ML20215H290
| ML20215H290 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 04/08/1987 |
| From: | Terc N, Yandell L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215H253 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-87-10, 50-368-87-10, NUDOCS 8704200247 | |
| Download: ML20215H290 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000313/1987010
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APPENDIX
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
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NRC Inspection Report:
50-313/87-10
Licenses:
50-368/87-10
Dockets:
50-313
50-368
Licensee:
Arkansas Power & Light Company (AP&L)
P. O. Box 551
Little Rock, Arkansas
72203
Facility Name:
Arkansas Nuclear One (AN0)
Inspection At:
Inspection Conducted: March 16-20, 1987
Inspector:
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N'. M. Terc, NRC Te
Leader
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Accompanied
By:
J. B. Baird, RIV NRC
C. Hackney, RIV NRC
G. Martin, PNL
J. Will, Sonolex Corporation
J. Weale, Sonolex Corporation
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. Approved:
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L. A. Yandell, Chief, Emergency Preparedness
Dat~e
and Safeguards Programs Section
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Inspection Summary
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Inspection Conducted March 16-20, 1987 (Report 50-313/87-10; 50-368/87-10)
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Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of the licensee's emergency
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response capabilities during an exercise of the emergency plan and procedures.
Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were
identified. NTwo deficiencies were identified (paragraphs 4 and 5).
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8704200247 870415
ADOCK 05000313
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
- G. Campbell, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- J. M. Levine, Director, Site Nuclear Operations
- E. C. Ewing, Gereral Manager, Plant Support
- M. W. Tull, Emergency Planning Coordinator
- D. B. Lomax, Plant Licensing Supervisor
- S. M. Quennoz, General Manager, Plant Operations
- L. W. Humphrey, General Manager, Nuclear Quality
- J. D. Vandergrift, Training Manager
- D. Boyd, Emergency Planning Coordinator
- D. D. Sne11ings, Manager, Nuclear Programs
- J. F. Bishop, Emergency Planning Coordinator
- R. W. Peckham, Health Physics Specialist
- F. P. Van Buskirk, Emergency Planning Coordinator
Others
- W. D. Johnson, NRC Senior Resident Inspector
- K. H. Oh, Observer, Korea Advanced Energy Research Institute
- Denotes attendance at the exit interview.
The NRC inspector also held discussions with other station and corporate
personnel in the areas of dose assessment, health physics, operations, and
emergency response organization.
2.
Follow-up on Previous Inspection Findings
(Closed) Open Item 313/8510-01; 368/8510-01:
The NRC inspector determined
that the sound system had been modified in the control room, and noted
that the emergency siren for all nonessential personnel to evacuate the
prota-?.ed area could be heard in the control room.
(Closed) Deficiency 313/8612-01; 368/8612-01:
The NRC inspector
determined that the licensee had revised EPIP 1905.001, Section 7.1,
removing the requirement for establishing radiological access controls ct
Radiological control points were
established at the egress and access points to the administration
building.
Additionally, the licensee demonstrated the ability to
radiologically control the access area for recovery teams.
(Closed) Deficiency 313/8612-02; 368/8612-02:
The NRC inspector
determined that the addition of a Radiological and Environmental
Assessment Manager, a Technical Assistant, and an Assistant E0F Director
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provided sufficient technical support in the E0F to allow the E0F Director
to focus on management control and decisionmaking processes needed to
properly coordinate and direct emergency response efforts.
(Closed) Deficiency 313/8612-03; 368/8612-03: The NRC inspector observed
the ability of appropriate OSC personnel to adequately coordinate recovery
and reentry emergency teams.
(Closed) Deficiency 313/8612-04; 368/8612-04:
The NRC inspector observed
that the licensee had established a method for performing continuous
accountability of emergency personnel in emergency response facilities.
(Closed) Deficiency 313/8612-05; 368/8612-05:
The NRC inspector
determined that the licensee had established a method to perform initial
personnel accountability in the protected area during a site evacuation.
Accountability was achieved within 30 minutes.
(Closed) Open Item 313/8511-04; 368/8511-04: The NRC inspector determined
that the computerized Gaseous Effluents Release Monitoring System (GERMS)
uses a numerical integration method for calculating doses from elevated
plumes.
This method is described in Section 9.8, " Finite Plume Immersion
Correction," of AN0's " Dose Assessment Methodology Manual." Correction
factors are expressed as a function of vertical dispersion coefficients
and the elevation of the plume centerline above the terrain surface.
The
NRC inspector concluded that the GERMS methodology adequately determines
effective release height for monitored releases and assumes a ground level
release for all unmonitored releases.
The NRC inspector ascertained that GERMS calculated doses from a finite
plume by first computing doses from a semi-infinite plume model and then
multiplying it by a correction factor. The NRC inspector noted that this
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method is adequate and is similar to those methods used in Regulatory
Guide 1.109, " Calculations of Annual Doses to Man From Routine Releases of
Reactor Effluents for the Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I;" Wash-1400, " Reactor Safety Study"; and
EPA-520/1-75-001, " Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective
Actions for Nuclear Incidents."
