ML20214X332
| ML20214X332 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Yankee Rowe |
| Issue date: | 12/01/1986 |
| From: | Mckenna E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214X327 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8612110069 | |
| Download: ML20214X332 (9) | |
Text
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p2 recog'o UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g
r WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 YANKEE ATOFIC ELECTRIC COMPANY YAf;EEE NUCLEAR POWEP STATION DOCKET liC.50-029 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICEtiSE Amendment No. 100 License No. OPR-?
1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Yankee Atomic Electric Company (the licensee) dated July 31, 1986 complies with the stand 6rds and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act),
and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordir3 y, the license is amended by changes to the Technical 1
Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.C.(E) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-3 is hereby amended to read as follows:
8612110069 e61201 PDR ADOCK 05000029 P
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Technical Specifications The Technical Specificctions contained in Apper. dix A as revised through Amendment hc.100, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as cf the date of its issuar.ce.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t
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Eileen M. McKenna, Project Manager Project Directorate #1 Division of PWR Licensing-A
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: December 1,1986
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w-I ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT l10.100 FACILITY OFERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-3 DOCKET NO.50-029
' Revise Appendix A Technical Spccifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are idertified by the captioned amendrent number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.
REMOVE INSERT 3/4 2-2 3/4 2-2 3/4 2-9 3/4 2-9 3/4 2-11 3/4 2-11 3/4 3-23 3/4 3-23 B 3/4 2-1 B 3/4 2-1*
B 3/4 2-2 B 3/4 2-2
- 0verleaf page provided to maintain document. completeness. No changes
. contained on this page.
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FOWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 4.2.1.2 The below factors shall be included in the calculation of peak full power LHGR:
N Heat flux power peaking factor, F, measured using incore instrumentation a.
at a power >10%.
9 b.
The multiplier for xenon redistribution is a function of core lifetime as given in Figure 3.2-3.
In addition, if Control Rod Group C is inserted below 80 inches, allowable power may not be regained until power has been at a reduced level defined below for at least twenty-four hours with Control Rod Group C between 80 and 90 inches.
Reduced Power = Allowable fraction of full power times multiplier given in Figure 3.2-4.
Exceptions:
1.
If the rods are inserted below 80 inches and power does not go below the reduced power calculated above, hold at the lowest attained power level for at least twenty-four hours with Control Rod Group C between 80 and 90 inches before returning to allowable power.
2.
If the rods are inserted below 80 inches and zero power is held for more than forty-eight hours, no reduced power level need be held on the way to the allowable fraction of full poder.
c.
Shortened stack height factor, 1.009.
i d.
Measurement uncertainty:*
1.
1.05, when at least 17 incore detection system neutron detector thimbles are OPERABLE, or 2.
1.068, when less than 17, and greater than or equal to 12, incore l
detection system neutron detector thimbles are OPERABLE, or 3.
1.080, when less than 12, and greater than or equal to 9, incore detection system neutron detector thimbles are OPERABLE.
AmendmentNo.pf,yf,yl,y[,g,100 YANKEE-ROWE 3/42-2
POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.2.2.1 F shall be determined to be within its limit by:
q Using the movable incore detectors to obtain a power distribution a.
map:
1.
Prior to initial operation above 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading, and 2.
At least once per 1000 Effective Full Power Hours.
b.
Increasing the measured F component of the power distribution map q
by:
1.
4% to account for engineering tolerances, 2.
5% when at least 17 incore detection system neutron detector thimbles are OPERABLE, to account for measurement uncertainty.
3.
6.8% when less than 17, and greater than or equal to 12, incore detection system neutron detector thimbles are OPERABLE, to account for measurement uncertainty, 4,
8.0% when less than 12, and greater than or equal to 9, incore detection system neutron detector thimbles are OPERABLE, to account for measurement uncertainty, and 5.
3% to account for fuel densification.
I 4.2.2.2 When F is measured pursuant to Specification 4.10.2.2, an overall q
measured F shall be obtained from a poder distribution map and increased by:
q 1.
4% to account for engineering tolerances, 2.
5% when at least 17 incore detection system neutron detector thimbles are OPERABLE, to account for measurement uncertainty, 3.
6.8% when less than 17, and greater than or equal to 12, incore l
detection system neutron detector thimbles are OPERABLE, to account for measurement uncertainty, 4.
8.0% when less than 12, and greater than or equal to 9, incore detection system neutron detector thimbles are OPERABLE, to account for measurement uncertainty, and 5.
3% to account for fuel densification.
4.2.2.3 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.
Amendment No. J0(, J26 J4I 100 YANKEE-ROWE 3/4 2-9
POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.2.3.1 FN H shall be determined to be within its limit by using the movable incore detectors to obtain a power distribution map:
Prior to operation above 75% RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel a.
loading, and b.
At least once per 1000 Effective Full Power Hours, The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.
c.
4.2.3.2 The measured FNAH of 4.2.3.1 above shall ba increaped, for measurement uncertainty, by:
5%, when at least 17 incore detection system neutron detector a.
thlmbles are OPERABLE; or b.
6.8%, when less than 17, and greater than or equal to 12, incore l
detection system neutron detector thimbles are OPERABLE, or 8.0%, when less than 12, and greater than or equal to 9, incore c.
detection system neutron detector thimbles are OPERABLE.
9 YANKEE-ROWE 3/4 2-11 AmendmentNo.33,g,J, 100 f
INSTRUMENTATION INCORE DETECTION SYSTEM LIMITINC CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 3.3.3.2 The incore detection system shall be OPERABLE with:
At least twelve (12) neutron detector thimbles OPERABLE.
a.
b.
