Text

Rev 2 to App R Compliance Assessment Rept
	ML20214J189
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	05/05/1987
From:	Murtha M; TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20214J186	List: ML20214J184; ML20214J189;
References
	02-1040-1153, 02-1040-1153-R02, 2-1040-1153, 2-1040-1153-R2, NUDOCS 8705270695
	Download: ML20214J189 (717)
	v • d • e

0 INFORMATION ONLY COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT REVISION 2 DAVIS-BESSE -

NUCLEAR POWER STATION

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Reviewed: L m .' Date: 30 3 P n,e 1 Approved: ( Date: b b[

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1 8705270695 870514 PDR ADOCK 05000346 PDR F

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O O O-Co?tPl.1Af!CE ASSESSMENT REPORr CllAMGF MOFiCE 1.00

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CN FCR SUPP ORIf;lNATOR DA'l E I)l S I R I Httr loft DAIE REVISION NO NO. NO. OI: lC I flA'I ED DATE Cf! ~ INCORPORATING -

I NLOI:l'UR ATED CHANGE NOTICE 29 N/A MUR rilA. 6/24/86 6/28/86 5/5/87 2 30 N/A ---

MllRTilA 7/1/86 7/5/86 5/5/87 2 31 N/A --

SUPERSEDED BY 7/22/86 CN #33 32 83-153 --

MURTIIA 8/5/8t> -8/9/86~ 5/5/37 2 33 N/A --

MUR rilA 8/27/86 8/29/86 5/%/37 2 34 N/A --

MURTilA 9/12/86 9/15/86 5/5/87 2 35 N/A --

MUR fila 9/13/86 9/18/86 5/5/87- 2 36 N/A --

MURTIIA 9/18/86 9/24/86 5/5/87 2 37 N/A MURTilA 10/21/86 10/23/86 5/5/87 2

38 N/A MURTilA 12/23/86 1/7/86 5/5/87 2

39 N/A --

MURTIIA 12/23/86 1/2/87 5/5/87 2 40 86-0341 0 MIIRTIIA I/14/87 ------

41 87-0003 --

MllRTilA I/22/37 ------

42 85-0238 --

MURTilA l/28/87 2/2/87 5/5/87 2 43 N/A --

'MURTilA 1/29/87 2/2/87 5/5/87 2 44 N/A MURTilA 2/2/87 2/12/87 5/5/87 2 45 N/A -- . MilRTilA 2/2/87 2/12/87 5/5/87 2 46 N/A --

MURTIIA 2/2/87 2/12/87 5/5/87 2 47 N/A --

MURTilA 2/2/87 2/12/87 5/5/87 2 48 86-0422 40 MURTilA 2/25/87 - - - --

49 85-0238 --

MURTIIA, 4/9/87 4/10/87 50 86-0144 0 5/5/87 2 MURTIIA 4/16/87

NOTE: Change Notices 1 thru 28 were i ncorpora tori into revision 1 of the CAlt

Fccility: 5B-1 epp:nsix R .

Dockat: 50-346 Co2plicnco Ansses=cnt Raport Rsvicicn: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION APPENDIX R COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME 1 EAGE Section

1.0 INTRODUCTION

AND

SUMMARY

1-1 1.1 Background 1-1 1.2 Purpose of Report 1-1 1.3 Scope of Report 1-2 1.4 Review Methodology 1-3

-1.5 Summary of Results 1-4 A*w '-"

1.6 Definitions, Abbreviations and Equipment 1-6 thru l-11 and Cable Numbering Systems Table 1-1 Fire Area Compliance Overview 1-1-1 thru l-1-3 Table 1-2 Summary of Exemption Requests 1-2-1 thru l-2-3

