ML20215F307
| ML20215F307 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 06/12/1987 |
| From: | Gridley R TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8706220328 | |
| Download: ML20215F307 (19) | |
Text
'
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CH ATTANOOG A, TENNESSEE 37401 SN 1578 Lookout Place JUN 121987 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:
Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555 Gentlemen:
In the Matter of
)
Docket Nos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority
)
50-328 s
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - ELECTRICAL CALCULATIONS - REVISED FINAL STATUS REPORT
References:
1.
Letter from TVA to B. J. Youngblood dated December 29, 1986, "Sequoyah Nuclear Plant - Electrical Calculations - Final Status Report" 2.
Letter from B. J. Youngblood to S. A. White dated February 10, 1987, " Transmittal of Draft Safety Evaluation on Electrical Design Calculation" 3.
Letter from TVA to B. J. Youngblood dated February 27, 1987, "Sequoyah Nuclear Plant - Summary of Cable Ampacity Sampling Program" 4.
Letter from TVA to B. J. Youngblood dated March 12, 1987, "Sequoyah Nuclear Plant - Diesel Generator Loading Sequences" NRC requested information regarding the Sequoyah revised Final Status Report on Electrical Calculations.
The following document constitutes a revision to the Sequoyah Electrical Calculations Final Status Report submitted to NRC (reference 1).
This revision is required as a result of TVA Engineering Assurance (EA) audits 86-23 and 87-09, the findings of the February 2-13, 1987 NRC/ Inspection Enforcement (IE) review of electrical calculations, and NRC's draft SER (reference 2).
Further, the previous submittal addressed only auxiliary power, control power, and instrumentation and control systems.
With the exception of raceway calculations, which were addressed in a separate submittal (reference 3), this revision expands the scope of the submittal to include all essential minimum set electrical calculations required for Sequoyah unit 2 restart as defined by TVA Electrical Engineering Branch (EEB)
Policy Memorandum (PM) 86-02 (EEB), revision 1.
Additional calculation areas addressed by this revision include communications, lighting systems, and station grounding.
7 An Equal Opportunity Employer
f
. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission JtJN 121987 I
The referenced EA audits also identified a lack of calculations for the diesel generator (DG) battery system and the security lighting systems.
Subsequently, calculations have been issued which addressed DG battery j
capacity; distribution panel selection, protection, and coordination; and i
system voltage drop, thus completing the requirements for the DG battery system electrical calculations.
TVA has provided the calculations listed in enclosure 1 directly for NRC review.
Security lighting level selection has been addressed in a technical justification memorandum based upon the results of preoperational and postmodification testing.
TVA has also provided the information on security lighting listed in enclosure 1 directly for NRC review.
NRC also requested justification of the adequacy of lightning protection.
The justification has been addressed in a TVA technical justification memorandum.
TVA has provided the information on lightning protection listed in enclosure 1 directly for NRC review.
The referenced NRC/IE calculations review identified a concern with the adequacy of the 125-volt dc Vital Battery System capacity calculation; specifically, in-rush loading was not being addressed in the battery duty cycle. This in-rush loading consists primarily of switchgear trip and close l
coils and de emergency lighting. While the switchgear loading may be determined analytically, little quantitative vendor data is available on de lighting in-rush currents. Thus, subsequent to NRC Audit 87-06, TVA performed a special test to determine the in-rush loading of the de emergency lighting cabinets powered from the 125-volt dc vital batteries. During the test, the normal loads for the dc emergency lighting cabinets were also recorded, and in two cases, were determined to exceed the values recorded in the circuit schedules on the TVA battery board single-line design drawings. These drawings were used as input to the development of battery duty cycle in DNE calculation SQN-CPS-004.
Thus, the conservatism and adequacy of the duty cycle evaluated in SQN-CPS-004 have become indeterminate.
This deficiency in the single-line circuit schedules has been identified as a condition adverse to quality (CAQ) and appropriately documented in Condition Adverse to Quality Report (CAQR) SQT870791 in accordance with TVA's Nuclear Engineering Procedures.
