ML20214N749

Nuclear Regulatory Commission ISSUANCES.May-June 1985. Pages 1,043-1,786

ML20214N749
Person / Time
Issue date:	06/30/1985
From:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM)
To:
References
NUREG-0750, NUREG-0750-B02, NUREG-0750-V21-B02, NUREG-750, NUREG-750-B2, NUREG-750-V21-B2, NUDOCS 8609170013
Download: ML20214N749 (814)

Text

_

. .. ~ -

t-

~:,

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION .. ,1 .

.1 -

ISSUANCES jf, 's:.d, ,..?f.. ... 'r..~ B. ;. ,.. . : .. , ;'.,A

- . ;. :s .. -. ;. :: -, . ' - < -

e

..u.;- , .

. r ., . ~ -

g.',  ; y [ .. . ...

P,

.'s. . . .. . .

OPINIONS AND DECISIONS OF THE , c, . ~ <

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ..

WITH SELECTED ORDERS  !.~ ,

. ~-

- .+._..,: .

_ ,y . ,

,s

\.

i May 1,1985 - June 30,1985 .,. . .  ; .

a. s Volume 21 , .

Book Il of lI '

Pages 1043 - 1786 pn rec o u' O h* g

's ***** / .

.s _

, i i s ,..

+:: -

,L: _c-

, . s.

n

,.>~

4- *g

+

i

. . ,t .

Prepared by the Division of Technical Information and Document Control. Office of Administration, s U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555 . .

(301/492-8925) . ., - -

,. s b

9 e

4 a

• 8609170013 850630 PDR NUREG 0750 R pop

r I

v: . , ;

i

. .e . ,  ; ;,. ] . j .

, q .... 4 f -

y. , .y. p -

i r- , F :i

., , . . , .,i s

.s 4

. .c,.v. .. .,..e. ..,

e.. .t...

. ' ?..

COMMISSIONERS sc, ,  ; . 4 1

. .t t .  : . :!. . ~ . -

' "' v> ,

Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman

....,r,

. c.

"', .;,: :1 Thomas M. Roberts

,, . m . :: James K. Asselstine

"- . l Frederick M. Bernthal

.' , s..; . Lando W. Zech, Jr.

.. 5 . :{

. s. .

u. . . . .,.

.. ii

. i i

t i

William J. Dircks, Executive Director for Operations Herzel H. E. Plaine, General Counsel Guy H. Cunningham III, Executive Legal Director i.

p *; V:a.' . .t

~

Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman, Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Panel

~

'y.' . . J. J. . .. 4 , ~ ' B. Paul Cotter, Chairman, Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Panel

. : ,. .s .

. : .t,.

,. . . c -

.s. - , . . .

~

'4 .

- . , . . s .J . ; ., . ,? ,,.

. s

u. ,,. l: ' .. 's : .;-

- = . , go. t

. . t!

' . . . . ., 3-

/. .. -l .;? , ,,,,...;. . . ,

<. - - , . .~. , ..

. , . .u ,~ .: . a. .

... ..t*

• r, .;. - ~. .a ....'e s ,. 4

s '..* ii . , . ... s .' 21, .%. -*-!s .s'

- . r. . . ,3. 9, p.. '

• ,. .;., . .,,'i.-

, j 'n,* * , , v 'o'..

• H.;'9 ,':. 0 f,";,t'G.',':4L.

.' b. ,,Yb. *

. Y. ' '

e-

...s' *

.. + _ i;, . ; * .' <t 1; ?. <?.'. f

. -p .. , , ,

i e*7 , ,

. .. .'. . .. ,s . n.

s.s,.,3 '.~ 'e

.sv e s.

v c..

,. , 4, se

~ . . . . _ . . . ... . .

9 A

b 4

• E

• g g

a h _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ - . _ _ _ _ _ - - . _ - - - - _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ - _ . .

i t

, i~/  :... g. j

' ~ , . .:

ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL PANEL i' .*:S ' .

~

Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman fr -:al-lq '

. 'lf . .

w..........,.

..g.

r. , e,. .'.uf k.l'f.,-[ '. '?l&

. . s. ...f. 5 ,n. k g$ ;r,.j..

.c. .

'.; g:- ?. , ';':

Members

, , . . . . uc,.::...u.

7 , . .. -

- -( . . , . - . .

Dr. W. Reed Johnson ' '

1r^ '

Thomas S. Moore f' . . ' r ' j. ' ,J' ,";';- .

Christine N. Kohl L. ' ,, ,.i.,

• Gary J. Edles , . .

Dr. Reginald L. Gotchy 9 '- *T* *

• ? '

t Howard A. Wilber }, '. C , , ,

I' :it . .

[r. 'v( ' ,  % 'i '

, .. 3. . ,s ..

(; . . .

ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD PANEL b-' ... ' .

t

'4.

B. Paul Cotter,' Chairman t

• * ' ' ' * ' ~

Robert M. Lazo,* Vice Chairman (Executive)

Frederick 1. Shon,* Vice Chairman (Technical)

Members Dr. George C. Anderson James P. Gleason Dr. Linda W. Little Charles Bechhoefer* Andrew C. Goodhope Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke' Peter B. Bloch* Herbert Grossman* Dr. Kenneth A. McCollom Lawrence Brenner* Dr. Cadet H. Hand. Jr. Morton B. Margulies*

Glenn O. Bright

• Jerry Harbour

• Gary L. Milhollin Dr. A. Dixon Callihan* Dr. David L. Hetrick Marshall E. Miller James H. Carpenter

• Ernest E. Hill Dr. Peter A. Morris' , .

Ilugh K. Clark Dr. Frank F. Hooper Dr. Oscar H. Paris' .

Dr. Richard F. Cole

• Helen F. Hoyt* Dr. Paul W. Purdom

1. , I * -

Dr. Frederick R. Cowan Elizabeth B. Johnson Dr. David R. Schink 'O' '

Dr. Michael A. Duggan Dr. Walter H. Jordan Ivan W. Smith * '{ J.<. .

t Dr. George A. Ferguson

James L. Kelley* Dr. Martin J. Steindler ,- ..

Dr. Harry Foreman Jerry R. Kline* Dr. Quentin J. Stober '

.i . s' ' '. '

'I .

Richard F. Foster Dr. James C. Lamb III Seymour Wenner ,

'* 1 ,

John H Frye III* Gustave A. Linenberger* Sheldon J. Wolfe* ," ' '

• i t" # '

. ; ?. .' ' .y . - l *. , s

. , i;

• Permanent panet members 1-ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE .

~. .. . ..

Ivan W. Smith -

. ~. " . . ; c 'C

.? ,

u .

J iii i

• s* '

. e e

. , y F

- - .~u.. . . . . . . ., ,, :.~ u.

L i- .

Iw. '

.f'O.,yllw .,.' .

.;, . .: . , p-

+- .

PREFACE py . .J; 7: f, V;.. . ,; ' .Y.;_' ",--.

.  %,:. . ~ :

• This is Book II of the twenty first volume of issuance * (1043 - 1786) of n.-

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and its Atomic Safety and iW7 Appeal Boards, Atomic Safety and Licensmg Boards, and Administrative

{Mia;-M.y'fh'b Kjl W.WF/C.!y/

,52NY p%. M.A[b]$,l.', ,.c M '

Law Judge. It covers the period from May 1,1985 to June 30, 1985.  ! 1. ' %

Atomic Safety and Licensms Boards are authorized by Section 191 of the !Z- E :'.MG* /11 :S "WU l9 '. ~<'f.Q ./ "

Atomic Energy Act of 1954. These Boards, comprised of three members Q,, ,9 2 ,g l u.G -

conduct adjudicatory hearings on applications to construct and operate Q- ' ' f, ' - -

nuclear power plants and related facilities and issue initial decisions which, subject to internal review and appellate procedures, become the final

.(

Y N ' '1 ; ,, ,.

! m .. .( , JTN Commiss:on action with respect to those applications. Boards are drawn . ' '.b.1 2.

from the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, comprised oflawyers, ii 0.il 3 "'  %^

nuclear physicists and engineers, environmentalists, chemists, and [f. M ; y,yh -p b , *'c,.., . -

P rl;*lQ , 'W

~ .

economists. The Atomic Energy Commission first established Licensing -e '

. Boards in 1%2 and the Panel in 1967. 7'*

.~.-

Beginning in 1969, the Atomic Energy Commission authorized Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Boards to exercise the authority and perform 6

' [T*:

/ .A .'/

'.;.M ..i':

.N

[p. i ., tjf - 1.f the review functions which would otherwise have been exercised and .

performed by the Commission in facility licensing proceedings. In 1972, 3'

~

~

~' '

that Commission created an Appeal Panel, from which are drawn the Ap-peal Boards assigned to each licensing proceeding. The functions performed by both Appeal Boards and Licensing, Boards were transferred to the '

Nuclear Regulatory Commission by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. Appeal Boards represent the final level in the administrative ad-judicatory process to which parties may appeal. Parties, however, are per-mitted to seek discretionary Commission review of certain board rulings.

The Commission also may decide to review, on its own motion, various g decisions or actions of Appeal Boards.

The Commission also has an Administrative Law Judge appointed pur-suant to the Administrative Procedure Act, who presides over proceedings ,

as directed by the Commission. t b ' i p.// v, The hardbound edition of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Issuances ,

S - '

.is a final compilation of the monthly issuances. It includes all of the legal ' - , J. ..

precedents for the agency within a six-month period. Any opinions, deci- l..

sions, denials, memoranda and orders of the Commission inadvertently ).y 4 c- . . +

omitted from the monthly softbounds and any corrections submitted by the p; ,U 6, .

NRC legal staff to the printed softbound issuances are contained in the t>

q. .

hardbound edition. Cross references in the text and indexes are to the NRCI .

ft 4 NJ ,

[yi .1 %."

page numbers which are the'same as the page numbers in this publication. , J5' Issuances are referred to as follows: Commission-CLI, Atomic Safety , . c 4 J.,

and Licensing Appeal Boards-ALAB, Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards-LBP, Administrative Law Judge-ALJ, Directors' Decisions-DD, , .

and Denial of Petitions for Rulemaking--DPRM. h,.

The summaries and headnotes preceding the opinions reported here!n are i ,-

net to be deemed a part of those opinions or to have any independent legal  !. .

c,y q significance. - ' *

't .[,!..+

Q V ,

i

. . . ., ., ,.- . _ . .J ,

, I

. g

. )

{

^

i,

.-a . . - _ . . ,

1 CONTENTS

[-

s, Y ,,

.x

[. . r . . .

Issuances of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 6 }.J.g. : ;;. .( , .g ,

9 a.& m:.:.:,.a n.

CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK (Indian Point, Unit 2) fb[:M ,, ?J3l(. 3.* " ' ' ~,' -

', ( ~

p . y* . , , l. '. 'g .

Docket 50-247 SP W 3 -

.-C"'

Decision,- CLI-85 6, May 7,1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........

LONG ISLAND LIGitTING COMPANY 1043 h-4

,s -

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station) [.

Docket 50 322-OL 4 '

Order, CLI 85-12, June 20,1985 . . . . . ... ..... .......

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, et al.

1587 f-  ;, . .

["' - -

(Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1) '

. a Docket 50-289-SP .

Order, CLI 85-7, May 9,1985. . . . . . . . ............ ... 1104 ,-

t Memorandum and Order, CLI-85-8, May 16,1985 . . . . . . . . 1111 ,

s Memorandum and Order, CL185 9, May 29,1985. ...... 1118 .... -,

PillLADELPlilA ELECTRIC COMPANY I (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2)

Dockets 50-352-OL, 50-353-OL Memorandum and Order, CLI-85-ll, June 11, 1985. . . 1585 POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (Indian Point, Unit 3)

Docket 50-286-SP Decision, CLI-85 6, May 7,1985 . . . . . . . . . ...... .... 1043 SOUTilERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY, et al.

(San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1) i Docket 50-206 Denial of Request for liearing and Request for Stay, } c, ,

CLI 85-10, February 19, 19 8 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 69 .

. .~

' ~

Issuances of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Boards i -

p

LONG ISLAND LIGliTING COMPANY p ,

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1) '

Docket 50-322-OL .

l Memorandum and Order, ALAB 810, June 19,1985 . . ... 1616 METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, et al. ..

(Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1)

Docket 50-289-OLA

• Decision, AL AB-807, May 8,1.985. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 .

.m 3

t.  :.,u .*

vil S

g

t

- --- - . - . t . . _ . . . . , , ., ,,  ; ,, ,

k .

~

s b

-, ,, PACIFIC dAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

.r-

• . , e' (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2)

.. ~ E ' P- '

Y ' "

'$ Dockets 50 275 OL,50-323 OL

. J.i ' ., ' - ' , , C.:E Decision, ALAB-811, June 27,1985 . . . . . . . . . . . l. . . . . . . . . . 1622

..;;'._ ~,

. PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

- (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2)

Dockets 50-352-OL, 50-353-OL Decision, AL AB 806, May 1,1985. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 b Memorandum and Order, ALAB 808, June 11,1985 . . . . . . . 1595 4 -

a Decision, AL AB 809, June 17,1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1605

'.{

7 - " - Issuances of the Atomie Safety and Licensing Boards

.m c . .- .

/.J -

.' COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units I and 2) 1 Dockets 50-456, 50-457 Memorandum and Order Admitting Rorem et al. Amended >

Quality Assurance Contention, LBP 85-20, June 21,1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1732 HOUSTON LIGHTING AND POWER COMPANY, et al.

l (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2)

Dockets STN.50 498-OL, STN 50-499-OL

(ASLBP No. 79 42107-OL)

Memorandum and Order, LBP 8519, June 18,1985. . . . . . . . 1707 l

l LONG ISLAIND LIGHTING COMPANY (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1)

Docket 50-322-OL S ' ' '

Partial Initial Decision on Emergency Diesel Generators,

,.,S 'l J . .

LBP 85 18, June 14,1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1637

• p.' ,% METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, et al (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1)

. >J ,'1 -

l ,' '

' " i:- ~

e Docket 50-289-SP (ASLBP No.79-429 09-SP) o 1 Partial Initial Decision on the Remanded issue of

• ?.' '. -l .

Licensed-Operator Training at TMI l.

r

- ', LB P 8 5-15, May 3,1985. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1409

' Memorandum and Order Approving Plan for Revising I

'n'- .

Licensed-Operator Training Program, 4,. ,4

- .. ' - - o.

LBP 85-21, June 24,1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1751 c, .- . .- <

~',e ', * * . . I,$ 4.

• 3 ' s

. . . :n:.. . .a. , . .

, ss ? , . ,7 n- ..:~

.e r.*:

• i . % 8 'g y,r . d. ,c . , p g ' ,,

r. .', ~ e .

r , c. . t , ' , ,'. g , , .:

y _,pp ?s.'y

" . i p, c a; s .c 1

Q .- c  ; .. , . . . .

vill

) , , q,,' g g 2 .s . . .

- . . ~ . . - - -. ,

===7-- . , , , , , , ,

4

l s-

. . . . .. . . . . .. . . ~ . . . . . . . . . - . . . . -

e

, v.: 6 ,l 3

. ca .- ,u.;.m t  ?

- ;c s L' '

' : . ', ,, y -

PillLADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY .l . . . , . , , .

.i'. .f,? AI" ' N. .

~

(Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2)

Dockets 50 352-OL,50-353 OL M '-

Third Partial Initial Decision on Offsite Emergency Planning, 0;$

D. .) Nled .TI.'Yd[ h . N,' p[.'t;/.b T' '."T.I.T .+

LBP-85 14, May 2,1985. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 .' ,'- "' W % W "' .

TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC COMPANY, et al. f'y ', ,'.dNINN,l[:: .i' . ' '

(Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units I and 2) ,

K . ; ;, - ,, ' i s . ,

Dockets 50-445-OL&OL 2,50-446 OL&OL-2 'OJ:*'

'.9.

(ASLBP No. 79 430-06 OL)

Memorandum and Order, LBP-85-16, May 24,1985. . . . . . . . 1539

, ' *R ,. -

' Memorandum, LBP 85 17, May 30,1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1544 f.' / .:M'. ' .' '[. .- ' '

- 7';-j ; ,

.: r,q R.*...g. ,

[.

' ~

Issuances of Directors' Decisions  :- -

• E.-

.. 3. , ., . ,

DUKE POWER COMPANY, et al. .O ., .

(Catawba Nuclear Station, Units I and 2)  :!- ; '

• Dockets 50-413, 50-414 +

ig. .

'e s Director's Decision, DD 85 9, June. 4,1985. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1759 6 MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY  !

(Maine Yankee Atomic Power Plant)  ;

Docket 50-309  !

Final Director's Decision, DD-85-6, May 13,1985 . . . . . . 1547 PillLADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY (Limerick Generating Station, Units I and 2)

Dockets 50 352, 50 353 i I

Director's Decision, DD-85-8, May 17,1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1561 UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY (Callaway Plant, Unit 1) ,

Docket 30-483 .

Director's Decision, DD 85-7, May 17,1985. . . ......... 1552 Issuances of Denials of Petitions for Rulemaking t,

.," e  : .

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. '

Docket PRM 20-7 J '

l Denial of Petition for Rulemaking, .

DPRM 85 2, March 29,1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1781 NUCLEAR RADIATION CONSULTANTS  : - e.

Docket PRM 35-5 h

'i '

Y ,

l Denial of Petition for Rulemaking,

}'

DPRM 851, February 12,1985....... ............... 1777 '

a '.:>.ai, . .

lx

! I r

l

I .

+

~

..t

.. .4

..',..,..s

., , . . . : ,_,,,..',,?,

.4 Indexes 5 S , .

. Case Name Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... . . . . . . . . 1-1

.i Legal Citations Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-5

• . - Case s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... .. . ..... . . . . . . . . . 1-5 "U . . '

,,' Regulatio ns. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 2 7

- 0'.  : Statutes.. ................... .... .. .................'l-41

. [*.~/M.) ..

O t h e rs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-4 3 f.- , , . .; % . .,;j S u bje c t I n d e x . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-4 5

,u j.

t Facility Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 71

... 4 y g.:.

5. _. 4 ,

t

. .$ ). 1 ,

. p b

, 3 . s' t e

9 e

. ] .

f

. s -

. *g*

. ._,y ._

s4 a.,. +

--l g * - '

9 3 g 1(,

%) "*I ^4 k .

• T g'*

• .1 w l

r. 8 i . > , ,i l

i

.

• e l

.. . . e, a

. . k. *

.E*- .#

• f i , g .g-..'.{,b-.

.'.,1.

. -" ~

. ,e

, e. . ,

d -s / ,

.,.'...: * , ,. .".,.4e,..

-% .jg, ,

i e , w 5; .

,. 4 4 -

s%. * ,.o d '4 ,1. h,j'.g'2 *, q t .,sh i

.s .. .: s+ y '. .t(o. - , ,;

3 ,

1 . -

. . s , , ;t, ;

l

. ... *~, - . . .

.., , . $- g I

.. 3 5 $ y- -

1 l

1 I

?

\

. . . . , a.-..-..+ . ~.-,- . .. .. . - ...~ -

. ._ c.  : .

• [ .-

. t. . J y

S.n g Af.', "-

, m . a. .

.- .g, .

Cite as 21 NRC 1043 (1985) CLI-85 6 .

& ,g n; g e g._. ,

2.'

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 i6 .A..7*0 6 Q (h,y 'd0 6 '

h *?,?

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,- . 4, 2' T: ' ' ': t '. ' '

. ri, s . ^k .' F. 'e J.( i.4 . . . . . . . ....? 1. , ;.

,.*:h._4:;;

,o COMMISSIONERS , ' , . .. ,

. .;. E. ,u . - .-

..e

, ;c m .

Nunzio J. Pahadino, Chairman .6 3'

. T.

Thomas M. Roberts ',

=, ..

James K. Asselstine .{ t! 3,. 'Mi .g; Frederick M. Bernthal, --

. , 'c

- 4 . .,

fa -.N .

<-4'?."', ',

Lando W. Zech, Jr. .,

' J .

a.e ,

...:;,f In the Matter of Docket Nos. 50 247-SP .-

50-286 SP fr

• a.

y. . .. , .

. r .; _,

CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK '

l (Indian Point, Unit No. 2)  !

I r

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (Indian Point, Unit No. 3) May 7,1985 i t

Petitioner requested shutdown of Indian Peint Units 2 and 3. In re-  !

i sponse, the Commission initiated a discretionary Licensing Board pro- l ,.

ceeding designed to gather information on whether to shut down the [a ,

~

units or to take other enforcement action. The Commission concludes

[. . . , ,c.. ,

that the record developed by the Licensing Board shows that neither  ! , . i' .

shutdown nor imposition of additional remedial actions beyond those im- [ . ; '"'k,6i . ' 7 -

plemented voluntarily by the Licensees is warranted at this time. The s. 3 'Y -

, 3 Commission, however, directs the Staff, inter alia, to confer with FEMA and report to the Commission on the current status of emergency plan- -

I<

ning and on whether deficiencies identified by the Board and Commis- , ,

! sion in this proceeding have been corrected. f t .

. . ..> . r.

a 7* - ,

. .. s j) u.: .

...m.  :  :,

. . , r .,

f a l [ ,, * , . a, - >

<e

}T , ,

1943 '

a e g

. -.:.... ~

c .

,t, . . 74 q t

.y...

. 1,' ;. , ,m. --

,1 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION: A U'i HORITY

,;a ..;; g , 7 ; m. .. .t . ., ,.7 :il UMPOSITION OF LICENSE REQUHIEMENTS) .

The Atomic Energy Act provides ample legal authority for NRC to

,- , , ^' ! 4

. :.7 ,,

,' j impcw customized sequiremcats desigt.ed to . minimize risk to public

. . J. . V. ' - health and safety (see, e.g., Atomic Energy Act, j 161(b). 42 U.S.C.

{ 2201(b)), and there is no constitutional prcblem with doing so.

. ..o,

. ,.' ,. , .. . t

.,s,

~;

,. 'j ". . ,3 ' . "' a NUCLEAR REGULA'f0RY COMMISd10N: AUTHORITY

. :. r . ;. . ' " 'J..1 ' . , wUMPOSITION OF LICENS/ REQUIREMENTS) q.: '

4'  ; Nf The Atcmic Energy Act doen not preclude prudent risk reduction mea.

c  ? .'

• g 7.. . . '. , .

o,. Y sures, provided it is rational to conclude that risk will be reduced. Conse-  !

h, .I .y !i quently, the Commision could impor.e special requirements for plants 1 in densely populat 3 areas.

~

, .;-  ;;.f , .

TECHNICAL ISSUES DISCUSSED Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs).

TABLE OF CONTENTS Psge I. INTRO D UCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . 1046 A. Bac k gro u nd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046

, . . , , .y ,

. B. The Indian Point Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 i .1 <7 .'

' ' }J -

11. RISK POSED BY SERIOUS ACCIDENTS AT

'. , - fi. . .l '.t ., r .. ' M.

INDIAN POINT UNITS 2 AND 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051

,, ; " . :.'f U.c - . ,c f(

. A. Commission Question :: Indian Poirit Risk . . . . . 1051 l ..m i

Q.e : .

, .:, Summary of Commission Conclesions on

- F- - c.'. . ' , -

, . , ;.; Commission Question 1 . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 j

i

..,, ,"I* 1. Defimtion of ' Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052

2. Validity of Risk Estirr ates . . . . . ........ 1055

3. Evacuation Assumptians ....... ... ....,1055

< . ~' . .

• • • N 4. Uncertainty of the Quantitative Risk

- : y 1 . . . '., j,1 ' % Estimates . . ...... ...... .. .. .... 1059

• 5. Containment Reanalyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 q,."' g p g 7. rl,i. W y..I 6. Source Term Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063

]i;';:b;}'*-(.v.;'Jp.3...- .f.O! *

7. Risks to New York /~ity ... ............ 1063

.'5NN,: ,.$R $

k,![.f, N. f.'f.

4

. 'g

, k ,, .[h e.

e: n

c:: '}  : 1044 I

~.. . . .. -.., .

, J ' '. .

l t

r '

j 6

- e i . .~ Y

. 1 e

t

. n

. L. ..  :.. r - ., . - .. -.-:= -- - - - ~

. =

7,..

. u.y..

c /bl'@ b + 4~' p./ 2... ' '# . ' d"N . '

l;RQ~3.w'

y. . $ *).m%'% 9 ~.. 2. 0%'.l ,. j I :n. . ,;-

..ur5 .W:.i *

. . . .,t-p.,

D :.J. Q 'm.g.s ....:;w: '..y.

.c: .

Page

..rw >

. n. . . ,; e ,

g g.;..p;e.,7,. .. p . . . <;. . ,y, - -

- k @. . 4 g!

- _ . , u -

II. RISK POSED BY SERIOUS ACCIDENTS AT W ,f! G Q Qd&A.

INDIAN POINT UNITS 2 AND 3 (Continued) $

m $ $.#.j~# D 4 ,, h. c @... c M ../ S. 9 d .

B. Commission Question 2: Measures to Reduce . ... . . ./.W. ;W, .a.r.;. r'. 5. ~ m .

M Wr WE., g' ?.vi5:J Q4 %sA.:..,.

Indian Point Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1964 f.. G. y.

Summary of Commission Conclusions on e, ?j.,.r2. .-[W,r:

c.u i

' :- i. . : '

M'r.I  : ?.-

Commission Question 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 l9 J.ff Y..,

.I.,W7 M,.h

*T ,., , M

1. Measures Required or Referenced by the + 2 21 . N*?i *. .f . . .'. 3 -

Director's Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 p&. 9l ",. . k .. -

2. Risk Reduction Design Features Considered . 1067 7.s.3r.;. ..s. .? . dN,h.

.~

. . . '?'1

3. Safety Assurance Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068 '.,". f.M. .".G< , C. %. <.L. . s ^.'.,d., @lm. . . -

4. Tornado Risk Inquiry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070 o c. ;;nW ' .. T,. - vv.

~ . t.b  :

.. ~

l S. Filtered Vented Containment System or

',. ; s

- ); ' x~. W f * ^ : j.x;'c';y. -

Separate Containment Structure . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 -4 ,'J];.Q.j:]d[;'i.99]'

6. Steam Generator Fixes and Primary -

,. '.' t : b.~ n. .9 . ~

Radioiodine Limit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 F, C. Commission Question 5: Indian Point Risk L ' l ' U,. . G.i h # '4 ~" W ' ?

, N['[*f3"l [,

Compared to Other Plants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 h Summary of Commission Conclusions on

• Comrnission Question 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 4

1. Board Conclusions and Recommendations . . . 1075  ;

2. Parties' Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 i

3. Commission Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 t III. INDIAN POINT EMERGENCY PLANNING . . . . . . . 1079 I i

A. Commission Question 3

Status of Emerancy  ;

i Planning at Indian Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079  !

l'. The Burden of Persuasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080  ! '

2. Reopening the Secord . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 f ,,f. ,u .'v3,' '.'[ j -

3. Public Education and Information . . . . . . . . . 1084 B. Commission Question 4: Improvements in -

i Emergency Planning . . . . ..................... 1085 E,.

n

.,J '. f .s.'"nc.N ' M ". T. . .

C. Commission Evaluation of Board's Conclusions on

$. f. ?, W, . .. , .f e

M # o. ' ' ' . '1.. , .s Questions 3 and 4 . . . . . . . . . . 1086

.; , ;W:.n.. W,z .-

2;.. ,,

IV. INDIAN POINT SHUTDOWN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 J ,.'. . _"ll ' ' M.J "' ,

'./ .

p ..s A. Commission Question /. asa . :nces of Indian J F, M ..;,. g ;" '.'W. .

Point Shutdown . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 3 . -

,  : .i. . ..

Sammary of Commission Conclusions on , ' e r>'e c: . - - ,

,E .f' - -

Commission Question. 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 [. WilS

~;^

1. Board Conclusions and-Recommendations . . . 1088 p M 9 .yf;'.'M h.?

2. Parties' Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089

• V . .'f

,; yGl +: *. - ,'.+'

,. q.l., .b. y ..s I

-

• 7  ; ,. _ , .

( f.,. r 4-.

i 1945 '

._ ,. ..3. . . .a v -*- "

~N^'

i.

' q .ie s i g I

I y .- . , ,

,-e_.-

, 4 - - - , - - - . - - w - - -

f- .-

, s

.' 1

. . . .u

.. ~ . . _ . . _ __ _ . . . _. ,, ,_. .~

. u. .q =

. .. , s

., s .

W , .

..,'...:  :.e . '.. .. ;,

Page

~ . ,,;. f,..s . .. J. klQ, . .g.(>;g;

s. ,':. : - .s

r. . n '. } :

. IV.A. Commission Question 6 (Continued) .

3. Commission Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Y -

.,7.!g 1

+

, B. Commission Question 7: New York State

[,.

~

s

. . , b.  ; Gove'rnor's Views . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091

c. c- , .

es

..J.'...

. b y ," * * , ;a9 c ..

[g *,: ' .j_

, V. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091

% .. ., ;. v . *

• TABLE 1. INDIAN POINT POPLLATION

' _; l t. , p.

., e ,

.s

/.,,t

.  ; .. . . .. . . . mf DISTRIBUTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050

, . . . y <;> , ;;. .. ... > ...n.

f (l y ;.9 1..,.9 TABLE 2. BOARD FINDINGS'ON ADEQUACY OF

g - z. ,3 . . . p; '.G.i

~ q ., - g c ^lf y (. d 1 EMERGENCY PLANNING (EXCLUDING r4.,, , 7.~ c; .

. .y .r,c.<

ROCKL AN D COUNTY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 v.

'. + : ..

- .m , . . . . , . 3 .- . .

. . ,. .r DECISION s

I. INTRODUCTION

.1 A. Background

]

~- 'i In a petition of September 1979, the Union of Concerned Scientists

, (UCS) requested the Commission to decommission Indian Point Unit 1, and to shut down Units 2 and 3. In a 1980 decision, the Director of j Nuclear Reactor Regulation ruled on the petition, granting it in part and

.g. .- Q .

, c.t : ) .

denying it in part. DD-80-5,11 N.RC 351. On May 30,1980, the Com-

,' . O,l 7. . , y,' ,;.P 7 mission issued an order (unpublished) establishing a four. pronged ap-

,1. . ; * ,; . 7;'.M3J5 ~

proach for resolving issues raised by the UCS petition: the initiation of u/3 i + '., , , '.g . .~ ..', q'. ' 25 J'& a special adjudicatory proceeding; an informal proceeding to determine both the issues for the adjudicatory proceeding and the criteria to be

..*,- , N. . '\g'. '. Js.:f.', .a '

n.j;.;{..;!

used in the  :( ydecision on that proceeding; a direction for the NRC regula-

. w.: . .. . ~ . -

.: ,. f @ , ^ x tory staff to generically consider reactor operation in areas of high popu-

,- . , . " - a lation density; and lastly, the establishment of a task force to review the

l. 3 i' advisability ofinterim operation of the Indian Point nuclear units during

. . ' _ . . ,W . . ,~. ,' , ; ~ 2. .t. ,'f 'I .

the pendency of the adjudication.' The May 30,1980 order was supple-

,.. .. ',' . s .-

,. 1

',y. a.' L;l' j," ,_.;;;:: ' ~ '

., * ".Y.[ " -#" / ;(i ,'h3,,(',J- f.],

• I The Task Force on Interim operation of Indian Point reported to the Commission in July 1980

• ' ' (NUREG.0715). The Task Force concluded that overall risk of the Indian Point reactors is about the

'(.** l*; 1

. ' ., .;.,4, 'f,7ci .a * 'r;,jf~,4.. I .'. g , same as the typical reactor on a typical site. Based upon this report and the Director's previous decision.

3_'  :[m . ,  ; . j ". . ,W .,'!. ,( $(*;' * %@;Q .. the Commission concluded on July 15, 1980, that the risk posed by the operat on of the Indian Point facilities did not warrant the suspension of the operating licenses during the adjudicatory proceeding.

• Wl;,I'h.;-1.'  ;; -. Mk[,'.*,*.'

. . [.f 9, .,;)*.;f::;g

.e Ct.I.81 1.13 NRC I (1981).

( ~ .,f (< ;T ,;f ,k.O [.isj ,g

• Sl-i.- ...- . . ..'_; ;. . p- ..

. , ;, . , 1946

. , ,e ,, ,

f, ,.I O $ . , ,

o f .'.'2

. ^ u' . :.. .

..  ; { - - ---- . .

- i m,m -

-. ~ - . . _ . __ . , , . .

1. .P '

{'-- *

,,g , , , ,

.g

~ .

)

i mented and explained further in a Commission decision dated January  ;

8,1981 (CLI-81-1,13 NRC 1) and in a Memorandum and Order dated . ,,

September 18,1981 (CLI-81-23,14 NRC 610).  !

The Commission made clear in its orders initiating the special pro- 4 .

ceeding that the purpose of the " discretionary" adjudication 2 was to gather information and to make recommendations to the Commission for enforcement action for Indian Point.) The Atomic Safety and Licens- ,

ing Board which was appointed by the Commission to preside over the special proceeding was not itself empowered to impose enforcement ac- '

tion. Rather, if the Licensing Board conducting the discretionary adjudi-  !

cation decided that enforcement action was appropriate, it was to recom-  ! -* '

s -

mend such action to the Commission. If the Commission agreed with  !

the recommendation, a formal enforcement order would be issued, and  ! ,

Licensees would be entitled to a formal hearing under i 189 of the i Atomic Energy Act to challenge the order. Thus the special adjudicatory proceeding was for.the purpose of gathering information, and was not i for the purpose of satisfying any j 189 hearing requirements.

The Board hearings commenced in June 1982. On April 29,1983, fol-lowing 55 days of hearings with 20 parties participating and over 200 wit-nesses testifying, the hearing record was closed. In addition to the tran-script, which exceeded 15,000 pages, there were nearly 3,000 pages of prefiled testimony and about 170 exhibits. The Board issued its opinion and recommendations on October 24,1983. LBP-83-68,18 NRC 811 (hereinafter " Opinion"). Comments on the Board opinion and recom- ~

mendations, received during the period November 1983 to February 1984, were submitted by the Licensees, NRC Staff, the Intervenors,'

New York's Lieutenant Governor DelBello, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The present Decision is based on: consideration of the hearing record; the Board Opinion; the parties' comments on that -

Opinion; briefings to the Commission by its regulatory stafT on July 23, 2 "Because the proceeding . . is not mandated by the Atomic Energy Act, it is not an 'on the record'  !

i proceedmg within the meanmg of the Atomic Energy Act " CLI-81 1, supra,13 NRC at 5 n.4.

I 2 In this regard, the Commission explained The purpose of the proceeding will be to take evidence and make recommended findmss and conclusions on disputed issues matenal to the question whether the ir.dian Point Units 2 and 3 plants should be shut down or other schon taken. The record of the proceeding, together with recommendations, will then be forwarded to the Commission for the final agency decision on the ments of the proceeding.

May 30,1980 order at 3.

• Union of Concerned scientists, New York Public Interest Research Group, Parents Concerned About Indian Pomt, west Branch Conservation Associanon, Rockland Citizens for safe Energy, Greater New York Council on Energy, Fnends of the Earth, New York City Audubon society, Westchester People's Action Coaliuon, and Honorable Richard L. Brodsky.

i 1047 i

t l-

e f ,

,;, a , s . . (

. ..x..- - - w.. . . . . .. A. d:L-.a a August 16; September 5, and October 2,1984; and the parties' com-

- ments on the NRC Staff briefings. We have also considered the parties' and the NRC Staff's responses to our Order of July 30,1984 (unpub-lished), requesting comments on Board Chairman Gleason's dissenting views on the Board's Opinion. -

The Commission's primary concern in initiating this proceeding was and is to determine the extent to which the population around Indian Point affects the risk posed by an accident at Indian Point,~ as compared to the spectrum of risks posed by other nuclear power plants. Further,

' the Commission was concerned with both the total risk to persons and

^

pr9perty, and the risk to individuals living in the vicinity of the Indian P 1nt site, including that resulting from possible difficulties associated

, 9 evacuation in an emergency. See CLI-81-1, supra,13 NRC at 6. To with develop a suitable record responding to these concerns, the Commission directed the Board to address seven specific questions:

+ .

1. What risk may be posed by serious accidents at Indian Point 2 and 3, including accidents not considered in the plants' design basis, pending and after any im-provements described in iCommission Questions) (2) and (4) below?

2. What improvements in the level of safety will result from measures required or referenced in the Director's Order to the licensees, dated Feoruary 11,1980 ior from other measures]?

3. What is the current status and degree of conformance with NRC/ FEMA guide-lines of state and local emergency planning within a 10-mile radius of the site and, to the extent that it is relevant to risks posed by the two plants, beyond a 10-mile radius?

4. What improvements in the level of emergency planning can be expected in the near future, and on what time schedule, and are there other specific offsite emergency procedures that are feasible and should be taken to protect the pub-lic?

5. Based on the foregoing, how do 'Fe risks posed by Indian Point Units 2 and 3

- compare with the range of risks posed by other nuclear power plants licensed )

to operate by the Commission? l

6. What would be the energy, environmental, economic or other consequences of ]

"3 ,

a shutdown of Indian Point Unit 2 and/or Unit 37 <

7. Does the Governor of the State of New York wish to express an official posi-6- tion with regard to the long-term operation of the units? 8

, The responses to the Commission's questions are discussed below. j Responses to Questions 1, 2 and 5 are discussed in i II, responses to 1e Questions 3 and 4 in i III, and those to Question 6 in i IV.*

' 5 The Governor of New York did not express his views in response to the Commission's invitation.

6 The Commission's questions were not the only ones litigated. To obtain information relevant to the

' . . ~ 1:

' Commission's questions, the Board also allowed litigation of a number of issues posed by the Interve-

. nors and the Board itself.

' 'f ,

g.; ,

o y',,s 1948

• N , -e ..%,, , , , , , ,

• * * ^ *  ;

• T 4

+.

.g .

r

,. 3, 8

9 .

g I

~'

l , - ,

s t

. w.

, e 4 c

B. The Indian Point Site The Indian Point site is unlike most nuclear power plant sites in its _ Y ,

proximity to densely populated areas. In terms of cumulative population .

and population density within a distance up to 50 miles from the plant

~

site, Indian Point is well above the average. See Table 1. Within a radius ,

of 5 miles, the cumulative population and population density values for Indian Point are exceeded by one site and are approached by a few other -

sites; for a 10-mile radius and beyond, Indian Point has the highest population density of any site. ,

The Indian Point site satisfies the NRC's reactor siting criteria,10 ~

C.F.R. Part 100, with respect to low population zone and population center distance. However, since late 1974, a guideline value for limiting

{l population density near power reactor sites has been used in considering -

cpplications for construction permits. Under this guideline, if the popula- ' , -

tion density averaged over any radial distance out to 30 miles from the .

reactor equals or exceeds 500 persons per square mile (persons /mi2), r '

construction permit applicants are required to consider less densely populated alternative sites. NUREG-0800, Rev. 2 (July 1981) at 2.1.3-3.

The average population density for radial distances of 0 to 2 miles or more from the Indian Point Plant exceeds the guideline threshold. It should be noted that the Indian Point site was originally selected 25 years ago for the Indian Point Unit 1, a 265 MWe plant that operated from 1962 to 1974. Unit 2 (873 MWe) and Unit 3 (965 MWe) were ap-proved by the AEC regulatory staff for construction at the site in 1966 and 1969, respectively. Unit 2 was in operation before the guideline threshold of 500 persons /mi2 was adopted by the Staff.7 i The numbers of persons, and their distribution around the plant, are i .

such that the Board in this special proceeding concluded that a severe l release of radioactive materials at Indian Point could have more serious ,

consequences than that same release at virtually any other NRC-licensed site. Opinion,18 NRC at 1032. However, as summarized in f V, p.

1091, of this Order, discussed below, the Commission concludes that i the record shows that neither shutdown of Indian Point Unit 2 or Unit l .

3, nor imposition of additional remedial actions beyond those imple-  ;

mented voluntarily by the Licensees, is warranted at this time. -

I I

2Although the population density around the Indian Point site is substantially higher than that of the average site. it is not unusually greater, for distances up to 30 miles, than the density of several other s'tes. See NUREG.0348, at T37 to T44. The Board also observed that there are other sites with com.

parably high population densities. See Opinion,18 NRC at 89193,108182.

1949 l

I

4

/ +-

e u *,

k e

-'-C-- -

. _..._._.__....a _.m._.m.__ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ,, , , , , _ _ _ , _ , , , _ .,

_ _ . _i t

TABLE 1

~

INDIAN POINT POPULATION DISTRIBUTION * )

l I.

l . Cumulative population (in thousands) within radius of g

- 5 miles 10 miles 20 miles 30 miles 50 miles

)t Indian Point 53 220 890 4,000 17,000  !.

Avg. Site 7.9 37 180 530 1,700 Max. Populated -  ;

Site 67 220 890 4,000 17,000  ;

~ i o

o Population density (persons /mi2) within radius of 5 miles to miles 20 miles 30 miles 50 miles Indian Point 670 700 710 1,400 2,200 i

_ i

. . Avg. Site 101 120 140 190 220 },

s 1 Max. Population 1-'

i Density Site 860 700 710 1,400 .2,200  !

' Data (rounded out to two figures) from NUREG-0348 "Demographu: Stathnics Pertaining to Nuclear Power Sites" October 1979. Based on 1970 Census,1979 .,

revision. Includes resident but not transaent population. The Indian Point site data are from pages T2 and Tl2, the other population data are from pages T21-T28, l. ~-

and the population density data are from pages T37-T44. The " average site" data are the average populations and population desities of Ihe ill sites considered E in NUREG-0348 The "manimum sate" data are line manimum populations and population densines of all the sites considered in NUREG-0348.

j e

i.

e i:

1

4 9 q.*

1

. . - . : a- w ..

V 4

II. RISK POSED BY SERIOUS ACCIDENTS AT INDIAN -

POINT UNITS 2 AND 3 A. Commission Question 1: Indian Point Risk - ' . .

