ML20215E497
| ML20215E497 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/12/1987 |
| From: | Harper J, Stone J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215E477 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-QA-99901081 99901081-87-01, 99901081-87-1, NUDOCS 8706190390 | |
| Download: ML20215E497 (6) | |
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ORGANIZATf0N:
INLAND STEEL COMPANY EAST CHICAGO, INDIANA REPORT.
INSPECTION INSPECTION NO.: 99901081/87-01 DATES: 02/17-20/87 OM-STTE HollRR.
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CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS:
Inland Steel Company i
3210 k'atling Street l
East Chicago, Indiana 46312 j
i ORGANIZATIONAL CONTACT: Richard L. Yancey TELEPHONE NUMBER:
219-392-4978; NUCLEAR INDUSTRY ACTIVITY: Steel producer.
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//z/87 ASSIGNED INSPECTOR:
w J. C. erper, Progra'm Development and Reactive Date InspectionSection(PDRIS)
OTHERINSPECTOR(S):
APPROVED BY:
J. [/. Stone, Chief, PDRIS, Vendor Inspection Branch IhSPECTION BASES AND SCOPE:
A.
BASES:
10 CFR 50, Appendix B and 10 CFR Part 21.
B.
SCOPE:
The inspection was performed to follow-up on a November 1986 Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO) Part 21 report concerning laminations in steel columns produced by Inland Steel Company (ISC) and supplied by Rockwell Engineering (RE) to North Anna for a new service water spray array system.
PLANT SITE APPLICABILITY:
North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2.
8706190390 % $
e.
.' # ORGAN!ZATION:
INLAND STEEL COMPANY-EAST CHICAGO, IND1ANA 1
REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99901081/87-01 RESULTS:
PAGE 2 of 6 A.
VIOLATIONS:
1.
Contrary to Section 21.6 of 10 CFR Part 21, ISC failed to post copies of Section 206 of the Atomic Energy Act.
(87-01-01)
B.
NONCONFORMANCES:
1.
Contrary to Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, at the time of the inspection, ISC did not have a procedure for performing sulfur printing at the #2 Basic 0xygen Furnace (B0F) Bloom Caster.
(87-01-02) 2.
Contrary.to Criterion II of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, at the time of the inspection, ISC did not have a procedure or instructions pertaining to indoctrination and training of personnel performing activities affecting quality.
(87-01-03)
C.
OTHER FINDINGS OR COMMENTS:
On November 7, 1986, VEPC0 notified the NRC that RE had supplied defective ASTM A36-84A wide flange structural members for the new SWSAS supports.
On September 15, 1986, a routine post weld QC inspection initially revealed laminations in the web section of a steel column. RE was the seller of the steel columns to VEPC0 and ISC was the supplier of 10" x 49" wide steel flange shapes to RE. The original purchase order 29191 from RE was place with ISC on September 12, 1985.for Inland Wide' Flange Shapes, ASTM A36-84A, W 10 in. x 49 in. x 35 ft. 3 in. On October 23, 1986, pre-installation ultrasonic testing (UT) of the steel from heat #17802 revealed lamination type indications on several columns. RE was notified and an ISC UT-NDE Level II technician visited North Anna on October 28, 1986 and identified the defect as " pipe type indications." According to the ISC Level 11 technician, 18 out of the 25 beams ultrasonically tested were rejected for pipe type indications. All beams were tested end to end. According to the ISC " Nondestructive Testing Personnel Qualification
& Certification Record," the ISC UT-NDE Level II technician was qualified according to the ISC " Training Qualification and Certification Procedure,"06-101, Revision 4, dated June 1981.
4 After review of the production records for the defective steel, ISC s
isolated the pipe condition to heat #17802 specification 52-05, AL killed steel, ingots #11 and #12.
ISC attributes the pipe problem to abnormalities occurring during the pouring of the ingot. The abnormality was a full-running stopper which essentially affects the
)
control over ingot pour height (in this case, it involved a short pour of 85" in a 90" mold).
'i L
c ORGANIZATION:
INLAND STEEL COMPANY EAST CHICAG0, INDIANA l
)
REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99901081/87-01 RESULTS:
PAGE 3 of 6 D.
CONCLUSION:
Inland successfully isolated the pipe condition to heat #17802 (261 ingots were produced in that heat), open top ingots #11 and #12.
Isolation of the problem was possible by narrowing down the ingot production size, steel making history, times and weight. The heat was produced at the 28" structural mill and tapped on October 6, 1985. The pour time was normal and there were no stickers / scrappy ingots.
