ML20214T206
| ML20214T206 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 05/28/1987 |
| From: | Zech G NRC OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS |
| To: | White S TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8706100162 | |
| Download: ML20214T206 (2) | |
Text
..
Chd/df m 7 g7 Tennessee Valley Authority ATTN: Mr. S. A. White Manager of Nuclear Power 6N 38A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
FEf% RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY EXERCISE REPORT-SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCY EXERCISE OF NOVEMBER 9, 1986 Enclosed is a copy of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Report for the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Exercise of November 9,1986.
As described in the enclosed report, FEMA did not identify any deficiencies; however, four areas were identified that require corrective actions.
Specifically, the items were:
(1) the failure of State field monitoring teams to take open window measurements; (2) the failure of State field monitoring teams to obtain KI prior to dispatch; (3) the lack of a clearly defined policy for the availability, distribution, and use of KI by Hamilton County; and (4) the neea for additional training in the use of dosinietry for Hamilton County personnel.
FEMA also identified 35 areas recommended for improvement.
These items are discussed in detail in Section IV of the Enclosure.
We encourage you to assist the appropriate organizations in resolving the weaknesses identified by FEMA.
Resolution of the items should be completed prior to the next full scale emergency preparedness exercise.
We also encourage you to work closely with the State and counties in the development of a secenario for the next full scale exercise that will effectively test the areas in which the above items were disclosed.
Sincerely, Gary G. Zech, Assistant Director, Inspection Programs Division of TVA Projects Office of Special Projects
Enclosure:
FEtM Final Report cc w/ encl:
(see page 2) 070610
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Tennessee Valley Authority 2
cc w/ encl:
H. L. Abercrombie, Site Director Sequoyah Nuclear Plant J. A. Kirkebo, Acting Director, Nuclear Engineering R. L. Gridley, Director Nuclear Safety and Licensing M. R. Harding, Site Licensing Manager bcc w/ encl:
J. N. Grace, RII J. G. Keppler, OSP S. D. Ebneter, OSP J. A. Zwolinski, OSP B. D. Liaw, OSP S. D. Richardson, OSP S. R. Connelly, 0IA K. P. Barr, OSP/RII NRC Resident Inspector NRC Document Control Desk State of Tennessee
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Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV 1371 Peachtree Street, NE Atlanta, Georgia 30309 i
l SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EXERCISE j
a Conducted on November 19, 1986 Exercise Report January 27, 1987 Utility:
Tennessee Valley Authority Plant Location:
Hamilton County, near Chattanooga, Tennessee i
Participating State and Local Governments:
1 State of Tennessee Hamilton County Bradley County 4
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l TABLE OF CONTENTS l
Pace I.
EXERCISE
SUMMARY
l II.
DETAILED DISCUSSION 5
State of Tennessee 5
j State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) 5 i
Dose Assessment 6
i Field Coordination Center (FCC) and Radiological Monitoring Control Center (RMCC) 7 1
Radiological Monitoring Field Teams 8
i Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) 11 Joint Infor:ation Center (JIC) 12 Hamilton County 13 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 13 i
Outside Activities 15 i
Medical Support 16 Bradley County 17 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 17 I
Outside Activities 18 a
j l
III.
SUMMARY
LISTING OF INADEQUACIES 22 4,
l
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IV.
SUMMARY
LISTING OF AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT 23 V.
APPENDICES 27 A.
Evaluator List and Assignments B.
Exercise Objectives and Scenario 8
I.
EXERCISE
SUMMARY
This full participation exercise was conducted on November 19, 1986, and was observed by seventeen Federal evaluators representing five Federal agencies.
The evaluation was based on NUREG-0654-FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1,
" Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Nuclear Power Plants."
All objectives of the exercise were accomplished and no NUREG-0654 deficiencies were identified.
Four areas requiring corrective actions were identified, and several areas are recommended for improvement.
These recommendations and requirements are listed in Sections III and IV and discussed in detail in Section II.
The following is a brief summary of the Federal evaluators' reports regarding the various facilities and activities of the exercise.
State of Tennessee State Emercency Operations Center (SCOC)
The State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) in Nashville is a superior ur.derground cperations center.
Emergency management operations were conducted in a superior manner.
Tinely and effective coordination was evident throughout the exercise.
Dose Assessment Dose assessment was conducted competently and professionally at the State EOC.
Protective action decisions and recommendations were made appropriately and in a timely fashion.
Field Coordination Center (FCC) and Radiolocical Monitorina Control Center (RMCC)
Overall, the Field Coordination Center (FCC) and the Radiological Monitoring Control Center (RMCC) functioned as designed.
There were some minor information flow problems even with the excellent communications.
The staff of both facilities are capable of j
performing their assigned functions and coordinating with the DOE RAP Team, but a review of the RMCC function is needed.
1 Radiolocical Monitorino Field Teams Though mobilization was not demonstrated, four teams and equipment were available and deployed to the field in a timely manner.
Three of the four field teams were evaluated.
(._-.
I,
Once in the field, team performance demonstrated a high degree of i
i competence and knowledge of operations.
However, only one DRH team was required to take an air sample, and no team collected a j
water sample.
t Although there was a greater effort this year to keep teams l
l apprised of changing conditions from the RMCC, too often this information, including meteorological data, was transmitted too l
late to prevent teams from entering high radiation areas
]
unnecessarily.
1 j
Central Emeraency Control Center (CECC)
The communications, coordination and flow of emergency and i,
technical informa' ion between representatives of the state (SEOC) and TVA (CECC) were cxcellent.. Independent accident assessments j
were performed quickly which allowed for the coordinated development and implementation of appropriate protective actions l
to mitigate the consequences of the accident.
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l Joint Information Center (JIC) 1 Most aspects of the public information system in the sequoyah i
Plan were superior, and all aspects of the operation were i
adequate to ensure protection of the public.
Particularly l
l commendable were communications, especially satellite j
programming, between the Joint %nformation Center (JIC) and other
.i facilities, overall coordination between JIC ataff and liaisons, 4
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and displays of appropriate maps, charts, and status boards.
staff control and planning were excellent, particularly the anticipation of what would be needed next in a fast-moving j
situation.
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Hamilton County i
Emeraency Onerations Center (EOC) j Activation and staffing of the Hamilton County Emergency i
i Operations Center (EOC) was performed promptly following the
]
Alert notification.
All staff were well trained and performed j
well their respective responsibilities.
A 24-hour staffing capability was demonstrated with a shift change.
The EOC was very well managed.
Scheduled briefings were excellent.
Message l
handling and distribution was efficient.
It is suggested, however, that operations personnel and agency representatives j
maintain logs of their activities.
Emergency workers in the field should be kept abreast of the emergency status and i
j protective action recommendations.
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l The EOC facilities were excellent.
The layout provided an
.j effective and integrated environment for supporting emergency
]
operations.
All necessary maps, charts, and status boards were i
present and used.
Communication capabilities were all l
functional, and several back-up systems were available.
The authorization to administer KI to emergency workers was not implemented promptly.
Some confusion existed regarding the availability, distribution, and use of KI within the county.
Additional training is indicated regarding emergency worker exposure control.
{
Outside Activities Emergency worker monitoring and decontamination was demonstrated I
at Ooltewah Middle School.