The first question which we posed was: _

What risk may be posed by serious accidents at Indian Point 2 and 3, including acci-g/ . ,.

dents not considered in the plants' design basis, pending and after any improve- - .

ments described in (Commission Questions] (2) and (4) below?  ;,

To clarify the scope of the question and the response we sought, we ' "~

provided the following supplementary instructions:

Although not requiring the preparation of an EnvironmentalImpact Statement, the Commission intends that the review with respect to this question be conducted con- ' "

sistent with the guidance provided the staff in the Statement ofInterim Policy on '

" Nuclear Power Plant Accident Considerations under the National Environmental ,

Policy Act of 1969;" 44 FR 40101 Oune 13,1980).' c -

• In particular, that pokey statement indicates that-Attentson shall be siven both to the probabihty of occurrences of releases and to the environmental consequences of such releases; The reviews "shall include a reasoned consideration of the environmental risks (tm-pacts) attributable to accidents at the particular facihty or facihties . . . "; '

"Approximately equal attention should be siven to the probabihty of occurrence of J

releases and to the probabihty of occurrence of the environmental consequences . .";

and Such studies "will take into account sisnificant site and plant-specific features . . ."

Thus, a desenption of a release scenano must include a discussion of the probability of such a release for the specific Indian Point plants.

CLl 81-23, supra,14 NRC at 612.

To help it answer Commission Question 1, the Board considered one intervenor contention and one question which the Board itself framed for litigation:

Contennon 1.1 The probabilities and consequences of accidents at Indian Point Units 2 and 3 com-

' ~

bine to produce high risks of health and property damage not only within the plume '

exposure EPZ but also beyond the plume exposure EPZ as far as the New York City ,

metropohtan area. -

Board Question 1.1 .

What are the consequences of serious accidents at Indian Point and what is the probability of occurrence of such accidents? In answering this question the parties shall address at least, the following documents: (a) the Indian Point Probabilistic Sq/m Study (IPPSS) prepared by the Licensees; (b) the Sandia Laboratory " Letter Report on Review.and Evaluation of the Indian Point Probabilistic Safety Study" (Letter Report), dated August 25,1982; and (c) any other reviews or studies of the .

1951 i

, - . - -i l- , , .

l-i I

l. .

e

'r '

. ^ - _

c ,

c +

+ -

_ -. 6 -

x.: -_a.iw ...:.a.~. J 1 '

.l -

IPPSS prepared by or for the Licensees, the NRC Staff, or the Intervenors,'or any other document which addresses the accuracy of the IPPSS.

l The Board considered Commission Question 1, Contention 1.1, and

] Board Question 1.1 together. The Board also heard testimony on three

, j additional Board questions.

?

j Summary of Commission Conclusions on Commission Question 1 The Commission agrees with the Board's conclusion that the quantita-

?: , tive estimates of the risks to the public resulting from serious accidents y at Units 2 and 3 are a small fraction of the competing nonnuclear back-

. a ground risk to which the population around Indian Point is exposed.

The Board pointed out that the risk estimates had uncertainties, such as

, those attributable to the omission of certain potential contributors to risk and to the limitations of the assumed models. To account for these j

uncertainties, the Board adopted a subjective Staff judgment that the j quantitative risk estimates presented by NRC Staff might have underes .

-  : timated the true risk by as much as a factor of 40. In light of the Board's i discussion of uncertainties, we feel it is reasonable to consider this added conservatism above the best estimates of risk.-

]' i We note that the Board's quantitative risk estimates do not purport to prove the acceptability of the Indian Point risk. However, when consid-

' cred as one factor in the evaluation of the public risk posed by the opera-

, tion of Indian Point Units 2 and 3, along with engineering judgments of plant safety and careful evaluation of the risk-reduction effectiveness of l Plant safety systems, the estimates are consistent with a finding that the units do not impose an undue risk to the public health and safety.

In the following sections we address the principal issues raised in the

'2 proceeding during consideration of Commission Question 1, Contention 1.1 and Board Question 1.1. ,

. i 1. Definition ofRisk

-j 1 Our first question was intended to reach a judgment as to the risk im-

.] posed on the surrounding population by a serious accident at Indian u Point Units 2 and 3. To clarify our definition of the term " risk," we emphasized in our January 1981 Order that risk included both probabili-

.- ties and consequences associated with potential accidents. We also noted what we considered useful measures ofindividual and societal risks. CLI-y [ 81 1, supra,13 NRC at 5 6. Despite our elTorts, the parties differed on the proper definition of risk.

s

- h .

a ,

i 1952

~

f i

..e ,

6 k

'6 .

+ ..

_3; ,

a _ -

, so .

~. =. . a ..:.= a s . . - .. m. w . = L- . .. . - 4 a~

9 1

~

a. Board's Conclusions and Recommendations  ;._ ,

^

The Board noted that the conventional definition of risk as the product - -

of both probability and consequences can make the calculated risk of a - .

f low-probability high-consequence accident equivalent to that of a high- 'j, . . . 'x probability low-consequence accident, even when the societal signifi- '

u- '

. c:nce of the accidents would be substantially different. As the Board put "e" it, ,

~

. N ..~.. m For example. consider an accident having a probability of 0.1 per year which results i in 10 fatalities; this accident has the same expected risk, one death per year, as an - -

accident having a probability of I x 104 per year which results in 10,000 fatalities. -

c t r

Risk estimates tell us that the accidents are mathematically equivalent. But are they .. 4..

societally equivalent?

l' ' 1 . , '

Opinion,18 NRC at 892. _

The Board recommended that the Commission " factor into its deliber- 3 ..

ations the potential consequences of a low probability accident at Indian - -

Point as well as the expected risk values that we have accepted in this report . . ." Id. at 893. The Chairman of the Board dissented from this ,

recommendation and pointed out that it would amount to ."considering  ;

consequences without their associated probabilities," which, he stated, i "we have been restricted from doing by the Commission." He noted that "the Board appears to be recommending a new standard exclusively [

for Indian Point." Id. at 1080. In response to Judge Gleason's dissent,  !

the members of the Board majority pointed out they did not propose to  !

chinge the method of determining risks; rather, with regard to Commis-

~

sion Question 1, they wished to " caution the Commission against any [

uncritical interpretation" of the Board's best quantitative estimates of ex- .

pected risk values. Id. at 1082 83.  !

i.

b. Commission Evaluation > -

On July 30,1984, we requested the NRC Staff and the other parties to l [. .

the proceeding to comment on Judge Gleason's dissent. Unpublished l Commission Order. In response, the NRC Staff agreed with Judge Glea- -

son "that it is not necessary for the Commission to factor low-probability high-consequence accidents in its decision to any greater extent than al-reIdy appears in the analyses performed by the parties to this proceed-ing." Comments at 9 (Aug.14,1984). The Staff stated that its analysis did treat such accidents and that Staff use of cumulative complementary i

1953 f

-r... _. v... --c. .,u,-4 .. - - . - - . . - . - - - , - - - . - - . . -.-u , ,,n - - -

.y w., , .

, v ;, , ,

.  ;+ ~ ,

, . e

-~

l ,

.-. ..w.=..=.-.-..a....n.=... . . . ., . i.w L.~r -

i i

distribution function (CCDF) curves acknowledged the existence of such accidents and indicated their place in the risk profile of the Indian Point units. Moreover, in reaching conclusions on the safety of the i ,- '

Indian Point units, Staff noted that it did not rely only.on numerical risk i .

estimates but also considered specific design and operational features of I the units that reduced the public risk.

The Licensees also agreed with Judge Gleason's dissent, arguing that, i

despite the low level of risk, the Board majority had overemphasized the

/ need for risk-reducing measures, such as a filtered vented containment.

l * '

.' Power Authority of the State of New York, the Unit 3 Licensee, asserted-

. D' i

. c ,

that the Board majority was " unlawfully and unconstitutionally" singling

' ' 'i out Indian Point for special treatment despite its own findings on Indian Point risk and contrary to the Commission's policy on backfitting.

! The Intervenors asserted that the Commission should disregard Judge Gleason's dissent. They pointed out that the Board majority's "rather modest" recommendation was " eminently reasonable" since there is far greater uncertainty in the probability component of the risk equation

... than in the consequence component.

C. "

We' emphasized in our January 1981 Order clarifying the scope of the j proceeding that serious accidents at Indian Point Unit 2 or Unit 3 were to be considered with " equal attention" to both probabilities and conse-l t

quences. We. interpret the Board majority's recommendation as remind-l .ing us to beware of uncritical reliance on the quantitative estimates of risk and to take into account the possibility that a low-probability acci-l '

dent at Indian Point may result in greater. consequences than the same c

accident at another site. We do not interpret it as a recommendation for us to consider consequences without regard to probabilities. Nor is it a recommendation that a " risk aversion" factor be introduced into the I

.< , < definition of risk.

i It is true that the Commission has already considered and rejected the possibility of giving greater weight to a single, very severe accident than

, ' 4

- to a number of smaller accidents with the same total consequences. See r '. Commission Policy Statement on Safety Goals for the Operation of Nuclear Power Plants,48 Fed. Reg.10,772 (Mar.14,1983); NUREG-

~' ' '

0880, Rev. I for Comment, May 1983, at 84,104. However, our rejec-tion of the introduction of a risk aversion factor into the quantitative design objectives of the safety goals should not be understood as a deci-

' sion to consider risk estimates with total disregard for consequences. In

,4 fact, the Commission believes that the entire risk picture, including fi probabilities, consequences, and CCDF curves, should be considered in l

jf ,

its decisionmaking. At Indian Point, where the population density is l

1054 1

-- -n.-,-... . . . . __ ,

l l___ _'__ _ _ __ _ ._ _ _ _ _ _ _.

<* +' .

$ 4 ,I

' I.

• u ,. - l

+'. ,

~t

. w . 1 a . . L .w. ..- .nw - . . - . - -

a-- . . ~ ~~-. ;

s .

v high, the estimated societal risk is more sensitive to uncertainties in the [- ' ' ,

cccident probability estimates than at other less densely populated sites. 6 i 'N 1 i f -

Focusing exclusively on overall numerical risk estimates is not appropri. b j y - .

ate irt general and, in the case ofIndian Point, is particularly inappropri- '

tte. ' ..'~

}

I In addition to recommending consideration of low-probability, high-consequence accidents, the Board pointed out that, because the popula.

'(~  ;"

tion around Indian Point is exposed to risk by two units, risks should be '

expressed in terms of the cumulative risk to the surrounding population

, of operating both plants until expiration of their current operating

4 licenses. Opinion,18 NRC at 885. In commenting on the Board's deci-

? sion, the Licensees objected to this manner of expressing risk because it ,

.was contrary to the Commission's preliminary safety goals, where socie-t:1 risk is expressed in different terms, i.e., per plant and per year. We - ~

j do not object to the Board's presentation of risk values in terms which it .

, believed better express the risk to the public posed by the Indian Point

• units. We do depart from the Board's approach, however, insofar as it .

, compared cumulative (reactor lifetime) societal risk for Indian Point  !

with per site-year values for otter plants. See Id. at 886.  !

1 i

L Validity ofRisk Estimates j i

a. Board Conclusions and Recommendations r ;-

The Board adopted risk estimates calculated by the NRC StafT/Sandia  ;

National Laboratory rather than those calculated in the Licensees' i Indian Point Probabilistic Safety Study (IPPSS) because (1) the Board  ;~

i considered estimates obtained (by Staff and Sandia) based on the Maxi.  ;

j mum Likelihood Principle more realistic and less intuitive than those ob-  !

i t:ined (by Licensees) using Bayes' Theorem, and (2) the Board found '

the Staff /Sandia modeling more closely represented the Indian Point '

plants than the IPPSS modeling. The Board was particularly critical of l '

! the use of Bayes' Theorem, noting that "it would be justifiable to reject the Bayesian methodology on statistical grounds alone . . ." Id. at 855-

56. Cf NUREG-0492, at X-30, X 39. l The Board itemized the risks of a potential accident at Indian Point, j .

finding that: the risk of fatalities (sum of early fatalities and delayed '

cencer fatalities) was at least 0.35 person per site year (person / site yr);

the risk of nonfatal radiation injuries was at least 0.13 person / site yr; the  :

risk of genetic effects was at least I case / site yr; the risk of population j exposure was at least 4000 person rem / site yr; and the financial risk  ;

(property damage without monetizing health effects) was at least $6 l million/ site yr. Opinion,18 NRC at 893 94. The Board concluded that  ;

1055

! i

!s f' ,1. "

l. .

. ..u ~ - ~ . ~ . . . . . . . . .-._.._..._....._x . am.. ,,:_L , ,a

/

4 '*

Z

~

[ the cumulative risk to society of operating both plants until expiration of their current operating licenses, a period of 23 years for Unit 2 and 26 years for Unit 3, was between about one half and one early fatality, about eight late fatalities (from latent .ancers), and at.least twenty-three i cases of genetic effects. The cumulative financial risk was estimated as

more than $147 million.

l The Board noted that these risks will be incurred mainly by the popu.

lation of about 15.5 million people who live within 50 miles of Indian Point. The Board also concluded that the risk of fatalities (including i >

- . q- ,

those from latent cancers) and nonfatal radiation injuries resulting from

'

• an accident at Indian Point was a very small fraction of the competing

~

< nonnuclear background risk to which the population around Indian .

- Point is exposed. Id. a: 894-95.

s , In commenting on the Board's Opinion, the Staff did not object to the risk estimates adopted by the Board, although the Staff did have reserva-l . tions about the validity of some of the Board's rationale. Comments at 7,12. In contrast, the Licensees argued that the Board's estimates of risk were unreasonably high because they were based on unrealistic as-

' sumptions, including those concerning the appropriate source term, con-tainment capability to prevent releases, evacuation times, and the effect of evacuation on risk. Comments at 12 15, 17-20, 23.

Disagreeing with both Staff and Licensees, the Intervenors asserted that the uncertainties associated with the calculated risk estimates precluded accurate assessment of risk of release, leaving only the assur .

I ance that catastrophe is unlikely but possible. Comments at 3. UCS com-pared the Board's estimates with the 1980 estimates of the Task Force on Interim Operations, observing that a core melt accident at Indian Point is now estimated as roughly 35 times more likely than the 1980 es-timates, early fatalities range from about the same likelihood to about half of the 1980 estimates, early injuries are roughly 300-450 times i

more likely, latent cancer fatalities are roughly 450-600 times more likely, and offsite property damage is roughly 300 times greater than the

- 1980 estimates. UCS concluded that the difference of more than 5 j

orders of magnitude between the major risk estimates by Licensees and i the Board's estimates shows that no more is known now about the risk ~

! of accidents than was known before the probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) were done. Comments at 6,7,20.

1 -

The parties differed about the validity of the methodology of the Indian Point Probabilistic Safety Study. The Board considered IPPSS's Bayesian approach unreliable. Opinion,18 NRC at 856. Licensees

• ' '. argued that the Board erred, pointing out that the validity of the IPPSS

', methodology is evidenced by Staff's risk assessment which, though

~

1956 l

l ,

n

)z '

i

• f I

, - -- , , - , , . . - . .-..---.____-_._.._.._L,- _.n.n-.,, ,-,,e

E ^' ,

.o u.V ,

a. w a.k.~ . . ~ . . = - . =- '.

i , .' ,

4 A k .

t ..

employing a different methodology, reached the same basic conclusions.  ! 9>'

Licensees' Comments at 16. Lt. Governor DelBello and UCS argued o ..r

1. ~c 1 that there is no assurance that any probabilistic risk assessments are t

~

.- M'7^ -

accurate because they are incapable of independent, empirical verifica- ' . ', f;

• tion. UCS contended that the Board correctly rejected the Bayesian ap- , .

proach used by Licensees, but wrongly accepted the Staff's PRA without * ~, '

addressing the question of whether any PRA is sufficiently reliable for ,

using the bottom-line results in decisionmaking. UCS also pointed out _ .f ' '

that Sandia did not explore the issue whether the IPPSS assessment of risk-dominant accident sequences was correct. Lt. Governor DelBello's -

.G

& " ^

4 Comments at 4-5; UCS Comments at 2,14-16. The Staff pointed out. e- t O j that the Board was inconsistent in finding the Licensees' risk estimates ,' "

j..j b unreliable because they were based on Bayesian methodology. As the . f! "

• Staff observed, the Board accepted the Sandia/ Staff point estimates, .b' which have a Bayesian component. Comments at 13.

y

b. Commission Evaluation - ,

We agree that the quantitative estimates of public risk obtained by PRAs are not empirically verifiable. Nonetheless, PRAs are a helpful supplement to engineering judgment. They should not be ignored, as UCS and Lt. Governor Del Bello argue. As the Board observed, PRAs are "very powerful tools for identifying strengths and weaknesses in reactor safety." Opinion,18 NRC at 854 n.19. If properly used, we agree.8 We agree with the Staff remark (Comments at 13) that the Board's generalizations about the validity of Bayesian methodology (Opinion,18 NRC at 855-56) appear to exhibit "some confusion." Nev/

ertheless, we believe that the Board was correct in not relying on the

IPPSS overall quantitative risk estimates and, instead, adopting the Staff's risk estimates. The Staff estimates were based on IPPSS as modi- 1

! fled and corrected by Staff and Sandia and, as noted by the Board, were calculated with more realistic models. Id. at 857 59. The Commission ac- ,

cepts the Board's recommended quantitative risk estimates. The values i are based on application of the then-existing (circa 1981) state of the art

of risk assessment techniques. We do not, however, (nor did the Board) .

! consider the quantitative risk estimates to be a proof that the risk to the public from the operation of Indian Point Units 2 and 3 is acceptably I

low. Rather they do not show Indian Point risk to be unacceptably high.

8 The Board's reliance on PRA is also consistent with the Commission's pohey Suidance on the use of risk annessment. as stated in the Commissaon's 1984 Pohey and Planning Guniance. NUREO.0885, j

issue J,i Vill.C.

1957 l ,

l

,r -

} ,,

7 ,

c >

. 7 ,

. -. _u

. sv ~ ~ . u;w - 2._,,, saa, I

l

, a

In other words, it is not in itself sufficient for the probabilistic risk as-

- sessments to yield acceptably low risk estimates. We believe that a sufri-l r cient showing of acceptably low risk must be based as well on engineer-

% ing judgments of plant safety as developed in thorough probing of the Indian Point units and in careful evaluation of the risk reduction effec-tiveness of plant safety systems. We believe that there has been such probing and evaluation and that, as discussed below, the safety improve-ments which were implemented voluntarily by the Licensees further assure that the continued operation of the units does not impose an

./ undue risk to the public health and safety.

Ennenetion Assumptions

3.  ;

.l a. Board Conclusions and Recommendations l

Three basic models for offsite emergency response were delineated l during the proceeding: the " evac reloc," the "early reloc," and the j " late reloc" models.' Because the capability of the surrounding popula-1 tion to respond to an accident initiated by a severe external event, such

' as an earthquake or hurricane, would difier significantly from the capa-

! bility to respond to other accidents, the. Board considered a combination s .I of two of the basic models as " reasonable." Id. at 875,887. This model, t

the " evac reloc and late reloc" model, assumes the " late reloc" model

! for accidents initiated by a severe carthquake or hurricane and the " evac reloc" model for accidents initiated by all other causes. Id. at 876.

- The Board concluded that the actual risks posed by Indian Point opera.

I tion could be higher than those estimated by the Statiin its assumed -

i " evac reloc and late reloc" emergency response model because the Staff failed to consider severe winter storms in estimating evacuation times.

l-

,. -' Id. at 888 89 Staff argued that failure to consider winter storms does not 7 -

significantly alTect risk because one of the StafTs evacuation models, the

E " late reloc" model, assumes that, in the event of a severe external

'% .- w'

.,_."7<-

, F. . s .

s,- 'The evacuation-relocation (" evac reloc") model enviseons evacuation of the area within 10 miles of

• A' 4* ' -

t the plant (at speeds and with delay times developed by Licenwe and FEMA contractors, and reviewed by the stafn and relocation of people within highly contaminated areas more than 10 miles from the i plant 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after plume passage.

1 The early relocation ("early reloc") model assumes that evacuation prior to plume peanage is not

possible and that people within 10 miles of the reactor and in the path of the plume leave 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> after plume passage. People more than 10 miles from the reactor relocate 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after pasange.

The late relocation (" late reloc") model assumes the occurrence of an external event more severs 1 than considered in each plant's design basis. This impedes evacuation and also makes sheltering difficult so that people are without shelter, leaving highly contaminated areas 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after plume passage. The staff concluded that even in this case the early and latent fatahty risk is increased by less than 4% ovet

'a what it would be under the staft's "early reloc" model, where evacuation from highly contaminated areas is assumed to take place within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> after plume pasange. opinion,18 NRC at 886,875.

9 1958

= ----. - m . .o

,W

+

g :

3 '

.s

^ ^ ~ ~ -- - - - " '-

. L,; ,

. _ ._ .u.. _ m 1. . _

f_ _

1 l lF *,',

.n ,,

c

.0

event, people will not be sheltered and relocated from highly contami-  ; _

nated areas until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after plume passage. Comments at 17,18. 'a The Board considered that the " late reloc only" was " pessimistic." The 5,_ VF . ' q ' r s n.- ( :4,;. '

i Board concluded that the societal risks ofIndian Point were somewhere .v g 4 ~'

a-  ;.

between risk estimates based on the " evac reloc and late reloc" and - 1, ,

" late reloc only" rnodels and probably nearer risk estimates based on fG ' ~ 9 -

i ^

the former. Opinion,18 NRC at 887. -

l -

. .e -

i b. Commission Evaluation _

We believe the Board's conclusions regarding the evacuation models i , ~. 1. -; .

tre reasonable. We agree with the Board's increase of the Staff's evacaa- .

.s M q ' ,

tion time estimates to account for the possibility of severe winter '**(J .[ ' ~ , ,"

1 storms. The effect of severe winter storms in impeding evacuation .

N-i '

should be factored into the emergency response scenarios assumed for ,

5 ['j 1 ". .

til severe accidents, whether internally initiated or resulting from the 4 .

! '" severe external event" assumed in the " late reloc" model. We also -

'~

I agree with the Board that, although pessimistic, the " late reloc" emergency response model is not unrealistic and should bound consider-ation of severe winter storms.

In commenting on the Board's conclusions, the Licensees contended '

i that, because "the structural integrity of the containment was so high .

that it could withstand any earthquake which could be experienced at j the Indian Point site," there would be no containment failure following I' a postulated worst-case seismic event and, therefore, the Staff's " late reloc" emergency response model was unrealistic. Comments at 17-20.

l liowever, there is not an adequate basis in the record to accept the -

! Licensees' characterization of containment strength. See discussion of containment reanalyses below. With respect to the realism of assuming I containment failure, we note that our Question I specifically requested

consideration of the risk posed by serious accidents," including accidents l not considered in the plants' design basis." In any case, we find the in- .

l formation in the record to be sufficient for us to reach our conclusions I without requiring further investigation of this aspect of potential contain- ,

l ment failure. .

1

4. Unceraninty of the Quantitative Risk Estientes . t

a. Board Conclusions and Recommendations The Board categorized the uncertainties in probabilistic risk assess-ment as:

e i

1959 l

l '

- ~ ,,-~w- ,. m --- - - . ,,-.- ,, ,-,--w.,,,--,,.,ww ,,.w-w--,3,. y, , , ,y,,,y,y ,,, , , , .,_,.-,.-,,.,,___,-yv,.,

ym.,-.-.,.---#----m-

- - - . , - s--

' ~

/,, y y ,

'N i .

~

. L .w~ a . N. O.h ' ..% _x.;.2

]_' c . ..,.

i..]:. . . . , r :.... . .a 3 a u_. ,

A

, . d-

, (-  ;

1' (1) statistical uncertainties, originating in the fact that it is impossible to measure ,

input parameters, such as component failure probabilities or human error probabili- t

,,I ties, with precision; (2) modeling approximations that have to be introduced to

. il make the predictive models tractable; (3) errors of completeness, or errors of omis-J sion, resulting from the fact that some failure mechanisms or, accident scenarios are

, .1- left out entirely; (4) computational errors in assembling the models.

l Opinion,18 NRC at 878.

The Board found that the uncertainties attributable to erroneous as-l sumptions in ~ modeling, modeling approximations, or omissions in modeling are likely to be far greater than statistical uncertainty, and their effect on the bottom line risk estimates could not be formally calcu-lated. Id. at 878 81. The Board pointed out that a major omission in the Indian Point risk assessment, as in all PRAs, is omission of the risk of

sabotage. The Board concluded that this factor is of " unknown quantita-l' tive significance" and is cause for concern. Id. at 890. The Board also found another error of omission in Staff's and Licensees

• failure to con-i sider equipment aging as a factor bearing on risk. The Staff failed to con-l vince the Board that the increasing understanding of reactor safety ,

during the plant's operating lifetime would outweigh the effects of as-ing. Consequently, the Board concluded that equipment aging and wear-out constituted "another error of omission, of unknown significance, and . . . not accounted for in our risk estimates . . ." Id. at 891.

The Board considered the various contributors to the uncertainty of the risk estimates, including the errors of omission, and adopted Stafrs subjective judgment that the Staff's risk figures were "unlikely, but not very unlikely," to underestimate the true risks by a factor of 40 or more.

The Board was candid in emphasizing the subjective nature of its opin-ion:

I f We have not been inclined to accept other estimates based heavily on subjective I judgment, and we have no basis for believing that Rowsome's (the Staff witnessl in-tuition is any better or any worse than that of other witnesses who have presented subjective testimony in this proceeding. Therefore, we cannot give great weight to the high estimates. But we found Rowsome to be a competent and thoughtful wit.

ness; since he would "not be very surprised'* to find Staff's estimates too low by a

. factor of 40, we are not inclined to dismiss the high estimates altogether. We think i it possible that Staff could, in fact, have underestimated the risks by as much as a factor of 40. . .. !n any case, we consider it prudent to consider the high estimates

, lid. at 881-82) as possible values which the parameters, the true risks, could assume. We recommend that the Commission do likewise. .

Id. at 891.

Staff did not contradict the Board's opinion that because of omissions in Staffs analysis, including -the effects of sabotage and plant aging 4 j 1960 I

< m _. _. . . . . _

e-6 5

. i

'Se , , .

. .g .

n..,.

i < , .. . ' u'- Yr'

;. . 2 ., . 2 de h .-- '/"?,

[

t. s

. .-, ; , ~,j .

L ,- s*

9 Q :: /.; f j. n ;

s-

[:

( d R' ~-a.; , f. .

(wearout), risk may be higher than actually estimated. Even so, Staft " WO'c k .s 7>

argued that it treated each of these areas of uncertainty in its testimony and in its proposed findings. Comments at 19.

1. Q%O[",j^^.gis ' ' ' ; '

Regarding aging, the Staff's witness testified that increasing under-standing of reactor safety and future improvements in the plants will out-

e

. '?M. 3.y.[ :;,pz;KN~ ' ,*.i f

weigh the effects of aging, and so lead to declining risk. Direct Testimo- ,ich - -

.;ii ny of Rowsome at 14, following transcript page 8777 (hereinafter cited E.: '

9/. ' Te as Tr. 8777 at 14). In comments on the Board Opinion, the Licensees

~

.w ; ,

2 -

stated that the failure rates used in IPPSS were based on industry wide 'f, ,

and Indian Point failure rates, and thus accounted for aging effects. Fur- . ;: '

V f ther, they argued that equipment aging is not a significant contributor to , .A .* . , e .' h'd,e risk because more than 90% of containment overpressurization accidents * '

- result from common-cause events such as earthquakes, fires and winds.

. .,s

. J" ~,Q

J ,

Thus the impact of aging is limited to those overpressurization sequences j- G i"V .

which lead to containment failure, i.e.,10% of overall risk. Comments ':.

atl4. '

Regarding sabotage, the Staff stated that it "[did] not believe that the

state of PRA methodology can account for the likelihood of sabotage at-tempts." Proposed Finding 1-204, Staff Proposed Findings at 191. The Staff believed that sabotage has little effect on risk because a potential  ;

saboteur needs both to initiate a core melt and keep all containment safe'-

guard features inoperable for a long period of time. Staff's testimony concerning other omissions was pessimistic:

We have not yet mastered the art ofincluding the contributions to reactor accident susceptibility made by those design errors that are not revealed by either design documents. surveillance tests or reactor operations. We are not very good at predict.

ing the likelihood that operators might misdiagnose an incident, and so employ the .

wrong procedures.

Tr. 7169 at 12.

The Intervenors asserted that the Staff's and Licensees' PRAs were entitled to no weight because they failed to account for the uncertainties flowing from sabotage, equipment aging effect, human errors, design /

construction errors, and equipment failure attributable to environmental , 4 .

causes. Furthermore, they continued, not only does the record contain no credible estimate of the range of uncertainties for the PRAs, but the Staff even took the position that a comprehensive uncertainty analysis '

cannot yet be performed. UCS Comments at 1516.

1961 p -

1-

. ...I.

~

e .. .g ,

. < .. - + . n - -

' ' - - P -

....,.1 ~_ _ . ', i.M .. ___,1,4 i,,,_, , . . 3

• • ~, . ',  ;

^* p 4 l - *

. b. Commission Ewduation

~

, , ',; [ ' When we first posed the question about the risk imposed by Indian X'~ y. Point on the surrounding population, we noted "the uncertainty that is

. e associated with risk assessment estimates of the absolute values of acci-

. ~. , dent probabilities and consequences." CLI-81-1, supra,13 NRC at 6-7,

" Although the record of the proceeding clarifies the nature of the uncer-tainty and provides somewhat subjective or judgmental estimates of the c 'l uncertainty, the record also shows a significant, probably irreducible, 7 -.y c.

y,, residual uncertainty which has not been rigorously quantified and which s R we must consider in our decisionmaking.

~ ' '

i While recognizing the limitations of uncertainty analyses in probabilis-W . .- ,

tic risk assessment, the Commission finds the Board's treatment of un-certainties adequate for the Commission to reach its decision in this case.

4 .

.~ 3. Conseinment Rennelyses The Board did not admit Licensees' containment reanalyses into the record. The Board indiated, however, that if the analyses' conclusions v(ere accepted, the risk of early health effects from Unit 2 may be re-

, {. duced by a large fraction. Opinion.18 NRC at 858. The Licensees 11 argued that because the Indian Point containments have greater strength

- and capability than previously assumed, the Board was wrong in failing -

to find that several factors were insignificant contributors to public risk, '

~,

including core-melt frequency, operator error, steam explosions, hydro-gen detonation, and aging of equipment. The Licensees stated that, if

.e the Board had taken these into account, the quantitative risk estimates

. , .n ' which the Board adopted would have been reduced. *

.q _

Because the Licensees' containment reanalyses were not admitted

• '" into the record, nor were they evaluated by NRC Staff, the Commission

""hf

i .

cannot assess the validity of the Licensees' claims.

> b' d' .i ,1 I t. it  ;

e *

. 10in an April 16, 1984 Board Notification (BN.84-073), the staff stated that recent scale model tests by sendia National Laboratones indicate that the conditional probetnlity of earty containment faalure (re.

. sulting from rapid heating of containment atmosphere) following a core melt accident at high primary

." - system preneure may be higher than previounty determined. Initaal stafr evaluation indecates that the test f, ejl results are not directly apphcable to pressortred water reactor (PWR) and nuclear steam supply system

,&fc'* (Nsss) containment response. The information is being analyzed to determine how it afrects estimates

7, t or the risk assonated with core melt and early containment failure. Id. Enclosure at 3.

1962

~

~*'f '

l *- * .. . , , ., ,

a d 4

, w- y 4 s 1 . . .

, f.Q l *. .

~

c .w ,

, -, . . . . . - ~.~-w a; ,- _ a ~ :m "

(. w. : .

.v

.g ,. . .

p- .

r

6. Source Term Assumptions & , j' 5 4. .' l ',.-

c. Board Conclusions and Recommendations , , f' ' if. - ,

The Board accepted the use of WASH-1400 (the Reactor Safety 4%b,'.,,. .

Study) source terms in making quantitative estimates of risk. The Board $.;^ .U.

2 agreed that the use of these source terms provided conservative (i.e., ,

~

> f. -

overestimated) predictions of radiological releases and that calculation E.'.: '

cnd use of reduced source terms would be " premature." The Board  ;.

E .. .

~

agreed with the NRC Staff position and noted, "lrlesearch is in progress I ~.L 0 to develop new models and to compile better data, and a decision on re- I f , t, duced source terms should await the outcome of that effort." Opinion, M f' ..s 18 NRC at E65. ' d!N WV Y 'a I "

The Licensees argued that the Board was wrong in its findings on risk gf iM '

because it failed to accept Licensees' estimates of source terms smaller c/ , ) q; '

than Staff's. Licensees alleged that testimony of their witnesses estab- ' , [y '

A ,* , .;

lished without contradiction that the source terms used in IPPSS and in Stafi's PRA are overly conservative. The Board's failure to account for

';c' '

reduced source terms, Licensees argued, is arbitrary and thus unlawful ,

in disregarding uncontradicted and entirely probable testimony of Licen-sees' witnesses whose' qualifications and judgment have not been dis-credited. Comments at 23.

b. Commission Evaluation If Licensees' characterization of the record regarding the source terms ,

were accurate, they would have a legitimate complaint. Stafi's testimony on this issue, however, was not an endorsement o'f Licensees' source- i term testimony; rather, Staff testified that it was likely that the source  :

terms would be reduced, but that the extent of reduction had not yet ,

been established. See Tr.12,$81. We conclude that the Board wasjusti-fied in not accepting the Licensees' use of reduced source terms. The t.

Commission notes, however, that by adopting the Staff's subjective esti- i' mate of uncertainty in the quantitative risk estimates (possibly underes-timated by a factor of 40 or overestimated by a factor of 400), the Board i~ ,

appears to take credit for conservatism in the source term assumptions L. -

by lowering (from 125 to 40) the factor by which risks could have been I ,

underestimated.

7. Risks to New York City -

Contention 1.1 alleges "high risks of health and property damage" .

beyond the plume exposure Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) as far as ,

l 1963

- ., ..-en,a ~

r .

l

=+b+.*w- .m. . . ... ~ .,m., , . , ,

z.

3 the New York City metropolitan' area. Opinion,18 NRC at 845. The

- Board did not consider these risks to be high, although it did note that, "under certain meteorological conditions, delayed fatalities from cancer 3

- appear to be possible almost anywhere in the city." Id. at 894.The Board

- concluded:

We agree with the Staff that there are risks as far away as New York City, but the

- adjective "high'* is not warranted. We also agree that the average annual early fatali.

ty risk and delayed cancer fatality risk, as calculated by PRA are very small fractions

• ' of the competing background nonnuclear risks. . ..Therefore, we rgject Contention

). '

l l.

Id. at 895 (citation omitted).

The Licensees and Staff did not dispute the Board's conclusions. We agree with the Board's conclusions.

B. Commission Question 2: Measures to Reduce Indian Point Risk

• The second question which we posed was:

What improvements in the level of safety will tesult from measures required or referenced in the Director's Order to the licensees, dated Febri;ary 11,1980?

To clarify the intent and scope of our second question we added that:

A contention by a party that one or more specific safety measures, in addition to

' those identified or referenced by the Director, should be sequired as a condition of operation would be within the scope of this inquiry if, according to the !.icensing Board, admission of the contention seems likely to be important to resolving wheth.

er (a) there exists a sigmficant risk to public health and s.fety, notwithstanding the

,.'. A.l.a b, , ' Director's measures, and (b) the additional proposed measures would result in a sig.

, " '

• g, ' l'l,, , ', . , -

)g . ,

nificant reduction in that risk.

~ " '

' [ i. CLI.8123, supra,14 NRC at 61213.

C

• The Board also considered three contentions and one Bo6rd Question relating to Commission Question 2.

Contention 2.l(a) stated:

' A filtered vented containment system for each unit must be installed.

e .. ,

s .

Contention 2.l(d) stated:

7 n .a ,

1 ' , , ,

A separate containment structure must be provided into which excess pressure from accidents and transients can be relieved without necessitating releases to the

'O>* } e ,, . ,,', {; , 3 , ,', , ,

, Q - f,,) t ' , , ., .. ,

J. r _ n e .w,. .

+; ' 1964 D f

, 6 6

9 - * * * =ua ..e r -w e -.r.., . . ,p , m,, q, 7 ,,_ _ _, _,

4 e . d . ,

a di b%

4

. - 4 L

4

. z.,. u .

. , 9. ' . _ - .

~.aw- w-~=-=-

': ' , .b

., . A environment, thereby reducing the risk of containment failure by overpressuriza.

uon. ,

i - ,. ,

Contention 2.2(a) stated:

The coohng system at the plants should be changed so that it no longer uses brackish liudson River water. This change is needed to combat safety retated corrosion prob-lems.  !

I Board Question 2.2.1 asked:

Should any of the requirements proposed at the July 29,1982 meeting of the NRC Staff and members of the 5000 (Steam Generator Owners Group) be required for Indian Point Units 2 and/or 3, considering the risk of a steam generator tube rupture . .

in this high population area? ,

Summary of Commission Conclusions on Commission Question 2 We agree with the parties in this proceeding that the measures im. '

posed on Indian Point by the February 1980 Order of the Director of ,

Nuclear Reactor Regulation have a small positive effect on risk reduc.

tion. Ilowever, because the risk reduction effect is not sufficient to be l termed " substantial," we be.lieve the Director's measures should be re- '

scinded unless they are required to fulfill generic requirements applicable '

to similar types of power reactors or are required to meet other license requirements for the Indian Point units. We also concluJe that it is un- .

desirable to require the Licensees to implement certain accident mitigat-ing design features (glow plug igniteis, a passive containment building '

heat removal system, a reactor cavity flooding system) and a " Safety Assurance Program." Further, discontinuing the use of brackish coolant (Iludson River water) at Indian Point is not necessary Similarly, neither .

a filtered vented containment nor a separate containment system should be required for Indian Point Unit 2 or Unit 3. However, in view of the -

vulnerability of the Unit 2 diesel generator and control buildings to high ,

winds, the NRC Staff should undertake a study of the capability of these I buildings to withstand high wir.d5 and the possibility that these buildings ,

and the condensate storage tar.k could be damaged by missiles created by failure of nearby strv:turcs. ,

l. Measures Required or Referenced by the Direcsor's Order The Director's Decision sovaht tm (1) change the conduct of opera-tions, surveillance testing, and maintenance to reduce transient frequen-cy, increase reliability of certain safety systems, and improve emergency  :

IM5 ,

{

n a . .a - 1 .a l response; (2) change plant staffing practices; (3) require more response i team training for severe accidents and normal operations; (4) increase i ECCS margin for limiting core temperature excursions during large LOCAs; and (5) induce Licensees to conduct specific studies on the sus-ceptibility of the plants to severe accidents in order to increase,Licen-i sees' understanding of risk and to provide a basis for exploration of addi-

! tional risk reduction measures. DD 80 5, supra. See Opinion,18 NP.C at 907.

i

a. Board Conclusions and Recommendations The Staff was unable to quantify the extent to which compliance with l

j the Director's Order reduced risks but estimated the reduction as less

' than a factor of 3. The Licensees did not quantify the risk reduction; I they noted that overall risk was not significantly affected because the measures required by the Order were directed towards internal events, j whereas Indian Point risks are dominated by external events.

1 On the basis of uncontroverted testimony of the Licensees and StalT, I

the Board found that the measures required or referenced by the Direc-tor's Order of February 1980 had a small, positive effect on risk reduc-tion, and that the elTect is not amenable to quantification, but is probably considerably less than an order of magnitude. Opinion,18 NRC at 908.

In commenting on the Board's decision, UCS stated that if operation continues, it makes good sense to continue in effect the measures im-posed on Indian Point in 1980 by the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regu.

lation and to implement the Board's recommendations for risk reduction measures. UCS argued that, nevertheless, neither the recommended measures nor the 1980 requirements were shown to contribute signifi-cantly to a reduction of risk. Comments at 11. Licensees essentially agree with UCS on the effectiveness of the measures, but argue that, be-cause of their voluntary implementation of new measures based on the l IPPSS results,88 the Commission should rescind the Director's 1980 Order "to the extent it has not been made generic." Comments at 33.

fi i

! b. Commission Evaluation On the basis of the record, the Commission finds it difficult to con.

. clude that all of the measures imposed by the Director in 1980 provide i

f IlTo reduce risk from earthquakes. Licensees made modifkstions, including placement of rubber j bumpers between adjacent buildings and strengthening control room ceihnss. Fire toinerabday of both I

units was reduced by equipment modification. Unit 2 hurricane vulnerabihty was reduced by requiring j anticipatory shutdown when hurricanes approach.

i i 1966 m

• h

~

.. , " G '. gf

e, N j[ :.s.

, -y .

MM ,m , w

, [ ;,, 3 - - 5' '

.s. , _ *,j.: % y

• M

.a . .- .. : . w .. .: :~.e.w u: u :-. .= .a .:. "

' f,'3i/

4 7: ' , . f- . .

7  :

substantial, additional protection which is required to protect the public

' % '-~

~

Ni health and safety. First, the Board found no support in the PRAs or in W. . .! i ; i.

the record generally for the proposition that the " fixes" contribute "sub- ' * ' % M@.  ;,M 7' % ' #

st:ntially" to risk reduction or to protection of the public. Indeed, as all '

- - ' @F *

. 'k parties agreed, and the Board found, the Director's 1980 measures had a "small, positive effect on risk reduction." Opinion,18 NRC at 908

i. :  ? .f '"

f ,;'

(emphasis added). The Board specifically conceded that the 1980 re- f quirements, while having a positive effect, did not significantly affect ~ '

overall risk because they were addressed to internally initiated events, ' '* -

and "the dominant accident sequences stem from the rare external events."32 Second, the special proceeding record contradicts the Direc. ' s tor's previous conclusion that "It]hese measures will significantly in- .

C.

crease the level of safety at the Indian Point Station." DD 80 5, supra, 11 NRC at 357. Therefore, we have decided to rescind all of the require. -

.v .

ments of the Order unless they are required to meet other license re- ' '

.? .

quirements for the Indian Point units or are required to fulfill generic re- 't cJ quirements applicable to similar types of power reactors. '

,j3--

2. Risk Reduction Design Features Considered The Board heard testimony from NRC Staff on "several potential '

design and operating changes intended to enhance the safety of these '

plants." These were three design features, a " Safety Assurance Pro. -

gram " and a tornado risk investigation. Opinion,18 NRC at 90815.

