ML20214Q888
| ML20214Q888 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 09/19/1986 |
| From: | CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214Q878 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8609290004 | |
| Download: ML20214Q888 (12) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:- e a ATTACHMENT 1 Consumers Power Company Big Rock Point Plant Docket 50-155 SYSTEMS ANALYSIS APPROACH TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF QUALIFICATION NECESSARY FOR CONTAINMENT SPRAY VALVE (MO-7068) September 19, 1986 8609290004 860919 PDR ADOCK 05000155 i P PDR OC0986-3034A-BP01 11 Pages l
I e 1 4 l Systems Analysis Approach to Determine the Extent of Qualification Necessary for Containment Spray Valve (MO-7068) Containment Spray System Description The Big Rock Point containment spray system consists of two headers, a motor operated valve in each, with water being supplied from diesel or electric driven fire pumps. A simple line diagram is presented in Figure 1. Operation of either header is sufficient to provide the required containment spray flow for controlling the containment environment following a primary coolant system pipe rupture. The motor operated valve in the primary header (MO-7064) is automatically
! actuated by redundant containment pressure sensors when pressure is in excess of 2.2 psig. The backup containment spray valve (MO-7068) is not automatic, ; but is manually actuated. Operation of both containment spray systems diverts flow from core spray and can result in degradation of core cooling under certain single failure conditions. Deliberate manual operator action to place the backup containment spray system in operation, independent of containment pressure instrumentation, is therefore a design feature of this system.
These system design and actuation features are reflected in our December 5, i 1980 submittal to the NRC and the Staffs January 13, 1981 SER. l Single failure analyses of the system during initial and long term cooling of the containment atmosphere are provided in our December 5, 1980 submittal and in testimony before the ASLB dated October 28, 1983, respectively. Summaries of these analyses are attached as Tables 1 and 2. Minimum required flow for various core and containment spray components against which the attached analyses can be compared are as follows: Core Spray Nozzle Flow 296 gpm Core Spray Sparger Flow 292 gpm j (when nozzle isn't in service) Containment Spray Flow 50 gpm (either header) Tuel Pool Makeup 24 gpm The flows presented in the attached table meet or exceed the minimum require-ments stated above even under worst postulated active single failure conditions. Description of Transients in which Containment Spray is Required i The containment spray system is not required to prevent exceeding the contain-ment design pressure (27 psig) during loss of coolant or steam line break events. This is reflected in the basis statements for Technical Specification Section 11.3.3.4. The principle purpose of the containment spray system is to l i l MIO986-3027A-BP01 ' 4
. , _ - _ , .- ._ . . = _ - . _ - - . ----- _- - . - - - -- _
D 2 i i maintain the containment temperature below the profile associated with electrical equipment qualification assumptions. Loss of coolant events do not result in a challenge of peak EEQ design tempera-tures even if containment sprays are not actuated for some time (on the order of 15 minutes). This is demonstrated by the temperature profile presented in Chapter 13 of the FHSR. Steam line break events, on the other hand, result in superheated steam leaving the break causing the containment temperature to
- exceed the 235*F initially analyzed in the FHSR. This condition was verified j in analyses performed as a part of the Systematic Evaluation Program and is reflected in our August 26, 1980 submittal to the NRC. Plots of containment temperature as a function of time for a spectrum of steam line break sizes are attached. The break analyses assume that no containment spray occurs for the first 15 minutes of the steam line break event (Figures 2 thru 4), The current design of the containment spray system was established primarily as a result of these analyses. The primary containment spray was made to actuate automatically with no time delay when the high containment spray setpoint is reached (formerly there was a 15 minute time delay). Power was provided to the backup spray valve permitting it to be actuated from the control room (this valve was formerly disabled electrically).
