ML20216C914
| ML20216C914 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 03/17/1998 |
| From: | Lochbaum D UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS |
| To: | Diaz N, Dicus G, Shirley Ann Jackson, Mcgaffigan E, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20216C898 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9805190437 | |
| Download: ML20216C914 (5) | |
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UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS March 17,1998 Chairman Shirley A. Jackson Commissioner Greta J. Dieus Commissioner Nils J. Diaz Commissioner Edward McGaffigan, Jr.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 I) ear Chairman Jackson and Commissioners:
Mr. Samuel J. Collins responded to our letters to you dated January 6 and 20,1998, with his letter dated March 11,1998. Although you were not on distnbution for Mr. Collins' letter, I assume you have seen it or can obtain a copy if you so desire. All three letters dealt with Millstone Unit 3's rudiness to restart.
In our January 6* letter, we requested that the NRC either require additional system assessments at Millstone Unit 3 or issue objective standards for determining wher. additional reviews are needed. By letter dated January 30,1998 Dr. William D. Travers detailed the criteria applied to findings from the Independent Corrective Action Verification Progmm (ICAVP) and corresponding NRC actions. That information was also provided in Mr. Collins' response to t.s. We reviewed this information carefully and concluded that it satisfies the second of our requested action options. Therefore, we are withdrawing our call for additional system assessments at Millstone Unit 3. We appreciate the staff's clarification on this matter.
According to Mr. Collins, "the purpose of the ICAVP is to confirm the effectiveness of the licensee's program in assuring that the plant's physical and functional characteristics are in conformance with its licensing and design bases." By any reasonable, objective measure, the results of the ICAVP to date unequis ocally demonstiate that this licensee's corrective action program is seriously flawed. The irrefutable sign is not in the overall number of discrepancy reports (DRs) generated by the ICAVP contractor, but in the number ofinadequate DR resolutions proposed by the licensee. For example:
DR-MP3-0015, Compliance with GDC 19: The ICAVP contractor reviewed NU's proposed disposition for this DR and stated: "NU has still not provided sufficient information for the ICAVP to conclude that the proposed actions will appropriately resolve the issue identified in the DR."
DR-MP3-0035, Not All Service Water IIcat Exch?ngers are included in the Surveillance Procedure Per LER 90-020-00: The ICAVP contractor stated: "We have reviewed NU's resolution to Discrepancy Report #DR-MP3-0035 and have determined that it does not provide enough additional information to resolve the discrepancy." (NOTE: This I.ER is 8 years old.]
Washington Office: 1616 P Street NW Suite 310. Washington DC 20036 1495 202-332-0900. FAX: 202-332 0905 Cambridge Headquarters: Two Ctattle Square. Cambridge MA 02238-9105 617-547-5552. FAX: 617-864-9405 Calsornia Office: 2397 Shattuck Avenue Suite 203. Berkeley CA 94704-1567. 510-843-1872. FAX: 510-843-3785 9805190437 980512 PDR ADOCK 05000423 G
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4 March 17,1998 Page 2 of 5 DR-MP3-0052, Pipe Support Calculation Discrepancy: The ICAVP contractor reporten. "NU's response for item #1 for the discrepancy report is not acceptable.. We are upgrading the significance levei for this discrepancy to 3 because the weld may be overstressed."
DR-MP3-0076, Max Operating Temperature Exceeds Allowable for Unsleeved Containment Penetrations 107 to 110: The ICAVP contractor stated: "We acknowledge and accept your disposition response related to the temperature limit of 200"F... We also acknowledge and accept your disposition response that elevated temperature loads applied to the penetration assembly by the attached piping have been evaluated in the referenced penetration calculation. Ilowever the DR was not written to address either of these issues." [NU got partial credit for a correct answer, but not full credit since it wasn't to the question asked.]
DR-MP3-0161. Flood Protection Procedures and Technical Specification Requirements Discrepancy: The ICAVP contractor stated: "The information provided to resolve item 1 is not sufficient, in that clear, unambiguous procedural guidance describing flood protection actions for sea water level above 13 feet stipulated in Te: Spec 3.7.6 is not evident.... There is no procedural guidance in either procedure SP3665.1 or AOP3569 that directs the operator to close the water tight doors and enter the LCO when the sea level is greater than 13 feet of when sea level surveillance is suspended." [ NOTE: This DR somehow camed a significance level of 4, despite the potential for inadequate flooding preventative actions.]