The first is discussed below; the second and third are discussed separate- -

ly in subsequent subsections. .

The mitigative design features proposed were:

1. To control combustible gases: an ignition system to control burning using slow plus ismters. '

2, To control building overpressuriistion: a passive containment building heat removal system. such as heat pipes. . t J. [To prevent] benemas penetration: a system to flood the reactor cavity.  ;, ,

/d. at 908. .

'4

+.

The Staffinvestigated the potential effect of these systems in reducing .c: / ,

e rly and delayed cancer fatalities. Because of the possible adverse condi. ,

7 tions that could be created by the systems (feature #3 increases risk if ,

not accompanied by a workable feature #2; feature #2 requires multiple ,

t lllt is unclear whether the Board was in effect recommending conunuation of the Director's 1980 re.

quirements, or even whethe,r the stafr continues to believe they are Jusened See opimon,18 NaC at 901 1967 J'

B

\

-~

(

i additional penetrations of the containment barrier) and because of the t uncertainties concerning the conditions the features are inten: led to miti-l gate, the Staff recommended against those design changes. The Board I agreed (/d. at 90911) and we concur. '

I

3. ' Sqfety Assurance Program i

a. Board Conclusions and Recommendations The Board heard NRC Staff testimony recommending a proposed

" Safety Assurance Program." The Board in turn re:omrnended that the Commission require the Licensees to develop and implement such a pro-

.; gram " subject to the advice, consent, and oversight by the NRC Staff."

.a Id. at 913.

j The recommended Safety Assurance Program, as presented in Staff 1 testimony before the Board (Tr.12,834, Part C at 1619), was d: scribed 1 as entailing i 1. Review, and when warranted. revision of procedures for maintenance, surveit.

lj lance testing, operations, technical specifications, ard personnel training to har .

vest the insights that can be obtained from the PRAs for better conduct of operations.

2. The use of th'ePRAs as an evaluauon tool to identify the importance to risk of patterns in fadure data obtained at Indian Point and to evaluate the re!evance I to Indian Point of severe accident precursors at other plants.

3. ContinueJ maintenance and use of the IPPSS as an operations management and desiga evaluation tool, including the implementation of cost effectne risk-reduction concepts.

4. Integration of the Safety Assurance Program into the conduct of operations.

Opinion,18 NRC at 911.

Licensees objected on several grounds to the Board's recommendation to impose a Staff proposed " safety assurance program": the costs could be signi0cantly higher than the costs estimated by NRC Staff; source term reductions will reduce risk estimates; Indian Point risk is al-l ready low and in accord with the safety goal, and thus there is no particu-lar reason for such a program; and, Gnally, imposition of such a program i con 0icts with 10 C.F.R. l 50.109 which permits back6ts for operating l plants only when they offer " substantial, additional protection which is i required for the public health and safety," and with the interim policy

- statement on backfitting, 48 Fed. Reg. 44,173 (Sept. 28,1983), which requires an evaluation of costs, bene 6ts and effectiveness of such meas.

~

ures. Comments at 33, in contrast, UCS stated that "it makes good

, sense to implement such a program." Comments at 11.

.a .. .

1968 i

E k

.g

x.

~~ ~

~

.. .. f

,.. j. d;.7

, . . ,, . _. ... . 1. ld-.':_na.L a ,

l.

b. Commission Ewluation [

The Commission agrees with the Beard that development and imple-

[-

r" t,-

c ef -

mentation of a Safety Assurance Program (SAP) along the general lines k -4

, .s described by NRC Staff might improve Indian Point safety. liowever, t. i the Commission must determine that imposition of such a program is necessary to provide substantial additional protection of the public health and safety in order tojustify requiring such a program. -

It is possible, as Staff argued, that this type of program could: reduce -

maintenance, surveillance, and operator errors; result in more efTective ..

plant manat,ement oversight; achieve additional assurance of safety from reexamination and improvement of procedures for operator ac-

[

tions; replace costly design " fixes" with less expensive, yet effective, procedural or operational changes; provide a framework for analyses of future rmtigative actions at Indian Point; and provide a framework for analyses of the efTect on safety of changes in equipment failure rates and ' '

plant aging, based upon operating data for this and other plants. The analyses would aid in reducing uncertainties in the risk estimates.

In addition to the advantages identified by the Staff, the Commission n:les that the program could be used to assure that the IPPSS was based  !

on accurate design and operations information, something which neither i Staff nor Sandia checked rigorously in their reviews. The program could I also provide a mechanism to assure that no changes are made to facility  ;

procedures or configurations which could increase risk. Finally, because cxternally initiated events dominate Indian Point risks, the program ,

could be designed to focus on such events.

{

Against these advantages, the Commission has weighed a number of disadvantages. This would be the Grst time that the NRC required such l a program. Before requiring such a program, criteria should be estab- i lished for the use in a licensing environment of a program based on a F full-scope PRA. The details of the program are ill defined, as are its ,.

costs. While the NRC Staff estimated that the Safety Assurance Program  ;

will cost the Licensees approximately $3 million initially, and a few i hundred thousand dollars annually to maintain, the Licensees argued i that the costs could be substantially greater. Tr.12,834, Part C at 17. If j th? residual risks at Indian Point are as low as the Board concludes, then i their complete elimination, valued at $1000/ person rem on a yearly ba. .

sis, for instance, would be comparable to the estimated startup cost of '

the Safety Assurance Program for the first year. Since we doubt that i.

such a program could eliminate risks, and implementation of any risk re-duction measure would not be without additional cost, the record does  !

not persuade us that maintaining such a program would be cost effective in subsequent years. i 1069

,. l

m. 9.; ,

+ .

a. . 1c ._ - u . .us , , _ _ ,  ;,...; ., ._ ,1,2&, ,,_

s A

The program might create other problems as well. First, it has the potential for interfering with normal operational activities. Second, the program is focussed primarily on operations, and its effectiveness in s ,

reducing external event contributors to risk - the major contributors -

,.- is not clear. Third, considering uncertainties and the potential that the

. probabilistic assessment is flawed, such a program could lead the Licen-sees to justify avoiding a safety-related action which should be taken, or to justify proceeding with an action which is unwarranted or perhaps even counterproductive. Finally, it could be argued that the Safety a .,' .,

Assurance Program invites a piecemeal approach to revision of IPPSS, which might be less desirable than a systematic and integrated overhaul

' t ' '- ; .. , -

^ 'R ", t , of the study.

We have considered the above noted advantages and disadvantages

. L s and the Licensees' objections to requiring a Safety Assurance Program.

. j ', '

• On balance, although the program may have potentially beneficial effects which merit future generic consideration, we find that the record does not support the Board's recommendation to require the Licensees to de-velop and implement a program embodying the elements set forth in the Opinion (18 NRC at 911 13). We are not persuaded that such a program y 3 is needed to assure adequate protection of public health and safety, or

- '> that it will provido substantial, additional protection of the public health

. and safety. Therefore, we will not impose such a program at Indian Point Units 2 and 3.

4. Tornado Risk inquiry

a. Board Conclusions and Recommendations

, The Board, noting that Indian Point Unit 2 had been recognized as

' being more vulnerable to accidents initiated by high winds than was per-ceived by the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (DD-80 5, supra),

was concerned about tornadoes as accident initiators at Unit 2. After

> t, . , . '. ' considering Staff testimony in response to Board questions, the Board J ' l ;'. ',

concluded:

. s. ..

~

'E In view of the infrequent occurrence of tornado watches and tornado warnings in the Indian Point area. and in view of the large contribution of a tornado-initiated accident to the latent cancer fatahty risk from Indian Point Unit 2, we believe that the risk reduction mieht offset the cost to the utility of taking protective action in

.J the event of a tornado watch or warning. Therefore, we recommend that the Com-mission direct the Staff to investigate thoroughly whether Indian Point Unit 2

- should be required to take appropriate protective action if the National Weather 3

' 5ervice issues a tornado watch or a tornado warnins for the Indian Point area.The

+

N.\ l i 'M  :,,. .{ f/ *

.J', t - 4 1970 j

s 9 %s

, ' ' * + ~ -r., - - , - . . . . , , , , , , , ,, ,,

i hfn ..('.,' ;r N+ .

i

,. y;

'a ,

.,d s .

s y i '"  %

=0 ,

'~

}.Y l.

,, ,- - e. i; , . -

s

D .rL t-

, y ', , ,d,'n

~. ;, p { '

< ~ y. ,.z-

..~

~ s

's-

,e .

.v.

. ... .v.. . s Na

• e ,. , . , . , ,

,i

-+ 1

& ./ ,,y -

b;f% .&.; 4 ?u-? 7., ;N' : ,~ .'

, ,e .l-dbbd:: ...'.5 # '" db-> MC~" J O " " ' - " * * *

• i' t

9' '

.v _ ,

7) 7

[; . . . ,

. p i , , .

~ '

investigation shouhl in our view, distinguish tornado watches frorn tornado D . . . ^ ' ' ,

W warnings. [W 4 Opinion,18 NRC at 91415 (footnote omitted).

gf L*

, i .l l Q# . *c [L + s~a -

.2 4 Staff opposed the recommendation that it be directed to investigate h O' l .Q . 9.: ,'

whether Indian Point Unit 2 should be required to take protective action tf J , ,. Q: ^

• NA > ;,

in the event of either a tornado watch or warning, arguing thac there '

' ~ -

is no evidence that such action would be cost-effective; tornado huard "

,.c -

E-is a substantially smaller risk than that of hurricanes; nornados are not a .,- +

~ ,e 4

~

dominant contributor to core melt; and there is a very short warning 'A ;e ~ .4

' n.

time for tornados, diminishing the value of this action. Comments at 11, V -

12. UCS, though agreeing that there is little evidence that precautionary i . ,

shutdowns are effective in reducing risk, would require them anyway if L -

there is to be no permanent shutdown. Comments at 11,12. '

. ,a The Board's recommendation was based on consideration of Licensee ..';.'

cnd Staff testimony that the mean event probability of tornados was about 1/30 that of hurricanes, and that tornados are second to hurricanes

.i~

as contributors to latent fatality risk. Staff has imposed on Licensees a re- -

quirement for anticipatory shutdown of Unit 2 in the egent a hurricane j , , ,

approaches the New York coast. The Board reccmmended further study 6 of anticipatory shutdown for tornado watches or warnings (which would  ! ,

be infrequent) in view of the large contribution of tornado initiated acci. -

l a d:nts to the Unit 2 latent fatality risk, and the results of recent tornado  :

research that contradicted the previous Staff conclusion that the shelter-l ing provided by surrounding buildings and hillsides made Unit 2 less sus- i ceptible to high winds. Opinion,18 NRC at 915.  ;

b. Commission Evaluation t .

While the Board's recommendation is prudent in view of the domi- [' ,

nince of externally imtiated accidents in Indian Point overall risk, the l Commission is not persuaded that a tornado study of the type recom-  !

l mended by the Board for anticipatory shutdown is needed. However, the  : .

Commission has decided to require an NRC Staff study of the wind re- , ,

sistance of the Unit 2 diesel generator and control buildings. In view of , '

j the concerns identified in Sandia's review and evaluation of the Indian i; -

l Point Probabilistic Safety Study (NUREG/CR 2934, at p. 3 36), the  : -

l ' tafT study should also consider the possi.bility of either the turbine S  !

! building or the superheater building, or parts from these buildings, fail-l ing and falling on the control building, and the possibility of the super- i l heater building failing and falling on the diesel generator building and l the condensate storage tank. ,

i 1

h l 1971 r 1

.. . . , m

- ~

--. a . = . ._ . . __.2.._ d;, , _ , . _ _ ,, ,_

S. filtered Vented ContainmentSystem orSeparese

~

. Conseinmer:t Structure

a. Board Conclusions and Recommendations Contention 2.l(a) stated that a filtered vented (ontainment system ,

' must be supplied for Indian Point Units 2 and 3. Contention 2.l(d) stated that a separate containment system must be provided. The Board heard testimony from Licensees, Staff, and Intervenors. All parties agreed that such systems would do little to protect against rapid over.

pressurization. The Board concluded:

' Considerins that such systems (especially the FVCS) can introduce sequer:ces that would exacerbate an accident. that no systems of the sort are actually in operation, that no established stsndards exist for such systems, and that reasonably intensive study by the Staff has indicated that these are costly ways to reduce rid, we do not believe at necessary to require either filtered vented containment or a separate con- ,

i tainment system at Indian Point, Units 2 and 3, as of tha time.

Opinion,18 NRC at 919-20 (citations omitted). The Board also noted j .

that the Commission's Proposed Policy Statement on Severe Accidents may stimulate further evaluation of such systems, and it urged reecami-nation of this conclusion in the light of future develop:nents. Id. at 920.

j

' The Licensees, Staff, and Intervenors p;esented testimony on the safety benefits of a filtered vented containment. The UCS/NYPIRG po-sition was that only core melt accidents are substantial contributors to ,

public hazard and that despite efforts to reduce the probability of a core melt, that probability remains high. This led them to conclude that only an accident mitigating feature such as a filtered vented containment

! system or a separate containment system could substantially reduce the

,,. , risk to public health and safety. c j l i Licensees and Staff countered that even though a filtered vented con-tainment system might reduce the already low risk oflatent cancer fatcli-l

.i '

, 1 ties by as much as a factor of 3 at a cost ranging from !!2 million ta $32

 ; million (excluding replacement power costs), inst.illation of such a l  ;

1 ' " system at Indian Point was not warranted. First, ttere was no practical M experience to rely on. No filtered vented containments are in place at l any commercial nuclear power plant in the United States. Secondaty con-tainment systems have been installed in Canadian plants, bat not of the

- type recommended by UCS/NYPIRG for Indian Pomt. Staff noted that the French are considering filtered vented containments for PWRs, ':ut

,' that they have done little work in analyzing degraded gore accidents. ,

Licensees' witness testified that at the Barseback plant in S.veden, the 01-

- tered vented contamment design arose "out of a political decision rather l

l .

l -

1072 i

,~,:

+ 't .- r *>. 3-. .m,,-e.- ,  %,

. i Ak c ~ = .

-- - ~ - . , - ,s .- - . . . . . . - , ., -- ,,- w.

_.~. _. ,

7, ,j , - -

< < - v. , g _. ,,

y ' '

w :;: i; m ., ~<n~', -

• .s + :< 'a!, 6 l o IDe..b ?.e*' .s1 U * ~ = * - * - - * ~ ~ - - ' " A**"

y ,.e .

~

l. <-

p' s than an engineering one." Second, filtered vented containments are not '" >

i fh.;W . . 4e

• '9 ,

efTective for all overpressurization accidents. The NRC Staff examined

' f~ if.(.,J'"' ' f'! -

their potential for three classes of overpressurization events: rapid Gverpressurization (e.g, hydrogen burn); moderati, rate of overpressuri- h, 7, y " ' H. , ' <

zation (e.g., from a primary system blowdown ard molten core reac- - '

^- '

' " ~

tion); and gradual overpressurization (e.g., from core / concrete interac- ' -

tion or long term decay heat). The NRC Staff concluded that, although .~ '

a filtered vented containment could be designed to accommodate moder- '

ate and gradual overpressurization, it would be ineffective in preventing <b .

containment failure, in the event of rapid overpressurization. Finally, j ' ;.r .1 . . . . , ,

NRC Staff witnesses emphasized that a filtered vented containment "t

'f ~ - (. * * '

could fail to function or, even when properly functioning, could cause 'M Jri o s, failure of other safety features by adverse systems interaction; and Inter-venor witnesses conceded this last point.

' y '.;," g",'

,k 7

^

'n-(

ics

- .] *

b. Commission Evaluation l";. ~w

., u.

The Commission agrees with the Board that the record does not -

demonstrate that such modifications would provide substantial additional risk reduction which is required to protect the public health and safety. '

We anticipate that the NRC's severe accident research program, partic- ,

ularly those elements pertaining to containment analysis and contain-l ment failure modes (see ch. 6 of NUREG-1080, Vol.1, "Long Range -

~

Research Plan, FY 1985 FY 19.89," September 1984) will yield the basic i -

data required for further design studies, and a realistic evaluation of the risk reduction potential of both concepts. Iri addition, we expect the .

Staff to keep abreast of relevant research and engineering experience in -

other countries and to inform us of significant new developments in con- -

tainment overpressurization prevention and mitigation. - -

i .

l 6. Steam Generator Fixes and Primary Radiciodine Limit ,

a. Board Conclusions and Recommendations v .

s Board Question 2.2.1 asked whether in view of the risk associated  ! <

(

with ster.m generator tube ruptures, any of the requirements proposed at j'  :,..(i the July 24, 1982 meeting of the Steam Generator Owners Group  !

should be imposed on Indian Point Units 2 and 3. The Board cone'cded  :

that ,

l ,

the only significant differences between the proposed requirements and the present . ,' -

l state at Indian Poini are that Indian Point Unit 3 lacks a continuous loose parts  ;. ,-

l

. .{

. 3 I

1973 ,

_ - - _ _ _ a_ -- _ __

_ _ . _= _ . .

. - + ,

1

.:.a . .  ;.:d...i2.L.. w .,.:...-.... .. .- -.

- -l 4

a 4

. < q G _

i

, monitonns system for its steam generators, and Indian Point Unit 2 does not cut-

u. 5 rently limit the iodine activity of its primary coolant as required by the proposed Standard Technical Specifications.

4 Opinion.18 NRC at 928. Accordingly, the Board recommended that the

. ' l Commission require: Power Authority of the State of New York l (PASNY) to install a loose parts monitoring system at Indian Point Unit

~; 3; Con Ed, for Indian Point Unit 2, to conform to the proposed Standard Technical Specification limit for primary system radioiodine. Id. at 929.

UCS and Staff agreed that there was no evidence of significant risk re-duction either from compliance with the proposed radiciodine technical specification limit, or from installation of a loose parts monitoring j system, as steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) accidents were not

.i' risk-dominant for Indian Point. UCS Comments at 11; Staff Comments at 10. The Licensees stated that they "are prepared to voluntarily imple-ment" both steam generator tube rupture " fixes." Comments at 32.

! b. Commission Evaluation 1

} The Commission finds that the record does not support the proposi-

! tion that the specific additional steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) measures recommended by the Board are required at this time to reduce j j risk. The Board stated, in discussing the SGTR fixes, that "the contribu-

! tion to the rneltdown risk of SGTR incidents may be small . . . ." Opin-ion,18 NRC at 928. The Staff would not require the steam generator fixes at this time because of the small contribution of steam generator tube rupture events to core melt risk. We note that the plant-specific

- findings based upon the Indian Point risk analyses are consistent with the Staffs generic. findings in the program for the resolution of steam

", )' .g;,y generator Unresolved Safety Issues (USIs).

• ~ - ' yn: . Thus, we conclude that decisions regarding the NRC imposition of ig ay,, the steam generator fixes recommended by the Board should await

'o , 77- generic resolution of the steam generator USIs. The fixes recommended

.,} by the Board should not be imposed by the Commission on Indian Point at this time.

1 6 ,

. N,>E

.s e m $ .0 J ,' )

s

I y .

' a;

.-{

4 g } ..

?. * ~

r,

• n.- - . Ah,

• 4,

, 1074

. .  % 4 d s {n<!, ,

( } Mw ,,, m _.~ . - . ~ . - - -

, , or,----. .- . r ,_;.-.---___ _ - - . _ _ . , ,m__ . -

- . . e,

".y

.%' , +e,, . . . _ . ..4 '. a w swi s. '. . . # .-

I I

i E

t C. Commission Question 5: Indian Point Risk Compared to ,- - ~ * ,

~

Other Plants ', '

F '# ~

The fifth question which we posed was:  ?, 3 ~ ., .

's. '

Based on the foregoing, how do the risks posed by Indian Point Units 2 and 3 com.

pare with the range of risks posed by other nuclear power plants licensed to operate by the Commission? '

CLI 81-1, supra,13 NRC at 8. ..

s 7:.. i = y Su;nmary of Commission Conclusions on Commission Question 5  ;

~

R$ n ..

The Indian Point site, as well as a few other nuclear power plant sites _f - '. f, -.

in the United States, is in an area of relatively high population density. ,i Consequently, a severe radioactivity release at that site could have more serious consequences than that same release at virtually any other NRC- . + x licensed reactor site. Nevertheless, the Commission concludes that the risk posed by the cperation of Indian Points Units 2 and 3 - which in- -

volves both the probability of a release and its potential consequences -

is not greater, and may be less, than the risk to the public posed by other NRC-licensed nuclear power plants.

Even though we accept the Board's finding that no truly reliable over-all risk comparison between the Indian Point plants and other similar- '

plants can be made at this time, we do not believe Indian Point is a risk

" outlier," that is, in a high-risk class all its own. This conclusion is based on design features of the Indian Point units that could lead to  !

lower frequencies of severe leaks from the containments, and on risk-  !

reducing modifications of structures, systems and procedures imple- I mented by the Licensees. Further support for this conclusion is derived  !

from the Indian Point quantitative risk estimates and, perhaps even i more, from the increased assurance provided by the intensive and com-prehensive probing of the safety of the Indian Point units which has [

taken place during recent years. i. ~ 7 -4

1. Board Conclusions and Recommendations V .

The Board drew four salient conclusions: (1) a severe release at  !

! Indian Point could have more serious consequences than that same

! release at virtually any other site licensed by the Commission; (2) the [!.

chance of a severe release at Indian Point is probably no greater, and l: , .

may be less, than.elsewhere; (3) no truly reliable overall risk compari- * ' -

son, be it of expected value (mean value), complementary cumulative ' -

t-1075 [. . .

I e

I, "

r J',- ,

. l.l)

- ~ ~2. . . . . . . . ._. ._ _ n. _ _

1, s - ~-i. ,.,

distribution function (CCDF), or other probabilistic standard, can be

, made between Indian Point and other plants in any comprehensive way; and (4) if earlier PRAs for other plants were reanalyzed with externally

', initiated events included, their calculated risks would be closer to the

. calculated Indian Point risk which already accounts for externally initiat-ed events. Opinion,18 NRC at 1032-33.

The Board noted that there were too few studies of nuclear power

~

plant risks resulting from both internally initiated and externally initiated 2' -

_. events to make meaningful comparisons with the Indian Point PRA. Be-

. _ cause externally initiated events are the principal contributors to Indian j

3 Point risk, the Board commented that IPPSS appeared to offer a pessimistic appraisal of Indian Point's risk when compared to the results of other PRAs. Even so, the Board concluded that "these considerations

. . . weigh in favor of implementation of the measures recommended herein for improving safety at Indian Point." Id. at 823.

From examination of CCDF curves for a number of sites, the Board also noted: "When one allows for the logarithmic scale of the ordi-nates, the early fatality curves show two sites lying clearly above the rest l

~ -l and the 'early injury' curves show two which are substantially above the l

others." The Board believed that these curves represented the Indian

.! Point and Limerick sites and."was inclined to agree with Intervenors'

,  ! witness that these two sites are ' outliers'." Id. at 1023.

l .! In addition to the foregoing, the Board urged the Commission "to con-sider the potential consequences of low probability accidents at sites

~

l

such as Indian Point, Zion, Limerick, and Salem, where the conse-

quences of a severe accident would be greater than at most other sites."

l For Indian Point, "such accidents could . . . result in fatalities that number in the hundreds or thousands." Id. at 893-94. As noted in our

+, earlier discussion of the definition of risk, the Chairman of the Board dissented from this recommendation.

'. ' , - ' ~

2. Parties' Comments

~ f[:-^'

- f.+.) , .. %'. .

UCS argued that the Board had no reasonable basis on which to con-clude that the societal risks posed by Indian Point are probably average

^

to above-average compared to other sites. First, UCS noted, the Board

< rejected the Licensees' probability estimates and concluded that there

,# was no reliable basis for comparing risks of different plants. Second, g' .

comparing the 1980 l'mdings of the Task Force on Interim Operation with the record developed before the Board, UCS noted - as found by

.!' s 5*

- both the Board and the Task Force - that the order-of-magnitude dif-N t. .

14.] ference in consequences for Indian Point over the average site is ex-

,N

,g ,

j

- E 1976 r ,s e A _ - Ib ,

e I

1

• c e

i o

w - , a -

. %. s . . .y .

w x - . . i<

, G

.x ~. . . -

a . ; w = &. e- w. x. - - --.

b i

t plained by the presence of 10 times as many people around Indian Point <

g.

as at the average site. The other conclusion of the Task Force - that 9 there is a lesser risk of accidents at Indian Point than at the average h plant - was contradicted by testimony of Sta!T witnesses Rowsome and -

Blond that the Indian Point units are roughly a'verage for estimated fre-quency of severe releases of radioactivity. Thus, the Board's ultimate conclusion of average to above-average risk is illogical in light of these t two subsidiary conclusions. Comments at 12-13.  !

Staff conceded that no truly reliable overall risk comparison can be .

made between Indian Point and other plants because the PRAs for other P

plants generally evaluate only internally initiated events, e.g., equipment malfunctions. Even so, Staff agreed with the Board that the chance of a ,

severe release at Indian Point is probably no greater and may be less '

g than elsewhere. Staff based this conclusion, in part, on comparisons of -

Indian Point risk estimates that include the major contributors to risk -

externally initiated events such as hurricanes and earthquakes - with risk estimates for other plants where only internally initiated events -

relatively minor contributors to risk - are considered. Even on the basis of this comparison, which is weighted against Indian Point, Indian 1 Point appears to be average. StafT admitted that methodological and ' l other difTerences among the PRAs limit the validity ofintercomparisons '

but should not preclude their use in determining whether societal risk of Indian Point should be accepted. Comments at 19,20.

l f

The Staff criticized the Board's finding that a severe release at Indian f .

Point could have more serious consequences than that same release at l virtually any other site licensed by the Commission. Staff noted that though a release at Indian Point could cause more serious consequences than the same release at most sites, there are other sites in the country ,

where the same release could have larger calculated consequences. Com-ments at 19. Further, StafT argued that no site studied represented a y unique extreme "in the continuum of sites depicted by the family of  :

CCDF curves." Id. at 20. The Staff also criticized the Board's selection  !

of Indian Point, Zion, Limerick and Salem for special treatment, and j stated that the record does not support "such singling out of these g, plants,". as they are not risk outliers. Comments at 16-17. U Licensees also criticized the Board's recommendation for special treat-  ;

ment of densely populated sites. They argued that such "a new unde-fined safety standard" would unconstitutionally single out Indian Point [

.and these other plants. Further, they argued, concentrating on low- p probability, high-consequence scenarios would not permit a meaningful choice between competing alternatives and may result in an increase in {

overall risk. Comments at 30.

l i:

1977 I

}

. , . . .. --,v. w - - -, : .---v-i

. E

. _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ , _ . _ , , . ~ . ,.

3 ' , V, u-.

---..._n.._

_ . _ . . _. , , , , ;,ju , , , ,,,, ; .

a. ,

..g s f In contrast, the Intervenors argued that the Commission should en-dorse the Board's recommendation and consider the potential conse-

. quences of low-probability accidents at sites with high population densi-ties. According to UCS, the Commission should adopt this reasoning

- >- and shut down Indian Point. Comments at 10.

3. Commission Evaluation

'3- ' - We formulated this question to bring together all the risk related con-

, f siderations (Commission Questions 1, 2, and 5) in order to determine whether Indian Point Units 2 or 3 were risk " outliers" that required

. ;,- shutdown or other remedial action. We conclude that the record does

- ~

6 not show that either unit is a risk outlier. Therefore, neither shutdown

- nor imposition of additional remedial actions beyond those implemented voluntarily by the Licensees is warranted at this time.

7* In response to Licensees' objection to the Board's recommendation that we consider special treatment for Indian Point and other densely populated sites based upon the potential consequences.oflow-probability

. accidents at those sites, we note that the' Atomic Energy Act provides ample legal authority for NRC to impose customized requirements de-signed to minimize risk to public health and safety (see, e.g., Atomic Energy Act j 161(b),42 U.S.C. l 2201(b)), and there is no constitution-al problem with doing so. The Act does not preclude prudent risk reduc-tion measures, provided it is rational to conclude that risk will be re-duced. Consequently, the Commission could impose special require-ments for plants in densely populated areas.

However, the record does not support applying our conclusions regarding Indian Point risks to Zion, Limerick and Salem. We reach this

? conclusion for the following reasons: (1) Licensees have modified the

.1, Indian Point plants to significantly reduce risk (Opinion,18 NRC at 4

857-58); (2) the Indian Point units have eight " design features" that "could lead to lower frequencies of major releases from the Indian Point ycy - 3 9W7@929 ;< u, ; . Y.containment than from some others,"_ with risk reduction of one or

{", 49 <Y1" more orders of magnitude resulting from two of the eight design features

- gas turbines and fan coolers (/d. at 1027); (3) risks are plant-specific;

. , i;. 'e ,

7" C

and (4) risk assessments for these other plants were not litigated in this

. -4 proceeding.

' i Nonetheless, we agree with the Board that a severe release at Indian

• Point could have more serious consequences than that same release at

.r virtually any other site. Therefore, it is necessary to closely scrutinize g ,':

,: ."- ( j ,- the design and operation of Indian Point Units 2 and 3 in order to pro-

7; y, ~,

o, x s, T vide confidence that they compensate sufficiently for such consequences w.. _

M s.j ucp

~

Q '; ,,

1978

- [

1 7 '+* = am y * , g . - _,

/

s

k . .

c ,

l , , ' , . . _ , . _ . .

_n_

r .-

I L

in terms of public risk. In fact, we initiated this proceeding to thoroughly '

~ -

investigate whether or not the design and operation of the Indian Point "

'i ' _

plants assure adequate protection of the public health and safety. ,

p. -

The Commission believes that, at this time, the potentially severe con- -

sequences of a major accident at Indian Point have been adequately con-sidered. We base this conclusion on the numerous Staff and Licensee ,

enalyses litigated at length during the Special Proceeding, on the design p .

features of the plants which could make the frequency of severe releases 1:ss than at some other plants, and on the supplementary modifications .

. A W .'

implemented voluntarily by the Licensees as a result of the IPPSS. ,- -

Therefore, considering both the consequences and probabilities for .- 1 ,.

severe releases, the Commission concludes that continued operation of .y Indian Point Units 2 and 3 poses no undue or disproportionate risk to ~'2 - '

~

the public health and safety. The risk comparisons, even considering our a 2.

reservations regarding their reliability, tend to support this conclusion. ,.

Further, the Commission has decided that the additional backfits "

recommended by the Board for Indian Point Units 2 and 3 are not war-ranted at this time. The record does not support a finding that these measures would provide substantial risk reductions which are required to protect the public health and safety. We will continue to test the  !.

validity of this conclusion within the normal regulatory process by con- l-sidering safety issues for Indian Point consistent with the treatment of these issues for any other power reactor licensed by the Commission.

In reaching this Decision, the Commission recognizes that the quan-

• titative comparisons of risk'are not sufficiently reliable to serve as the sole basis for the Decision. As we have indicated above, the quantitative I risk estimates have been used as only one of the factors considered in- '

reaching our conclusions.

III. INDIAN POINT EMERGENCY PLANNING f

A. Commission Question 3: Status of Emergency Planning at  !

Indian Point [ -

The third question posed by the Commission was:

What is the current status and degree of conformance with NRC/ FEM A guidelines of state and local emerg,ency planning within a 10-mile radius of the site and, to the extent that it is relevant to risks posed by the two plants beyond a 10-mile radius?  !~

i We are generally satisfied with the Board's Opinion in this area. As of ,

the close of the record, the Board found that emergency planning at i 1079 l b'

N"'

~

7. . ,

,5 .

- -. . a . - .- -...a.:.._ ~ . . -x. , - _ .

Indian Point was inadequate in that the present plans did not meet sever-al of the sixteen mandatory standards of 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(b), and were not in conformance with NRC/ FEMA guidelines.18 NRC at 954. The Board's findings on these standards for Licensees and for all counties except Rockland are summarized in Table 2 on the next page. We direct the Staff to report to us within 60 days on whether these deficiencies, and those detailed in our discussion below, have been corrected.

Regarding Rockland County, the Board concluded that planning and preparedness were generally deficient and that the (then-) draft Rock-land plan that the State had adopted as a compensating measure had i " substantial" omissions, including provisions for evacuating schoolchil-

~

. dren, for adequate training, and for implementation of public education requirements. The Board made clear that it had reached no conclusion as to the adequacy of the "new State Compensatory Plan," which was used during the August 1983 exercise; nor was the Board aware of plan-ning progress in Rockland in the S-month period between the close of the record and the issuance of its Opinion. Id. at 930-31,954. The Com-mission directs the NRC Staff to c.onfer with FEMA to determine wheth-er the deficiencies have been corrected, and to report back within 60 days.

As noted above, we are generally in agreement with the Board's Opin-1 ion. Hence, in the following sections, we address only those Board con-clusions which,~ in our view, merit special attention. Both the Intervenors l and the Licensees submitted extensive comments challenging many of

! the Board's rulings ~and findings. In light of our disposition of this pro-ceeding, we do not address the Licensees' comments; however, this should not be perceived as agreement with Licensees' opposition to the Board's rulings. l L The Burden ofPersuasion l T a. Parties' Comments .

I i The Commission instructed the Board that "[nlo party will have the <

' burden of persuasion'." CLI-81-23, supra,14 NRC at 611. NYPIRG, I l - joined by the other Intervenors, argued that this instruction allowed the l Board both to avoid deciding difficult issues and to allow continuation of )

i the status quo. Comments on ASLB Recommendations to the Commis-sion (hereinafter cited as NYPIRG Comments) at 3. The Board found the record inconclusive on the adequacy of: letters of agreement with

. . reception and congregate care centers (Opinion,18 NRC at 935); public notification (id. at 939); emergency communications (id. at 941-42); and

[ w.

[ ,

protective response (id. at 947). In these instances, NYPIRG asserts, j 1980

+

B s

.--ses--- opn i

r E

e, .

~-

[ .- .

6 g, w ^ * .-

e_ h k i ._ - . - ;. . . s _ . *___ _

e e

TABLE 2

~

BOARD FINDINGS ON ADEQUACY OF EMERGENCY f . . .

PLANNING (EXCLUDING ROCKLAND COUNTY)*

50.47(b)(1) e no significant deficiencies NUREG-0654, Evaluation Criterion A .

50.47(b)(2) e no significant deficiencies Evaluation Criterion B ,

50.47(b)(3)

• record inconclusive as to existence of - r Evaluation Criterion C ietters of agreement with reception and ,

congregate care facilities ,

(.,

50.47(b)(4) e no significant deficiencies -

Evaluation Criterion D - -

50.47(b)(5)

• no significant deficiencies, but record Evaluation Criterion E inconclusive with respect to the existence of or need for route alerting or other procedures in the event the siren system fails -

50.47(b)(6)

• record inconclusive as to adequacy of -

Evaluation Criterion F capability to communicate with emergency workers 50.47(b)(7)

• Public information brochures and posters '

Evaluation Criterion G were not distributed in Westchester .

l 50.47(b)(8) e no significant deficiencies -

i Evaluation Criterion H 1

50.47(b)(9) e no significant deficiencies ~

Evaluation Criterion I 50.47(b)(10)

• insufficient attention was given to .

,1 ,

Evaluation Criterion J protective actions during a severe winter .

I storm - J - '

• plans for protection of schoolchildren were not finalized [The Board found the plans in "an unacceptable state of flux." 18 NRC at 946.]

l 1981 i'

~

\.. -

l 1

e r

F ,

1 J.L . .'.

2.- . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .~ .

1

) TABLE 2 (Continued) i l 50.47(b)(10) e in Westchester (as in Rockland)

,; insufficient attention was given to the identification of the non institutionalized,

mobility-impaired populace and j assessment of their needs

• no letters of agreement for Westchester County bus drivers

• record inconclusive with respect to protective response planning in the

, ingestion pathway EPZ j 50.47(b)(ll)

• no significant deficiencies, but record 1 Evaluation Criterion K inconclusive as to adequacy of provisions for disposal of contaminated wastewater i 50.47(b)(12) e no significant deficiencies 1 Evaluation Criterion L

t 50.47(b)(13) ~

• no significant deficiencies j Evaluation Criterion M j 50.47(b)(14)

• no significant deficiencies Evaluation Criterion N 50.47(b)(15) e training or' emergency workers was i Evaluation Criterion O deficient - record inconclusive as to extent of this deficiency

' ~

, l. .. -

• training manual was deficient 50.47(b)(16) e no significant deficiencies

, Evaluation Criterion P

. j the Board was faced with insurmountable or unrebutted evidence unfa-

" ' vorable to the Licensees. The Board merely labeled the evidence "incon-

.l - clusive" tojustify continued operation.

1

, e

'l b. Commission Evaluation of Comments

- We agree with Inte venors that the Board's findings ofinconclusive-ness are weak in some cases. We believe that in trying conscientiously s 'j to apply the Commission instruction that "[nlo party will have the ' bur-j den of persuasion,'" the Board may have overextended the instruction.

uz s

. i, 1082 s

U . : -

s

',s,' ' .,*

y

.l. g s

-

, , f '

s .-

f ,

i -

}-

.~. ,

For example, the existence of letters of agreement for reception and g ' n' 2 .

congregate care facilities and route-alerting procedures are issues of fact g;, , _

, ~ M,' > m . ,

for which there is no affirmative evidence in the record. Nonetheless, w

' the Board found "only minimal support" for Intervenors' assertion that -

'n %, i,l;?j';3.. 7 g, they were lacking.18 NRC at 934. Although the Licensees' only evi- '

',. M.d. ,

dence on this issue showed that they had done substantial planning for -

congregate care and reception centers in conjunction with the American .

- 'T

Red Cross (Direct Testimony of Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Quade and '

4 Douglas, Tr.11,773 at 11), their evidence did not clearly demonstrate - ~

the status of the planning. Further, though various schools were . f, .

designated as reception centers or congregate care facilities and were /" ,

.'. .. ( ,

notified of their designation, not all accepted the designations, and let- ,

ters of agreement are missing for most of them. Tr.11,919-23.

n ' ,'

In requiring the Intervenors to establish that there are no letters, the , . -. . s.~ ,

Board placed too heavy a burden on them. Since FEMA found a defi- -',

ciency in December 1982 based on the absence of these letters (Tr. <. '

14,720; FEMA 1982 Update Report at 13) and the Board cited no evi-dence to cast doubt on the FEMA finding, we believe that the only rea- .

sonable conclusion based on the hearing record is that no such letters ex- ,

j isted for most facilities. The results of FEMA's post-hearing review of [

county plans show similar omissions. FEMA found no letters of agree- ,.

ment with reception centers in Westchester, Putnam, and Orange Coun-ties, and a single letter of agreement with a congregate care center in _

Westchester and Putnam. FEMA asked the State to incorporate or refer-ence the agreements in the State plan. The State replied that the plan ..

included only letters for congregate care centers. The lack of letters ap-parently remained a deficiency as of the time of FEMA's comments. '~

~

The Board also found the issue of public notification capability unre- ,

~

solved, citing FEMA's recommendation following the 1982 exercise that route alerting or other procedures be developed in the event of fail- ~

ure of the siren system. The Board apparently relied on the Staft's un- _

supported assertion that "a back-up route alerting system is provided in ,

the emergency plans for each county." See Opinion,18 NRC at 939. In -

.+ '.

?

our view, this capability should have been judged deficient rather than .

.i

" unresolved." Finally, the Board was unable to conclude on the basis of < 3 the record whether the emergency communications capability with sup-  ;

port personnel and facilities was adequate. .

The Staff should confer with FEMA and report to us within 60 days h on the status of compliance with these requirements. j i

1083 l

l t

e.

, =- s m - - - , ------------,w- -~ --,-w -w-- w e- w-- .

. . 2,

c. . . , .  :.c . ,

s

> . 1

- L. -. a- . . -.: . . ., . . . . c. . . ::

l 2. Reopening the Record

a. Interrenors' Comment l NYPIRG argued that Intervenors offered additional evidence to over-come the Board's reluctance to make conclusions based on inconclusive evidence, but these offers were rejected. NYPIRG Comments at 4. For example, the Board rejected the Intervenors' request to conduct cross-examination conc ~erning Argonne National Laboratory's verification hnalysis for FEMA of Indian Point emergency planning. Licensees argued in rebuttal that the Argonne analysis was irrelevant, as it' ad-s dressed details of outmoded plans. Comments at 48.

]

l

'! b. Commission Evaluation a

j' We conclude that the Board properly ruled on the Argonne analysis.

Intervenors attempted to cross-examine FEMA witnesses using the Ar-l gonne analysis, and though the Board allowed them the opportunity to

'j lay a proper foundation for its use, they were unable to.do so." Thus,

.; the Board was justified under the Federal Rules of Evidence in rejecting

. the attempted cross-examination. We are not aware of any attempt by'In-

, ;i tervenors to properly introduce the analysis into evidence, e.g., as part of their direct case, with the authors of the analysis testifying at the hearing.

Although for purposes of a decision based on the adjudicatory record

, the Commission is not required to consider the Argonne analysis, the

, ] NRC Staff, if appropriate, may consider the analysis in the context ofits l' informal enforcement process.

L J

~

3. Public Education andInformation The Board concluded, based on FEMA's appraisal and its own review

, of the public information brochures, that the brochures were adequate.

. However, the Board could not find that the distribution of the brochures 1' was adequate because the revised brochure and posters had not yet been

, distributed in Westchester or Rockland as of the close of the record.

, i Opinion,18 NRC at 943,954.

l , j Lt. Governor DelBello argued that there continued to be a need for j . j more public information and participation in emergency planning and s .. . . .  !

't..

13See Tr.15,042-53. The Board ruled that the Argonne Analysis was beyond the scope orthe witness'

( '

direct testimony. they were not its authors, and they had not relied on it in coming to any conclusions related to their direct testimony. Id.

7 j l l

I l 1984 l l l

q.y - -

4

+-

v,~,  ;

w - . .

s . g. , .

c a* -

'a b ' '

~ - . . . . m. . . & .._ d # '

\ .

