ML20214V471

Partially Withheld Commission Rept Seeking Approval of Ltrs to Dept of State & DOE Concerning Rev to Operating Assumption Covering Relative Ease of Fabricating Clandestine Fission Explosives

ML20214V471
Person / Time
Issue date:	03/26/1979
From:	Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
To:
Shared Package
ML20214V407	List: IA-84-345, Partially Withheld Commission Rept Seeking Approval of Ltrs to Dept of State & DOE Concerning Rev to Operating Assumption Covering Relative Ease of Fabricating Clandestine Fission Explosives ML20214V404 ML20214V471
References
FOIA-84-345, TASK-CA, TASK-SE SECY-79-213, NUDOCS 8612090697
Download: ML20214V471 (51)

Text

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1972 SECY-78-213

1. Pt :h 26, COMMbSGIONER ACTION

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William J. Dircks, Director E-From:

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeauards A

2 Executive Director for Operations f, "Os 5

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REVISION TO THE' OPERATING ASSUMPTION COVERING THE

Subject:

RELATIVE EASE OF FABRICATING CLANDESTINE FISSION EXPLOSIVES (CFE) (U)

To obtain Ccmission approval of letters to the Purpcse:

Department of State and the De'partment of Enero concer-ning a proposec for applicatior of physica protection requirements.

In a memorandum dated June-33, 1977, subject:

" Staff Discussion:

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Guidance on Action Plar, on Recomendations of Report of the Task Force on Allegations by James H. Conran", the Commission provided the _folloning guidance:

"The staff should develap and circulate for use by relevant staff members a set of operating assumptiens regarding:

(a) the relative ease of fabricating clandestine fission explosives..."

(Enclosure 1)

Therefore, an operating assumption was prepared with the iJ) assistance of ERDA's Division of Military Applications (now DOE's Office of Military Applicaticos), and was distributed to the staff by the EDO on August 8, 1977 (Enclosure 2).

The Comission memorendum also stated:

"The designated staff liaisen personnel should closely menitcr the progress of the ERDA CFE

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- ~ study to encourace a tirely de'ivery to NRC by this su:r,ar.

At th:t time, the staff should ensure that all relevant technical

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aspects are considered in the NRC cperatino

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assumptions and rulemakirg."

,\\'"MONTACT :

r" P 42aker, NMSS, ext 74014 K

Nociert,NMSS, ext 74191 m.i.Q.%:

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The study was received in February 1978 and is

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included as Appendix A to Enclosure 3.

An additional report entitled "Coments Concerning the On-Site Clan-t=

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destine Fission Explosive Scenario", prepared by Dr. J. Carson Mark for NRC, is also relevant and is included as Enclosure 4.

Upon receipt of these reports, the NRC staff liaison personnel conducted a technical review (Enclosure 3) of the current operating assumption with the assistance of personnel from DOE's Office of Military Applications, the DOE weapons laboratories, and Dr. J. Carson Mark.

A draft revised NRC operating assumption on the relative ease of fabricating clandes-tine fission explosives (Enclosure 5) was prepared to assure technical compatibility with the recently com-pleted DOE study on CFE.

The central feature of the revised operating assump-j tion, so far as re ulatory functions are concerned, is a l

'n 10 CFR 73.1.

Specifically, thi comparable technica bases.

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In the development of the technical review, comments were solicited from the technical staff in DOE's Office of Military Applications and the comittee that prepared the ERDA CFE study (with the exception of Cmdr.

William J. Ogle, who retired shortly af ter the study was completed).

Their coments were incorporated in the review and the revised operating assumption.

They have no technical objections to the conclusions of the review.

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i Directly related to this matter is a memcrandum from f

Mr. Chilk to Mr. Gossick, dated September 19, 1978, whose subject was " Safeguards Requirements for Inter-mediate Enrichment Fueled Research Reactors (SECY 78-458)".

l This memorandum requested the staff to " review current I

and proposed safeguards requirements which are applicable to research reactors, fuel facilities and transportation activities wh=are enrichment and quantities involve U-235 at 20% and abov i

e., SSNM) to determine what recuirem nts could be j

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Ensures that our regulatory recuirements are

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based upon the best technical information

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available.

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Provides a greater incentive for domes '

non-power reactor licensees to us 4.

Provides a more accurate technical basis for assessing regulatory requirements fo 5.

Ensures that safecuards recuirements er plied t B.

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That the Co mission:

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Accreve sending the letters in Er. closure 7 to the Department of State and De;: art ent of Energy.

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Proceed with rulemaking on Category 11 and Category

~3 111 materials (SEC) 79-38) while awaiting responses MomDepartm

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Note that if the Department of State or Department -

'oTTnergy and the staff's recommen lons.

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f'ote that if the Decartment of State and Department Coordination:

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The Offices of Nuclear Reacter Regulation, and

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International Programs concur in these recommenda-tiens.

l William J. Dircks, Director Office of i;uclear t'aterial Safety and Safeguards

Enclosures:

See attached pace

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ACASS:ED

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Enclosures:

SE 1.

Memorandum from Samuel J. Chilk to Lee V. Gossick, dated June 30, 1977 1.~

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NRC Operating Assumption on Clandestine Fission Explosives 3.

Technical Review of NRC Operating Assumption on Clandestine Fission Explosives PCooies of Appendix A withheld-available upon request-one copy available in the Secretariat's Office) Fission Exolosive Scenario Comments Concernino the On-Site Clandestine 4.

by Dr. J. Carson Mark ("Cocies withheld-available upon request) 5.

Proposed revised NRC Operating Assumption on Clandestine Fissior Explosives 6.