The enclosure spray is therefore required principally for the spectrum of breaks associated with the main steam line. Only one of the spray headers is required (generally the automatic primary spray). Backup spray is required only during a steam line break event with a coincidental failure of the primary containment spray valve. EMP 3.3 reflects the use of the containment spray system in this manner. The procedure also identifies a secondary use for the containment sprays for washing down iodine released to the containment atmosphere during a LOCA or steam line break event (both spray headers are suggested for use when the operator is instructed to perform this activity). Qualification of MO-7068 Because the operator was not totally refurbished following the qualification test at Franklin Laboratories in 1975, qualificat'on of MO-7068 during LOCAs or steam line break events is indeterminate for containment ambient conditions. Although accepted specific environmental qualification documentation has currently not been assembled, it is believed that the existing actuator will remain operable throughout a short usage period of a matter of months until a r qualified replacem'ent can be effected. It is expected that the actuator will I also withstand a future LOCA. The two age-degradable actuator subcomponents not subject to periodic maintenance and replacement are the motor and internal control wiring. The actuator motor features class B insulation (reference Big Rock Point EQ file 3.80). According to the eleventh edition of the Standard Handbook for Electrical Engineers (Fink and Beatty), the overall temperature rating of the class B insulation system is 130 C or 266 F. Si'nce the valve is expected to stroke only twice throughout the event (once to open immediately after the onset of the accident and then at least four hours later to close to t enter post-accident recirculation) and the stroke time is less than 60 seconds 1 in each case, the temperature rise of the motor windings will have no appreciable i t i MIO986-3027A-BP01 '
-. - _ - - _ \
3 i effect on the overall motor temperature. Generally, the motor temperature will follow the LOCA/MSLB temperature curves which remain in the vicinity of , overall motor temperature rating (252 F peak < 266 F). The only other parameter j judged capable of applying significant stress to the motor is radiation. As described in the attached April 6, 1979 letter from Limitorque, a class B insulated motor was irradiated to 2 E+08 R with no detrimental effects on ) motor operation. This dose far exceeds the Big Rock Point TID of 5.45 E+05 R. The other age-degradable subcomponent in the operator, not subject to periodic maintenance and replacement, is the control wiring. According to field walkdown data, this wiring is type TW which is flame-retardant, moisture-resistant thermoplastic (PVC). Materials literature research shows that PVC material has considerable threshold levels relative to Big Rock Point LOCA/MSLB conditions. Belden Wire Catalog Number 878, Revision 1, 1979, page 98 indicates that the maximum continuous temperature for PVC is 221 F. It is expected that this wire would not be damaged during a Big Rock Point LOCA/MSLB since the temperature excursion above 220 F lasts for on the order of minutes. The peak temperatures between the initiation of the event until actuation of the valve are not significantly greater than the PVC continuous rating. " Principles / Techniques of Radiation Hardening," Volume 2, NJRuddie (page 11-5) indicates that PVC can withstand 2 E+07 R. This exceeds the Big Rock Point TID of 5.45 E+05 R. In the unexpected event that the valve would fail, it is more likely this failure would affect the valve's ability to reclose after it had been initially opened early into the accident. (Opening the valve, if necessary, occurs within several minutes into the accident after observing that the primary spray valve has failed to open.) On reaching the open position it is assumed that the valve fails and can no longer be closed. The following single failure analyses describes the effect of failing this valve in the open position. If the valve was opened because MO-7064 failed to operate, then Tables 1 and 2 (initial and long term flow rates) remain valid. By definition, the postulated single failure is the primary containment spray valve failing to open. For short term conditions (Table 1), this sets up an ECCS configuration similar to 3 the case where no failures have occurred - ie, there are two fire pumps, two core spray headers and one containment spray header in service. In this case, the non-ECCS break core spray flow is 363 gpm and the ECCS break core spray flow is 332 gpm, both in excess of the required 296 and 292 gpm flows, respect- , ively. Containment spray flow in both cases is more than twice the required l 50 gpm. The confituration is specifically analyzed in the long term cooling evaluation (Table 2). If the nozzle is used for recirculation, core spray , flow is 341 gpm and pool flow 28 gpm, each in excess of the required 292 and i 24 gpm. If the sparger is used the expected flows are also in excess of the requirements at 303 gpm and 29 gpm for the core and pool, respectively. Failure of MO-7068 in the open position once opened as backup to a failed, MO-7064 is within the current plant design basis. < If the valve is opened for the purpose of iodine washdown as specified in 1 EMP 3.3 then a different ECCS configuration exists, that is both containment sprays are open. During initial spray, this configuration has been analyzed, MIO986-3027A-BP01 i
. - - - .. - -. - .- . . .=- . .- - . - - . . - - . _ .
j- . 4 i and nozzle flow is as much as 332 gpm. However, as opening the backup contaiu ment spray in addition to the primary spray is a deliberate action required by
- procedure, then single failures on top of this configuration must be evaluated.
