ML20215M313
| ML20215M313 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 06/22/1987 |
| From: | OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215L442 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8706260349 | |
| Download: ML20215M313 (9) | |
Text
=
TABLE 2-5 Instrumentation Ooeratine Recuirements for Other Safety Feature Functions '
~ Minimum Minimum Permissible Operable Degree of Bypass No. Punctional Unit Channels Redundancy Conditions 1 CEA Position Indication 1 None None Systems 2 Pressurizer Level 1 None Not Applicable 3 Subuvulius Mu231u 1 Ncac Not-Appideable-
- onitor
~4 3 PORV Acoustic Position 1"C None Not Applicable ,
Indication-Direct !
Tr 'f Safety Valve Acoustic 1"C None Not Applicable I Position Indication ,
PORV/ safety valve Tail db
- 4. 5~ l None Not Applicable Pipe Temperature j NOTES:
$ Y a One cha nel per valve l b One RTD for bo PORV s; two RTD's, one for each code safety. l c If item f'is o erabl , requirements of specification 2.15 are modi-fied for items and to " Restore inoperable channels to operability within 7 days or be in hot shutdown within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />."
d If items and are o rable, requirements of specification 2.15 are modified or item to " Restore inoperable channels to oper-withi 7 days r be in hot shutdown "ithin 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />."
ability \
3 g 15 1 4
8706260349 8706422 PDR ADOCK 05000285 p PDR l
AmendmentNo..idedh 2,70 l
l j
1 j
. i l
1 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPE!tATION 2.21 Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation I
- Applicability Applies to post-accident munitoring instrumentation not included as part of the Reactor Protective System or Engineered Safety Features. ;
This specification is applicable while in modes 1, 2 and 3. l Objective To assure that instrumenta:1on necessary to monitor plant parameters during post-accident conditions is operable or that backup methods of analysis are available.
i Specifications Post-accident instrumentation shall be operable as provided in Table 2-10. l If the required instrumentation is not operable, then the appropriate action specified in Table 2-10 shall be taken.
Basis Pos t-accident monitoring instrumentation provides information , .uring and following an accident, which is considered helpful to tM cperator in determining the plant condition. It is desirable that this instru- j mentation be operable at all times during operation of the plant. 1 However, none of the post-accident monitors are required for safe shutdown of the plant nor are any control or safety actions initiated by the monitors.
In general, the post-accident monitors provide wide range capabilities i for parameters which are beyond the range of normal protective and control ins trumentation. They also provide remote sampling and analysis capability to reduce personnel exposure under post-accident j
conditions. Because the information ne;essary to assess the effect of an accident (i.e. , core damage) can be obtained from other sources and J i by manual methods, it is not necessary that the post-accident monitors be operable at all times. 1 TM Sabcc>e lecl rn n rmni4.o 7 yg llcohcl Junediori Therrnocouf de- ) Theermauple ( CET) comprisedhe (HJTchnd 4h* c re Ex inae se coce sco I n*=enMa (
- 0 44"" . 9"]* L l
.tcm~IlF 2 E g -o73-s c4bilit cfthe pkt'd oPc'^f*r b [t The funchon of f he ic 4hc endence M
<cac3#' '"#
unc( he recovenj from ICC . Add' '?ge .He c<pproacht) on"U n Mc 4wd indyunenIS a r*' '# crude *t
,nen by . Thc6 '
. Lder g3 97. TH am not rTflul'e CN f*
4hc mT 64 Nuns$he P*d D '
,,npc 4e !
