OEs TROM Marold D. orf, Director Nuclear Af. rs
SUBJECT:
Environmental Document for Korea Nuclear Units 7 and 8 As provided in the " Unified Procedures Applicable to Major Tederal Actions Relating to Eucle.ar Activities subject to Executive order 12114" DOE has reviewed the subject document. Attached is a memorandum recommending some technical changes i for incorporation into an annex if time permits.
- i Attachment i
W
l ...'
- o' q,. s, .,4
- 4, bi~f .
jgyf,)
.%,f UNITED STATEE ENVIRON *.tENTAL #ROTECTION AGENCY w As e .s o s. c.c 1: m April.21, 1980
. g,r.:t t e t,g A *.m. W a'; p MEMORANDUM TO: Gerard F. Nelfrich OES/NEC Department of State FROM: Alan 3. Sigle? (, D Acting Dir d , 06eans & Regulatory Division office of International Activities I
SUBJECTt Environmen'tal Document for Korea Nucinar Units 7 and S This responds to your memorandum of March 25 requesting agency comments on the subject document. At this time, EPA has no comment on the concise environmental review. (
,, s .
1
}
Department of Energy
\Vashington. D.C. 20585 4Pky %
ti,. s i MEMORANDUM FOR RAROLD D. BENGELSDORF, DIRECTOR OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR AFFAIRS FROM: ROBERT J. STERN I ACTING DIRECTOR, NEPA AFFAIRS DIVISION l
SUBJECT:
REVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT ON THE EXPORT OF TWO NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS TO KOREA 4 Pursuant to your request, we have reviewed the technical aspects of the concise environmental analysis prepared by the State Department for the export of two nuclear power reactors to Korea. We appreciate your office's assistance in arranging the meeting we had with Messrs. Belfrich and Bettauer of the State Department on April 16 to discuss . this report. We found this meeting, which was also attended by Martha Crosland (DOE General Counsel's Office) and Ed Milenky of your office, to be very helpful in discussing with the State Department representatives our mutual concerns regarding this concise analysis. We agreed at the April 16 meeting to keep our comments to 4 a minimum in light of the very short time period available before the State Department- feels it is necessary for- ' the Administration to make a final judgment regarding the export license. However, it is also our understanding-that the State Department will restructure future reports to be more analytic and ' issue" oriented. We will provide some suggestions regarding the format for future analyses in the next few weeks. Our comments on the Korean analysis follow.
- 1. In general, the document can be improved by the inclusion of specific references to environmental documents prepared for similar U.S. facilities at similar sites and brief summaries of the relevant findings of these documents as they relate to the reactor exports to Korea.
These'would be especially useful in the discussions of projected radiation emissions from the facility under both operating and accident conditions. _ , - - ..,n., --, ---r
. . -n
-,, r - ,- ,-w . -y ,-.m , ,-w .__ .
- e 8
2
- 2. Any specific plans 'for the reactor design, equipment, or operation that are intended' to avoid potential accidents such as Three Mile Island should be discussed.
- 3. The analysis of the impact on the U.S. and global commons from the export of the reactors should be reviewed for consistency with the analysis for the Phil11 pine reactor export prepared by NRC.
- 4. To the extent possible, discussion of appropriate issues for the Korean case should be included as an addendum to this analysis.
Office of he Gegeral Counsel Concur Nonconcur [%.
,, y, .
sd
- Date_
Da te V . 2 L . 9F e 4
,-----,m-- , , ,.--wwc, , --~.v.,. -r- -,en -w, --n--,., ,-, w a m w - , - n -
1 Addendum to the Concise Environmental Review for KNU 7 & D i Addressing Comments from the Department of rmergy
- 1. References to environmental documents Projected radiation releases during operation of KNU 7 & 8 will be within the limits specified in 10 CFR. Page 16 of the concise Review states that the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations,
- par't 10, has been adopted by Korea. -
i For plants operating in the United States, the environmental i report requires that calculations be made of releases possible during different accidents. These results are reported in 4
- both the environmental report and the final environmental statement, the litter being prepared by the NRC. Calculations to the requirements of the environmental report have not been i
done for M10 7 & 8. However, the results would be expected to be equivalent ce tiose of similar plants operating in the U.S., as listed en page 5. While none of these plants is located on the ocean, the most recent document is the Final Envi:ena-ntal Statement for Farley 1-2, which is identified by yl the document number 50348-159, dated December 1974. l
- 2. Specific modifications to reactor design, equipment, or operation
- resulting from the U.S. Three Mile Island accident required of vendors other than B&W have not yet been enumerated by the
, USNRC. However, KECO intends to continually review the lessons learned from the accident to determine applicability to KNU 7
& S.