For short tena cooling, failure of the diesel generator or a fire pump will result in reduced fire pump flow with potential diversion of flow from the 1 core through both containment spray headers. While this condition has not
- been analyzed, if core spray flow drops below 290 gpm the operator must simply close one of the two containment spray headers to regain adequate core spray
- flow. If MO-7068 will not close because of qualification deficiencies, then
. MO-7064 can be closed. Failure of MO-7068 in the open position does not f jeopardize core cooling during the short term, as a result. The configuration i
of both containment sprays being open is not analyzed for longterm cooling
- (Table 2). Consequently, a single failure of M0-7064 to close in this configur-ation jeopardizes core spray flov during recirculation.
t It is concluded that use of MO-7068 as backup to MO-7064 does not result in operation outside the design basis should the backup containment spray fail open because of environmental qualification. However, if the valve is used to assist in long term iodine washdown, its failure to close could lead to inadequate core cooling if a coincident single failure of MO-7064 to close were to occur. Since operation of MO-7068 is required for some accident scenarios, EMP 3.3 is being revised to restrict the use of only one containment spray header for iodine washdown activities. Reliability of the Containment Spray Valves i , As stated above the qualification backup containment spray valve iMO-7068) is ] inde te rmina te . Also stated above was that the system design is such that the ] backup valve is not required to maintain the containment environment within ] design unless the primary containment spray valve were to fail to open. Even if the backup valve were not qualified, considerable assurance that the plant j can respond safely to a steam line break can be provided if it can be demonstra- ] ted that the primary valve is reliable. A search of historical plant data has been performed on motor operated valves to determine their overall reliability. The data search was performed for the period 1971 through 1980 and was assembled as a part of the Big Rock Probabilistic Risk Assessment. Over 2000 demands on i the plant's 40 motor operated valves were documented in this time period with I approximately two dozen recorded failures to operate. None of the failures
- were associated with either of the two containment spray valves. A search of LER data from 1980 to present has also determined that no failures of MO-7064
- or MO-7068 to operate on demand have occurred. The data translates to a plant
{ wide reliability cf 99% for motor operated valves. It also suggests that the ! potential for a demand on MO-7068 during accident conditions is remote and, . while required by regulation for defense in depth, the need for qualification ! of this valve is limited. l l
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k i MIO986-3027A-BP01 i i I _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ )
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- FIGUHE 1 - CONTAINMENT /COHE SPHAY SYSTEM DIESEL .
FIRE PUMP N0-7051 MO-7061 P7 X % X y TO CORE SPRAY RING SPAR 6ER f N0-7070 M0-7071 P6 ) N % X TO CORE SPRAY N0ZZLE ELECTRIC FIRE PUNP IN STEAM DRUM CAVITY
\/
Mo-7064 [ { M0-706a w-tA VT--tA e
/\
{
/\ IN STEAM /\
DRUM CAVITY
\
-- _ _ _ _ - _ \
-g . ~~7E44 /
Og CR /c AldC. 4 / 2 ~5-EO I APPENDIX C l TABI2 1: COWAINMEM AND CORE SPRAY FIDWS Containment Spray ! Steam . Containment Core Spray Reactor Failure Break Drum Enc-losure Pressure Nonle Ring Pressure (Gpe) (Gpe) (Psig) (Gym) (Gpe) (Psig) , i None Non-ECCS 64 67 10 363 270 70 Diesel / Non-ECCS 66 70 10 - 292 70 Generator
' Fire Pump Non-ECCS.. 61 64 10 330 246 70 '
T Backup Non-ECCS 62 66/137* 10 332 257 70
- Coat Spray Valve N ,
None Nonle 59 61 10 - 332 38 Fire Pump Nonle 54 56 10 - 298 38
- Backup Nonle 55 59/119* 10 -
321 38 i Cont Spray *
- N Valve 43 43 . . .
-~
-~
9
. I 3
i (.s.
