ML20215C245
| ML20215C245 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 06/20/1985 |
| From: | Schweibinz E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Davis A, James Keppler, Spessard R NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215C208 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-86-373, FOIA-86-A-124 NUDOCS 8610100186 | |
| Download: ML20215C245 (7) | |
Text
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NUCLEAR REG LATORY COMMISSION F D
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June 20,1985 MEMORANDUM FOR: See Below FROM:
E. R. Schweibinz, Chief, Technical Support Staff
SUBJECT:
SALP BOARD MEETING - FERMI The attached Draft Salp Report for Fermi 2 will be used as the basis for the Board Meeting scheduled for June 27, 1985, at 1:00 p.m. in Conference Room A.
To ensure all comments are incorporated into the report, each responsible person is expected to review the report prior to the Board Meeting.
Comments should also be solicited from those staff members who had inspection responsibility during the assessment period.
Should you be unable to attend the Board Meeting, please arrange for appropriate representation by a member of your staff.
1^ ^ 't E. R. Schweibinz, Chief Technical Support Staff
Attachment:
As stated cc w/ attachment:
James G. Keppler J. A. Hind A. B. Davis C. J. Paperiello R. L. Spessard W. L. Axelson L. A. Reyes J. R. Creed J. J. Harrison L. R. Greger C. C. Williams M. P. Phillips M. A. Ring M. C. Schumacher D. H. Danielson D. Lynch, LPM F. C. Hawkins B. J. Youngblood, NRR W. G. Guldemond E. G. Greenman J. I. McMillen C. E. Norelius N. J. Chrissotimos S. Stasek R. Warnick 8610100186 860929 P. Byron, SRI PDR FOIA CARDE86-A-124 PDR 1
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DRAFT SALP BOARD REPORT U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFOR.%NCE Inspection Report No.
j Detroit Edison Ceepany Name of Licensee Fermi 2 Name of Facility October 1, 198t. through June 30, 1985 Assessment Period 4
1
e DRAFT V
Ill.
SUMMARY
OF RESULTS Rating Last Rating Tliis Functional Area Period Period __
Trend l
l A.
Plant Operations NR 2
B.
Radiological Controls 2
2 C.
Maintenance NR 2
D.
Surveillance NR 2
E.
Fire Protection 3
3 F.
1 I
G.
Security 2
2 l
H.
Fueling NR 1
1.
Piping Systems and Supports 2
2 6
DRAFT 6'
J.
Electrical Power Supply and Distribution 3
2 K.
Instrumentation and Control Systems 3
2 L.
' Electrical Equipment and Cables NR 2
M.
Preoperational and Startup Phase Testing NR 1
N.
Quality Programs and Administrative Controls 2
2 0.
Licensing Activities 2
- NE = not rated or not rated separately.
7
DRAIT p
3.
Board Recommendations The Board recommends that the licensee increase their attention in this area due to the extremely short period of operating experience. Concerted effort by licensee management may be required to ensure that indicated performance is improsed and personnel errors are reduced.
B.
Radiological Controls 1.
Analysis Licensee performance received a rating of 2 during the SALP 5 period which ended September 30, 1984. During the current assessment period inspections were performed in November-December, 1984, (50-341/84043) and Mr.rch 1985, (50-341/85017) to review the licensee's preparations for fuel load in the areas of radiation protection and radwaste; no violations or deviations were identified. No inspections of the confirmatory measurements or environmental monitoring programs occurred during this period.
It was determined that the licensee had satisfactorily completed activities required for fuel load.
Five activities need to be completed before exceeding five percent power and are addressed 12
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,1 DRAFT by open items and/or license conditions. One additional item concerning operability of an interim solid radwaste system is required to be completed prior to the warranty run.
Licensee progress on these items has been generally satisfactory.
Items involving operability of the permanent liquid radwaste system, operability of the post accident sampling system, and installation of a collimator for the germanium detector used for post accident sample counting, are essentially complete and ready for final NRC review.
Items involving heat tracing of the Standby Gas Treatment System sample lines and review of the effluent monitoring system quantification program are in progress and scheduled to be completed by July 2, 1985.
The licensee recently submitted a Process Control Program (PCP) covering operation of a vendor supplied interim solid radwaste processing system to NRR for approval. The vendor system is expected to be operational before exceeding five percent power and will be used until completion of the permanent solid radwaste system.
Management involvement, resolution of technical issues, and responsiveness to NRC issues have been satisfactory during this assessment period.
s 13
a DRAFT e
2.
Conclusion The licensee is rated Category 2 in this area. This is the same rating as in the previous assessment period. Licensee performancu has remained essentially the same over the course of the current assessment period.
