ML20215N600

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Summary of 861021 Meeting W/Util & Sargent & Lundy in Bethesda,Md Re Design of Diesel Generators to Ensure Testing Does Not Impair Capability of Providing Emergency Power. Facility Design Unacceptable
ML20215N600
Person / Time
Site: Byron, Braidwood, 05000000
Issue date: 11/03/1986
From: Olshan L
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8611070060
Download: ML20215N600 (9)


Text

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o November 3, 1986 Docket Nos. STN 50-454 DISTRIBUTION STN 50-455 _ Docket m e: L. Olshan STN 50-456 NRC~PDR' "" OGC -

m and STN 50-457 PD#3 Rdg. E. Jordan <

Y J. Partlow B. Grimes se LICENSEE: Comonwealth Edison Company S. Varga ACRS(10) t E. Rossi J. Knight ,

t, FACILITIES: Byron Station, Units 1 and 2 A. Gill R. Karsch, .: 'l Braidwood Ststion, Units 1 and 2 F. Rosa R. Lobel J. Stevens

SUBJECT:

MEETING

SUMMARY

- DESIGN OF DIESEL GENERATORS TO ,

INSURE THAT TESTING DOES NOT IMPAIR CAPABILITY 0F PROVIDING EMERGEhCY POWER >( "

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On October 21, 1986, a meeting was held in Bethesda, Maryland, to discuss the Q J' capability of the Byron /Braidwood diesel generators to provide emergency power ,

if they are being tested. Members of the NRC, Comonwealth Edison (the licensee) and Sargent & Lundy (the architect-engineer) were present. Meeting attendees are listed in Enclosure 1. The material-handed out by the licensee and used during the meeting is included. in Enclosure 2.

The licensee described the actions that take place if a loss-of-coolant accident '*

(LOCA) and loss of offsite power (LOOP) occur while a diesel generator is being -

testing. All the actions needed to enable the diesel generator to provide ,i '

emergency power occur automatically, with one exception: The operator must take. '

manual action to place the diesel generator breaker control switch from the "after close" to the "after trip" position. ThelicenseesaidthatthisprevenO;.

.the diesel generator from being closed onto a faulted bus. The licensee stated ~

that the operators have been trained to take this action and that there is a high likelihood that the correct action will be taken in the required time.

The NRC state 1 that the Byron /Braidwood design is not acceptable because reliance on manual action does not . satisfy the NRC position. The NRC position, as stated in FSAR Question 40.181, is that all of these actions must be automatic. 1 s

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th'e 4 sign licensee 'on the agreed to submit four Byron a letter within

/Braidwood units so 10that daysallthat will commit actions neededto toaltering.

allow a dieseli;geneiator to supply emergency power when it is being tested will occur automatically. . The proposed design will also prevent the diesel generator from y

. e,. ..s closing onto as faulted bus. The NRC concurred with this approach.

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Mr. Dennis L. Farrar liyron Station Comonwealth Edison Company '

Units 1 and 2 CC' '

Mr. William Kortier Ms. Diane Chavez Atomic Power Distribution 528 Gregory Street Westinghouse Electric Corporation Rockford, Illinois 61108 Post Office Box 355 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 Regional Administrator, Region III i

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Michael Miller l 799 Roosevelt Road Isham, Lincoln & Beale < Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 One First National Plaza l 42nd Floor Joseph Gallo, Esq.x l Chicago, Illinois 60603 Isham, Lincoln & Beale l Suite 1100 Mrs. Phillip B. Johnson 1150 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

1907 Stratford Lane Washington,:D. C. 20036 Rockford, Illinois 61107 ,

Douglass Cassel, Esq..

