ML20214P249

Amends 68 & 60 to Licenses NPF-2 & NPF-8,respectively, Revising Tech Specs 3.1.2.5.b.2 & 3.5.1.c to Increase Boron Concentration Limits by 300 Ppm in Refueling Water Storage Tank & in RCS Accumulators

ML20214P249
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	11/05/1986
From:	Rubenstein L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20214P250	List: ML20214P249
References
TAC-61876, TAC-61877, NUDOCS 8612040128
Download: ML20214P249 (24)

Text

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1. 9

'oi UNITED STATES E'

,' j' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y

.l WASHINGTON,0. C. 20555

/

ALABAVA POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-348 JOSEPH M. FARLEY NL' CLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO.1 AMENDvENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 68 License No. NPF-2 1.

The Nuclear. Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Alabama Power Company (the licensee) dated July 3,1986, supplemented August 27, 1986, complies.with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commissior's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfiec.

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendrrent, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-2 is hereby amended to read as follows:

8612040128 861105 i

PDR ADOCK 05000348 p

PDR I

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-2.

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 68, are bereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implenented during Modes 5 and 6 of the eighth refueling outage.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

,o

=

' Lester S. Rubenstein, Director L PWR Project Directorate #2 Division of PWR Licensing-A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Charces to~the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: November 5,1986

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 68 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-2 DOCKET NO. 50-348 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

Remcve Pages Insert Pages 3/4 1-11 3/4 1-11 3/4 1-12 3/4 1-12 3/a 5-1 3/4 5-1 3/4 5-11 3/4 5-11 B3/4 1-3 B3/4 1-3 B3/4 5-2 B3/4 5-2 I

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REAC'lVITV CONTD0L Sv5TEMS B04ATED WATER SOURCES - S4UTDOWN LIMITING CONDITIO* FOR ODERATION 3.1.2.5 As a nininum, one of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

a.

'A boric acid storage systen with:

1. A ninina, contained borated water volume of 20C' gallons,

2. Between 7000 and 7700 ppm of boron, and

3. A ninima solution tenserature of 65'F.

b.

Tne refueling water storage tank with:

1. A ninica, contained borated water volume of 30,003 gallons,

2. A ci-ir.;- bo on concentration of 2300 ppm, and l

3. A rinina solution te90erature of 35'F.

ADDLI: E1LITi:

M31ES 5 and 6.

ACTIO*.:

With no borated water source ODERABLE, suspend all operations involvinE C0;.E ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SUD.VEILL ANCE RE0'JIREMENTS 4.1.2.5 Tne above required borated water source shall be demonstrated OPER'E' E :

a.

At least once per 7 days by:

1.

Verifying the boron concentration of the water, 2.

Verifying the contained borated water volume, and 1

Verifying the boric acid storage tank solution temperature when it is the source of borated water.

b.

At least once per 24 hoars by verifying the RWST temperature whe*, it is the source of b.' rated water and the oJtside air temperature is less than 35'F.

t FARLEY-UNIT 1 3/4 1-11 AMEN 3 MENT N3. 2f,f E i

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REACTIVITY CONTPOL SYSTEMS BORATED WATER 5000CES - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.6' As a ninimun, the following borated water source (s) shall be OPERABLE as required by Specification 3.1.2.2:

a.

A boric acid storage systen with:

1. A minimum contained borated water volune of 11,336 gallons,

2. Between 7031 and 7700 pp, of boron, and

3. A mininum solution temperature of 65'F.

b.

The refueling water storage tank with:

1. A r.ini9J7 Contained borated water volune of 471,000 gallons,

2. Fetween 233) and 2511 pp, of baron, and

3. A minimum solutio 9 tenperature of 35*F.

A:DLICA~1L:'V:

M33ES 1, 2, 3 and 4 AC T

• 0'. :

With the boric acid storage system inoperable and being used as one of a.

the above required borated water sources, restore the storage syster to 0DERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least H0T STANDBY within tne next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 1% delta k/k at 200*F; restore the boric acid storage systen to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />, b.

With the refueling water storage tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLO SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

FARLEY. UNIT 1 3/4 1-12 AMENDMENT N3. 2f,6S

3 /4.5 E"E GENCY C00.E Cn9 LING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3/4.5.1 ACCUMJLATORS

. LIMITIN1 CONDITION FOR OPER ATION 3.5.1 Each reacto coolant systen accumulator shall be OPERABLE with:

a.