3.
Board Recommendations C.
Maintenance 1.
Analysis This functional area was examined by a region based inspector during one inspection within the assessment period. The inspection was performed to determine the adequacy of imple-mentation of the licensee's operating phase maintenance and modification programs.
No violations were identified in this area. However, two unresolved items were identified in the preventive maintenance (PM) program:
(1) the current low rate of completica of scheduled PM Tasks and (2) the potential for applying resources to lower priority PM tasks when higher priority tasks or tasks of the same priority are overdue. The first item is of concern, in that the licensee has not evaluated the impact of 14
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t At opproximately 0230 hours0.00266 days <br />0.0639 hours <br />3.80291e-4 weeks <br />8.7515e-5 months <br /> on June 4, 1985, with the plant in operational condition 4, prior to initial criticality, it was deter,ined m
that grab samples of the P.eactor Building ventilation effluent had not been taken within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of the failure of the Reactor Building entilation effluent radiation monitor.
This did not comply with 3.3.7.12-1 which apply when the number of Actions 121 and 122 of Table operable effluent radiation monitoring channels ic less than the minimum required by Fermi-2 Technical Specification 3.3.7.12.b.
The The root cauce of the event was determined to be personnel error.
(NSO) on duty when the control 4
Control Room Nuclear Supervising Operator terminal for the radiation monitor became inoperable failed to document his instructions to the Chemistry Department for verifying operability Later shifts were not informed of of the affluent radiation monitors.
the agreement between Operations and Chemistry to split recponsibilities for verifying these monitors, nor was there an entry in the NSO log.
Personnel have been counseled to document such instructions in the In addition, the event has been discussed with Operations future.
% rsonnel and will be highlighted by a memo placed in the required Goding program.
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, n c a ammim At opproximately 0230 hours0.00266 days <br />0.0639 hours <br />3.80291e-4 weeks <br />8.7515e-5 months <br /> on June 4, 1985, with the plant in ational condition 4, prior to initial criticality, it was determined
. grab samples and iodine and particulate samples of the Reactor
. 21 ding ventilation effluent had not been taken within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of the failure of the Reactor Building ventilation effluent radiation monitor.
This did not comply with the requirements of Actions 121.and 122 of Table 3.3.7.12-1 which apply when the number of operable effluent radiation monitoring channels is less than the minimum required by Fermi-2 Technical Specification 3.3.7.12.b.
The root cause of the event was determined to be personnel error.
The Control Room Nuclear Supervising Operator on duty when the control terminal for the radiation monitor became inoperable failed to document his instructions to the Chemistry Department for verifying operability of the effluent radiation monitors.
Later shifts were not informed of the agreement between Operations and Chemistry to split responsibilities for verifying these monitors, nor was there an entry in the NSO log.
sonnel have been counseled to document such instructions in the cure.
In addition, the event has been discussed with Operations parsonnel and will be highlighted by a memo placed in the urgent required reading program.
1 On June 3, 1985, at the beginning of the day shift (0730-1600 hours),
the Control Room NSO noted that the Control Terminal (CT-2B) for the effluent radiation monitoring system was malfunctioning.
This terminal 011ows remote monitoring and operation of the SPING (Stationary j
Particulate, Iodine, and Noble Gas) monitor.
A repair order (PN-21) was
.itten on June 2 when problems with the terminal were first noted.
The
-ontrol Room NSO informed the Nuclear Shift Supervisor (NSS) of the l
1 otatus of the CT-2B terminal and requested that Chemistry personnel l
perform a visual inspection of all SPING units to verify that they were l
cparating.
This visual inspection was completed by 0750 hours0.00868 days <br />0.208 hours <br />0.00124 weeks <br />2.85375e-4 months <br /> and all SPING units were found to be operating properly.
The NSS instructed the NSO to have the visual inspection repeated at two hour intervals, since the status of the SPING's could not >2 determined while the CT-2B terminal in the Control Room was inoperable.
At 0820 the Control Room NSO contacted the Chemistry Lab and arranged for Chsmistry personnel to inspect the SPING's on the Radwaste Building HVAC cxhcust, Turbine Building HVAC exhaust, Sevice Building HVAC exhaust, cnd Onsite Storage Building HVAC exhaust.
The NSO and Chemistry agreed that Operations personnel would inspect the SPING's on the Reactor ilding HVAC exhaust and the Standby Gas Treatment System.
This eement was not recorded in the NSO's log and the NSS wac unaware of
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The NSS assumed that the Chemistry section was inspecting all of the SPING's.
At approximately 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br /> and 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br />, Chemistry personnel checked the status of the RU, TB, SB, and OSSB SPING's.