Participants were well trained in i
monitoring procedures and participated enthusiastically.
l The Command Post East, Route Alerting, Controlled Evacuation i
j Point, Manned Roadblock #33, and Shelter Information Point were 1
observed.
Each area demonstrated the ability to activate and staff the location, but no written procedures were in place for l
workers to follow, i
i Emergency workers were equipped with dosimetry, but were unsure j
of maxjmum doses and reporting procedures.
i Medical Suncort i
A superb demonstration of a coordinated emergency response for handling an injured and contaminated victim was given by the i
Emergency Medical Services staff and Park Ridge Hospital staff.
Patient care and transfer during all phases of the demonstration were exemplary.
Physician participation and staff work in l
handling the contaminated patient were of textbook quality, and medical health physics support and contamination control i
activities of staff persons were excellent.
No deficiencies were noted in the decontamination and medical care of the injured
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patient.
i Bradlev County Emeraency Onerations Center (EOC)
Bradley County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) capabilities were greatly improved as a result of occupying a new facility.
1 l
No inadequacies were identified.
l Outside Activities
)
Route Alertina and Traffic Control - No problems in route j
alerting, care for mobility-impaired, or traffic access and i
control were observed which could lead to a conclusion that
Bradley County is unable to protect its citizens in the event of a power reactor accident.
Decontamination - Actual demonstration of decontamination of evacuees before admission to the shelter was excellent.
The j
decontamination center workers were well trained and were i
enthusiastic.
A separate facility for decontamination of emergency workers was activated and staffed but no actual demonstration took place.
The county EOC has a written procedure for quickly training volunteers to handle " frisking" in case a large influx of evacuees arrive at the shelter.
Shelterina - Sheltering capability of Bradley County was demonstrated by opening and staffing the First Baptist Family l
Life Center.
Participants were found to be generally knowledgeable with a spirit of cooperativeness and desire to solve problems.
Progress over previous exercises was apparent.
l Areas needing improvement were identified.
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II.
DETAILID DISCUSSION State of Tennessee State Emercency Operations Center (SEOC)
The State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) in Nashville is a superior, underground emergency operations center.
For radiological emergencies, the operational area is divided into three separate areas:
operations, radiological health activities, and communications.
The facility has a superior communications center which operates on a 24-hour continuous basis.
The operations room is extremely large and well equipped i
with excellent maps and status boards which were posted promptly and reflected the current situation at all times.
Areas
)
evacuated were clearly identified with dark green acetate.
This greatly facilitated briefings.
Adequate briefings were conducted to keep everyone informed of the developing situation.
Microphones were used throughout the EOC.
All ring-down phones are installed with a signal appliance strobe light that flashes when the phone is to be answered.
The ringing volume has been decreased on all other phones which greatly reduces noise in the LOC.
Additionally, large electronic i
i signs have been installed, also with strobe lights, that indicate the emergency classification status, Prompt Notification System j
soundings,;or other pertinent information concerning the l.
emergency.
There are several television monitors throughout the EOC.
Each 4
operations table is wired so that approximately 75 individuals can monitor the audio portion of the telecasts.
The sound can also be increased sufficiently to be heard throughout the EOC without the use of individual headsets.
During this exercise, there were five hours of telecasts originating from the Joint Information Center.
Press conferences and other activities at the Joint Information Center were also telecast to exercise facilities.
The State Emergency Management Director has a small television monitor, with headset, directly l
in front of his work station.
The telecasts were made possible by use of a satellite.
Representatives from the Tennessee Valley j
Authority (TVA), Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA),
and the State Radiological Health Unit effectively coordinated their activities.
l The Prompt Notification System was activated within nine minutes of the announcement of the Site Area Emergency.
Subsequent activations (simulated) took place concurrently with changes in l
classifications and/or protective action recommendations.
l
6-All participants in the SEOC effectively coordinated their activities and displayed a high degree of enthusiasm and professionalism.
Emergency operations management was carried out in a superior manner.
Sumerior Items:
1.
The overall management of emergency operations, and the physical facility associated with EOC operations.
Deficiencies:
None.
Areas Reauirina Corrective Actions:
None.
Areas Recommended for Imorovement:
None.
Dose Assessment The radiological health portion of the exercise at the State EOC was performed in a well organized, efficient and professional manner.
Dose calculations were performed on a computer using plant release data.
Also, back calculations were conducted from field data.
However, beca 1se no air sampling meas nements were conducted within the plume by State field teams, the State radioiodine dose projections were dependent on a TVA radiciodine measurement or on use of source terms with arbitrary noble gas to iodine ratios.
Previous communication problems in the exchange of information between the State dose assessment group in the SEOC and the TVA dose assessment group in the CECC seem to have been resolved.
i Protective action decisions were reached both for plume exposure 4
1 pathway hazards and for ingestion pathway hazards, and protective action recommendations were made appropriately and in a timely manner.
Sumerior Items:
1.
Overall performance.
Deficiencies:
None.
i Areas Reauirina Corrective Actions:
None.
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1.
A substantial effort should be made to ensure that adequate air sampling measurements of radioiodine and particulate concentrations are conducted in the plume by State radiological field teams to provide a basis for State dose projections, particularly for unmonitored releases.
Field Coordination Center (FCC) and Radioloalcal Monitorina Control Center (RMCC)
Overall, the Field Coordination Center (FCC) and the Radiological Monitoring Control Center (RMCC) activities were adequate for their assigned functions.
Information flow could have been 3
improved between the FCC and the RMCC.
The satellite information from the JIC was an excellent addition to the facility for updating the FCC staff on the general plant status and information provided to the media.
More frequent briefings are needed and each agency should go to the microphone to speak.
The RMCC staff should be included in some of the FCC briefings.
Excellent boards for displaying evacuated sectors were available in the FCC and information was posted promptly.
However, some incorrect information on evacuation status was late in being posted.
This was never corrected, resulting in evacuat'en completion times differing by approximately two hours.
The RMCC evacuation status board was never posted.
The board used for field team data was not adequate, and there is some question whether or not the boards were intended for use by the RMCC staff.
An FCC representative should be assigned to the RMCC to ensure information flow is adequate and status boards are posted.
Information packets are required for field monitoring teams which include radio procedures, maps, instructions for finding sampling points, and sampling procedures.
This would eliminate congestion of the radio network with instructions on routine items.. Field team direction strategy decisions are transmitted from the SEOC.
RMCC staff should provide more updates to field teams on plant j
status, wind direction, etc.
The RMCC Coordinator has multiple
~
responsibilities which make it difficult for him to coordinate DRH teams and to accomplish interagency coordination as well, i
Communications were excellent between all parties.
The strobe lights on ring-down phones were very effective and greatly reduced the noise.
DOE teams were deployed prior to the request for assistance.
The DOE team deployment information was not passed from TEMA to DRH (SEOC) to the RMCC.
The RMCC should be aware of additional resources enroute.
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1 a.
The RMCC staffing and function should be reviewed to see if there
]
is a more effective way to control field teams.
Sunerior Items:
1.
Satellite video broadcast worked well to keep FCC staff l
informed.
),
2.
Strobe lights on ring-down phones were excellent to control noise.