2.0 REFERENCES

2-1 2.1 Drawings ,

2-1 2.2 Procedures 2-2 Reports 2-2 0 2.3 2.4 2.5 NRC Documents Letters 2-3 2-3 thru 2-4 3.0 SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS, COMPONENTS AND CIRCUITS 3-1 3.1 Introduction 3-1 3.2 Performance Goals 3-1 3.3 Safe Shutdown Functions 3-2 thru 3-4 3.4 Requirements and Assumptions 3-5 3.5 Safe Shutdown Systems Determination 3-6 thru 3-7 3.6 Safe Shutdown Systems 3-8 thru 3-26 3.7 Safe Shutdown System Components 3-26 thru 3-28 3.8 Safe Shutdown System Circuits 3-28 thru 3-30 3.9 Plant Communications and Security 3-30 thru 3-33 Table 3-1 Safe Shutdown Systems 3-1-1 O

Facility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 TABLE OF CONTENTS O

(Continued)

SECTION PAgg 4.0 APPENDIX R, SECTION III.G EVALUATION 4-1 4.1 Introduction 4-1 4.2 Requirements 4-1 4.3 Assumptions 4-2 4.4 Evaluation Methodology 4-3 4.5 Methods of Achieving Compliance 4-3 4.6 Fire Area Evaluations 4-4 thru 4-7 (See TC i and ii of this section for effective pages)

Table 4-1 Appendix R,Section III.G Compliance Summary 1-12 5.0 . ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS 5-1 5.1 Common Power Source Analysis 5-1 thru 5-5 5.2 Spurious Actuation Analysis 5-5 thru 5-8 5.3 Common Enclosure Analysis 5-8 thru 5-10 Table 5-1 Safe Shutdown Components Evaluated for Spurious Actuation 1-6 6.0 EMERGENCY LIGHTING 6-1 6.1 Introduction 6-1 thru 6-2 6.2 Emergency Lighting Evaluation for a Fire in the Control Room or Cable Spreading Room 6-2 thru J-7 6.3 Emergency Lighting Evaluation for a Fire Outside the Control Room and Cable Spreading Room 6-7 thru 6-11 -

Table 6-1 Summary of Results of the Emergency Lighting Evaluation for a Fire in the Control Room and Cable Spreading Room 6-1-1 Table 6-2 Emergency Lighting Evaluation for a Fire in the Control Room / Cable Spreading Room Results (by Room) 6-2-1 thru 6-2-7 Table 6-3 Emergency Lighting System Modifications Identified from an Evaluation of a Serious Control Room and Cable Spreading Room Fire 6-3-1 thru 6-3-6 1

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() TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

SECTIOli PAfaK Table 6-4 Components Requiring Emergency Lighting for a Serious Plant Fire 6-4-1 thru C 6 Table 6-5 Lighting Requirements per Fire Area for a Serious Plant Fire 6-5-1 Table 6-6 Summary of Recommendations for a Serious Plant Fire -

6-6-1 thru 6-6-2 7.0 ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY 7-1 7.1 Introduction 7-1 thru 7-2 7.2 Response to NRC Clarification to Generic Letter 81-12 7-2 thru 7-7 7.3 Alternate Shutdown Capability for a Fire in the Control Room or Cable Spreading Room 7-7 thru 7-8 Table 7-1 Alternate Shutdown Methods to Meet the Requirements of Section III.G.3 for Fire Areas lut and R 7-1-1 thru 7-1-3 Table 7-2 Alternate Shutdown Methods to Meet the Requirements of Section III.G.3 for Fire Area AB 7-2-1 thru 7-2-3:

Table 7-3 Alternate Shutdown Methods to Meet the ' Requirements of Section III.G.3 for Fire Areas T and U 7-3-1 thru 7-3-3

-Table 7-4 Alternate Shutdown Methods to Meet the Requirements of Section III.G.3 for Fire Areas BF and R 7-4-1 thru 7-4-3

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8.0 OIL CQLLECTION SYSTEM FOR REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 8-1 8.1 I'ntroduction 8-1 8.2 Issued Exemption for RCP Oil Collection System 8-1 thru 8-2 i