Tne isolation valve open, b.

A contained borated water volume of between 7,555 (31.4%) and 7,783 (59.4!-) gallons, c.

A boron concentration of between 2200 and 2500 pon, and d.

A nitrogen cover-pressure of betweer. 601 and 6A9 psig.

ADLICcEILITY:

MOSES 1, 2 and 3.*

ACiln'.:

e.

Wita o,e acc;m lato Inoperable, except as a result of a close:

s isolation valve, restore tne inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status witnin one haar or be in at least HOT STANOBY within the r*>*

6 nours aad -in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

W". n n 4 5:cumulator innoerable due to the isolation va've bei :

closec, eitner in7ediately ope 9 the isolation valve o-be in at leas: 43T ST ANDBY within one hour and in HOT SHL'T30WN within the f ollowin; 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

SJR7E I LL A'Cr. REir.'IREME'.iS A.5.1.1 Each a:cu'alator shall be demonst 'ted ODERARLE:

a.

At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by:

1. Verifying the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover-pressure in the tanks, and

2. Verifying that each accunulator isolation valve is open.

'Fressurizer Pressare aoove the P-ll setpoint.

F ARLEi-UNIT 1 3/4 5-1 AMENDMENT N3. 2f,EE

EMEMGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS hw.<EILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Contin::ed) b.

At least once per 31 days and within 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after each solution volume increase of greater than or equal to 1% of tank volume by verifying the baron concentration of the accumulator solution.

c.

At least once per 31 days when the RCS pressure is above the P-11 setpoint by verifyitig that power to each isolation valve

. operator is disconnected by a locked open disconnec: device.

[

d.

At least once per 18 months by verifying that each accumulator isolation valve opens automatically under each of the following conditions:

1.

When the RCS pressure (actual or simulated) exceeds the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure Block of Safety Infection) setpoint, 2.

Upon receipt of a safety injection test signal.

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'I FAALEY-UNIT 1 3/45-2 MDDMOT NO. 23 j

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E".ED ~ E'." CADE C03'.!N3 Sv 5T E"5 3/4.5.5 REr0ELING WATED STOR A5E T1'A LIMITIN5 CON?! TION F0; OPERATION 3.5.5 Tne ref ueltr.g water storage tant (RWST) shall be ODERABLE with:

A minimum contained berated water volume of 471,000 gallons, a.

A boro, concentration of betwcen 2300 and 2500 ppm of boron, and D.

c.

A nininam water tenperetare of 35'F.

ADPLICLE!L! Y:

M3'E5 1, 2, 3 and 4 A"t10N.

increaanie, resto e the ta,.. to 0DERA:.E the re'velit; wete* sta age ten-With r

in C).-

status witnt. I hou-or be in at least 40i ST AN39.Y witnin 6 hou s an:

540T:34*. witni-tne 'o11 04ie; 30 ho;as.

SU E.' E !.L A's '.; H E 3 ' '. J E '

• E 'i 5 4.5.5 ins RW5i shall be de onstrated ODERABLE:

a.

At least once per 7 cays by:

Verifying the contained borated water volu9e in the tank, a:

1.

2.

Veelfyir.; the boron contertration of the water.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the RWST temperature whe-b.

tne oatsice air tenserature is less than 35'F.

A*tE'0"E '.T

',:. 2f.fI F

lei-UNIT 1 3/4 5-11

s,

'REcC'!VITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES BORcTION SYSTEMS (Continued)

MARGIN from expected operating conditions of 1.77% delta k/k after xenon decay and cooldown to 200*F. Tne naximun expected boration capability requirenent occurs at E0L from full power equilibrium xenon conditions and requires 11,335 gallons of 7000 ppn borated water fron the boric acid storage tanks or 44,826 gallons of 2300 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.

Witn' the RCS tencerature below 200*F, one injection systen is acceptable withnut single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single injection syste9 betones inoperable.

The licitation f or a maxinun of one centrifugal charging puno to be OPERc5LE and the Surveillance Requirenent to verify all charging pumps excent the rea, ired OPERABLE pump to be inoperable below 180*F provides assurance tnat a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single RHR relief valve.

