ML20215F403
| ML20215F403 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 12/19/1986 |
| From: | Youngblood B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | White S TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8612230384 | |
| Download: ML20215F403 (17) | |
Text
- (,
~
rN Q.
\\~,"
.pn nn:.l
},
~
$' 7 UNI TED STATES '
[
)g,'
k'r; V
I NUGLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
j
'y WASMG TON, D. C. 20W.
%,.@ /
,a 1 0 DEC BS6
~
UuVn hou.
50-327 m*
50-328 er. s..s. wnite 1 1
Manage,r of Nuclear Power Tennessee Valley Authority Q 38A lookout Place
^
1101 Kuk7t Strect iChai h m a, Teanessee 37402-2E01 Snh ect:
haramittal of Draft Safety Evauhtfon on the Interim i
' Acceptance Criteria for Small, Bore Ptoing Enclosed is a draf t copy of the staff evaluation on the proposed inter.ia acceptance criteria fcr small-bore piping. The staff intends to incorpor-ate th15 evaluation into the Sa fety Evaluation Report (SER) on Volume 2 of the Nuclear Parfo;'mance Plan which addresses Seqt.oyah.
The puroose of this !ctter is to transmit the report to the Tennessee Valley Authority f rVA) and to req 0est tht TVA raspond to the confirmatory items identified T
in So "o ic t.
9 With the exception of the cosidretory items, the staff has found the TVA interim acccotance criteria for small-bore piping acceptable.
However, TVA should address the following prior to restart of either Sequoyah unit.
s (1) TVA will perfum a study durinij the l'ong-term portion of the pipe.
support reanalysis program to verify that friction loads on supports due to thermal growth or piping at Sequoyah are not significant.
9 (2)
I/A '.<lll also perform during the long-term portion of the program an evaluation which will justify the ofpe support deflection criteria uwd tn yerify rialdity.
(H UV aill revied the results of the Errployee Concern program and the Qtegory I(L) Piping Program to assess any potential impact on ths.
/)iternately Analyzed Piping Program.
(4) TVA should confirm #that the dead weight effects of line mounted valves with extended operatorsi were properly accounted for in tha origiral analysis and that the wblkdown progran instituted for the, Phase 1 activity did not identify any lack of support for, concentrated dead weights.
x W
TVA's generic guideline; for u suring adequate seismic supports for pipe trovated valves with exteided structures should te revised and made undirhiguors regarding f.he ryulcement of both vertical and lcteral jupprts (as ?,3 posed to requ bing supports in two orthogonal planes);
also, additional training of inspectors to assure prnper consideration of vtrtical supports should be iscussed.
t
}
~
8612230384 861219 PDR ADOCK 05000327 p
PDR g
"7 19 DEC 1986 In order for the staff to support'the TVA projected restart date for Sequoyah, TVA should respond to the above items within four weeks of the date of this letter.
If TVA cannot meet this date, it shoeld provide its proposed date to the staff in writing within two week of the date of this letter.
I If you require any additional assistance, please contact;the project manager for the Sequoyah SER, Mr. Joseph J. Holonich at (301) 492-7270.
Sincerely, B. J. Youngblood, Director PWR Project Directorate #4 Division of PWR Licensing-A
Enclosure:
As stated cc: See next page DISTRIBUTION:
Docket File NRC PDR Local PDR PFC, System NSIC PWRi/4 Reading MDuncan BJYoungblood Reading TAlexion TVA0P (3) S. Richardson AR 5029 HDenton JTaylor BHayes GZech, RII NGrace LSpessard KBarr SAConnelly DMuller TNovak BJYoungblood JHolonich CStahle TKenyon WLong BKSingh KHooks ACRS(10)
OGC JPartlow BGrimes GBagchi EJordan Shou MReinhart, AR JThompson CUpright PWR' WR-A PWRf47DPWR-A PW)d PWR-A JH ch/ rad CStahle TKdn 12/f/86 12g /86 12/ /86 PWR#U@WR-A PWR#
r-s MDuddhW BJYc h ood 12/%/86 12/
86 L_
g
!u Q
~c
. Enclosure Safety Evaluation on 5 mall-Bore Piping
_ Interim Acceptance Criteria 3.3 Interim Acceptance Criteria 3,3.!