Deficiencies:
None.
Areas Reauirina Corrective Actions:
None.
Areas Recommended for Incrovement:
4 1.
Improve information flow and accuracy of data among i
groups in the FCC (and RMCC).
Use of boards should be reviewed.
More frequent briefings in the FCC are needed.
4 2.
Information packets should be available for the i
Federal /SMRAP field teams on procedures for radios, monitoring, maps, etc., as stated in the Sequoyah Plan, j
page A-3 and page E-50.
1 Radiolocical Monitorina Field Teams Prior to departure from the RMCC, the Field Team Coordinator kept the field teams informed on plant conditions, j
All teams were successful in locating monitoring points and j
reading maps if specific routes were not known (none of the PSC vehicle drivers was familiar with the area, so map reading by team members was essential).
A few-inaccuracies persisted in the i
}
written reference descriptions of monitoring point sites.
Only one team regularly preceded its radio transmissions with
" drill message" or "This Is A Drill".
It is important that this become a standard procedure because other operations (such as the
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DOE RAP teams) have access to transmission and monitoring over l
dedicated State frequencies.
None of the highest recorded field readings was transmitted to the RMCC with a " drill message" l
t preface.
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No team remained in a radio " dead spot" location for more than five minutes, and teams remained in contact with one another even i
when RMCC did not respond to radio contact.
Back-up radio j
capability in PSC vehicles was shown but.not demonstrated.
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There was an improved effort this year to keep teams apprised of i
plant status, emergency action levels and meteorological conditions.
However, much of this information was transmitted too late to prevent Teams #1 and #2 from entering potentially high radiation areas (i.e., >100MR/hr).
Field Team #2 was, at one point, deployed to a high radiation location and told to
" stand by".
The team left there on its own initiative when GM reading exceeded 100 MR/hr open window.
-Anti-contamination protective geah was adequate in number for all team members and PSC drivers.
There was an apparent discrepancy between instructions contained in the SOPS, which call for open and closed window GM readings at 1
all locations, and the exercise instructions, which were not uniformly understood by all teams.
Field Team #1 believed that no open window readings were to be taken.
Field Team #2 bolieved r
that they were to be taken only during plume traverse in order to locate the plume centerline (this team provided open and closed window readings for all points, however).
Field-Team #4 followed the SOP and took open and closed window readings at all locations.
In future exercises, the State should assure consistency between the SOP and instructions for the day.
i Accident assessment objective Number One was not completely accomplished because only one air sample ant no water samples i
were collected.
Otherwise, field team demonstrations indicated a high degree of competence.
4 Field Team #1 -Generally, Field Team #1 had adequate training to carry out technical field operations.
Ambient air and air sample measurements were observed.
Soil, water and vegetation samples were not taken.
However, some difficulties were noted:
- 1) the initial equipment check out did not use checklists or SOPS; 2) gloves were not worn during the handling of air samples; 3) the team only took closed window readings (I.8.); and 4) samples were not double bagged and labels were taped to the bag, giving the potential for label loss.
4 Communications were generally adequate, with only occasional dead
)
spots noted.
Communications were reestablished by moving the I
vehicle a short distance from the dead spot.
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The team seldom used the prefix "This Is A Drill" for transmissions.
This is particularly important for transmissions of radiation readings.
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Field teams generally were not advised of plant status, emergency l
classification level, meteorological data, dose projections or
}
protective actions underway.
Field Team #1 did a good job of traversing the plume, despite this lack of information from the dispatcher.
4 1
Field Team #1 had adequate dosimetry and members read their dosimetry regularly.
The SOPS indicated exposure limits and the team was aware of the limits.
There were sufficient anti-contamination outfits and respirators 4
for team members.
The team members did not have KI with them (J.10. e. ).
Deficiencies:
None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:
1.
I.8. - Field Team #1 only took closed window readings.
The team leader was under the impression the procedure had been changed and had crossed out "open" in his copy
~j of the procedures.
Teams should always take and report both open and closed window readings.
2.
J.10.e. - Field Team #1 did not have KI with them.
Team members should be trained to bring their KI with them from their home base, or obtain KI at the field team dispatch point.
Areas Recommended for Imorovement:
1.
The kits should be checked before deployment trom the city wher2 they are stored and again at the point of dispatch to the field (the RMCC in this case).
2.
Double bagging is not required by the procedures.
Samples should be double bagged and the label securely attached, either with a tag or on a label taped to the i
inside of the second bag.
i 3.
Gloves should be worn whenever handling potentially contaminated materials.
4.
The team (all teams) received minimal information about the plume location, wind shifts, plant status, etc.
Without sufficient information, teams would be in danger of running into the plure while trying to avoid it.
Teams should be aware of plume, wind and plant conditions.
Field Team #2 - Team members were prepositioned for this exercise, but had good knowledge of actual mobilization 1
procedures (which have been demonstrated in prior exercises).
One Ion chamber was out of calibration (and had not been calibrated within the previous year).
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Sunerior Itagg:
1.
Demonstrated field team knowledge and competence.
Deficiencies:
None.
i Areas Reauirina Corrective Actions:
None.
1 Areas Recommended for Imorovement:
1.
Assure consistency between field team SOP and specific 1
exercise instructions regarding monitoring activities.
1 2.
Provide opportunity for field test and demonstration of air, water and soil sampling media by all teams in a l
future exercise.
Field Team #4 - Maps were adequate and familiarity with equipment 4
and sampling points by the team was excellent.
4 Radio equipment was generally acceptable.
Messages between RMCC and Field Team #4 were not adequately identified as drill or I
exercise messages.
i Team members had adequate personal dosimetry.
Dosimeter readings were transmitted to the RMCC with each sample point data j
transmission.
The State team d d not have KI in its kit.
Deficiencies:
None.
Areas Resuirina Corrective Actions:
None.
i Areas Recommended for Imorovement:
1.
Kit organizations.
2.
Some xerox copies of SOP's and report documents are i
poorly reproduced.
3.
"This Is A Drill / Exercise" to introduce and close radio transmissions.
1 Central Emeroency Control Center (CECC)
I i
The State dispatched several Emergency Management representatives to the CECC to act in a liaison capacity.
These representatives were instrumental in enhancing communications and coordination i
between the State Emergency Director and the TVA Emergency Director.
The flow of technical information from the CECC to the State Health Department representatives located in the SEOC was excellenc.
The content of this information was complete, i
accurate and provided in a timely fashion.
Hence, unlike several previous exercises, the representatives of the Division of Radiological Health at the SEOC were able to perform an independent assessment of the emergency conditions promptly.
The ability to make this accident assessment quickly greatly facilitated the coordinated development and implementation of appropriate protective actions.
Overall, the coordination and communications between representatives of the State and TVA were excellent.
This contributed to mitigating the consequences of the developing emergency conditions in a prompt manner.
Deficiencies:
None.
Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:
None.
Areas Recommended for Imorovement:
None.
Joint Information Center (JIC)
The public information system in the Sequoyah Plan is generally superior.
All operational components worked together effectively.
Commun' cations have improved significantly since past exercises and are certainly state-of-the-art with the addition of t he satellite programming.
Facilities are excellent.
Coordination between JIC staff and PIO liaisons were very good.
