ML20214Q919

Application for Amend to License DPR-35,consisting of Proposed Change 87-04 Revising Tech Specs to Clarify Requirements for Undervoltage Relays.Fee Paid

ML20214Q919
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	05/22/1987
From:	Bird R BOSTON EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
Shared Package
ML20214Q921	List: ML20214Q919 ML20214Q927
References
NUDOCS 8706050263
Download: ML20214Q919 (7)

Text

10CFR50.90

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.- aosnwanson Executwe Offices 800 Boylston street Boston, Massschusetts 02199 Ralph G. Bird Senior Vice President - Nuclear BECo 87-080 Proposed Change 87-04 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk May 22, 1987 Washington, DC 20555 License DPR-35 Docket 50-293 Procosed Technical Soecification Chanae Undervoltaae Relavs Listed in Table 3.2.8

Dear Sir:

Pursuant to 10CFR50.90, Boston Edison Company (BECo) proposes the following revisions to Facility Operating License No. DPR-35, Appendix A. The requested change is to clarify Technical Specification requirements for undervoltage relays.

An application fee of one hundred and fifty dollars ($150.00) will be electronically mailed to your offices in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR Part 170.12(c).

R. G. Bird i GGH/dvc Attachments \

l signed original and 37 copies 6 cc: See next page g g Commonwealth of Massachusetts) i County of Suffolk )

Then personally appeared before me, Ralph G. Bird, who, being duly sworn state that he is Senior Vice President - Nuclear of Boston Ecison Comp (:

• f /..f, 6 that in thehe nameis duly and on authorized to execute behalf of Boston and file the Edison Company and submittal that the statam containeg@ .C t

• i l said submittal are true to the best of his knowledge and belief. 7 i,g ,) ( ,

My commission expires: 84,., / 1 /'f M .-

DATE _ NOTARY PUBLIC ?y e4 Garafd G. W'stney

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Nctary M iic 8706050263 870522 My cow.!ss:on ha.res Ap* 3, im PDR ADOCK 05000293 P PDR.

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BOSTON EDIS0N COMPANY

'U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 R. H. Hessman, Project Manager Division of Reactor Projects I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, MD 20814 Senior NRC Resident Inspector Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Mr. Robert M. Hallisey, Director Radiation Control Program Massachusetts Dept. of Health 150 Tremont Street F-7 Boston, MA 02111 t

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ATTACHMENT A Proposed Technical Specification Change Undervoltage Relays on Safety Related Buses (Table 3.2.B)

Proposed Chanae Changes are being proposed for Technical Specification (T.S.) Table 3.2.8 titled; " Instrumentation that Initiates or Controls the Core and Containment Cooling Systems." These changes affect pages 50 and 50A and are listed below:

For page 50 l

Replace the present Trio Level Settino data:

OV with 1.1 Sec Time Delay

3094V with 18 Sec Time Delay

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i with the following:

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At 0 Volts between

, 1.1 to 1.2 seconds j Time Delay Delete the footnote which states: "These trip setpoints define the range of trip settings selected from the appropriate relay curve."

l For Page 50A Delete reference to individual relays under the heading of Trip Function:

Replace i

Startup Transformer Degraded Voltage Relays l with Startup Transformer Degraded Voltage

. Delete and do not replace:

127A - 504 Bus A5 1, 2, 3 & 4 and 127A - 604 Bus A6 1, 2, 3 & 4 Changes are also being proposed for Table 3.2.B.1 " Instrumentation that Monitors Emergency Bus Voltage". These changes affect page 53A and are listed below:

Delete reference to individual relays under the heading of Function:

Replace Emergency 4160V Buses A5

& A6 Degraded Voltage Annunciation Relays (1)

Hith Emergency 4160V Buses A5 &

A6 Degraded Voltage Annunciation (1)

• Delete and do not replace 127A - A5 Bus A5 1, 2, 3 & 4 and 127A - A6 Bus A6 1, 2, 3 & 4

• Replace the present Settina data:

3850 2% with 9.2 1 0.1%

Second Time Delay with the following:

3850V i 2% with 9.2 0.5 seconds time delay Reason for Chanae Page 50:

l This change involves the Trip Function for the Startup Transformer Loss of Voltage devices. These devices are part of the original plant design installed as loss of voltage protection for the safety related buses.

The reference to the 3094 volts with 18 second time delay is being deleted.