2-97 Amendment No. SI,[
- 6
]
f '.) l t
,a e _2V6n M0 TC AR av _ (kn&Ofb n a f*C O O O f*
- c. bessel level (elJTC) channe( ore 'noprnWe; i repairs ma.q onik he presibk lduring b ned refueling outage.. Thie .
ie 5ccause b sensors arc. auedble. onl3 JFer 4c midic sheids am removed, an A & ceceb- veue ( heocl ; che frogs are emovecl . I+ is not hsible k repaic+ Tchannel excepF during o. refueling .oJac)e. Ifonl3 o, ne c Aan nel k inopca6le, i 4.shoallbe cesfore cl 4 crecate. sJ d us in a. refuehj odage as s~n as. reasonah possh e. Tf both chaanels are. iogem% ; o k lea d en e sannel s w l be res%d la ope <able-et d us A r'n3he nex? refuel outge. The cae ee- %ermocoup es u>ere indaIIec: pusuavd 40 RugeG-o757 I here- are seven (7) insktlecf per-core padrad , &v of mMch wee ceguired by -b M ueEG. Tkis ;is ehnkd via 4he fwknote.40 Tohle 2-Io. h a --
..._,,. . . . A
i 1 TABLE 2-10 l Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Operating Limits Minimum
. Operable Instrument Ch annels Action
- 1. Containment Wide Range Radiation Monitors (RM-091A & B) 2 (g)
- 2. Wide Range Noble Gas Stack Monitor RM-063L (Noble Gas Portion Only) 1 (a)
RM-063M (Noble Gas Portion Only) 1 (a) RM-063H (Noble Gas Portion Only) 1 (a)
- 3. Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor (RM-064) 1 (a) i
- 4. Containment Hydrogen Monitor (VA-81A & B) 2 (b)(c}
- 5. Containment Water Level Narrow Range (LT-599 & LT-600) 1 (d)
Wide Range (LT-387 & LT-388) 2 (b)(c) l 6 Containment Wide Range Pressure 2 (b)(c) l Ma dM 3 ->(a) With the number of OPERABLE channels less than re: I channels operable requirements, initiate the pre-planned alternate method of monitoring the appropriate parameter (s) within 72 hours, and
)
- 1. either restore the inoperable channel (s) to ,0PERABLE status within -
7' days of the event, or
- 2. prepare and submit a special report to the Commission pursuant to specification 5.9.3 within 14 days following the event outlining t the action taken, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans !
and schedules for restoring the system to OPERABLE status. (b) With one channel inoperable, restore the inoperable monitor to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours. (c) With both channels inoperable, restore at leas t one channel to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours. (d) With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the minimum channels operable requirements, operation may continue until the next cold shutdown, at which time the required channel (s) shall be made operabic. )SCL ggchec) , 2-98 Amendment No . 81, 87, S 7. , e
~
y Add The Following To Table 2-10: (E)(F)
~
- 7. Reactor Coolant System Subcooled Margin Monitor 2
- 8. Core Exit Thermocouples (I) 2/ Core Quadrant (G)(H)
- 9. Reactor vessel level (HJTC) (J) 2 (K) (L)
Add The Following Footnotes To The Table: E. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the minimum channels l operable requirement, either !
- 1. restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status withii 7 days, or
- 2. initiate an alternate means of monitoring the subcooled margin, or
- 3. be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
F. With both channels inoperable,
- 1. restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours, or
- 2. . initiate an alternate means of monitoring the subcooled margin, or
- 3. be in at least H0T SHUTOOWN within the next 12 hours.
G. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the minimum channeis operable requirement, either restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE ! status within 7 days, or be in at least HOT SHUTOOWN within the next 12 hours. H. With both channels inoperable, either restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT SHUT 00WN within the next 12 hours. I. With the number of OPERABLE Core Exit Thermocouples less than the four required by NUREG-0737, either restore to at least four OPERABLE channels within seven days of discovery of loss of operability, or prepare and submit a special report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 5.9.3 within 30 days, out-lining the actions taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans for restoring the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. J. .A channel is eight sensors in a probe. A channel is OPERABLE if four or more sensors, two or more in the upper four and two or more in the lower four, are OPERABLE.