Internal coordination within TEMA staff was good.
Coordination between TEMA and TVA could be improved, perhaps with the addition of permanent liaison in respective TVA/TEMA work areas.
Visuals were well developed and used very effectively.
Staff control and planning were well executed.
The rumor control system, while fragmented, was well staffed and had adequate communications to support it.
Suoerior Items:
1.
Communications, particularly external.
2.
Coordination between JIC and field facilities.
3.
Facilities.
4.
Visuals.
5.
Staff control / planning.
Deficiencies:
None.
Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:
None.
Areas Recommended for Imorovement:
1.
Timely production, verification and dissemination of information could be improved with either additional staff or updated equipment.
2.
Rumor control analysis would be enhanced if TVA staff provided better and quicker information about media monitoring activity and content of incoming queries.
Hard copy should be provided of all releases.
3.
The rumor control system is much broader than reflected in the plan.
It is suggested that this be considered during the next plan revision.
4.
Greater audience control should be exerted by the State moderator during media briefings.
5.
Description of evacuation sectors should be based on physical boundaries, and these descriptions should be part of briefings and other information.
6.
Brochure could benefit from design improvement.
The importance of retaining the brochure could be stressed on the front cover.
7.
Hard copy at EBS messages which actually go ont should be provided promptly to JIC staff.
8.
Status board in JIC should be expanded to include more events and should be reviewed for accuracy.
9.
Tab L concerning sheltering livestock should be re-written to improve clarity and to place more emphasis on instructions.
10.
Improvements in security procedures to eliminate personnel clearance delays should be considered.
Hamilton County Emeraency Operations Center (EOC)
Activation and staffing of the Hamilton County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was performed promptly following the receipt of the Alert notification.
The notification was received over the TEMA hotline at 8:37 a.m. by personnel present for normal daily duty.
During off-hour periods, the nocification would have been received at the County Sheriff's 24-hour dispatch post.
During the exercise, EOC personnel activated the staff
.using written call lists.
The EOC was fully staffed and operational by 9:20 a.m.
All staff were well trained and
knowledgeable in their respective duties.
Twenty-four hour staffing was demonstrated for all staff through a shift change.
A PIO from the EOC was dispatched to the JIC.
The PIO's responsibility was to coordinate information regarding activities in Hamilton County with the joint news releases.
Management of the emergency operations at the EOC was very strong.
Scheduled briefings were conducted every thirty minutes.
)
Unscheduled briefings were presented each time a change in exercise classification occurred.
The briefings were concise, integrated new infozzation into the overall emergency response, reviewed and/or defined technical concepts, and anticipated the next level of response.
Each member of the operations staff and each agency was provided with a copy of the plan and procedures.
Message handling was prompt and efficient.
Each message was logged and summarized the actions that had been implemented.
The physical facilities of the EOC were excellent.
The EOC was spacious with adequate working areas for all personnel.
Noise and congestion were not problems.
Back-up power was available and demonstrated.
The status board was kept current and was clearly visible.
All necessary maps, charts, and displays were present and used.
Communication equipment was excellent with a variety of back-up systems to support emergency operations.
Hotlines were available to TEMA, NAWAS, NOAA, and the EB3 station (WDOD).
A hard copy telefax machine was available and used for transmission of messages and news releases to and from the JIC, Public alerting was handlad primarily by TEMA.
The county was, however, responsible for performing the route alert function.
According to the plan, the initial siren and EBS activation by TEMA also triggers route alerting by the county.
Because the siren /EBS activation was not synchronized with the scenario, j
some confusion arose over the initiation and intent of the action.
However, the county did order the route alert function according to planned procedures.
The activation of traffic control points, traffic assistance teams, shelter information points, and relocation centers was also ordered promptly.
The county recognized early its shortage of equipment and personnel and requested additional support from some of the runicipalities.
As
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the risk area increased, it became necessary to evacuate and reestablish the East and West Command Posts.
Residents with special needs or lacking transportation are known to the local police departments and volunteer fire district personnel.
Plans were in place to render assistance to those residents.
The order to administer KI to county residents within the 5-mile EPZ and to all emergency workers was not implemented promptly.
Confusion existed regarding the volume of KI required and its distribution and use within the county (J.10.f.).
Additional training is required regarding the use and distribution of KI.
. a Deficiencies:
None.
Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:
1.
J.10.f. - The State directed the administration of KI to all residents within the 5-mile EPZ and to all emergency workers.
The order was ignored until pursued about 45 minutes later by the evaluator.
A variety of responses and explanations were presented by the EOC staff.
A more clearly defined policy is required concerning the availability, distribution, and use of KI.
The county should develop this policy with TEMA representatives.
Areas Recommended for Imorovement:
1.
Updates / briefings should be transmitted to emergency workers.
Outside Activities Monitoring of emergency workers was done at the Coletewah Middle School by three Health Department nurses.
They were well trained in monitaring and decontamination proceduret.
A CDV-700 was used with a protected probt.
Staff wore protecti e clothing and footies.
They were equipped to monitor people at the entrance and release non-contaminated workers.
Contaminated workers were sent to be showered and re-monitored.
Provisions were made for contaminated clothing and valuables, and extra clothing was available.
Two units from the Tri-Community Fire Department were also available to assist.
Procedures for the decontamination of people and containment of water were discussed.
There was no provision for vehicle decontamination.
A RACES operator was available to aid communications with other areas.
Route alerting was done by the Hamilton County Sheriff's Department.
The sirens sounded at 12:02 and one officer was instructed to start the route at 12:09.
The route was started at l
12:17 and completed at 12:32.
Flashing lights, sirens, and the public address system were demonstrated.
However, no instruction or printed messages were available.
The controlled evacuation point at Highway 58 and Gamble Road and the manned roadblock #33 at the intersection of Lee Highway and Georgetown Road were observed.
1
, o The controlled evacuation point was manned at 12:32, immediately upon completing route alerting.
The roadblock was ordered at 2:08.
Both officers were able to communicate with the EOC and each other via their car radios.
They checked in with the EOC periodically, and were told each time to " stay in place".
Both officers were aware of the evacuation routes but were unaware of the location of the reception center.
Procedures for clearing traffic were not demonstrated, but a Transporation Assist Team (TAT) was available at the roadblock to assist the officer in charge.
Two TAT teams had been observed when they arrived at the Command Post East location on Career Road.
Each team consisted of a truck equipped with five gallons of gasoline and barricades.
Each truck had radio communications with the EOC and each other.
The mobile Command Post East was observed at the Career Road location.
It had extensive radio communication capabilities and the dosimetry and TLDs for emergency workers.
Individual record cards were also issued.
Emergency workers were not aware of maximum doses and did not Know where KI would be issued if it were necessary.
Workers were unaware of procedures for recording or reporting doses.
Workers at the Shelter Informatio!. Point (SIP) were also u.1 aware of what procedures should be followed.
A RACES operator was at the SIP to assist with communications.
It is suggested that emergency workers be given some additional training on dosimetry.
Also, written procedures should be in place for each worker to follow (K.3.b.).
Deficiencies:
None.
Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:
1.
K.3.b. - Additional training on the use of dosimetry is needed.
Areas Recommended for Imorevement:
1.