Letter from Frank P. Martin to Robert F. Burnett, dated November 17, 1978 (with enclosures) 7.

Proposed draf t letters from Lee V. Gossick to Department of State and Department of Energy 8.

Letter from Louis V. Nosenzo to James R. Shea, dated March 12, 1979 9.

Letter from James R. Shea to Louis V. Nosenzo, dated March 15, 1979

• Copies available upon request from Paul Baker, NMSS, 74004 Commissioners' comments should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by c.o.b. Friday, Aoril 6.1979.

Commission Staff Office ccaments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissicners NLT April 2,1979, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary.

If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional time for analytical redew and ccmrent, the Com?.issicrers and the Secretariat should be apprised of when co-ents r.ay be expected.

DISTRIBUTION Commissicners Commission Staff Offices Exec Director for Operations ACRS Secretariat 1 ASSL D

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1.ee V. Gessick Executive Director for Operaticas N

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Sa=uel J.

Secretary K,710~. :

STAFF GUID.G'CE O /,CTION PU.N ON FJ'CO'OESDATIONS OF :',E?On!

OF TEE TASK FORCE 0:: AI.LEGAT!0::S BY JA!GS h. CCN?s.N t

1.

The Cennissi.n has noted the c:af f's 00: nents on the task force repcrt na believce that th2y are generally resp-d.sive to the task force's re ercand.ttienc.

The s:sff should preceed,to carry eut its propcsed s::ic. plan consistent with the. follcwing specific guidan e:

T'.e s:sf! e.ho 21d cccelerate its e f f or ts to es tabl_i_s.h..en.e.rsting

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-C A g r e e n.r...t. :n Sp.ect:1 ation., which b actne e.,.n:1n.g the E?la :C.10 977.

for f ully.icple_r..a procedures f e_ctive en :-: arch 1

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cclures she_uld be ser.: to the Cc :iscion for review and apprev21.

ht s sff should ccrefully revic, NRC's procedures fer p:hering isfeguards-relcted infornstien fren cli cu: side sources to deter:ine

.r.2:her pres ent arran ccen:s are f ully adequate te ensure that fa:

i: receivie; and ill contir.uc to receive all inf orma:ica necessary to c:.rry out its sciegeards functicas. (Net : :., :..,t j

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use by releva.nt c:sff o f c. p era t ing as sunp t..i.o.ns re gard in;;,:c.....d :.... c

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g) The relrtive ecse cf fabricating clandestiac fiarion explosives.

(b) The characceristics of possibic adversaries which ::ight direct i

their netivitics against a nuclear facility.

(c) The reliabilit*/ and utility of information received frc:s outside courecs.

.These operating asst.cp tions should be accenpanied by i-:plenan:ation pro:cdures to asmist the staf f in applying :he assunp:icns.

The cesenp; ions and t racedures should take clear the degree of cc::ser-vatism : hat should exist + in saf egucrds considera: ions, especi:lly in cases where highly sensitive infer _ation cannot be videly dis-senine:ed ancn; the staff or where there is a lach of definitive

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The operating asce:ptions sheuld be c -pleted and availabicforscffusebyJ.ulv.31,1977.uu.5Q ENCLOSUP.E 1

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AUG 8 1977 F

MEMORANDU!i FOR:

Clifford V. Smith, Jr.", Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Edson G. Case, Acting Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Saul Levine, Director Office of Nuclear Regulatory Resear:h Ernst Volgenau, Director Office of :nspection and Enfcrcement Robert S. Minogue, Director Office of Standards Developr.ent FROM:

Lee V. Gossick, Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

OPERATING ASSUMPTION OM CLANCESTINE FISS:0N EXptOS!VES Attached for staff guidance is the operating assception c:ncerning the relative ease of fabrica:ic; clandestine fissicn ex:lesives.

This assur.p:icn was formulated in response to the Commissicn's mercrancum dated June 30, 1977, giving staff guidance on reccamenda:icns of the repcrt of the Task Force on Allegations by James H. Conran.

It should be used by NRC staff in performing safeguards related functions.

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Lee V. Gossick Execucive Director for Operations Enclosure As stated 1

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OPERATING ASSUMPTION COVERING THE RELATIVE EASE OF FAEMCATING CLANDESTINE FISSION EXPLOSIVES

Background:

UndertheEnergyReorganizationActof[97c,ERDAwasgiven the responsjbility for nuclear weapons, design and fabrication.

Trerefore, NRC relies upon EREA for technical information relatec to tnis-area.

Since detailed technical information specifically ap;1icable to the design and fabrication cf a clandestine fission explosive (CFE) r#ght assist an individual or a group with interest inimical to the public health and safety in either constructing a CFE or.perpetratinc a credible hoax, this information is classified and subject to strict need-tc-kr:a cons'derations.

Consequently, it is impractical to cisseminate such cata :: more than a few NRC personnel who have safeguards responsibilities,.

This, factor, coupled with an appreciation for the dire consequences wh':r could arise from the successful detonation of a CFE, creates the neec ':r a :: servative operating assumption in this area.

The following assumoti:n has been formulated for the use of NRC staff memoers with safeguar:s resper.sibilities.

Operating Assumotion:

It is assumed that a small n:n-nat':ral gr:g? cf people could design and build a crude nuclear explosive de. ice which would produce a significant nuclear yield, that is, a yield much greater than the yield of an equal mass of high explosive.

To accomplish this, they would need an amount of special nuclear material which is at least equal to the five-kilogram formula quantity,and : hey would have to possess the appropriate technical capabilities.

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2-tecree of Ccnservation of the Ooeratin; /.ssumotion:

The operating assemption censiders two different aspects of the fabrication of a CFE - the anount of SNM requirec and tne tecnnical capability of a c.rcuo of pe' cole attemoting the tash.