. 1
t i m r i e d r l w
, e e o t w t p d u o s nt p n y d ai i c n
o . t y a h s ss . c g e . t t tb t n a g t e u uu u e r u M p ps p g e e p . n n n r k m n t e i i e i e o . e i u c c . m rn p n . e . ens . c e t o n . c . n a k r k rat k i si o k i k i l c u c ut u c t n . t c t c l e s e ssp e s o e ei y e s e n i h s h sin h u v vs t h u h w e c e c esi c o n l l o i c o c o v r re c o a ap l c n v v a r l p l prD l a i . i . t t k - G u e e T e t y h by i i y N S n n n nnR n y al e kc al u y u I T n a w o n a ww oor n a l p rp ep l c ct ei rp ep c r l p c r l p S h n h nno h p pu y h w pu i p i p E S C K C Kkf C A O s C C s Os C A C A T L _ O D R N T A N O S C N O D y I N c T A n -
) A e .
d R N u - e B O q M R M R M R R Q R R M R M R - u I I e n L T r - F i A A t C T n N . o . E _ 9 C S M ( K U C R 3 E T
- H S 3 C N e I c E R nn e e e e e e L O S ao t t t t a
t a t a B F U li a a a A O lt r r r y r y r r . T S E i c k b k b k b f k b f k b k b E N en c i c i c i i c i i c i c i I A vu e l e l e l r e l r e l e l C L rF h a h a h a e h a e h a h a N L E E S u C C C C C C V C C V C C C C - U C _ Q S E I _ R ! F c - F i n M O ~ t o U w r- s u i M o bre t n I o ao l N 1 f i n l F r AtMe A c n ri et pa i c t n i T a o e d o O c so i t n ni i ui e t a at ed ot ve i p d v i g r nc a vn lI ca A c l r au - r e a oi a i Vt c e M id V n ed a s F - t n o vn yr e dg aI ki l I t e _ D y a r ct a ep _ r en oi V n f m _ l a eM po l s o ae e i o Oi B o yi ST n l o t P tt / n i c Vi V ei V e a x b R s Rd rs R p h u u O o O n ao Oi C A S PP P a SP PP 9 0 1 2 3 a 1 2 2 2 2 12 - g pl" , nu i tP o Y'dP _
5 r . n
- s.
r s. mkcr ce C e d u e m lr c o e t d n a [or ve r r fr vi v F s n o u m ne os f o r s g n.C o e 0 0 3 &g.c l s s g d elii bbg s w o mn/eDeg k n l tnAi i on l e fa o d a mnA ov b ahco f t r d o e r n foAaro s n h . o c n i a x n >n ai nw t f s i a M e ol e t a n m e btnb o e nn r halnu m r r ah n 2d pn raK on b e c n sa ih rc i l rd rsE r G l l a a pt a c b h bd t a u mubim o cl e a o N I T S i e v r mn oa Cd G s a Ye Crc w a r e p m CrCf r u e E T S L S a b a b t a b DO r N R e A T v N y e S O n N C c e O n h I D e w
)
d e T N A A R u q e r S Q 1 0 R k ey el M R B N "h u I O F t n L I 5 n - i A T " o t C A m n T i - o , N v; C ( S K M E eF S
}c 3
C U E R e c t e /a p0 0 kc m
- H T nn ao a
r m n3 e h 3 C S N li k b kr b i h w h h E R I l t c i b t o C a L B O F S i c en h e l a & C o il web C A U vu C C C . T S 0 E E rF u . . . d en a h I C A N S a b a b mw ro N L m od E U Q C L E fld roe eol
.bp E S R I F M pcl t gt oes a mJ cB M F U O )
nl n i at nl M I H 3 L fd il s rl N I N U pc oi i-FE M o n 4
, D C
u tda d 7V i t 0 2 o ree al h n i d p m i r N ( b i t u sdl ee da n s c B Y hhs ccs nA D e A 7 8 E x i yf t s ase e o v A fc f i l e n n 2 6 S
- e r
li t rh eS yl ll n yh o t r tt yh a o r o c rt o dD l a e Y a Cx I rhl t umoia C h Y acinn uaaon8rPr ire k( t QEDMA1P
- 1 0
Q5DMARPP M 3 3
~k" F@@@ ?
