ML20215M200

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Insp Rept 99900337/87-01 on 870331-0401.No Violations, Nonconformances or Unresolved Items Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Corrective Action Taken Re 840830 10CFR21 Rept, Selected Records & Witness Tests on Pressure Switches
ML20215M200
Person / Time
Issue date: 05/07/1987
From: Naidu K, Stone J
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20215M182 List:
References
REF-PT21-87, REF-QA-99900337 NUDOCS 8705130119
Download: ML20215M200 (6)


Text

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GRGANIZATION: PAUL MONROE HYDRAULICS, If400RPORATED ORANGE, CALIFORNIA REPORT INSPECTION INSPECTION NO.: 99900337/87-01 DATES: 3/31-4/1/87 OH-SITE HOURS:

16 CORRESPONDENCE ADCRESS: Faul Monroe Hydraulics, Incorporated ATTN:

F. Erlach President 1701 West Sequoia Avenue Orange, California S2668 ORGANIZATIONAL CONTACT:

R. C. Fisher TELEPHONE NUMEER:

714-978-9600 NUCLEAR INDUSTRY ACTIVITY: Hydraulic snubbers and hydraulic actuators for valves.

Refurbishment of actuators manufactured by others.

A ASSIGNED INSPECTOR:

Y age k7/#7 K. R. Na'idu', Program Development and fe_ active Date Inspection Section (PDRIS)

OTHERINSPECTOR(S):

~

87f7 AFFR0VED BY:

J.C.ftone, Chief,FDTIS7Ye'ndorInspectTonBranch ae IhSFECTION EASES AND SCOPE:

A.

BASES:

10 CFR Part 21 and Appendix B to 10 CFR 50.

B.

SCOPE:

Review corrective action taken relative to a 10 CFR Part 21 report dated August 30, 1984, review selected records, and witness tests en pressure switches installed in hydraulic valve actuators which leaked oil at the South Texas Project.

FLANT SITE APPLICABILITY: South Texas Project Units 1 & 2 (50-498; 499).

8705130119 870511 PDR GA999 ENVMUNH 99900337 PDR

ORGANIZATION: PAUL MONR0E HYDRAULICS, INCORPORATED ORANGE, CALIFORNIA REPORT INSPECTION Nn - QQQnn197/R7 n1 RESUITS-PAGF 7 nf 6 A.

VIOLATIONS:

No violations were identified during this inspection.

B.

N0]!C0NFORMANCES:

No nonconformances were identified during this inspection.

C.

UNRESOLVED ITEMS:

No unresolved items were identified during this inspection.

D.

INSPECTION FINDINGS AND OTHER COMMENTS:

1.

Background Information Paul-Monroe Hydraulics (PMH) manufactures hydraulic snubbers and hydraulic valve actuators to operate valves manufactured by others.

PMH also services hydraulic valve actuators manufactured by others who have since discontinued production.

PMH provided hydraulic actuators to operate valves manufactured by Control Components, Incorporated. These valves are used as power operated relief valves at the South Texas Project Nuclear Power Plant.

2.

Review of 10 CFR Part 21 Report On August 30, 1984, PMH informed the NRC Region.1 office of potential problems in hydraulic valve actuators installed in the Limerick Nuclear Power Plant. PMH supplied similar actuators to Byron 1 & 2, Braidwood 1 & 2, Limerick 2, and kPPS 1 & 4.

Specifically, the hydraulic pump, that maintains hydraulic pressure in an accumulator that supplies fluid to operate the valve ac'.uator, cycled more frequently than specified in the PMH operation manual.

PMH stated that frequent cycling to recharge the accumulator does not prevent the system from performing its intended function.

However, it reduced compenent life and caused the system to operate at elevated temperatures which could, at some point, cause automatic shutdown of the unit. PMH determined that the frequent cycling occurred because of pressure leakage from three components a) the solenoid operated directional control valve, b) the piston seals in the valve actuator and c) the gas precharge in the accumulator. PMH established corrective action to prevent recurrence as follows:

ORGANIZATICN.