The censervatism of each aspect of -he assunption is addressed below.

Based upon information supplied by ERDA, ccre than one theft equal to tr.e five-kilogram formula would be required to construct a CFE.

arthernore, for many types of SNM found witnin the fuel cycle, sic-C r.ificantly mere SNM than the five-kilogran fornula amcunt would be ecuired to ccnstruct a CFE without metallurgical or chemical orocessinc.

Monever, considering the disastrous consecuences of a detonation of a CFE, NRC colicy shcule ;ive safeguards no credit for the fact that more

.than a five-kilogram formula quantity of S'J' is recaired to construct a CFE.

The degree of conservatism concerning the relative ease of designing anc fabricating a CFE, including the time recuired, is a natter of some conjecture because of the inherent uncertainties associated with the technical competence of a non-national group.

The group would have to include persons capable of searchiag and understar. ding the technical literature in several fields and of accomplishing the required ecnnician-type tasks.

A great deal depends en the competence of the croup; if that is deficient, not only is the chance of producing a total failure increased, but the chance that a member of the,nrouc might suffer serious or fatal injury wculd be quite real.

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3-of ra;ic asse-bly after raterial acquisition deoends strc.;ly on the tec-ical cor,pett e of the group.

Acain, hcwever, 6;e tc the disastrous corsec.ences of one detonation of a CFE, t;RC policy should,ive safeguards no : edit f$'r.' the difficulty or any extended length of ti e ir.v0lved in :esigning and fabricating a CFE.

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In a memorandum from Samuel Chiik to.ee Gessick concerning " Staff Guidance en Action Plan en Recommenda:icns :f Re: -: of the Task :orce en Allegations by James H. Conran", dated June 30, 1977, the Commissioners provided the staff with the following guida.ce:

'7be staff should develop anc circulate for use by relevant

taff members a set of operating assun:: ions egarding:

a) The relative ease of 'abrica:i ; :*ancestine fission explosives..."

The NRC 0: era:ing Assumption on Clancestine tissi:- Explosives aas cistrieu-ted to tne staff on Augus; a,1977.

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.In the same memcrandum 'r:m Samuel

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Lee Scssi:k, *he 00mmissicners also statec that:

"The desi;nated staf# liaisen pers:rre' sh:f : :'ese'.y meni:;r the progress of.re ER:A CFE s:u:j :: er:: rs;e a :imely :elivery to NRC by this summer.

At ina: ;dme. tr.e sta" should ensure that all relevant tecnnical as:e::s are :: si:e e: in NRC c:erating assumptions anc rulemaking."

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After a series of reviews 3rd mecificati:rs, :Pe subject report entitled "A DOE Scecia'. Stucy :.e: r: :n Reacter Materiais and Nuclear Explosives" (Classified Ccnficent'al NSI) was received by the staff liaisen ;ersonnel in February 1975 and is included as Accendix A of tn#s re:Crt.

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-2 In the course Of :ne reviews of the DCE -e: ort, i: beta e a::arent

na a separate report cealing specifically wi n :ne :.-site ::andestine Fission Explosive Scenario described by Mr. C:nran was :esiratie.

This separate report entitled Comments Concerning :ne On-site Clan:estine Fission Explosive Scenario (Classifiec SECRET '.ATIONA'. SECUR:TY INFORMATION) was prepared fcr NRC cy Dr. J. Carsen Mark.

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'Jpon recef:t of these reports, the Director of tre Division of Sa'e-guarcs directec the staff liaison :ersonnel, in a mercrancu-cated A ril 3, 1978, to concuc: a review of the NRC Operating Assum;;i:n on Clancestine Fission Ex:icsives in accercance with our res::nsibilities uncer the Matts:n Task Force Action Flan. This recor cresents ne resa::s of :ne liaisen staff's technical review.

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The NRC 0:erating assumption coverin; tre ' relative ease of fabricatirg clandestine fission ex:losives (CFE) accresses three s:ecifi: as:ects cf the fabrication of clandestine fission ex:losives.

These as:ects are:

1) the ease or likelihocc of success of fabrication of a CFE by a suo-national grouc, 2) the minimum ar.oun: of time that such a grouc wcule re-quire to fabri: ate a CFE, and 3) the minimum nr. cunt of s:ecial nuclear material wnich would be required to construct a CFE.

This :e:nnical review will address each of :nese as:ects se:a-ste y.

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Sefore ceginning the technical review, i t is useful :c cefine a CFE. A nuclear explosive is definec as an ex:losive device in which nuclear fission energy makes up essentially all :ne e ergy releasec (Appendix A, l

pg'32).

'n otner explosives involving fissile material, nuclear fission energy may be present and possibly even important, but it is not the primary energy source.

Some types of criti:ality accidents Or an.excicsive dispersa j-device may ce examples of such exp10sions.

' ere# re, a CFE is a clances-i tinely fabricated expicsive cevice in unien r..: lear #ission energy makes up 4

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essentially all the energy releasec anc anien may range frec a very crude, makesnift arranger.ent up thrcugh an appr0ximation cf U.S. nuclear weaper, j

ecnnology in the mic-1940's.

Suen :evices :an have.igni'i:an: nuclear yield, perr.aps as hign as 10 to 20 k'ict:ns;

wever, ace # rem reacter grade clu::nism, ne yield could be 'ess oy a factor :f ten :r more.

I i

Ease of Fabrication (U) l

' ')

In Accencix A, :ne types anc f:rms :f 3:s:ial ra: ear aterial within

}

the nuclear fuel cycle are groupec int: these classes (cal'ed categories in i

Appendix A) based upon the relative difficulty of using trer as starting I

(

materials for CFE's.