Alternately _ Analyzed Pipir,g ard Supports Restart Program 3.3.1.,
Introduction in Section III, 5.0 of the Sequoyah NRR, TVA described a special pec9rs it had developed to verify the adequacy of pipino ard rethods. Alternate cnalysis is e method forLlocating supports and qualifying piping / support sygtems using methodologysbased on guidelines and criteria rather than by rigorous comouter analysis.
This method had generally been applied to /-frch diamete and smaller safety related piping and support systems.
The purpose of 'this special program is to evaluate and resolve
The concerns are related to incomplete or improper documentation and in-rdeavate corpliance with the AA criteria.
In addition, TVA identified the possth111ty that some piping segments may not have been analyzed.
TVA'is car. ducting a two phase program.
Phase I (Restart Program) is intendd to. provide suf ficient confidence in the adequacy of the picing systems to justify restart' of the plant. This phase will be limited to AA piping systems equired to initigate FSAR Chapter 15 avents and safely shut down the plant.
Prim;ry areas of concern which, in the short term, could adversely affect safe plant operation will be evaluated. TVA has propcsed relaxed " interim" acceptance criteria for the evaluation of these concerns prior to restart.
Phase It (Long Term Program) will address all AA safety class piping dnd is intended to ensure that FSAR comitments are satisfied anc that doc-un,entation is completed. Areas that were not judged to be short term safety L
concerns will be evaluated in this p h se.
The acceptance criteria will be long term established allowable limits.
The hstart Program (Phase I) is cu.rently (fiovember 1986) in precress.
The, Uni t 2 Program is nearly complete. The Unit 1 Program has just started.
TVA indicated that the Long Term Program (Phase II) will be initfeted after restart and is expected to be corapleted by the second or thiro schedules outace.
1 l
Cr -
o.
The staff has reviewed and evaluated the Restart Program as defined in the Sequoyah Nuclear Perfonnance Plan.
In addition, during the week of October 6,1986, an NRC audit was held at the Sequoyah Plant site.
The audit tnam ceasistco of staff and censultants freir Brookhaven National Laborctory, fhe racas of the audit was on the Restart Program scope, interim acceptance Uituta, and implewentation.
Details of the audit are surrearized in this 9fety evaluation repo-t, The following covers the staff evaluation of the Restart Progran based on information available at the time of the audit.
The Long Tenn (phase II)
Proar.m has not yet been finalized by lVA or reviewed by the sta".
Ir e W ition, TVA hw twa programs in progress which may have a potential impact on the AA pioing program. ' The first is the Employee Concerns Program which is currently scheduled to be comoleted by the end of 1986. The second is the Category I(L1 pipinn program which is scheduled for completion prior to restart.
3,3.1. !
Evaluation 3.3.1.2.1 Pgstart Prcgram Scope The proposed program scope related to AA piping and succorts was Jet ined by TVA in the Revised Seoucyah NPP Section III-5.0 (Ref. 2).
The staff reviewd the areas of concern in both the short term and long term concern category defined by TVA. The fellowing is a description of the concerns ana the statf evaluation.
Short. ferm Concerns 1.
Effect of anchor movecee.ts on branch lines at connection of branch to main run.
The effect of anchor mcvements (i.e., run line movements) have not always been adequately evaluated at large rigorously analyzed run line/small alternately analyzed branch line piping interfaces. Discrepancies in this s
category could result in excessive stress in the branch picirc ar.d excessive loads on the_affected supoorts.
2.
Torsional effect of large motor-operated valves and oneumatic valves in smalI piping.
The effect of torsion due tc seismic acceleration of large eccentric rass (i.e., valve operators) was at tires not properly considerec.
Discrepancies in this area could result in excessive pipe stress anc excessive loads on the affected suponrts. Also, excessive displacern.nts of the valve operators could result in damage to the valves and their attachments, or to adjacent sensitive equipntent.
,a
, 3 Interface between seismically designed AA piping and non-seismicall designed piping for pipe sizes greater than two-inch nominal diameter.
As used herein,- deadweight-supported piping is piping supported to i
seismic position retention requirements utilizing typical drawings.
af fact of large seismic displacements in seismic position retention-The
.(which has rigid horizontal supports) may not have b analyzed.
stress and excessive loads on the affected supports. Discre Staff Evaluation the staff agree ~d with TVA's assessment that each o result in excessive pipe stress and excessive support loads in the affected piping.s program.ystems during an earthquake, and should be included in the Restart Long Term Concerns The following areas of concern were judged by TVA not to be short term Program
- TVA proposed to exclude the following concerns from the Restart concerns.