The NRC inspector determined that the X/Q value used by GERMS to determine
Technical Specification limits under 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I, was
discussed in a letter from the NRC to AP&L, dated September 16, 1980.
This letter, which contained Amendments 46 and 15 to AN0's operating
licenses, endorsed the use of the highest X/Q average annual value to
determine limiting values of radioactive release rates over any 1-hour
period, and annual average doses at the site boundary resulting from
normal reactor operation.
The NRC inspector noted that GERMS used the default (annual average) X/Q
value as well as real time X/Q values to calculate site boundary doses in
a program subroutine for classifying emergency classes.
This subroutine
compares calculated site boundary doses to doses for specific Emergency
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Action Levels recommended by NUREG 0654, Appendix 1.
The NRC inspector
ascertained that GERMS relied on default values of X/Q to determine
Unusual Event (UE) and Alert emergency classifications, but used real time
X/Q factors to determine Site Area Emergency (SAE) and General
Emergency (GE) classifications.
The NRC inspector observed that ANO
procedures related UE and Alert emergency classes to Technical
Specification effluent release limits.
emergency classes were related to specific whole body dose rates at the
site boundary.
The NRC inspector determined that a new meteorological tower and new tower
instrumentation installed in early 1986 were incorporated as part of plant
instrumentation in January 1987.
The NRC inspector also noted that AP&L
has a contract with Environmental Systems Corporation, under which they
will determine meteorological data availability as well as provide Quality
Assurance to validate and determine the reliability of the meteorological
tower aad related instrumentation.
3.
Program Areas Inspected
The following program areas were inspected.
The inspection included
interviews with cognizant individuals, observation of activities, and
record reviews.
The depth and scope of these activities were consistent
with past findings and with the current status of the facility.
Except as noted, the inspection revealed no violations, deviations,
deficiencies, unresolved items, or open items.
Notations after a specific
inspection item identify the following:
I = item not inspected or only
partially inspected, V = violation, D = deviation, H = deficiency,
U = unresolved item, and 0 = open item.
Inspection Procedure
Functional Area and Inspection Requirements
82301
Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors
(1) Control Room - H (see paragraph 4)
(3) Emergency Operations Facility - H (see
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paragraph 5)
(4) Operations Support Center
(5) Corporate Command Center - I
(6) Offsite Monitoring Team - I
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(7) Corrective Action / Rescue Team - I
(8) Security / Accountability Team
(9) Press Center - I
(10) Medical Team - I
(11) Postaccident Sampling - I
4.
Control Room 82301 (1)
The NRC inspector noted that the turnover of the overall emergency
direction and control from the Shift Operations Supervisor (S0S) to the
Emergency Coordinator (EC) was fragmented and improperly executed because
of the following events:
At approximately 8:12 a.m., the EC told the SOS that he was ready to
take responsibility for offsite notifications, but that he was not
ready to take responsibility for protective action recommendations.
At 8:20 a.m., the.50S and the EC allowed this fragmented assumption
of responsibilities to take effect.
As a consequence, it became
unclear who was at that time overall in charge of directing and
coordinating emergency response efforts.
The NRC inspector noted that the licensee staff apparently failed to
discriminate between the concept of transferring overall responsibility,
and the transfer of two undelegable duties (i.e., making notifications and
protective action recommendations).
The NRC inspector further determined
that there was a need for an adequate protocol clearly demarcating when
the responsibility for overall direction and coordination is definitely
established.
Finally, the NRC inspector noted that Procedure EPIP 1903.51,
paragraph 4.7, specifically discusses the transfer of two undelegable
duties, but apparently equates this to the transfer of overall direction
and control.
This constitutes a deficiency (313/8710-01; 368/8710-01).
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Emergency Ooerations Facility (EOF) 82301 (3)
The NRC inspector determined that the initial classification of General
Emergency and the formulation of appropriate protective action
recommendations were not timely.
At 11:20 a.m. , significant core damage was indicated by the containment
high-range monitors (3E7R/hr), and a radioactive release to the
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environment was detected by. environmental monitoring teams at 11:24 a.m.,
-indicating the loss of the third barrier.
The Emergency Operations
Facility Director (E0FD), who was at that time the person responsible for
- directing and coordinating AP&L's emergency response, did not declare the
General Emergency until 12:00 p.m.
Additionally, protective action
recommendations for evacuation were not formulated until about 2:00 p.m.
This constitutes a deficiency (313/8710-02; 368/8710-02).
The NRC inspector subsequently determined that the licensee had no
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methodology in place which incorpot-ated the containment high range
monitors into their accident evaluation and classification scheme.
In
addition, the NRC inspector ascertained that the licensee lacked a method
to. evaluate core damage.
See Deficiency 313/8704-01; 368/8704-01 for
further discussion of this matter.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Exit Interview
1he NRC inspector met with the NRC senior resident inspector and licensee
representatives denoted in paragraph 1 on March 20, 1987, and summarized
the scope and findings of the inspection as presented in this report.
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