These classes are definec as f:ilews 3:pendix A, pg 27):

Class I l

1 i

i.

. o W

. 2.55

f. t

. 255 III

~.

- '.' r 2. *. *. s* r. 2. '.

",r"ou

a. ".......c.

' o' 0. F... c. "..* *. #. n

.$ t " '.. -. #. e.

.$ ".." # *

• 5 e" 5,

. a r

• .a. c. 2.

.a..

v a

t.. C c.

.s.

.... enc 1x e s

.....a a_

_,ni 2.

...:.... 3 u..,a

.. 5

,.c r..,,_

c...

3..

. ' ' '< e l

'. a 4,1. -. r e * -" c.. a w. r < =. =.... '. =..=.r

a..s. '. 2 '. v a..

.t. - -

i

=

r..r2,.

,.u..

/. 52. 4 w 1..,,

• h e r e +'O r D r 's " a. ". *$

" C r 5 A. r v a *. '. s.. a.::e5*.*2

'..*.c. -**"S*'.*; *$2"....-*.'.-*

i...

~

-^

e. C U 'n C n 0 *.

3' # '/ a. s.#

.. c. e. d. *. #.*

.. a.

. '. #. # 4.. ". '. *./-

• 2

2. *: ' ' a #..t

.n.a. v

1. . 3. r. e..s * '. r. ; A i

v.

4.7. 3 s.. :::. : g r....... 4 7. :. 3 4... a. r

.s.

.-2.,

_3

3. r. 4. 31..

.....4 e i

" g *. 3. e g 3. *

,= [W e, '/ C. P 3 C. C.

.. 3

.a.

a..y.a ;...A.

• e a,-

.. e. t

• a s. e 2 * * - e.

• f.

- t.

n

..d-3

c. a. e. r.s. d

.s.e..... ~. 4.. a.

t '. e..

3*

de

• e. s.:. r.s.

e-

.. a.t s. r. e. a. d.

.i c.

.se.c.. c.

. i-...

t

.4

. 2

2.,.4.

..s.

.s r.2 4.,s'

.. r e. r.... e.

.e.

.r....

.r..

....r-2 4

I ?.5 Table !!.I of Apper, dix A l'ac.c

' "

• i w.2 * =..c, ". *.2.e.e i.. a. o.. r.i a '. 3

4. n. 'i g w o. -

w

} I,, a. iSot0D1C mix;' ares of.

si D,e y. o. v,o. e.

'. n *..*. i s

l. i9 n 'w, **e

. ra.s c-~*. C'.,e#2*'"C.

2.(.5.'~.~~.'"."

• • • .. c. 2 " <...

6..

o.

- j o. r. y - e. r c. a. r.., s. 4... i n.

i +. $. r a..m. e " ~. ^. #.

.~2.".

'.~s'*..*"#.. P.

' v * 'a " a..t

~, #

'. h a. ' r e. s o.

• . c o o. r.= *. i n c. a s s '~...~...* *.. e s e c..- *r s '.. c. e I

b l

t i

I

$. r $.

. r. m.

t au-*4

G-6

.tney are cct ccnsidered further.

The discussion on pages 40 tnrougn 45 of 1r. J. Ca-son Mark's y

.)-

" Comments on the On-site Scenar'c" (Ref. 2) indicates : at, unless an ad-if versary has-planned carefully,

).

should be censiderec useable in a - E.

Minimum Fabrication Tire (g)

Consicerations in r.e cpera:ic; assan::icn ::ncer 'n; :ne minicut.

s amount of ti'me reputred :: fabricate a CFE ay be s';- ":ar.: for safeguards Our:oses ir. twc c nceivable cases.

r :ne # irs; :ase, : e safeguarts system relies neaviiy u:en its :a;atili y :: e:1::ure : e s:e:#al nuclear material t

before an adversary car make use Of 't

#a:rica e a sel:Or..

r.

~e secena case, an adversary trans:cr s the act-nuclear c r: reets of a FE in:

a f acili:y' and ::cpie:es :ne assea::. Of the device u'tr"- the #acility.

'..' )

Based upon current state-of-tne-ar: recacture ca:1:ili:ies, i: seems insufficiently conservative to iace neavy safeguards eliance upon re-caoturing s:ecial nuclear material in the interval te:4een a sue:essful theft and use of tne material in a CFE. This is no: mean: :: ic:iy that cnce material nas een stelen i: cannot be reca::ured Or :na: res:u-:es es:escec n imer via;

I 7

.recacture capability cr adversary use-denial /celay safeguards are wasted.

Rather, it eans that a cer.servatively designed safeg;ards system will be oriented, as the present NRC =andatec system is, toward im0eding and a: pre-hending an adversary before the necessity to recover s;ecial nuclear material arises..Therefore, most of the concern about mininue CFE fabrication tice relates ta the second case, the sc-called on-site scenario.

7

/3

.}

Inis analysis indicates r.at the discussien ir. ; e 0: era:ing Assum;-

tion concereirg :ne minitur :4:e required for :ne 's:ricati:n of a CFE is at least sufficiently conservative for Clas I materia',s.

The Operating Assumption is clearly. overly onservative in :nis regar: for Class II materials, to Mininu-Ouantity of SNM Recuirec (U)

7 _.

, _. _ _.. _. ~

.m_

.. ~ -.

m.

- e f

4 I

4 A

C 4

4 l

l Y

L

'(

I i

k I.

t h

1 4

4.

i i

1 r

i i

E t

4 4

i

(

(

l I

f i

1

?