DR-MP3-0180, Technical Justification for Changes to FSAR: The ICAVP contractor stated:
"While most of the changes in FS ARCR 87-MP3-10 are clarifications, there is a change in FSARCR 87-MP3-10 which should not be characterized as a ' clarification' since the change affects the frequency of testing for the MSIVs from 'at least monthly' to ' quarterly.'.. As noted in the Licensee's response to this DR, the stand alone screening dated 2/28/97 which was performed for FS ARCR 95-MP3-16 determined that a 50.59 evaluation was required. Eight (8) months has elapsed since this determination and the Licensee reports in response to this DR (without explanation) that the 50.59 has yet to be completed. In the absence of funher information, it is considered the timeliness in completing such 50.59 evaluation is not acceptable." [ NOTE: The subject FSAR change notices are 11 and 3 years old, respectively, yet still unresolved.]
DR-MP3-0267, Design Criteria Discrepancy: The ICAVP contractor reported: "S&L cannot accept the statement that pipe support frames are ' typically free to expand thermally such that intemal stresses and the resultant connection loads are minimal.' Review of the support configurations identified several cases with rigid welded connections on both ends of the auxiliary steel members. This type of the configuration does not allow for the expansion due to thermal effects and will result in accumulation of high stresses in some instances."
DR-MP3-0514, Containment Enclosure Building Negative Pressure: The ICAVP contractor reported: "NU's response does not fully address the issues identified in the discrepancy report." The ICAVP contractor then provided 13 paragraphs detailed the deficiencies in NU's response.
DR-MP3-0566, Auxiliary Building Ventilation Ductwork Classification: The ICAVP contractor stated: "NU's response does ncu
, address the issues identified in the DR regarding the classification of the auxiliary building ventilation ductwork between the missile hood and the
March 17,1998 Page 3 of 5 ventilation vent.... Based on the FSAR and Reg Guide 1.52 requirements identified above and the 12/6/84 letter which states that ductwork associated with the safety related portions of the auxiliary building ventilation system is seismically qualified, the auxiliary building ductwork between the missile hood and the ventilation vent should be classified as QA Category I Seismic Category I ductwork." [ NOTE: The ductwork is presently is not so classified.]
DR-MP3-0580, Secondary Containment Drawdown with SLCRS and ABVS: NU posited that the issues raised in this DR "do not represent discrepant conditions." The ICAVP contractor reported: "NU's response should address why they do not consider this to be a discrepant condition."
DR-MP3-0658, ABVS Filter Unit Electric Heater Capacity: The ICAVP contractor reported:
" Disagree with NU's response that this is not a discrepant condition. This is a discrepant condition because FSAR Table 1.8-1 and Table 6.5-1 do not take exception to nor provide clarification to RG 1.52, Rev. 2, paragraph C.3.b requirements regarding capability of the electric heating coil to maintain relative humidity of air entering the adsorber below 70%."
DR-MP3-0670, CCP & CHS Area Ventilation System Winter Operation: The ICAVP contractor reported: "The impact of below freezing conditions, especially in the areas near the supply air discharge to the room, needs to be addressed. The results of this evaluation are needed to establish the final significance level of this DR."
The systems, functional areas, and technical issues covered by these DRs vary widely, but there is a recurring and extremely troubling theme - the licensee repeatedly failed to completely and adequately resolve the concerns identified in the DRs. A disturbing number of the DRs involved issues that had been raised several years earlier at Millstone. One assumes that the licensee is putting forth its best effort towards resolving these DRs. As demonstrated by the ICAVP contractor's appraisals for these DRs, that effort is simply inadequate. And these are not the only DR dispositions which the ICAVP contractor rejected. It is all too easy to find examples.
Befbrejoining UCS, I worked as a consultant on the Browns Ferry restart project in 1987, on the FitzPatrick design bases document project in 1992-1995, on the Indian Point 3 restart effort in 1995, and on the Salem Unit 2 restart effort in 1996. These projects all involved the disposition ofitems very, very similar te, those documented in the Millstone DRs. On some of these projects, I was responsible for resolving the items, while on other projects I was responsible for reviewing the resolutions developed by other groups. I never encountered a rejection rate nearly as high as that presently occurring at Millstone. I visited Mr. Martin Bowling and members of his staff at the Millstone site on February 20,1998, and listened to their explanation for the high rejection rate. I subsequently probed deeper into the ICAV'P contractor's reasons for rejecting NU's proposed dispositions. It is obvious that the standards at Millstone are not higher; NU's performance is lower. My conclusion thus remains the same - the Millstone licensee is doing an inadequate job on its corrective actions.
Two particularly alarming questions are raised by exorbitantly high rejection rate at Millstone:
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Left to its own devices (i.e., without the independent review by the ICAVP contractor), what confidence is there that this licensee will adequately resolve non-DR items?