1 Thermal expansion flexibility nay not always have been adequately evaluated.
po;;ibly resulting in fatigue related failures.This may result in ex This problem was not considered a primary concern because of the small number of high temperature AA lines and because of the secondary nature of thermal expansion stresses.-
2.
sizes less than or equal to 2-inch nominal diameter. Inte The diccrepancy is identical to the short term concern number 3
,=
descrioed above.
smaller mass of piping.This was judged to be less significant because of the 3
Support for cases of long piping runs and support of large concentrated weights.
Long piping runs may not have been adequately supported in the axial direction.
Large concentrated weights may not have been adequately supported.
Both deficieacies could result in excessive pipe stresses and support loads.
Staff Evaluation 1.
Based on information provided by TVA, the staff determined that thermal expansion stresses will most likely not be significant for most AA piping systems since only about 57, of the piping systems have maximum tmperatures above 200*F.
In addition, since thermal stresses are
secanoory and self-relieving in nature, they will not result in gross failure of the piping.
The main concern is the potential for developing of fatigue cracks which could occur after the applicaticn of a number of excessive thermal stress cycles.
The staff agreed with TVA's conclusion that for low temperature systems the small possibility of such failures occurring dccs rmt represent a significant risk to plant safety for short term operation.
However, to ensure against possible. fatigue failures in high ttecerature systems. TVA agreed to include these systems in the
-program.
7.
The staff concluded that evaluation of the interface between AA piping erd deadwcight-supported piping for pipe sizes less than or equal te ? ireb diamatar need not be considered in the Restart Program.
Discrepancies ir this category do not represent a short term safety concern for several The small mass of the piping reduces the possibility of pipirg reasons.
and support failures.
Valves and equipment at the interface of seismic te deadwaight supported piping are relatively stronger for srtzl1 pipino than for iteger piping.
It is therefore unlikely that movement of the dead-weight supported piping would result in the propagation of a ofee break into the seismic piping.
3.
The stiff concluded that evaluation of potentially inadequate supports for long riping runs (in the axial direction) ard large concentrated weights need nat be considered in the Pestart Program. Discrepancies in this categcry do not represent a short term safety rcrcern because 1) friction and increased damping ef fects of lateral supports on long axial runs would reduce thec.retical loadings, and 2) the largest concentrated weights would be motor operated and pneumatic valves that would be evaluated in the Restart Progren.
3.3.1.P.2 Restart Program Interim Acceptance Criteria TVA had developed a revised set of interim acceptance criteria for use in the evaluation of piping and pipe supports in the Restart Program. The pro-posi.d c> lteria were defined by TVA in response to an NRC Technical Information Pcquest (Ref. 3).
The criteria were developed so that the Restart Pregran could be performad in a timely manner with minimum support modifications.
The criteria are not in accordance with FSAR corsaitnents or with current code requiremen ts. They are, however, intended to provide increased confidence that the piping / support systems required for Chapter 15 accident mitigation and cafe shutoown are adequate for short term operation.
Piping and supports passing the interim criteria but failing the long term criteria will not be meditied prior to restart but will be reevaluated and, if needed, modified during the long Term Program.
The prcocsed interim criteria were defired in terms of exceptions to FSAR cotmitments.
The jolicwing is a list of the exceptier erd the staff evaluatiers:
Pb2,iy Criteria Exceptions Exceptien 1:
Secondary stresses due to seismic anchor ncverents (SAF)
(Th) plus thermal anchor movements (TAl') will be evaluated and tterral 3eparately to ASME Code Section Ill NC/ND-3653 equation 10 limits instead or being combined and comparea to the equation 10 limit.
Eyaluation:
TVA reviewed all system in which SAM and TH+T/V stresses had been evaluated separately to equation 10 limits. There were a total of 65 piping systens in this category. A preliminary evaluatier of 30 of these systems indicated that all 30 meet equation 10 or 11 Ifmits with SAM and Th+ TAM stresses combined.
to ecuation 10 or 11 requirements. TVA will review the remainire ?F systems Consistent with the revised Restart program scope discussed in Section 5.2.1, thermal expansien stresses (Th) will only be determined for piping systems with maximum temperatures exceeding 200'F. Thern.al expansion stresses in colder systems will be assumed negligible. TVA proposed a revised restart criteria exception for system that do not meet equation 10 or 11 allowables.