1 4

r I

s i

i i

i i

l l

1 I

i 4

I i

i I

L i

I

,.,,,,,n-,,n._.

,--n.n__

.w I Ant i I isRA8111M 150f0 Pit' 791Xll18t15 (tt)

. esotopic Omynsitinni ')

Iotal U Containteng I Sve('f) 3 7 t r1 U-715% U 2 5 fit, (U) f o' inula Kilograms * (g),

Ifl0 5.0 (5.0) 91 1

5.4 (5.0) 10 30 1.I (5.0) 50 50 10.0 (5.H) intil no 75.0 (s.n) 100

?.0 (7,0) 90 IO 7.2 (2.0) 10 30 2.8 (7.0) 50 50 4.0 (7.0) 4 '.

4.4 (7.0) 10 10 6.1 (2.0) 70 80 10.0 (2.0) lo(?)

qis 20.0 (7.0) 75 50 75 4.4 30 34 40 4.8 At be 64 1.1 In

n in II.1 5

Its W.

40.oI4I

(

, II) th antum clearnt man in 6 8 3rmans, f>eantitles in i.arr the.cs ave ma n of enntaine.l isu lle 8.ntope. AII manes roundeel to acaerst 0.16 3.

(llT(4) Ihe eule for calculating five formula klingrams does east inrlmle 11-715 Isotoge mass in this isotopic mlature lice ause the uvanlune is -

~

enrletel to leu than 70% in U-215 (41) (5) the informatlan in these colisens of Tahle I is unclassif tml.

(ft)(6) Ihe information in these columns of Tahle 1.15 Confidential Restricte.1 Data.

(if) (1) the Ininemation in this column of Tahle I is Conflatential Isational Security Information.

e

s s

e P

4 e

ew m.*

s.*

EE=

or E

r

=

em ur g

.E c

4

.c.

==

g

.e

.h.

G g

e C

=

_=

m

.L.

.U e.

.n, v

==

L n

k w

P.

N e -

e-C 0

I L

c a.

• r i

g

.c-e g

e.

e

.e.

,,m c

g -

e e

c.e C.

C.

C.

O C.

O.

C.

L C

e

• =

i c

E

=

v L

g-N N

N N

N N

N g

-c.

=

7 3

E l

-c.

==

bO N { h m

s.

e w

.=. $

a

-g

-3 g

. w s

=

{

w g

7 w

c-E p

h E.

oo e

e se De

.m m

=.

=

N; a*

N s

er e e

==

3

==&

d g

C er -

w w

w w

w a

C.

a N'

=~.

f.

.c.

g.

m.

er.

-E a=.

E a

er

.

g

=

e.

C C

• .=

.mm e

N C.

3 C

4, C.

w m

.C.

E a

a-C' w

=

t es s

4 L.

=~

' J::

6 w

ed a

c.

De '

=

v w

O CP w

L g

"E

-e g er g

L 4

=

L e

C.

-O N.,

e C

c.

3 c 2 3

5 - -==

e-w M.

C.

.g g

e C

C er a

E as b

a.

L

-2 C

=.C en 3

5 C

e C

3,=

Al N.

e.s t,

a.

a C

N.

p I -

g N.

3 b.

{

I EN**

O e

4P Y

h 8*

E E

E N

• = =*

er '

=

9.g

=v L

w e-

==*

ft 2

P.o P.

er.

t' 4

4

[

e 3

3 w

9 C

E a

s tr

-u 3

e f

2 E C 5 e -

6

c..

.x K-

~

6=

c N

N s

C.

Q C

q a

9 C

=

L g

2

=.

-C

-C C

m.

en ed as **

C C"

}

}

e.

e.

e.

g.-

l,,

1 g e

N.

O

=

m.

7 wA

==

e-

~

a 9

l.

m

==

w f e =

3 P

g,,

4 g

e

m

,=..==

m b

T

[

E w

w

=

=-.

w

.d-N'

=

w w

r.-N N

==

g ap e.

3 C.

1.

N.

e.

.== }

=

e==

=

m

=

m

=.-

=

= =.=..=.,

w w

7

=

g.

g

=

w w

w

O e

.d

/c A thi" signi'icant point is na' I

l

\\

l I

n g

9 10

/

11 m.

~:

state-of-the-ar processing tecnniques.

onclusions and Recommendations (U)

Comparison with the Ceoartment of Energ;. :.e::-: ;issencix i) anc information contair.ec in Reference i 'nc1 cates : a

e :ur-rent hRC ocerating assum;; ion is at. leas; ace: a:e:j ::nserva:ive in a,:.

4 t

cf areas excect for the j6 ine curren: cperating assum;;ien also ap: ears :e#i:ier.:

ne fclicwi.9

/, areas:

. s. o.. a - r a. n. *.

n. o. r.3 +. r.. 3 3 e. a..... +. j c. n. e

c. > e '... s c. r. 2. 3. c. #r o.

/,3 tr.cse ate-ia's wi tr. :ne

'Y

/.$"

/42.

The current c:erating assumption c:es "ct c;nsis'e# ly 7.,

/

\\

/g>

/7 3.

The curre'; c'erating assa. OtiOr c' asses Ce '.ai".

• y es anC J2-6 f0"T$ Of N

R o

1&

/ Fcr exam le, the curren: c:e-ating assu ::icn includes 4

3( he current operating assun::i n #ai's istinguise

( be tween when it addresses y, tne minimur time recuired to fabrica:e a ::E.

U

(?:Fi f A craft NRC Operating Assumo:icn ::vering tr.e.e't: ve Ease of Fa:ri-4

ating e.lancestine issicn -x:losives, wnicn is 5 f #icient.iy ::nse-vative

/,

r in all areas and over:.mes :ne cefi,cier.ctes :na: a.s :een i:en:'#d ec in

... i e r e. v i e w of

• ...e r.

c.n*.. 'i R r. n.

e.