Dr. Bruce von Zellen 109 N. Dearborn Street Department of Biological Sciences Suite 1300 Northern Illinois University Chicago, Illinois' 60602 DeKalb, Illinois 61107 Ms. Pat Morrison Mr. Edward R. Crass 5568 Thunderidge Drive Nuclear Safeguards & Licensing Rockford, Illinois 61107 Sargent & Lundy Engineers 55 East Monroe Street Ms. Lcrecine Creek Chicago, Illinois 60603 Rt. 1, Box 182 '

Manteno. Illincis 60950 Mr. Julian Hinds U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Byron / Resident Inspectors Offices '

4448 German Church Road Byron, Illinois 61010 Mr. Michael C. Parker, Chief Division of Engineering 3 Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety 1035 Outer Park Drive Springfield, Illinois 62704 s

1

  • t ENCLOSURE 1 DESIGN OF BYRON /BRAIDWOOD DIESEL GENERATORS OCTOBER 21, 1986 NRC COMMONWEALTH EDISON A.- Gill K. Ainger; -

R. Karsch* J. Dennehy J. Knight D. Farrar R. Lobel* T. Weis-L. Olshan F. Rosa SARGENT & LUNDY E. Rossi J..Stevens D. Galanis-B. G. Treece  ;

  • Part-Time Attendance f .l. '

i

- sARGENTO LUNDY cuo,ncen. Prepared by: D. P. Golanis emcaco Date: October 17, 1986

> BYRON /BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 Design of Diesel Generator Breaker Control Scheme Relative to Periodic Testing of the Diesel Generator Unit

1. Design Basis Requirements a) Regulatory Guide 1.108, Position C.l.b. (3)

" Periodic testing of diesel generator units should not impair the capability of the unit to supply emergency power within the required time. Where necessary, diesel generator unit design should include an emergency override of the test mode to permit response to bona fide signals."

b) IEEE STD 387-1977, Section 5.6.2._2_

"Upon receipt of a start-diesel signal the automatic control system shall provide automatic startup and automatic adjustment of speed and voltage to a ready-to-load condition."

(1) A start-diesel signal shall override all other operating modes and return control of the diesel-generator unit to the automatic control system.

c) FSAR Ouestion 040.181 d) FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.1 (Pages 8.3-2 through 8.3-7)

2. Design Description (Reference Schematic Diagram 20E-1-4030DG01)

During periodic testing, the Diesel Generator is synchronized with the preferred offsite power source and the Diesel Generator breaker is manually closed onto the 4.16kV bus via the control switch at the main control board. The breaker control switch ~

is then released in the "after close" position. A " Diesel Generator Trouble" alarm activates and a message (DG breaker auto-closure circuit not available) is printed by the Sequential Events Recorder alerting the operator that the Diesel Generator breaker is. incapable of responding to an automatic emergency closure signal. While operating in this mode, a simultaneous or sequential occurrence of a) a design basis accident (LOCA),

and (b) loss of offsite power, will result in the following:

The Diesel Generator governor is automatically shifted from the droop (test) to the isochronous (emergency) mode.

Page 1 of 2

October 17, 1986

.o 2 ~. Design Description (Reference Schematic Diagram 20E-1-4030DG01)

(Cont'd)

The voltage regulator is shifted to the automatic mode.

The Diesel Generator breaker is automatically tripped.

Undervoltage relays automatically trip all loads on the bus (except the 4160/480V transformer) and open the offsite source feed breaker.

An alarm is activated in the main control room alerting the operator that the Diesel Generator breaker has auto-matically tripped.

Emergency procedures require the operator to acknowledge the above alarm by placing the Diesel Generator breaker control switch from the "after close" to the "after trip" position.

The above operator action arms the Diesel Generator breaker auto-closing circuit and the breaker automatically re-closes

.onto the 4.16kV bus.

Sequential loading of the diesel generator is automatically performed with services required for the safe shutdown of the reactor.

In the existing (above) design, operator action is required to ensure the Diesel Generator breaker recloses onto the 4.16kV bus.

Automatic re-closure of the Diesel Generator breaker is prevented by the presence of the "STP" control switch contact in the breaker auto-closure control scheme. The purpose of the "STP" control switch contact is to prevent the breaker from automatically reclosing onto the bus (after it has automatically tripped) without the operator first investigating the cause of the trip (possibly a bus fault). Furthermore, the "STP" control switch contact safe-guards against cycling of the circuit breaker under certain operating conditions, (e.g., an overload / fault while the Diesel Generator is connected onto the 4.16kV bus after a loss of offsite power condition).

Page 2 of 2

2 j B/B-FSAR AMENDMENT 37 .