PAUL MONROE HYDRAULICS, INCORPORATED ORANGE, CALIFORNIA REPORT INSPECTION QQQnO197/P7.nl RFStil TS ?

PAGF 3 nf 6 NO a.

The solenoid operated directional control valve, manufactured by Kean Controls Corporation, leaked because the solenoid seating surfaces were scored during fabrication or from previous fluid contamination.

The suspect valves were replaced.

Other solenoid valves were monitored and repaired.

PMH currently performs source inspection on each valve.

b.

Hydraulic fluid was found to be leaking past the piston seal of the Flotork actuator.

PMH re-bronzed the pistons' and rehoned the cylinder barrel walls. To prevent recurrence, PMH assigned a PKh unique part number in the bill of material which requires Flotork to rebronze the piston and the cylinder walls in actuators ordered by PMH.

c.

Four accumulators were observed to have porosity on the inner surface.

PMH replaced the defective accumulators with tested accumulators. To prevent recurrence, each accumulator is pressure tested prior to acceptance.

No problems have been identified subsequent to this corrective actior,.

3.

Review of the 10 CFR Part 50.55(e) Condition On liarch 23, 1987, Houston Light and Power Company, the owners of the South Texas Project Nuclear Power Plant (STP) reported to the NRC that during hot functional testing of Unit 1, the pressure switches installed in the hydraulic actuators (HA) manufactured by PMH leaked oil. The HAs operate valves manufactured by Control Components Incorporated (CCI) and as a unit function as power operated relief valve (PORV).

In this case, CCI is the contractor, PMH is the subcontractor to CCI.

Each HA is equipped with three pressure switches (PS) manufactured by ITT NeoDyn (NeoDyn).

One PS monitors the nitrogen pressure in the hydraulic oil accun.ulator. The second PS monitors the oil pressure and starts the hydraulic oil pump motor when the accumulator pressure drops to a specified value. The third PS stops the hydraulic oil pump motor when the accumulator pressure reaches a predetermined value.

Six of the eight oil PSs installed on the four HAs leaked oil. The four nitrogen pressure switches did not leak. The leaking oil PSs were replaced with the enes intended for Unit 2.

STP returned three of the six failed PSs switches to PMH for tests and evaluation. The inspector reviewed the pertinent documents at PFH located in Orange, CA and observed tests performed on the returned PSs at NeoDyn located in Chatsworth, CA.

t.

o ORGANIZATION:

PAUL MONR0E HYDRAULICS, INCORPORATED ORANGE, CALIFORhlA REPORT INSPECTION Mn. QQQno197/A7_n1 RF91 HTS?

ParJ a nf A a.

Review of Chronology of Events The inspector reviewed the chronological sunmary of communica-tions between STP and PMH and determined the following:

1)

On February 28, 1987, the HAs performed satisfactorily as documented in the PMH service report.

2)

On March 5, 1987, STP initiated Nonconformance Report SJ-03470 dated March 5, 1987, documenting that a total four PSs installed in four actuators leaked. The PSs were replaced, tested and determined acceptable.

3)

On March 11, 1987, two additional PS leaked.

4)

March 16,1987, PMH to STP inquired whether the PORV HAs were exercised as required by PMH maintenance manual during the storage period of years in the warehouse.

5)

March 23, 1987, telephone notes from STP to PMH indicated that a honconformance Report was initiated to document that the HAs were not exercised according to the manufacturer's recommended maintenance instructions during storage in the warehouse.

C)

On March 25, 1987, three of six PSs were shipped to PhH along with two failed servoamplifiers.

4.

ObservationofTes_tsatITTNeoDyn(Chatsworthj On April 1,1987, NeoDyn performed tests on 3 PSs returned from STP, identified as AIMS-PSH-7411, AIMS-PSL-7411 and CIMS-PSL-7431.

All three switches were type 100 P15780 and have a date code 84-09 indicating that they were manufactured in September 1984.