.= *. '..a r.'e.e.-.'.-.

.=.:. e c. r.

. e. < e - - c...

he im:ac cf this nen 0:erating assun::', cr, ::nser.a:ive estimates of

. e _.. $ n $._...a,..... a n. 4.

2. c -< ci v. 4.3 4

.a3.......... e r.

.c..:

'. a. w' v,

ei.

(U; It is recommended tha

nis craf Ocerating Assa:::icr be acceptec as the technical basis for these as:ects of NRC sa'eguar s regula:icns re-lated to tr.e use of nuclear materia'.s in c'ardestine #ission expicsives anc

na: a: r::ria:e rule. making be initiate: :: me d i '., ~ ; ".FR P a r: 72.

.s A,

~

e-

_ o

.w

.,\\

Iw A

3 s

Reference:

1.

J. Carsco Mark Co.ments Concernina the on site - ar. des"' ne Fissien xclos:pve Scenario, July 1978.

b l

l 1

I

(

'g 4

TABLE OF CONTENTS Pace 1.

SUMMARY

COMMENT 1

2.

THE SCENARIO; PROBABLE ASSUMPTIONS 4

3.

CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS TO PROSA5LE ASSUMPTIONS......

7 3.1 Critical Masses and Masses of Nuclear Comconents....

7 6.

Observa tions ag 7.

Conclusions 55 i

0

~

!nd b.s. * '2 ' Y L

y

~4 G E.-- : yy

~

q'

.a 9

2 There are many extraneous factors whien :cuic, decending on the circumstances, affect the con:u:: of the c:eration in ways ranging from merely adding some difficulty, to forcing a suscension of the c:eration.

[For example, tne activation of some types of fire-su:pression system in the area where they were working would add difficulty if the group were ade:uately out-fitted with air packs; but could end the operation if they were not, and so on.] Such contingencies, as well as that of whatever interaction there might be with the guard force, are nc: :onsidered further in the present assessment.

Taking account only of tnose trings wnier. the acversary wculd have to do -- anc nave tc do ri;nt -- a judgerer.: as :: ahe her these could properly be describec as " easy, brief, and straightforward" will

eoend on individual tastes.

Relevan coints in this connection are ciscussed in ce ai' in -he sections wnicn fo'. low.

'W"

. _ _. _ _~

1;

.4 5

J t

5:enari:: 3-::able Assumstions

.: :e:ailee ac:cun of the scenario unce" discussion is available to 1

e a;;her; and it is net even clear whe

ner sucn an account exists.

i 1

t 4

J t

I I

i 1

1 1

i 1

4 1

J t

i t

l~

i

.-ing tnis :: have been nis crimary source of data :ne main su eren s v.r. Conran would nave nad 10 werk free would nave inciucec i

I e

5 l

i t

1 6

i b

i f

l i

t h

I i

h I,.

W T i,

,, - - -,. -, -,,,...,. - ~.. -. -,, - - - -.,., -,. -. -. - -, -,, -.. -., -... - - -. - - - -. -

m m~

6 some of the statements listed above are in need of correction

.;.9

etail, the resulting changes might not greatly affect the general e-

ession.

What is of much more importance is that the statements a,.-n:: ce added so glibly together as we have just done.

4 i

t l

l' l

i i

i e

i

9 M:.c _ n x 4

~

/

2.

cr-ecciens and 'dditions to Probable Assumotions 3.:

Critical vasses and Masses of Nuclear Comocnents Critical mass cata for several different fissile materials and various core-reflector combinations are given in ?ax on, M. C.

et al, " Critical Dimensions of Systems Containing U-235, Pu-239, TID-702S (1964), and in L. J. Kock, H. C. Paxton, and U-233."

" Fast Reactors", Ann. Rev. Nucl. Science, Vol. 9 (1959), from

. wnich :ne following values are taken for a hignly-enriened (94%)

core of J-235 metal, n

Tacle I Re#1ec:ce Critical Mass Core Mass Reflector Total Mass 52 k;.

Ncne 52 kg.

2" Uranium 26 k;.

110 136 k;.

4" Uranium 20 kg.

335 255 k;.

6" Uranium 18 kg.

75 772 <;.

2^

k..

.)

a t.ron

.. k3

, :_9 k;.

.ron 9/

.<g.

4

,o 5" Iron 25 kg.

3:S 374 k;.

e

' 2" Seryllium 22 kg.

10 32 kg.

2" Seryllium 15 kg.

30 a5 kg.

5" Beryliium 12 k;.

56 78 kg.

4 w

-'---n-r--v--v

---Tv--

9 v

r+CrN'-^*""- - - * '

9 y

7

D e

40 g

Y J

e -

aq

-he r,&l 000 0 U0 10n C Oe#. 44. C

• oq *-t (2 G C *. GC f f 00 *- 0.0 X IV s

emy

.. K 7 f"

• • f

• C>1b N.

' Cal /sec, 00, C,) 'OT ?UI6 D^ $

X Y

41 v

1. cr some special military explosives -- values about :ne same i

as those of various types of scod.

When full therma' ecui-4

• iorium snould be es ablisned, they can thus succor: Ouite

arge temperature differences between an insice sur'a:e wnere

. neat may be supplied and an outside surface at ambient tempera-

[In case the ambient medium were air, the outside surface, ture.

~ would be somewhat above ambient temperature; and, of course,

~_.

7.

d nere nave Deen at least some references in :ne caen literature ::

/.

