ML20215B051

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Significant Deficiency Rept 87-14 Re Lack of Documentation Certifying Modes 5 & 6 N-1 Operation.Initially Reported on 870507.Appropriate Documentation Expected to Be in Place When Full Power License Received.No Addl Repts Required
ML20215B051
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley
Issue date: 06/02/1987
From: Carey J
DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To: Russell W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
2NRC-7-152, 87-14, NUDOCS 8706170201
Download: ML20215B051 (3)


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'Ab5 M 2NRC-7-152

-(412)393 7546

/ Beaver Valley No 2 Unit Project Organization Telecopy (412) 393 7889 QGgB"j'j8"U June 2, 1987 h Shippingport, PA 15o77 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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Region'I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 ATTENTION: Mr. William T. Russell

' Administrator-

SUBJECT:

Beaver Valley Power Station - Unit No. 2 '

Docket No. 50-412

' Lack of Documentation Certifying Mode 5 & 6 N-1 Operation Potential Significant Deficiency Report 87-14 Gentlemen:  ;

This Potentially Reportable Significant Deficiency Report is 'being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e). It is anticipated that no additional reports will be required.

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY By l W J u arey v Sr. Vice President i LMR/ijr NRC/LMR/SDR/8714 At ment AR cc: Mr. P. Tam, Project Manager (w/a)

Mr. J. M. Taylor, Director (3) (w/a)

Mr. J. Beall, Sr. Resident Inspector (w/a)-

Mr. L. Prividy, NRC Resident Inspector (w/a)

INP0 Records Center (w/a)

NRC Document Control Desk (w/a) l 617] g hao 2 [

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g ATTACHMENT

1. Sumn:ary As a result of the certification process by. Westinghouse for the Beaver Valley Unit No. 2 Technical Specifications, it was learned that inadequate documentation existed to permit the Reactor Coolant System loop isolation valves to be closed even during Mode 5 or 6. Even.

though N-1 operation during power operation (modes 1 or 2) is being pursued for both Beaver Valley Unit No.1 and 2, it was not scheduled to be completed before receipt of both the low power and high . power licenses for Beaver Valley Unit No. 2. However, the ability to close the RCS loop isolation valves for various purposes during cold shut-down and refueling modes (Modes 5 & 6) was always considered by DLC to be an analyzed plant condition.

2. Immediate Action Taken Mr. C. Moon, the NRC Technical Specification reviewer for Beaver Valley Unit No. 2, was contacted on this concern. It was agreed that the criteria needed to reopen the RCS loop isolation valves would be omitted from the upcoming Tech Specs to be issued with Beaver Valley Unit No. 2's low power license. Duquesne Light has committed not to close either Beaver Valley Unit No. 2 or Unit No. 1 RCS loop isolation valves until documentation can be placed in order.

Mr. L. M. Rabenau, Lead Compliance Engineer, Beaver Valley Power Sta-tion Unit No. 2, also contacted Mr. D. Limroth, NRC Region I, of this concern on May 7, 1987.

3. Description of Deficiency Beaver Valley Unit No. 2 has a set of isolation valves on each of its three Reactor Coolant System loops. These valves could be used to permit N-1 operation either during plant shutdown or during power operation. Licensing of N-1 operation during power operation is not expected in the near future. However, N-1 plant operation during Modes 5 and 6 was intended for the first cycle for Beaver Valley Unit No. 2. Westinghouse notified Duquesne Light during their certifica-tion process for the Beaver Valley Unit No. 2 Tech Specs that they never fully considered any N-1 operation for Beaver Valley Unit No. 2, including Modes 5 and 6. As a result, they could not certify that- all analyses concerns had been addressed for this plant operation. Thus the Beaver Valley Unit 2 Tech Specs concerning loop isolation valve operation could not be certified.

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4. Analyses of Safety Impiicatson This lack of documentation falle under 10CFR50.55(e)(1)(iv), a signif-icant devi1 tion from performance specification which will require evaluation to establish the adequacy of a component to meet the criteria and bases stated in the Final Safety Analysis Report. With-out adequate documentation, closure of the loop isolation valves would put the plant into a potential unanalyzed mode of operation. l
5. Corrective Action _Taken to Resolve the Deficiency Operation of the RCS loop isolation valves was withdrawn from the Beaver Valley Unit No. 2 Tech Specs to be issued with the low power license expected near May 21, 1987.

Duquesne Light Company and Westinghouse are proceeding to evaluate Mode t and Mode 6 N-1 operation. Appropriate documentation is expected to De in place to support this mode of operation for Beaver Valley Unit No. 2 by receipt of its full power license. This issue will be resolved through NRR.

6. Additi_onal Report No additional reports are expected. /

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RECEIVED-REG;0N i 18 1987 JW -8 Pit 2:

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