As a portion of the corrective action for this deficiency, TVA has revised calculation SQN-CPS-004 to include a detailed load analysis of the most heavily loaded 125-volt de vital battery.
This revision includes a duty cycle based upon the worst-case composite operational mode for the battery and includes the in-rush requirements as determined analytically and empirically.
The preliminary results of the calculation verify sufficient battery capacity for Sequoyah unit 2 restart with no operational constraints and no technical specification revision necessary.
Therefore, no technical specification change concerning the battery duty cycle will be required or submitted to the NRC. Upon issue of the calculation, the single-line drawing circuit schedules j
will be revised as appropriate.
j
)
. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission M { g jgg7 The DG loading sequence analysis was addressed in a separate submittal to NRC (reference 4).
All essential minimum set electrical calculations are subject to further revision for the following items:
1.
verification of all previously unverified assumptions; 2.
deletion of nonconservative or unverified design cable lengths; 3.
correction of deficiencies identified by the Design Baseline and Verification Program (DBVP);
4.
incorporation of configurational control (as-condructed> drawings and applicable DBVP walkdown data; and 5.
inclusion of continuing plant modifications for engineering change notices (ECNs), field change requests (FCRs), CAQs, etc.
Items 1, 2, 3, and 4 listed above will be completed before unit 2 restart.
Item 5 is a continuing effort for the life of the plant.
Please note that Appendix R-associated circuit calculations will not be fully revised in accordance with the configurational control drawings identified in item 4 before unit 2 restart and that only the Class lE portion of these calculetions will be as-constructed before unit 2 restart. is a correlation of the PM 86-02 unit 2 restart essential minimum set of electrical calculations with the TVA calculations performed to fulfill the requirements of the EEB PM. is a description of the existing CAQs and significant condition reports (SCRs) identified by the electrical calculations program. is a list of cenmitments made in this letter.. With the exceptions r
as detailed above, the Seq.0yah essential minimum set electrical calculations i
required for unit 2 restart are completed and have been issued at the revision 0 level or above.
Revisiont to the calculations will continue as previously stated and will be complete before unit 2 restart.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY R. Gridley, Dire tor Nuclear Safety d Licensing Enclosures cc:
See page 4
.a
_4 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission cc (Enclosures):
Mr. G. G. Zech, Assistant Director for Inspection Programs Office of.Special Projects U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Region II Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Mr. J. A. Zwolinski, Assistant Director for Projects Division of TVA Projects Office of Special Projects U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4350 East West Highway EWW 322 Bethesda, Maryland. 20814 Sequoyah Resident Inspector Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 2600 Igou Ferry Road Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379 I
l
.. ~... -
I ENCLOSURE.1 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT Electrical Calculations and Memorandums Calculation List
'1.
Diesel Generator (DG) Battery Capacity - SQN - CPS - 007 REV 0 2.
Diesel Generatdr Battery System Adequacy - SQN - CPS - 011 REV 0 13.
Diesel Generator Lube Oil Pump Voltage - SQN - CPS - 012 REV 0
'4.
480V AC APS Short Circuit Analysis - 02SDJ -P213350-1 REV 4 Memorandum List
- 1. 'From W. S. Raughley to D. W. Wilson "Sequoyah Nuclear Plant - Technical Justification - Yard Security Lighting and 125 Volt DC Emergency Lighting Systems (Control Rooms and Safe Shutdown Areas)"
2.
From J. R. Baumann to Electrical Engineering Files "Sequoyah Nuclear Plant - Technical Justification - Station Grounding System (Lightning Protection, Cathodic Protection, Lightning Arrester)"
. Marr Ik J L$rW5SS&se#El $lN5w$
w'OA W L
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ENCLOSURE 2 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT List of Minimum Set of Electrical Calculations (Sheets 1 to 6)
Note:
Numerical listing of calculations is based on listing as taken from PM 86-02 and associated Auxillary Power, Control Power, Communications, and Instrumentation and Control sections.