09e oossibility tha: :ne nea; source in reac:Or grade :lutoniu:-

~

-';n leac to oro:lems 5:# an amate - $cmb-maker:

49 6.

Obse-vations Statements have often been made concerning various ha:ar:s (eitner

.real, or supcosed) which would confront an amateur bomb-maker --

.us a y witn the implication that one or more of them would

.eitner stop him or do him in.

Coments on two of these, as they

-wouic apply to the on-site scenario, are given below.

In addition,

.sc e (unfortunately, but ne:essarily) rather general coments are

-at:ressed to the interesting natter of tne total time re:uired to e :: ::ste sucn an operation.

s

{

m

,.._m--

,,___-_.,e-~m

,,,y---w-

- ~. -.

e

'd

• V

'd 0; e# ting Assumotion

[ov*eir9..eRela.lve-ase0

pa ricatina Clandestina s

1ssion -xplosives (U)

I ENCLOSL'0_ 5

PROPOS D. REVISED.

OPERATING ASSUMPTION COVERING THE RELAT:VE EASE OF FABRICATING CLANDESTINE FISS:CN EXP;0SIVES (U)

Backcround:

(U)

Under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, the Department of Energy.

(then ERDA) was given the responsibility for nuclear aeapons design ar6 fabrication.

Therefore, NRC relies upon DOE for techr.ical informatien soecifically a olicable to the design and fabri:atier :f a clancestine fission ex;losive (CFE) whicn mign; assist an inc#vid.al or grouD witn interests inimical to the ':ublic health and safety in either constructing -

a CFE or perpetrating a credible hoax. Tnis inf:rma-i:n is classi'ied anc subfect :: strict need-t -knew considerations, and."erefore canect be generally cisseminated. This factor, coupled wi:n an 1: reciation fcr the dire consecuences which could arise from :ne success #; ce:cnation of a CFE,

reates :ne need fer a censerva:ive o: era:ing assum;;i:n in -.is area.

( U ',

On Aucus: 8, 1977, the Executive Directcr for C;erati:ns dissemina:ec a CFE c:erating assum: tion.

Since that time, NRC nas analyzec fur:ner tecn-nical informa:icn received from DOE related to CFE design anc fabrica:icn.

I Consideration of this analysis has led the staf# to re#crmulate tne coera-ting assumction.

(U)

In order to state the operating assumotion, the foll: wing cefinitions are necessary:

2

-CFE or Clandestine Fission Explosive - A nuclear explosive device wnicn has been illicitly fabricated.

A nuclear ex:losive device is any explo-sive device using special nuclear material for wnich the total explosive energy released is significantly greater than the ex:losive energy released

'by the: conventional high explosive components or by a cuantity of conven-tional nigh explosive whose weight is equal to the device weight.

Uranium Enrichment Index - The uranium enrichment ir.cex is computed

. as follows:

c Dlutonium Enricnment Index - The :lu: Onium enricamen; index is : mouted as follows:

Nuclear Material of Hign Strategic Significance - Nuclear material with nigh strategic significance is iA i When the subject materials are nc: readily separable from other radicactive ma:e-ial wnicn cas a :: 11 external radiation dose rate in excess :f 100 re*s m

per hour at a dis:3n:g 3; c,.a...

,._ any ac.

cessible surface witncu frterver.in; snieldir;, or 2

J Thresocid Quan:i:/ cf Nuclear Material cf. i:n C.r.=.2.-ic 51',. ::2.cance -

Ocerating Assu.cticn: tus m

sw/

l

t' 4

4 egree of Conservatism of the Operating Assumotion: ("1, (C

The operating assumotion considers tnree different as:ects of the fabrication of a CFE - the amount of SNM required, the tecnnical :acability Of a grouc 1

or peccle attempting :ne task, and tre minimum time re:uire:.

ne ::nserva-

.s t1sm or eacn aspect of. tne assumot1:n is ac.ressed be.i:w.

.t.

i

-Sased upon informa icn sup:liec by CCE, 4

l

~

rurtneracre, for many ty:es and forms of nuclear mate-ial of hign stra e;ic si;nificance founc wi:nin the fuel cycle, :0nsiderably

Hewever, i

censidering the cisas rcus c:nsequer.ces Of a ce: nati:- Of a CFE, NF.

policy should give safeguards no credit for the fact :na; 4

For nuclear material of high st-ategic sign 1ricance not directly useaole in a L.

ec., icy may give

.. r.

safeguards credit in terms of :ne cuantity of materia' requi ed :nly fer

ne minimum ex:ectec material losses resulting fr: Or::essin; re s:rategi:

nuclear ma:erial in:: a direc::y useasie fern :nreu;n :ne es: advanced

c state-of-the-art enemical and metallurgicai technicues.

It is envisioned that such crecit acuid be given, if a: all, only On a case-cy-case basis for specific chemical and metallurgica'. forms of nuclear material of high strategic significance.

The degree of conservatism concerning tne relative esse of designing and fabricating a CFE is a matter of some conjecture because of the uncertainty c ncerning the innerent competence of a non-national crou.

The group wouic have to include persons capaole of seartning anc ;ncerstancing the tecnnical literature in several fields, of ince;er.dently arriving at correct technical judgments, and of accomplishing the re;; ired f abrication Operations. -If the competence of the gr0up is deficient in any of nese areas, not only is the chance of procucing a :::al failure inc easec but als: the risk that one.or more memoers of the group might suffer a sericus or fa:ai injury would be significant.

However, due to the disastrous consecuences of tne detonation of a CFE, NRC colicy sncuid give safeguarcs nc creci- # r the difficulty 1

involved in cesigning anc fabricating a :FE.