5 &'
.o ATTACHMENT C Justification and No Significant Hazards j Consideration Discussion )
i i Omaha Public Power District (0 PPD) proposes to change the Fort Calhoun Station j Technical Specifications as follows. The request is to revise Section 2.15, 1 Instrumentation and Control System, Section 2.21, Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, and Section 3.1, Instrumentation and Control Systems Surveillance Requirements. ! The proposed changes add Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation (ICCI) to l Technical Specification 2.21, Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation. Added ' are the Heated Junction Thermocouples (HJTC) and Core Exit Thermocouples, ! (CET). The Subcooled Margin Monitor (SMM) is moved from Section 2.15, Instrumentation and Control to Section 2.21. Additionally, the surveillance i requirements for these components are added to Table 3-3. This implements Item II.F.2 " Instrumentation for Detection of Inadequate Core Cooling," as required ' by NRC Generic Letter No. 83-37, NUREG-0737 Technical Specification, dated November 1, 1983. Following the March 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island Unit 2, many features were added to nuclear power plants to enhance the ability of the operator to manage accidents and transients. The ICCI System is one of these ' enhancements and serves to provide information to the plant operators relative to Reactor Coolant System (RCS) inventory. The proposed change adds the ICCI System to the Technical Specifications to reflect its incorporation into the i plant. 1 A statement concerning required number of channels is included as a footnote to Table 2-10, (item (I)). Item (I) requires a special report to be submitted within 30 days if the number of operable channels falls below the required number of channels for greater than 7 days. As alternate means exist for the calculation of the subcooled margin, (separate from the calculation done via the " inadequate core cooling system instrumentation"), the Specification for the Reactor Coolant System subcooled margin monitor provides an additional alternative to plant shutdown. The action statements (as noted in footnotes E and F), allow for restoring the inoperable channel (s) to operable status within 7 days, or initiating an alternate means of determining the subcooled margin, or initiating a plant j shutdown within the next 12 hours. I l Pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.92, the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications were assessed to determine if there was potential for a significant hazards finding. l Will the proposed change increase significantly the probability or consequences t of any accident of malfunction of equipment previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report? i ( .
,c ..:
Attachment C (Continued) I No, the implementation of the proposed changes would not significantly increase l the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated. The I inadequate core cooling instrumentation system was installed in order to ' provide for the post accident monitoring of the condition of the reactor core. The systems themselves only serve in a monitoring capacity, and do not directly control any automatic function associated with the accident. Failure of any portion of the system would be, first of all, controlled by the added limiting conditions for operation, assuring that the operations Staff is aware of the requirements of the system. _ Additionally, the failure of the system would have ! no impact on the course of any accident previously analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report. By adding limiting conditions for operation, the likelihood of any accident occurring with the system unavailable is lessened. Will the proposed change in any way create the possibility for a new or different accident than any previously analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report? 3 No, since the proposed change is only intended to impose operability ' requirements on an existing system. The imposition of these requirements in no way creates any new or different accidents than those previously included in the Safety Analysis Report. ; Does the proposed change significantly reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of the Technical Specifications? No, because this change is intended to impose operability requirements on the ! Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation System. It does not lessen any requirements of the existing Technical Specifications, and hence does not reduce the margin of safety. For the above reasons, the Omaha Public Power District does not believe that , the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications involve any significant hazards considerations. The commission has provided guidance concerning the application of the stand-ards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists by providing certain examples (51 FR 7751) of amendments that are considered not l likely to involve significant hazards considerations. Example (ii) relates to a change that constitutes an additional limitation, restriction, or control not presently included in the Technical Specifications, e.g., a more stringent surveillance requirement. The proposed change is representative of Example ! (ii) in that it is an addition to the post-accident monitoring instrumentation ' required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Post TMI Action Plan. Based on the above discussion, the proposed change does not involve a signifi- < cant hazards consideration in that it does not: (1) involve a significant [- increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evalua-ted; (2) create the possibility of an new or different kind of accident from i any accident previously evaluated; or-(3) involve a significant reduction in a ' margin of safety. In addition, it is concluded that: (1) there is reasonable j assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the proposed change; and that (2) these proposed Technical Specifications will not result in a condition which alters the impact of the station on the environment as described in the NRC's Final Environmental Statement. I}}