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I ENCLOSURE 3 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT Corrective Action List of CAQs and SCRs (Sheets 1 to 5) i i
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SQN - SCRs & PIRs FOR ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM CALCULATIONS SCR SQNEEB8607 PROBLEM:
DEFICIENCIES EXIST HITH RESPECT TO INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS' VOLTAGE IN THE CLASS 1E AUXILIARY PHR SYS.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
INSTALLATION OF EIGHT NEW CABLES AND EIGHT l
NEW 80-PERCENT VOLTAGE SOLEN 0ID VALVES.
(ECN L6648)
SCR SQNEEB8532 - PROBLEM - DEFICIENCIES EXIST HITH RESPECT TO INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS' VOLTAGE IN THE 120-V AC VITAL INSTR PHR SYS.
j CORRECTIVE ACTION:
PULLING LARGER SIZE CABLE TO REDUCE CABLE IMPEDANCE AND PARALLELING SUPPLY CABLES TO REDUCE CURRENT THROUGH VARIOUS PORTIONS OF THE AFFECTED CIRCUITS.
(ECNs L6609, L6663, L6698)
SCR SQNEEB8605 - PROBLEM:
INADEQUATE MINIMUM DC INPUT VOLTAGE FOR THE UNIT 1 INVERTERS AND 26 MISC SOLEN 0ID VALVES AT MINIMUM BATTERY TERMINAL VOLTAGE.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
RECERTIFICATION TESTING OF INVERTERS DETERMINED THAT INVERTERS HILL OPERATE PROPERLY HITH AVAILABLE l
VOLTAGE.
THENTY-FOUR SOLEN 0 IDS HERE RECATEGORIZED AS l
N0H-REQUIRED AT MINIMUM BATTERY VOLTAGE. THE REMAINING TWO SOLEN 0 IDS HERE CERTIFIED OPERABLE BY THE VENDOR HITH AVAILABLE VOLTAGE.
NO PHYSICAL MODIFICATIONS HERE REQUIRED.
(ECN - N/A)
SCR SQNEEB8629 - PROBLEM:
DIESEL GENERATOR OVERLOAD DURING BLACK 0UT CONCURRENT HITH PHASE B CONTAINMENT ISOLATION DUE TO RANDOM LOAD BLOCK ADDITION AT T = 30 SECONDS.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: ADDITION OF TIME DELAY RELAYS TO ENSURE THAT RANDOM LOADING DOES NOT OCCUR SIMULTANE0USLY AT T - 30 i
SECONDS.
(ECN L6715)
{
SCR SONEEB8665 PROBLEM:
INCORRECT SETPOINTS FOR VITAL BATTERY BOARDS I, II, III, IV, AND V MAIN BREAKERS.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: ADD REDUNDANT PROTECTIVE DEVICE OR RESIZE EXISTING PROTECTIVE SCHEME AS REQUIRED BY DESIGN CRITERIA SQN-DC-V-11.3.
(ECN L6606)
SCR SQNEEB8523 - PROBLEM:
INADEQUATE OVERCURRENT PROTECTION FOR TEN V3 PENETRATION CIRCUITS.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: ADD REDUNDANT PROTECTIVE DEVICE OR RESIZE EXISTING PROTECTIVE SCHEME AS REQUIRED BY DESIGN CRITERIA SQN-DC-V-11.3.
(ECN L6606)
SHEET 1 0F 5
4 SCR SQNEEB8676 - PROBLEM:
INADEQUATE CONTINUOUS CURRENT PROTECTION FOR (Unit 1)
ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS.
SQNEEB8677 CORRECTIVE ACTION: OBTAIN EXCEPTION TO DESIGN CRITERIA (Unit 2)
SQN-DC-V-11.3 FOR ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS 52 AND 53.
(ECN - N/A)
PIR SONEEB8657 - PROBLEM:
FIFTH VITAL BATTERY SYSTEM TRANSFER SWITCHES ARE NOT ADEQUATELY RATED TO WITHSTAND MAXIMUM AVAILABLE FAULT CURRENT.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: CORRECTIVE ACTION HAS NOT YET BEEN DETERMINED.
iHIS SYSTEM IS NOT REQUIRED FOR UNIT 2 RESTART.