The system would be acceptable for Interim operation if combined SAM +Th+ TAN equation 10 stresses neet a 1.5 Sa allowable (instead of the code 1.0 Sa allowable).
To justify the higher allowable, TVA provided a fatigue evaluation based on the original Mark) equations which form the basis for the ASME Code Class 2/3 equations 10 and 11. The fatique evaluation denerstrated that under the worst case conditions, the reduction in fatiooe safety rnargin with the higher equation 10 Tilowable is not significant.
The staff cencluded that the criteria exception is acceptable for interim operation based on the anticipated 11Mtco use of the higher allowable and the small decrease in safety margin.
Exception 2:
OBE or upset inertial loads will not be evaluated for interim operation. Only SSE or faulted loads will be censidered.
Evaluation:
In the program implementation, TVA actually considered OEE or upset inertial loads. This criteria exception was withdrawn. This
[
was acceptable to the staff.
Exception 3:
Current code allowables will be used with the old stress intensiticstion factor (1) or the currently allowable code stress will be used with primary stress indices (B).
In many cases B will exceed i.
Tho net effect is an increased faulted allowable pipe stress.
Evoluation:
In the program implementation, TVA was able to reet IJ SI b31.1, 1567 Code allowable with the correscer. ding stress intensification factors (1). This satisfies tre FSAR commitment and this criteria exception was withdrawn.
This wac acceptable to the staff.
j'ipeppport Exceptiong i
Exception 4:
TIBT.
Evaluation of SSE seismic loads only. No evaluation of Evaluation:
The staff concluded that this criteria exception is smaller than SSE loads.acceptaale for interim operation because OBE loads Therefore, a demonstration that the plant can be safely shut down for SSE insures that it can be. safely shut down for 03E.
Exception 5:
SSE load case combination will be evaluated to an allowab stress of 1.7 x AISC allowable.
Evaluation:
7Enowable in accordance with SRP 3.8.4.TVA agreed to revise the al wi thrirawn. This was acceptable to the staff.This criteria exception was Exception 6:
Rigidity requirements committed to in the FSAR define maximum deflection requirements for supports. These requirements need only be verified for the first two support locations in either direction frm rotating equipment.
E nluation:
in accorduce with their FSAR commitment.TVA agreed to withdraw th This was acceptable to the Steff.
Exception 7:
~~
The effects of friction loads due to thermal growth do not have to be considered in the reevaluation of existing supports.
Evaluation:
The staff concluded that this criteria exception was 5cceptable for interim operation since friction loads are not expected to be significant.
TVA had performed a study for the Watts Bar Plant Pipe a
the design of supports. supports which demonstrated that friction loads do no Sequoyah as part of the Long Term Program.TVA committed to perform Exception 8:
For expansion anchor bolts, allowable loads will be based on a minimum safety factor of 2 Evaluation:
TVA agreed to change this criteria exception to a safety f actor of 2.5 for wedge type bolts and 2.8 for self drilling expansion bolts.
This is consistent with the plant's origina~ design basis.
In the Long Term Program, TVA will insure the IAE Bulletin 79-02 safety factors (4 and 5) are met.
This was acceptable to the staff.
J Exception 9:
For spring suppcrts, variability will not be checked but a check will be made to insure that the spring will not bottom out for faulted conditfors.
Evaluation:
TVA agreed to withdet - this exception. Variability checks siTT be made for all vorfable spri, supports in accordance with FSAR cmniitments.
This was acceptable tc the staff.
Exception 10:
For all component standara supports,1.7 times the normal T5ia rating or the NF faulted load rating, whichever is greater, will be used for faulteo conditions.
Evaluation:
TVA agreed to withdraw the exception and will use either 1.E TTices the normal loading in accordance with SRP 3.8.4 or the ASME Code f:F faulted load rating.
This was acceptable to the staff.
3,3.1.2.3 Restart Program Implementation The Restart Prograrr implementation is controlled by a set of nine prcyram procedures:
SON-AA-001 througn SON-AA-009. These procedurcs define the program and provide specific instructions on evaluation methods and dccurertation recuirements.
A sumraary of the activities to be acconplished by TVA during th! Rottart Program is given below.
fne lines required for restart were identified as part cf the Design 63seline and Verification Program which is discussed in Section 3.2 of the SER.