[ <:

i. - ,

drills, and that there might be a need for NRC pressure to compel the h,  !"1 -

'~

State to provide adequate funding for offsite emergency planning." He [ ~

Y clso argued that there could be no effective emergency response without [. 7.

- '. ~,

' '~

trust on the part of the public toward utility and public officials. Com- e -

ments at 6. NYPIRG et al. criticized the Board's conclusion that " annual ~

dissemination of the brochure is a reasonable way to make information available and should eventually lead to public awareness of emergency '

responses." (Emphasis added by NYPIRG.) They suggested that the re-l sponse to notification of emergency measures be tested to determine [ ,

whether people were sufficiently informed about emergency planning. j. '>

'., f NYPIRG Comments at 17.

! . i i .

The Commission believes the record suggests that the use of public in- .

formation measures other than brochures may be desirable, and directs 1 the Staff to confer with FEMA and report to us within 60 days on this  ! ,

matter.

i B. Cominission Question 4: Improvements in Emergency Planning .

The fourth question posed by the Commission was:

What improvements in the level of emergency planning can be expected in the near  ;

future, and on what time schedule, and are there other specific offsite emergency ,

procedures that are feasible and should be taken to protect the public? i During the evidentiary hearing, FEMA communicated its assessment  !

of improvements in emergency planning directly to the Commission.  !

Consequently, the Board decided not to assess the ongoing improve- l-ments in the level of emergency planning for Rockland County. Opin-i 14 Lt. Governor DelBello submitted the following statement in this regard: I Chapter 708 of the laws of 1981 was enacted over the resistance of the utihty companies in New [

, York as legislation to create a $1.5 milhon nuclear emergency planning and preparedness fund at .

the state level. It is also fair to say without pressure from the NRC the Chapter 708 program [

I would probably never have been enacted . f .

Governor Cuomo recommended in his 1984 state of the state Address that these 708 Program I fees be doubled this year via legislat we action.  !

Another approach worth considering is to simply deregulate the 708 program. The rimed funding amount per reactor per year could be deleted in favor of bilateral negotiations between utilities and the state and local governments. to determine the exact amounts needed to bring emergency ,.

plan $ up to standard. All parties could then venfy the budget requirements needed before fund-  !

ins is awarded. Each utshty would pay only site-speciric costs, plus a share for state coordination. <

l In that way, funding would be tri.ly fair and adequate. and the costs for emergency planning would be internalized within the nuclear industry on a site-specific basis. Pressurefrom the NRC may again be necesiary to obtam this necessary amendment.

Comments at 9 (emphasis added). i l

i I a e

1085 e y . - . . . - _m

' S

- = - - - - - . . a. . . . . . __ . _.

ion,18 NRC at 931. However, the Board did make findings and recom-mendations concerning several areas of future planning and prepared-ness, including the potential need for a State compensatory emergency plan for Rockland County (Id. at 930), the coordinition of evacuation planning for the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) with areas outside the EPZ (id. at 1003-05), and the lack of any need for predistribution of potassium iodide to the public (14. at 1008).

We agree with these Board conclusions.

Two recommendations of the Board require further action. First, the Board found that a case had not been made for a shutdown of power op-erations in the event that adverse weather conditions degraded the road network. The Board suggested that the Commission consider whether the emergency plans needed modification to provide for alerting the public at the site emergency level instead of the customary general emergency level, when adverse weather conditions were likely to de-grade the evacuation routes. Id. at 1010-12. We direct our Staff to confer l

with FEMA on the advisability of such a modification and to report to J us its recommendations within 60 days.

Second, the Board recommended that, although there is no specific re-quirement for special measures to be undertaken to inform handicapped persons or those who are non English speakers, additional assistance should be provided for communicating with handicapped' persons in a densely populated area such as Indian Point, and that FEMA should review the need for better communication with the non-English speak-ing population. The Board also recommended publication of brochures and posters in Spanish, if warranted. Id. at 1017. Licensees criticized the last Board conclusion, arguing that there were few " unsupported non-English speakers in the EPZ" and no single foreign language was pre-dominant. Comments at 48. This comment, if correct, leads us to doubt l that such measures are warranted, and the Staff should confer *ith l

t FEMA to determine its validity. Concerning the Board's recommenda-

' tion for additional measures to inform the handicapped, the Staff should confer with FEMA and provide its recommendations to us on this and on the preceding issue within 60 days.

C. Commission Evalustion of the Board's Conclusions on Questions 3 and 4 In response to Commission questions pertaining to the then-current status and degree of conformance of emergency planning and prepared-ness at Indian Point with NRC/ FEMA guidelines, the Board identified

.M 1986 ,

f . -. -

e

- ' - - ~ " ^ ' - ' -

-T_-

• gfg.p g ; - ~; .j ; ,

m, ,

4 m -

4 . . , , . -m. . .

, ;, ~ ,'w'

(

y' g 14; '

1

,+.>.,s.. -- u - - - ~~. ~

n .,,

}.

+p. ~u,[., *.

i several deficiencies as well as " substantial omissions" in the draft Rock-9)7'f i Z land County emergency response plan. Additionally, as noted above, the l ,.

.- . e#

Board identified numerous inconclusive items and made suggestions .,'? -

' - N,.

with regard to further investigation by NRC and FEMA. While we note <. -

- that many of the Board's findings have been overtaken by subsequent ..] , ,

events, we believe the findings are generally reasonable, given the qual.

~

i -

w _

ilications discussed above and the evidence introduced into the hearing . 2 by the parties at the time. Hence the Commission directs the Staff to -

"1'

, report within 60 days as to whether all of the deficiencies identified by - ~"' '

j the Board in respons: to Questions 3 and 4 have been corrected.  ; > i E j.[

Having said this, we are now faced with the decision whether or not to 41 take enforcement action based on a record which is almost 2 years old.

Considering the record as a whole, we have decided against taking en-

' l.N. ' ,

i forcement action at this time. We believe that the Board's findings on -

t (mergency preparedness, generally speaking, support our decision inso- ,,

J I

fir as the findings were based on the Board's subsidiary conclusions con- - -

cerning absolu,te and comparative risk, on the financial and power .

l supply costs of shutdown, and on the changes occurring in the prepared-  !

ness situation. It is clear from the record and from the Board's Opinion  ;

that the emergency planning deficiencies had a relatively small effect on i risk, and the Commission has repeatedly emphasized that risk is the ,

heart of the proceeding. See CLl-SI-1, supra,13 NRC at 6. Indeed the j Commission's questions at the outset of the proceeding indicate. that the l Commission was concerned with emergency planning problems at i

. Indian Point. Addressing that concern, however, was not to be the end I of the inquiry concerning the need for enforcement action. A decision i

on enforcement action was to be based primarily on the answers to the j l Commission's questions on risk.

Further, we note that, while concluding that there were deficiencies l-and inconclusive items in emergency planning and preparedness, the .

Board recognized that the dynamism of the preparedness situation made i the hearing record obsolete. The Board observed, for example, that the *

Commission's October 4,1983 " Notice to the Parties" noted the correc- . -

l tion of two mWor emergency planning deficiencies, i.e., the availability ,

of buses in Westchester County and the adequacy of the State compensa-tory plan for Rockland County. Opinion,18 NRC at 844. However, the .

information on which the " Notice" was based is not in the hearing rec-

[ ord. <

Although our decision not to take enforcement action is based pri- i mirily on the responses to the risk questions, we have also decided that it would be unwise to initiate enforcement action on such a stale record, i  !

1 i

1987 ,

i. , ,. .... . .-. - - . - . J 9

~

. . - . . , - . . - ~ ~ .. 4----, - ,.- -

,m..,.v,,w,,,---,------.,---m.-,-.,---

A w- - - - 2. s J_ . . . . ._.1. . c.

. .2m.u. , ,

?

i i

4 especially when responsibility for many of the deficiencies cannot be at '

tributed to the Licensees. We note that the mandate for the special pro-ceeding allows the Commission to base its decision on both the Licens- ,

ing Board record and other relevant information. See CLI-81-1,13 NRC 1 (1981); CLI-81-23,14 NRC 610 (1981). Thus, we recognize that a

- full scale, integrated exercise of New York State and the four counties took place on November 28,1984, to test emergency planning and pre-paredness in the 10-mile EPZ surrounding Indian Point. Although the

-initial indications showed continuing improvement, we were informed by FEMA on February 26,1985, that their review of the November ex-

' ercise revealed two Category A deficiencies, and that a remedial exercise

- is scheduled for April 10,1985. We believe the remedial exercise is the appropriate action for the present. Should FEMA's final evaluation of the November exercise and the remedial exercise indicate continuing deficiencies in Indian Point emergency planning, we will revisit this

' issue at that time outside this proceeding.

IV. INDIAN POINT SHUTDOWN t

i A. Commission Question 6: Consequences of Indian Point Shutdown The sixth question which we posed was:

What would tie the energy. environmental. economic or other consequences of a shutdown ofIndian Pcint Unit 2 and/or Unit 3?

CLI 81-1, supra,13 NRC at 8.

Summary of Commission Conclusions on Commission Question 6 The Commission agrees with the Board's finding that in the near term, the effect of shutdown on energy reliability is not likely to be sig-nificant. However, the monetary costs of shutdown of either or both of the Indian Point units would be substantial. Shutdown would have no

- significant environmental impact, nor would it create a significant physi-

' cal benefit to the population in the vicinity of the Indian Point site

! which would outweigh the costs of shutdown.

<^ L Board Conclusions and Recommendations The Board found that a shutdown of Indian Point's nuclear powered facilities would not jeopardize New York State's energy requirements or 1988 l

l 1

t

~ ^

'.- 1 ,

-2e

--- . - - l. .3

% 9. $..g ,

A.

its reserve margins, provided the State has a low economic growth rate [).hJ,'d$,.}.

7 and also has implemented its planned 25-year generation and transmis- . c 5.vf: ' N - '

sion program. Opinion,18 NRC a't 1053,1078. However, a shutdown would necessitate the payment by electric ratepayers of a significant ,.jQ.@T-4 -i. , y * ','

s-economic penalty which totals $4-6 billion in present-day costs. Over the next 6 years,- this penalty would cause an estimated rate increase to the I~'

C~ .

customers of Consolidated Edison of approximately 2% annually, and , ' . 7,, .' - m..

l for the New York Power Authority's customers, approximately 13% an- f 1: j; '; -

nually. Id. at 1%0. Although the Board was unable to accurately quantify w E7c; . , .

indirect economic' consequences of a shutdown, i.e., business and em- !i ~ m ; t; f ' _-

' ployment losses, government service reductions or tax rate increases, it " ;M Tdlis ~i '

concluded that the tax loss impact on governmental entities surrounding er. .?:;f h 8 . , .

the Indian Point site would be substantial and highly significant to resi- f-dents in the area. The Board also concluded that closing the facilities

• jph ^ -- -

would produce no major environmental impact. Id. at 1061-62, 1067, -

1078. ',

a In addition, the Board found that the economic penalty which would i result from closing Indian Point could not be mitigated by purchasing power from the Orange and Rockland Utility, Inc., or by substituting a mass program of more energy efficient household appliances and small internal combustion power co-generators. Id. at 1063,1077.

, 2. Parties' Comments

Though . the Board estimated that shutdown would cause average annual rate increases with a substantial direct cost penalty and would be 4

likely to cause further, substantial indirect costs such as losses of em-ployment and tax revenue, the New York City Councilmembers argued

that they were acceptable. NYPIRG et al. argued that the Board's conclu-

• sion was unwarranted in light of the fact that over half of Con Ed's cus-

tomers live in New York City and their representatives concluded that '

I those costs were preferable to continued operation. Comments at 8. -

, m i

3. Commission Enaluation -

[ The purpose of Commission Question 6 was to obtain information

that would have been useful to the Commission in making a decision in

! the event that risks had been judged to be marginally acceptable. In such 4

a 1989 i

i I

l

• --% -~w I

1 l'

, . . . -. , . _ . , - -. -. ,. -,,.n.-,-._

. - - . ~_ . . . . .

3, . , .

,O t

'}? ,

f.

. . . - . .:. ..u..z . .. . - ~

+

'k i

t l a case, the information could have been useful in considering the desira-

,  ! bility of mitigative strategies. However, the Commission agrees with the j Board's finding that the costs of Indian Point Units 2 and 3 shutdown i would be substantial.

! The Board did not appear either to accept or reject the judgment of l the New York City Councilmembers that the projected cost increases

! are acceptable, and there appears to be no basis in the record for either course. First, even if a majority of New York City residents may favor shutdown, the record does not show whether that majority constitutes

, more than a large minority of Con Ed's customers. Second, although l over half of Con Ed's customers may live in New York City, the record says nothing about those whose rates would be more substantially affect-

! ed among PASNY's customers: State agencies, municipal systems, and

• rural electric cooperatives. Indeed, the Board concluded that Indian.

Point shutdown would raise rates throughout the State, not just in New York City. Opinion,18 NRC at 1060.

. With respect to power supply reliability, the Board observed that al-

. though electric utility reserves would be adequate despite Indian Point shutdown as long as the State's energy plan is implemented - bringing on-line within 15 years over 5000 megawatts (MW) of new generation, and a 1000-MW pumped-storage hydro project. . 2350 MW of capacity .

has been cancelled or indefinitely postponed. Id. at 1052-53. Also, reserve margins would be affected by actual growth, and the accuracy of even the best growth projections is questionable. Consequently, the

- Board concluded that although'it is reasonable to assume that replace-ment energy could be provided if the Indian Point units were closed, that." assumption is subject to serious questions of uncertainty in areas of growth forecasting and the full implementation of New York State's

Energy Master Plan." Id.

.j In effect, then, the Board found the record inconclusive as to the long-term effects of shutdown on reliability, but justifying continu:d opera-

--a j tion for the short term. The Board found that the monetary and other i costs of shutdown would be " substantial."

l We do not argue with the Board's estimates of the monetary costs of 3 j shutdown, nor with the Board's concerns that, for the long term, depending on growth rates and implementation of the New York State Energy Plan, long-term shutdown could detract from power supply relia-bility.

i 4

6 h;

. ~ ,

1990 i

B

a _

,  % - :y _ . , , _

f,:.

'n a. . } {, +

. , . . . w . =.

. : w:~ a. . . = ., -

>_ ;qg y.3

, y

.m.~.--

Q _ gh c  ; .a .

B. Commission Question 7: New York Governor's Views '

. q~ ., , .

I".

y ' . :. - s v s ;.~ n ,,s u

Does the Governor of the State of New York wish to express an official position g. .- ' ' ; .' . .. <':: ... -

,'"y*".'..,.'.'

with regard to the long-term operation of the units? I P * '- + x,. '

y '

.- a ,

m:<

j,( t. . u.

Board Conclusions and Recommendations ,

~'

The Board, by letter dated April 23, 1982, invited former Governor ..

v.,.. . . . . _ .

~^

Carey to express his position. By letter dated May 2,1983, the Board f.l

', f f invited the views of present Governor Cuomo. Neither, however, re- s. . ..

plied.

• p..

w. ,

r V. CONCLUSION ,.,..M- -

t. y. .._

.. .. .s 31 . . , . ' b T. ' '

We conclude that neither shutdown ofIndian Point Unit 2 or Unit 3,  !$,i' .

J . . g.

nor imposition of additional remedial actions beyond those already im- ,.. ..

plemented by the Licensees, is warranted at this time. Our conclusion is [ 'm - >

based primarily on engineering judgment of plant sa fety, as demonstrat-ed by thorough probing of the Indian Point units and .by evaluation of the risk reduction effectiveness of plant safety systems. A secondary con-sideration is the fact that the quantitative risk assessments adopted by the Board indicate that the level of risk to the public health and safety is .

teceptably low, t We are not persuaded that the additional potential risk-reducing meas-ures recommended by the Board should be imposed on the Licensees at  : -

this time. We are, however, directing our Staff to investigate the vul- ,

nerability of certain Unit 2 buildings to high winds and to keep abreast  ; .

of relevant research and experience with filtered vented containments in j ,

order to assess their potential value as consequence mitigating means  !

for application to the Indian Point units. t' We find that even though at this time there can be no truly reliable .

quantitative comparison of the risk imposed on the public by the Indian Point units and the risk imposed by other similar nuclear power plants, operation of Indian Point Units 2 and 3 does not impose a risk to the ,

public significantly greater than that imposed by other NRC licensed

• plants. We do not believe that Indian Point is a risk " outlier," i.e., in a . -

higher risk class all its own. .

~

i Emergency planning at Indian Point was inadequate at the time of the ,

conclusion of the hearings in this proceeding. However, we recognize  ;

that the situation has improved since that time, and direct our Staff to l confer with FEMA, and report to us within 60 days of the issuance of .

this Decision on the current status of emergency planning at Indian j -

l' 1991 l

t 9

=0 '

e p  ?

.y

.s

.  ?

p ~a . ..u . ..=..x.= -.: - , _ __ .. . _ . _

i.')

d

. . .j

~ , . . .c . .t

.?r y y ,~ -'. '

Point and on whether the deficiencies identified by the Board and by the

' Commission in this proceeding have been corrected This Stati report,

% .,' f.$q

. , v. however, will be outside the context of this special proceeding, as with

/'/' -,fj this Decision we terminate the proceeding.

. '~. Commissioner Asselstine dissents from this Decision. His dissenting

,l opinion and the additional views of Chairman Palladino and Commis-sioners Roberts, Bernthal, and Zech are attached.

c . . : 7. gij ,

f , , ! , % ;M..J,g It is so ORDERED.

- y Q. LQ,3 7"y .

4 For the Commission

,.f. . , , ' ,'.y .,

~ +

~

IJ John C. Hoyle d

dd Assistant Secretary of the Commission 1

4

'j

[~ Dated at Washington, D.C.,

this 7th day of May 1985.

-1

., ')

DISSENTING OPINION OF COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE i

.'b

' U I could not disagree more with the Commission's decision today in-the Indian Point Special Proceeding. The severe accident risks dominate

.W,

?- ..,, the risk to the public health and safety associated with the operation of T y,3 the Indian Point plants. By its actions today, the Commission has decid-

,,. ?e . 'y :) ed to do nothing further to improve the ability of the Indian Point plants

, ' , ,; j;f 'p 0p] ,

either to prevent the occurrence of a severe accident which has the 6 potential to harm members of the public surrounding the plants or to

~

', /{' M* Mli f.lQDis UW minimize the public health and safety consequences of such an accident

. Q .gM; f at the Indian Point site.

"c With the exception of the few measures which the Indian Point Licen-

• 'k ..~

l . , q sees have agreed to continue on a voluntary basis, the Commission has '

l

..- now abandoned the interim measures adopted by the NRC at the outset i

' ' _ . 4, ' W of this proceeding to improve the level of safety of these plants. The "sf e 4'

VM W; Commission has rejected virtually every initiative proposed by the NRC StafT and adopted by the Indian Point Board in this proceeding for

" ,i ~ f'.D5T. ?

improving public protection, and the Commission has effectively ended

^

. mSM ,3 M , further efforts to explore any additional accident prevention and mitiga-

~

. tion measures for the Indian Point plants. Finally, the Commission has

, . x. .-Q p' fd.:TL&') .

J

, :'l 1992 1

~ * * * * * . . , -

J

[Y"

- . . . , , , ._ _ -. . , , ..~

.g . - . . .

+ ,

l,' -, .,

.V ',~ ; f-c '

.

e.n ~ 9

. p_ .c ';, ,

. ,. v .f . ,.w t g' c 4 -

- > - ' . !? . g; ,g , -

' f. _ . s . __._..u-u._. .L. m u .. a m .- .2 % > - M A GQ,9A? ,F . .

.t n ., ",.

C,hw.W -.:..x- . - ,

. - - ~

;y ,

c .. ' +* . *

,~ .

chosen to defer action to address the continuing significant deficiencies q  : y.R.* .

R. .

in emergency preparedness at the Indian Point site. g.pf r$',w. . ,p, i

Although I would not order the immediate shutdown of the Indian Point plants, I do not believe that the level of protection against serious f[Q.

"<^' O 'W -

A. . ,

$c;a N ,. ~ g

• b p.p.J r _ ' . ~

, k "

accidents now afforded by the plants has been demonstrated to be ade- ' .' ,' ' , , D j, f ',

quate for the remaining operating lives of Indian Point Units 2 and 3. I -  ; 'h- '

would therefore continue in effect all of the interim safety improvements

- ~".. f ,

. required by the NRC Staff at the outset of this proceeding. I would re . . ,

~

quire the additional safety initiatives recommended by the NRC Staff and the Indian Point Board, including: (1) measures to reduce the vul- '

e nerability of the plants to steam generator tube rupture accidents and to . ~ _ - ~

damage from tornado risk; and (2) the Safety Assurance program. I 1._ ' J- ,[ ,

would also require continued efforts to explore in greater detail further D?? ,ih: , 1 l

' Q . ] ~- ) (. ,

• u . -

titernatives for safety improvements in the plants, including the possible p,

installation of an additional decay heat removal system, a filtered vented u.; .

y _4 -

containment or a separate containment system, all of which have the i potential to improve either the plants' ability to prevent severe accidents f

l- .

^J 'l or to mitigate their consequences. Finally, I would initiate enforcement  ; ,

i tction to ensure that the continuing significant deficiencies in emergency preparedness for the Indian Point site are corrected within the near fu-ture. If those deficiencies are not corrected promptly, I would take ap-propriate enforcement action until the deficiencies are corrected, as our I regulations require.

When a previous Commission began this proceeding nearly 5 years j ego, it took the unprecedented step of initiating the first reexamination  ;

of the safety of an operating nuclear power plant. In its May 30,1980  !

order initiating this proceeding, and in subsequent orders defining the L- '

i scope of the proceeding, the Commission promised a thorough reap- l' ,

i praisal of the risks to the public posed by the two operating Indian Point ,. ,.

units, of the adequacy of emergency preparedness at the Indian Point [' '

l

( site, and of the need for safety improvements in, or shutdown of, the plants.

[n i g l ,

l This reappraisal was to consist not only of a technical safety assess- .w .

i ment by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff, but also of a formal ,[ ' ' g' - ' , ,

4

! adjudicatory hearing before an independent Atomic Safety and Licensing t ',G ~

~

Board. This hearing was intended to assure a full public airing of the rele- -

vant safety issues regarding the risk posed by the Indian Point plants.  :

i Members of the public were to be given the opportunity to present their  ;

evidence on these issues and to test through cross-examination the opin-ions, judgments and analyses of the Licensees and the NRC Staff. The -

Commission was then to reach its judgment on the need for shutdown j; /-

t -

i 1093 y -

t ~* "'"*~' ~*

,-..-.e.p.*-*]-

I #

5

• t, s

h A ,, f = b , > +' - .

u 1 s ~ , ; .. . ~

'

• s c j,

../

' ~

,}:

" j'y.\y y' . .

7, ~ . j . ~ - - - , .;c.

,. . , .w

. :.r . . :. ,

' - --'"""--i ~-- - a .: . . - . , .au i ,;;.

i -

v;

'h*

, ,y 3

- ' e <

, (. .'. y *

.m .

of, or safety improvements in the Indian Point units based upon this

. j $ @: ~ .. ' :'. .. ;a

.@,;.,,f J y p.' ' W.

hearing record.

.. ,. m; , 4..; y , , '

• 1 . ' All of these steps were taken by the Commission With the realization,

' ,, y, f f fp"f W j ' ' ' '

- in the aftermath of the Three Mile Island accident, that a serious acci-

.f c W .t dent at a nuclear power plant which has the potential to harm the health

. g g:

t

f,, ' ~

u.s...',

ny 2, and property of the public surrounding the plant can in fact occur. This realization, and the Commission's willingness to undertake a public airing of the risk of such accidents at the plant with the largest number l

M W Qi s _ ,

of people in its vicinity, indicated.a possible change in the Commission's WN MQTs M. . ~ -

approach to safety. It seemed that the Commission was at last willing to

.,; , .. [r.. C M.. .'.u

. r..c "f ' ' ' .

forsake the complacent attitude toward safety that had contributed so

• .< q,C ..< j ;k i,' M ' G ' 4 ;, much to the Three Mile Island accident. It seemed that the Commission

, , e, e ~,7 *. t ,'.j ! p p was prepared to probe the adequacy of measures both to prevent serious accidents from occurring and to mitigate the consequences of such acci-j ,j .h. ' . 1.3, ! ' '

U . ' 3' ". '.--

.~

dents should they occur.

This change in the Commission's attitude toward safety was well justi-f fied and long overdue, and the dangers associated with the past attitude

= C, '

of complacency were clear. As the President's Commission on the Acci-l , ,

dent at Three Mile Island put it:

After many years of operation of nuclear power plants', with no evidence that any

' member of the general public has been hurt, the belief that nuclear power plants are ~

' i sufficiently safe grew into a conviction. One must recognize this to understand why

..J

- many key steps that could have prevented the accident at Three Mile Island were

". . . , ,,~%' '

not taken. The iPresident's] Commission is convinced that this attitude must be j

., j, ;' .. d,,

changed to one that says nuclear power is by its very nature potentially dangerous, and, therefore, one must continually question whether the safeguards already in v.J q. ki ?. M --

~

~

.- , PdQJ.'f8;r.N3 Z place are sufficient to prevent major accidents. A comprehensive system is required j

?~[s

.c

...%. h d'M '7ldr

?; & ,.:,i n:n % .i 7 In which equipment and human beings are treated with equalimportance.'

.gk[ip.,[..QQ k The first sign that the Commission's enthusiasm for this inquiry, as well j ",q^?'$./W M [Q N M.% as its new questioning attitude toward safety, was waning came shortly i C  ;' .?R after the commencement of the adjudicatory hearings. On July 27,1982,

,: t fM%yQg.Q[47.%~ , )4 . -.J hl the Commission issued an order which redefmed the ground rules for

,lin, L tl,V.%.. ,o@;E.,y',g Q..'

' the proceeding, restricted the public's opportunity to obtain a hearing on F. . , A .

new proposed safety measures for the plant, and erected new barriers to

'..? the public's ability to present evidence in the hearing on tiie risks posed

d/ 6. 7qf ,N ;1"[i[V,;

% Q, by the Indian Point units. The Commission's July 27 order led to the

, 4 b' : .g

?',

~.a* 't.f

• y:.ll& U . 9f:Y-M y: W, A

r^,[hx,Q

$N~

s

.n'7- : e.d4 MWe ,7, [R. 'Wthm*;;;

n.Q';;,

A. l'k,?. .}

.W d '.y[;&@;Q

.G 4hy.: 't 9 ,,jw D ' D [ 2 [ .t.h[.Mi//j'e I Report or the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island at 9.

~

..,g-  :

-4s

.. . s

% f>

• 4 m J. 1994

• {

.,e,. ,

' ' '.944s".' W , e =mw w . .. s .#....,, p,. .,, , , , , , _ __ _

t

.% , 'I /s

' N * . . , j' ' , "

g1 f ',,

• 4

.z

• ~

.. 1 . w .....

~..h .. . : nL , _.

• 4

y. ,

' - \g y.-

eg.

..<-.3 s i , . .J

,, .N ' , W.*

(r  ; . ,' '*

J. ,  ; ;, . .d ' ; " - L. 1 L O I A0Oa'5 * ' ' ' ~ ~ - N

,s. ~

} *

,  ; s ,

p,_:.-

... 3 ~'

, resignation from the NRC of the Chairman of the Indian Point Board . . . . . 'm "

i and resulted in a delay of several months in resumption of the hearings.2 .

The Commission's decision today represents the final step in the <k' M . rc.:.m [" %3 .* ~

'.,N c h.. 1 7 .. l,'#n^ N'^E. '#

Commission's return to the attitude of complacency towards safety hq q _. f-1.. e 'JE which prevailed prior to the Three Mile Island accident and which was a  %;, N :,. T. ,1  % '

significant contributor to that accident. This proceeding has demonstrat-ed that the risks to the public from severe accidents at Indian Point are 0 W 'f 9.n . N 2

-:,.. A y%('

substantially higher than believed at the time the Commission instituted

! the proceeding. In the face of this knowledge, the Commission chooses - -'

to reject even the modest safety improvements recommended by the , , '

", e VD- \' :.' >>'

NRC Staff and the Indian Point Board, and to end any meaningful effort to explore more ambitious safety initiatives for the plants. Thus, the -:o .w .gl p -

Commission has elected to ignore the warnings of the President's Com- ..*C . .

mission on the Three Mile Island Accident. This return to complacency 'w. -( " 'd. -

nWc,h 5 is most unfortunate in the case of the Indian Point plants and the other '; f f,.f '

- ~-

operating reactors located in densely populated areas of the country. / '

It is worth noting that the Indian Point site was first selected as an ac- 6" ., . . ,, , ,

. I'J.

ceptable location ~for nuclear reactors based upon what turned out to be '

an erroneous judgment that containments would maintain their integrity given a core meltdown.3 The Commission in its decision, as did the Atomic Energy Commission in the mid-1960's, refuses forthrightly to I

face up to that misjudgment and rejects the adoption or further explora- i tion of measures that could reduce the risk to the level that was per- .

ceived to be acceptable when the site was first selected. ,

i i

The Risk Question at Indian Point l

Although many aspects of the debate concerning the risk to the public l.

posed by the Indian Point plants are quite technical, the central risk '

i

~

question, and the basis for my fundamental differences with the Com- ~

mission majority, can be stated simply. The record of this proceeding es . , ,. '

tablishes that a serious nuclear accident at the Indian Point site could '

result in thousands of near term fatalities and thousands oflater fatalities -

due to cancers caused by the exposure to radiation. Under certain weath- '.,, .g G ' , , i ' , '; ,

~' ',

er conditions, delayed fatalities due to cancers caused by the accident appear to be possible as far away from the plant as almost anywhere in '***s "c. _

V 21 opposed the Comnusson's July 27,1982 order, as did Commissioner Gilinsky. My views opposins the Commission's order are pubhshed with that order. ConsoMared Edrson Co. of New York (Indian f- * '

Point, Uma 2), CLI-8215,16 NRC 27,39 (1982). * -

l.

• 3Desid okrent. Nucitar Reactor safety: On she History of the Regulatory Process (The Universsty or Wisconan Press,1981). Sec. e s., pp.46,103 35, and 163 78. .

l 1995 f

L

},,.,, .

7 m.- .

xe-ee 4

1

. -. -~ _- -. - .__

; _ .1 . . . ,

, ,,3.,

. - s

, s m

e o.',- '

J

s. ;

-e.

I

j. . ,.

. - ~ . . _ w_ _ . .u

_ . 2 , _ . . . m.a . x,m o .J.':'

.u:

4 ,,

,s- .

. New York City. A significant contributor to the potential for this catas-

, , .~'

trophic number of early and late fatalities in'the case of the Indian Point ,

t .' plants is the size of the population living in the vicinity of the plants.

- j ,.

- The Indian Point site has the large:st population density of any nuclear power plant site in the country at distances of 10,30, and 50 miles from

, , , ~ , . '

the plant.'

- , .1 .. Admittedly, the likelihood of a serious nuclear accident at the Indian '

. a 7,5 .

~' x

, . . , .' Point plants resulting in thousands of near term and later fatalities is ,

5 J. ,a ./ f;' . ,

low. Several elements are needed for such an accident to occur. First,

, n 'p - y . s

. '. ., W 3 . .

there must be a severe accident at the plant which leads to melting of -

, p ( s r.; .'~ '

. r: . . the reactor fuel. Second, there must be a failure in the containment

,, 4 . .

+ structure which surrounds the reactor vessel. Such a failure could occur

, >'v. f . ,

_ [ , , , ; s' because of some equipment breakdown or human error which violates I^h.'

l

.J. ~

the integrity of the containment, or because the sequence of events A '. during the accident leads to a radiation release which in some way by-

~'

passes the plant's containment system. Equipment failures and human

) - , errors leading to the loss of containment integrity occur from time to time at nuclear power plants, the most recent one occurring at the San Onofre Unit 1 plant on Fetiruary 13, 1985. Accident sequences which can lead to bypass of the containment system have been identified for the Indian Point plants as well as for other plants. third, weather condi-

- tions must permit the transportation of the radioactive releases from the j 4 ' ,' '

plan't to areas of population concentration. Weather conditions,'such as severe winter storms, can also increase the consequences of a severe F; , ' , ,

accident by preventing early evacuation of the surrounding population

^

in some accident situations. The low likelihood of an accident resulting

.ZW ds.t..Q..  ?,.

W.$'i-<f, .q ..G.I.:. . ' in large numbers of fatalities is based in large measure on predictions that an accident leading to a core meltdown is itself an event of low

.j y,i f. ..V , y 'kjf ,, Qj Q probability and/or the assumption that the simultaneous occurrence of a

, j'ZJ@;..? A y,C,fY/D- core melt accident, the loss of containment integrity and adverse weather q p '<, ,

i ,*.n ,$ L .?" conditions is unlikely.

l Although it is relatively easy to predict the consequences of a severe j

Of{;-r.*T'%.

.c , gg. .]V,.i.y  ; 6 J 'j f'. J . accident at the Indian Point site given various assumptions concerning ,

' (;,

• L : . - 3., .

the type of accident, containment performance and weather conditions, i

- 4 *. - - ;-

.-  % ,9 i ,2 0, it is far more difficult to predict with any degree of accuracy the proba-

<~.i.;.L,3"9.:'R .^ bilities of these events occurring. Indeed, the Indian Point Board ex-c-

' */ . '. pressly recognized the large uncertainties involved in efforts to predict

mu-].z e.

f. k h,y y;n

[ [.['[Q'[ the likelihood of core melt accidents, containment performance and

.) _h[ h: . weather conditions. Opinion,18 NRC at 872,878-81.

@d[{D .['- C$.

a ,$Q]4 Q.7[,'.?,h.g.';(.'NdR.G; .

f

.G k".; QQQ 3 /.

f-q W '7

• ConssWswd Edson Ca e/New York (Indian Point, Unit No. 2). LBP-83 68. IS NRC Sil. 893 95.

' Ap//;

.' c y ;. .% 'J.),,{.h: c, y J '. *

, 900-02 (1983).

, .., q s. . .

'e

. J s- - 1996 J *1

. . *'4 .(

• • • • -*^'a pa w^ * -.W - w. team ** e 3==. .-~ . m, . . . .~ .

.y.

ls , il* , .

'}f ..

I g ,

4 >

. , j_ *e

- - ~. . , m . . _ . . . , _

_ _ _ _. ... . +..

.[. , _ , ,1 _

-^

s

., . ,j 7, .

a g. y, g. Q . ,

~

- /

~

7. , .S g ', ,

=a;, a .. . . - , .. = a .: e :. s.c:.;>.2  :.- - = ~-- .

At the same time, it is clear that the potential costs to society from  ;. ,

dangerous, low-probability accidents increase dramatically at the high- L.'f' *

,. ..+>  ;

population-density sites such as Indian Point. Id. at 893-94. The central TW' N 7+ '. -*3 ' - : '."

..e,,.. . -

question before the Commission in this proceeding is how to make deci- C V. : ' ' ' e .

. ,; f .

sions on whether to require additional safety measures at the Indian ',' s S' - ' ? l ;, 3 Point plants, and at other high-population-density sites, given the exist- '

.W , - ~

i., ,

ing large uncertainties in accident probability esumates and the potential- -

r .

ly greater costs to society from accidents at such sites. the uncertainties ,

',f', t i are so large that an objective observer could conclude that a severe acci- - . -* ,. '

dent at the Indian Point plants leading to catastrophic consequences is

' ~

.;~ . .,

~

credible, or conversely to conclude it is incredible, depending upon how ,,f~n'- e . . , -

one views the uncertainties. . y7 N e a '.,

.3 2 - Jm.l.., . '.

- .v..'

The Treatment of Uncertainties 1 .,3 >.>y .

The Indian Point Board factored the uncertainties in risk assessment _n N ..

into its decision in two ways. First, it reviewed and evaluated the Staff's . . - ,

uncertainty estimates for the accident risk assessments performed for the Indian Point plants. Although the Board adopted the Staff's high esti-mate of risk to account for uncertainty, the Board recognized that the StafT's estimate was an intuitive judgment on the part of one NRC Staff reviewer and noted that there was no basis for believing that reviewer's intuition was any better or worse than that of other witnesses. Id. at 891.

It also appears that the Board may have relied upon new source term in- l formation, which has yet to be validated based on accepted scientific ,

principles, in deciding not to increase the Staff's upper risk limit by a substantial additional factor.5 Id.

The Board also considered uncertainties in a second way. Both the Board and the Commission's Task Force on Interim Operation ofIndian -

~

Point recommended that where the consequences of a severe accident - '

rppear to be high, as is clearly the case with the Indian Point plants, the -

Commission consider measures to reduce the severe accident risks. Put simply, the Board recommended that the Commission consider pursuing >

additional safety measures at the Indian Point site in recognition of the' ,

~ .. 'e'i -

fact that such an accident could result in much more serious conse- . , /. c '

quences than at sites with lower population density. Id. at 893-94. '.. ~

It is of fundamental importance in this proceeding, as well as in other Commissian regulatory activities, that the Commission factor into its 3 To the entent that it renes on new source term information, the uncertainty estimate adopted by the ,

Indian Point Board may t'e too low. I suspect that an uncertamty estimate of a factor of 100 or more is -

past as hkely to be curect as the factor of 40 adopted by the Board. ' "

1997  ;

i g .. .-.*go-e. .

9

i 1 '

-i. ,

. .- a.- . a. . . ". : . 1 .. . . , . a. . ..._.u.

decisionmaking the uncertainties in risk assessment. Our Advisory Com-T '. mittee on Reactor Safeguards recently advised just that: "There are

. deep problems involved in the regulatory use of risk. assessment for deci-

.' ' ~ '

sionmaking in the face of uncertainty. We recommend that the Commis-sion adopt a position on this point and make it clear to the NRC Staff."6 The Commission has adopted a position on uncertainties in this deci-sion. Unfortunately, in deciding not to consider the potential costs to

- ~

j. . . society of dangerous, low-probability accidents, and in deciding to reject i  ; those safety improvements for the Indian Point plants recommended by o, - 'e

, - l .,.- L fo the NRC Staff and the Indian Point Board, the Commission has, in ef-M' ) fect, chosen to ignore the large uncertainties inherent in risk assessment

.e s '_ in general and in the specific risk assessments considered in this proceed-ing. More than anything else, this aspect of the Commission's decision

' ~

reflects a return to the unquestioning complacency on accident risks of j the pre-TMI period.

I strongly support the Board's recommendation that the Commission s q j give serious consideration to the potential costs to society of dangerous, '

e low probability accidents at Indian Point. Given the uncertainties in-

] volved in risk assessment and the serious potential consequences of an

-j accident at Indian Point, I believe it is both prudent and nece>sary to i consider additional improvements which could reduce both the likeli-hood and consequences of such an accident.

l i

~! Safety Improvements The Indian Point Board considered a number of measures designed to

.. reduce the likelihood and consequences of an accident at the Indian

/

N N' Point plants. These included: the measures required in the February

- , p .. ,

A': CC 11,1980 order by the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regula-s - f. OQ.^ .'. A . ' %.yT.; tion; additional mitigative design features; the Safety Ass'urance pro-l' l  : r. J./ <

gram; measures to reduce tornado risk; a filtered vented containment

, 1.  ; , ) N' " system and separate containment structure; and additional steam genera-

• ; ,W. -

tor requirements. I agree with the Indian Point Board on the need for,

, =.i .

' ~ '

, [t' ij and benefits of, those safety measures which were recommended by the

- Board. In addition, I agree with the Board's judgment that further con-s

' ~

,i , %; , sideration should be given to a filtered vented containment system and

-;<- separate containment structure.

.c.

C _ r ~ % I find the Commission's decision to reject all of the safety improve-

.[ .m I ,

'$' q .e ments recommended by the Board, save those few which the Licensees

. , n: );?1. . . . . .%. .,:.:. ,bf. ' &

Y

..g"([// e- 9', "'{ i N

• Letter rrom ACRs to the Commisson dated March 12.1985. "ACRS Comments on the Proposed g; ,# i; e. f~ ~ j. f(y. ' F: ~.

Rule on Backfitting."

. W , s, ',

lo9g

]

. S.

.m, , .,_ , ,, __ _

/

.e k

• O

h. *

, y

y , _

' ~

i '. ~

[ l ; k

(- 3, . , - ,

, ~ -

N i. w. m 2 . . . $ _O O '. -N OC ' ~ ' - * * " ' -"

,. z.. .

. u- ,

hive agreed to continue voluntarily, to be unsupportable. The Commis- I' sion's decision is particularly ill-advised in the case of the proposed , [ %' y y [1',

Safety Assurance program and the filtered vented containment. The pro- c..-; y 'w m ,Q'

.;. f.2 c ? ;. , ,,. ,,

-y, 'f;.

posed Safety Assurance program, which was recommended by both the ' '

NRC Staff and the Indian Point Board, contained a number of elements intended to address the potential for human error and equipment failures "f ' W W,5

g sf,(~4],f,"} y 8.

• t -c "i which can contribute to severe accident risk. The objectives of this pro- ' ~

+

gram were to bring about improvements in key areas of human perform- '%

W /.

^

ance and equipment reliability, to improve and refine our understanding _OU,+ ]- .

Y of accident risk estimates for the Indian Point plants and to reduce - ~ -

, 45, where possible areas of existing uncertainty in current risk assessments. ,

r, . . .

Wy

' ~

A significant potential benefit from this proposed program was to be that . .

th2 results of the program could be factored into the detailed risk assess- --

/ s .

~

' yr ~ " 6. / ,

ments performed for the Indian Point plants. These risk assessments , ,

~

could then be more than just filed away and used as a justification for some bottom line judgment on the accident risks at the Indian Point

/' -

. Zi

., 73, 'l-pl:nts. Rather, they could become continuing and useful tools for iden- '

.~ ^

tifying and addressing potential areas of safety weakness in the plants. ~ '

As a result of the Commission's decision, these benefits will now be lost.