- Primary Spray / Backup Spray nu1280-0059b-43 Revision 12/19/80
%d2 Sel yds lns.my f a c/ El23 TABLE I A. Recirculation Cases (No Single Failures)
- 1. Nozzle Flow 408 gpm (296 gpm required)
Fuel Pool Flow 32 gpm ( 24 gpin required)
- 2. Sparger Flow 373 gpm (292 gpm required)
Fuel 35 gpm ( 24 gpm required) B. Recirculation Cases (With worst active single failure - o Containment Spray Valve Open). M 1. Nozzle Flow 360 gpm (296 gpm required) Containment Spray 79 gpm (no requirement) Flow (MO-706 4) Fuel Pool Flow 29 gpm ( 24 gpm required) l 31/ / I T
- 2. Nozzle Flow g gpm (296 gpm required)
Containment Spray 99 gpm (no requirement) N Flow (MO-7068) 1 M Fuel Pool Flow 28 gpm ( 24 gpm required)
- 3. Sparger Flow 325 gpm (292 gpm required)
Containment Spray 94 gpm (no requirement) { ppa ( w e-7e6 O Fuel Pool Flow 31 gpm ( 24 gpm required)
- 4. Sparger Flow 303 gpm (292 gpm required)
Containment Spray 132 gpm (no requirement) Flow (MO-7068) Fuel Pool Flow 29 gpm ( 24 gpm required)
%N2 bd[ 7d5/meny
'acng/g3 TABLE I A. Recirculation Cases (No Single Failures)
- 1. Nozzle Flow 408 gpm (296 gpm required)
Fuel Pool Flow 32 gpm ( 24 gpm required)
- 2. Sparger Flow 373 gpm (292 gpm required)
{ Fuel 35 gpm ( 24 gpm required) ; 1 ( B. Recirculation Cases (With worst acti'le single failure - l' c Containment Spray Valve Open).
.M 1. Nozzle Flow 360 gpm (296 gpm required)
Containment Spray 79 gpm (no requirement) Flow (MO-7064)
- Fuel Pool Flow 29 gpm ( 24 gpm required)
- 2. Nozzle Flow gpm (296 gpm required)
Containment Spray 99 gpm (no requirement) N Flow (MO-7068)
- 'M Fuel Pool Flow 28 gpm ( 24 gpm required) e _
- 3. Sparger Flow 325 gpm (292 gpm required)
Containment Spray 94 gpm (no requirement) pgra (e164) Fuel Pool Flow 31 gpm ( 24 gpm required) l
- 4. Sparger Flow 303 gpm (292 gpm required)
Containment Spray 132 gpm (no requirement) l Flow (MO-7068) ; Fuel Pool Flow 29 gpm ( 24 gpm required)
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LIMITORQUE CORPORATION 7
% -%r . .
5114 Wcodall Acad P. O Box 11318 Lynchburg Virginia 24506 'b; Telephone -804-528-4400
- Telex-82-9448 April 6, 1979 Consumers Power Company, 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 ATTENTION: Mr. Michael R. Wade
REFERENCE:
Palisades Valve Actuator Qualification Limitorque Order 334514, Items A and B Daar Sir: As requested, enclosed is a copy of Franklin Institute Report F-C2232-01 (Limitorque 600198) for your use. This report would apply to the units supplied on Limitorque order number 334514A and B. At the time Limitorque received the order for the units sup-plied on our 334514A and B, no accepted IEEE qualification standard existed and therefore the uni +.s were not manufactured in accordance with any specific qualification requirement. For your information, Westinghouse Nuclear Energy Systems did expose a Limitorque motor with Clasc B insulation to a level of 2x 108 rads with operational tests being conducted following the irradiation at room temperature and then at an elevated temperature of 2750F. An identical unirradiated motor was included in the operational tests for comparison. Both motors passed the test with no significant difference noted between the two motors throughout the test. This information might possibly be of use to you relating to radiation capabilities. Relating to,your question about generic family, all Limitorque actuators are designed using same materials, clearances, tolerances, and stress levels making the entire line of Limitorque valve actu-ators a generic family. Vary truly yours, LIP.ITOR'.UE CORPORATION w
\ , Dl'b. d-s J. B. Drab
/lc Automated Valve Operators and Jacks for Industry}}