MARCH 1982 QUESTION 040.181 l

"IEEE-387-77 Section 5.6. 2. 2 (1) and Regulatory Gu.ide 1.108 position C.l.b.3 recommend that the periodic testing of diesel generator units should not impair the capability ,

of the unit to supply emergency power within the required time.  :

guidelines The following discussion provides the necesary (requirements) to meet the objective of the-  !

above referred Industry Standard and Regulatory Guide.

"The diesel generator unit design should include an emergency override of the test mode to permit response to bona fide emergency signals and return control of the diesel-generator unit to the automatic control system.i A-design which does not have such a feature would neces-sitate operator action of varying levels of complexity depending on the specific design and plant conditions, in order to enable a diesel-generator in the test mode to respond to a bona fide emergency signal. The concern

, here is the possible consequent disabling of a D/G due to operator's inaction or wrong action thereby reducing the available safety margin with regard to onsite a-c i power at a time when it is most needed. l I

"Each die a frequen,sel generator must be periodically tested at .

cy as specified in R.G. 1.108. I is normally once per month but could be as high as onceThis test frequency every three days.

hour. The duration of each test is one

. During a normal successful test the diesel generator is loaded on its bus with the governor operating in

! a droop mode, and the load carried by the diesel engine

, is a function of governor speed and speed droop setting.  ;

In order to enable a diesel generator in the test mode

.to respond to 'a bona fide emergency signal, the design must incorporate the following features for the stated plant conditions:

1

1. Accident Conditions t..

During the periodic testing of a diesel generator, if a safety injection signal is generated, the diesel generator breaker should be tripped automatically.

'This will permit the unit to be cleared from parallel y operation with the system and enable the diesel generator to attain the emergency standby mode.

In this mode of operation, the diesel governor control should change automatically to the isochronous mode

\mil which will maintain the ' engine running at a synchronous speed corr,esponding to 60 Hz at the generator terminals.

All noncritical protective trips except engine overspeed 4

and generator differential should be bypassed for Q40.181-1 l

d -

B/B-FSAR AMENDMENT 37 MARCH 1982 this accident' condition. Additionally, the voltage regulator should change to the automatic mode thereby maintaining the generator at a preset constant voltage.

With the above actions complete, the diesel generator /

unit will be ready to accept the required load in the event of a loss of offsite power. {

J

2. Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) Conditions Normally, during periodic testing of diesel generator, the diesel generator is paralleled with the offsite power system. During such a test, should a LOOP occur, a LOOP signal would probably not be generated because the D/G would attempt to provide power to the bus and to the offsite system through the closed offsite power feedbreaker. In-this case, the D/G breaker will trip on overcurrent or underfrequency and in some designs the D/G breaker also locks out for this condition. To assure the continued avail-ability of the D/G unit it is essential that the diesel generator breaker should not be locked out for such overload conditions. At the same time, the governor is shifted automatically from droop to isochronous mode and the voltage regulator to automatic mode. With the above actions complete, the diesel generator unit will be ready to accept e its required load for LOOP conditions.
3. Accident Conditions / LOOP For simultaneous accident / LOOP condition or sequential i accident and LOOP condition, the requirements stated in items 1 and/or 2 uould be adequate to assure the restoration of the diesel generator from the  !

test mode to the emergency mode.

Provide a discussion how you meet the above stated guidelines." .

RESPONSE

We agree with the guidelines set forth in this question-to meet the requirements of IEEE-387 Section 5.6.2.2(1) and Regualtory Guide 1.108 Position C.l.b.3. The Byron /

Braidwood diesel-generator system design includes emergency override of the test mode for both accident conditions (Safety N-}-

Injection) and loss of offsite power (LOOP) to permit response to bona fide emergency signals and return control of the diesel-generator to the automatic control system. Upon Q40.181-2

s i -

B/B-FSAR AMENDMENT 37 MARCH 1982 receipt of either a safety injection signal or a loss of offsite power signal, the governor is auto-matically shifted from droop to the isochronous mode and the voltage regulator is shifted to the automatic mode. Therefore, the diesel-generator breaker controls will be revised to trip the breaker upon receipt of a safety injection signal concurrent with the diesel generator operating in the test mode. Also, the Byron /Braidwood diesel-generator breaker control scheme does not lock out the diesel-generator breaker on overcurrent or underfrequency which assures the availability of the diesel generator to accept its required load for LOOP conditions.

.O 040.181-3 l