I also agree.with the Board's conclusion that a filtered vented contain-ment or a separate containment system should not be required at Indian i Point Units 2 and 3 at this time. However, I am concerned that, contrary  !

to the Board's assumption that "the Staff (and the Commission) will  !'

reexamine'our conclusion"'(18 NRC at 920), specific evaluation of such systems at Indian Point will now be delayed indefinitely. The arguments rgainst the use of a filtered vented containment presented by the Staff and Licensees in this proceeding were generic and addressed concepts rather than specific proposed designs for installation at Indian Point. Be-cause of this, I conclude that such systems have not been explored suffi- ..

ciently to support a firm decision that they should never be required at ~

Indian Point. The Board appeared to share this view in its recommenda- 1 tion against requiring such systems "at this time."

The Staff and Licensees pointed out that the use of a filtered vented '

containment or a separate containment system might reduce latent ,

cancer fatality risk by as much as a factor of 5 and that the costs of such ,

systems would probably be in the tens of millions of dollars. For a site located in densely populated areas, such a reduction in risk might be '

worth the costs. The issue should at least be considered further.

• Accordingly, I would have directed the Staff to develop a plan for a '

more detailed evaluation of the risk reduction potential and the costs (to '

NRC and the Licensees) of filtered vented containments or separate con- '

tainment systems for Indian Point Units 2 and 3. Furthermore, I would - -

1999 l

p s *M

\

[ ,

, ,1 . -

m

, . l ^: u

~

. . , - i 3;

. . . .c . ,

". '4 4 g

. < w

i . . i:. a . ~........a._.. .e w:a:, .x r

i ,

1

.I

- have directed the Staff to consider other additional s'efense-in-depth con-

, i : ,

1

. . ., cepts it Indian Point, such as a dedicated decay heat removal system.

. f.  : .

Emergency Pisaning As the Commission notes, the Board found that emergency planning -

, at Indian Point was inadequate in a number of respects. In view of the

< ' ^- ., E Board's findings, the consistent pattern of significant deficiencies in

. - .~ c'E. l ' "S4 ;l. .. emergency planning at Indian Point and the evidence from the Novem-m 7.y , y S.W. ber 28,1984 exercise, which indicates that at least some of these defi-

- - :? ciencies continue to exist nearly 2 years after the close of the record in l ' '

f yp; ' the special proceeding, the Commission should now initiate enforcement

,g ,

i. 2 -

action under our regulations. Indeed, the determination of the need for J' such enforcement action was one of the express purposes of the special

. . ?' -

J<

proceeding.

I would therefore initiate the 120-day clock and require the correction l '

of all significant deficiencies within that period. It may well be, as the

majority contends, that the results of the November 28, 1984 exercise will demonstrate that many of the deficiencies identified by the Board have now been corrected in addition, the further exercise held on April

. .j 10, 1985, may show that the two. continuing significant deficiencies l identified in the November 22d exercise have now been corrected. But l at present, we simply do not know based upon the record in this pro-

! 1 ceeding. The enforcement action called. for under the Commission's

-( regulations is designed to provide the information needed to answerjust l j j l these questions. The Commission should follow its regulations and initi-

.;;. : . . ; e .f t , ate the appropriate enforcement action. Instead, the Commission has

, ,-' f3 9., ' ,a.. . ..g. ,, '

chosen to defer any further action, beyond requesting a report from the.

3; Q * .U K.-j . Staff, to address the continuing problems in emergency planning at

<;'-.- A ' f - >; g. i. '-' , 7.),. ;(g i , Indian Point.

~.g., --

~~

, . . '. .-~:- '. x :

. . . . Cenelusion

- '  ? For the foregoing reasons, I cannot support the Commission's decision '

today.

f , j

. , s .-

D .g',,

• p't .1* ,. :- - q: ,.

• I 6 ,e -- .g3

^ ,.

! 6 .- j_ *f' k N f s , s ,

s N $.h 3 .q ', N 1 4 '

g  ? .. , , ,

t

~

1100 1

~

5m

,v

, m,. g----- 7 . m

,. .. r

. , _ .._ _ r m.

=  :, . -

6 0

% g 9 4 L, O

n . .' . .

, . 7.c

l ' .r r, . . .

. ' , 1 ~

31

. .:p , , 'g ,

.:::.r::.;.;,uG R =- w -  :-- ~- - - ~~

^7 ,

s .

rm

[

[. , , ,::c,'*"< ,

q -

e ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF CHAIRMAN PALLADINO AND < - '.#, .*

COMMISSIONERS ROBERTS, BERNTHAL, AND ZECH .

%, y

-7. M Q :ij g.i).Q ,' ' ~

lt is important to note that none of the Commissioners, including ... - P. s *c;..

Commissioner Asselstine, would order shutdown of Indian Point Unit 2 Q@:"'%.,,M M

1 fd,M '%% gg,;n or 3 at this time by virtue of the unacceptability of risks to the public. ' ~ d - Q M ~ $,.-k a -

The Commission majority believes that what is at issue here is whether ' J, < M- x ..

cr not there is a need for special additional safety measures justified by . g ' c? [ . G .. i E ;c reduction in public risk because of siting characteristics of these plants.

The Commission majority reviewed the same information and reached a M 1 '. '.

different conclusion from that reached by Commissioner Asselstine. We

- '* Dp:f7 VN T M T will not address all the areas of perceived disagreement as this would be  ? 'q.X ;;.W W .,

essentially a repetition of the rationale presented in the Decision itself. '-

_ '/ [ .fr q,' ['

However, neither the Commission majority nor Commissioner Assel-stine would have required substantial safety modifications such as fil- I

, % h ,'j. Q .; y J 7'.

tered vented containment or dedicated heat removal systems at this b-

QRy'M M time. The difference seems to be one of degree - namely, Commission-  ! .

.% M.s.d l?( Q; ' 4 %., '

er Asselstine would require an agency commitment to additional study , . f. l,' O~

of measures such as filtered vented containment specifically for the  ; ?.c

~

Indian Point plants, whereas the majority of the Commission believes S.

these issues can be adequately addressed in the NRC's severe accident  ! -

r: search program and the Staff's activities to monitor relevant research i and experience in other countries. The Commission reviewed the bene-fits and costs of a Safety Assurance Program, and the majority concluded f

i that, although such programs may have potentially beneficial efTects  !

which merit future generic consideration, the record did not support i imposition of the program. It also was not clear that such a program, as '

defined in the record of the proceeding, would be effective orjustifiable. -.

Given its importance in probabilistic analysis, the Commission consid- -  ;.1 .

ered at some length the treatment of uncertainties in the Indian Point 4 . , ,. ."~~ '

risk estimates. The Commission was briefed by the NRC Staff on the -

_f. +

subject. While recognizing the limitations of uncertainty analyses in -

~

probabilistic risk assessment, the Commission majority found the .

" ^' h ~

Board's treatment of uncertainties adequate for reaching its decision in this case.

3 f - ,_ J.,7 . . -f' ', ,".

@^eW .,-

l In reaching its decision not to impose special risk reduction require- pls '

l ments, the Commission majority recognizes that any remedial actions re- -

l quired to address particular generic or plant-specific safety issues will be -.

instituted in a manner consistent with the resolution oflicensing issues M for any plant. This is because the Commission majority concluded that -

the Indian Point pjants do not appear to be " risk outliers" requiring ,[l <

imposition of special risk reduction measures. In addition, on the basis ' '

1101 ,'

, - , s, ., ,

.~- 9._;

, ~ M s ~,;- *

~

( w w a: .. = ..a. . a..e. . _. w __. w; . a._ , .

s- ,

". . ' of the record, the majority of the Commission could not conclude that

,4^j ,

1. 4 . -

... the measures imposed by the Director in 1980 would provide substan-

/. <

, f B~ tial, additional protection which is required to protect public health and

• '* safety. It is for this reason that the Cominission majority decided to re-

, f ,

i

~

scind the requirements of the Director's 1980 Order unless they are

- needed to meet other licensing requirements for the Indian Point units N or'are needed to fulfill generic requirements applicable to similar types

. ,# ' N,,_,.f, ",'^ of power reactors. The Commission majority sliated the Board's concern g y' ,g f4 < - Q i ? - regarding the wind vulnerability ofIndian Point Unit 2 and consequently

%y

,'[A) (.- '

-![ -

- is requiring a Staff study of the susceptibility of certain Unit 2 structures to damage in high winds.

w ,, 1  ;. We all agree that the status of emergency planning set forth in the

_ -i ,

,_  ; ~ -

record of this proceeding is stale. In the emergency planning area, it is important to note that neither the Commission majority nor Commis-

[.

A - ' < , sioner Asselstine would shut down the plant because of the deficiencies identified in the course of this proceeding. However, Commissioner As-seistine argues that our regulations require us to initiate a 120-day clock in these circumstances. On this we disagree. The rule - 10 C.F.R.

,' { 50.54(s)(2)(ii) - is not intended to require the Commission to initiate

- a 120-day clock whenever there might be emergency planning deficien-cies. Rather, the initiation of the enforcement clock should be based on an assessment of the accuracy and currency of the information. Accord-

, ingly, the difference is in agreeing on how to address the issue. Commis-4' sioner Asselstine would start the 120-day enforcement clock. The majority of the Comn'ission is unwilling to consider enforcement action prior to being informed as to the current status of emergency planning at Indian Point. Our request for a Staff report within 60 days assures 3- f f.,,,'.

4 .

m , that, if there are significant deficiencies in Indian Point entergency plan-

! . %fq.4N'$ N '

ning, we will have the information needed to decide whether to initiate

. i c , c;' U C. @'i. [ '- enforcement action.

. Z .~ Y ,9 , The Commission cannot agree with Commissioner Asselstine's posi-

, I' 3 :./E' M % ~ ,' tion that our decision reflects a " return to the attitude of complacency 3._. g.. . . .

qq.i,; P towards safety which prevailed prior to the Three Mile Island accident and which was a significant contributor to that accident." It is not rele-vant to this decision to attempt historical. comparisons or to estimate

'i, ,- ..4's what portion of the responsibility for the TMI accident should be at-

' "*^~

'[~,~~ tributed to the agency's attitude prior to the accident. Suffice it to

.s. tc, -

emphasize that this Commission is committed to assurance of the safe

_M g . Q ,y],.y.- operation of all licensed facilities, including the Indian Point units.

rAf3d,65 .. 2 z I'l - Indeed, as stated in its 1985 Policy and Planning Guidance, the Commis-y '. 2 ;.'.h j .L, sion's policy is "to make sure that existing nuclear facilities and those in  %.WyS7.f. .pV m coming on line operate safely. Consequently, the highest priority will be

4. 4:31.;[. - T-m ,

n, -

m ,~-

1102 1 1is- <D.

.w;y; ..+ .,

2.s . . .

i .

Y. 'N3

~t . if .% ' ' A. ,' W

,.,M c){.[4

. m.g*f, 'M,c S. f . ,

AL,

, -- :- ; ::7' -

--, ~ . , .

,[.{',.y.

. g ,g

~ ** * . , , ,

3* = i _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ e . - . - - . , - - - . .-..____m.m c. . - _ _ - - _ ,

v E. .. v,. ~a- --. y . 4.

_. v. . . -  ;,v .

.g.S. s; *s :Jc, a

. . .c. . -

~c ,9 - , -

yf*. * %,I,y. ,),; {g. r . . . . ?,

s r y'- C ,

., m

.--i*,.,o. .

.;au'%w';

7-'

W.

ac.'7t.;.j '.2.. ' . . . .A . . ~ .- ' . - . - - - .

n_

~ ~ . - - - - ' ~ - -

.a. .

?: '

L. -

r.

3 4 given to assuring facilities are adequately designed, built, and tested I' -

l, .,

prior to operating and that operating facilities ~ maintain adequate levels c- -

of protection of public health and safety." We believe that our decision Y : dj,J f$5fd.~id a.?cn <f 1 in this proceeding supports this policy. s4.0 f j<s$ #lj ,5. .[ p.". .' ., ,

e.v. , ..

,.%. " .. %: =. ,j .e .. g ' :e;c,..?

. . *- . ~ .

, . w. ,,-. ,

. .'; ./.; O y g?.. Wt * . , - -._

- ,,* , .~ ' ,r$

h',* 40 = w$

l5 * , ; .' u,

.*% * -'. ,..m.

p k g IO

: :.<.., ^'\j . .- ~ .. <

..- 1,. >

$3. . ' .,' * } '.5';.

J. rw :y ' &.

.. . q.) . .r ,N' ~ J.' . . .g,, -

at 4y e,.,.* o . q-y; C.:. . a -3* e . -

n, '[

. ' h'g* . ./ - -[ " >

.*=...%e n' ..e 'e %, . .. ,'*; e +

c m*

~

. .z_ , M..

t.. . , % '. ,K,..y r . $, s. . , , .'.

~..,.,s+' '.h.:l :-y ;..... . . " . ar lr i V' '

.'. ~- .- .p; .

~ . to ,' ' ~: If ' , C. :?,

m  %

• ,e j,

s9 s ,

6 : ,* y af. '. '.'. ' t, % ; i - ' ' ~ .

n' 0

7 4

L.

i

• 6 p-i i >

0

, e 1

. f:f-5 'p,.

{ {., f ' - 4 d

,S

/' & .

'5

' E

• j+^ : .'"

s.

p

=a - ,e on' * .

• 7: 8

, e . . -.

3- g^ O f*=',*,,,

s , ?; ,*, , , ~ ~; ,

- (! [, , , ) . *'. '

2-

.,p.

g_ . ,

- ~

, , *.3 , ,

D 44 ,

4 A 4 o f , * *

? "".. 4g

. j' , .

, [

a.. . -.

5 h~ ~

1103 l -

(

I I

e

,, . n . ,

4 6

t ,

s .

- - - a. . ; __._. ace w. .._s.,, .__

_n....-. _ _ ._ . . , ._

Cite as 21 NRC 1104 (1985) CLI 85-7

( . .

., UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

.. , NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

. COMMISSIONERS:

s...

7,

, , ,', Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman Thomas M. Roberts James K. Asselstine Frederick M. Bernthal Lando W. Zech, Jr.

4 6

In the Matter of Docket No. 50-289 SP (Restart)

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, et al.

. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No.1) May 9,1985 The Commission denies Intervenors' motion to reconsider its decision

,, - (CLI-85-2,21 NRC 282 (1985)) that no further hearings are warranted

.. , in the TMI-l restart proceeding.

P

~ '

.8[ 3 s i;;

. RULES OF PRACTICE: REOPENING OF RECORD

, 'nl? .' . : 4 " -%;;e., , ;

" The burden is on the movant to establish prior to reopening that the

< p_  :' it ~ ,,; ;

'lc ; y, * . 'i ,

standards for reopening are met. A movant is not entitled to engage in discovery in order to support a motion to reopen. Rather, the issue in

. . s -,

, ,, g,. each case is whether the available information meets the standards for

.. - . reopening, i.e., timely raises a significant safety issue which might have affected the Licensing Board's decision, such that the record should be

, , J' q,: reopened and discovery initiated.

I.' ) -I

.:',,'>)m.k.'

aem .:;p$ [h; , ,

.f, <

.*] Is,,, e. 4.J,, ey

. .? (.'-..j

..*us . - . ,

.:s . . g e 2, *a "% k .~a:

1104

~

gi.

p _Wa.

W"*8'N*-'- e.e-w-.

P * '.

4

.g

~

4 1

. - n. 2 L- - . . - ... e .. n .~ -.

I RULES OF PRACTICE: REOPENING OF RECORD '. .

s If a motion to reopen is to succeed, it is not enough merely to express  : g',

a willingness to provide unspecified, additional information at some un- i, known date in the future. See generally, e.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. ~F ,

(Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-753,18 NRC 1321, 1324 (1983).

RULES OF PRACTICE: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (RAISING MATTERS FOR FIRST TIME) ?1 ,

i ,

A party may not raise in a petition for reconsideration a matter not I placed in contest before. See, e.g., Kansas Gas and Electric Co. (Wolf * .~  ; '- '

Creek Generating Station, Unit No.1), ALAB-477, 7 NRC 766, 768 'd,' Q , _

(1978). .? .

..y ORDER On March 13, 1985, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Common-wealth) and Three Mile Island Alert (TMIA) moved the Commission to reconsider its Februarf- 26, 1985 decision that no further hearings are warranted in the TMl-1 restart proceeding. CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282.6 Both the Commonwealth and TMIA maintained that further hearings should be held on leak rate falsifications at TMI-2, leak rate testing at TMI-1, Staff's "likely" change of position, Licensee's response to the Commission's October 25,1979 Notice of Violation, and the changes to the Keaten Report. In addition, TMIA argued that hearings should be held on the Parks / King /Gischel allegations of harassment and wide-spread safety violations at TMI-2, and on changes to the Lucien Report.

• The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) supported the motions for re- . ,

consideration. The Licensee and NRC Staff opposed the motions.'As ex- C- .

plained below, the parties have presented no new arguments which , ,

would cause the Commission to reconsider its decision. The motions for reconsideration are therefore denied. .

,' ~

Before discussing the factual issues raised in the motions for reconsid-l

eration, the Commission will address the procedural arguments. TMIA I The Commission in Ct.I-85 2 also held that the Lacensmg Board should issue a decision on the train-l ing and mailgram issues. The Commission also decided to institute a separate proceeding on TMI.2 leak '

I rate falsifications. and ofrered Mr. Husted the opportunity to request a hearing on the Appeal Board con.

dation affecting his employment.

l

1105 i

A

-,a w -

-e e s e

.w .. , _ . . _ _

,,  ?' .,, *

~ '~, #

k #

'.1 ^ f f

. .:, t ,

, l. ' y> -

. ./- -

3,

,, e s ,. , y, y ., s . ,

s a-

n. -

. y . ' ;;r - ~ , ,

y -

4 - ,

2 . w- __2.a.a _w =..z.. u u ..- ...:.:. = u.L._.w. .a

, ~,

i

,e.w "n .

1'-

, 3sr y

.5.g, a-m , . .l

,. . J repeated the argument previously made by UCS that the Commission in

%(; , Pf $1 ~. . f . l l

requiring the parties to set forth disputed issues of fact applied an incor-l

^

'. i " .Y Z '

'N rect legal standard. TMIA expanded on this argument by citing examples 1 7, r~ in CLI-85-2 where the Commission found that there were no factual dis-

~

. putes. TMIA claimed that without discovery it could not challenge the

,.. . . , . L -facts presented by the Staff and Licensee, and hence the Commission's l f . "p l

1 O ~'L. . g .e requirement amounted to a predetermination of the issues.2 l ,,, - 9 't jg i; . y",- TMIA has misconstrued the standards for reopening. The burden is j g ,' l 7.g e p

% . on.the movant to establish prior to reopening that the standards for  ;

,' f f . . .1 reopening are met. The movant is not entitled to engage in discovery in '

l

-~-

, y 9.-

Y <!Clf -

9 order to support a motion to reopen. Rather, the issue in each case is whether the available information meets the standards for reopening, l

_ i.e., timely raises a significant safety issue which might have affected the ~;

Licensing Board's decision, such that the record should be reopened and j

/  ; discovery initiated. The Commission explained in CLI 85-2 that the re-quirement that the parties put forward their best. case was imposed in

, order " fairly to judge whether further hearings should be held." 21

! NRC at 286 n.4. After reviewing the available evidence, the Commission in CLI-85-2 found that this standard was not met on any issue. See gener-

^Q ally, e.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station,

j. Unit 3), ALAB-753,18 NRC 1321,1324 (1983) ("[ilt is not enough .

merely to express a willingness to provide unspecified, additionalinfor-l mation . . . at some unknown date in the future").

3 TMIA and UCS argued that the Commission applied an improper l , standard in ruling on whether Staff's "likely" change of position required e ,; g , 'g reopening. Staff's "likely" change of position presents the question of 14 W - ?. . . . p-

. v;." TN:

i 1 c,- whether a party's "likely" change of testimony may have invalidated the

, p 'm V.D " S W .h adicdicatory decision to the extent that the original testimony was critical

' NM'g'Nyf "hj. Q 'j to the decision. To decide this issue, the Commission properly consid-

. / %,M * ., - 7' cred each factor supporting Staff's changed position in order to deter-

>< 1'v.pl,. j[ f. p}$

,- 1 TRI Q pr mine the pCssible impact on the original adjudicatory decision. As the

. p g.43:l;Ml. Commission explained in CLI-85 2, the issues cited by Stafifor its "like-

.iG . .V.'.( g l ' d ly" change of position were either fully litigated or are not currently sig-

. ; ,. 3,W q, . f,.1  :

< -; 7, . 4

. . .;t , ,

-p

,fr . : l. : Jp w (' ,._~ #

m.

,A' s .~5 }'e 'f ,,,

! %' s 1;. .. . ; D' *i%'.- .

' ' . N't, . , ; .; 'M. ; '. . y;, :.3

,. n,,T ..a W' W np' ;H.3,. 2 UCs argued that the Commission has no legal authonty to reverse the Appeal Board's decision to  !

-Qd.lh.'I[/? U,[&,((( @ .,d

. t reopen on the Hartman allegations. ALAS-738,18 NRC 177 (1983), teecause the Commission did not i l h g-t' *.c @ g 'd .u. h ; ,i,;l,g7,Jl,'f'p,i* 72'... -

properly take review or that decision. When that decision issued, the Commission issued an order stay.

N l'f p <- <!.M< @V

! .v i ins it to preserve the sastus goo, and taking review or whether it should be stayed until of completed an '

)

l

• 9;I,,, ,

i. etaf f yJ

,;M ,$ r gn.E 'f.M

'Q $Q.7 investigation into the Hartman alleganons. The Commismon subsequently lifted the stay and simultane.

,.23,f,

,?

gp g,  % ously took review or whether the hearing was still required. The Commismon, which has the ultimate re.

lt: -

sponsibility for its agudications, clearly had the authonty to act as it did. See &rida Power and L4r4r Co.

- +

j y ; f- 4;,'.'j. g *j f . O ^ W. *.

(st. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2) CLI-80-41,12 NRC 650 (1980).

.?+', , - .. .,2,,

OM '

r .

.;x ._r..

i

, , .3, , . , ;.f .

gg ; . . ,qq, i y,t -; 1106

.. q - ,, + "

3

.. (, >

i

~

..3 z ,,; f ~ l* i~

u ',;..,.-7..~. - - . . ..;7,,.- -

g

• S [ b i

A n.l "

a e

, . - . . * .._.-t.- -m., . - - . . - - - _ ._.-,.-s-. ~ . . _ _ - . .

m. , p

, ye

{> ,t_

.- _  % 4. .'.4 ..,W4.._.u.#

... ... .-.mu-J 5

nificant. Therefore, Staff's "likely" change of position does not require , , .

~

reopening.2 .

N -{ ~

• TMIA argued that the Commission applied a standard to determine - ,  ?* ,

- when company employees' actions are to be imputed to management <

.,-t ' ' ,

which is inconsistent and legal error. There is no inconsistency or legal '

error in the Commission's decision. The Commission stated that the -

corporate entity must bear some responsibility for the acts ofits employ- - -

ees, but corrective action can ameliorate improper conduct. The Com-mission further stated that it would not hold executive managers person- ,

ally responsible for the acts of employees in the absence of knowledge .y .

of or involvement in those acts. There is nothing inconsistent in this ap- ,

JN: W.

proach, nor is it inconsistent with TMIA's argument that the pattern of - . ,

conduct must be used to evaluate Licensee's performance. The Commis- y' P , , { , f. . a sion simply disagrees with TMIA's assessment that there has been a pat- , .s , K , c._1 # ^

1 tern ofimproper conduct by current management.*  ;

'E

. ,  ;~

The Commission will now turn to the factualissues raised in the mo- ,

l tions for reconsideration. TMIA, the Commonwealth, and UCS all argued that the Commission erred in not requiring further hearings in the restart proceeding on TMI 2 leak rate falsifications. The Common-wealth maintained that the separate proceeding to be initiated on TMI 2  !

falsifications is inadequate because it exempts GPU's officers and direc-tors, and because its completion is not a precondition of restart.

As explained in CLI-85 2, the Commission feels justified in relying on a statement to the court by a United States District Attorney regard-ing the involvement of GPU's officers and directors. That statement, made after the matter had been before the Grand Jury for 4 years, was*a carefully worded statement of exoneration. The Commission does not believe that a further expenditure of agency resources in duplicating the work of the Grand Jury and the United States Attorney would be justi-

• fled.

The Commission further explained in CL185-2 why the TMI-2 leak .

rate falsifications did not warrant hearings in the restart proceeding.5 s

t (

3None of the other arguments regarding staff's "hkely" change or position presents any basis for reconsideration of the arguments previously made to and considered by the Commission.

• TMIA also requested that the Commission allow informal discovery on TMI-2 leak rate falsifications to continue. This request was opposed by Licensee and staff, and in a pleading filed on behalf of "nu-merous former employees of Metropolitan Edison Company who may be involved in hearings concern.

ing the h!!eged leak rate falsification." The TMIA request is denied. There is currently no ongoing hear.

-ing on TMI 2 leak rate falsifications, and it would be inappropnate to rule on discovery among potential future parties. .

8 UCs creatively argues that the Commission erred in reversing the Appeal Board's decision to reopen on the Hartman allegations. because the Commissaon relied on extra-record information. UCs conve.

niently ignores that the Appeal Board reopened the record based on extra-record information. Clearly in .

(Continued) ,

1107

• w , , - m.-g

• • ._ e 3h-, ,

1 _

- ~ . . - - . _ .. ___ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ . _ , _ - _

.?. . . .

, , .s j,.3: ' (sQ . -

s . ,

-: s w. . .

~x x

y. ; , , L, ,~'

s-q- * .

2 : . a : u a . ..- : - ..-._.. w - . ..z a :n

]

i ,

d -

. ~

. ~ , ,

~

.s ,.

• a

~ ,

. . 3,yg^ ' Neither TMIA, the Commonwealth, nor UCS has presented any new in-s ,'

formation which would alter the Commission's judgment. TMIA's argu-  ;

! <r. - ,gm ment that upper management must have been aware of the falsifications, J^ ' -

';. and that the falsifications occurred because of financial concerns of  !

l ' ' '

,d upper management, is based on little more than speculation. The con-cerns expressed by TMIA, the Commonwealth, and UCS regarding Mr.

~

.' i 'g ,.A', Ross rely on unsupported speculations and inferences. While, as noted 4-

,' d ff 4 -

by TMIA, some former operators expressed a view that Mr. Ross must have known of the TMI-2 leak rate falsifications, none had any actual J

tgf % >~.g '

evidence of such knowledge beyond this. Moreover, the weight of evi- i i L wy -@ . dence is to the contrary.6 Hence this issue does not raise a significant

,' *^ ' 1'? safety issue. i

b!~ .;

The parties in the motions for reconsideration also claimed that fur-

~

+

ther hearings are required on TMI-1 leak rate practices,7 changes to the T' Keaten Report, and Licensee's response to the October 1979 Notice of Violation.8 None of the arguments on these issues presents any basis for

~

reconsideration of the arguments previously made to and considered by the Commission in making its original decision. The claim of factual errors in CL1-85-2 is without merit.' Accordingly, these issues do not

~

i r i K

deciding whether new information warrants reopenmg the Commission must consider available new in.

i -

formation. UCs* real complaint is with the fact that the Commission considered more information than 3 (- the Appeal Board, and reached a different conclusion.

l 6 TMIA also challenged the Commission's decision to bar poss.bly implicated individuals from "respon-

_ r. , ^-

, " ' sible management" or " operational" positions. TMIA claimed that the Commission statement that the 1

q , - ',

i' .

4',

'd*

,d4. "present system of checks and balances and procedural safeguards ensures that rn individual in other po.

sitions can adversely affect the plant's operation" was not advanced by any party. The Commission fully

. e' .- '

., ,5 e

(,.77.e .(hf.y V. explained the basis of this decision, which comes from the Licensing Board's management decision. Le f- f } W ggf.y 21 NRC at 303 04.

1;,

% .f 4

• $cy 7 L'Cs argued that test results were routinely discarded at TMI-1, and negative test results were regular-y,.p,. % Q W ^ ly accepted as valid. UCS maintained that Mr. Ross must have been aware of these prac: ices. To clanfy

• *., a f( Q h [i

, }y p: ;. / some apparent confusion, the Commission's statement in CLI-85 2 that "!w]e do not agree that Ross

- must have known of the irregulanties at TMI-1," 21 NRC at 313, referred to additions of hydrogen and

.i ,

My tA. @Q - water. The Commission is not presently concerned with Mr. Rosa' knowledge of negative test results or

. ,1 ,J Q, discardmg invalid tests. The Commission in CLI 85 2 explained that there was no culpeble motive for

'l.

" "p  ; those practices, and that they pose no current concern.

/ .

i 8 The Commission was not, as TMIA argued, confused about Licensee's response to the october 1979 4

. G:,' J6 Notice of violation. The Commission adequately explained that Mr. Dieckamp reviewed the response.

.,' f s found "the argument." or, more accurately, one specific part of the response, " kind of thin," and chose 9 , ,. , .

.-a' -

not to intervene.

y. .

yy,' .l .3 M

q ,

9TMIA claimed, contrary to the Commission's finding, that there are signincant factual disputes.

.. d"Q'w

• K. 7. AN .' TMIA cited as factual disputes the reason spurts of hydrogen were added and the sign:Gcance of the l

g { y'**~

3.g'g%y f . * : . *yyT , DMT$ * '

loop seal. Neither of these items presents a significant factual dispute. The Commission's decision found it unnecessary to resolve the reason for the spurts of hydrogen, concluding that the circumstantial evi-i pj ..r, y,c.g y. G ,.e u .' Y - ,F dence of a few irregulanties did not raise a significant safety issue at sMs time. The significance of the

! loop seat is a judgment based on available evidence; there is no factual dispute regarding its existence.

1 , . f* y[*Q wN EM 4

,J- 06.,h,X?%

TMIA's argument that Unit 2 operators learned of the loop seal and its effect on leak rates from Unit I

• '. ' E ,, . .1 , operators is suppcrted by only vague recollections. This does not raise a significant factual dispute.

. 'o , 4 il 4' \, 1108

.. , a:

+f'

• • .=9.-=+em.m..- - -. , ,

a ,

P? l

-.g , . . _ , . - - . ..,y

q,. .

7 4 b': ~

-?.

[

..r a g 1

, 9 - .

.. c. . x - a. x . . . ~2 .. ~ . - - - - -

4

.y .

..:1 warrant further discussion.no See, e.g., Nuclear Engineering Co. (Shef-

. j' 7 3 , 3 3 ,

field, Illinois Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Site), CLI-80-1,' 11 %g_,I $ "

!" W>:

9gh '; ,' -

NRC 1,5-6 (1980). R

. Finally, TMIA maintained that further hearings should be held on the s

..i,;- 'L' , b fp,.; 3. Y[M '.

Parks / King /Gischel allegations, and on the changes to the Lucien Re- .

'S- '*/ p m - '

' 12 port. TMIA made no new argument regarding the Lucien Report and ac-

'e

~

s cordingly has failed to persuade us that our conclusion not to hold hear- -

ings on .this matter is erroneous. With regard to the Parks / King /Gischel . m. .

allegations, TMIA now claims that it did move to reopen the record on the procedural violations themselves, because it " recited in full detail O.>6'- 95.'

e:

1 Ol's findings regarding the accuracy and significance of safety violations alleged by the 'whistleblowers.'" Ol's investigative report on the pro-1

.:' % .'.3[A'.{ ^ - -

• . /Q ,

cedural violations was issued in September 1983. TMIA one year later  :'. .VjV (A.@ r. % .. . ~

discussed those violations to support its motion to reopen on the alleged QSE9,[.fdF#]

discrimination. A party may not raise in a petition for reconsideration a -

K .E . ' N matter not placed in contest before. See, e.g., Kansas Gas and Electric '

"-@3:4 .

Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit No.1), ALAB-477, 7 NRC 766,768 (1978). TMIA has not under any reasonable view ofits motion _

to reopen requested that the Commission reopen on the procedural vio-  !

litions at TMI 2.H Nor does the Commission find it necessary to consid-er sua sponte whether this issue warrants reopening. The relation of the procedural violations at TMI-2 to the operation of TMI-l appears tenu- '

' ous at best. The Commission will address the procedural violations as a i nparate enforcement matter.

l TMIA also asserted that the Commission made factual errors in its .

analysis of this issue. TMIA began its discussion with an apparent prem-  !

isc that no action could be taken against these individualsfor any reason l

because they were engaged in protected activity. The Commission in i

CLI 85 2 adequately explained that hearings are not warranted because  ! .

the actions taken against Messrs. King and Gischel were not based on  !

their involvement in protected activities, and the apparent discrimination l against Parks represented an isolated occurrence. TMIA's claim of factu-al errors in the Commission's decision can better be characterized as a factual disagreement with the Commission's firclings. TMIA once again ,

6 - i, i has relied on its 10 C.F.R. 2.206 petition as a basis for its view of the >

l factual circumstances here. The Commission in CLI 85-2 adequately ad- '

dressed those arguments.

10 The Commonwealth also argued that the Commission should not make any decision on restart before l the Licensing Board issues a decision on the training issue. since the Commission did not decide that '

i issue in CLI.85 2. it is not properly before the Commission in a motion for reconsideration. '

~

j 13 Moreover. even if TMIA had made such a motion. it appears it would have been unumely.

\

• I j 1109 i

i _

e l

_ - _ . _ - , . - - ,-,m. , , . _ _ _ _ . . , -__ m - _

P

. cc ,

f, 1

,.Ua % . . . .. .

.' ,..-mL.w /+'.a e" 4 >..wd-eso.- -- -'= *="=J -d- '*** # # d * '

n.

a- .

s

- s-f'

p. *

\,-.

., vu

. ... . : .g . ., -

, . . The motions for reconsideration are therefore denied.

(.

.: Commissioners Asselstine and Bernthal disapprove.his t Order.

It is so ORDERED.

For the Commission

1.

. E' SAMUEL J. CHILK -

N. -^l.

c . . Secretary of the Commission

.-...e. .

, . v '-, ,

Dated at Washington, D.C.,

. . ' this 9th day of May 1985.

m 7

5 e

e O

4

. .,.4 -., ,.. -

s s 9

-4' , e, , e,, *

e. . . ." k ',*%* ** ,

, , Yg ,[*. t i ' 4 e ). i ' .. ~' ' .. s

• n. ak' I 4 e<V..' ,s,

~ '.d,'<.*'j,; ,.1 .

.V . . . .

--l < y e.. . yn, ,.*

" ~?. t v , l 9 se . - . . .

.y * ' * -il # 4~. ,

_* \ t h.'!! e s*

.,f '.e~ '.j -) '. ft+

Y t ' ? l&,Q ."' ' s

,c p t;%

t-

, , 3 ,

• ; g .:. t..'

s

. ' .' '

• d * $

d *

,v - <  ; s .,

• • Y{

I *k 4 r  %

W 59 g

• e a kg. . j ' *k .

Y

\ep' '_4 ['y  ;$ f. + ,y:  ; N.,',4.s i.;s*, ' . c !% y k ', + . .

.t.

s

, ' '6 a e,.- , t I j,J i.,U. t'O #'* *

• 4 4.%

• L e i4 +. ,n

• ,' / ,

<s.' '* \^y. ' . ' .. : 5% *.fl: 'r t

" * - i** .% d.aJ 1 ".j. fy: C .f.f-2.'

M . .

• v, ..* <. :y.-;W.,,

E ,' ,

', ' ^. :*e s , .

M.

1110 w

b h

.. . ..,-re.e ~ m - - *- -

• 9

1- < -

l -

'.t l . ,.

l -

[

Cite as 21 NRC 1111 (1985) CLI-85-8 g :c. - ? .,,f.,4 _ .-

[ :,.

r c .. ;  :. .: .w. -.,-

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ( ,v' ])h ~# $ , /. , _ -

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION . '. '- A -

. .T  :/ .

(c.

COMMISSIONERS: b .' . . .

j. , , ,- m ec ,

Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman , ,,,

~ '

Thomas M. Roberts s , -!*.~r 4. =. -:-  :

James K. Asselstine . ..-

, ' /l 9 - '

Frederick M. Bernthal  :

Lando W. Zech, Jr. O' . .._['. -

W+a^' -

a q ; , ,,' . ; . 9;, n . ,. . ' S

^

', h

', {,-

• . i

. . , .<j.

In the Matter of Docket No. 50-289-SP '

(Restart)

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, ci al. }

(Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No.1) May 18,1985 .

The Commission denies Intervenors' motion to reopen the record in I .

the TMl-1 restart proceeding and Intervenors' request that the Commis- l sion sponsor a health effects study prior to making a restart decision. -

i- ' '

RULES OF PRACTICE: REOPENING OF RECORD i.

Under established Commission practice three factors are considered

~

in determining whether a motion to reopen should be granted: "(1) Is . J' ,

!' l, the motion timely; (2) does it address significant safety (or environmen- ' -

.y ' '

tal) issues; and (3) might a different result have been reached had the newly proffered material been considered initially." Metropolitan Edison .

Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-85 2, 21 NRC 282,285 n.3 (1985). ,

I i i I

6 i

l 1111 t

q' ', ,

. ,s ,

.a~. . = . . . . . ~ . . . - .. . _ . .~ w. u. _ . . .;.2 .

. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER I. BACKGROUND AND

SUMMARY

On June 21,1984, Marjorie and Norman Aamodt filed a motion with the Commission alleging that releases of airborne radioactive materials from the March 28, 1979 accident at TMI-2 were substantially greater

,. _ . . than have been acknowledged and that these releases have led to an

' ~ '

unexpectedly high level of cancer in local residents. The Aamodts based their allegations on door-to-door interviews that Marjorie Aamodt and

- others conducted of residents of two areas near the TMI 2 facility. The

< Aamodts requested the Commission to investigate their allegations and to defer a decision on the restart of TMI-l until the issues they raised have been studied further and fully resolved. On December 13, 1984, the Commission denied the Aamodts' motion to sponsor a new study of health related issues arising from the TMI-2 accident. The Commission stated that the "Aamodts have not presented sufficient reliable informa-tion to show that previous, more comprehensive and scientific surveys of TMI-2 accident rac'iation releases are erroneous." CLI-84-22, 20 NRC 1573,1575 (19847.8 On January 15,1985,, the Aamodts filed a motion asking the Commis-sion to reconsider the December 13 denial of their request. They also requested the Commission to reopen the record in the TMI-l restart pro-

, ceeding, asserting that the issues raised by their survey were relevant to "the management competence, emergency planning and health issues"

' / ~' litigated in the restart proceeding. On April 13, 1985, the Aamodts

. amended their request by submitting additional information.

7 ,

?. For the reasons which follow, the motions to reopen the record and to

~ l' defer a decision on TMI l restart are denied.2

~

4 6

• ?.

- + 5 ~-

I Commissioners Asselstine and Bernthat dissented. They would have provided NRC funding to ongoing

~

e i studies being conducted by the Commopwealth of Pennsylvania's Department of ifealth.

.-; 2 should the Commission in the future acquire informauon regarding the need for any further studies l" ' ' ,

, . -l along the lines requested by the Aamodts, it will, of course, make its views known along with any ap-

%- 4

"/,1. propriate recommendations. The NRC staff is currently evaluaung this matter and will be providing

• recommendations to the Commissson shortly. The Commission is also assessing whether the Commis-

[' ,, ,

sion's Advisory Panel for the Decontaminanon of TMI.2 could provide a useful forum for citizens to

. . A'- '

= - .o. . s' raise health-related concerns. These matters are not relevant to the restart proceeding hersute health ef.

facts resulting from the TMI.2 accident are not related to a determination whether TMI.I can be safely operated today. Seei II.C. utfra.

1112

e. - . , .

i

-- ,. .~ . . - - -.-

, c'

. . . 7. , . _

f ,,

K+. .,. '

's. LA. w , .. . . . . . .-  : ::.:-..  ; .n. .- ...::c__ w : ' H.. E. 'l '

y. , !. . .

,.-~7- .

t .y l :y .

II. ANALYSIS OF MOTION TO REOPEN THE RECORD l .  : ..e .

, gCMSI ,k 2 The Aamodts claim that the record of the restart proceeding should es "'W. m e e t ..s.,,. ,.

be reopened to examine health-related issues arising from the TMI-2

.. -D, S Q '

( L. ';:. 7 V

' accident. The Aamodts allege that death certificates obtained from the

- . y'n '

'~

Pennsylvania Department of Health establish that: (1) there is an m

.. E' elevated cancer mortality rate in certain areas surrounding TMI 2; (2) *

~ '

an increased rate of neonatal hypothyroidism in Lancaster County in .P ~ v '

~

! 1979 resulted from the TMI-2 accident; (3) serious post-accident health "'d "

effects within and beyond the 10 mile radius of TMI demonstrates that -

I the presently approved emergency plans are inadequate; (4) residents .' , . ,g . 7 .

~~^ '

7:

near TMl are suffering adverse health effects from high levels of radia-  %, . ,.

'7 m

• tion currently in the environment; and (5) the 5100* Fahrenheit (*F) -

temperatures reached within the TMI 2 core during the accident pro- , c; ' I.. Y' s *q. .

duced elevated levels of fission products and transuranics which have es- ' , ' '"~ ' ci ~ SP - . ' -

caped to the environment and could be harmful to the public. ,A * '

,; f 72 - *

' 7.,

j The Aamodts also believe the record should be reopened on an issue . s 4

relating to the integrity of Licensee's management. The Aamodts allege '

that information developed in the restart proceeding on the Dieckamp I mailgram issue demonstrates that Licensee personnel lied to the

- Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection on the morning of March 28, 1979. The Aamodts maintain that after the Commonwealth had been warned of projected radiation releases of 10 rems per hour over ( .

Goldsboro, TMI personnel discounted this information by claiming, con-4 trary to fact, that the surveillance teams had been dispatched and had ,, ,

- ~ <

verified that a significant release had not occurred. .

Under established Commission practice three factors are considered ,

in determining whether a motion to reopen should be granted: "(1) Is l

the motion timely; (2) does it address significant safety (or environmen- '

, tal) issues; and (3) might a different result have been reached had the 9-

! newly profTered material been considered initially." Metropolitan Edison . -

Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI 85-2, 21 NRC i . , ,

, , p.

282,285 n.3 (1985). ~ '-

The NRC Staff opposed the request to reopen the record, arguing that . t  !- + *l ~

i the criteria for reopening the record had not been satisfied. The Licensee -

.- . , 6 l also opposed reopening of the record on whether Licensee personnel .

