ML20214Q758
| ML20214Q758 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 09/18/1986 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214Q746 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8609260284 | |
| Download: ML20214Q758 (2) | |
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[o UNITED STATES g
NUCLEAR HEGULATORY COMMISSION o
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
.... /
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO.12 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-35 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1 DUKE POWER COMPANY, ET AL.
i INTRODUCTION l
By letter dated June 6, 1986, Duke Power Company, et al., (the licensee) pro-posed that License Condition 2.C.(16) of Facility Operating License NPF-35 be amended to allow an extension of time for the submittal of the licensee's steam generalo7 Tube rupture (SGTR) analysis. The extension would be for one l
complete cycle of operation.
j EVALUATION l
In NPF-35 issued on January 17, 1985, license condition 2.C.(16) regarding SGTR analysis stated that:
" Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, Duke Power Company shall submit for NRC staff review and approval an analysis which demonstrates that the steam generator single-tube rupture analysis presented in the FSAR is the most severe case with respect to the release of fission pro-ducts and calculated doses.
Consistent with the analytical assumptions, Duke Power Company shall propose any necessary changes to Appendix A to this license."
The amendment to the above license condition would be accomplished by replacing "first" by "second." Thus, the first part will then read: " Prior to startup following the second refueling outage, Duke Power Company shall submit...."
The balance of the condition remains the same.
The following paragraphs provide the justification for the change.
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As a result of the Ginna SGTR event, the staff has questioned the assumptions used in the SGTR analysis presented in the Catawba and other Westinghouse plant FSARs, including the capability of plant operators to terminate the event in 30 minutes, and whether systems and components credited to mitigate the accident consequences are safety grade.
In response to these concerns, a subgroup of utilities in the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG), of which Duke Power Company is a member, was formed to address the licensing issues asso-ciated with the SGTR event on a generic basis. The subgroup submitted: (1)
WCAP-10698, "SGTR Analysis Methodology to Detennine Margin to Steam Generator Overfill" in December 1984; (2) Supplement 1 to WCAP-10698, " Evaluation of i
Offsite Radiation Doses for SGTR Accident" in May 1985: (3) WCAP-11002,
" Evaluation of Steam Generator Overfill due to SGTR Accident" in February 1986. The staff has completed its review of Supplement I to WCAP-10698 and concluded that plant specific radiological consequence analyses would still be required.
8609260284 860'/18 PDR ADOCK 05000413 P
2-The staff will prepare a generic SER which will include evaluatio'n of the SGTR 1
systems analyses and assumed operator action times in WCAP-10698 and WCAP-11002.
The staff will also require plant specific information including radiological consequences analyses, analyses of steam line static load in the event of over-fill and justification that systems and components credited in the analyses to mitigate accident consequences are safety grade. The staff recommends that the licensee submit all plant specific information at least six months prior to the second refueling shutdown, in order to enable the staff to review it in a timely manner.
The staff concludes that there is reasonable assurance that Catawba Unit 1 can operate for the first two fuel cycles before this issue is resolved, because:
(1) the probability of a design basis SGTR during the first two fuel cycles is low; (2) in the event of the design basis SGTR, the offsite consequences can be expected to be within 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines, particularly if no liquid release occurs; (3) the core melt probability from a single tube rupture is very low (Reference 1); (4) systems and components utilized for accident mitigation are generally safety grade.
With regard to Item (4), the licensee plans to upgrade the pressurizer and steam generator PORVs to safety grade, by the end of the current first refueling outage for Unit 1.
In Supplements 2 and 5 to Catawba SER, the staff found that this upgrade was acceptable. The up-grade of the PORVs to safety grade provides additional assurance that the PORVs will operate as intended if called upon to depressurize the RCS in the event of a design basis SGTR accident. Thus, the staff finds that the time extension to allow submittal of SGTR analysis prior to startup of Catawba Unit 1 following the second refueling outage is acceptable.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION a
The amendment involves a change in use of facility components located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes in surveillance requirements.
The staff has determined that the amendment involves no signi-ficant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant in-crease in individual or cumulative occupational exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there.have been no public comments on such finding.
Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical ex-clusion set forth in 10 CFR Section 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
CONCLUSION The Commission made a proposed determination that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register (51 FR 28996) on August 13, 1986, and consulted with the state of South Carolina.
No public comments were received, and the state of South Carolina did not have any comments.
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We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Connission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Reference (1) NUREG-0844, "NRC Integrated Program for the Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issues A-3, A-4 & A-5 Regarding Steam Generator Tube Integrity,"
Draf t Report for Comment, April 1985 Principal Contributors:
Kahtan Jabbour, PWR#4/DPWR-A Bernard Mann, RSB/DPWR-A j
Dated:
September 18, 1986 j
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