Operations checked the t
All units were found to be operating normally.
Chsmistry continued its verification of the SPINGs assigned to it, however, Operations did not repeat the inspection of its two assigned SPINGs at 1430 hours0.0166 days <br />0.397 hours <br />0.00236 weeks <br />5.44115e-4 months <br />.
The Control Room MSO did not dispatch an operator to check the SPINGs.
During his turnover to the next shift, the Control Room NSO verbally coumunicated the inspection arrangements to the oncoming NSO.
Questioned after the reportable event was discovered, the relieving NSO did not recall being told that Operations was performing the inspections of the Reactor Building and the SGTS SPINGs.
- Instead, he recalled believing that Chemistry was inspecting all of the SPINGs, based on instructions from the NSS and statements in the shift relief c., ort written by the NSS's. For this reason, the Reactor Building and e Radwaste Building SPINGs were not inspected during the evening shift of June 3, 1985.
Soon after the start of the night shift (2330 hours0.027 days <br />0.647 hours <br />0.00385 weeks <br />8.86565e-4 months <br />, June 3 to 0730 hours0.00845 days <br />0.203 hours <br />0.00121 weeks <br />2.77765e-4 months <br />, June 4), 0,oerations learned from a Chemistry Technician that Ch2mistry was not checking the RB and SGTS SPINGs.
The Nuclear Assistant Shift Supervisor (NASS) could not find documentation that Oparations was performing these inspections.
At 0130 hours0.0015 days <br />0.0361 hours <br />2.149471e-4 weeks <br />4.9465e-5 months <br />, the NSS roguested that Chemistry check the RB and SGTS SPING's.
At 0200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br />, a Chemistry Technician found the RB SPING was tripped.
He inspected the unit and, finding nothing wrong with the unit, restarted it.
At 0205 hours0.00237 days <br />0.0569 hours <br />3.38955e-4 weeks <br />7.80025e-5 months <br />, he informed the NSS of what he had found.
l Later that day, at 0855 hours0.0099 days <br />0.238 hours <br />0.00141 weeks <br />3.253275e-4 months <br />, Chemistry personnel obtained data from the RB SPING's microprocessor which indicated that the unit had tripped between 1230 and 1300 hours0.015 days <br />0.361 hours <br />0.00215 weeks <br />4.9465e-4 months <br /> on June 3.
Therefore, the monitor had been inoperable from then until 0200 on June 4, approximately 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> l
total.
During this period, the plant was in operating condition 4, prior to initial criticality, and there were no radioactive gases in the roactor building.
Thus the potential for unmonitored releases was nagligible and the safety consequences of this event were minimal.
However, when the Reactor Building HVAC exhaust monitor tripped, the plant entered the action statement of Technical Specification 3.3.7.12.b.
Action statements 121, 122 and 123 of Table 3.3.7.12-1 parmit releases to continue provided grab samples are taken every eight
'8) hours, and auxiliary sampling equipment is used, as required, and j
ilow is estimated every four (4) hours.
The NSS was unaware that the i
l monitor had tripped and did not meet these action requirements.
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The cause of this event was the failure of the day shift NSO to record his instructions to Chemistry in his logbook and to inform his NSS that Op3 rations was performing the inspections of the RB and SGTS SPINGs.
This event has been discussed with the NSO involved.
The i_mportance of properly communicating info _rmation and documenting i,aformation through wr.wlete and_ thorough log entrie_s Will be discussed witE all li cen s:ed op:er a t_or s iD_ thei r requalarication program. This will be emphasized in a memo to be placed in their required reading.
In addition, this LER will be included in the opar=&nr's required reading and will be discu E d with the _other__ licensed personnel during requalification training.
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June 27, 1985 hip ce e p NP-85-702 a
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Attention:
Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 f
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":e r nce:
Fermi 2 i
NRC Docket No. 50-341 fg-NRC Operating License No. NPF-33(-
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Subject:
Transmittal of Licensee Event Resort 85-020 l
s Please find enclosed LER No. 85-020-00, dated June 27, 1985, for a reportable event which occurred on June 4, 1985.
As indicated below, a copy of this LER is being sent to the Region III office.
If you have any questions, please contact us.
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i Sincerely, l
G R.S. Lenart i
Superintendent Nuclear Production
Enclosure:
NRC Forms 366, 366A i
i cc:
Mr. P.M. Byron Mr. M.D. Lynch Regional Administrator i
USNRC Region III 799 Roosevelt Rd.
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137 Director / Coordinator Monroe City-County Office of Civil Preparedness 965 South Raisinville Road Monroe, MI 48161 t
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