A minimum of two (2) OPERABLE neutron detector thimbles per core quadrant, and Sufficient OPERABLE movable neutron detectors, drive and readout c.
equipment to map these thimbles.
Exception:
For Cycle 18. Items a and b above are not required if operation is at or beyond 4,000 NWD/NTU. However, there shall be at least nine (9) detector thimbles OPERABLE and a minimum of one (1) OPERABLE neutron detector thimbles per quadrant.
APPLICABILITY: When the incore detection system is used for core power distribution measurements.
ACTION With the incore detection system inoperable, do not use the system for the above applicable monitoring or calibration functions. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.
t SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.3.3.2 The incore neutron detectors shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by normalizing each detector output to be used within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to its use for core power distribution measurements.
l l
YANKEE-ROWE 3/4 3-23 Amendment No.
[, [,
,100
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3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS BASES 1
The specifications of this saction provide assurance of fuel integrity j
during Conditions I (Normal Operation) and II (Incidents of Moderate i
Frequency) events by:
(a) maintaining the minimum DNBR in the corer 1 1.30 during normal operation and in short term transients, and (b) limiting the j
fission gas release, fuel pellet temperature and cladding mechanical properties to within assumed design criteria.
i l
3/4.2.1 PEAX LINEAR HEAT GENERATIO*1 RATE 1
Limiting the peak Linear Heat Generation Este (LMGR) during Condition I events provides assurance that the initial conditions assumed for the LOCA analyses are met and the ECCS acceptance criteria limit of 22000F is not exceeded.
When' operating at constant power, all rods out, with equilibrium xenon, power peaking in the Yankee Rowe core decreases monotonically as a function of cycle burnup. This has been verified by both calculation and measurement on Yankee cores and is in accord with the expected behavior in a core that does 4
not contain burnable poison. The all-rods-out power peaking measured prior to exceeding 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER af ter each fuel loading thus provides an upper bound on all-rods-out power peaking for the remainder of that cycle.
Thereafter the measured power peaking shall be checked every 1000 equivalent full power hours and the latest measured value shall be used in the computation. The only effects which can increase peaking beyond this value would be control rod insertion and xenon transients and these are accounted for in calculating peak LMCR.
l l
The core is stable with respect to menon, and any menon transients which l
may be excited are rapidly damped.
l The menon multiplier in Figure 3.2-3 was selected to conservatively account for transients which can result from control rod motior, at full power.
The multiplier is defined as the ratio of the maximum value of Fs due to menon induced top peaked power redistribution and the Fg of the nominal operating axial shape. This is consistent with the methodology used to derive the UlGR limits, Which were generated based on the worst top-peaked exial power distribution. The minimum value of the multiplier is unity.
YANKEE-ROWE 33/4 2-1 AmendmentNo.B[
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3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS I
BASES (Continued)
The limits on power level and control rod position following control rod insertion were selected to prevent exceeding the maximum allowable linear heat generation rate limits in Figure 3.2-1 within the first few hours following
}
return to tower af ter the insertion. With Yankee's highly damped core, the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> hold allows sufficient time for the initial xenon maldistribution to accommodate itself to the new power distribution. The restriction on control rod location during these 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> assures that the return to allowable fraction of full power will not cause additional redistribution due to rod motion.
Af ter 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> at zero power, the average xenon concentration has decayed i
to about 20% of the full power concentration.
Since the xenon concentrations are so low, an increase in power directly to maximum allowable power creates j
transient peaking well below the value imposed by the xenon redistribution multiplier.
Thus, any increase in power peaking due to this operation is below the value accounted for in the calculation of the LHGR.
I These conclusions are based on plant tests and on calculations performed with the SIMULATE three dimensional nodal code used in the analysis of Core XI (reference cycle) described in Proposed Change No. 115, dated March 29, 1974.
The Factors d, e, and f in Specification 4.2.1.2 will be combined statistically as the " root-sum-square" of the individual parameters. This method for combining parameter uncertainties is valid due to the independence of the parameters involved. Factor d accounts for uncertainty in the power distribution measurement with the movable incore instrumentation system.
8 I
Factor e accounts for uncertainty in the calorimetric measurement for 4
determining core power level.
Factor f accounts for uncertainty in engineering and fabrication tolerances of the fuel.
Together these factors,
~
i when combined statistically, yield an uncertainty of 9.4% for less than 12 operating thimbles, 8.5% for less than 17, and greater than or equal to 12 operating incore thimbles and 7.1% for greater than 17 operating thimbles.
l This factor and Factors a, b, c, and g will be combined multiplicatively to obtain peak LHGR values.
4 1
3/4.2.2 and 3/4.2.3 HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR AND NUClran ENTHALpY RISE HOT i
CHANNEL FACTOR 4
The limits on heat flux and enthalpy hot channel factors ensure that
- 1) the design limits on peak local power density and minimum DNBR are not exceeded, and 2) in the event of a LOCA the peak fuel clad temperature will 0
not exceed the 2200 F ECCS acceptance criteria limit.
l Each of these hot channel factors are measurable but will normally only be determined periodically as specified in Specification 4.2.2.1 and 4.2.3.1.
This periodic surveillance is sufficient to insure that the hot channel factor limits are maintained provided:
YANKEE-ROWE B3/4 2-2 Amendment No. /df, Ja',100.
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