- - e
, - - -. - . _.. .- - . = . --. .-
J s g e' i
- 3. The DOE comment asks for a review of the P.nalysis of impact in the Korean concise review for consistency vs.th that done by the NRC for the Philippine reactor export. The two analyses differ in their approach but they reach the same conclusion --
that health, safety, and environmental impacts on the global commons can be estimated to be negligible, i The analysis of the impact of KNU 7 & 8 on the U.S. and global commons was founded upon ERDA-1542 which concluded that the impact of 1000 GWe of worldwide nuclear power ca' pacity operating overseas would be negligible. The concise review thus reasoned that the smaller power capacity of 1800 MWe that KNU 7 and 8 rcpresented would also have a nil impact.
- The NRC analysis of the Philippine case is composed of air and i
water pathway assessments and the results they derive in each of these media are based upon.nathematical analyses from previous U.S. generic reactor accident impact studles. In attempting to apply these analyses to the Philippine case, the NRC compared the environmental assumptions of the U.S. studies to the known l conditions of the Philippine site. No such comparison is made 9 by the concise review in referring to ERDA-1542. The extra effort and level of detail of the NRC assessment gives numerical basis for their conclusion of insignificant impact, even when a class 9 accident is considered. e9
- 5. Quality Assurance.
U.S. regulatory guides,and ANSI standards apply. These standards apply for equipment manufactured in the U.S. and in Korea because Korean Licensing authorities have adopted those standards. The U.S. quality assurance standards were already in effect in the manufacture of locally built equipment for KORI 1 and 2 and KNU S
& 6 projects. KICO, with the help of Bechtel, performs quality assurance on items manufactured for Bechtel in Korea. Westinghouse will perform quality assurance on NSSS equipment manufactured for it in the U.S. and Korea. Bechtel will perform quality assurance for all other items manufactured for it in the U.S.
l 9
. - . - - _ . - . - . . . . - - . ~ -.
(.' *.
.I2 .
m.' . DEPARTMENT OF STATE g,. wm..c.a. o c. mio BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS MEMORANDUM April 15, 1980 TO: OES/NEC - Gerard F. Helf ich FROM: OES/ENH - W.H. Mansfie
SUBJECT:
Environment'al Document for Korea Nuclear Units 7 and 8
Generally, I only have several comments on the paper.
- I continue to believe a summary of the key environmental factors contained in the paper would be useful to the decisionmaker and would pull together the main findings and conclusions of the 31-page report. .We prepare summaries of three-page Departmental telegrams.
On page 20, tne discussion of the " global commens" effects should also draw upon the ma+.erial used in the
" third country" effects: that is, that dispersion and dilution will eliminate impacts to the global commons in the immediate area. The discussion under global commons now talks in terms of global effects. Effects on the
" global commons" means more than global effects. The global commons involves areas which are not under national jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Such effects could be more localized than global effects and I believe it would be useful in this case to make mention of the same factors
, as regards the global commons as third country impacts.
In"Section III. Nuclear Development and Regulatiore" the report chronicles activities that Korea is engaged in to develop its nuclear program. But nowhere does the reader get an idea of whether in the view of the evaluator these activities are sound or adequate to enable Korea to carry out its nuclear program in a nafe and environmentally protective fashion. It describes cooperative projects, outlines the organization of committees and the AEC, etc. all of which is irrelevant if this organization or these activities are not conducted properly. I believe that to the extent possible,
- the evaluator should give the decisionmaker some idea of the soundness of this program. Illustration: page 26 on receiving
_ procedures only says Korea's " closely related" to curs. Is it not possible to giv decisionmaker some idea if licensa.ng procedures Ce)
- I i <
Jt .. ' j 2- - they are considered satisfactory from an environmental standpoint?