Ingots #1-13 were charged in pit #6 at 6:05 pm on October 6, 1985 and drawn on 3:37 am on October 7, 1985. There was apparently no recognizable causes for excessive pipe in the ingots (i.e., dished top contour, ingot eruptions, boiling, metal loss). However, ingots #11 and #12 did experience an irregularity since they were poured with full running stoppers (a short poured ingot of 85" ina90" mold).
It is probable that pour height control and/or top end turbulence as a result of the full running stopper condition led to excessive pipe. According to the "#2 B0F Metallurgical Report of Steel Making Inspection," the pour stream condition was solid, the metal action was quiet and the top condition was foam.
Yields are calculated to be 81.5% and 82.8% for ingots #11 and #12 respectively.
Procedure #404-P-024, " Pouring Stand Set-Up Preparation Prior to Teem Killed Open Tap Heat," #404-P-025, " Pouring Stand Mold Pouring Height Marking," #404-P-013. " Emergency Pouring," and #661-P-101, " Charging and Drawing Ingots," were reviewed and found adequate. All applicable procedures were followed during the production of heat #17802.
In as much as pipe is an inherent quality of ingot solidification, the critical operation for good ingot quality is the cropping operation.
Therefore, in this particular case, the origin of the pipe defect is academic since it should have been spotted and eliminated during the cropping operation. Under the Metallurgical comments in the " Steel Application Memo" the instructions to the shearman were ingots "#11-12 =
cut out pipe." However, after the ingot was rolled and sent to the 28" shear mill, #2 bloomer for cropping, the shearman was required to
" shear to obtain the ordered Steel Application Memorandum (SAM) weight" according to the procedure #661-1-107, "Shearman/ Operating Shear." The ordered SAM weight for ingots #11 and #12 were one piece at 7260#, one piece at 5550# and one piece at 7460#, one piece at 5700#, respectively.
The order width and height for ingots #11 and #12 were both 13.8750" and 12.00".
The shearman apparently followed the SAM and the procedure JQA No.
661-J-107 without either looking for or noting excessive pipe. Upon reviewing the #2MPR transaction log for the #2 blooming mill and the SAM,
L* *, 4 l' ORGANIZATION:
INLAND STEEL COMPANY.
EAST CHICAG0,' INDIANA' j
?
\\
. REPORT INSPECTION t
NO.: 99901081/87-01
'RESULTS:
PAGE'4 of 6 l
it'was evident for. heat #17802 that two groups of' ingots, #2-5'and #6-11, the same amount of. steel was cut for each group (each group has. pieces withthesamelength).
Ingots #2-5 all had 5" of steel cut from rolled.
1 ingots with an original 12' 4" length and 6" of steel cut from rolled
. ingots with an original 11' 11" length.
Ingots #6-11 had 7" of steel cut from-the rolled ingots with an original 13' 9" length and 6" from the rolled ingots with an original 10' 7" length.
Ingot #12 had 6" of steel cut from the rolled ingots with an original 14' 2" length and 7" of steel m
from the rolled ingots with. an original 10' 11" length.: With this consistant pattern of the amount of steel sheared, it is probable that the shearman failed to note and eliminate some secondary pipe in the ingots.
It is also possible that some pipe was interpreted as segregation and subsequently disregarded by the shearman.
In many cases, pipe is not visible on the surface but can only be detected by ultrasonics or radiography.
Heat #17802 was not. originally produced as. a nuclear order for RE. The inspection revealed that RE did not specify the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B on the original purchase order (P0 29191) to ISC or the replacement order (R4-88962) but they did impose the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21.. As a result of not imposing Appendix B on ISC,-RE was not effective in communicating the quality requirements of the order.
At the time of the order (prior to July 1, 1984) ISC had a two tier quality system one for Nuclear Quality orders and one for commercial grade orders.
Presently, ISC treats all prime steel orders as quality system orders.
Therefore, at that time ICS justified filling the RE order from their commercial grade stock using their nomal and routine (quality require-ments) procedures, which at the time were different from their equivalent Appendix B quality program (from a procedural standpoint). Nevertheless, since Part 21 was imposed on the order, ISC should have been alerted to the possibility that the structurals were to be put into nuclear related service.
As part of their corrective action, Inland has committed to inquire about end uses on all orders specifying 10 CFR Part 21 (in cases where 10 CFR 50, Appendix B is not specified as in this case).
ISC plans to supply all orders specifying NCA 3800, N45.2-77,10 CFR 50 or 10 CFR 21 as bloom-cast (as a primary steel specification) and ingot-cast bottom-cut-only (as an alternative steel specification).