Written procedures are needed for route alerting (messages to be broadcast), control points, and roadblocks.
Medical Surnort Alerting of Parkridge Hospital staff that an injured and possibly contaminated victim would be arriving in a short time occurred at about 9:30 a.m.
Within about ten minutes, hospital security staff and Emergency Medical Services staff were prepared to receive the patient.
1 The reception area and decontamination and treatment rooms were quickly covered with absorbent materials to prevent the spread of contamination, and the area was " roped off" to prevent entry by t
)
unauthorized persons.
A superb demonstration of a coordinated emergency response for handling an injured and contaminated victim was provided by Emergency Medical Services and hospital emergency staff.
Patient care and transfer during all phases of the demonstration were exemplary.
Physician participation and staff work in handling the contaminated patient were of textbook quality, and medical health physics support and contamination control acitivities were excellent.
No deficiencies were noted in the decontamination and medical l
care of the injured patient.
Suoerior Items:
l l
1.
Handling of injured / contaminated individual, including communications and transportation.
Deficiencies:
None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:
None.
Areas Recommendet for Imorovement:
None.
Bradlev County Emercency Operations Center (EOC)
The new structure is well lighted, ventilated, well equipped anc fully capable of supporting sustained operations with a kitchen, bunk room, and showers.
Informative display capabilities are excellent, and the communications area is superior and capable of expansion.
Most county organizations were represented, and the county executive entire exer (principal elected official) was present during the cise.
Excellent staff procedures packets were available at each operating station.
Although information display facilities were excellent, there was a reluctance to use them.
The sliding status boards covered the route map and one roadblock map.
The other roadblock status map was not used until the evaluator questioned its purpose.
There was no apparent plotting of the plume or monitoring points.
The EPZ map did not show population at risk.
This could have been-easily corrected since data was available.
. o The communications area was excellent but there was no conferencing capability on the radio console.
Suoerior Items:
1.
The procedures packets for each functional station in the EOC were invaluable as briefing tools for people who act infrequently in their emergency role.
Deficiencies:
None Areas Reauirina Corrective Actions:
None.
Areas Recommended for Imorovement:
1.
EOC staff should be trained in the techniques of map posting.
Key information displays should not be subject to cover-up on sliding board facilities.
2.
Consideration should be given to equipping the communi-cations system with a radio conferencing capability.
Outside Activities Route Alertino and Traffic control - Relative to the route alerting plan, there in no doubt that adequate resources exist within tie county to execute the pian within the time frame established (45 minutes'.
The exercise called for routes to be run in three zones for a total of ten routes.
Ten manned vehicles were available and could have been at the route starting points within 15 minutes.
The routes would take 12-20 minutes to complete.
The one roadblock established was a good demonstration of capability.
(One exception was a lack of knowledge as to the purpose / function of the film badge on the part of two road department individuals.
Workers were also unsure of their monitoring function.)
Provisions for the mobility-impaired are adequate but chance exists for unforeseen problems because of lack of some information on specific individuals, e.g.,
the precise impairments were unknown for some individuals.
A card file for 46 individuals was present in the EOC and was duplicated at the State EOC.
A resource evaluation indicates there would be no problem in the transportation of the mobility-impaired.
Approximately 20 vehicles (county and funeral home) would be available for stretcher-type cases.
Private automobiles would also be employed.
i l.
i l
Communications equipment in the patrol car used by the Sheriff's Department to run the alert route was not operating correctly.
i The patrolman was concerned about this.
Conversations with the shift Lieutenant indicated this problem was department wide.
Superior Items:
1.
The organization and direction of all activities which are the responsibility of the rescue squad, EMS and Sheriff's Department were excellent.
Deficiencies:
None.
l l
Areas Resuirina Corrective Actions:
None.
Areas Recommended for Imorovement:
1.
System for routine update of mobility-impaired file.
2.
Emergency workers at roadblock should be better instructed on the matter of exposure control and the function of film badges.
3.
Roadblock personnel should as better instructed on the monitoring function.
4.
An indepent eat assessment of shortcoinings in the communications equipment of the Sheriff's Department should be made.
Decontamination - The decontamination center was established at the basement of the shelter for evacuees.
A separate decontamination center for emergency workers was activated and staffed at the local high school.
The decontamination center workers were pre-positioned and the center was ready before General Emergency was declared.
The workers were well trained and enthusiastic and actually performed the monitoring and decontamination procedures.
They knew how to handle the instruments and the recording of data.
The only area of concern at both facilities was that contaminated water was allowed to flow into the general drainage system.
The personnel at the roadblocks were equipped with CDV 700 survey meters.
The vehicles are supposed to be checked there for contamination.
However, there is no vehicle or equipment decontamination facility or procedure.
There is also no procedure to decontaminate people who are not going to the shelter.
Superior Items:
1.
Enthusiastic and well-trained personnel.
l
?
o l '
]
2.
Written procedures were available to train volunteers quickly in the monitoring of evacuees.
Deficiencies:
None.
I Areas Remuirina corrective Actions:
None.
Areas Reco===nded for Incrovement I
I 1.
Procedures should be established to deal with vehicles found contaminated at the roadblocks, and with 1
contaminated people not going to the shelter.
shelterina - The First Baptist Family Life Center was activated i
as a shelter for Bradley County evacuees.
Six persons from the Bradley Cleveland Developmental Services posed as evacuees and i
were processed through monitoring and decontamination (if
]
indicated) and registration into shelter.
j The shelter was staffed by personnel from the American Red Cross, I
i Bradley County Department of Human Services, Bradley County j
Public Health Department, Rescue Service, and Amateur Radio I
Emergency Service.
For the third time (three exer cises) there
{
was no traffic control or security personnel at the shelter.
Supplies were on hand -- appropriate forms, medical supplies, I
{
etc.
An ambulance was tilso avai.'able at the shelter.
1 j
The demonstration reflected improvement during the past two 1
years.
The facility itself is adequate to accommodate the number indicated, i.e.,
space, showers, etc.
If this facility had to be t
utilized for any length of time, however, it would be well to i
obtain additional tables, chairs, etc., since most of the j
furniture on hand is suitable only for children, i
i The staff demonstrated an enthusiastic level of play.
Those who i
were interviewed indicated they had received appropriate
- training, i.e., shelter management, radiological monitoring, etc.
However, many indicated they needed more practice and more insight into others' responsibilities in the shelter.
The demonstrated procedure for re-monitoring evacuees inside the j
shelter is questionable and should be reconsidered.
)
Staff with key shelter responsibilities should be more familiar I
i with the facility.
For example, the shelter manager was unfamiliar with the location of the restrooms, and the food l
service chairman did not know the location of the kitchen.
2 i
A written agreement between the county and the First Baptist Family Life Center is recommended.
This is a privately owned facility.
There was some conflicting information as to which l
1 areas would be available for use as a shelter, and this as well i
as liability responsibility, etc., should be clearly understood i
j and agreed upon by all parties.
I
This evaluator was in Bradley County during the exercise two years ago, and it was apparent at this year's exercise that marked improvements have been made in shelter capability.
The county did demonstrate the capability to protect the population.
Deficiencies:
None.
Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:
None.
Areas Recommended for Imorovement:
1.