- On page 26, para 2 on Power Plant Licensing there is mention of environmental studies but no indication in what kind of studies or whether the results are available to us. On page 29, last para, there is mention that a l Preliminary Safety Analysis Report has been produced, but l no indication if the reporter knows what was in it or saw ,
it. Supporting information of this kind could be helpful j in the report if it is available. j 1 j '. With some addition'al assessment, such as this, I j think the report would be improved. l l i ,: l '.,. l
-. i l
1 I . e i ! -i ) m e9 mm m m - -, - --a. - -,
- g. -
4 Addendum to Concise Environmental Review for KNU 7 & 8-Addressinct Comments from the Office of Environmental Affairs, Department of State
- 1. Global Commons -
1 As the comment points out, effects on the global commons may be localised, but these effects should be 4
- small. Studies thus far concluded indicate that discharges from the plant will be well dispersed and diluted through both l air and water courses, resulting in no adverse impacts.
. Since local dispersion through the water course is highly likely, greater dispersion and dilution of the pollutants will occur before they reach the global commons. Through the air, l satisfactory dispersion / diffusion factors mean that radioactive i material will be well dispersed and diluted before deposition, whether deposition occurs in the global commons or in Korean i j territory.
- 2. This comment seeks some indication of the adequacy of the Koreans to carry out its nuclear program in a safe, environ-i mentally protective manner.
J - I Korea's experience in nuclear power is the indication of their ,I . capability. Their nuclear power program has extended over ten l years in which four pressurized water teactors were purchased, licensed by the procedures described in the concise review and subjected to standards adopted from the U.S. regarding the e environment, plant design, and quality assurance. or.e . of j those plants has been operating since 1978.
- 3. The comment asks about the environmental studies that are the basis for tentative site acceptability. Those studies are superseded by the information to be presented in the PSAR which will serve to validate the tentative conclusion of acceptability.
J 4 The comment' also notes mention of a PSAR having been produced; actually it is scheduled to be released in May 1980. The l-information summarized in section II of the concise review is j based on a draft of inputs for the PSAR. e 9 't a G 4 t i I
- g. . .
. ;"E3, '
i Js i*
- 8.
- m: 1 :j EXPORT-lMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES I
~.' W As HINGT O N, D.C. 30 871 sau soo.ue exau mn.
TELEX so.agt April 14, 1980 Mr. Gerald F. Relfrich . Director, Office of Export and Import Control OES/NEC - Room 4327A Department of State Washington, D.C. 20520 Ra: Environmental Document for Korea Nuclear #7 6 8 Project
Dear Mr. Belfrich:
[he Engineering Division of the Export, Import Bank has reviewed the Concise Environmental Review Korean Nuclear 7 & 8. We have no further comment or input at this time. Sincerely,
, n . '. - (
/ John A. Brois Chief Engineer
_. . _ . - . - _ _ . . . _. . - . _ , . ._ _ . _ _ _ _m..... ._.._...._.m.. . _ _ _ _ _ - . . _ ow
- 4
.*A%,,
/,c.Ix4.*,y # ', -
1,%~'.d,
.:.sJ
' .'d; .. ' .
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL. AND DISARMAMENT ACENCY u m c m oc .w u i April 2, 1980 MEMORANDUM .
/
d TO: OES/NEC - Gerard Helfrich TROM: ACDA/NP/NX - Richard L. Williamson
SUBJECT:
Environmental Document for Korea Nuclear Units 7 and'8
- Pursuant to the " Unified Procedures Applicable to Major Federal Actions Relating to Nuclear Activities" subject to Executive orr.'er 12114, ACDA has reviewed the draft environ-mental document for Korea Nuclear Units 7 and B and does not intend to comment on the document.