UT inspection will be mandatory only if ordered by the customer or in the specification. - Bloom-cast and ingot-cast bottom-cut-only will reduce the probability of pipe or secondary pipe from being missed during ingot shearing since these production methods are inherently less prone to the pipe defect.
ORGANIZATION:- INLAND STEEL COMPANY EAST CHICAGO, INDIANA REPORT INSPECTION Hn - QQQn1n91/A7-01 RESULTS:
PAGE 5 of 6 10 CFR Part 21 Issues As part of a plant tour of ISC, the NRC inspector verified that the Part 21 notice and procedures were adequately posted, however, Section 206 was not posted (see Violation 87-01-01). Upon interviewing two supervisors in the finishing and shipping department it was evident that they had no knowledge of 10 CFR Part 21 or of a Part 21 procedure. There was no objective evidence that employees involved with tasks affecting quality at ISC have knowledge of the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21.
Additionally, there is no objective evidence that 10 CFR Part 21 is
-addressed in any indoctrination and training of personnel perfoming activities af fecting quality.
Training and Qualifications From the information provided by ISC, the NRC inspector concluded that a procedure for guidance on training and indoctrination of personnel involved in quality related activities did not exist.
(See Nonconformance 87-01-03.) ISC submitted infomation to the NRC inspector which indicated that the quality training and indoctrination program consisted of crew meetings, audits on job performance and departmental training classes (statistical process control (SPC) and bander marker training classes).
These types of training methods (except the audits) generally covered ISC's quality philosophy, future quality goals and covered in depth training on applicable job procedures. No objective evidence existed to support that these classes or any other classes formally incorporated and covered the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21, 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, or hCA 3800 of N45.2-77 or the ISC quality systems manual.
A lack of training in these areas was evident from interviews conducted by the NRC inspector with two ISC supervisors. Neither supervisor was aware of 10 CFR Part 21.
In addition, non-salary employees directly involved in qnlity activities (i.e., shearman) are not formally trained and indoctrinated on the ISC Quality Systems Manual or on 10 CFR Part 21.
The shearman is responsible for cropping out pipe from rolled ingots, therefore, eliminating laminations in the final product. Since the shearman is the last check point for pipe in the 28" mill, he is an essential part of the ISC ingot steel quality production program.
According to a January 28, 1985 Inter-Comunication to all Department Heads from the Superintendent, Qualification Planning and Development,
.. 0ur intent is to train employees who would immediately use SPC."
e ORGANIZATION:
INLAND STEEL COMPANY EAST CHICAG0, INDIANA
. REPORT INSPECTION wn. cooning1/A7_n1 RFsulTS.
PAGF 6 nf 6 The " Training Qualifications and Certification Procedure for Nondestructive i
Testing Personnel,"06-101, Revision 4, June 1981 was reviewed and found to be adequate. The Nondestructive Testing Personnel Qualification and Certification record was also reviewed. Qualifications for an ultrasonics Level II inspector (the inspector that tested the structurals at VEPCO) and a Level III inspector ultrasonics were checked. Certifications, qualification tests, eye examinations and performance sumaries for these inspectors were all up to date.
Plant Tour The No. 2 Blooming Mill and the No. 2 B0F/ Continuous Casting facility was toured. This tour included visits to the Basic 0xygen Furnace, the Ladle Metallurgy Station, the Strand Slab Caster, and the Strand Bloom / Slab combination caster. During the tour it was revealed that there was no procedure for the sulfur printing technique being perfonned at the #2 B0F Bloom caster.
(SeeNonconformance 87-01-02.)
Considerable time was spent in the shearman's pulpit observing shearing practices on shear slabs finished at #2 bloomer. Procedure 661-J-107 "Shearman/ Operating Shear" was available at the work station and was correctly implemented.
E.
PERSONS CONTACTED:
Jeff 0'Barske, Quality Coordinator, Inland / East Chicago
- Frank A. Surgot, Staff Engineer, Inland / East Chicago
- Phillip A. Speer, Section Manager, Inland / Chicago
- James L. Federoff, Audit Coordinator, Q.S., Inland / East Chicago
- Richard L. Yancey, Audit Coordinator, Inland / East Chicago
- Cedric Oliver, Sr. SPC Engineer, Inland / East Chicago
- Rich Pruitt, Section Manager, Inland / Chicago A. J. Rudis, Jr., President, Rockwell Engineering Company R. A. Ruter, QA Administrator, Rockwell Engineering Company
- Attended the exit meeting.