The boron capability required below 200*F is suf ficient to provide a SHUTh0'.'. MARGIN of l'a delta k/k af ter xenon decay and cooldown fron 200*F to 140*F.

Tnis condition requires either 2,000 gallons of 7000 ppn borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 7,750 gallons of 2300 pon borated water i

from tne refueling water storage tans.

l The contained water volume limits include allowance for water not available because of discharge line location and other physical characteristics.

The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 8.5 and 11.0 for the solution retirculated within containnent after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and nininizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systens and components.

The OPERABILITY of one boro, injection system during REFUELING ensures that this systen is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES The specifications of this section ensure that (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimun SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) limit the potential ef fects of rod misalignment on associated accident analyses. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure co9pliance with the control rod alignnent and insertion limits.

l FAD. LEY-UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-3 AMENOME*.T NO. 2f,62

REACTXVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES For purposes of detemining compliance with Technical Specification 3.1.3.1, any inoperability of full length control rod (s), due to being imovable, invokes ACTION statement "a".'

The intent of Technical Specification 3L1.3.1 ACTION statement "a" is to ensure that before leaving ACTION statemer.t "a" and utilizing ACTION statement "c" that the rod urgent failure alam is illuminated or that an obvious electrical problem is detected in-the rod control system by minimal electrical troubleshooting techniques. Expeditious action will be taken to detemine if rod imovab,ility is due to an electrical problem in the. rod control system.

The ACTION statements which pemit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied by aditional restrictions which ensure that the original design criteria are met. Hisalignment of a rod requires measurement of peaking factors or a restriction in THERMAL POWER; either of these restrictions provide assurance of fuel rod integrity during continued operation.

In addition, those safety analyses affected by a misaligned rod are reevaluated to confirm that the results rema.in valid during future operation.

The maximum rod drop time restriction is cons $ stent with the assined rod drop time used in the safety analyses. Measurement with Tava greater than or equal to 541"F and with all reactor coolant pimps operating Insures that the measured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a reactor trip at operating conditions.

Control rod positions and OPERABILITY of the rod position ir,dicators are required to be verified.on a nominal basis of once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> with more frequent verifications required if an autcmatic mentoring channel is inoperable. These verification frequencies are ade:pate for assuring that the applicable LCO's are satisfied.

FARLEY-UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-4 AMEN 0 MENT NO. 44

6 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS The OPERABILITY of each Reactor Coolant System (RCS) accumulator ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the accumulators. This' initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.

The limits on accumulator volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for accumulator injection in the safety analysis are met.

The accumulator power operated isolation valves are considered to be

" operating bypasses" in the context of IEEE Std. 279-1971, which requires that bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met.

In addition, as these accumulator isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.

The limits for operation with an accumulator inoperable for any reason except an isolation valve closed minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional accumulator which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures.

If a closed isolation valve cannot be immediately opened, the full capability of one accumulator is not available and prompt action is required to place the reactor in a mode where this capability is not required.

3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure considera-tion.

Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the accumulators is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double: ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward.

In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

With the RCS temperature below 350'F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.

FARLEY-UNIT 1 8 3/4 5-1 AMENDMENT NO. 26

EMEDGENCY CODE C00LINi SYSTEMS BASES

.. -==.

The Surveillance Requirenents provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that at a minimum the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsysten OPERABILITY is maintained.

Surveillance recuirements for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA.

Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection poiht is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assur.ed in the ECC5-LOCA analyses.

3/a.5.4 P003N INJECT!0* SYSTE" TH: S SDECir! CATION DELETEn.

3/4.5.5 RErt'ELING WcTER ST001GE T ANv.

Tne 00E;AS LITY of the Ref ueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) as part of tne ECCS ens;ees that sufficient negative reactivity is injected into the core to counteract any positive increase in reactivity caused by RCS system coolco e.

RCS cooldown can be caused by inadvertent depressurization, a loss-of-coolant accident or a steam line rupture.

The ODED.A*iLITY of the RWST as part of the ECCS also ensures that a suf ficient supply of barateo water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event c' The limits on RWST mininum volume and boron concentration ensure that a LOCA.

1) suf ficient water is available within containment to permit retirculatio*

. cooling flow to the core, and 2) the reactor will remain subtritical in the l

cold condition following mixing of the RWST and the PCS water volumes witn all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly in the event of a small break LOCA and with no control rods inserted in the event of a l

large break LOCA. Tnese assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.