ACDA/NP/NX:MMcGraw:ofo 4/2/80
.' .Y * .
k,w9) . w d- . . Department of Energv . Washington. D.C. 20385 F.AR 311080 Mr. Gerard Helfrich Director OES/NEC Room 4327A U.S. Department of State Washington, D. C. 20520 Dear Gerry. - We have reviewed the draft.envirpnmental document for Korea Nuclear Units 7 and 8 and have no coments to make. Sincerely, , 3gg
. dg1 D irector, Di ion of Politico-Military Security Affairs 4
~ - ga aico Shea - Action g~ UNITED $TATES Cys: Ofrcks r, ,- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Cornell 5' I W As mN GT ON,0.C. 20$$$ '
*% * * * * * / f Shaptr CFFICE OF TM June 30,1980 49 T
Denton PWade seencTany MEMORANDUM FOR: William J. Dircks, . ting EDO ' FROM: Samuel J. Chilk, Secret i
SUBJECT:
SECY-79-495A - UNIFIED GENCi ENVIRONMENTAL PROCEDURES APPLICABLE TO NUCLEAR E TS (COMMISSION ACTION ITEM) This is to advise you that the Commission (with three Comissioners concurring) provides the following guidance, as requested by the staff. Commissioner Gilinsky in his response indicated that he would prefer that the assessment also address the issue of spent fuel disposition and its impact on the global commons. Commissicrner Bradford did not participate. The NRC environmental review should be based on generally available literature, generic impact statements prepared by the Commission and other federal agencies, information contained in environmental assessments prepared by the Executive Branch and calculations prepared by the NRC based on available analytical models. The NRC analysis should address the potential radiological impacts from a sericut accident on the global commons and should include the same topics covered in the recent Philippine reactor case. That analysis included an assessment of the following as they relate to effects on the global commons: ~ (1) potential impacts from atmospheric releases; (2) potential whole body and thyroid ractiation doses which could be received'; (3) potential somatic and genetic radiological effects; and (4) potential effects of any liquid releases based on inforration contained in the Liquid Pathway Generic Study - NUREG-0440. cc:
- Chairman Ahearne Commissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Kennedy Commissioner Hendrie Commissioner Bradford Commi-ssion Staff Offices Director, International Programs CONTACT: ,
SJSParry(SECY) 4-1410
Distribution: ! JRShea i JDLafleur JBDevine MRPeterson
- JUN 2 61980 TDorian '
IPEI Rdg File ! Mr. Louis V. Nosenzo , IP Rdg File : 1 Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy and Energy Technology Affairs U.S. Department of State Room 7831-Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear Mr. Nosenzo:
Thank you for your letter of May 6 which forwarded Executive Branch views on Westinghouse's export license application to export two power reactors to South Korea (XR-133). In cunoection with our review of this case, the following questions have arisen: 1. What is the assessment of the Executive Branch of the impact of the recent internal political developments in South Korea on South Korea's nonproliferation policies? In-particular, are there any indications of any shift in South Korea's position regarding the acquisition or development of nuclear explosive devices? ^ 2. In view of the mcent unrest ia South Cholla Province, what is the assess-ment of the Executive Branch regarding the capability of the South Korean authorities to provide adequate physical- protection with respect to-nuclear export? facilities and material, including the reactors proposed for 3. What are the intentions and capabilities of the South-Korean government with respect to developing indigenous spent fuel reprocessing or uranium enrichment capabilities? Also, are there any indications that the South - Koreanfrom
. facility authorities France? are renewing their interest in obtaining a reprocessing Your. early response to these questions would be appreciated.