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s-t March 17,1998 Page 4 of 5 Since this licensee cannot adequately resolve DRs, even knowing that each item will be scrutinized by the ICAVP contractor in a very public forum, it seems highly likely, if not a downright certainty, that the licensee's performance on non-DR items will be significantly lower.
I have little doubt that this licensee can eventually obtain adequate dispositions on the DRs given enough iterations through the ICAVP contractor. But the ICAVP contractor's role is not to guide this licensee to the proper destination. If this licensee is to safely operate Millstone Unit 3, it must demonstrate an ability to independently resolve discrepancies. Right now, this licensee is relying too heavily on ' guidance' from the ICAVP contractor. This licensee is supposed to have an adequate, stand-alone corrective action program, not one that depends on a ' trial and error' disposition process.
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Where is the NRC's Special Projects Office?
Other than obligatory appearances at the occasional public meeting, there are few discemable signs of the Special Projects Office's presence or involvement. From my discussions with Mr. Bowling and his staff at Millstone, I formed the very distinct impression that the Special Projects Staff has little involvement in the DR process other than to facilitate information exchanges between NU and the ICAVP contractor, The majority of recent issues at Millstone have been identified by citizens and the local media. The Special Projects Office appears to have assumed an unusually passive role. Rather than simply tell me that I'm wrong, I'd prefer that the Special Projects Office show me that I'm wrong.
If the Commission wants a metric on this licensee's corrective action capability, it could not possibly find one better than the licensee's performance dispositioning DRs identified by the ICAVP contractor. Right now, that metric is sending a very clear signal that this licensee does not have an adequate corrective action program. Millstone Unit 3 should not be permitted to restart until this licensee demonstrates acceptable performance on its corrective actions, l
In our January 20* letter, we described a bias in the NRC staff's evaluation process. Mr. Collins' response did not address this concern. Mr. Collins stated that "The NRC expects that the licensee will correct any safety-significant areas of noncompliance before restart." The problem, as we detailed in the January 20*
letter, is that the NRC lacks an objective standard distinguishing " safety-significant" items from other items.
The NRC's inability in this crucid area is not our opinion alone. Nor is it a recent NRC problem. In August 1987, the United Stated General Accounting Office concluded:
"NRC does not have guidelines that provide the utilities notice that a plant has safety or managet ent problems severe enough to warrant NRC's shutting the plant down. The Atomic Energy Act allows NRC to take this actions when reasonable assurance does not exist that the plants operate safely. Ilowever, NRC's commissioners cannot agree on the specific types and/or degree of safety problems that could endanger public health and safety such that NRC would l
require the utility to cease operations at a plant."'
i We maintain that the GAO's 1987 observation is valid today, particularly when applied to objective guidelines applied to safely restarting a problem plant.
- United States General Accounting Office," Nuclear Regulation: Efforts to Ensure Nuclear Power Plant Safety Can 13e Strengthened," GAO/RCED-87-141, August 1987.
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March 17,1998 Page 5 of 5 The GAO reaffirmed its conclusion just last May:
"While we are not making judgements on the safety of plants, the many safety problems identified in some plants raises questions about whether NRC's regulatory program is working as it should.
Determining the safety of plants is difficult because NRC does not precisely define safety. Instead, NRC presumes that plants are safe in they operate within their approved designs and in accordance with NRC's regulations. Because of the many redundant safety systems built into the plants' designs, NRC believes that plant are safe to operate even when some of their safety systems are not working properly."2 Mr. Collins' response stated that "The NRC's program is focused on assuring that each Millstone unit is in compliance with its licensing and design bases, including applicable NRC regulations." We presume that this is not a new NRC policy, but has been the NRC's policy since Millstone Unit 3 received its operating license in January 1986. Yet, as clearly demonstrated by the record $2.1 million civil penalty imposed by the NRC last December,' the plant operated in violation ofits licensing and design bases the entire time.
The more than five dozen violations cited in the civil penalty affected some of the most risk significant systems at the facility. Neither the licensee's testing programs or the NRC's inspection program corrected the discrepancies. Thus, it seems inadequate, and quite frankly somewhat galling, for the NRC staff to dismiss our concem by referencing the same standard and process that failed so many times over the past decade. Therefore, we respectfully request a substantive answer to the concern we raised in the January 20*
letter. We would be glad to meet with the Commission or the NRC staff to discuss the concem ifit will facilitate resolving this important safety issue.
Sincerely, hauMG David A.Locabaum Nuclear Safety Engineer i
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' United States General Accounting Office," Nuclear Regulation: Preventing Problem Plants Requires More Effective NRC Action," GAO/RCED-97-145, May 1997.
' Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Press Release No.97-180, "NRC Proposes $2.1 Millien In Fines For Violations At Millstone Station," December 10,1997.
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