Class B, C, D, and M lices identified passing over cres ure retention areas will be evaluated for short term concerns during Phase I.
in order to identify lines which were rigorously analyzed, detailec isonetric drawings and the rigorous analysis data base will be collected.
Unit 1 and Unit 2 hanger Iccation isometrics will be collected for piping identified as being required for restart to obtain existing documentation.
These hanger location isometrics were developed for 2-inch and larger piping and included position retention piping.
Engineering Data Systems (EDS) isometrics for piping inside containrent will be obtained as available.
These isccetrics were originally crawn by CDS. EDS determined the support locations for Unit I and TVA determined the support locations for Unit 2.
Class B, C, D, and M alternately piping will be identified on flow diagrams and physical drawings. Packace bcundaries will be lecEttd such that a pipino analysis problem size would be limited to a maximum of 400 node points, normally at 3-way supports or near suitable anchor points.
The marked-up flow diagrams, physicals, and isometrics will be reviewed for potential Phase I type discreparcies.
w
~
a
,r u -,
The operating " modes, insulation data, valve data, and anchorinovemen 7
data Will be requested / collected in these areas with potential concerns If readily available, it Will be obtained for other areas. Hanger location drawings will be gathered to increase the confide been analyzed.
If this information is not obtained, a walkdown of the piping is needed to develop an isometric.
If needed, isometrics will be drawn, where previously nonexistent 2 and 1/2-inch and larger piping in areas 'of potential concerns us,ing for information from the physical drawings, to facilitiate the evaluation of areas having potential concerns.
Piping and related supports associated with areas of concern will be screened using engineering judgements and/or-simple calculations.
piping / supports failing the screening will be evaluated. using detailed Those hand calculations or computer methods.
A visual walkdown will be made of piping requiring detailed hand calculations or computer analysis for any obvious differences based on s
the available documentation.
document any obvious differences, Detailed measurements will be made to When the detailed hand calculations or computer analysis is complete, th supports will again be evaluated.
phase I (interim) restart sllowables and failing normal (long-ter during Phase II. established acceptance allowables will be so noted for further Supports failing the screening have the potential to be modified and must be precisely evaluated.
detailed support walkdown is required, which could necessitat removal of insulation and require detailed support measurements.
=
Supports and piping will be evaluated against restart acceptance 4!'
(interim) allowables and long-term acceptance allowables.
Supports clearly be so itentified to designate modifications whic made until after restart.
All support design and evaluation packages will be issued prior te issue of design drawings.
The piping calculation packages will be issued prior to restart.
calculation package will be documented in a data base.
Each
)
--w
+-p y,
w.7 9---.--
,,y m--
ye-- - _m,-.-
m-9
--m w
--,-y--ywy-
--w-y,-v
p i--g
---m---w-
As a minimum, each piping calculation package, even if it was not evaluated for a discrepancy, must contain a hanger isometric or this piping, and any design data collected for that Staff Evaluation the audit of the Unit 2 Program.The staff evaluation of the Restart Pr During the audit, the staff and its consultants reviewed the program procedures, pe~rformed reviews of sa calculations and conducted a field inspection of sample piping / sup runs.
The program procedures provided instructions for various levels of evaluation.
Piping documentation packages were first reviewed for identification of Phase I areas of concern.
screened against simple criteria.
Identified areas were then exceed 1/16 inch at branch connections, no further analysis would coquiced.
- byliMed hand calculations or computer analysis t support loads were then compared against design loads.
Pipe exceeded design loads, a detailed pipe support evaluation would be per If support loads Piping / support systems which could not be qualified would be modified term program criteria were used to design the modifications Long support design packages.The staff and its consultants revicwed a num buildings and different potential short term safety concernsThe p reviaw covered all levels of analysis from simple screening to detailedThe coinpater analysis.
In addition, a field inspection was conducted for two sample piping systems in the Reactor Building and two sample system Auxiliary Building.
and is proceeding adequately in implementing a p y
term safety concerns will be identified, evaluated and resolved prior to restart.
However, there were two items that were not fully resolved duri plant the audit.
They are as follows:
1.
insure that pipe supports are rigid.TVA was unable to pr during the Long Term Program to justify the adequacy of theTVA w criteria.
This was acceptable to the staff.
2.
The staff field inspection identified loose washers in unistrut cl supports.