(ECN - N/A)
SCR SQNEEB8646 - PROBLEM: GIVEN DIESEL GENERATOR BREAKER CLOSURE AT 80-PERCENT VOLTAGE AND 850 R/ MIN AND LOADS APPLIED AT t=0 (CLOSURE OF THE BREAKER), THE VOLTAGE WILL DIP BELOW THE 25-PERCENT VARIANCE AND WILL NOT RECOVER TO 90 PERCENT OF NOMINAL FOR 1.9 SECONDS FOR BLACK 0UT WITH PHASE A ISOLATION.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
BASED UPON TEST RESULTS OF SI-7 (PERFORMED JANUARY 23, 1986), BREAKER CLOSURE ACTUALLY OCCURS WHEN VOLTAGE IS GREATER THAN 100 PERCENT OF NOMINAL.
THUS, NO DEFICIENCY EXISTS AND NO CORRECTIVE ACTION IS REQUIRED.
(ECN - N/A)
PIR SQNEEB8666 - PROBLEM:
THE AVAILABLE FAULT CURRENT AT THE 6.9-KV UNIT BDS EXCEEDS THE BREAKERS' RATINGS FOR THE FOLLOWING CONDITION:
FULL LOAD OPERATION WITH POWER SUPPLIED FROM THE USSTs AND GENERATOR OPERATING AT 24.5-KV (673 MVA AVAILABLE).
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS ESTABLISHED UNDER SQ-DCR-P-1958.
(ECN - N/A)
SCR SQNEEB86124 - PROBLEM: MAXIMUM LOCA LOADING FOR C&A BLDG VENT BDS 1Al-1, 2Al-A, AND 281-B EXCEEDS THE FEEDER BREAKER CONTINUOUS CURRENT SETPOINTS.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
CHANGE FEEDER BREAKER SETPOINT (PROPOSED).
(ECN LATER)
CAQR SQT870791 PROBLEM:
THE LOAD TABULATIONS ON 125-V DC VITAL BATTERY BOARD SINGLE-LINE DRAWINGS 45N703-1, R26, AND 45N703-2, R22, ARE INCORRECT RELATIVE TO DC EMERGENCY LIGHTING LOADS.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
DETERMINE WORST-CASE BATTERY LOADING AND REVISE CALCULATION SQN-CPS-004 AND THE AFFECTED SINGLE-LINE DRAWINGS ACCORDINGLY (PROPOSED).
(ECN LATER)
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SCR SQNEEB86131 - PROBLEM:
TABULATED WORST-CASE 2-HOUR LOADING ON VITAL BATTERY l
BOARDS I, II, III, AND IV PANEL 3 BUS EXCEEDS MANUFACTURER'S CONTINUOUS CURRENT RATING.
{
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
ADDITIONAL VENDOR DATA DOCUMENTED A 5-HOUR BUS i
RATING ON PANEL 3 IN EXCESS OF THE 2-HOUR LOADING; THUS, NO CORRECTIVE ACTION IS REQUIRED.
SHEET 2 0F 5 i
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SCR SQNEEB86167 - PROBLEM:
THIS SCR DOCUMENTED THREE CAQS:
(1) LACK OF SELECTIVE COORDINATION FOR 480-V ERCH BDS AND DIESEL AUX BDS; (2) LACK OF OVERLOAD PROTECTION FOR SEVERAL 480-V IE LOADS
(
(SWGR & HCC); (3) LACK OF ADEQUATE SHORT-CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR J
STATION DECK SUMP PUMPS A AND B.
1 CORRECTIVE ACTION:
1 PROPOSED (1) ADJUST BREAKER LONG DELAY PICKUP; PROPOSED (2) CAQRs SCR SQNEEB86167 AND PIR SONEEB86192 IDENTIFIED TWO DEFICIENCIES WITH RESPECT TO THERMAL OVERLOAD HEATERS (TOLS):
i A.
THE TOLS FOR APPR0XIMATELY 100 CLASS 1E MOTORS OR VALVES WERE NOT SIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF TVA POLICY MEMORANDUM (PM) 86-18 (TVA).
B.