A written agreement should be developed between Bradley County (or American Red Cross) and the First Baptist Tamily Life Center owners.
2.
Consideration should be given to modifying the present plan which provides for the routine re-monitoring of evacuees inside the shelter, since that procedure appears to be unnecessary.
3.
More training for all players is needed to clarify their responsibilities and how they interact to form a
" shelter team".
4.
Security and traffic control personnel should be present at the demonstrations if the shelter is to be considered fully staffed.
. l l
I III.
SUMMARY
LISTING OF INADEQUACIES l
Facility or NUREG Corrective Scheduled
(
Activity Item Action Date of l
Completion l
Deficiencies None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions Radiological I.8.
Field Team #1 only took closed Monitoring window readings.
The team Field Teams leader was under the impres-sion the procedure had been changed and had crossed out "open" in his copy of the procedures.
Teams should always take and report both open and closed window readings.
J.lc.u.
Field Team #1 did not have KI with them.
Team members should be trained to bring their KI with them from their home base, or obtain KI at the field team dispatch point.
Hamilton J.10.f.
The State directed the admini-County stration of KI to all resi-dents within the 5-mile EpZ l
and to all emergency workers.
l The order was ignored until pursued about 45 minutes later by the evaluator.
A l
variety of responses and explanations were presented by the EOC staff.
l A more clearly defined policy I
is required concerning the availability, distribution, and use of KI.
The county should develop this policy l
with TEMA representatives.
K.3.b.
Additional training on the l
use of dosimetry is needed.
. e IV.
SUMMARY
LISTING OF AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Facility or Activity Areas Recommended for Innrovement Dose 1.
A substantial effort should be made to ensure Assessment that adequate air sampling measurements of radiciodine and particulate concentrations are conducted in the plume by State radiological field teams to provide a basis for State dose projections, particularly for unmonitored releases.
FCC and 1.
Improve information flow and accuracy of data RMCC among groups in'the FCC (and RMCC).
Use of boards should be reviewed.
More frequent briefings in the FCC are needed.
2.
Information packets should be available for the Federal /SMRAP field teams on procedures for radios, monitoring, maps, etc., as stated in the Sequoyah Plan, page A-3 and page E-50.
Radiological 1.
The kits should be checked before deployment Monitoring from the city where they are stored and again Field Teams at the point of dis RMCC in this case). patch to the field (the 2.
Double bagging is not required by the procedures.
Samples should be double bagged and the label securely attached, either with a tag or on a label taped to the inside of the second bag.
3.
Gloves should be worn whenever handling potentially contaminated materials.
j 4.
The team (all teams) received minimal i
information about the plume location, Wind shifts, plant status, etc.
Without sufficient information, teams would be in danger of running into the plume while trying to avoid it.
Teams'should be aware of plume, wind and plant conditions.
5.
Assure consistency between field team SOP and specific exercise instructions regarding monitoring activities.
Facility or Activity Arras Recommended for Imorovement 6.
Provide opportunity for field test and demonstration of air, water and soil sampling media by all teams in a future exercise.
7.
Kit organizations.
8.
Some xerox copies of SOP's and report documents are poorly reproduced.
9.
"This Is A Drill / Exercise" to introduce and close radio transmissions.
Joint 1.
Timely production, verification and Information dissemination of information could be Center (JIC) improved with either additional utaff or updated equipment.
2.
Rumor control analysis would be enhanced if TVA staff provided better and quicker information about media monitoring activity and content of incoming q>eries.
Hard copy 4
shculd be provided of all ruleases.
3.
The rumor control system is much broader than i
reflected in the plan.
It is suggested that this be considered during the next plan revision.
4.
Greater audience control should be exerted by the State moderator during media briefings.
5.
Description of evacuation sectors should be based on physical boundaries, and these descriptions should be part of briefings and other information.
6.
Brochure could benefit from design improvement.
The importance of retaining the brochure could be stressed on the front Cover.
7.
Hard copy of EBS messages which actually go out should be provided promptly to JIC staff.
8.
Status board in JIC should be expanded to include more events and should be reviewed for accuracy.
Facility or Activity Areas Recommended for Imorovement 9.
Tab L concerning sheltering livestock should be re-written to improve clarity and to place more emphasis on instructions.
10.
Improvements in security procedures to eliminate personnel cicarance delays should be considered.
Hamilton 1.
Updates / briefings should be transmitted to County emergency workers.
2.
Written procedures are needed for route alerting (messages to be broadcast), control points, and roadblocks.
Bradley 1.
EOC staff should be trained in the techniques County of map posting.
Key information displays should not be subject to cover-up on sliding board facilities.
2.
Consideration s1ould be given to equipping the communications system with a radio conferencing capability.
3.
System for routine update of mobility-impaired file.
4.
Emergency workers at roadblock should be better instructed on the matter of exposure control and the function of film badges.
S.
Roadblock personnel should be better
{
instructed on the monitoring function.
6.
An independent assessment of shortcomings in the communications equipment of the Sheriff's Department should be made.
7.
Procedures should be established to deal with vehicles found contaminated at the roadblocks, and with contaminated people not going to the shelter.
8.
A written agreement should be developed between Bradley County (or American Red' cross) and the First Baptist Family Life Center owners.
Facility or Activity Areas Recommended for Incrovement 9.
Consideration should be given to modifying the present plan which provides for the routine re-monitoring of evacuees inside the shelter, since that procedure appears to be unnecessary.
10.
More training for all players is needed to clarify their responsibilities and how they interact to form a " shelter team".
11.
Security and traffic control personnel should be present at the demonstrations if the shelter is to be considered fully staffed.
1
I l
V.
APPENDICES i
A.
Evaluator List and Assignments l
B.
Exercise Objectives and Scenarlo l
l l
l L
a 1
FEDERAL EVALUATOR _ ASSIGNMENTS SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EXERCISE November 19, 1986 CHIEF OF EVALUATORS AND RAC IV CHAIRMAN Glenn Woodard (FEMA)
STATE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS _ CENTER (SEOC)
NASHVILLE, TN John Heard (FEMA)
Dorothy Nevitt (USDA)
Caroline Herzenberg (FEMA)
FIELD COORDINATION CENIER (FCC) - CHATTANOOGA, TN RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING CONTROL CENTER fRMCC) - CilATTANOOGA, TN Jeif Slack (DOE) l JOINT INFORMATIOff CENTER (JIC) - CllATTANOOGA, TN Stacey Gerard (.EMA)
Carolyn Perroni (FEMA)
Tom llawkins (FEMA)
CENTRAL __ EMERGENCY __ CQNTROL CERTEIL_fCECC)
CilATTANOOGA, TN Bob Trojanowski (NRC)
MEQICAL,ftIRVICES - Cif&ITANOOGAm TN Ray Boyett (FEMA)
RADIOLQQIghk_IIILD MONITORING Ray Boyett (FEMA)
Bill Knoerzer (FEMA) l Jim Opelka (FEMA)
Chris Saricks (FEMA) liAMILTON COUNTY - CilATIARQQGA, Til Jim Levenson (FEMA)
Dee Demmitt (FEMA)
])EADLEY COUNTY - CLEVELAND,__TN Don Hammonds (FEMA)
Raj 3ekar (FEMA) l l
l
1 I
e EXERCISE OBJECTIVES i
1986 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT EXERC15E 5pecific objectives have been developed within the framework of the Sequoyah Emergency Response Plan.