The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics, t

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AMENDMENI N9 II'3I'I

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FARLEV-UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-2

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/#p o og#'e, UNITED STATES

• j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3

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W ASHINGTON. D. C. 20555 g

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ALABAMA POWED COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-364 JOSEPH M. FAPLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 AMEN 0 MENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 60 License No. hFF-E.

1.

The Nuclear Feoulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Alabama Power Company (the licensec) dated July 3,1986, supplemented August 27, 1986, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance: (1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted witnout endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be cerductec' in complience with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-8 is hereby amended to read as follows:

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~(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 60, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

.This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuar.cc and shall be implemented during Modes 5 and 6 of the fifth refueling outage.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGilLATORY COMMISSION

_n_

, Lester S. Rubenstein, Director PWR Project Directorate *2 Division of PWR Licensing-A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Cate of Issuance: November 5, 1986 I

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r-ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 60 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8 DOCKET NO. 50-364 Replace the.following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendrent number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

Remove Pages Insert Pages 3/4 1-11 3/4 1-11 3/4 1-12 3/4 1-12 3/4 5-1 3/4 5-1 3/4 5-11 3/4 5-11 B3/4 1-3 B3/4 1-3 63/4 5-2 B3/4 5-2 1

REACT!VITY CONTDOL SYSTEMS BOD ATEn W:TEP SOUDCES - SHUT 03k"1 LIMITING CONDITION FOR ODERATION As a nininun, one of the following borated water sources shall oe 3.1.2.5 ODERABLE:

A Doric acid storage system with:

a.

1. A ninina, contained borated water volume of 2000 gallons,

-2. Between 7093 and 7700 ppm of boron, and

3. A nic.in; solution tenperature of (5'F.

b.

Tne refueling water storage tank witn:

volone of 30,000 gallons,

1. A ninina". contained borated water

2.

• ninin;7 boron concentration of 230] pp., and

3. A rininan solution tenperature of 35'F.

ADDLIC'?!LITY:

M11ES 5 and 6.

ACil3N:

k'ith no borated water source ODERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTEDATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.1.2.5 The above required borated water source shall be demonstrated ODERaf;E At least once per 7 days by:

a.

Verifying the boron concentration of the water, 1.

Verifying the contained borated water volume, and 2.

Verifying tne boric acid storage tank solution temperature wnen it 3.

is the source of borated water, At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the Rh'ST temperature when it is tne source of borated water and the outside air temperature is less b.

tnar. 35*.

AMENDMENI NO. EC 3/4 1-11 FADLEY-UNIT 2

RE AC'!VITY C0'. TROL SYSTEMS BODATED WETED S0J CES - OPEDITING LIMITING CONDITION FOR ODERATION

- - = =. - - -... - -..... - -.... -.. _

3.1.2.6 As a ninimun, the following borated water source (s) shall be 00ERAELE as required by Specification 3.1.2.2:

a.

A boric acid storage systen with:

1. A ninin;m contained borated water volune of 11,336 gallons,

2. Between 7000 and 7700 ppn of boron, and

3. A ninina solution temperature of 65'F.

b.

The refueling water storage tank with:

1. A ninina. contained borated water volune of 471,000 gallons,

2. Seta' ten 2303 anc 2530 pp of bcron, anc

3. A rJnin;" solution tencerature of 35'F.

A::L!CAF:L:'i:

M37ES 1, 2, 3 and 4 ACT:0N:

a.

With the boric acid storage system inoperable and being used as oae c' the above reauired borated water sources, restore the storage syste to ODERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STAN0BY wit 91n the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 1% delta k/K at 200'F; restore the boric acid storage syste. t:

OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hoJrs.

b.

With the refueling water storage tank inoperable, restore the tani to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

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FARLEY-UNIT 2 3/4 1-12 AMENDMENT N3.E0 i

3/4.5 E"E:GENCT CODE C03LIN5 SYSTEMS 3 /4. 5.1 ACCUMJLAT0DS LIMITIN3 CON)) TION FOR OPERATION 3.5.1 Each reactor coolant system accumulator shall be OPERABLE with:

a.

The isolation valve open, b.