THE IMPEDANCE OF THE TOLS FOR APPROXIMATELY 100 CLASS 1E l
MOTORS OR VALVES PRODUCED EXCESSIVE VOLTAGE DROP TO THE COMPONENTS, THEREBY POTENTIALLY RENDERING THE DEVICES INOPERABLE.
l AS CORRECTIVE ACTION FOR THESE DEFICIENCIES, THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS WERE PROPOSED AND IMPLEMENTED AS APPROPRIATE.
A.
FOR MOTORS, RESIZE THE TOL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF PM 86-18 AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH POSITION C.2 0F REGULATORY GUIDE 1.106, REVISION 1, MARCH 1977.
B.
FOR ACTIVE VALVES NOT ACTUATED BY A SAFETY INJECTION (SI)
SIGNAL, BYPASS THE TOL CONTACTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ECN-L6883 AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE 87-29.
C.
FOR SI ACTUATED VALVES, BYPASS THE TOL-IN ACCORDANCE WITH ECN-L6883 AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE 87-29.
THIS OPTION IN SEVERAL CASES REDUCED THE CIRCUIT IMPEDANCE SIGNIFICANTLY AND RESULTED IN THE POTENTIAL FOR A FAULT CURRENT TO EXIST IN EXCESS OF THE ASSOCIATED CIRCUIT BREAKER INTERRUPTING RATING.
IN THESE INSTANCES, THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS WERE ALSO REPLACED.
FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION OPTIONS 2 AND 3, APPLICABLE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS SHALL BE REVISED AS REQUIRED.
PROPOSED (3) REPLACE THERMAL MAGNETIC BREAKERS.
SHEET 3 0F 5
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PIR SQNEEB8668 - PROBLEM:
PRESSURE SWITCHES ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO SEISMIC CATEGORY 1 REQUIREMENTS.
FAILURE OF THESE SWITCHES WILL CAUSE THE MCR AIR CHILLERS NOT TO PERFORM THEIR INTENDED SAFETY FUNCTION.
CORRECTION ACTION:
REPLACE COMPONENTS OR OBTAIN SEISMIC QUALIFICATION FOR EXISTING COMPONENTS.
(ECN - N/A)
PIR SQNEEB8682 PROBLEM: AN INTERLOCK FROM THE C0 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM INITIATION SIGNAL THAT STOPS THE DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM EXHAUST SYSTEM IS NOT SEISMIC CLASS 1 AS REQUIRED BY FSAR SECTION 9.4.5.3.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
REPLACE COMPONENTS OR OBTAIN SEISMIC QUALIFICATION FOR EXISTING COMPONENTS.
(ECN - N/A)
PIR SQNEEB8683 - PROBLEM:
HEATER CONTROL CIRCUITS ARE NOT SEISMICALLY QUALIFIED.
THEIR FAILURE CAN CAUSE THE HEATERS TO TURN ON INADVERTENTLY, WITH THE POTENTIAL TO HEAT THE ASSOCIATED ROOMS TO AN UNACCEPTABLE TEMPERATURE.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: REPLACE COMPONENTS OR OBTAIN SEISMIC QUALIFICATION FOR EXISTING COMPONENTS.
(ECN - N/A)
SCR SQNEEB8667 PROBLEM: AIR COMPRESSORS WERE SEISMICALLY QUALIFIED: HOWEVER, QUALIFICATION DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT INSTRUMENT SETPOINTS WOULD NOT HAVE AN UNACCEPTABLE SHIFT FOLLOWING A SEISMIC EVENT.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: REPLACE COMPONENTS OR OBTAIN SEISMIC QUALIFICATION FOR EXISTING COMPONENTS.
(ECN L6878)
SCR SQNEEB8673 - PROBLEM: HIGH TEMPERATURE SHUTDOHN INTERLOCK IN EITHER SHUTDOWN BOARD ROOM A OR B WILL SHUT DOHN THE AIR-CONDITIONING EQUIPMENT FOR THE OPPOSITE TRAINING BOARD ROOM.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
FURTHER EVALUATION OF SYSTEM DESIGN HAS DETERMINED TH/.T A PROBLEM DOES NOT EXIST.
SCR SQNEEB8691 - PROBLEM:
A.