~
Sincerely. Originalsigned by JamesB 5 hen James R. Shea, Director Office of International Programs e
s< . 8 o,, UNITED STATES u
.h ri NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
.{ I wAssancrow. o. c. rosss '/
( C C. I b# April 23, 1980 -p H6: MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman Ahearne M(P Commissioner Gilinsky 8 y H' Commissioner Kennedy Comissioner Hendrie Commissioner Bradford " FROM: Edward J. Hanraha
SUBJECT:
NRC'S ROLE IN THE PREPARATION OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEWS PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 12114 This memorandum recommends Commission action on the staff's recuest (SECY-80-185) for guidance on NRC's role in developing and reviewing Executive Branch environ-mental documents prepared pursuant to Executive Order 12114. (This issue was i oreviously discussed in SECY papers 79-495 and 495A which are still pending action by theCommission.) We will also discuss how the Commission may wish to treat the environmental document already received on Korean nuclear units 7 and 8. 1 The Commission is now in a position to decide how it will oarticioate in the Executive Branch environmental reviews. In the Philippine oroceeding, the Commission is defining what it will consider in the area of health, safety, and environmental impacts with respect to export licensing (i.e., effects on global commons and the territory of the United States). Also, we have now had an oppor- . tunity to review the first two Executive Branch environmental documents prepared pursuant to Executive Order 12114. The analysis developed in each document's section on the global comons could have been substantially improved. It relied too heavily on the findings contained in ERDA-1542. In oarticular, the relatively limited discussion of potential impacts uoon the global commons in ERDA-15421oes
- not address either the radiological imoacts from potential accidents on people, fish, recreational activities, shipping activities, etc., or imoacts associated with waste management options. Further, the Executive Branch may have based its analyses on a different definition of the tem " global commons" than the one 4
adopted by the NRC staff. In its February 29, 1980 submission in the Philipoine
, proceeding, the Executive Branch suggested that to the extent that impacts may affect resources over which the coastal state exercises recognized jurisdiction, (usually fisheries resources within 200 nautical miles of the coast) such impacts could be treated as impacts in a foreign jurisdiction and not on the global commons. The NRC staff prepared its analysis on the basis of a territorial sea j extending twelve miles.
CONTACT: Bretta Applebaum Weiss (OPE) 634-3295 - 9
i -
. To 7he Commir.sio'n l Therefore, we recommend that IP be directed to send a letter to the State Department describing NRC participation in the Executive Branch environmental reviews and requesting discussions on the preparation of the analyses of impacts on the global comons in future documeM-The letter should indicate that the NRC will primarily devote its efforts to analyzing impacts upon the global commons and U.S. territory, but*is willing to provide available technical expertise in other areas when requested by the State Department.
The letter should also indicate that ERDA-1542 should be supplemented to include a more egmprehensive analysis of impacts of reactor exports upon the global commons. / For example, radiological impacts from potential accidents on people, fish, recreational and shipping activities as well as waste management options should be addressed. As for licensing proceedings arising in the near term, i.e., until ERDA-1542 is revised, the staff should be directed to provide State with its analysis of potential effects upon the global commons,which would include an assessment of radiological effects from potential accidents and various waste management options. In this regard, we have been informed that State plans to transmit for NRC comment another en'ironmental document (s) in the near future dealing with the export of two reactors to Spain. Finally, regarding the Korean environmental document, we recommend that you request the staff to provide its own technical analysis of the export's potential-effects on the global comons along the lines discussed above. With respect to the foregoing we have prepared draf t guidance to the staff. Please provide your coments and/or approval to SECY by COB, May 2. l OGC conepts in this memorandum.
Attachment:
As Stated - cc: 1.eonard Bickwit Sam Chilk . William Dircks Howard Shapar James Shea Harold Denton 1/ It is our view that EREA-1542's discussion of impacts on US territory is adequate, although it overestimates those impacts since the US reactor export program is substantially smaller than that projected in 1975. ERDA-1542'might be revised to reflect this change. ' u
t, . , e' . ATTACHMENT = MEMORANDUM FOR: William Dircks, Acting _ Executive Director for Operations FROM: ' Samuel J. Chilk Secretary a
SUBJECT:
NRC'S ROLE IN THE PREPARATION OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEWS FURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 12114 - SECY-80-185 The Commission has reviewed SECY-80-185 and provides the following comments and guidance to staff. 1. The Commission reiterates the position that it will limit its consideration of health, safety and environmental effects of reactor exports to those potential effects upon the global commons and the-territory of the United States. In this regard, the Commission finds that the treatment of potential effects on the global commons in-the first two Executive Branch environmental reviews could have been significantly improved, as too much reliance was placed on ERDA-1542. The Commission believes that in the 'iong term its concerns can be remedied on a generic rather than a ccse-by-case basis. The Commission directs the staff to send c letter to the State Department (1) describing NRC participation in the Executive Branch environmental. " reviews;.and (2) requesting discussions on the preparation of the analyses of impacts on the global commons in future documents. The letter should indicate' that the NRC will primarily devote its efforts to analyzing impacts upon the global commons and U.S.-territory, but is willing to provide available technical expertise in other areas when requested by the. State Department.