These objectives are designed in part to address suggestions and deficiencies outlined in the FEMA 1985 Sequoyah Exercise Report, and are as follows:
i Alert Warnina and Notification 1.
State duty officer and Risk County Emergency Management Directors /EOC j
duty officer will follow procedures established for timely notification of appropriate response organizations dependent upon the particular emergency classification.
2.
The Prompt Notification System will be activated one time by the SEOC
]
Director in accordance with the correct sequence and procedure as outlined in the Sequoyah Emergency Response Plan. (Any additional activations will be simulated.)
l Emergency Facilities and Equipment 7
j l.
The functional adequacy of the Bradley County EOC will be fully exercised.
A new EOC has been constructed in the old post office building in Cleveland, t
Special attention shall be focused on long term liveability, I
ventilation, and noise control.
(1985 NUREG deficiency H.3, Bradley County).
2.
Efficient staffing and operation of the State Emergency Operation Center (SEOC), Field Coordination Center (FCC), Radiological Monitoring Control Center (RMCC), and two risk county EOCs will be demonstrated. Staffs will j
be initially prepositioned at the 5EOC, JIC, RMCC, and FCC.
3.
Intemal message flow and logging systems will be demonstrated within the SEOC and each risk county EOC.
Direction ad Control 1.
State and local EOC directors will demonstrate their knowledge of the Plan
]
and exercise their decillon making skills and ability to coordinate l
partklpating agencies and personnel into one united emergency response j
force.
i
Emermency Communications 1.
CECC and 5EOC (Specific focus will be on improving flow of information between the State and TVA Dose Assessment Groups);
2.
Communications between EOCs will be emphasized. Discussion among the EOCs will demonstrate the importance of community essential protective response information between key decision makers.
(NUREG deficiency J.10.F.(Hamilton County).
3.
The functional adequacy of the telephone system between operational facilities will be tested.
Ormanization Control 1.
State and local emergency organizations shall demonstrate the capability for 24-hour per day emergency response, to, include continuous manning of communications links. (To be simulated by roster)
Public Iniormatk+n, 1.
The Joint information Center (JIC) concept will be employec as the pchlic information system for the Sequoyah Plan. The JIC concept will function for the first time from the new TVA office compicx in Chattanooga, Tennessee.
The ability of the JIC Coordinators and various Plos to dessiminate accurate information to the news media will be demonstrated.
2.
The ability of these personnel to allay and control rumors will be judged especially important.
Protective Actions Response 1.
The permanence and readability of status boards and large EPZ maps in the new Bradley County EOC will be observed and exercised for their functional adequacy. (1983 NUREG defielency J.10.B. Bradley County).
2.
The usefulness of new Sequoyah Demographic Information Indicated by sector will le demonstrated.
Additionally each sector has been assigned to a specific shelter beyond the fitteen mile radius of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.
(1983 NUREG deficiency 3.10.B. Hamilton County).
3.
Melgs and Bradley counties will practice their shelter management
E o'
r l
capabilities by activating at least one shelter each.
4.
Control of access to evacuated arena by means of roadblocks w111 he demonstrated.
i 3.
The means for protecting or providing for the special needs of a mobility impaired individual will be shown.
l 6.
Based on predetermined criteria, the decision whether a lasue KI to l
emergency workers and/or the general population will be chosen.
Radioloakal FJoosure Centrol
.I l
1.
SIP personnel will demonstrate their ability to conduct radiological I
monitoring techniques for evacuees.
' i 2.
A Hamilton County Hospital has been chosen to !!1ustrate their ability to 1
render " clean" a contaminated and injured individual in a timely manner.
l 3.
Monitoring and possible decontamination of an Individual will be
]
demonstrated at a Melgs and Bradley County shelter.
l 4.
Emergency workers will be screened at manned roadblocks as they exit the i
endangered areas.
If de..rred contaminated they would report to at i
emergency worker decontamination center. Proper dosimetry will be lasued j
to each emergency worker as appropriate.
One emergency worker l
decontamination center will be opened.
i i
l Accident Assessment j
1.
Radiological field monitoring teams will test their water and air sampling J
techniques, and direct radiation measurements.
l 2.
State and federal field monitoring teams will be coordinated and directed through the RMCC.
l 3.
The ability of the SEOC/DRH to conduct dose assessment and recommend i
proper protective actions will be tested. Dose assessment will include an l
estimate of total population exposure.
(
i Recovery and Re entry j
1.
The esercise will not include a recovery and re entry phase.
l i
i
i.
i s.
+
SEQUOYAH EXERCISE 1986 OFF-5ffE RESPONSE NARRATIVE Initial Plant Conditions j
Unit 1 is at 100% power. A series of malfunctions is investigated by the Assistant i
Shift Engineer. He reports that the normal supply breaker has tripped and will not reset; it appears to be a problem internal to the breaker. Assistance of the Electrical Department is requested.
t 5
The electricians confirm the breaker has internal damage and will have to be replaced. A replacement breaker is not available on-site, but one is available at l
Watts Bar. Repair time will be approximately 2 - 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. Due to the estimated j
length of repair, an ALERT is declared.
i 0816 - 1030 (C5T) - ALERT lta_tg I
Tne off-site response begins with notification. om TVA's Central Emergency
)
Control Center (CECC) by ring down telephone to the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) operations officer that an ALERT has been declared i
at the SEQUOYAH Nuclear Plant. The Director of TEMA (or his designee) will be j
notified. The Director of TEMA will notify the Governor, State of Tennessee, and
)
the Adjutant General, State of Tennessee. The operations officer will notify:
a.
Department of Health and Environment (DH&E notifies the Division of Food and General Sanitation)
]
b.
Division of Radiological Health (DRH notifies Air Pollution Control)
)
c.
Field Coordinator of the Field Coordination Center (FCC) to stand by.
j d.
Tennessee Highway Patrol (THP) to stand by.
j e.
Hamilton County Emergency Management l
f.
Cleveland-Bradley County Emergency Management j
g.
Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) and National Oceanic and atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Radio to stand by.
l h.
Emergency Medical Services (EM5) 4 l
I l
d A
1.
Water Supply (DH&E)
The director of TEMA may selectively man the State Emergency Operations j
Center (SEOC) and the 31C if he so desires. Once the primary notifications are complete, the operations officer will notify the following agencies to stand by or 1
report to their assigned duty stations as the State Director may order.
Governor's Press Secretary to report to the SEOC, or to open the 31C in a.
Chattanooga a
b.
Tennessee Department of Transportation - Stand by to man FCC c.
Tennessee Department of Agriculture - Stand by to man FCC d.
Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency - Stand by to man FCC e.
American Red Cross f.
Public Service Commission - Stand by to man FCC g.
Department of Tourist Development - Stand by to man FCC i
h.
U.S. Department of Energy - Stand by to man FCC 1.
Host counties, Meigs, Rhea, Sequatchie - Stand by to open shelters.
J.
Department of Conservation - Stand by k.
