ML20215H452
| ML20215H452 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 10/10/1986 |
| From: | Capstick R VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORP. |
| To: | Rooney V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| FVY-86-97, NUDOCS 8610230213 | |
| Download: ML20215H452 (4) | |
Text
a:1l VERMONT YANKEE l
NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION l
RD 5, Box 169 Ferry Road, Brattleboro, VT 05301 m
ENGINEERING OFFICE 1671 WORCESTER ROAD FRAMINGHAM. MASSACHUSETTS 01701
=
FVY 86-97, 1986 October 10 TEL E PHONE 617-672000 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Mr. V. L. Rooney, Senior Project Manager BWR Project Directorate No. 2 Division of BWR Licensing
References:
(a) License No. DPR-28 (Docket No. 50-271)
(b) Letter, VYNRC to USNRC, WVY 75-95, dated September 9, 1975 (c) Letter, VYNRC to USNRC, WVY 80-132, dated September 19, 1980 (d) Letter, VYNRC to USNRC, FVY 81-148, dated October 27, 1981 (e) Letter, VYNRC to USNRC, FVY 82-30, dated March 26, 1982 (f) Letter, USNRC to VYNPC, NVY 83-192, dated August 19, 1983 (g) Letter, VYNRC to USNRC, FVY 84-76, dated June 26, 1984 (h) Letter, USNRC to VYNRC, NVY 86-29, dated February 14, 1986 (1) Letter, VYNPC to USNRC, FVY 86-51, dated May 30, 1986
Subject:
Supplemental Response to NRC Request for Additional Information - Appendix J Technical Specifications
Dear Sir:
By letter, dated February 14, 1986 [ Reference (h)], you requested additional information in order to complete your review of Vermont Yankee's (VY's) proposed Appendix J Technical Specifications [ Reference (g)]. In accordance with your request, VY submitted the requested information on May 30, 1986 [ Reference (i)]. At that time, we stated that the remaining information necessary to complete our response to Question No. 1 would be provided within 90 days of startup from the 1985/1986 outage. Accordingly, enclosed herein, please find our supplemental response providing the remainder of the information requested in Question 1.
We trust that this information is sufficient to allow your review to continue; however, should you have any questions or require additional information, please do not hesitate to contact this office.
Very truly yours, 8610230213 861010 MONT MMJUCN NER CMORAN DR ADOCK 0500 1
g R. W. Capstick Licensing Engineer RWC/dps
'ig Enclosure l
1 e
ENCLOSURE Supplemental Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Appendix J Technical Specifications Question No. 1 The following penetrations have been listed in the Vermont Yankee Local Test Program as having met the requirements of the water-seal as discussed above and in Appendix J; and consequently, no air-leakage testing is proposed. For each of these systems state how a water seal is provided under the post-accident DBA condition which include loss of off-site power and worst case single active failure.
Include or reference drawings or sketches showing system piping and the pumps involved. Note that no credit will be given to water legs provided by water in the reactor vessel. A crossover between redundant trains of an ECCS System may be taken into account if a procedure exists to provide the water leg to the isolation valves in the event it would not otherwise be available:
Penetration No.
System 7-12 RHR Shutdown Cooling Supply X-13A/B LPCI Injection X-14 RWCU Suction X-16A/B Core Spray X-17 RHR Head Spray X-42 Standby Liquid control
Response
, Penetration No.
System X-17 Previously Provided [ Reference (1)]
X-13A/B Previously Provided [ Reference (1)]
X-42 Previously Provided [ Reference (1)]
X-12 We have reviewed this penetration with respect to recirculation line LCCA's and conclude that there may nyt be a sufficient water seal supply.
However, due to the design of the RHR System at this penetration and ALARA concerns for piping modifications, an exception will be requested for testing this penstration.
The RHR System has many modes of operation which include shutdown cooling and supplemental or back-up
e ENCI-OSURE (Continued)
Penetration No.
System X-12 (Continued) fuel pool cooling.
Since these modes of RHR require the availability of penetration X-12, these modes of removing decay heat would be jeopardized while testing. Removing these modes of RHR (during shut down) has not been analyzed in our FSAR.
There is also a concern associated with the potential for draining the vessel through the RHR shutdown cooling line. This concern is presently being considered in our review of NRC I/E Information Notice 86-74.
The RHR System forms a seismically qualified loop which penetrates'the containment and thus leakage by the penetration isolation valves, if any, would not have a clear path to the atmosphere.
During normal operations (normal reactor pressure),
annunication/ instrumentation exists which checks leakage past penetration X-12 1 solation valves by monitoring down stream pressure. The pressure setpoint is 100 psig which is monitored by PS-118.
Additionally,-
there is a safety relief valve (SR-4G) which is down stream of penetration X-12 that is set at 150 psig.
Therefore, if penetration X-12 isolation valves should leak during operation, these components would indicate a problem by annunication or by tall pipe leakage. Thus, the boundary integrity is checked during normal surveillance which would identify leaks and initiate repairs.
As described above, even though Vermont Yankee does not formally leak test these valves, sufficient means are available to give positive assurance that the penetration isolation valves will perform their required function.
s'
ENCLOSURE (Continued)
Penetration No.
System
~X-14 We have reviewed this penetration with respect t'o recirculation line LOCA's and conclude that there may not a sufficient water seal supply. This penetration is presently tested but not included in type "C" testing results.
It will be included in the type "C" test results.
Due to the system design at this penetration and ALARA concerns, an exception will be requested for test direction and media.
X-16A/B We have reviewed these penetrations with respect to single failure criteria and conclude that there may not be an external water seal available on one or the other penetration. These penetrations will be tested.
Due to the system design at these penetrations and ALARA concerns, exceptions will be requested for test media and to test the isolation valves as a unit. The check valves inside the drywell also create an ALARA concern for testing and repairs and therefore, an exception from testing these valves will be requested.