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Insp Repts 50-313/87-10 & 50-368/87-10 on 870316-20.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Emergency Response Capabilities During Exercise of Emergency Plan & Procedures
	ML20215H290
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	04/08/1987
From:	Terc N, Yandell L; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20215H253	List: ML20215H249; ML20215H290;
References
	50-313-87-10, 50-368-87-10, NUDOCS 8704200247
	Download: ML20215H290 (6)
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APPENDIX l

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

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NRC Inspection Report: 50-313/87-10 Licenses: DPR-51

50-368/87-10 NPF-6

Dockets: 50-313

50-368

Licensee: Arkansas Power & Light Company (AP&L)

P. O. Box 551

Little Rock, Arkansas 72203

Facility Name: Arkansas Nuclear One (AN0)

Inspection At: ANO, Russellville, Arkansas

Inspection Conducted: March 16-20, 1987

Inspector: . ( 0$

M. Terc, NRC Te

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Date '

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Accompanied

By: J. B. Baird, RIV NRC

C. Hackney, RIV NRC

G. Martin, PNL

J. Will, Sonolex Corporation

J. Weale, Sonolex Corporation

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. Approved: b dlAAG

L. A. Yandell, Chief, Emergency Preparedness Dat~e

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and Safeguards Programs Section

. Inspection Summary

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Inspection Conducted March 16-20, 1987 (Report 50-313/87-10; 50-368/87-10)

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Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the licensee's emergency

response capabilities during an exercise of the emergency plan and procedures.

Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were

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identified. NTwo deficiencies were identified (paragraphs 4 and 5).

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

ANO

G. Campbell, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

J. M. Levine, Director, Site Nuclear Operations

E. C. Ewing, Gereral Manager, Plant Support

M. W. Tull, Emergency Planning Coordinator

D. B. Lomax, Plant Licensing Supervisor

S. M. Quennoz, General Manager, Plant Operations

L. W. Humphrey, General Manager, Nuclear Quality

J. D. Vandergrift, Training Manager

D. Boyd, Emergency Planning Coordinator

D. D. Sne11ings, Manager, Nuclear Programs

J. F. Bishop, Emergency Planning Coordinator

R. W. Peckham, Health Physics Specialist

F. P. Van Buskirk, Emergency Planning Coordinator

Others

W. D. Johnson, NRC Senior Resident Inspector

K. H. Oh, Observer, Korea Advanced Energy Research Institute

Denotes attendance at the exit interview.

The NRC inspector also held discussions with other station and corporate

personnel in the areas of dose assessment, health physics, operations, and

emergency response organization.

2. Follow-up on Previous Inspection Findings

(Closed) Open Item 313/8510-01; 368/8510-01: The NRC inspector determined

that the sound system had been modified in the control room, and noted

that the emergency siren for all nonessential personnel to evacuate the

prota-?.ed area could be heard in the control room.

(Closed) Deficiency 313/8612-01; 368/8612-01: The NRC inspector

determined that the licensee had revised EPIP 1905.001, Section 7.1,

removing the requirement for establishing radiological access controls ct

the Technical Support Center. Radiological control points were

established at the egress and access points to the administration

building. Additionally, the licensee demonstrated the ability to

radiologically control the access area for recovery teams.

(Closed) Deficiency 313/8612-02; 368/8612-02: The NRC inspector

determined that the addition of a Radiological and Environmental

Assessment Manager, a Technical Assistant, and an Assistant E0F Director

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provided sufficient technical support in the E0F to allow the E0F Director

to focus on management control and decisionmaking processes needed to

properly coordinate and direct emergency response efforts.

(Closed) Deficiency 313/8612-03; 368/8612-03: The NRC inspector observed

the ability of appropriate OSC personnel to adequately coordinate recovery

and reentry emergency teams.

(Closed) Deficiency 313/8612-04; 368/8612-04: The NRC inspector observed

that the licensee had established a method for performing continuous

accountability of emergency personnel in emergency response facilities.

(Closed) Deficiency 313/8612-05; 368/8612-05: The NRC inspector

determined that the licensee had established a method to perform initial

personnel accountability in the protected area during a site evacuation.

Accountability was achieved within 30 minutes.

(Closed) Open Item 313/8511-04; 368/8511-04: The NRC inspector determined

that the computerized Gaseous Effluents Release Monitoring System (GERMS)

uses a numerical integration method for calculating doses from elevated

plumes. This method is described in Section 9.8, " Finite Plume Immersion

Correction," of AN0's " Dose Assessment Methodology Manual." Correction

factors are expressed as a function of vertical dispersion coefficients

and the elevation of the plume centerline above the terrain surface. The

NRC inspector concluded that the GERMS methodology adequately determines

effective release height for monitored releases and assumes a ground level

release for all unmonitored releases.

The NRC inspector ascertained that GERMS calculated doses from a finite

plume by first computing doses from a semi-infinite plume model and then

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multiplying it by a correction factor. The NRC inspector noted that this

method is adequate and is similar to those methods used in Regulatory

Guide 1.109, " Calculations of Annual Doses to Man From Routine Releases of

Reactor Effluents for the Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10 CFR

Part 50, Appendix I;" Wash-1400, " Reactor Safety Study"; and

EPA-520/1-75-001, " Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective

Actions for Nuclear Incidents."