TVA provided information on a bolt tightening program that is currently in progress which will correct the problem.
concluded that this was acceptable subjec The sts.ff adequacy of the bolt tightening orogram. t to verification the
_. 3. 3. i i) _Coaclusion i
The staff concludes that TVA has defined an adequate program for resolution of short term safety concerns required for plant restart.
in wdit of sample design packages and a field inspection of sample Unit 2 Based on piping systems, the program implementation is proceeding adequately.
Cnmpletion of the Restart Program for Units 1 and 2 will provide sufficient confidence that alternately analyzed safety class piping / support systems adaqaately designed for startup. required to mitigate FSAR Chapter revisions and on the satisfactory resolution of the fo items:
p_rg ram Revisions Tables 5.1 and 5.2 provide a summary of TVA's originally proposed pr scape and interim criteria versus the revised scope and criteria accepted by tha staff.
The following are the program revisions.
1.
The Restart Program Scope will be expanded to include thermal expansion analysis and evaluation of all piping systems with maximum temperature exceeding 200 F.
2.
Restart Progra.n interim criteria exceptions shall be limited to the following:
a)
Secondary stresses due to seismic anchor movements (SAM) and thermal (Th) plus thermal anchor movements (TAM) will meet ASME Code Section III NC-3652 equation 10 or 11 load combinations and stress limits in accordance with the FSAR couraitment.
Thermal expansion stresses (Th) need only be included in the load combination if the maximum piping system temperature exceeds 200*F.
Systems which do not meet equation:10 or 11 allowables can be qualified for restart on a limited basis if equation 10 stresses do not exceed 1.5 Sa.
b)
Pipe support designs will be evaluated fnr SSE but not for OBE.
c)
The effect of friction loads on supports due to thermal growth of piping will not be considered.
d)
Expansion anchor bolts will have a minimum safety factor of 2.5 for wedge type bolts and 2.8 for self drilling expansion bolts.
Confirmatory Items 1.
TVA will perform a study during the Long Tena Program to verify that friction loads on supports due to thermal growth of piping at Sequoyah are not signifirant.
. 4 IVA will perform evaluations during the Lorg Term Progran to justify the pipe _ support deflection criteria used to verify rigidity.
3.
The results of related restart prcgrams such as the Employee Concerns Prograra anc the Category I(L) Piping Frogr6u will be
~
reviewed and ev61uateo by hRC to assess any potential irrt.ct on the AA Piping Restart Program.
In addition, the TVA bolt tightenirc program will be reviewed and evaluated by the stef# to verify that the program will identify l
and ccrrect potential cases of loose washers in unistrut type pipe supports.
3.3.1.4 References 1.
Imc Vemorandum, " Audit Report-Sequcayh Restart Program on Alternately l
Analyzea Piping and Supports", R.L. Ballard to C. Stahic, November 13, 1986.
2.
" Revised Sequoyah Nuclear Performance Plan", Tennessee Valley Authority, July 17, 10P6 3.
"Sequoyah Nuclear Plant NRC Technical Inforretien Request on Interim Acceptance Criteria, Civil Engineering Fro
, attachment to letter, R. Gridley (TVA) to B. Youngblood (NRC)graras"
, August 18, 1986.
2
Table 5.1 Sequoyah Restart Program i
Alternately Analyzed Piping and Supports Program Scope
~
i PROPOSED SCOPE FSAR COMMITMENT CURRENT STATUS k
t 1.
Alternate!y Aaalyzed Safety All Safety Class Piping Acceptable Class Piping required to mitigate FSAR Chapter 15 events and safely shut down plant.
=
d 2.
Ev11 oat.e only short term Evaluate all safety Revised Scope Acceptable safety concerns:
. Anchor movements at concerns including:
. Addition of thermal t.