'~

I lied to Bureau of Radiation Protection, but did not take a position on l whether the record should be reopened on the other issues raised by the ,

j Aamodts. ..'

i 1 .

• f i

i l

l 1113 I. ,..y ,-

~

L j- c I

. - .- a. .

3. ,  :.5 6

,5.

j. w. .. .

, z . 1

. . . . < .e._ . o a' .,

. _.,m.__:.. . w. . . . . , _. . _ _m n . . _ _ . . 2 . _ .

'i .

r l

A. Timeliness ,

The central issue raised by the Aamodts relates to their allegation that

.,l there are elevated levels of cancer in the TMI area. Their request to reopen the record on that matter is untimely. The Aamodts Grst present-

. ed their concerns regarding cancer levels to the Commission in June of

. 1984, yet did not request reopening of the record until January of 1985.

'[ '

i

. - The Aamodts have not presented any justification for not requesting at

, . y 3; that time a reopening of the record.2 m .e ,

. c. . J . "

B. Whether Claims Raise a Significant Safety or Environmental Issue

., c w The Commission has reviewed the material presented by the Aamodts

<, regarding alleged elevated cancer levels in the TMI area and continues

to believe that the prior studies are correct in concluding that the -

l ,

3 .

number of health effects from radiation releases arising from the TMI 2 4

accident will be negligible. The Aamodts have not presented information

.! which casts doubt on the' previous studies. For example, the Aamodts

~I have not reported when the cancers which form the basis for their allega-j tions were diagnosed relative to the TMI 2 accident and have not shown i , that the cancers resulted from the TMI-2 accident..When the cancers arose or were first diagnosed is particularly significant, in light of the

!~

l obvious fact that cancers which arose prior to the TMI 2 accident cannot be attributed to the accident, and the fact that, even for those cancers i ,

arising since the accident, the undisputed scientific evidence is that I

, ', *7 there is generally a -latency period for cancer development following

,.f, '

f,.

xp sure to radiation. Even if additionalinformation, such as date of di.

! 7 -

,l" ' 'W' 3 ,

.posis of the cancers, type of cancer, health, occupational, and personal i

9r . -

4 histories of the deceased were available, we believe it is unlikely that f'W - ,- statistically and scientifically valid conclusions could be reached regard-ing the causes of the cancers in the small population groups associated with the Aamodts' informal survey. The epidemiological evidence pre-sented by the Aamodts is fragmentary and anecdotal. As a technical and

, J. ~ logical matter, it is not sufficient to support a reasonable doubt as.to the i

. adequacy and correctness of the several detailed scientifically conducted .

'J T '

studies on which the Commission relied. Therefore, under the circum.

l.

y f,. ( - ". .,

• 5 .. t '; i s ? ;.'s - .

. j,14 s. .

c

,' * :o g," ., .

[,

, s

) ,

y', ,s' ty ,.+,. ' ' ~ ]. . O , 3The Aamodts also have not estabhshed when the information they rely on in support of their other claims became avadable and whether the facts could have been presented to the Commission et an ear.

lier date.

i j t

" I

. 1114

- l I

k -.- - . , ,. . . . .. -

j .

r 5

- . - . . . - . .  : - lu -

1 stances, the Aamodts have not raised a significant safety or environmen-tal concern.

3.<;]

,y'

. , e . v:

. j. , ,

T*

4 ':

Their other claims similarly fail to raise significant issues. With respect ", a '

v e; , Q, q,jf,' '

to their allegations that there was a higher rate of neonatal hypothyroid-  ;. 'My9 - o ism in Lancaster County in 1979 than there was in the 1981-1983 peri-Wc-od, the Pennsylvania Department of Health has analyzed the seven * ' e - ,-

cLses of hypothyroidism that arose in 1979 and concluded that they ' '*#

c.? -d:- "

could not be attributed to radiation, but should be attributed instead to , .

fIctors such as incomplete maturation of thyroid glands and lack of enzymes to synthesize thyroxine. In fact one of the seven cases occurred

'i ,

prior to the accident anc another within 3 months following the acci- ,

N .

• dent, a time period too short for the hypothyroidism to have resulted . . - u ,u f from the TMI 2 accident. The Aamodts have not provided information '. >

that would lead us to question the Department of Health's conclusions. . . .,. . > g.

The Aamodts' allegation that health elTects reported by TMI area resi- .' .

9, "7, dents, such as nausea and severe vomiting, resulted from radiation re- , 7f ., ,

leased from the TMI 2 accident that was higher than reported is not sup- '

ported by available information. The NRC Staff estimates that the aver-age radiation dose to an individual within 10 miles of the TMI site re. '

sulting from the TMI 2 accident was approximately 8 millirems, and the average dose received by individuals within 50 miles was approximately .

2 millirems. Based on accepted scientific principles governing the effects of exposure to varying levels of radiation, these dose levels are far too low to be the cause of the kind of adverse health effects cited by the Aamodts. In the absence of other evidence demonstrating a link between the cited health effects and the TMI 2 accident, the Commission must j "./

continue to support the findings reached in earlier assessments of radia-

^

tion releases from the TMI-2 accident.

With respect to the Aamodts' claim that there are currently unaccepta-bly high levels of radiation in the environment near TMI, the NRC ,

Staff, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Pennsylvania *

,1 F

Department of Environmental Resources conducted an informal field .

survey with sophisticated radiation monitoring equipment of sites select- .' , ' ' ,

ed by the Aamodts. The agencies concluded that the radiation levels

,T. '

werc within the normal range. <

The Aamodts also speculate that the high temperatures (in excess of .

5000*F) reached within the TMI 2 reactor core during the accident creat- '

! ed a "high probability" that transuranic materials were released into the atmosphere. Transuranic materials emit alpha radiation and could be 'Y .

another possible source of adverse health effects. The NRC Staff has

examined these allegations and concluded that the likelihood of measur- ..

able quantities of transuranic material becoming airborne and subse- -

i 1115 l

\

- ~

s

.;y .' i q =

. 3 y

.r.- ,

i+ .  ; , i s' m f , , .

4 .

m. , .

~. . - . . u.a- . . x . .. . n. - .  :- a 7:- .

. 1 i.

d

~ '

^

7' ** -

quently being released into the environment is low. The Staff further noted that no measurable quantity of transuranic material other than

,', that associated with normal background levels has been identified in any

~.

?.. of the air or soil samples taken around the TMI site during or after the

, j accident. Accordingly, again the Aamodts' concerns do not raise a sig-

.. , j nificant issue.

., , s-Z ., , ; Finally, the Aamodts' claim that the Licensee deceived the Pennsylva-

.., .. e J.et 2 - nia Bureau of Radiation Protection concerning radiation measurements l %.2y

'~

, . - . on the day of the TMI 2 accident is based on a draft document which was prepared in the course of an NRC investigation conducted in 1980,

~

. -2 but before pertinent individuals had been interviewed by the NRC. Af-(

ter the interviews, the Staff determined that the facts contained in the

. ']

- working draft were erroneous and concluded that the Licensee had not d provided erroneous information relating to the Goldsboro dose rate pre-J diction. The Commission has concluded on the basis ofits review of the

'f allegations and the StalTs and Licensee's responses that the Aamodts'

.. l claim of deception is not supported and accordingly does not raise a sig- .

.l nificant safety issue.

3 i

.; C. Likellbood of Reaching a Different Result

~,

The C'ommission does not believe that the information presented by the Aamodts in their motion would have led to a different result. With the possible exception of the claim that Metropolitan Edison Company oflicials deceived Commonwealth officials on TMI-2 accident radiation

.( releases and the neonatal hypothyroidism issue,* the Aamodts' cancerns

. .. ,, . are not relevant to the restart proceeding because health efTects resulting t.a J. C. from the TMI 2 accident are not related to a determination whether

.( .,

,'// .. f - ( * ' TMI l can be safely operated today. As discussed above, the Commis-

, 1* ' * ' ' ' .! ~ sion finds that the Aamodts' claims of Licensee deception to bc without 6

. , 1, l ,

any foundation. With respect to the neonatal hypothyroidism, the infor-

,, Je ' . , -

.v '.-

mation presented by the Aamodts does not form a basis for concluding that the Licensing Board erred in LBP 8159,14 NRC 1211,1596

~ '

l .

3 d (1981) when it concluded that the alleged increase in neonatal hypothy.

.O roidism was not caused by the TMI 2 accident.

~ '( . ;f 4 #d For these reasons the Aamodts' motion to reopen the record is de-7't.' nied, as well as its request that the Commission sponsor a health effects

..;c,,.

. !.N3Q - '

( study prior to making a restart decision.

& _t,

,.9jm '

, ' f, ,*);( *'. .

• .>CVl w,,

[J s 4,

e *. .

-ia ,. J,

• 2 D. Y. M [ , ,_ .

4 The Licenans Board addressed the hypothyroidiern issue in the content or evaluating the protective

, ( ( , , action criteria used by the Commonwealth or Pennsylvania m emergency rianning.

1116

.,,7 g 4

a. - - . .

- . . . - . .- .. .- - . ~ _.- - - - . .

. ._ s

t. ,

,  :.n .

~

=S$

k

' .. . ~. . ..s..

.~:... - . . -..

- I_

1

,- 'a.

0

.j ..

. s Commissioner Asselstine's separate views are attached. '**,?1- .iuV.h ,-

i

. , s..<. .. ' ' .

.  : .. x. . ,

o It is so ORDERED. 7 .,:. 4 's' ;.'( y. . f, , '. ,4 .'W,x.

L.. a . m, n c. .. . . + q, , . -

4. . .c ,

o'

 !, .lN*m

~

For the Commission $

af c.t . 77., .;(:.y* ,

.. g. g. . n i

, f. s; 2 . .. .

, p.,,v;..

s.

.~ ' . - -

SAMUEL J. CHILK ...

.s.p . *'

?.',...-

Secretary of the Commission ., .

D

ted at Washington, D.C., k v. '- ,

this 16th day of May 1985.

• V

.F '..

w . .

x.. .,

, .y ,

,y, N

. c ,',.~. , /,. . -

.. :; v"; -

SEPARATE VIEWS OF COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE .' .n... '

n.g- .

. . ; , s* . . .

I concur in the result reached by the Commission, but not in the sub-1 stance of the Order. I do not believe that we should reopen the record of

{

the TMI-l Restart proceeding to hear this issue. However, I do believe f

{

{ further study is necessary. The Commission should hire an independent  ;

consultant who is expert in the fields of epidemiology and the health ef- j..

! fects ofionizing radiation. That consultant should review the information  ;

submitted by the Aamodts as well as the various existing studies of the j. .

radiological releases from the TMI accident and the impact of those '

releases on the people surrounding the plant.

] p -

'.

• r r

, t. .

t. . ,

(.

y f'7 .,.

4

... - - , , :,.,; g ,- .g:,

.e*. .

d- -

F r

s#

• i t

I Commisesoner Roberts was not present for the amtmation of this item; if he had been present, he i  !

world have approved.

i.

f 1117 i

o .

,.-,.m - - .- e , . - . .--- - - - , ,,.,_--_,_._,,,.---_.,_e.---,-y,.,,- m - . - , ,.-m..,__ r_-7_,---,._-_r_--_..--

. . .s  : ;, ,

s" . .

=.

.. . . - . ......;.._ . _ . . , , : w .n O.1.. r i

. , Cite as 21 NRC 1118 (1985) ,

CLI.85 9

, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

• ~

a COMMISSIONERS:

< . . 3

, , ,~ ,

0 .~ ,

Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman Thomas M. Roberts

.. James K. Asseletine Frederick M. Sernthal

• ~ Lando W. Zech, Jr.

4 in the Matter of Docket No. 50 289.SP (Restart)

- METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, et al.

} (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No.1) May 29,1985 3'

, The Commission lifts the effectiveness ofits 1979 enforcement order directing that TMI-1 remain shut down and permits TMI.1 to resume operation subject to the completion of two conditions. The Commission

, holds that the two management-related issues which remain pending before the agency do not warrant keeping TMI.1 shut down until agency s ,

proceedings have been completed.

a ATOMIC ENERGY ACT: ENFORCEMENT ACTION 1

(OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING)

The law normally affords a licensee the opportunity to challenge an en.

forcement action in a public hearing prior to the time an enforcement

., action takes elTect. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant Units I and

" , ' .'/.' ' f , .' . , , . ,

J;# . 2), CLJ 73 38,6 AEC 1082,1083 (1973).

l . . . ,' . _

e 1118 I

I t'

s e

. L -

ATOMIC ENERGY ACT: ENFORCEMENT ACTION *

(DURATION)

..; ,.7F. w.,

ti 'y,u,

';-?t,?f'

,:, ' . j.,.q .t hhf' -

The law obligates the Commission to fift the efTectiveness of an im- ...ds,;dg. 4 , '_}

' ?" "

mediately effective shutdown order once the concerns which led to q- . 4; .1 , -

m: king the order immediately effective have been adequately resolved.

See, e.g., Pan American Airways v. CAB, 684 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir.1982);

Northwest Airlines v. CAB, 539 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir.1976); Air Line Pilots

'. ."'j' .

Ass *n, International v. CAB. 458 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. I972), cert. denied. -

420 U.S. 972 (1975). .~,... l

^

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: IMMEDIATE ' - ' '

AGENCY ACTION , i  :"* i A provision in the law allows immediate action when required by the ' '

public health and safety or public interest. See 10 C.F.R. l 2.202(f), . ,  ; .,c which implements 5 U.S.C.6 558(c).

ATOMIC ENERGY ACT: LICENSEE'S CHARACTER  ;

(STANDARD FOR DETERMINATION)

A generally applicable standard for integrity is whether there is rea. j son:ble assurance that the licensee has sufficient character to operate .

th3 plant in a manner consistent with the public health and safety and ap. 8 plicable NRC requirements.

ATOMIC ENERGY ACT: LICENSEE'S CHARACTER f (STANDARD FOR DETERMINATION)

{'.

In determining whether a licensee has the requisite integrity to operate a nuclear power plant, the Commission may consider evidence regarding lic:nsee behavior having a rational connection to the safe operation of th2 plant. This does not mean, however, that every act of a licensee is -

relevant. To be so, the action must have some reasonabic relationship to ,

licinsee's character, i.e., its candor, truthfulness, willingness to abide by .

regulatory requirements, and acceptance of responsibility to protect i public health and safety, i

i b

i a b 1119

9 v

a

- - - ........a. . . . , ~ . , . . w ,,

s

.- l -

ATOMIC ENERGY ACT: LICENSEE'S CHAR.ACTER-(STANDARD FOR DETERMINATION)

Acts bearing on a licensee's character generally should not be consid-cred in isolation. The pattern of licensee's relevant behavior, including corrective actions, should be considered.

a * -

e,

, , f f' ATOMIC ENERGY ACT: LICENSEE'S CHARACTER

,' , (STANDARD FOR DETERMINATION)

Licensee behavior includes acts of licensee employees, since all or-r

. ganizations carry on their activities through individuals.

ATOMIC ENERGY ACT: ENFORCEMENT ACTION i (HEARING RIGHT)

~

That a Licensing Board has imposed license conditions does not con-vert an enforcement proceeding into a license amendment proceeding.

Once the Commission establishes a formal adjudicatory hearing in an en-forcement case, it need not grant separate hearings on any license condi-tions that are imposed as a direct consequence of that enforcement hear-ing. .

ATOMIC ENERGY ACT: ENFORCEMENT ACTION (HEARING RIGHT)

Restart of a nuclear power plant following its ordered shutdown does

[ [ ' . ' .-

1. .,- , . , , ,3 /

not constitute a license amendment, but involves lifting a suspension,

- .i.

.' a f,{. and hence does not create new hearing rights. See, e.g., San Luis Obispo C

^

Aforhersfor Peace v. NRC,751 F.2d 1287,1314 (D.C. Cir.1984); Sacra-mento Afunicipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Sta-

'?

-, tion), CLI 19 7,9 NRC 680, afd, Friends of the Earth v. United States,

' 600 F.2d 753 (9th Cir.1979); Public Service Co. o/ Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units I and 2), CLI 8010,11 NRC 438 (1980), affd, Save the Valley v. NRC, 714 F.2d 142 (6th Cir.1983)

(Table).

s., .

ATOMIC ENERGY ACTt ENFORCEMENT ACTION

, . U . ',; .. s. ' , '.-]- .

- c.

. >. n .-

. (HEARING RIGHT)

Pf 7, ,. 3 ,- ~'

Section 2.204 of 10 C.F.R., which provides that the Commission shall make a license amendment immediately effective upon finding that the 1 II20 e

4

4 1

-.- .L.: - .-. -.

public health, safety, or interest so requires, applies only when the Com- -

.P mission makes the determination to make a license amendment efTective 3  :.14 . u 'r'; ,

without affording an opportunity for a prior hearing. - -

'[V

- n ., . .

,.( [

,, y ATOMIC ENERGY ACT: INITIAL LICENSING DECISIONS

~

c-3,'

.s' . '

(IMMEDIATE EFFECTIVENESS) .

The standards in 10 C.F.R. 5 2.764(f)(2)(i), which provides that the Commission shall make a Licensing Board decision authorizing a unit to -

operate at full power immediately effective -

.:n .

if it determines that it is in the public interest to do so, based on a consideration of

• J * ~ ".

the gravity of the substantive issue, the Ukelihood that it has been resolved incor- '

, , J .

rectly below, the degree to which correct resolution of the issue would be prejudiced ,.g' by operation pendmg review, and other relevant public interest factors. . F ..

Cpply only to initiallicensing decisions. ~

3 -

ATOMIC ENERGY ACT: ENFORCEMENT ACTION (LIFTING OF ORDER)

The standard for. determining whether to lift the immediate effective-ness of an enforcement order is whether the concerns which led to making that order immediately effective have been adequately resolved.

Once the Commission finds this has been done, it is legally obligated to lift the immediate effectiveness of the order, regardless of the nature of the latest Licensing Board decision on the matter. This is a matter pecu.

liarly within the Commission's knowledge and involving the most discre-tionary aspects ofits enforcement authority.

,a ATOMIC ENERGY ACT: ENFORCEMENT ACTION '

(LIFTING OF ORDER)

The Commission cannot ignore its legal obligation to lift the immedi-ate efTectiveness of a shutdown order once the concerns which led to making that order immediately effective are satisfied, even if a single ,

issue not significant for safe plant operation remains pending before the '

. o Licensing Board. See, e.g., Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-79 7, 9 NRC 680 (1979) (re- ,

sumption of operation authorized prior to hearing); see also /CC v.

Oregon Pac (fic Industries, 470 U.S.121,127 (1975) (Powell, J., concur- .

ring); Pan American Airways v. CAB, 684 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir.1982);

Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 539 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir.1976); Altline '

1121 t

< ',- - o 3 s .

.g' a .. #. . ;. . m . ,' .2 i

( .

1 l Pilots Ass'n, international v. CAB, 458 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,

' 420 U.S. 972 (1975).

NRC: JURISDICTION The NRC is not a legislative body and it lacks discretion to act on the basis of issues that are not within the scope of the laws established by

. Congress.

ATOMIC ENERGY ACT: RESPONSIBILITY OF NRC 4 In the Atomic Energy Act, Congress has directed the NRC to make I decisions regarding the licensing of nuclear reactors on the basis of its I

own expert judgment and analysis of whether the detailed regulatory re-

- quirements of the Commission have been satisfied.

I f

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER i

! I. INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

i l Three Mile Island, Unit 1 ('TMI 1) has not operated since February i 15, 1979, when its operator, Metropolitan Edison Company, shut it

! down for refueling.' Following the March 28, 1979 accident at TMI 2,

! the Commission on July 2,1979, issued an immediately effective en-

',. s forcement order (unpublished) directing that TMI I remain shut down until further order. In an August 9,1979 Order the Commission ex-

c. , , , ,

-+ ,

plained the basis for its shutdown decision and established the restart

' ,. proceeding to determine whether TMI l should be allowed to resume

. operation. CLI-79 8,10 NRC 141. Exhaustive hearings have been held c; in the restart proceeding, and only two issues, both management related, 4 remain pendiag before the agency. The agency's appellate review of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board's (" Licensing Board") decision on

- i the adequacy of GPUN's training program is under way, and the Licens-ing Board is currently preparing its decision on the Dieckamp mailgram j issue.

-[

' 1As a resuh et a corporate reorganuation ofrectne January 1.1982. General Public Utdities Nucleat Corp. (Gru Nuclear) replaced Metropolitan Edison Company as Lkensee. Lkensee will be referred to

. <',' > throughout this order as Licensee. GPU Nuclear. or GPUN Reference wdl also be made to General Public Utahties Corp. tGPU). the parent corspany of GPU Nuclear.

1122 t

.t s' . ,.

.s ~

a. .

In today's Decision for the reasons that follow, the Commission, after i. , p ..  ;. y. ,

s:tting forth its overall views on Licensee's competence and integrity, .

.;j;fj, C E[.9 f7 9 . f , g ,M , O L"^q

,g . . e m .

concludes that the two remaining management issues do not raise con- .

cerns warranting maintaining the immediate effectiveness of the shut- ~'(($lIdd

, $ 4Ca : ?.?.[. -

d wn Orders, and therefore that lifting the effectiveness of those Orders f,',...h'$,Q'Jf.;..

"j

Ue.7[7.

. S.  ; ,

is required. This Decision lifts the effectiveness of the shutdown Orders, ' ' -

,' h an action which permits TMI I to resume operation, subject to satisfac- g . ~. - '

tory completion of the conditions imposed in this Order. J ', . , . +. '

s

.v The Commission's review of whether to lift the immediate effective- ..h ' ,

, ,,e-ness of the 1979 shutdown Orders has taken considerably longer than , ,d' -

y. c g ,. <

' \ h.N' hj$ % f. f9 ** ;'

the Commission originally anticipated because of a succession of events 4 .o - '

cnd the development of new information following the initial closing of the formal adjudicatory record in 1981. The Commission evaluated J- ' P i.;n y . : ,J-: ' - '

whether that new information warranted reopening of the record in an Order dated February 25,1985, and concluded that it did not. CLI 85 2,  %:

I

> ' 3E ddhq,-Q

,1 ' S .

21 NRC 282. Some of that new information is also discussed in today's ,' A. . P .[. ;-j.l, . ' , .

Decision. .. ... .,  ;

Because of the unique nature of this proceeding, the Commission has decided also to address certain other concerns which have been brought to its attention in the context of the restart proceeding, but which fall outside the scope of the proceeding.

II. BACKGROUND A. Establishment of the Proceeding - Effectiveness and Appellate Reviews The law normally affords a licensee the opportunity to challenge an en-forcement action in a public hearing prior to the time an enforcement .

action takes effect: .

The norm for admimstrative action modifying outstanding licenses embraces a prior '

opportunity to be heard. . . . .,-

g, '..'.

lilt has always been recognized that summary administrative action substantially ,  ; -

curtailing existing rights . .. is a " drastic procedure." fahay v. Malloner. 332 U.S. ,;

245,253 (1947). See Ewmr v. Myrmser d Casselberry. Inc.,339 U.S. 594,599 (1950); ,  %-

Davit. Administrative I aw i 7.08. .e ,

1 Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units I and 2), CLI 73 38, 6 '

AEC 1082,1083 '(1973). '

In this case, however, the Commission determined in 1979 that the ,

I public health, safety and interest required making the shutdown Orders

• u -

1123 I

I -

t

/

. r; .

, L

. 6.. . ._ o c s .. a',_.. . . u x , ,, , a ,

l 1

immediately effective.2 Since the law obligates the Commission to lift the effectiveness of an immediately effective shutdown order once the concerns which led to making the order immediately' effective have been adequately resolved, see, e.g., Pan American Airways v. CAB, 684 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir.1982); Northwst Airlines v. CAB,539 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir.

1976); Air Line Pilots Ass'n, international v. CAB,' 458 F.2d 846 (D.C.

l Cir.1972), cert. denied, 4:.3 U.S. 972 (1975), the Commission provided for a dual review of the Licensing Board's decision. One review was the normal appellate review which consisted of appeals of Licensing Board decisions to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board (" Appeal

. Board") and then to the Commission.8 The other, the " effectiveness re-view," involved determining whether to lift the immediate elTectiveness

-l of the shutdown Orders and authorizing plant operation during the

! pendency of the appellate review. See CLI-79-8, supra,10 NRC at 149.

i This " effectiveness" review, which involves "the most discretionary as-pects" of the Commission's enforcement authority, CL1-81-34,14 NRC 1097,1098 (1981), originally consisted of a review of decisions rendered by the Boards, other relevant information provided to the parties for comment, and party comments.

These two independent reviews have been simultaneously under way since the Licensing Board issued its first Partihl initial Decision. While the Commission originally anticipated that the effectiveness review would be completed before any of the appellate review was finished, the i

appellate review has been completed on all but the two remaining management issues, namely, training and the Dieckamp mailgram. Ac-cordingly, the Commission's effectiveness review is now limited to whether the concerns regarCng those two issues are such as to warrant

. . maintaining the effectiveness of the sh'itdown Orders.*

Today's Decision is based on tne record of the formal adjudication.

'. This record includes the rcievant adjudicatory decisions, and other mat-ters and papers filed in the formal adjudication, including information t

3 la the Comme.We July 2.1979 Order directing that TMI.I remain shut down pending further or-

. der. the Commias a stated that it lacked the

• requisite reasonable assurance" that Unit 1 "can be

! operated without endangenng the health and safety of the public." and that "it is 64 the public interest i

that a heartng precede restart of the factiety." This saep was taken based upon a provision in the law that

, allo *t such immediate action when required by the public health and safety or public interest. see 10 i C.F R.l 2.202(D. wtuch imple'rients 5 U.s C.t $$8(c).

3 The Commission onginally li. tended to conduct the appellate review of the Licensing Board's decision

' ' 6tself. Because of the complealty of the proceeding, the Commission subsequently established an Appeal Board to hear initial appeals. CLI 88 19.14 N RC 304 (1981).

- 4 Neithet the Licensing Board's forthcoming decision on the Diectamp madgram nor the appellate U review of that decision and the traitung decimon will be prejudiced by this elTectiveness Decision. If the

, Licensing Board. or the Appeal Board or Commission as part of the oppellate revice, should determine that additional meswres are required, appropriate action etli be taken.

l I 1124 i

e e

._ y  ; = v

' ' ^

.c .

,c , - ,

, . .m

', y, n

, ' '1 r/.

,, ,. 2 . ., . . : - n a:Li a ,

.:p '

4

. _o

.l u ' (l,., 7 \ Q

. *. ,

m, .

3~ g .j c

. A ,.. 1 . -

. .1 .. . .

presented in motions to reopen the record and nondisputable mafters / 7' such as personnel changes. ggfik.C.!TfM,V./ .

% k, y, f.p.q

',2

3. Pressedings Before the Licensing Beard Qa,0My;@q'r:&gE/

v m. 7n ' u-74

'. C .wf

,n ma .s.,..g g . .;

g.l;[Og G.:,'

The Licensing Board to date has issued four partial initial decisions in j' T'.p,' ": Np.,#.' . j Q , N Sc:: N i

M$

this proceeding.s The first set forth the procedural background of the ' Y'" '

M: 2" ,

hearing and contained the Board's findings on the management compe- C' 41.l.7 R # "- I tence of GPU Nuclear. Among the issues addressed in that decision ' *T .7 ' U, O '

's '

wtre Licensee's management structure, the adequacy of its operator N. N ' ' S*; . ' ' '

training program, its safety related maintenance and repair procedures, management's response to the TMI-2 accident, and the Licensee's

/D .* ][ 6:i .i .7 .d*

,1 Ncs EwO.5'thj y,f. ,-N.d*

ttchnical capability and resources. LBP 81-32,14 NRC 381 (1981).

With the exception of a subissue involving possible cheating on operator TgrlM[' M' ',, ) "N N 4 'd 0 ?",d,l 7 ' '

license examinations, over which it retained jurisdiction,' the Board's ,4j ;;.. J . . n.

conclusions on the management issues were favorable to resumed opera- ' V i*-/ 1- -- '

j> '.z' , , s " . ~'f l tien of TMI 1.7 On October 2,1981, the Licensing Board reopened the 'C ' '

record to hear evidence on the implications of the information on cheat- '

ing, and appointed a Special Master to hear the evidence.

On December 14, 1981, the Licensing Board issued a Partial Initial Decision on hardware / design issues, the separation of Units 1 and 2, -

and emergency planning. This decision was also favorable to restart, sub. -

ject to correction of various deficiencies. LBP-8159,14 NRC 1211, 1711. -

The Special Master issued his recommended findings on the cheating is.tues on April 28,1982. LBP-82 34B,15 NRC 918. After reviewing the Srcial Muter's Report, and the parties' written comments on that Re-post, the Licensing Board on July 27,1982, issued its Third Partial Initial I, '

Decision, which addressed the cheating incidents. The Board, imposing y . s.,

four conditions on the Licensee's training program, concluded that the i- *

cc>u, issues in the reopened proceeding "have been resolved in favor of re- i ,,  ;, -

stirting Three Mile Island Unit 1," and that the conclusions of the two c...

a.. a.

e< ,e -

.g 1 ,

Gt ' , , . ,

N. 4

+ %, . ' .l,,'

+ e_

8 over 15$ days of a4udecatory hearings have been held in this proceeding, and thirteen pertees have ' +

partecipated. In addeuen, thousands of members of the public who were not perues to the proceedrag - -

have provided written and/or oral statements. .

• Shortly in fore the isevance of the Board's first decision, the NRC staN noursed the L6censmg Board ,

ofIta invesugaHon lato alleged cheating by two of Licensee's senior reactor operators on NRC.edmenes. -

t: red. operator bcense exams. In hght of this development the BoarJ retamed jurisdicuon "to coneseer further the eNect of the invesugauon of cheating on our decisson subsequent to the leeuence of the in- * "

vssugauon report." 14 NRC at 403. ,

?

The board, however, imposed ten hcense condiuons regard ng management, if Licensee were perm 6t-

• ted to remert TMI.1 P

1125 l m

?.

4

,pa., . o mo - w " '

L_

3'

,. s - . . . u. _ . .. ._ _

l r

earlier partial initial decisions remained in efTect. LBP-82-56,16 NRC 281,385.

On May 3,1985, the Licensing Board issued its Fourth Partial Initial Decision.8 LBP-85-15,21 NRC 1409. That decision, issued in response to the Appeal Board's remand in ALAB-772, see discussion infra, ad-

~ dressed the adequacy of GPU Nuclear's licensed operator training pro-

; gram. The Licensing Board found the training program adequate, provid-

[ [- ed that GPU Nuclear " institute a procedure for evaluating after training

?' the performance ofits trained operators in the job setting for revision of

. ,; the training program." Id. at 1536. The Board retained jurisdiction " sole-

' ~ ' '

. ly for the purpose of approving the plan for job performance evalua-tion," Id. at 1537, but held that the plan did not have to be developed or i . , approved prior to restart.

o C. Appellate Review j In the emergency planning area, the Appeal Board, although it modi-I fled somewhat the Licensing Board's decision, found that the plans were

- adequate once all required conditions were met. ALAB-697,16 NRC 1265; ALAB-698,16 NRC 1290 (1982). On September 8,1983, the j Commission completed its review of ALAB 697 and ALAB-698 and, reinstating a condition regarding staffing of the emergency offsite facility

, imposed by the Licensing Board, concluded that emergency planning for TMI I is adequate, subject to necessary Staff certifications.' CLI-83 22, 18 NRC 299 (1983).

, in the hardware area, the Appeal Board in ALAB 729,17 NRC 814 g

, (1983), found in favor of restart.'8 The Commission took review of five

, , issues in that opinion, and on July 26, 1984, resolved four of them on i ,. f

,,i'

• . t h 8 in response to a Commision request in CL! 85 2, the Licensing Board on Aptd 11.1985. provided its ultimate conclusion on t!.e tramms issue and tne essence or the supportmg rationale L6P 8510,21 NRC 603.

'stafr on Aptd 2,1981. certirted that the conditions related to emergency preparedness had been i ,

sausred.

4 to As a sepstate mauer, the Appeal Board on Jdne 30.1982. requested Commission authorization to 1

i hear three issues sue gwrrr il) repair or the corroded steam generatoe tubes' (2) pouible cracking in i some high pressure nen'et or their thermal s'eeveir, and f 3) possible distoriton of augthary feedwater t sporgers. The Commession, although n 63 reed that these issues "must be satisfactorily molved before

. . . a decision on . . . restart. decided to handle these issues outside of the restart proceeding.

CLI 8212.16 NetC 1, t 0982). The rtrst issue is bems addressed in the separate proceedmg on the steam generator repeers at TMbl. The 1 Kenang Board issued a decimon authonrins issuance of the heense amendrrent necessary for operation eph the repened escam generators. LBP 84-47, 20 NPC cr4 1405 0 9847 aff".f ALA8107, 21 NRC H910985), acd t*m ar'

endment was issueJ The latter two

• J issues were adiresned by the stafr m sEC't.82 502. staff feue to cracking in TMI l nonies of sleeves and that the feedwater sparger assue was wtappt, cable ur IMbt The Comrmaion accepts the NRC

+

stafrs r>ndmas and is notaarted thas these issues have been tesot*ee J .j -

i t

. 1126 il

. h, ,L ',

. ,. 2 .. .----w . -

f '.

'A '

the basis of the record already developed in this proceeding. On the fifth  ;- > -

< . . . ..;g issue, the Commission directed Staff to certify the status of environmen-

y. .[ , ,;.f ,

., w ;m -

tal qualification for radiation of certain electrical equipment.'8 CLI-8411,20 NRC 1.

In the management area, the Appeal Board on August 31,1983, re-i O M(f-C.'

.S.j; N".I.Mf.{',S Y@6

?' 5' opened the record on allegations made by Mr. Harold Hartman, a fd,V S'.,,iiM.hh%' C 3 ' ' 7 ~~

',,a.

former TMI-2 operator, which dealt with possible falsification of leak

d i l, $ .. '

"P rate data at TMI 2 prior to the accident. ALAB-738,18 NRC 177.'2 ',;./. '>e f . #-

On May 24,1984, the Appeal Board issued its decision on the rest of i i.J. -

~

the management issues. ALAB-772,19 NRC 1193. The Appeal Board P Q',i_

found that the record needed further development on GPU Nuclear's ~ . 4-licensed operator training program, and on a May 9,1979 mailgram from GPU President Herman Dieckamp to Congressman Udall concern.

% 5

% $% Ay,*,2 - !

sifiO*' ,,

I* -

ing the TMI 2 accident. The Appeal Board in ALAB-772 also granted a M V;;o W M*'" V ~-

motion to reopen on pre accident leak rate practices at TMI-1.

On September 11, 1984, the Commission took review of whether the 7 'l$.'. 'J.j ,, '*l[. ' '

> !,E ' ' '

hearings ordered by the Appeal Board in ALAB 738 and ALAB-772 " J .' g ; '

were warranted, and whether any of the information in NUREG 0680, 7~

Supp. No. 5, "TMI-l Restart, an Evaluation of the Licensee's Manage-  ;

ment Integrity as it AfTects Restart of Three Mile Island Nuclear Station ,

Unit 1, Docket 50 289" July 1984 ("NUREG-0680, Supp. No. 5"), war-  !

ranted further hearings.8) CLI 8418, 20 NRC 808. On February 25, 1985, the Commission held that for public policy reasons the Licensing Board should issue its decision on the two remaining issues in this pro-ceeding - training and the Dieckamp mailgram - but no other hearings ,

were warranted within the restart proceeding. CLI 85-2, 21 NRC 282 (1985).

The Commission in CLI 85 2 fully explained why no further hearings were warranted within the restart proceeding. Briefly summarized, the .

Commission found that no issue met the standards for reopening, i.e., M-raised a significant safety concern which might have affected the Licens- 1.; ,

ing Board's decision. With regard to the three most significant issues dis-s

< c

,s . , '

Il staff on May 24,1983, certified that the equipment was qualaried. 6 si+ . ' e5 - *: -

12 The Commission on october 7,1983, took review or whether the hearing ordered by the Appeal ' '$

• Board should proceed prior to completion of an investigation into these allegations by the NRC's Office

• of Investigations and, to preserve the status quo, stayed the Arpeal Board's decision while it conducted

• thzt review. subsequently, the Department of hstice requested the Commission not to pursue this ,

matter during the pendency of the criminal proceeding against Metropolitan Edison Co., UntredStases e. j Metropolitas Edaon Co., No. 83-00188 (M.D. Pal, and the Commission agreed to cooperate. After the crimmal proceeding was settled via a plea agreement and resultans conviction, the Commission tihed the stay, CLI 8417, N NRC 801 (1984).

13 The NRC staff in NUREo.0680, supp. No. 5. set forth its latest evaluation of Iicensee's manage. I, '

I ment integrity, specifically focusing on matters addressed in numerous investigations conducted by the I( s < -, ,

commission's Office of Investigations. l - , .

I, 1127 I

I i -

E 4

i k-

2

~ 1-E 9'

t.

3 .

nijy

- . s.xa , :. M . .. - . z . . . . - a s e d

.- W .

~

cussed in CLI 85 TMI 2 leak rate falsifications, TMl 1 leak rate v" practices, and Staffs "likely" change of position -- the Commission

. e,. .c S found as follows.

~~

~

Personnel changes and procedural safeguards have mooted the sigriifi-

' ~

. cance of the TMI 2 leak rate falsifications for current TMI-l opera-tions.8* Of those licensed to operate TMI 2 prior to the accident, only i y J vi ;p. y one - Michael Ross - is lic'ensed to operate TMI-1, and he has been

. ;F , ,q r 5 3% cleared of involvement in falsifications at TMI 2 by the NRC's Office of

- t.'ic . ,

's ' .

Investigations (OI) report. GPU Nuclear's upper management similarly has been cleared of involvement by the U.S. Attorney, based on a

'V '

V:' Grand Jury proceeding which led to the indictment of Metropolitan

,, I ' . ~( Edison Company. Hence the fact that individuals working at TMI-2 over

.y e . 6 years ago may have falsified records has no significance to the current

. 6 operation of TMI 1.

< With regard to pre accident TMI-I leak rate practices, the Commission in CLI 85-2 explained that the circumstantial evidence of a few irregu-latities does not raise a current safety concern. 01 investigated pre-accident TMI l leak rate pr'actices, and found no pattern of falsifica-tions, nor any motive to falsify While the 01 investigation.did identify

- some procedural violations, such as the practice of discarding test re-suits, those violations are just one more example of pre accident defi-

. ciencies at TMI, and their significance today is minimal at best. The pur-s pose of the restart proceeding was to determine whether current ~prac-

- tices at TMI l provide reasonable assurance of safe operation. Whether

. , 1- TMI-l can be safely operated was extensively litigated, and the Commis-

.. ,JW sion is satisfied, based on the extensive examination of GPU Nuclear in f f. o- this proceeding, that the personnel, procedures, and organization cur-fl ..' M'sy,$,f.7 y Q rently in place provide reasonable assurance that similar procedural defi-s3 l v . M. f t ciencies will not recur.

p (,.ry , ? '. ' '.M . The third significant issue in CLI-85 Staffs "likely" change of

( 7, Njh.':t.n fy position - is also of minimal current significance. Of the four events

. / h LJ , relied on by Staff for its "likely" change of position, one (the Floyd cer-i .

qN r.ff.f.$., tification) was fully litigated, and the other three (TMI-2 leak rate prac-

% , ]..g _ it ces, pre acc id ent traii n ng rregu i ar l iit es, and Licensee's responsc to the F{ .

2.,'j

ll.

Q,> , ? Xe j .

i

. . .N 14 The Commismon in CLI.83 2 stated that it would be institutmg a proceeding separate from the restart i

,, >< - M. $ /. proceeding on TMI.2 leek rate falsefications "to determine the ultimate status of those likely involved 6n t ,. O j ' .?(* +Ich :a? .

the TMI.2 leak rate falsificauona. which includes those Licensee has sesresated from operational duties at TMI.I and those now working at other nuclear facilities." 21 NRC at 305. The Commission excluded J . g . , , d['M*W ' :f. ' %

from this hearms those cleared by the U.s. Attorney, and Michael Ross, cleared by ol's investigation.

vi'y  ;, . ;'f'g*p j.((#.,/,3 L The Commenseon also offered Charles Husted an opportunity to request a hearms on a condiuon im.

posed by the Appeal Board whsch barred him from havms any supervisory responabiliues insofar as the

• .NM* E $ .$ : */ f*/1

.- trsining of noniscensed personnel was concerned.

.m i.- 1123 I J a *

"s 4 , .sge

7 - ,

, .. 4

. 1-a G . , ,j-y -

' .f ..y ; ,

. y.' ' t W.s m. .;.- ..,

.. .. s, p -

,n *.-

p.x  : w: q:,:w..n$e z.

.n m ... ~u , _ ->

. . . - .,

• h u .a . .. =u..- L.~a A K w .-  ::

%'.Q*",j,,j,QQ t;p a. >

s. y. . ,- - -. gu

-y. , s

.*4 . -

. .-  :..t .

-'  : y a..f ~ ,

g ,

1979 Notice of Violation) have no current significance. Therefore Staff's ...,., W $ $ QcQ.y .q.

W "likely" change of position does not warrant further hearings.

g . .yA , fr k:GW.:sp&.r',sie m.y.~

j.

V ? 5,. ,il.4;;r.g.,d, y, ., .pWeg. . i. .

D. Effectiveness Review of Managessent Issues ;i cy!

ap'i..f;.

j, M ;.hp A '

r, M, ^&'-7C' J:: 16,. " 7 '

The Commission as part of its effectiveness review of the Licensing ' '

Board's decisions has obtained written submissions from the parties, #

(?J. ' y. ' j.; -

^

t-and has heard oral presentations by the parties on October 14,1981, in .' - - a. / \ .v '

.j . i' ;  ?

Washington, D.C., on the Licensing Board's First Partial Initial Decision . .. ? -

on management competence, and on November 9,1982, in Harrisburg, J.^ ,

.g & f ' " .