* ~
.. ' William Dircks 1 i
The letter should also indicate that ERDA-1542 should be supplemented by the l
, relevant agencies to include a more comprehensive analysis of impacts of reactor exports upon the global canmons. For example, radiol,ogical impacts from potential accidents on people, fish, recreational and shipping activities as well as waste management options should be addressed. In addition, the analysis of impacts on US territory contained in that document might be revised to reflect the fact that the US reactor export program is substantially smaller than that projected in 1975.
d
- 2. With resepct to cases arising in the near term, i.e., until ERDA-1542 is revised, the Commission directs the staff to provide the State Department with analyses of the potential effects upon the global commons of proposed exports for inclusion in the Executive Branch environmental reviews. These analyses should include, as a minimum, assessments of radiological impacts from, potential accidents on people, fish, recreational activities, shipping activities, etc., and impacts associated with possible waste management options.
- 3. With regard to the Korean environmental document, the staff is directed to provide the Commission, as part of its analysis of the meritsof the application, a technical analysis of the export's potential effects on the global commons. The analysis should include, as a minimum, a discussion of the potential radiological impacts from poteiitial accidents on people, fish, recreational activities, shipping activities, etc., and potential impacts associated with various waste management options.
a
July l9 97 Attachment 1 Review and Update of NRC's 1980 Concise Environmental Review for Korean Nuclear Units 7 and 8 4 INTRODUCTION Export license applications, XR162 and XR163, are for the export of four (4) ' Combustion Engineering units, each rated at 1,000 MWe, with two (2) units each to Yonggwang and Ulchin, respectively. The principal considerations in the review of such applications (common defense, security and proliferation) are being addressed by others. This environmental review is limited to the radiological impacts on the " global commons," those areas outside the jurisdiction of any nation (e.g., the high seas). Both the releases of radioactive material from normal operations and possible releases from severe accidents are considered. The NRC staff conducted a study in 1980 of potential radiological impacts on the global commons that could result from a proposed nuclear reactor export to South Korea. The purpose of this evaluation is to reconsider the 1980 study and to determine whether new and significant information has been developed that would change the earlier conclusions with respect to effects on the global commons. This review was not intended to update certain information I (e.g., demographic and socioeconomic information) that may.have been presented for background purposes. PRINCIPAL CHANGES Major changes have occurred in the Republic of Korea (ROK), particularly in the dramatic advances in the ROK economy and the growth of ROK nuclear power experience. Neither of these changes is directly relevant to the present assessment. The previous assessment provided information about the ROK economy, population distribution, land use, etc.; while this information may have changed significantly, these changes do not affect the potential impact on the " global commons." Consequently, no update to that information is either required or offered. Similarly, ROK experience base in the operation _ of nuclear power plants is not directly relevant. This added experience is likely to substantially reduce the probability of a severe accident, but such probabilities generally are not reflected directly in assessments of this type. Other developments which could have a significant impact on the environment are:
- 1. The Chernobyl nuclear accident;
- 2. The NRC reassessment of the accident source term and its use in siting criteria;
_Tu l y Si l M97
/H b t h nt6 d (:,
- 3. Experience with the releases from the normal operations of nuclear power plants;
- 4. National and international reassessment of the biological effects of ionizing radiation;
- 5. Experience with the additional requirements imposed as a result of the Three Mile Island accident; and
- 6. Design differences.