br.toch/run interfaces
. Thermal expansion flex-ibility expansion analysis 1
, taege motor rperated and
. Interface between seismic in Restart Program for piping above 200*F pneumatic valves and deadweight piping for
. Interface between seismic 2 inch and smaller pipe scope and deadweight piping for pipe sizes greater than
. Axial support of long 2 inches piping runs and support of large concentrated weights s
t 2
Table 5.2 Sequoyah Restart Program Alternately Analyzed Piping & Supports Interim Criteria i
I PROPOSED INTEPIM CRITERIA FSAR COMMITMENT CURRENT STATUS l}
Ptl' yin Stress Limits SAM + TH + TAM < S eq.(10)
Revised Criteria Accept-SAR'< S I
. Til i T '.M < s or at'e on a limited basis:
P+DW+ SAM +TH+ TAM <S +S eq(11) where
~ where
. If equations 10 or 11 i
SN4
- Seisinic Anchor P = Pressure Stress cannot be met, piping
- lovanent Stress acceptable if:
T.H f.hermal Expansion Stress DW = Deadweight Stress TT' = Therm 41 Anchor Movement S
= ASME Code Allowable Stress
)
5 A5ME Code Allowable at Hot Temperature t
3tre:n lange for Thermal Expansion
- 2. Piping _08t laertial Loads Hot coast.1^ red i
Considered Resolved i
. TVA agreed to with-draw request l3.PiingCoar l
A Mixed ffic of:
Use Both
. Allowables fre.9 Current
. Allowables and Resolved
)
L ASME Cade, and
. 1 - factors
. TVA agreed to withdraw F-
. St.ress int nsification From B31.1, 1967 Code request a
factort 'i) from ANSI i
831.1, 1967 Code
- 4. SSE Allowable; for Supgorts l
~. 1. 7~x ~AlWAl l ma bl es --
1.6 x AISC Allowables Resolved (per SRP 3.8.4)
. TVA agreed to withdraw request S. seismic Loads for Supports
. SSE Only Both OBE & SSE Acceptable SSE more severe than OBE Only SSE has Safety Significance
Table 5.2 (Cont'd)
Sequoyah Restart Program Alternately Analyzed Piping & Supports Interim Criteria PROPOSED INTERIM CRITERIA FSAR COMMITMENT CURRENT STATUS
- 6. Support Ricidity Requirements
~ Tnly Isupports in either ~
All Supports should meet require-Resolved
~
direr. tion from rotating ment.
equipment should meet
. TVA agreed to withdraw j
requirement.
request
- 7., Friction loads on Supports (Induced ty Pipe Thermal Considered
)
Growth)
Acceptable
. Not Con.iidered
. Generally insignificant to supports of small bore piping
- 8. Anchor 801t Safety ~ Factor
~7JYne all Eli.s 4 or 5 as required by IE Bulletin Revised Criteria Accept-79-02 (No FSAR Connitment) abic
. 2.5 for wedge type i
bolts
. 2.8 for self drilling bolts
. For 494 supports, 489 meets IE 79-02 requirements
. IE 79-02 will be fully
}
implemented for long-term
- 9. Sp_No check on Torce rinL Sy pr ts j
variability Permit only + 25% variability Resolved
. TVA agreed to withdraw request
- 10. Faulted Condition Allowables
%upports omponent Standard Use thi Greater of
. 1.7 x Normal Load Rating 1.6 x Normal Load Rating Resolved (per S.R.P. 3.8.4)
. NF Rating TVA agreed to withdraw or request ASME Code NF Faulted Load Rating (No specific FSAR Connitment)
_h
Fr. S.A. Wnite Tennessee Valley Authority Sequoyah Nuclear Plant CC:
Tennes<.ee Drtoartmant of Public Health Recional Administrator, Region II U.S. Fluclear Regulatory Consission, ATTN:
Director, Buraou of 101 Marietta Street, N.W., Suite 2900 Environmental Health Services Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Cordell Ilull Building flashville, Tennessee 37219 J. A. Kirkebo AMN:
D.L. Williams fir. Michael H. Mobley, Director Tennessee Valley Authority Division of Radiological Health 400 West Suunit Hill Drive, W12 A12 T.E.R.R.A. Building Knoxville, Tennessee 37902 150 9th Avenue North Nashville, Tennessee 37203 Mr. Bob Faas Westinghouse Electric Corp.
County Judge P.O. Box 355 Hamilton County Courthcuse Pittsburnh, Fennsylvania 15230 Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402 R. l.
Gridley Tenaessea Valley Authority Q 15/8 imokout Place Ch.itt.umoqi, Tennessee 37402-2801 M. I., llati!!ng Tennessee Valley Authority Sequoyah N:: clear Plant P.O. 80T 2000 Sotidy Ib hy, Tennessee 37379 Res istant Inspector /Sequoyah NPS c/o U.S. fiuclear Regulatory Consnission w
2600 Igou Ferry Road Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379 R.L. Abercrombie Tennessee Valley Authority Sequcyab Nuclear ?lant P.O. IMx 1000 SoSiy Da Ey, Tennessee 373/9
{
l l
\\
i.
.