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(continued)

YQLk'UE 2 I_dEiO Appendiv A: Safe Shutdown Components List a ttru 2r Notes 2" thru 29 Append 1:' B-1: Circult/Sub-Component Location Summe by System '

enru Je8 Append 1" B-2: Circult/Sub-Component Location Summer.

by Fire Area 1 thru !20 App en d t :- C-1: Assoc 1sted Circuit Location Summary by Power Source 1 thru 21 Append 1: C-2: Associated Circuit Location Summary by Ftre Area 1 thru 19 Appendix C-3: Associated Circuit Evaluation Summary 1 thru 14 Drawings: 12501-A-221F Rev. D 7749-E-44B SH-1A Pev. 7 12501-4-222F Rev. D 7749-E-44B SH.25 Rev. vA 12501-A-22?F Rev. D 7749-E-445 SH.26A Rev. 04 12501-A-224F Rev. D 7749-E-44B SH.26B Rev. DA 12501-A-225F Fev. E 7749-E-488 SH.07A Rev. 4 12501-A-226F Rev. D 7749-E-48B SH.37B Pev. ;

12501-A-227F Rev. B 7749-E-48B SH 37C Fev. v 12501-A-22SF Pev. C 7749-E-48B SH.37D Rev. 0 12501-A-229F Res. B 7749-E-318 Fev. 22 12501-A-2;OF Rev. L 7749-E-008 Rev. 22 7749-E-335 Rev. 30 7749-E-349 SH.1 Rev. 2 ._

7749-E-412 Rev. 20 -

7 749-E-412 SH.1 Rev. 2 7749-M-012A Rev. 23 7749-M-026A Rev. 21

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Facility: DB-1 Appandix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153

.O TOLEDO EDISON COM ANY DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT NO.1 APPENDIX R CONLIANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT SECTION 1.0 INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

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TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE l l

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

AND SUtt!ARY 1-1 l 1.1 Background 1-1 1.2 Purpose of Report 1-1

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1 1.3 Scope of Report 1-2 1.4 Review Methodology 1-3 1.5 Summary of Results 1-4 t

1.6 Definitions, Abbreviations and Equipment and Cable 1-6 Numbering Systems TABLES Table 1-1 Fire Area Compliance Overview Table 1-2 Summary of Exemption Requests 4

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Fccility: DB-1 Appandix R Docket: ' 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: .1- No. 02-1040-1153 A-

1.0 INTRODUCTION

AND

SUMMARY

1.1 Backaround During' the week of July 25-29, 1983, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) performed a fire protection audit at the Toledo Edison (TED), Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit'No. 1 (DB-1).

The purpose of this audit was to ascertain the DB-1 level of compliance with Sections III.G, III.J, III.L and III.0 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50. Twenty-nine findings were identified by the NRC audit team at the exit meeting on July 29, 1983. Of these, eight were related to the requirements of Appendix R while twenty-one were related to Fire Protection Program - National Fire Protection

. Association (NFPA) - commitments.

TED initiated - a program of immediate and long tera corrective actions in respense to the findings of the NRC audit team. The immediate corrective actions and the long ters actions were '

finalized in Toledo Edison's letter to the NRC dated September 13, l

1983, Serial No. 986 (Reference 2.5.H). Immediate corrective actions - were implemented. In the long ters, the existing Fire Protection Program will be upgraded based on a detailed evaluation j of station design to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R.

This report presents a detailed review and assessment of the DB-1 design against the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G " Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown capability," III.J

" Emergency Lighting," III.L " Alternative and Dedicated Shutdown Capability," sud III.0 "011 Collection System for Reactor Coolant Pump."

The Revision 0 of this report was submitted to the NRC in September of 1984. Subsequent- plant changes and a final determination of -

F modifications to be performed to resolve non-compliances .has resulted in the need to issue Revision 1. Additionally, the format of the report: has been slightly altered to promote clarity and ease i

of understanding, as well as to facilitate the maintenance and update of the document. It is hereby being submitted in place of Revision 0.