A contained borated water volume of between 7,555 (31.4%) and 7,780 (58.4%) gallons, c.

A boron concentration of between 2200 and 2500 ppn, and i

d.

A nitrogen cove

• oressare of between 691 and 649 psig.

ADDLICaclLITY:

M37ES 1, 2 and 3.*

AC T 10'. :

a.

W1tn one accu ;1ator inoperacle, except as a result of a closec i s ol a t i er. valve, restore the inoperable accunulator to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the ne>

6 no;rs and in HOT 5"JTDO,:', within tne following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

b.

Witn one accumulator inoperable due to the isolation valve being closed, either immediately open the isolatior, valve or be in a.

least HDT STANSBY within one hour and in HOT SHUT 30W'. within tne f ollowing 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

S'JRVE !LL AN:E REQUIREMENTS 4.5.1.1 Each accu,;1ato shall be denonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by:

1. Verifying the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover-pressure in the tarks, and

2. Verifying that each accumulator isolation valve is ope 9

' Pressurizer Pressure above tne P-11 setooint.

FARLEY-UNIT 2 3/4 5-1 AMEN 3ME!.T NO.EC

F 'iENCY CORE C00!ING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 1 b.

At least once per 31 days and within 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after each solution volume increase of greater than or equal to 1% of tank volume by virifying the boron concentration of the accumulator solution.

c.

At least once per 31 days when the RCS pressure is above the P-11 setpoint by verifying that power to each isolation valve operator is disconnected by a locked open disconneet device.

[

d.

At least once.per 18 months by verifying that each accumulator isolation valve opens automatically under each of the following conditions:

1.

When the RCS pressure (actual or simulated) exceeds the P-11 (Pressurizar Pressure Block of Safety Injection) setpoint, 2.

Upon receipt of a safety injection test signal.

FARLEY-UMIT :

3/4 5-2 AMENDMENT MO. 26

EMERGENCY C00E C0111NS SYSTEMS 3/4.5.5 REFUELING K'iEP STOD ASE T ANK LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION Tne refueling water storage tank (RWST) shall be OPERABLE with 3.5.5 A ninimur contained borated water volune of 471,000 gallons, a.

A boron concentration of between 2300 and 2500 ppn of boron, and j

b.

A nininum water tenperature of 35'F.

c.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 ACTI1N:

inoperable, restore the tant to ODE. E;E Witi the refueling water storage tank status witnin I hour or be in at least HOT STAN3BY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in C SH"TD14', within the f ollowing 30 tours.

SURVEILLAN:E RE0;' IRE

• TENTS

_=

Tne RWST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

4.5.5 At least once per 7 days by:

a.

1. Verifying the contained borated water volume in the tank, and

2. Verifying tne boron concentration of the water.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the RWST temperature wnen b.

the outside air temperature is less than 35*F.

A'tENDMENT NO. E3 F ARLEY-UNIT 2 3/4 5-11

REa:TIVITV CONTROL Sv5TEMS BASES BORAT10N SYSTEMS (Coatinued)

MARGIN from expected operating conditions of 1.77% delta k/k after xenon decay and cooldowr, to 200 F.

Tne naxinun expected boration capability requirement.

occurs at EOL from full power equilibriun xenon conditions and requires 11,336 gallons of 7030 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 44,826 i

I gallons of 2300 ppn borated water from the refueling water storage tank.

Witn' the RCS tenperature _ below 200*F, one injection systen is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions ' prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single injectica systen becomes inoperable.

The limitation f or a maxinun of one centrifugal charging pump to be ODERABLE and tne Surveillance Reauirement to verify all charging punps excert the reavired 0 ERABLE puns to be inoperable below 180*F provides assurance inat a nass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single RH:. relief valve.

The boron caoability required below 200*F is suf ficient to provide a

-SHUTDOWN MA: GIN of 1% delta k/k after xenon decay and cooldown from 200*F to 140;F. This condition reauires either 2,000 gallons of 7000 pan borated wate-fro tne boric acid storage tanks or 7,750 gallons of 2300 ppn borated water i

from-tne refueling water storage tank.

Tne contained' water volume limits include allowance for water not available because of discharge line-location and other physical charatteristics.

The linits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a DM value of between 8.5 and 11.0 for the solution recirculatec

. witnin containment af ter a LOCA. This pH bano mininizes the evolution of iodine and minin1Zes the ef fect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion o",

nechanical systems and components.