Pennsylvania, on the next two Licensing Board partialinitial decisions.88 .x.1 f' M , ' ~. ' . s ' ~

In addition, the Commission held an evening session in Harrisburg on November 9,1982, where it heard from members of the public regarding the restart of TMI 1.

@^<

? ; 9

pa

.TS"[.s&-S . Q

' M W 9 . y ;7,M. .

• O "

,.w m'

Subsequent to receipt of the parths' comments on the Licensing ^J ' .S .ic . s p '.

Board's decision on the cheating incic' f.s. there were numerous devel-

, ~ .T

. f( %I'y. , i ,A 'f . ..

.f@l .'6[ p :

opments in the management area whion have led to additional oral and . .

97 written presentations by the parties and have affected and substantially "

prolonged the Commission's review process. Although the Commission in CL1-85 2, supra, decided that none of this new information warranted further hearings, as r 'mmarized supra, the Commission will briefly dis- "

cuss the chronology u' events in order to place today's Decision in per-spective, w On April 18, 1983, the NRC Staff advised the Commission that be- -

cause of the pendency of several matters that might bear on the compe-tence and integrity of TM1-1 management, the so-called "open issues."- . , . . -

l the Steff was initiating actions to " revalidate" its position that Licensee -

minagement had sufficient integrity to operate the facility." Staff in a May 19,1983 memorandum to the Commission listed the following . - .

open issues: the General Public Utilities (GPU) v. Babcock and Wilcox ,

'y <. '-

' ~

(Bd W) lawsuit transcript revi:w;18 the Hartman allegations concerning :j . 1,i , ,

r-l ;i ^

- ,, , ;V; , .-Em'y,w.% .-

15The parties mentioned in today's Decision are the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Common. d-

~

wealth), the Union of Concerned scientists (UCs). 'Ihree M.le Island Alert (TMIA), Marjone and l ', ' &3 s '

\ *F. ' t. '4 ;'

Norman Aamodt, the NRC stafr. and the Licensee.

16The Commission has also solicited and received numerous wntien submismons from the pubhc on N.' '" r~ ' ' ', *

~*, ~

.. C ~ O.'

V

'm '

whether and. if so, prider what conditions. TMI I should be restarted. .'-

UStafr "revahdated its postion in NUREG 0680, supp. No. 5 conclud:ng that "there is reasonable ,

assurance that GPUN can and will conduct its hcensed activit4s in accordance with regulatory require-ments and that GPUN can and will operate TMl-1 without undue psic to the health and safety of the ,

pubt:c." Id. at 13-10. i'

'8GPU sued Baw in the Umted states Disinct Court for the southern Distnet of New York (80 Civ. ,

4~ -

IMt3(RO)). claimme that B&W, the manufacturer of the reactor's nuclear steam supply system, should < i% . . .

te held liable for causms the TMI-2 accident. That lawsuit was settled after nearly 3 months of trial. , ,

4 i

1129

• t.-

p .

_ _ - _ _ . . . ~ . _ . - . m . .y .

e -

I l

I

, .s ,

p s ~ . ,

1

,. ax. .. ,

9 s .

. .xa - ,Hj & !.

~ m .p.. . , 4 _ : c , m. '

4-L ~. . *'

,-9

( a

~ , ,

s.-

r,s g.s. y .

s ..s.

1 , .-

.g; j.s

n. w .2_ .1.. a _.. _ _ _ u , _y 3:

,m ., _ ,

• , ,  ! ,s 4(

o, ,

~ , s.a..

q ..

• v.

. 4 ,

f 'R y .

k

~  :.e

, Y w m: . . -

y l . ,',u hvT ay

+ . $ n ,, a e, s. g-i,

.?

1 leak rate falsifications at TMI-2;" the Parks, King, and Gischel allega-tions regarding improper practices ar.d harassment at TMI 2 during the

[

l < j*,0.; My;g 3 cleanup;20 concerns raised by the firm of Rohrer, Hibler and Replogie l, .,; , . f.Uf A 7;

~ *

- yy. '

w.

n, (RHR) and by Basic Energy Technology Associates, Inc. (BETA) re-g, -

gw s 4' s ports;28 and questions regarding whether GPU failed promptly to notify l

the Commission or Appeal Board of material information in the RHR,

-g'

~ '

BETA and other reports,22 Subsequently, additional questions were 1 -

. s . gl g. -

7 : , ' ,'g raised regarding the preparation of the Keaten report by GPU,22 leak f ..

, ~ g.4 p- .y ,j. q . ' . g g't ,

l

- llh : .

i k;. ['~ .g' Y',f ~Or,"&y,", Ne-$ '4 .*;' .

' , y ' (< Much of the information developed in that trial appeared to relate to Licensee's management compe.

tence and int'grity, and hence appeared relevant to the restart proceeding. Accordingly, the Commission A

>g,

. . , -' p g! ,, './ 7 .C* ;T .

detected the NRC staff to review the trial transcripts and the eahibits, whether introduced in evidence j*.,"'.,.M, c

cr not, to determine whether they contaaned new information relevant to restart. The Commission also .

j f...

{

,j .* *; j.,n. , . G ., ' ji }l provided the parties to the restart proceeding an opportunity to comment on these documents and the staff's review, and several parues submitted comments. several issues arising from this review were

• f j

,, , ;'m t e->  : ^ , A _, "p.-f ~,t ! .

• referred to 01 for investigation, and are discussed separately, Wre.

' .i; .J' '; "(

The Appeal Board densed a motion to reopen the secord based on the GPU e. SalF trial evidence. l

', *  %.', ' ' ' ',I ALAB 738,18 NRC 177,195-97 (1983), and the Commission declined to take review of that holding.

. ,t , ,

l' Harold Hartman, a reactor operator at TMI 2 prior to the accident, alleged that leak rate tests, which

' were used to assess whether primary system leakage surpcased technical specification limits, were pur-1 s ,

i posely mampulated ard records of such tests falsified or destroyed at TMI-2 prior to the accident to

' cover up the fact trat over an extended period of time the results of the tests exceeded Technical Speci.

fication limits. The Commisnon in CLI-g5-2 explained that these allegations do not rasse a concern for 5f j ,

i

• current operanon of TMI-1. See discusson supre.

20 Messrs. King and Gischel were employed by GPU Nuclear in connection with the ongoing cleanup of TMI 2. Mr. Parks was employed by Bechtet. They alleged that established safety procedures were not

,l , being followed in conducting the cleanup, and that they had been harassed by management for raising

, j these concerns. These alleganons were referred to OI, which conducted separate invesugations into the {

1 ' '

i alleged procedural violations and the harassment claims. 01 Report Nos. 1183-002 (May 18,1984),

• 11-83 002 (Septemtier i,1983). Tne Apposi iioerd prior to completion of the 01 investigations denied a

.i -

,a 1 motion to reopen the record on these allegations. ALAB-738, supre.18 NRC at 197. Based on the OIin-

- .- 4./" ]

o p A,ff0 vestigauons, the Commission found that Licensee had not discriminated asamst Messrs. King and

~

7 ' ' >* Gischel. For the purpose ofits analysis, the Commission accepted Stan's conclusion that Mr. Parks had

. ' - %. , t-, V' E" ,

been discriminated against, but found that this single act of discrimination did not meet the standards 1

for reopening, particularly given that the major GPUN official involved no longer was associated with

/ j,,,$'yw.a.,,,6:j:I?,4.,.i,.

,. f 4 [;*![vhM.ifg TMI l.CLi 85-2, aqpre,21 NRC at 327 29.

28 The RHR and BETA reports were prepared for Licensee by cuiside consultants. The RHR report i

l '

. . C 'r

i, & n .?y, 3(fJ,,~ '

d ho% -fog 7 *;;;h;g (" Priority Concerns of Licensed Nuclear Operators at TMI and Oyster Creek and suggested Action 4rM^ ) Steps" (Mar.15, a983)) dealt pnmanly with operator asutudes, while the BETA report ("A Review of

.< T aO.'/ ,' . . , G ,N M.7g..7 1  :< Current and Projected Expenditures and Manpower Utilization for GPU Nuclear Corporation" (Feb.

. y, r

yf

~.4.6 :d.h,6h'i

• M, ; Jf$i*].s. p y,i",f.%p.d,. (.y M;h.d.+d M 28, 1983)) was designed to evaluate operational efficiency. Both reports contained information that ap-peered to bear on issues in the restart proceeding, and hence were the subject of comments by several parues. Staff in NUREG-0600, Supp. No. 4 ("TMI l Restart - An Evaluauon of the RHR, BETA, and

"(,* C'I,mh.$l ' MyxV.(j]M i

f ' " .; . .

DreA INPO Reporta" October 1983) evaluated these reports and found no signdicant new information.

y. ... 7'"&g -' N, f*/[ W / q ,,, ; 4 ( - The Appeal Board denied a motion to reopen the record based on the substance of these reports.

ALAB 774,19 NRC 1350 (1984).

;( ,l- ' , ,  ;  %,

4 f

( f,} a.' 71 " % %;;,g i 22 The NRC Staff concluded that the RHR and BETA reports were not provided to the NRC in a timely manner. This issue was referred to Of to determine why the reports were not provided at an earlier yj. , U ,[ .; ,/ f -w.

l*7 d'.Q-j<['*;i

, ;_ X time. The 01 investigation did not disclose evidence of a deliberate attempt by Licensee management to

-);1;

- g .y , . .

., withhold informanon contained in the RHR and BETA reports from the NRC. 01 Report No. 1-83-013.

j .

7 '. V O$*. 80 c. , , >D* '

Apnl 16,1984. The Appeal Board denied a motion to reopen based on the reporting of these documents to the NRC, ALAB-774, seqpre, as did the Commission. CLI-85-2, aqpre,21 NRC at 341.

( . .J$gg p ,

j lt , g:? W m.MJf,4q ?9 p,! M [, MM Q < 23 Quescens regarding preparanon of the Keaten report - an internal GPU report on the TMI 2 acci-r* M y a dent wntten by a task force headed by R.W. Keaten - arose from the review of the GPf/ e. AdlF trial

'* i ,h .,- W AA.yMCM' Ji7 W 1,y.@k W Q lO material. Essentially, this issue, which was investigated by 01, involves the propnety of changes made to

.': ~^ '

y...

4 :'

e dw yth ?U lit N

dreAs of the report by GPU management, and whether those changes reflect adversely on management's insegnty. Of in its investiganon did not find evidence of improper changes to the Keaten report itself.

Qf,M .s,sW2j:k. @g r,j g ; M G bW.$..c.n[7@ (Coaa-ce

/

5"

.. ~

b ;' .

Qy 1130

.#>7

' s

~$ .

~~

', .- R-.- 4:

s

, k

, .tn ***e*-

e . - .

-. - -3.-a- w.,, . - . . ,. , , ,,

,. . , .- y ; ;.;--, p.n..

e. .. , .

• j I

k s , **

, .a .

o ,

- , a. * : e-n .c) m' . .

'Y h;c

- ), ~,

i . ... , ..', , b l~

' , . , .,g - g a.a . 9 g .g

.m.*  ; .7 ,

1 s p-- .yw y...

y y, g%. .r.

i

- 2 - . .e. .p.. ,

• 3 '

ww - -.a ' ' ' '

.- --. . .. . oa = t . -.. . m. ' ' -

' :+i%'M:: :

m j%. , P .E. - -

y,qM:

,y.  ; : -. - .,s.-r .._

c, - , -

-? : - n.

%q{.m _. . , .

c-rate practices at TMI-1,24 pre-accident training irregularities,25 changes dM; !st. ..g 5 f. .En . , _. . . .

to the Lucien Report,2' and a change in operator testimony regarding the sequence of events during the accident.27 Further, Licensee was in-edg.fy.g .,yggQM6 A'.

dicted for criminal acts in connection with the Hartman allegations, and &,5;M C 6.M,9 . y QC c' .i G., Xh .f..

subsequently pled guilty to one count and nolo contendere on six $['A9:: Y N'M?/Y" ;.1 2,4:M  ;/

others. The United States District Court for the Middle District of v. RM '

Pennsylvania on February 29,1984, entered a judgment of guilty on the m U@d '-j (,' hk '

one count, and a judgment of conviction on the six counts to which Met-ropolitan Edison pled nolo contendere. H;f3 <o s-

',%.?X,^. - .w . . m

.j.J t i 6 ' "

In response to these open issues, Licensee on June 10,1983, commit- ' .Q , ' K , P @. . .,

ted to several significant organizational changes. Licensee committed to 7 hVJ e n l , 7N. ,

reassign personnel such that "no TMI 2 licensed operator will operate.

TMI-1, with the exception of the Manager of Operations, Michael W;.nj.E.:['

M W .h;- a f2L W "9 . ,

Ross."28 Licensee also committed to " add full time on shift operational ,N%M .W.i % . -e However, of did rmd that Licensee in response to the NRC's october 25, 1979 Notice of Violation (NOV) had made maccurate and incomplete statements. ol Report No. 183-012 (May 18,1984). The

& &J-": [x' k. .W n. -

!' .s T ..

-S

'e Y v.. v., p . ' .

Q'/ .

% '/. C ' - '*

Commission found that the remogal of the mdividuals primanly responsible for the response to the

NOV mooted any segmGcance of this issue. CLI-85-2, supro. 21 NRC at 323,334. -

s 24 The NRC staff in its abbreviated investigation into leak rate test practices at TMI 2 discovered some questionable data at TMI-l. Accordingly. O! was asked to mvestigate possibic leak rate falsification at TMI 1. OI completed its investigation (ol Report Nos. 1-83-028 and I-83 028, Supplement. April 16, 19841 shortly before the Appeal Board reopened the record on this issue in ALAB-772,19 NRC 1893 (1984), revV. CLI 85-2,21 NRC 282 (1985). 01. although it identiGed some procedural irregularities, did not fmd either a pattern of falsifications or a motive to falsify. The Commission found that this issue ,, .

did not meet the standards for reopenmg. See discussion supra.

25 stafr in the review of the GPU v. Bd W trial record found several pre-accident Licensee memoranda

. which endscated possible regulatory violations in Licensee's traimng program. 01 conducted three sepa-rate inquines into pre-accident tramms irregularities. 01 Report Nos. Q-1-83-014 (May 31,1983);

Q l-83-Ol$ Uuly 26,1983); Q-1-84 004 (March 22,1984). ol determmed that none of these inquiries '

q wirranted a full invesugation. The Appeal Board in ALAB-774, supra. denied a motion to reopen based on pre-accident training irregularities.

26 The GPU v. Bd W tnal record review also led to an OI inquiry into changes made to a technical r, -

report regardmg the accident prepared by K.P. Lucien of Energy Incorporated under contract to the Licensee. 01 Report No. Q-l-84 006 (May 18,1984). Based on Ol's mvestigation, the Commission -eE ' '

found no direct evidence of wrongdoing, and concluded that heannas on this issue were not warranted.

CLI-85 2, supro. 21 NRC at 337. - ,,- " ,'

27 Of also investigated the causes of a change in testimony by Licensee employees during the GPU r.

, M ;'t .I;

,'^

8d W tnal from their earlier statements concernmg whether full-Gow high pressure irucction (HPD had been manua!!y initiated on the morning of the accident when the last two reactor coolant pumps were n *6J

%A ' , ^

shut down. ol Report No. 184-005 Uuly 13,1984). The Commission found from ol's investigation - A / - i that there was no factual evidence to support the charge that the change in testimony was improperly motivated, and that this issue did not warrant reopening. CLI-85 2, supre. 21 NRC at 338.

6.' 5

= Wg%{'ij NO

• Wf - ~'

q\ ,7 g -f f #$ i 28 The Licensing Board described Mr. Ross as possib'y "the most important person on the TMI I operat. ./ c 1" N k. f ., A .,'6 . -

ing team as far as the public health and safety is concerned," LBP-81-32, supra,14 NRC at 439, and 2P

'i " " .n < .

~

hence Mr. Ross has been closely examined throughout this proceeding. As explained in CLI-85-2, the .. -[

• e Commission Gnds that TMI I can be operated safely with Mr. Ross in his current position. 21 NRC at  %' l 298-99. i The Commission m CLI-85 2 mod:Ged Licensee's commitment and imposed it as a condition:

No pre accident TMi-2 operator, shift supervisor, shift foreman, or any other individual both in , .

the operaung crew and on shift for trainmg as a licensed operator at TMI 2 prior to the accident s.

shall be employed at TMI-I in a responsible management or operational position without specinc c, ,.,.,,, .

Commission approval., ,

(Contmued)

, , .j y . ,

9 4

1131 -

5 4

\

.i .

c.A;

• - x, , .

l

.,w

' c

- - =- = . -

- . . . _ , x., l ,s = ;z.

l 1

1

' 1

,.h l .,

, . J quality assurance [QAl coverage until the open issues are resolved."2' Further, Licensee stated that until the open issues were effectively re-

. 7:, s.y

- solved it would " reassign personnel such that those functions which pro-

,' vide overview assessment, analysis, or. audit of plant activities would m contain only personnel with no pre-accident involvement as exempt Met 4 .. l Ed employees at TMI-I or 2."30 Finally, Licensee committed'to "reallo-cate the priorities and assignments within the Office of the President of

.~

~  %. , , .'

GPU Nuclear."

1.- .

The Commission on November 28, 1983, heard oral presentations ,

(o - ..n;. ; :;. ;3 y . -i. ' from GPU on its June 10,1983 management organization proposal and

- q -

,:iC '

subsequent changes.38 GPU in its presentation stated that its June 10,

-j 4 ,',,,.- _

1983 plan had been implemented, and committed to taking the following

~ '

-' further steps. First, GPU would elect to the GPU Nuclear Board of f .' s

, .' ~ < ~

Directors three outside directors "with meaningful credentials and

~

demonstrated independence." Second, these new directors would com-prise a Nuclear Safety and Compliance Committee of the GPU Nuclear 4

- Board, and that Committee would employ a staff to monitor the opera-tion and maintenance of the GPU system nuclear units.32 Third,' the

' Nuclear Safety and Compliance . Committee would periodically . issue

}

re;' orts regarding the operation and maintenance of the GPU system

nuclear units, and those reports would promptly be provided to'the

.i

" operational position" as used here includes any position involving actual operation of the j plant, the direction or supervision of operators, or independent oversight of operations.

This condition shall also apply to the pre-accident Vice President, Generation, TMI-2 Station 4 ,

' Manager, TMI-2 Supervisor of Techsteal Support (from January 1977 to November 1978),

1 =* '2 / .~

TMI-2 Superintendent of Technical Support (from December 1978 to the accident), and TMI-2

.9M @g..?.. Y- y'._ .

~,..

supervisor of operations. This condition shall not apply to Michael Ross, and Brian Mehler may continue in his present position consistent with this condmon.

M&tS y .:a l,l /3 fk  ;',".; , , ,f,

- " Q, ' , , i - 0 ,,., y '

, 7 , .% i . s

'S-21 NRC at 341-42.

29See discussion supre for a listing of the "open issues."

g N. b - M lxt. 0*+ W..'../ -

g. i M' ' t y' W*p 5 30 Mr. Clark at the November 28,1983 Commission meeting explained that "the exempt classification la payroll classification] . . picks up all supervisory management, all people charged with the responsi.

i]s . :WW

+Ji bility for directing the operauon. It does not pick up the workers, the hands-on people, be they mechan-1,

} n 'tt t ,b ;.y. ics or clerks."

i W. n : c .

31 The Commission heard oral presentations by the other parties on December 5,1983, on GPU's C_ '4 '

• propoest. stafrin its presentation set forth the conditions under which it believed TMI I could be safely

p( ,_

-4 .

~ , , operated, which included round-the-clock NRC inspection and a 25% power limitation.

~~

t: i, m

+

.- ,. 2 7 # ,

UCS in comments dated January 25,1984, argued that the Commission had failed to respond to the a p .% . ',Q.' -

. * ' p g ?.' D UCs request that the parties be provided an opportunity to present oral responses to Staff's December 5

.l

y. f; i ( " 7. ,* m , ', ' yy ', c q 5 *<'

c 43 ,.'

proposal. The Ccmmission responded to the UCs motion by providing the parties an oppartunity to submit wr;ttan comments on staff's proposal. The parties also had the opportunity to discuss the Stafr

~)h .v, . [ E _,; 9.1, proposal in the August 15,1984 oral presentations to the Commission.

32 Licensee notified the Commission on March 15, 1984, that Messrs. Lawrence ! Humphreys (Chie*

j .1, . . ' . - .

h jt.. y [j:!*k.',a .. il,: G ;;,. P pl 3([ @ Executive officer of UNC Nuclear Industries). Warren F. Witzig (Chairman, Nuclear Engineering Department, Pennsylvania State University), and Robert v. Laney (consultant in nuclear and energy s 7'

. j/. ,' Q

• ;M . quJ.4. *%pl:.. ~,-l^ . . [ ' "m^:.@ M y/ project management) had been elected to the GPU Nuclear Board of Directore, and that they would

., j ^ ' W . G .> ' 2 9 make up the Nuclear Safety and Compliance Committee.

...' C.,QN .f*.).

O f. .x g M 6 7 6 i p i t; M N 5 / i, , The Commission in CLI-85-2 adopted Licensee's commitment as a condition: " Licensee, in the ab-sence of Commission authorization to the contrary, is to retain its expanded Board of Directors and its fig;Jg.-.gf'r, y v' 'C..M ;;;g ,

,,.}- .

p, { - Nuclear safety and Conipliance Committee." 21 NRC at 342.

. n..

g*

+ 1132 x ,,

.g . ' ~

L. k I

e F "+-9v.* ,_% .p,.y, ..p_

% ' **

• 7 , w eat = g,,,,,,. ,

e

' s g..C * * /. w

,, g. s

. .w > w - p. ..<

t . ,

• ? j . e :* *- s o

.s c

.w

s- L ,

s . . .

m _

'... ..=. , y,':

M.

u.,v ,

. . e ,, o. . . . c,

..  :.n ..:..-

l

- ..= -.a- -.. L .$LEb ~ ~

h~

_ q^ - i

~-

, c- -

NRC and the public. Fourth, Mr. Robert Arnold, who had been Presi- 1

?),[*.'4Jhbjy:: . .b 3 h. , .j.i/ $ ,

dent of GPU Nuclear, was reassigned to nonnuclear work within the ,

GPU system. Mr. Philip Clark, formerly Executive Vice President, re- 13W , '. ' f M .g.y.iJo g:Jf..y .

placed Mr. Arnold as President of GPU Nuclear, while Mr. E.E. Kint- -

li ,

ner, formerly Vice President, became Executive Vice President. Both + [! D - f ,f'J.9e '4,'

x"!," N '"

Messrs. Clark and Kintner were elected members of the Board of Direc- ,.( +..% ,.

tors of GPU Nuclear.33 1 F.,, -

,,. , " 4. ",

On January 27, 1984, the Commission set forth its tentative views .

and plan for resolution of management integrity issues prior to restart.H ' r: >

The Commission stated that the only then-ongoing 01 investigation <  ; N~ , .. ",

which might require further resolution prior to a decision on the -

6N 'fp, m:nagement issues was the Unit I leak rate investigation. The Commis- ?A- T sion explained "that, in principle, temporary separation from nuclear op- ' . . , 4. ; ...m erations of some GPU employees and other actions, including those pro-posed by the Licensee, can serve as an interim solution to the manage- j ./l '$ ',lR ), % Y O. c- l.

.f ment integrity issues raised by the 'open items,' pending resolution of (3.,, M ~*Q, d '. .y ' W . '

those items." The Commission also noted its view, " based on currently _ /S ' Y , i available information, . . . that neither Chairman of the Board William Kuhns nor President of GPU Herman Dieckamp will have to be tempo- i rarily or permanently separated from nuclear operations prior to restart."  !

The Commission on June 1,1984, requested the parties l i

to comment on whether, in view of ALAB.772 and all other selevant information, '

including investigative reports by the Office ofInvestigations, the management con.

cerns which led to making the 1979 shutdown orders immediately effective have been sufficiently resolved so that the Commission should lift the immediate effec-tiveness of those ' orders prior to completion of review of any appeals from ALAB-772.

f i .

Licensee, Staff, TMIA, the Asmodts, UCS and the Commonwealth sub- -

mitted comments, and the Commission heard oral presentations from the parties on August 15,1984. . -e !

t' ', - ..

i* .

s.'.,.,,. ..:

33 subsequently, on February 6,1984, GPU Nuclear anonunced further changes to its organization. Mr.

hhn F. O' Leary, former Deputy secretary of the Department of Energy and GPU Board member since s*

, j '. ' l

- ' *M 5 ~^~ ~

october 1979, was elected Chairman of GPU Nuclear. Mr. Clark, President and Chief operating ofFeer '

of GPU Nuclear, was also appointed Chief Executive omcer. Mr. Herman Diecksmp, former Chairman

• and Chief Executive ofricer of GPU Nuclear since its inception, remained only as a member of the Bostd of Directors of GPU Nuclear, although he continued to hold the positions of President, Chief Operatorig omcer, and a member of the Board of Directors of GPU.

N The Commission on January 20,1984, provided the parties with a list ofintegnty issues for commenL This hst represented a compilation of issues having as their bases ** facts or disputes about facts raised ,

during the restart proceedmg or thereafter, and which at face value appear to have some possible con.

nection with managemem iniegnty." The hst was designed to assist the Commission in identifyms and '

evaluaung issues concerning Licensee's integnty. Licensee, stafr, TMIA, the Aamodts, UCs, an3 the .

Commonwealth commented on that hst.

1133 -

(

. , , , .u- -

4 1

e n

, c' - ,

e -

,_ .h '

. . w. .

...~..-..d..%% [. , , . ;. ,1.. . * , ,,{ e , > -

. ,t

> StafT, as part of its comments, provided its " revalidation" of Licen-see's management in NUREG-0680, Supp. No. 5. StafT in that evaluation found 3

- pattern of activity on the part of. . . Met-Ed (whichl, had it been known at the time

[of the Licensing Board proceeding on TMI-1 restartl, wo0ld likely have resulted in a conclusion by the staff that the licensee had not met the standard of reasonable

' assurance of no undue risk tre public health and safety.

.  ; .: , .~

M. at 13-5. With regard to the current Licensee, GPU Nuclear, Staff bal-

.. .. ' Tl/' ' "$ '

anced the past improper acts of Metropolitan Edison against GPU Nucle-

'_ , i. ,

' '~

ar's record of remedial getions and performance, including the record of j current senior management, and concluded that GPU Nuclear was ac-ceptable.

~

. - The Commission, in its September 11, 1984 Order taking review of e J- whether further hearings should be held, stated it would not rule "on whether to lift the immediate effectiveness of the 1979 shutdown orders until after it has decided on what further evidentiary hearings, if any, are required in the restart proceeding." The Commission further stated that, if it " decides that further hearings are required, it will decide whether the public health, safety and interest require completion of those hearings prior to a decision on lifting effectiveness." CLI-84-18, supra, 20 NRC at 809.

After the Commission decided what further hearings were required and the Licensing Board issued its partialinitial decision on GPU Nucle-ar's licensed operator training program, the Commission heard oral pres-entations from the parties on' May 22,1985. The parties in their presen-s , ,

tations addressed both the training decision and the overall question of e Q . ' ' , g.7

~

whether the Commission should now lift the immediate effectiveness of .

d.fOJ ; Y{ ;'p y.](( .,

i the shutdown Orders.

.. ,  : M g. '.'

s .

III. THE COMMISSION'S EFFECTIVENESS DECISION

, ,,.,' s 3- 4 . .- < .; ' , .

The Commission in CLI-85-2 decided that for public policy reasons

c. n

~~

2

[ '

the Licensing Board should issue a de' cision on the two issues remaining

,',p l h fu , ,(, in this proceeding, training and the Dieckamp mailgram. The Commis-f o - sion further decided that hearings in the restart proceeding were not war-(. c 4

is . /- u.. ranted on any other issue. The question before the Commission now is

.-4:,,

5 . , .. .

accordingly limited to whether any concerns regarding the training issue a' y;.,y i. 5X,..: .j .

.% are such as to warrant maintaining the immediate effectiveness of the

. , ' , .%. shutdown Orders prior to completion of the agency's appellate review of I

- C t, ;

. i.

• s 7 7.7-W3' . w,., c f

.g ,

4 [ .*'

1134 er 4

. - . ~ .. . ~ . , ,_,

.__.,.y_. ' ^

+'

U ? , q'i. {. <j, , I-L i'_ e L

^

~s x.2 ; . q:;

, }. ['

> f.=

Y

• I

- w ,s . ,

..m 3 -

.. . p: >

.,  ? .

.c

• . .. n..

./.1~ -j-;,

,  !; ',h ',,'!!R J. '9 .,s 7; -; y , z p i g . .. ,y ~

<=. n m;on

,. . ,v . : .. : .

- - , - ;3 .. 3r,e . . - '

.QU.W .J O :~. . . : '

-.A E"J ~t.u M M & *'- "~L' " ," ~~-~^ -

8 i

that issue, and whether any concerns regarding the mailgram issue war-  ; ', ,'

rant maintaining the effectiveness of the shutdown Orders at least until a 1 X ' ' '

c'; 5,g .N. D M 4 8 the Licensing Board issues a decision on that issue.M As explained below, the Commission has decided that these two issues do not raise serious questions about whether TMI-l can be safely  ?.'E s_.

%mcW h 59,, -

' .; . ;O c .. . .U

. g.g".

. % .6'd.

y jp. /

operated, and accordingly do not warrant keeping TMI-l shut down .. , . g -. # % % ,':".q ?..; W ;

until agency proceedings have been completed. The Commission, after j E: ' ,

.7.. -

7,.. l ' ./

first placing these two issues in perspective by providing a general over- ' 7 . ' M. . f.'C; ,,fG ' . e view of the competence and integrity issues, will discuss below why . @, S these two issues do not raise serious questions about the current safe op- n ,y

.M[,\. F3.y! (c ri.~T . '[~

c_

f eration 'of TMI-1. The Commission will then address procedural issues . s. - *7

. . !, . ?. . ,.

raised by Intervenors. Finally, the Commission will discuss Staffs 2< . f' 4 C. W..' . ~ .,. .~~K, .

proposals of round-the-clock NRC inspection and a 25% power limita- .9 ,. .. . ..

tton.

s  %,..

r n

, c. y .:,. , ' . , ~..,.,,

. . . . . J .e , f,, ;.' ,

k .'-;N', **

• A. Management Competence and Integrity q. W fW:g,N;* * 'M T m . uk ' {- '

't'

1. Introduction - '

In the Commission's August 9,1979 Order, the Commission directed the Licensing Board to evaluate whether Licensee had sufficient manage-rial capability and resources to operate TMI-I safely. CLI-79-8, supra.10 '

NRC at 145. In a subsequent Order issued on March 6,1980, the Com-mission gave the Licensing Board specific guidance on areas to be ad-dressed in determining whether management had sufficient competence to operate the facility. CLI-80-5,11 NRC 408 (1980).M The Licensing ,

' Board addressed these issues in its Partial Initial Decision of August 27, F 1981, LBP-81-32,14 NRC 381, and reassessed management competence kI-after the cheating incidents in its Partial Initial Decision of July 27, ,

1982. LBP-82-56, supra. ~-

M c.

4 y J ,.,, , ,

i M Were the Commission to wait for completion of the proceedmss before the Licensing Board. it would then have to decide whether to await completion of the appellate review. As explained htfra. the Dieck-amp mailgram issue does not raise health and safety concerns that warrant maintaining the immediate

'j7 2. _; [^fc. ,

[. '

,' -? -

(ficctiveness of the shutdown orders. Therefore. there is no reason to postpone a decision until the **

.93' 'a.s.v i 4; O}'. ' -

Licensing Board issues its decision. ' .E ,( ; .'I". .

M The Commission in that order directed the Licensing Board -

to examine the following broad issues: (D whether Metropohtan Edison's management is suffi- '

ciently staffed. has sufHcier.: resources and is appropriately organized to operate Unit I safely; ~

(2) whether facts revealed by the accident at Three Mile Island Umt 2 present quesuons con- ' " - -

cernmg management competence which must be resolved before Metropohtan Edison can be . . ,

found competent to operate Unit I safely; and (3) whether Metropolitan Edison is capable of '

operating Umt I safely while simultaneously conductmg the clean-up operation at Unit 2. .

CLI.80-5. siera. Il NRC at 408. The Commission then went on to hst 13 specific issues for the Licens. ~

ing Board to examme in the course of examining the broad quesuons. '

• , - " ,' . , o .

• 3* ,

1 1135  :

- - ~

..y - . . . - .

7 .- _ . - -

e I

. - - -_ - .= .. . ._.

k- >

-'/ . ' s i.g r

n; 7,

,  : s

=*#- =*.4.u .emm as % , 's ..% , , ..n,f,.,.,g,.,,,,;u.. 4 - , o 'l m M ..%_-M8M.*d-E

,. The Appeal Board in its review of the Licensing Board's decisions re-

's ,

opened the record on four management-related issues: the adequacy of

~

. .1 training, the accuracy of the Dieckamp mailgram, ' pre-accident TMI-l

,.- . ',. leak rate practices, and TMI-2 leak rate falsifications. The Appeal Board N found the record on the remaining management issues to be adequate,

- and affirmed the Licensing Board's findings on those issues.

,. , The Commission in CLI-85-2, supra, reversed the Appeal Board's de-cision to reopen the record on TMI-l leak rate practices and TMI 2 leak

> . .  : rate falsifications. The Commission, having carefully reviewed the y i ;. 3 .

• M u.j-

~ c:j .

Appeal Board decisions on the management issues, is satisfied that the

,;^ -

Appeal Board has thoroughly evaluated the major issues relating .to i 4- <

"'",' management, and endorses its favorable substantive findings on Licen-see's management. The Commission addressed the Appeal Board's con-

. , . . , f" ' ." .

clusion that further hearings are required in CLI-85-2. The Appeal

~

3 , , .

- Board decisions, the Commission's decision in CLI 85-2, the Licensing 1 Board's May 3,1985 decision on training (LBP-85-15, supra), and the

- underlying adjudicatory record constitute the basis for the Commission's finding that GPU Nuclear has sufficient competence and integrity to

~

operate TMI l safely. Nevertheless, because th'emanagement compe-l i tence and integrity issues are so significant, for completeness, before ad-dressing the training and Dieckamp mailgram issues, we will summarize i here our reasons for endorsing the overall favorable findings in the adju-

{ dicatory proceeding on the management issues.

1

2. Overview

.m.:,M.g ' The Commission has indicated that the broad issues regarding compe-

,  ;- 3 ,: .. <

• l,* ? . U [ ^ tence to be considered in this proceeding are whether GPU Nuclear

. M.3,J. 16T 7: management "is sufficiently staffed, has sufficient resources and is ap-

'l ' W, W N. ?~. 2.f.'c ' ' ' propriately organized to operate Unit I safely." CLI-80-5, supra,11

, ','- e- , Q ' tf , ~ ' NRC at 408. Essentially, the issue of competence concerns whether

. 7; ,4 - W GPU Nuclear has the technical resources and capabilities to provide rea-

,a - -

4 '

- sonable assurance that TMI-l will be operated safely.

g, '

The concept of " integrity," or " character," is a more difficult one to W,f. mf' .

^ '

- , define. See generally, e.g., ALAB-772, supra,19 NRC at 1206-08; Hous-

, ' ron Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-y 84-13,19 NRC 659 (1984). A generally applicable standard for integrity l

&. _, y W' .M^ 1[ ;' l

~ '

is whether there is reasonable assurance that the Licensee has suflicient '

9.Wr- 1' sl;.jiy, character to operate the plant in a manner consistent with the public

.-y

. .[y, ,,4%. h::Q.Q'.D[^ ,.: 1 :..%E v health a

and safety and applicable NRC requirements. The Commission in making this determination may consider evidence regarding licensee

. . ; 3.j ..-

behavior having a rational connection to the safe operation of a nuclear M7f) - e,. 5.-[: e.- .M3. .w . . " '

4 9

. J 1136

, ys ' ' :

.r

.,. n,g 33 "->c--- m m r -m - '- --v . -

e ;j .. " ~T,sy ' -~~ -

.c , ,- .i.

t * ~^' '

i

, /.,

s . .c

, y, -

, m, , , 7 , j.

. s.

,. m. , ,

y :

• U . sl y .; /,.1 -

~

4 , .

e[ 3  : n , 9 M. ,

w. -

- p. a ,

g- um i ,

1 y .;; ; MMS

.- ~>

, w , , .

N .. da$ $ ).$'21ew; ; $$Y * ~ . . 51 ND. '

...2"

, s ._ 3 -s~ . . ...~ ,

i. c , .

+ ,

{.} ' , .'

y s.w 1 .; .

.: . . 3

. . . . u . . j. .

power plant." This does not mean, however, that every act of licensee is ,

' NM ' A .iMFind,?.WMN D, D relevant. Actions must have some reasonable relationship to licensee's character, i.e.,'its candor, truthfulness, willingness to abide by regulatory 2,s.m'n.M'Mgp.O ,@. ..W; .u w:4 r 7.Wa.ct o

.m requirements, and acceptance of responsibility to protect public health . 7 $ ?#. D ~ 5 M - @ d @ 'a and safety. In addition, acts bearing on character generally should not be considered in isolation. The pattern of licensee's relevant behavior, f'}Wj. dif!@Wt'TM  : T:%.$hg,g.' MN?

~~

.M including corrective actions, should be considered. -

Without question, the Metropolitan Edison management of TMI-2

, [. $.. / W Ti5;; '. '.7$G.5.O

~: 'm /k! ee e :4 / * ^

prior to and immediately following the March 28,1979 accident failed to 3 E' "

provide the climate, resources, attitude, and leadership that the Com-mission expects of a licensee. We note that a portion of this proceeding  ? $ . X ...' 375 W ..,PNQN9" r<nd the parties' efforts have been devoted to demonstrating manage-ment's failures prior to the accident, which include the events leading to N..M' 3e'" > .2.1 f($ @M ii:l. M ',

$ dQQlh.< 'l the criminal conviction of Metropolitan Edison. However, those past events are 6 years old, and the company responsible no longer operates

,, J I s f, .'

',5

, J 5: l;',.

SW:

TMI-1.38 The Commission's responsibility and concern is with the management and company that would operate Unit I today, and with

'C C'h WWsdM - l e .t .-

their willingness and ability to operate the plant according to the high

~

~ 5,. JWp'gJ ,$' M ',

3 " '~

standards that we require and that the public demands and deserves. '. j Therefore, the Commission rests its decision on evidence demonstrating '

u ,

that past inadequacies have been corrected, and that the current compa- 1: ,

ny and management have the necessary competence and integrity to pro- ,.

vide reasonable assurance that TMI-l will be operated consistent with -

~

public health and safety and the Commission's requirements. .

GPU Nuclear has replaced Metropolitan Edison as the company re- -

l sponsible for operation of TMI-1. GPU Nuclear has a new chairman and ,..

I revised Board of Directors, a new President, Executive Vice President, i

<?W.

~

Vice President of TMI 1, Chairman of the General Operations Review . . .

? - #.:.O.4 -

Board, and numerous other lower-level managers, as well as a substan- .

tially modified organizational structure and operational procedures.3? It  % QQ 7y: 71. ; ;iA ,

is the qualifications of this management, not the management of 6 years >  ;-;'--/ ", , 7

. .Q ago, that the Commission is now evaluating. The Commission is satisfied -

_ E ~ ., n .1 . '

• s >

g< t , j " smS , 1 4, - O - .-

h ,f. : '\ .h.y/ M., .

r m ;,' [, q.. ., ' ((]' ,

37The references to " licensee behavior" include acts of heensee employees, since all organizations

, '/ [c/ ' .h* '

<'. ?,.$ f " .?IC carry on their activities through individuals. - -y .

38 Not only does a company with a different name now have responsibility for operation of TMI-1, but . ## W

' the organizational structure is substantially modified from the previous company and a substantial -

number of the individus1s in direct management of TMI-l at the time of the accident have been re. ,

.q , i. ' ,

placed.See discussion Mfra. , .. . ,,.;' '

,V'# 2' M See LBP 8132, supra.14 NRC at 403. Philip Clark, GPUN President, informed the Commission 5 I

durms orat presentations on August 15,1984, of the current figures. of the twelve senior GPUN em. '**

1+ '

'7-ployees, eight joined the GPU system after the TMI-2 accident. Three of the remaining four had no in- ,, , <m..

volvement with Metropohtan Edison. of 435 key personnel (includmg managers, technical / professional . <q

• • . ,y,p , ' ",.. **

r and heensed operators),235 joined GPU after the accident and another 100 had been employed within ,-,< ,~ '

. .-,4 the GPU system prior to the accident, but not with Metropohten Edison. . w =: . wiS 4

1137

. ,_ .~ ._ , .. . _ _

9

. ~ -

. , - - -> --,>--.u--e y t., ay .y ,wv .m.

.-- . ~_.

4

- ~. Or :

-:h ' -

i

• . p s. . . . . (,

. ;f.

. s- .; - w. .s

. . . , , .  ;'s .:

.c _

.wu

- . . . _.u . . . a w :.._.u.;. . . . . n._ a_. . . _.m . m, .

1 f

t that current management has both the necessary competence and in-

"7 7- 9 , , _. '

tegrity to operate TMI-l safely.

.,~ . , ' < '

' l, The Commission in reaching its favorable conclusion regarding

.j management competence and integrity has considered the depth with which the performance and plans of the Licensee have been examined.

a r , Indeed, because of the TMI-2 accident, the Commission has examined N. . .q.., . a.

y . : (, . the management of this utility more extensively than in any other case

. l,Q J ' , M 'e . -

. in NRC's history. That examination has shown that present GPU Nucle-7 _, '

' *.Q f &:'.> i'l' j - -

ar management is fundamentally sound. Personnel changes in GPU

, .,"~y j , { .I Nuclear management in 1983-1984 (which were not in dispute) even further support this conclusion."