This is no: incended to pre-clude NRC safeguards colicy from giving credit #:r any difficulties which l

the physical or cnemical form of the strategic nuclear material might i

I present an adversary dJring an attem tec theft.

(.q The possibility of rapid assembly of a "FE af er at:uisition of strategic

-i nuclear material de: ends en the techni:ai : m;e ence :f :ne gr:u;, the l

details of tre device design, and the s:ec'#i: :rys':al anc chemical fcrm l

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6

- of the strategic nuclear material.

Basec on informati:n su; lied by DOE, the times stated in the operating assumetion are consicerably less than the actual times required for assembly of a CFE under the most ideal cir-cumstances. Nevertheless, due to the disastrous consecdences of the detonation of a CFE, NRC should give safeguards no credit for any CFE assembly time in excess of that stated in the Operating Assum: tion.

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v

.e The Honorable Thomas R. Pickering Assistant Secretary of State for OceansandInternationalEnvironmental(lE)p,'._.

and Scientific Affairs U. 5. Decartment of State LJii r,; 2 Washing:cn, D. C.

20520

} ear Mr. Pickering:

s0ur staff has recently conducted a technical review of the current NRC bperating assumption regarding the relative ease of fabricating clandestine

fission explosives (Enclosure 1).

A portion of this review concerned the te:ermination of the threshold quantities of soecial nuclear r.aterial for whicn the greatest cegree of physical protecti:n is requirec.

Carrer: NRC

-regulat4 ons se: this thresnold at five formula kilograms, whicn is cen-sistent with the efinition of Categcry I nuclear material ir :NFCIRC/225.

if 1

O/The trea ren: of (In his res:Onse of 0 ~ March 15,.9r. Shea recuested Executive Branch evaluation of hcw U.S.

EN:;:SL.E -

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2

'de woulc appreciate Executive Branch views and ccmr.ents as tc whether such Sincerely, Les V. Gossick Executive Direc cr for 0:erations nclosures:

e 1.

NRC 0:eratinc Assumotion on Clandestine F1ssion :xclosives 2.

Technical Review of the.NRC Coeratinc Assucct'on on Ciandestine Fissicr Ex61cs0ces Drc:csec revised.';RC 0:eratinc issum: tion on landes:1ne rission :xpiosives

. Van Ocren, AC:A

. 3. Mandyside, ::E i

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DRA ~

Mr. Duane C. Sewell Assistant Secretary for Defense e : grams r

U.S. Department of Energy s

Washington, D.C.

20545

'Cese Mr. Sewell:

-Our staff has recently conducted a technical review, based upon information contained in the DOE Sce:ial Stucy Decor on Reactor

-Materials and Nuclear ExDiosives anc technical discussions with DOE staff in the Office of Military A:::ica:icn, :# :ne curren: NRC Oc-

-erating assumption regardinc the re:a:ive ease :# fabricating c'ar-

~' destine fission e ciosives (Encicsure 1,.

A ocr:ict of this review x

=r.,

c.

Mr. Cuane C. Sewel' -

'Any actions taken to implement the recontendations of the staff review j must be carefully coordinated Sincerely, Lee '!. Gcssick Exe:utive Direc:Or f:- C era:icns

Enclosures:

1.

NRC 0:erating Assur tion en Clandestine Fissi:n Excicsives 2.

Letter from Louis V. Nosen:o to James 0 Shea datec " arch 12, :.79 3.

Technical Review of the NRC 0:erating Assumotion en Clancestine Fission Excics'ves 4

Proposed revised.1RC Opera:ing Assumption on Clandestine Fission Expicsives

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON W A5HINc7oN, D. C. 20555

%,....*e MA 1 a 1973 Mr. Louis V. Nosenzo Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy & Energy Technology Affairs Room 7831 U.S. Department of State Washington, D.C.

20520

Dear Mr. Nosenzo:

Thank y'ou for yr.ur letter of March 12, 1979 providing Executive B' ranch coments on the final draft of the proposed Upgrade Rule for physical protection of Category I material. Your views will be considered by NRC in our preparation of the rule.

Mr7our letter noted, among other matter., the Executive Branch recomen-]

dation that NRC change the basis for its domestic physical protection 1

' regulations from SNM categories based on " contained" fissile material I

.to categories based on " effective" kilograms of fissile material (uranium-l 233, uranium-235, or plutonium).

I would appreciate your views and corTnents as to what effect such a " change to NRC physical protection regulations might have on international obligations. undertaken by the U.S., which are based on the " contained" approach.

These obligations include those for physical protection under the Supplier Guidelines, the reciprocal written assurances (already provided to Sweden and the U.K.)

to provide at a " minimum a level of protection comparable to that achieved

{ by the measures set forth" in INFCIRC/225/Rev.1, and assurances provided in Agreements for Cooperation renegotiated pursuant to the Nuclear Non-I proliferation Act (which also reference INFCIRC/225/Rev.1).

Implemen-g tation of any physical protection obligations resulting from U.S. adherence to the Physical Protection Convention could also be affected by such a l

.Lp Lhange.

~

J) With regard to your coments on the Category II and III Rule. Chairman y, Jiendrie, in his March 1 letter to Assistant Secretary Pickering, provided 3, the current schedule for prompt publication and implementation of the final yerule. Gowever, any change in the basis for defining categories of SNM could result in further delays before the U.S. would be able to provide

1. 3 unequivocal assurances regarding the physical protection of Category II fandIIImaterial]

The Classified Information has

. been Removed from this Document

. cereh, This copy of this document is

• CLAS F ED.

By Authority Of:

te fm State 8/2E J es R. Shea, Director Mfice of International ProgramsBy:

SURE

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