The OPERABILITY of one boron injection system during REFUELING ensures that this systen is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

3/4.1.3 M3VABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES The specifications of this section ensure that (1) acceptable power distribution limits are naintained, (2) the nininum SH'JTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) limit the potential effects of rod nisaligonent on associated accident analyses. ODERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensare compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits.

FARLEY-UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-3 AMEN 3 MENT N2. 60

REACTIVITY CONTRCL SYSTEMS BASES For purposes of dete-:iining compliance with Technical Specification i

3.1.3.1, any inoperability of full length contr:1 rod (s), due to being imm vatle, inv kes ACTION statament "a".

The intent of Technical Specificaticn 3.1.3.1 ACTION statement "a" is t:

ensure that before leaving ACTION statement "a" and utilizing ACTION statement "c" that the rod urgent failure alarm is illuminated or that an obvious electrical problem is detected in the rod control system by minimal electricai l

troubleshooting tecnniques. Expeditious acticn will be taken to detamine if rod imovabjlity is due to an electrical problem in the rod control system.

The ACTION statenea.ts which permit limited vardatiens fr:m the bas :

d requirements are ac:cmpanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the i

I original design criteria are met. Misalignment of a rod requires measuremer.

of peaking factors or a restriction in THERMAL POWER; either of these restrictions pr0 vide assurance of fuel rod integrity during continued l

o peration.

In addition, those safety analyses affected by a misaligned roc are reevaluatec to confim that the results remain valid during future operation.

The maximum rod drop time restriction is consistent with the assumed roc drop time used in the safety analyses. Measurement with Tavg graater than or equal to 541*F and with all reactor coolant pumps operating ensures that the measured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a reactor trip at operating conditions.

Control rod positions and OPERABILITY of the rod position indicators are required to be verified on a nominal basis of once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> with more frequent verifications required if an automatic monitoring channel is inoperable. These verification frequencies are adequate for assuring that the applicable LCO's are satisfied.

c FARLEY-UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-4 AMENDMENT NO.35

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES l

3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS The OPERABILITY of each Reactor Coolant System (RCS) accumulator ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the E S pressure falls below the pressure of the accumulators.

This initial surge of water into the core provides the' initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.

The limits on accumulator volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for accumulator injection in the safety analysis are met.

The accumulator power operated isolation valves are considered to be

" operating bypasses" in the cont 9xt of IEEE Std. 279-1971, which requires that bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met.

In addition, as these accumulator isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.

The limits for operation with an accumulator inoperable for any reason except an isolation valve closed minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional accumulator-which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures.

If a closed isolation valve cannot be immediately opened, the full capability of one accumulator is not available and prompt action is required to place the reactor in a mode where this capability is not required.

3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be availab'le in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure considera-tion.

Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the accumulators is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging l

from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward.

In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

j-With the RCS temperature below 350*F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is l

acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable i

reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.

FARLEY-UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-1

EMEDGENOV CORE C00 LINS SYSTEMS BASES 33 The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that at a mininun the assumptions used in the safety analyses are net and that subsystem ODERABILITY is maintained. _ Surveillance requirenents for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA.

Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping syster to each injection point is necessary to: (1) prevent total punp flow fron exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of, total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above tnat assumed in t%e ECCS-LOCA analyses.

3/4.5.4 B3RON IN.1ECT10N SYSTEM THIS SDECIFICATION DELETED.

3/4.5.5 REFUELING WciER STORAGE TANv.

The 03 ERA?!LITY of the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) as part of the ECCS ensures tnat suf ficient negative reactivity is injected into the core to counteract any positive increase in reactivity caused by RCS system cooldos.

RCS cooldown can be caused by inadvertent depressurization, a loss-of-coolant accident or a steam lir.e rupture.

Tne ODERABILITY of the RWST as part of the ECCS also ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event o' The limits on RWST nininum volune and boron concentration ensure that a LOCA.

1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and 2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the l

.ing mixing of the RWST and the RCS water volumes with all cold condition fol'.

l control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly in the event of a small break LOCA and with no control rods inserted in the event of a i

(

I large break LOCA. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.

The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

l l

AMENDMENT NO. 22, 6 FARLEY-UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-2