This point on the loss of voltage relay curve was initially provided as information to the NRC as that point at which the relay would trip if subjected to a sustained degraded voltage event. This information was requested of all licensees following a degraded voltage incident at Millstone 2 in July 1976.

In 1977 the NRC required additicnal undervoltage devices be installed to provide redundant degraded voltage protection. These devices, listed on Table 3.2.8 page 50a, were provided with a higher and faster trip level setting (3745 Volts at 9.2 seconds) which made the reference of 3094 Volts at 18 seconds for the loss of voltage relays unnecessary.

The footnote, related to the Trip Level Setting, is also being deleted in conjunction with the above change. This will remove a source of confusion.

The reference to the relay curve was relevant only to explain the 2 voltage points.

The revised trip level setting of "At 0 Volts between 1.1 to 1.2 second Time Delay" includes a 0.1 second tolerance and defines the acceptable accuracy required for this electro-mechanical relay.

Page 50a:

The change to Table 3.2.B. Trip Function, on page 50a, deletes all references to individual relays. The original intent of adding the relay identification numbers was for clarity, however, this has not proven to be effective. These instrument channels consist of relays and timers. Listing the relays and not the timers in Technical Specifications led to questions during audits regarding the testing of the timers. This level of detail should be and is provided in procedures. Testing of the devices will continue in accordance with the Technical Spcifications through the use of existing implementing procedures.

Page 53a.

The reasons given above for the changes proposed for page 50a also apply to changes proposed on page 53a, Table 3.2.B.1.

The relays and timers in the instrument channels listed on page 53a (alarms) are of the same type and accuracy as those listed on page 50a (trips). They provide a similar but non-safety related alarm function for the safety-related buses. Therefore, the trip and alarm relays should have the same specifications and tolerances. The existing degraded voltage alarm channel setting tolerance is overly conservative and is being revised to correct an l obvious error. The existing i 0.11. second tolerance on the alarm channel timing amounts to a 0.0092 second tolerance on the alarm function. ]

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T Tolerances on alarm settings can be at least that of associated trip devices.

To m.aintain consistency within Technical Specifications, the setting tolerance for the alarm devices is being changed to coincide with the trip devices; l 1.e.: 0.5 seconds.

Safety Evaluation and Determination of No Sianificant Hazards Considerations This amendment involves only administrative changes to the PNPS technical specifications. The changes clarify existing technical specification functions and settings. No changes are being proposed to previously analyzed trip level settings or surveillance requirements.

10CFR50.91 requires that at the time a licensee requests an amendment, it must provide to the Commission its analysis using the standards in 10CFR50.92, about the issue of no significant hazards consideration. In accordance with 10CFR50.91, the following analysis has been performed.

1. The proposed amendment will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The deletion of the reference to 3094 Volts with 18 second time delay is made for clarity. Referencing the loss of voltage point on the curve, "At 0 Volts between 1.1 to 1.2 seconds Time Delay", is sufficient information to demonstrate the Technical Specifications Trip Level Setting. This change does not effect previously analyzed accidents.

Removal of the footnote referring to the Trip Function for the Startup Transformer Loss of Voltage devices is made to reduce confusion. The subject devices will still be demonstrated capable of performing their designed function, but Technical Specifications clarity is enhanced.

Therefore this change has no effect on previously evaluated accidents.

Deleting all references to individual relay numbers removes a source of confusion regarding testing of components in the instrument channels.

Specific identification should be and is provided by procedures.

Relays and timers in the instrument channels listed on pages 50a and 53a are of the same type and accuracy, and perform similar protection functions and should therefore have the same specifications and tolerances.

This change does not revise Technical Specifications trip level settings or surveillances that have been previously evaluated and approved.

Therefore, the proposed amendment will not result in a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. The proposed amendment will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

For the reasons given in answer to question 1, this change does not alter the function or setpoints of the subject devices. Since the function and setpoints have been previously analyzed and found acceptable, this administrative change will not create a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously analyzed.

3. The proposed amendment will not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

As analyzed above in answer to question 1, surveillance and setpoint requirements are not being reduced. The margin of safety provided by these devices and their associated setpoints and surveillances have already been found acceptable. Since there are no substantive changes to analyzed and accepted settings associated with the margin of safety, there is no significant reduction in the margin of safety.

As determined by the analysis above, this proposed amendment has no significant hazards considerations.

This change has been reviewed and approved by the Operations Review Committee and has been reviewed by the Nuclear Safety Review and Audit Committee.

Schedule of Change This change will be put into effect within 30 days of receipt of approval by the NRC.

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