In this type of PS, a teflon coated polymide diaphragm senses the process pressure and transmits it to an actuating mechanism. The diaphragm isolates the process from the motion transfer drive and is held in place between the pressure port, 0-ring assembly and the pressure plate. Hence, perforation of the diaphragm will permit oil to enter the motion transfer device and exit through the electrical conouit box.

1

.~

c ORGANIZATION:

PAUL MONR0E HYDRAULICS, INCORPORATED 0RANCE, CALIFORNIA i

REPORT INSPECTION MA QQ0rn197/R7.01 RF9fff TS-PAnF 5 nf 6 During the test, all three pressure switches leaked when subjected to air pressure forcing remnant oil through the motion transfer device mechanism. The pressure switches were disassembled and the diaphragms were examined. Black particles were observed on two of the three diaphragms. The preliminary conclusion was that particles in the hydraulic oil deposited on the diaphragm and may have caused perforations. NeoDyn stated that the particles on the diaphragm and samples of the oil which was expelled from the switch during air pressure tests would be sent for chemical analysis.

The body and pressure plate of each switch would be further examined.

The damaged diaphragns were replaced in the three PSs and the PSs were retested with air pressure. The PSs held 3000 psi without leaks and were verified to actuate to the high and low setpoints.

5.

Review of HA Record _s_

The inspector reviewed the available documentation at FhH on the HAs supplied to CCI. The documentation was in the form of final data packages (DP) for eight HAs with serial numbers PF 89270-500-01 through 08. The DPs indicate that HAs were tested at PMH during November 2 through December 8, 1984. Each DP contained the following:

a.

Certificate of Ccnformance certifying that the HA is in accord-ance with the CCI purchase order and applicat.le requirements of PMh quality assurance program and that the HA has been qualified to the applicable requirements specified in specification 652/800/1, Revision 0.

b.

An " Acceptance Test Procedure for Linear Valve Modulating Operator" checklist was used to document the test results.

A quality control representative witnessed the tests as evidenced by his signoffs.

c.

Certificate of Conformance (CoC) from United Technologies, Springfield, Massachusetts dated November 21, 1984, certified that the accumulators conformed to the applicable design specifications.

The CoC is dated several days after the HAs were tested. PMH clarified this discrepancy by producing a Nonconforming Material Report dated September 14, 1504, which identified that the CoCs did not accompany the accumulators. The CoCs were received after the tests.

0 ORGANIZATION:

PAUL MONR0E HYDRAULICS, INCORPORATED ORANGE, CALIFORNIA i

REPORT INSPECTION en.

oconn197/97_n1 R FCI'l TS -

PAGE E of 6 d.

The CoC from FORNACIARI/ PARKER dated November 27, 1984 certified that the cylinders conformed to the applicable design specifications.

PMH stated that the CoCs received with the cylinders on September 24, 1984 were deficient and had to be returned. The revised CoCs were dated November 27, 1984.

e.

PMH received 27 pressure switches (PS) from NeoDyn on September 17, 1984. During receipt inspection, the

.eceipt inspector observed that the CoCs did not accompany the PSs.

Inspection ISS ho. 0047 dated September 24, 1984 documented this discrepancy and was closed on October 1, IS84 after the receipt of Cots. Review of the documents indicates that there was no apparent problem with the operators in general and that specifically the PSs were operable.

E.

EITINTERVIEW:

The inspector met with individuals identified in Section F and discussed the scope and findings of the inspection.

F.

PERS0h5 CONTACTED:

Paul Monroe Hydr _au,lics, Incorpor_ated, Orange, California F. Erlach, President

  • R. Fischer, Chief Engineer J. Raymont, Director of Operations T. Cottrill, Quality Assurance Manager All the above individuals attended the exit meeting on March 31, 1987.

ITT heoDyn, Chatsworth,,,C,alifornia

  • J. F. Dregne, Regional Sales Manager
  • L. Amper, Quality Control Manager
  • L. A. Dunham, Engineering Manager
  • S. R. Nanda, Director of Quality Assurance
  • Denotes individual who attended the exit meeting on April 1, 1987.