The NRC inspector determined that the X/Q value used by GERMS to determine

Technical Specification limits under 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I, was

discussed in a letter from the NRC to AP&L, dated September 16, 1980.

This letter, which contained Amendments 46 and 15 to AN0's operating

licenses, endorsed the use of the highest X/Q average annual value to

determine limiting values of radioactive release rates over any 1-hour

period, and annual average doses at the site boundary resulting from

normal reactor operation.

The NRC inspector noted that GERMS used the default (annual average) X/Q

value as well as real time X/Q values to calculate site boundary doses in

a program subroutine for classifying emergency classes. This subroutine

compares calculated site boundary doses to doses for specific Emergency

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Action Levels recommended by NUREG 0654, Appendix 1. The NRC inspector

ascertained that GERMS relied on default values of X/Q to determine

Unusual Event (UE) and Alert emergency classifications, but used real time

X/Q factors to determine Site Area Emergency (SAE) and General

Emergency (GE) classifications. The NRC inspector observed that ANO

procedures related UE and Alert emergency classes to Technical

Specification effluent release limits. On the other hand, SAE and GE

emergency classes were related to specific whole body dose rates at the

site boundary.

The NRC inspector determined that a new meteorological tower and new tower

instrumentation installed in early 1986 were incorporated as part of plant

instrumentation in January 1987. The NRC inspector also noted that AP&L

has a contract with Environmental Systems Corporation, under which they

will determine meteorological data availability as well as provide Quality

Assurance to validate and determine the reliability of the meteorological

tower aad related instrumentation.

3. Program Areas Inspected

The following program areas were inspected. The inspection included

interviews with cognizant individuals, observation of activities, and

record reviews. The depth and scope of these activities were consistent

with past findings and with the current status of the facility.

Except as noted, the inspection revealed no violations, deviations,

deficiencies, unresolved items, or open items. Notations after a specific

inspection item identify the following: I = item not inspected or only

partially inspected, V = violation, D = deviation, H = deficiency,

U = unresolved item, and 0 = open item.

Inspection Procedure Functional Area and Inspection Requirements

82301 Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors

(1) Control Room - H (see paragraph 4)

(2) Technical Support Center

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(3) Emergency Operations Facility - H (see

paragraph 5)

(4) Operations Support Center

(5) Corporate Command Center - I

(6) Offsite Monitoring Team - I

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(7) Corrective Action / Rescue Team - I

(8) Security / Accountability Team

(9) Press Center - I

(10) Medical Team - I

(11) Postaccident Sampling - I

4. Control Room 82301 (1)

The NRC inspector noted that the turnover of the overall emergency

direction and control from the Shift Operations Supervisor (S0S) to the

Emergency Coordinator (EC) was fragmented and improperly executed because

of the following events:

At approximately 8:12 a.m., the EC told the SOS that he was ready to

take responsibility for offsite notifications, but that he was not

ready to take responsibility for protective action recommendations.

At 8:20 a.m., the.50S and the EC allowed this fragmented assumption

of responsibilities to take effect. As a consequence, it became

unclear who was at that time overall in charge of directing and

coordinating emergency response efforts.

The NRC inspector noted that the licensee staff apparently failed to

discriminate between the concept of transferring overall responsibility,

and the transfer of two undelegable duties (i.e., making notifications and

protective action recommendations). The NRC inspector further determined

that there was a need for an adequate protocol clearly demarcating when

the responsibility for overall direction and coordination is definitely

established.

Finally, the NRC inspector noted that Procedure EPIP 1903.51,

paragraph 4.7, specifically discusses the transfer of two undelegable

duties, but apparently equates this to the transfer of overall direction

and control.

This constitutes a deficiency (313/8710-01; 368/8710-01).

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Emergency Ooerations Facility (EOF) 82301 (3)

The NRC inspector determined that the initial classification of General

Emergency and the formulation of appropriate protective action

recommendations were not timely.

At 11:20 a.m. , significant core damage was indicated by the containment

high-range monitors (3E7R/hr), and a radioactive release to the

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environment was detected by. environmental monitoring teams at 11:24 a.m.,

-indicating the loss of the third barrier. The Emergency Operations

Facility Director (E0FD), who was at that time the person responsible for

- directing and coordinating AP&L's emergency response, did not declare the

General Emergency until 12:00 p.m. Additionally, protective action

recommendations for evacuation were not formulated until about 2:00 p.m.

This constitutes a deficiency (313/8710-02; 368/8710-02).

The NRC inspector subsequently determined that the licensee had no

i methodology in place which incorpot-ated the containment high range

monitors into their accident evaluation and classification scheme. In

addition, the NRC inspector ascertained that the licensee lacked a method

to. evaluate core damage. See Deficiency 313/8704-01; 368/8704-01 for

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further discussion of this matter.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Exit Interview

1he NRC inspector met with the NRC senior resident inspector and licensee

representatives denoted in paragraph 1 on March 20, 1987, and summarized

the scope and findings of the inspection as presented in this report.

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ML20215H290

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