PRESENT SETPOINT FOR INSTRUMENTS THAT START THE TRAVELING SCREEN MOTORS FOR THE ERCH SYSTEM IS 90 PSIG.
ACCURACY OF THESE INSTRUMENTS IS 4.5 PSIG.
{
SAFETY LIMITS ARE LOWER - 70.5, UPPER - 70.9.
THEREFORE, OPERATIONAL LIMITS ARE VIOLATED EVEN WITH A SETPOINT CHANGE.
B.
PRESENT SETPOINT FOR THE ERCH BACKWASH INITIATION IS 2.0 PSID INCREASING; OPERATIONAL LIMIT IS 0.5 PSID. THEREFORE, THE PRESENT SETPOINT VIOLATES THE OPERATIONAL LIMIT.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: SETPOINTS MUST BE CHANGED.
(ECN LATER)
SHEET 4 0F 5 t m.. :a,~.-.
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PROBLEM:
C.
PRESENT SETPOINT FOR THE ERCW BACKWASH FLUSH INITIATION IS 20.0 PSID INCREASING. OPERATIONAL LIMIT IS 34.0 PSID DECREASING.
FUNCTIONAL LOGIC IS INCORRECT, AND SETPOINT IS IN VIOLATION OF OPERATIONAL LIMIT.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
SETPOINT MUST BE CHANGED, AND OPERATIONAL LIMITS NEED TO BE RECALCULATED.
(ECN LATER)
SCR SQNEEB8689 - PROBLEM:
A.
PRESENT SETPOINT FOR NONESSENTIAL CONTROL AIR ISOLATION IS 80 PSIG DECREASING; SYSTEM DESIGN LIMIT IS 83 PSIG.
INSTRUMENT ACCURACY IS + 2.7 PSI.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
REEVALUATE MECHANICAL SYSTEM DESIGN LIMITS AND REVISE SETPOINT, IF REQUIRED.
(ECN L6878)
PROBLEM:
B.
PRESENT SETPOINT FOR STARTING AND LOADING THE ESSENTIAL AIR COMPRESSORS IS 75 PSIG DECREASING; SYSTEM DESIGN LIMIT IS 73 PSIG.
WITH INACCURACIES OF 2.7 PSI, SYSTEM DESIGN LIMITS COULD BE VIOLATED.
CCRRECTIVE ACTION:
REEVALUATE MECHANICAL SYSTEM DESIGN LIMITS AND REVISE SETPOINT, IF REQUIRED.
(ECN L6878)
SCR SQNEEB8690 - PROBLEM:
A. THE AUTOMATIC CONTROL FOR THE TURBINE-DRIVEN FEEDWATER PUMP IS SET FOR 880 GPM.
THE SETPOINT TO LOCK OUT MANUAL CONTROL IS 800 GPM OR GREATER.
THEREFORE, MANUAL CONTROL IS EFFECTIVELY PRESENTED.
OPERATING PROCEDURES REQUIRE MANUAL CONTROL.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
NONE.
REEVALUATED SYSTEM OPERATION WITH RESPECT TO DESIGN CRITERIA AND DETERMINED THAT A PROBLEM DID NOT EXIST.
(ECN - N/A)
PROBLEM:
B.
FS-46-57 HAS A Rt. SET ADJUST WHICH MUST BE SET TO MINIMUM TO PREVENT LOCKUP. SURVEILLANCE INSTRUCTIONS 00 NOT REQUIRE THIS ADJUSTMENT TO BE MADE.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
NONE.
REEVALUATED SYSTEM OPERATION WITH RESPECT TO DESIGN CRITERIA AND DETERMINED THAT A PROBLEM DID NOT EXIST.
(ECN - N/A)
SHEET 5 0F 5 l
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J ENCLOSURE 4 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT LIST OF COMMITMENTS 1.
All essential minimum set electrical calculations will be revised for the following items before restart of the affected unit:
- a. Verification of all previously unverified assumptions.
- b. Deletion of nonconservative or unverified design cable lengths.
- c. Correction of deficiencies identified by the Design Baseline and
)
Verification Program (DBVP).
- d. Incorporation of configurational control (as-constructed) drawings and applicable D6VP walkdown data.
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