These developments are addressed in the following paragraphs. The Chernobyl Accident The Chernobyl accident provided experience with (a) a major release of i radioactive material from a nuclear power plant accident, and (b) the environmental transport and dilution of released radioactive material over great distances. The principal information provided was the validation of the conservatism of widely-used, including NRC, models for calculating doses from both normal and accidental releases. Specifically, the NRC models would predict lethal doses off-site from a release to the environment such as occurred at Chernobyl. Similarly, the available dosimetric data indicate that the actual doses from environmental radioactivity were lower than would have been predicted by NRC models in the absence of control measures such as the interdiction of contaminated milk. Overall, the Chernobyl experience supports the conservatism of the 1980 study and does not alter the conclusions of the earlier work. ; The Vodated Accident Source Terms and Reactor Sitina Criteria Extensive efforts were made by the NRC and its contractors to formulate a new model source term for accident- analyses. Updated source term insights documented in NUREG-1465, " Accident Source Terms for Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants," is believed to be "a more realistic portrayal" than the earlier model documented in TID-14844, " Calculation of distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites." The principal differences are that the new source term includes a gradual (rather than instantaneous) release for the radioactive material from the fuel, and a predominantly particulate form for the radioiodine (rather than elemental and organic forms). Concomitant with the release of NUREG-1465, the staff was reassessing the US regulatory framework that would permit the use of the updated source term insights; this was promulgated as revisions to NRC reactor site criteria rule. I
While the new source term assumes larger releases of certain nuclides than was assumed by the earlier model, the overall impact of the change (including the gradual release in the presence of active engineered safety features, and changes in the dose criteria) is to reduce calculated doses. Consequently, these developments do not alter the conclusions of the earlier work. Releases from Normal Operations The calculated off-site doses from releases from normal operations of nuclear power plants in the US have been reduced by about a factor of 20 since implementation of the program to make such releases "as low as is reasonably achievable" (ALARA), while the power production has increased by a factor of about 3.6. This change is documented in the series of reports numbered NUREG/CR-2850, Volumes 1-14, e.g. " Dose Commitments Due to Radioactive Releases from Nuclear Power Plant Sites in 1992." This change is believed to be primarily the result of improvements in the performance of nuclear fuels, and improvements in measures to control releases. Since Korean regulations and requirements for nuclear power plants are generally consistent with those of the US, it is to be expected that releases and doses from normal o)erations in the ROK also would be reduced over the period since 1980. Thus, tie previous conclusions are believed to be conservative and this development does not alter the conclusions of the earlier work. Bioloaical Effects of Ionizina Radiation The biological ill effects of exposure to high levels of ionizing radiation were delineated by 1911 (when the first papers on the genetic effects of radiation were published) and the risk esticates for high doses have been based on actual observation. For low doses, below about 20 rem (cSv), ill effects (discernible health effects) are not seen, even in the most extensive epidemiological studies. Risk estimates for low level exposures have been estimated by committees of the US National Academy of Sciences since 1956 and by the " United Nations Scientific Committee on Atomic Radiation" since 1958. These estimates largely are based on the delayed effects of high doses to the survivors of the nuclear weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which still do not show ill effects below about 20 rems (cSv). The risk estimates have changed with every new report but the changes do not warrant changes in the NRC release criteria for nuclear power plants. Consequently, the biological effects data an~ d risk estimate changes do not alter the conclusions of the earlier work. Additional Reauirements Based on the TMI Accident As a result of " lessons learned" from the accident at the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear power plant, a number of new requirements were placed on US nuclear power plants. A number of the THI requirements reduce the likelihood of a severe accident, mitigate the consequences of a severe accident if it did occur, and facilitate emergency and protective actions. These new requirements were incorporated into the regulations after the 1980 study was completed and after the design features were establishe1 sr the reactors being considered in that study. To the extent that TMI requirements are
L t - . reflected in the designs being considered now, current reactor designs have enhanced safety with improved accident prevention and mitigation. Consequently, adherence to any of the TMI requirements does not alter the conclusions of the earlier work, i Plant Desian Differences The 1980 study was based on 950 MWe Westinghouse plants whereas the ) resent application is for 1,000 MWe Combustion Engineering plants. While t1ere may be significant differences from both the design and the operational perspectives, the two are essentially identical from a radiological perspective. The five percent difference in power level is within the uncertainty of the analysis. Also, in the NRC licensing system, the analytical methods for performing radiological analyses for pressurized light-water reactors (PWRs) are the same whether it is a Westinghouse PWR or a Combustion Engineering PWR, Thus, the design differences that may exist do not negate the validity of the conclusions of the 1980 study. CONCLUSION On the basis of its review, the staff confirms that the conclusions of the 1980 study with respect to the environmental impact on the global commons remain valid; with this supplemental review, the staff concludes that an appropriate environmental document exists that covers the proposed action. _ _ - -}}