ML20215M590
| ML20215M590 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 10/23/1986 |
| From: | Zupko J Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM) |
| References | |
| 86-7, NUDOCS 8611030044 | |
| Download: ML20215M590 (3) | |
Text
F 0 PSEG Public Service Electric and Gas Cor pany P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station October 23, 1986 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Dear Sir SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 UNIT NO. 2 REPORT 86-7 SPECIAL REPORT This Special Report describes a pressurizer overpressure protection system (POPS) actuation on September 24, 1986.
It is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.4.10.3.
This report is required within thirty (30) days of discovery.
Sincerely yours, J. M. Zupko, Jr.
General Manager-Salem Operations MJPapc Distribution 8611030044 861023 gDR ADOCK 05000311 PDR i
The Energy People
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4 SPECIAL REPORT NUMBER 86-7 PLANT _IDENTIFICATIONt 831em Generating Station - Unit 2
'Public Service Electric & Gas Company H ncock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:
Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System Channels I & II Actuation Event Date(s):
9/24/86 Report Date:
10/23/86 This report was initiated by Incident Report No.86-309 i
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:
l Mode 5 - Reactor Power Level 04 - Unit Load 0 MWe j
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:
This Special Report describes a Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System (POPS) actuation which occurred on September 24, 1986, during Reactor Coolant System (RCS) fill and vent operations.
This report is submitted for information in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.4.10.3.c. which states:
i j
In the event that either the POPS's or the RCS vents are used to i
mitigate an RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to
{
Specification 6.9.2 within thirty (30) days.
The report shall j
describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect j
of the. POPS's or vents on the transient and any corrective l
action necessary to prevent recurrence.
On September 24, 1986, the Unit was in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) with Reactor coolant System (RCS) fill and vent operations in progress.
At 0604 hours0.00699 days <br />0.168 hours <br />9.986772e-4 weeks <br />2.29822e-4 months <br />, No. 22 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) was started.
The resultant pressure transient actuated both Pressurizer Overpressure Protection Channels (Power Operated Relief Valves 2PR1 and 2PR2).
The highest indicated pressure was approximately 360 psig.
Both POPS valves closed within a few seconds following actuation and the RCS pressure returned to approximately 325 psig.
APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:
The induced pressure transient, caused by starting No. 22 RCP, i
actuated 2PR1 and 2PR2.
The valves actuated at minimum " indicated" (the error in reading the transmitter) pressure of between 340 and 350~psig.
Technical Specifications require the setpoint to be below 375 psig.
Since-reactor coolant pump operations require the RCS i
pressure to be at a minimum value of approximately 325 psig the pressure transient caused by the start of the No. 22 RCP was enough to increase the RCS pressure above the POPS actuation setpoint.
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SPECIAL REPORT 86-7 1 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENC5:
1 The vent and reactor coolant pump operations were performed in accordance with the respective procedures.
The RCP was not started (to get entrained air out of the Steam Generator) until the minimum pressure of 325 psig was reached.
Also, all Steam Generator secondary temperatures were less than fifty degrees farenheit above the RCS loop temperatures.
The maximum indicated pressure was i
approximately 360 psig.
Valves 2PR1 and 2PR2 remained open for a i
minimum amount of time (a few seconds) following actuation.
Had either of the valves failed to close, the operator would have responded by closing the blocking valves (2PR6 and 2PR7).
All systems and indications functioned as designed.
There was no undue risk to the health or safety of the public due to this event.
In accordance with Technical Specification Action Statement 3.4.10.3.c, because the POPS was actuated to mitigate a RCS pressure transient, this Special Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of Technical Specification 6.9.2.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
Because the allowable instrument and channel tolerances can reduce the margin between the minimum required pressure for RCP operation and POPS channel setpoints (the indicated error), the pressure transient resulting from starting a RCP may cause actuation of either i
or both POPS channels.
A review of the Operations procedures involved shows that sufficient operator guidance is given.
No procedure modifications are required.
A review is being conducted to identify ways to avoid this type of POPS actuation in the future (Reference SORC Open Item 86-089-01).
This event will be reviewed by the Nuclear Training Department for applicability in the licensed operator training programs.
M V
3 General Manager -
Salem Operations l
l MJPapc SORC Mtg.86-089 l
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