Joint laformation Center Coordinator i
1000 (CST) at the plant an undetermined amount of radioactive liquid release takes l
place via the turbine building drains. If the 3IC has not been activated, the public RM may al o be activa ed at this t me.
i Local:
Hamilton and Cleveland-Bradley County Emergency Management Directors proceed to notify the County Executives / City Mayors of municipalities within the 10 mile EPZ and essential response staff and volunteers. The County EOCs may be selectively manned at this time at the Directors' discretion.
Plant Conditions l
i At 1030 (C5T) there occurs a radiological release to the environs (puff) caused by a i
series of malfunctions in the reactor cooling system. A seal to a reactor cooling pump has failed, an instrument line has become overprenurized and burst, and water is leaking from the area of the seal return filter.
A SITE AREA EMERGENCY is declared.
2 j
1 6
9 A
1030-1230 (CST)-SITE AREA EMERGENCY 5 tate:
When SITE AREA EMERGENCY is declared, TVA's CECC will notify the SEOC staff as in ALERT. The TEMA Director will order the activation of the SEOC, the JIC and, the FCC if not previously activated.
DRH and TVA field monitoring teams will be dispatched from their present locations and ordered to assemble at the RMCC for further instructions. They wi!!
be dispatched from the RMCC to various locations as the situation requires. When in place, the field monitoring teams provide off-site monitoring data to the RMCC i
where the data is jointly assessed. TVA will make recommendations for off-site protective actions, if warranted.
These actions are confirmed by DRH and provided to the TEMA Director and the Governor for action. The TEMA Director will censider activating the prompt notification systen soon after notification of the site area emergency. When activated, the fixed siren system, mobile alerting routes (for exercise purposes one route in each county will actually be run), and EBS/NOAA weather radio systems will be exercised. (Any other activations of these systems will be simulated) The entire 10 mile EPZ should be notified by this means within 45 minutes. Residents should secure their homes and remain tuned to EBS for further instructions. The Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency (TWRA),
the U.S Coast Guard, and volunteers, will provide notification to commerical river traffic withio the 10 mile EPZ. They wi!! restrict ingress into the zone. Persons in recreation areas will also be notified by this means. Since no significant l
release has occurred at this point, no further protective I
action will be warranted.
All State Emergency Services Coordinators (ESCs) assemble at the SEOC, RMCC the JIC, and the FCC. All field forces remain in place and are on stand by status.
The Tennessee Department of Agriculture (TDA) assesses the need for protecting dairy animals and milk processing plants. TDA in coordination with the JIC should release "get ready" instructions to the agricultural community.
i 3
1 a
a s
Local:
4 Hamilton and Cleveland-Bradley County Emergency Management Directors are notified immediately of the SITE AREA EMERGENCY. They activate their county EOCs.
County Department heads and other response leaders pre-position equipment and staff as required. County Sheriffs notify and/or coordinate all necessary support (municipal police departments, THP, fire,. rescue, etc.)
resources. Traffic Assistance Teams (TATS) are notified and placed on stand by.
School superintendents and their transportation staffs in Hamilton and Bradley Counties are notified.
The Chattanooga Area Regional Transit Authority (CARTA), is notified that school buses and a limited number of CARTA buses may be needed for general population evacuation. Host counties are similarly notified.
School principals initially assume shelter manager roles and supervise setting up of i
shelter and registration of evacuees.
Nursing teams arrive and prepare to supervise radiation screening and decontamination, if necessary, of evacuees.
Amateur Radio Operators arrive at the shelters and establish communications with the SIPS. American Red Cross on arrival, assumes operating responsibility for the shelters.
1230-1600 (CST)- GENERAL EMERGENCY State:
A GENERAL EMERGENCY is declared when a significant airborne release occurs.
The SEOC is notified of the change by ring down phone from the CECC and l
immediately notifies:
a.
Staff present in the SEOC b.
County EOCs i
c.
State Field Centers (RMCC, JIC, FCC) d.
Any state agency required Due to the magnitude of the release, TVA and DRH recommends to the TEMA Director that an evacuation be ordered within the two mile zone and five miles downwind within the 10 mile EPZ. At the recommendation of the Director of TEMA, coupled with the advice of TVA and DRH, the Governor declares a state of emergency and orders the recommended evacuation.
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DRH and TVA continues to assess the need for further evacuation and sheltering downwind from the plant and continue to jointly assess field monitoring results and make appropriate recommendations. Plume tracking commences and monitoring teams are dispatched to selected areas. TDA orders the sheltering of da!ry animals and live stock within two miles of the plant and sectors downwind out to 10 miles.
They may also assess the need for further protective actions out to 20 miles.
All state and local off-site responders are activated and positioned at County EOCs and field locations.
The JIC continues to provide the media with Information regarding conditions at the plant, evacuation, and other public information.
1 Hamilton and Bradley County Emergency Management Directors proceed with implementing the evacuation plans for the sectors affected. All responders are 1
activated or remain on stand by. The Sheriffs, having confirmed the completion of 1
alert'.ng the public dispatch personnal to man critict.1 road blocks, assist in the orderly evacuation along control routes, and provide security to the evacuated area. Traffic Assist Teams (TATS) are dispatched to critical locations along the evacuation routes.
All law enforcement support (police, THP, rescue, etc.) resources are utliized as needed. Sheriffs continue to coordinate this function.
The County Highway Departments set up barriers at predetermined points on county roads in the affected sections; Tennessee Department of Transportation Personnel place barriers on state routes within these areas. For exercise purposes Hamilton and Bradley counties will each man one critical roadblock. TAT teams (one each) will remain in SITU at regular assembly points in Hamilton and Bradley Counties. Their functions along evacuation routes will be simulated.
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Hamilton and Bradley County will simulate evacuation of effected sectors to demonstrate their ability to conduct general population evacuation.
A contaminated and injured person will be transported to Parkridge Hospital in Chattanooga for treatment.
Meigs County (host) will practice their shelter i
management capabilities by activating a shelter (Meigs County Consolidated High Schoolin Decatur). Bradley County will open the First Baptist Family Life Center in Cleveland.
Monitoring and decontamination of an individual will be demonstrated in both shelters. A school bus route will be run for evacuees in Hamilton and Bradley Counties. Emergency worker decontamination centers will be opened in both counties, although actual decontamination will be simulated.
The American Red Cross (ARC) operates shelters as needed and begins their locato service. ARC staff are assisted by Tennessee Department of Human Services in managing shelters. Shelter Information Points (SIPS) are established along the evacuation routes and provide information to 9 ose in need (one in each risk county). The EMS personnel in both risk counties simulate transportation of non-ambulatory evactees in need ri transportation md respond to any medica!
evacuation needs.
Following the initial release from the plant, TVA and DRH field monitoring teams will be instructed by the RMCC to broaden their area of monitoring. They will continue to report back to the RMCC at 15 minute intervals. This intensified monitoring effort will continue until the plant reaches stability.
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1545 (CST)- PLANT REGAINS STABILITY At this point the plant reports to the CECC, SEOC, etc. that the plant has returned to normal following the resumption of main power to the plant. Although the i
exercise terminates, this is the point at which recovery plans would be formulated and recovery actions would begin.
1600 (CST)- TERMINATE THE EXERCISE 6
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