, > f,

',p9 g. J;y ~

L With regard to Licensee's overall competence, Licensee in the initial proceeding on management issues made a strong affirmative showing of

' ' ' " ~ the overall strer.gth of its : .anagement structure, human resources,

- safety review process, and shift staffing commitments. The GPU Nuclear f

,- structure provides dedicated technical resources to operate GPU's nucle-V. . , - ar facilities, thus minimizing resource competition from the nonnuclear

. . aspects of GPU operations. The organization of GPU Nuclear provides N- .,

significantly greater technical resources and more logically organized

~j and accountable functional relationships than existed in. Metropolitan Edison. The quantity of technical resources applied to nuclear operations ,

has been significantly increased.*t Those GPUN managers new to the

!- GPU system since the accident have extensive experience and significant technical qualifications that adequately correct pre-accident failings.

1 j The training department has increased its staff, significantly expanded

~

. %. , , d .[

. and modified the curriculum, and significantly increased the time devot-

. .; .  ; ed to operator training. An entirely revised maintenance system has 4;" . ' ";'W /* ,

p g.D;W'!' been put in place since the accident. Subsequent allegations that manage-1 y j Q,y -[Jy.' fji: N

,. ment aided cheating were not proven during an extensive hearing.

C ,

r m 77i i ~ .' ; While the cheating should not have occurred, the Commission finds f i. . 'D' 'Y .

' N 1.. ~

that, because present GPU Nuclear management did not participate in, ,

encourage, or condone the cheating, those incidents do not undermine ti - the overall competence of GPU Nuclear management to operate TMI-l

- " safely.

. ~ -

.p* -

l ,

-- l

_j' /

t. ' . {

z;,.

M:. ..

5,

• ', ]- 40 No party moved to reopen the record based on these personnel changes.

/ y , a . ;-

5 N y 3 , -,,,7. , 41 See a at 413. on August 15.1984. GPU Nuclear provided the Ommission with current information

a. t m ,7-

' ,"J. on its technical resources. Approximately 915 full-time company employees devote their efforts to

. ,O% g. .,, y g,'

,. . .k i 'J, TMI.I. of these. 435 are key personnet. including managers. technical / professional positions. and

-r ' "*.  % . ;. :. . . <

_ .gg licensed operators. Prior to the TMI-2 accident, Metropolitan Edison devoted approximately 315 em.

.t ,-D - [ Q; n . }l Pl oyees to TMI-1. including 127 key personnel. Prior to the accident the TMI training stair was com-

~

.v r/% 9 prised of seven individuals. It now has 55.

>+- ,

)

s

<' a.%. %

E. W."

,m : , ,

e,]

1138

• .j n . . . .  ;

y.df '. g

~

p

~ '

+

? Q f (

g:

,.:f*_  :.n). .

y

. - r .- , .-

M

$ [, $ , ~

w- ;

5  %  %

,7 y ,-

.u .

E *

' , c..,p

% * >a

+

_ *l : h+a'

- -e , ,e ,.

,w, -

O . c

• g ;4-fi b .y.Q: . .

' ~,

?, , ,

R.U&C.rw.. . .-;.., u ~..w ~, - - ~ a.=.---

.... x

,; a% .. .* ,

' 'N

• Og 4 8 -

.. - l X t -1 % . _

The Commission finds, considering the above factors, that Licensee's j ., , 9.-c current management has the requisite competence to provide reasonable W.jpcnQ(I@q/LC.

TM t.ssurance that TMI-l can be operated safely. M.h.%94W'NNd.Nj./'/'[c '

With regard to Licensee's integrity, the restart proceeding would not c.cgy)f.-?),Qy.f';g,(. _

hsve been as lengthy and complex as it has been had Licensee's per-formance been exerr.plary. The Licensee's performance since the acci- ZA;S.dPypef?

G# E ' % U 'G O dent has been marred first and foremost by the cheating incidents. In QW/f. " d this connection the Commission notes not only the cheating itself, but Licensee's early unwillingness in a few particular instances to acknowl-

%.$.Y%'

%. ',9 'i.R .W -

i'g_ -

edge the fact of cheating and to take prompt disciplinary action against .

YJMdt.iSMN LY, D '.

W JNM y '

those responsible.42 GPU Nuclear was also responsible for several procedural violations 9  !.

during the TMI-2 cleanup, for procedural violations at TMI-l found in 4d, . , p% '

W  : 'M U.w.,$z3 d. - (. g.. ' , '

the October 28,1983 Region I inspection report, and for the harassment , sn.@gMW' y .

of Parks. gAR, @ Z g , j ( ,, 2 -. -

However, the issue before the Commission is not whether GPU H.yM2.{r;W .cg. 4 4 +

Nuclear has made mistakes, but whether GPU Nuclear as presently con-

~

m .: s ' ": t'

' ^

stituted and staffed has the necessary integrity to provide reasonable ;qs! ,' y

' ~

assurance that it will safely operate TMI-1. The Commission finds that it  ?~' 0 has. GPU Nuclear has now shown a determination to correct its errors '

and improve itself. The Commission notes in this regard GPU Nuclear's willingness.to seek the views of independent evaluators,4) to implement their recommendations,44 and to add qualified outside expertise to its -

staff.*5 Further, high-level management at GPU Nuclear has demonstrat-ed a commitment to assure that a proper attitude is followed throughout the organization." .

,\lu Ib. ,

{I 42The Licensms Board in its May 3,1985 dectsson on training (LBP-85-15, supra) found that Licensee's management had now accepted their responsibility for the cheatmg.

b.ic* ' '

-2 '~

7

- . , i *.

43 For instance Licensee contracted for the BETA and RP't reports, see note 21, supra, fce a review of . . . I ;e .

its training programs by Data Design Laboratories (" Assessment of selected TMI l Trainmg Programs" .' .? '.' . O 1 -

.,O

. . ' . , ,' '. '(

(sept.10,1982)) ("1982 DDL Report"), and for an assessment by Admiral H.G. Rickover ("An As- -*

.'7 .'

sessment of the GPU Nuclear Corporation Organizauon and sen or Management and Its Competence to -% ., 4 ,~ - , .; ;

operate TMI-!" (Nov. 19,1983)) ("Rickover Report"). Licensca has also been evaluated by the Insti- o s '. 4' <<' .

tute of Nuclear Power operations. These reports for the most part were generally favorable to Licensee. 3- ' 'jd -?), .g* ..: -

44 For instance, all but one of the original operator Accelerated Retrairung Program (oARP) Review Committee's recommendations on Licensee's training program have been or are bems implemented, all I$}'

" s-

.g l but two of the recommendations in the RHR report have been or are being implemented, and all but L'

! two of the recommendations in the BETA report have been addressed, either through implementation +

or disagreement. '

g- '

45 For instance, GPU Nuclear has expanded its Board of Directors to include three outside directors, 4e

• who will also head a Nuclear Safety and Comphance Committee. See reacra#y note 32 and accompany- '

ing text, syra.

l~  ; . .; , , ,

4 For instance, upper rnahagement m response to the cheating personally interviewed operators to *

,y, s ensure that the operators understood that cheaung would not be tolerated, and upper management in re- ny, ; ,,

l-sponse to the Parks incident has implemented policies to ensure that harassment does not recur. . . ,. .-.-

s ew 1139 -

., ._ , ~ ,

i  ! h' .

y . .,

g.. . 1'~

_j

= ~

l

.:2 &.a :. . , _l' . w .,., h '

.t ..a . . . , .:. ;. . ~a. .,L ;_ .,._ ? . . .

. i g

, a- r

., . ,]'

l Most importantly, there is no persuasive evidence that any of the indi-

' viduals in charge of GPU Nuclear have been personally implicated in I" '

~

v' -

wrongful acts. Indeed, the individuals currently responsible for the lead-

~

, d' ership of GPU Nuclear present an impressive array of credentials and ex-perience. They are also responsible for the significant improvements made over the past performance of Metropolitan Edison Company.

,..,.y' c . . f The Commission finds that the present organization which will be re-

' Q , /g ' l ,m sponsible for operation of TMI-l has demonstrated, both in personnel

'y ,.6 .

- 9 , , and in actions, that the past failings at TMI will not be repeated. In sum,

, .2 - $ ,

. . after considering the personnel currently in charge of TMI-l and the per-v a.f. formance of GPU Nuclear, the Commission concludes that GPU Nucle-4 , .,

^

' e .' . '. - -

'j at has the necessary competence and integrity to provide reasonable assurance of safe operation of TMI-1. The Commission expects GPU f , ,,

i

. 3:

. , ,d Nuclear to recognize that the public as well as the NRC will be closely

~

l watching its future performance, and therefore to strive to achieve stand-l :i ards of excellence that will serve as a model for the industry. We will j now turn to the two specific issues still pending in the restart proceeding.

.n '_ <i j

} B. Whether the Training Issue Raises Concerns-Warranting l .,

1 Maintaining the Immediate Effectiveness of the Shutdown

, .{ Orders

. t i L Background

a. Proceedings Through ALAB 772 m

One of the most important issues in the restart proceeding is whether

.;7[ ' p. . <r;f,1.ilf'-

?, the operators at TMI-I are adequately trained. In its First Partial Initial 4

. y g- $p' G-W Decision, the Licensing Board, after reviewing the program, organiza-tion, and personnel devoted to training, concluded that " Licensee has in p }/Q,yf.].Qt-

f. M U ', K . g + -

place at TMI-l a comprehensive and acceptable training program." LBP-

., y ayj .g 81-32, supra,14 NRC at 478.

y7' ' 9%R r After the Special Master examined the cheating incidents, the Licens-ing Board in its Third Partial Initial Decision reevaluated the training

• (' 'j ..

3 n

program. The Licensing Board stated that it " remained convinced that the evidence supported the conclusion that Licensee's training program was well designed to train qualified operators and that there was a ration-3' .

.a al plan to implement the program." LBP-82-36, supra,16 NRC at 379.

~

d,' '" L The Board was satisfied that Licensee was devoting sufficient resources to its training program, and that Licensee "cannot be faulted in the 'se-

.,. . J: 4-

,2[. Qf ij..(. - ..g lecticn of the advice it sought for its training program, the credentials of

'a Q d7"7:f y ~M.

- its training managers or on the general design ofits training program."

EJ0

' '.c:y. ,-_

'%.G --

Id. The Licensing Board found that inadequacies in the administration of

)

q fg ,, + ,

1140 ny q

. . - . ,, J.a : . . ; e

1. p_

,1, d __'. w' j ' .,,;

• 4 +

W

^

l . W.NIO, 0.l, f: . .n '

-c

. ; pn g. ,

f g

-..tp _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ , _ _ ._ _ . . . _ . . - . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ ~ _ . _ . . . . , _ _ _ , , . , , , _ _ _ _ .

e -

A hy .- -

a

.g .

,.r;s "

• - N . - ;A*

( , . .

, yn " . c - . ~

, a y, . .

. ~ :. n.a 2-~.  ;- - . . _ - ., z.. . w =:.w.. .w a_. . . .

the training program resulted from a failure to apply the principles of ,M .

quality assurance and quality control to the instruction and examination 3 .-Z.Gi 6." 4*'M. '

' _, 2 ~~

process, and did not represent a total program failure. The Licensing '. Mc.

Board imposed four conditions aimed at ensuring adequate program im- [(I./.3,#

lJ' [ '; ,. ,

~W [: ; '%

plementation, which were to be satisfied by Licensee within 2 years fol- .

lowing any restart authorization.47 W .; . - '

The Appeal Board in ALAB-772 held that the Licensing Board had n'0 .e . ,

not developed an adequate record on the adequacy of the training pro- . . ' E' , -

gram in light of the cheating incidents. The Appeal Board found that . [ , 5.s '

'[t]he deficiencies in operator testing, as manifested by the cheating epi- .3 . b. - 1;. -

sodes, may be symptomatic of more extensive failures in Licensee's overall training program. Whether these deficiencies still exist or have I$sMcU 2

7 '

been sufficiently cured is not evident from the record." 19 NRC at 1233.

The Appeal Board held that the " principal difficulty" with the Licens-k@[.R.$. 2.k@,h 4 isid- ~,

ing Board's decision was its failure adequately to reconsider in light of S.s .Y# "/C - -

the cheating incidents its earlier finding that Licensee's training program was "' comprehensive and acceptable.'" Id., quoting 14 NRC at 478.

$- YQ:

• j The Appeal Board noted in this regard "that the generally positive tes- -

timony of the OARP Review Committee and licensee's other independ- , ,

-ent consultants was of decisional significance" to the Licensing Board's initial favorable finding.48 Id. at 1234. The Appeal Board noted that' the '

OARP Review Committee prior to the cheating incidents had found

" pre-accident neglect" of the TMI Training Department and identified .

~s hortcomings (such as bitterness and anxiety among some employees, I inadequate training facilities, and the need for special teacher training

• for the instructors). Despite these criticisms, the OARP Review Com- [  :

mittee on balance gave the Licensee's training program high marks. The j; Appeal Board believed that additional testimony was required from the it .

l*

5^. r i ' *

~

47Those four conditions were:

- "(l) There shall be a two-year probationary period during which the Licensee's qualiracation and

/

' C

~','>

4 requalificahon testing and training program shall be subjected to an in-depth audit by inde. ,-

pendent auditors, approved by the Director of NRR, such auditors to have had no role ir. the J, .l , j-1 TMl.1 restart proceedings. v." .

(2) Licensee shall establish criteria for qualifications of training instructors to ensure a high level _

,[ '

l of competence in instruction, including knowledge of subjects taught, skill in presentation of 9* A.N. y- -e, knowledge, and preparation, administration, and evaluation of examinations. r -y .>

~7 , .-

. . s ,

C,'-.( *N.

(3) Licensee shall develop and implement an internal auditing procedure, based on unscheduled -

(' surprise') direct observation of the training and testing program at the point of delivery, s>-

such audits to be conducted by the Manager of Training and the Supervisor of operator Train.

ing and not delegated. '

(4) Licensee shall develop and implement a procedure for routine sampling and review of exami-i nation answers for evidence of cheating, usms a review process approved by the NRC stafr." , *1 16 NRC at 384. The last three of these conditions have been implemented. Design Data Labs has been -

hired (and approved by stafn to do the in-depth audit required by the first condition. The probationary s j period has been incorporated as a license condition.

48 The OARP Review Committee was comprised of five individuals with expertise in various aspects of

'i traming who are not affiliated with the Licensee, although their compensation was paid by Licensee. ,

I 1141 f .

j [1 i i ,

..,.,+-'

. .- .. -. 7 I

, - - - - - - - - . . . - - , . . - - . , - --m-,- ~ -. - - - - - - - - , --. , , . , - . , .m- , . - , - - - - , - , - .v--. -y-~--

,y a. ,

"  ; V .

- j '.' ,

l

- .: 7 , -

~ . , -- - + , t.

g 4 9

+ ..  ;

4 -. ...m . dAha M..,,,_.L g. uu, g ,n.; _ , , ,w ,, ; ,,.; _ _

t 1

~

OARP Review Committee regarding how it would now strike the balance between the positive and negative aspects of the program. The Appeal

'. ? Board held that, "[o]nce the cheating incidents raised questions about

, 1. ,

that judgment, it was incumbent upon the Board to seek further testimo-ny from the independent experts upon which it so heavily relied in the 3 first instance." Id. The Appeal Board therefore reopened the record and

'i #.. , '

V_ directed the Licensing Board to take further evidence from the OARP y .f . 3 f', Review Committee regarding the effect of the cheating incidents on its y ,

. . > m ,.'!. W. '

earlier favorable findings."

.y:.y

.:. G ,'-*

• The Licensing Board's Decision on Remand

, b.

[

[ .

' The Licensing Board, following the lead of Licensee and UCS, chose t . . ~;

~. 4 to interpret the Appeal Board's directive broadly. Thus, rather than

- limiting the hearing to the views of the OARP Review Committee, the Board considered ~ the overall question of whether GPU Nuclear's T '

licensed opg,rator training program is adequate to prepare the TMI-l

' licensed operators to operate the plant safely.a The Licensing Board, after examining all the evidence before it,58 concluded "that the Licensee has made an appropriate response to the 1981 cheating episodes and to the concerns of the Appeal Board set out in ALAB-772." Id. at 1419. The Board found Licensee's response satis-fled each of the following four essential elements: (1) management l

personnel have conceded their failures in connection with the cheating, have committed to prevent any recurrence, and have extensively im-proved communications between management and employees; (2) em-ployee attitudes have improved; (3) examination security will prevent

,' E M U w

. .. . ) ,

, y A D'7.'.) : ;

future cheating; and (4) the training program has been improved. The

-f; "< ".ggj[,y( fourth element was the most extensively litigated, and received the y'; >

.v.W%i.M '. most attention in the Board's decision.

jh W.l >

' &f".%N.$

f$$*$j T% .n "f . ,

1. In CLI-85-2, the Commission, noung that the evidentiary hearing on training had been completed,

, y' "

' I I'"J' I d- ~

-

• found that for public policy reasons the Licensing Board should proceed to issue its decision. 21 NRC at

, .s. '"

. ., 7. ",

289.

a Licensee chose to present testimony on the overall adequacy of its training program, and UCs chal-I - ,' , i*- lenged that overall adequacy. The Board explained as follows: "The Board agreed with the stafr that

! '@ 4 . Ji

' . . pg , .

ALAB-772 did not remand this matter to litigate again the enure licensed-operator training program.

Licensee and UCs, having elected e Komplete litigation, the Board followed them, because a complete

' ' . fv 1. ; *' .

case tended to bound the concerns of ALAB-772." LBP-85-15, supra,21 NRC at 1533.

,MMj Mi@j f. ,

l

• 51 six groups of witnesses tesafied in the reopened hearings on training. Licensee presented four Wh ,d g.n.Q[. ,y groups, conasting of the panel of nye experts who made up the Reconstituted oARP Review Commit-

+  :,-.pg$.14 *M

? ." Q> y, W , > " tee, and three groups of Licensee employees involved in the training program. stalt presented a panel of

'fgy.74VTA9A witnesses who tesufied regarding the methodology used by the Reconstituted oARP Committee to eval-b f, 'lb , uste the training program. Finally, a UCs witness also suned regarding the methodology which should

'< be used to evaluate a training program.

s e t*

- .".., 1142

, no s# ,y,

.- rt

. f. .l **m ~~*n m-

~#^****""~ ~ ' ~ - - ~ ~ ~ - - - - -

ql , .

~

'*,.y & T

~

s -

% 4 g

2 n .

-- - , - =w u :x. . - .

l -

L 5

The Licensing Board in reaching its decision examined the personnel ,

- '5 ,

p., . $ ;. ,% Q in charge of the training program, management's response to the cheat- f-

'E f'h t ing, including employee attitudes, and the licensed-operator training pro- h '

.~

gram itself. The examination of the training program included an exami- , ,.

nation of program development and methodology, substance and execu- ' *

tion, and program evaluation and feedback. "

~

f The Board found that the " licensed operator training program for i:'

s i

TMI-l is adequate to train reactor operators and senior reactor operators to operate the unit safely," Id. at 1536, with one proviso. That proviso was that the " training program needs improvement because it does not :E. 12 -

provide for the evaluation of its trained personnel in the job setting for X Lf "

the purpose of validating and revising its training program." Id. at 1502. -

s r

l..

. '. Y~s

To correct this deficiency, the Board imposed a condition requiring Lictnsee to " implement a plan to evaluate the performance of trained

~}. ..

-' j-

reactor operators and senior reactor operators in the job setting for revi- . ,

sion of its TMI-I licensed-operator training program." Id. at 1536. The  ;

Board, although it retained jurisdiction to review the terms of the license condition to be proposed by Licensee, held that this plan did not -

need to be developed and approved prior to restart.52

. Finally, the Board considered the impact of the views of the Recon-stituted OARP Review Committee.53 The Board could not find from the l

I-I SAThe Licensing Board had explamed in its April 11,1985 Response to CL1-85-2 that "(Dormal evalua-tion or operator performance in the job settmg is almost by its very nature a function best performed fl afur restart . " LBP-8510,21 NRC 603,607 (1985).

33 The Reconstituted oARP Review Committee (Reconstituted Committee) conducted two reviews or Licensee's training program. The first, which consisted of reviewing documents, interviewing training ,

in2ructors, supervisors and administrators, and inspecting training facilities, was conducted in response to the Appeal Board's decision in order to provide a Report to the Commission in connection with a 17, then-upcoming meetma on whether to hft the effecuveness of the ,autdown orders. The Reconstituted [

Committee in its July 3,1984 "Special Report of the Recon >%.co oARP Review Committee" ("spe- I cial Report") responded to the Appeal Board's concer s 'twlithin the limits of time and resources i' *

- available." Special Report at 5. The Reconstituted Committee stated in that Special Report that the * .

cheating incidents "were extremely serious and reflect unfavorably on the orgamzations as well as the ,

individuals involved." M Nonetheless, the conclusions of the Reconstituted Committee were favorable.

The Reconstituted Committee conducted a funher review of the training program in order to prepare .

o '- ,

its testimony. In that review, the Reconstituted Committee reviewed pertinent documentation , inter. .~ .

viewed personnel, observed training sessions, and visited relevant facihties. The Reconstituted Commit- - ..4? ,a j tee m their testimony discussed, among other things, Licensee's trainmg resources and management, the training staff, instructor development, hcensed operator training programs and procedures, and com-munications between management, traimes and operations personnel. The Committee also discussed '

i the specific sub-issues raised by the Intervenors.

The Committee, recognizing that its earher special Report had been limited by time constraints, ex-plcined that, subsequent to that report, each member had spent as much time as he had available to fur- .

ther review Licensee *s training program to provide assurance that the conclusions reached in the Special Report were correct. The Committee concluded as follows: "(Ilt is the Committee's judgment that the ,

licensed operator training program at TMI I is an effective program and will continue to qualify indi- , ,

~,

viduals to operate TMI l. The Committee thus takes this opportunity to reaffirm the conclusions reached in the Special Report .

I 1143 p

l '. :

y . . _ _

_ .7 ., . _ . .x l

s l .

_,ii -

. , _ , . , - . . --+r --

.  ; n. ,

u. - - .

, . s. . ..x , . .r

. (.

. - .e : .c .. . . .. . ..:..._.._ . . . . = _ _ a_. . _

= , ,

, y m

.n- ,

a" -

substance of the Committee's review alone that the Committee's ulti-mate conclusion - that the program was adequate to' produce individuals

' ' . ' N .-

I' - '

- competent to operate TMI-l - was either correct or incorrect. Howev-er, the Licensing Board did find that the Committee satisfied the re-f manded order in ALAB-772, in that the Committee "provided its very

, 1  ; carefully constructed and well-founded opinions on the basic issue and

," ' y/ ,,,f j' various subsidiary evidentiary questions just as the Appeal Board re-

'I.A- < - "

quested." LBP-85-15, supra, 21 NRC at 1534. Therefore, the Board,

' ~ " ' '

+ J- rather than attempting to separate the Committee's findings and testimo-4

_ *. - #, - ny from the other evidence, simply used those findings in conjunction s.~h- with other evidence in analyzing each issue regarding Licensee's training 1,.-

program.54 The Board in this regard noted the very high value it placed on the Committee members' opinions.

. .c ,

~

, c. Analy3is The concerns about Licerisee's training program which led in part to making the 1979 shutdown Orders immediately effective were based on the apparent deficiencies in Licensee's pre-accident training program.

Licensee's current training program, as extensively described by the Licensing Board, bears little resemblance to that pre-accident program.

There have now been three hearings which have considered the ade-quacy of GPU Nuclear's licensed operator training program. The Licens-ing Board found that Licensee's improvements to its training program over this time period have been significant. Licensee has substantially improved the licensed operator training staff for TMI-1,55 upgraded the

-..y <, ,.% ,

. , . . A. . , ; f W . ,_ ,...ydi

. . .v , , , . ,

,' y. l f.' i..; *s.; ., ,, . 3. ;;,,.[(s.l.

t s w c.a. ~,( p 2 L., 7,;.mp .% , * . _. .m la . *:? ? f f , ,'[ * *, _fE Vg .,

> . ;g . g 5 54The Licensing Board also addressed the impact of INPO's accreditation of Licensee's training pro-

' -ff i,. g '1 b, ~ ,' W : y ,y.-

• gram. As the Board did not rely on this accreditsuon in its decision, that accreditation need not be fur.

. - * , .9 s.'* ,. .

1 ' , -

ther addressed here.

- .- 0 5a/ J. L. ,. . 55As summarized by the Licensing Board-

.- 's In 1981,it [the licensed operator trainmg staf!1 consisted of one supervisor and two instructors.

'4s .v e ' ' .'c who were sRo-licensed. Two contractor-supplied personnel also were assigned. None of these

- L./ . .' . ,

• • ~

. ~ ' individuals held degrees. . .Today, manpower in the operator Training section devoted to

. .o. .

TMI l licensed operator training consasts of one manager, one administrative assistant, two staff i' . <

- ,.'.  ?. '

• positions (both with responsibihties asinstructors), one supervisor, and three instructors (one of whom is assigned as supervisor of Nonlicensed operator Training). of the six persons designated -

.. . .. -5

, N. =/ .

- Y.' .[1:A.q [

to conduct licensed operator training, four have been licensed or certified as senior reactor oper-

• ators. Three of these licenses are current; the other is not, but that instructor is now requalifying

] ih;J.[j] 'h D2' M;. . N '~fkg .. .1 'P U.N,".t JC ,. for a current sRo license. . .The combmed nuclear power plant experience of the stafr is 48

,i i, k # d ',? 67 d. Zy

• h,%'. ' years, of which 25 years are commercial. The combined instructor experience for the Operator

,an'. * -

b1 .A ..

Training stafr is 29 years, of which 22 years are in the nuclear field. Five of the stafr hold bache-lor's degrees; one of these has a master's degree as well.

, .Q f. . gb;* ;r ' Y7,s y .! #Avp.'*.*.--Q7v.' f Id. at 1428 (citations omitted). In addition, there is now a separate simulator Development section of 4 e

.- 7c - y ' '.s .^- -

the Training Department that consists of one manager and three instructors. See at at 1429.

, ,,,' ,M

.{ '

fc;i .., 2, '

1144

. . . c I

M,g L 3  %

l^ lN,,

[ '.;l ._, _

b k e g

,- y - ,

7,

.c

.. p #

G.;:. .m ;

7~

4; .1 , .

3 ,

c

. . ~ :. x. - , - . . . - - - - - -

4 4

• s.

training facilities and support equipment,5* and changed the training pro- .-  % .

nM -

gram "from a traditional, knowledge-based program that depended i

heavily upon the prior knowledge of the instructors to a very modern, ~, M ,' MyD-

 % g [~ J. ;E

. 3A'S' M  :

• q -,

/.?~N 4 BCL:

structured, performance-based program," Id. at 1420," -

W ;.* H "' T*fi

~

The question facing the Commission, then, is whether, after three ex- +

haustive hearings and a Licensing Board decision favorable to Licen-  ? ' , - "' ,

w see,58 there are still concerns about Licensee's licensed operator training ?J .

1 - 79 program which warrant maintaining the effectiveness of the shutdown Orders, In light of the~ depth of examination given Licensee's training

' SQ d%s f ,

a'-

f~,-

[

program and the Licensing Board's favorable findings, the answer to this question is favorable to restart. The Commission finds that there are no mWcW !M * ' OM,4 .."

? ?.1- e .

concerns about the adequacy of GPU Nuclear's training program which EM, 'i4 K-would warrant maintaining the immediate efTectiveness of the shutdown -

' 3 MiiO E Orders during the agency's appellate review of the Licensing Board's -U ,,, :.

f;; )( @ y} .Wg.C C decision.5' . - ,

t

-. C{

,f

. . , 7..

$6"An upgradmg of training facilines and support equipment has been in progress since 1930. The majonty of classroom training for heensed operators now takes place in a modern,20,000-square-foot training cer.ter built for this purpose and first occupied in mid 1981. The center, used entirely for train.

ins purposes, has fifteen classrooms (two of which can be combined into an auditorium). It houses the B:sse Pnnciples Traimns Simulator (BPTS) and its support equipment, a control room mockup, office space for a training stafr of sixty-two, a hbrary, file room, audio-visual equipment room, conference .

room and photocopy, vending machine, storage and rest room areas. . . . A new, idenucally sized build- '

ins has been designed with construction to begin in the Spring of 1985. This building will house the j BPTS and the new rephca simulator (under construction), the Communications Division, and will pro.

! vide more inaructor work area." 14. at 1430. .

57 The credit for this improvement must be given to the managers now in charge of Licensee's training program. See d at 1455.

. 58 Concerning the one deficiency found by the Licensing Board, the Commission agrees that job per-formance evaluations are best performed after i plant goes into operation, and that this condition need not be met pnor to restart. See LBP-8510, say,s. With regard to whether reasonable progress has been made on this item, the Board stated that Licensee would demonstrate reasonable progress ifit began im- s .

mediately to satisfy the requiremens. Licensee on May 28,1985, submitted a proposed plan to satisfy -

this requirement. Under the terms of the Board's decision, this is sufficient to demonstrate reasonable progress. ,

5' On May 22,1985, TMIA moved the Commission to reopen the record. TMIA claimed that it hadjust * * ~

, discovered another instance of cheating by Floyd in 1979, and that Licensee's failure to produce this in- s' .

formation dunns the hearings undermines the Licensing Board's conclusion in its May 3,1945 Partial **

t i Initial Decimon on training that Licensee's managers have acknowledged their failures and their re- ,

sponsibihty to prevent cheaung. C '

i The Licensing Board's May 3,1985 decision has been appealed to the Appeal Board. Accordingly, that Board is the appropriate one initially to consider TMIA's monon. That motion is therefore hereby referred to the Appeal Board.

i The Commission has nonetheless considered whether the pendency of that n'otion should impact on '

today's Decimon. The Commisuon has decided that it should not. First, Licensee identified this incident L3 the Commission and parties on June I,1984, nearly I year before TMIA c' nose to file its motion to

, reopen. TMIA's motion therefore appears to be untimely, and should not cause any further delay in I makmg today's Decision.

More importantly, the adequacy of Licensee's cunent training program has been litigated and found

, to be acceptable. The considerauon of the current training program specifically included whether ade- '

quate remedial steps had been taken in response to earher cheaung. One more example of earlier cheat-ing would be redundant and of mirumal significance.

l ,

(Contueunt) 1145 f

3.- f awa-ye ,we. -w- * #

-Ct*v* %_, ,gT'*"'

• 4 ,' " " ' "'

- i J

r

." k

.v .. <

>= i.

~

f N

.u. ~ . a ....x. _ , . .  :., . . . . .

- :i. .

. .i

' ~

1. C. Whether the Dieckamp Mailgram Issue Raises. Concerns

. ',' j Which Warrant Maintaining the Immediate Effectiveness of

I. the Shutdown Orders c

1 1. Background On May 7,1979, Congressman Udall, then-Commissioner Gilinsky

~

and others toured Three Mile Island. James Floyd, who was at that time

s. . .

.  ; TMI 2 Supervisor of Operations, conducted the tour of the TMI 2 con-

. . J '

trol room. Mr. Floyd during that tour stated that on the first day of the

~

[ .1 accident a pressure spiked occurred which initiated the containment building spray. Ile asserted that the spike had been observed by Licensee r personnel and an NRC inspector.

. On May 8,1979, the New York Times published an article describing Mr. Floyd's presentation. The paper stated that Mr. Floyd asserted that control room personnel and NRC inspectors knew the plant's fuel core was seriously damaged 2 days before the damage we.s formally reported

, and the seriousness of the accident made public.

Herman Dieckamp, GPU President, on May 9 sent a mailgram to Congressman Udall with a copy to then-Commissioner Gilinsky. That mailgram' stated, in pertinent part, "[tlhere is no evidence that anyone interpreted the ' pressure spike' and the spray initiation in terms of reac-I tor core damage at the time of the spike nor that anyone withheld any l information."

I In the original management hearings, neither the parties nor the Licensing Board pursued whether Dieckamp told the truth in the mail-gram. Instead the Licensing Board relied on the NRC's Omce ofInspec-tion and Enforcement (IE) investigation and testimony to cone'ude that Mr. Dieckamp had not made a material false statement, and that Mr.

- fr  : 9 .. s . Dieckamp believed the statement to be true when he made it. LBP-

. 3' ' , , ,

.j

.' - V, _

4 81-32, supra.14 NRC at 555-56.

c , 1. In ALAB-772, supra, the Appeal Board found the Licensing Board's N, .' . "a reliance on IE's investigatory report unjustified because of the concluso-

, c '

ry nature of that document. The Appeal Board noted that no party had actively pursued this issue and that no party had chosen to cross-exam-cf ine Mr. Dieckamp on the mailgram when he testified in the proceed-

~  :,_,

. a ". ?l~,

't - With regard to the assertion that Licensee withheld the information. the Commission need enty note j, . y *

, ,s s

- that Licensee itselfidentiried this mformation 1 year ago.

-* ,. : ? ? M, . ,. s.#. . .y The Commission therefore concludes that the pendency of this modon to reopen does not raise com

.A <',s.. .- ,,r, ;%. ".. *

. &y ,: .a*- ,,

e <

cerns which would warrant maintaining the effectiveness of the shutdown orders.

..y 4 eo The " pressure spike" refers to the sudden increase in containment pressure dunrts the accident from g 35 about 3 to 28 psig followed by a rapid decrease to 4 psis. This spike was due to the burning or explosion

~

of hydrogen, which is symptomatic of core damage.

1146 l

. i

. . _ . . . . - . ~ . .

h

. s., ,

i i .

-l .; . .. y -

' yn .

g:

. , ,. .;r

,. 11 - s. . .,

v a . _

b, ,

n ,- '

.L. _i ing. Nonetheless, it held that the Licensing Board erred in not pursuing 1 . . y .- -

the matter more fully. Although the Appeal Board noted that it was not suggesting any wrongdoing by Mr. Dieckamp, and that further hearings kf#M NkYN.N .-

might not be very fruitful because memories fade after 5 years, it re- [.h].;,Y[.25

.. / w $$7M [.7; $ .$.Sf,[. @ ,

.f' nianded the matter to the Licensing Board for further hearings in order i f.- , ' - */ p .1, , , At ' , " , ~

not to " leave it dangling." 19 NRC at 1268. ' s .- V a. # '

On February 25, 1985, the Commission found as a matter of public c % , ?. ! " N g ; O 4. c; '

policy that the Licensing Board should issue a decision on the Dieckamp - ' r; ; . . ;. ;, .f .%

mailgram issue. The Commission in that Order noted that Mr. Dieckamp 2 { f-

, y . g ; L.; ., ';

continues to hold a high-level position with Licensee's parent organiza- . * . . W.h 5- "

i.U t Ydif7$'

~

tion, and that hearings would resolve any " lingering questions." CLI- ~

e, m 85 ., supra, 21 NRC at 289.

' -W c.?/$-:

't a. , y -

v.%.,; _wp. N.m.

2. Analysis  ?. .h$,

.f*>

. So-f$,hi.@::K m c . g .9 ,

The Commission has given considerable thought to whether it should -s ,.

Ao

, wait for the Licensing Board to issue its decision on the mailgram issue' L % ' O y' q . 'g;.s 3 before making its decision as to whether to lift the immediate effective-ness of the shutdown Orders. The Commission has determined that the i mailgram issue does not raise health and safety concerns that would war- -

rant maintaining the immediate effectiveness of the shutdown Orders. ,

Mr. Dieckamp is no longer President of GPU Nuclear and is not in- ~

i volved in the daily operations at TMI 1. Although he continues to serve j on the Board of Directors of GPU Nuclear, in that position he does not have day to-day responsibility for the safe operation of the facility. Ex- '

-ecutive management responsibility is vested in Messrs. Clark, Kintner, and O' Leary, none of whom were at GPU at the time of the accident. .

Moreover, these ' individuals have direct access to the parent Board of .

Directors of GPU for matters of safety and budget without going

~

through Mr. Dieckamp in his role as President of GPU. We do not be- _

lieve that under the present organizational structure and procedures, ,- , .

including provision for independent oversight of nuclear safety, Mr. ., --q -

Dieckamp's presence as President of GPU and as a Board member of 4

.; e GPUN could adversely affect.the safe operation of TMI-1, especially for *I- _.i. .,1 Q ', -

the short period before the Licensing Board renders a decision. '

f. . .

We further emphasize that in ordering further hearings the Appeal '

Board did not find that Mr. Dieckamp had probably engaged in wrongdo- -

ing. Rather, the Appeal Board wanted to resolve any lingering suspi-4 cions. If the Licensing Board should determine that Mr. Dieckamp has >

engaged in wrongdoing, the Commission.will take appropriate action. ,

However, options to be considered in that event would not include shut- -

o ting down the facility. ' F. ,

1 1147 i

t

.c..w.m... -

y-s -3.- yc.--..--- - -.---

. 6 #

v-e- , y. -p-. geyey----.---.-- , , y-r--- - , - -y-y

• r' 5 - '* 1 frb ;

S,4 G.3 ,

-' ' - i-

, . J.i

. :. q.f. ;>

0.~

. ~ , . .

c , . .

T-3 ,

n

..:... i . - . . u L - ... .. . - . . . . , . L .: ,; L-i - . Y "k.

? o s e 3

y; *

.y.

?;.

~' D. Procedural Issues

.l ,

,' ; L Applicable Standardsfor an Effectiveness Decisio.n

, UCS argues that this proceeding is no longer an enforcement proceed-1 ing where the issue would be whether to lift the immediate effectiveness of the shutdown Orders. UCS contends instead that, because the Licens-4 . g% ing Board has imiiosed license conditions, it is a license amendment pro-w,! ,1 M.

,(,, *

. . , yy W ceeding. UCS therefore . concludes that the standards in 10 C.F.R.

{ 2.764 or { 2.204 for making a Licensing Board decision immediately ef-

s fective should apply, and that these regulations do not allow the Com-1 M.

, e mission to make an "immediate effectiveness" decision where the con-L , .% ' <- trolling decision - the Appeal Board's decision in ALAB-772 to reopen

'% the record - is not favorable to operation.

f'  :~f -

~-

-Tc. The Commission does not agree with UCS. That the Licensing Board has imposed license conditions does not convert this proceeding into a

s. license amendment proceeding. Once the Commission establishes a formal adjudicatory hearing in an enforcement case, as it did here, it nee.d not grant separate hearings on any license conditions that are im-posed as a direct consequence of that enforcement hearing. The UCS logic would lead to a situation in which every condition or qualification on operation suggested in an enforcement hearing would have to be recycled through an array of separate additional hearings.68 Therefore this remains an enforcement proceeding, and neither

{ 2.764 nor { 2.204 is applicable.62 Rather, the standard for determining i.- ** , .) y , , fi}

7 'l Nor would restart itself constitute a license amendment, as UCs contends. Restart twolves tining a

. y; c .N. [ .* g o,.. - e

~

., ' fj , suspension, and hence does not create new hearing nghts. Sec. e.g., San Luir 06apo Mothers /pr Brace v.

.h "' NRC,751 F.2d 1287,1314 (D.C. Cir.1984); Sacromesso Mussepst Urary Distret (Rancho seco Nuclear

"?m b.a M*@ C' N.*[_w f pb'.n.WJW-g" 3-Cir.1979); Pub

• 4c.7Service ;hg Generating station) CLI-79-7,9 NRC 680,40*d Friends o/the Earth v. Unard Saurs. 600 F.2d 753 (9th Co. ofIndissa (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating station. Units I and 2),

e * ' s g . %@; , W u CLI-80-10, !! NRC 438 (1980), gB*d. Save the VaAiry v. NAC,714 F.2d 142 (6th Cir.1983) (Table).

~i>.. ., c . . 62 Section 2.204, which provides that the Commission shall make a license amendment immediately ef.

. , QC-g' ' g._p:i .

.J f4 $ W,A- ' 0 F ?, - fective upon finding that the public health, safety, or interest so requires, applies only when the Com-

, ,' ,

• f Nff $(gp .fQi.. ' mission makes the determination to make a license amendment effective without affording an oppor.

, 6?k-  % E;s Tf' '

tunity for a prior hearing. liere an exhaustive hearing has already been held on posable amendments to

.~  ; - - - 1. 6 4, ; . the license, and since additional amendments would be imposed or granted only as a result of a prior

.] g.( ' 'a o hearing, i 2.204 does not apply.

'- ,N $ $- , section 2.764(n(2) of 10 C.F.R. is similarly inappiicable. Section 2.764(n(2)(i) provides that the a' ' 'N - '

Commission shall make a Licensing Board decision authorizing a unit to operate at fu!I power immedi-

3

' . (%',

'* ately efrective ifit determines that it is in the public interest to do so, based on a consideration of the gravity of

.;; ' , q.

, u. . " ,M; f.1 E:T 9 the substantive issue, the likelihood that it has been resolved incorrectly below, the degree to st:- which correct resolution of the issue would be prejudiced by operation pending review, and y . *- ,3: yc Yh.M  % g n.wESku, Q^s other relevant public interest factors.

UQ.Nc[U' "; 7$' y $

. . . .L . ; ' .

The standards in 5 2.764(n(2) apply only to initial licensing decisions. TMI-! received an operating license in 1974, and a decision to allow restart of TMI-I would reinstate Licensee's nghts under that

.. y1 W P: i ?.j- D.'j' ? pg Sees U.j.ltjyl,'g-# s operating license. That license conditions have been imposed as a result of the hearing procesa does not F;,",Qfg convert this enforcement proceeding into a licensing action such that i 2.764 would apply, as any en-

.. T ? .~g C-s % forcement proceeding can lead to license conditions.

,'j

s.

• i

[. .

~

. . ,x_ l 1143 w

s %4

's 3, i - *

,.T ,

u. "h

. . . _ - . - . , _ . . _ ~ . . . . . . . _ .,

6 b' < ~

_ w -_ _ -

4 g 4

., 9

, u..,. . . . . .-.. - -- -----

G-f whether to lift the immediate effectiveness of an enforcement order is .ml '

whether the concerns which led to making that order immediately effec- 1 ~ (.fl. .N.

, 5,',J.~ .. .. s ,I,: )W ' '

tive have been adequately resolved. Once this has been done, the Com- +- 4 ,-

mission is legally obligated to lift the immediate elTectiveness of the d.'. '

.' r c ~>' _ ~ !['- "

order, regardless of the nature of the latest Board decision.') As the .i ~. . .., ,

Commission explained in an earlier order: I' ' '