1.2 Purpose of Report The purpose of this report is to docurent the analysis performed for DB-1 to determine the level of compliance to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G, III.J, III.L and III.O.

For those plant fire areas which are not in compliance, analyses are presented and procedural revisions and/or physical 1-1 i

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l Facility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report i Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 O

modifications are in progress or are proposed for the purpose of meeting the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's requirements. In certain areas, exemptions are requested f rom specific requirements where it has been determiu.J that existing fire protection features provide equivalent protection to that required by Appendix R.

The report presents the methods by which TED has determined that eithe r:

1. The DB-1 design complies with or will comply with the specific requirements of Appendix R, Sections III.G, III.J, III.L and III.0; or

2. Exemptions have been requested from the specific requirements of Appendix R, Sections III.C, III.J, III.L and III.O.

1.3 Scope of Report A detailed re-examination and re-analysis of the DB-1 '

safe shutdown capability has been pe rfo rmed and is included in this repo rt . This extends the previous fire p rotection activities performed under the guidelines of Branch Technical Position (BIP )

AP CSB 9.5-1, the response to which was submitted to the NRC in 1977 The re analysis considers fire protection improvecents incorporated into DB-1 since the 1977 response.

This repo rt reviews DB-1 safe shutdown systems, components, circuits , and associated circuits for compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G. This report also reviews the emergency lighting and reactor coolant pump oil collection systems for compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Sections III.J and III.0, re spectively. Technical information is provided in this report to pe rmit NRC staff review and approval of proposed plant modifications. -

This re port contains eight sections. Section 2.0 identifies the references utilized' to develop the Appendix R Compliance Assessment Report.

Section 3.0 desc ribes the proces s used to identify the safety functions, safe shutdown systems, components, and circuits required to achieve safe shutdown in response to a serious plant fire. The specific Appendix R requirements that are needed to be add re s sed in this report are included in this section. The section details the plant systems and components whic h are required to be available to achieve safe shutdown of the plant.

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Fccility: DB-1 Appandix R Docket: 50-346 ' Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1- No. 02-1040-1153 O Section 4.0 describes the evaluation process of locating safe shutdown components and circuits in the fire areas, and presents the evaluation of nonconformances with respect to Appendix R,Section III.C and planned re solutions. This. section det,sils the non-coupliances associated with each individual fire area and stipulates action to be taken to resolve each non-compliance.

When required, an evaluation against the requirements of Appendix R,Section III.L is also addressed.

Section 5.0 describes the analyses pe rfo rmed on associated circuits of concern, including an evaluation of nonconformances with Appendix R,Section III.G and planned resolutions.

Section 6.0 provides a discussion of the evaluation of the emergency lighting, including the. proposed resolutions to conform to Appendix R,Section III.J.

Section 7.0 provides a discussion of the al'te rnative - shutdown capability at DB-1. The details of the area review with regards to Appendix R,Section III.L is referenced to Section 4.0 of this re po rt. In-addition, Section 7.0 provides detailed re sponses to-the relevant questions contained in _ Generic Letter 81-12 (Reference 2.4.D) as supplemented by the NRC staf f's clarification -

dated March 22, 1982 (Reference 2.4.E).

Section 8.0 provides e discussion of . the evaluation of the oil collection system for the reactor coolant pumps against the requirements of Appendix R,Section III.O.

1.4 Review Methodology This report was prepared in several steps, the first of which was -

the identification of safe shutdown systems at DB-1. An analysis was then performed to identify the safe shutdown systems necessary

! to achieve and maintain hot standby and subsequent cold shutdown in the event of a postulated fire. Af ter the requisite systems

! were identified, the related components and circuits we re

identified and located in the individual fire areas. At this time, the Associated Circuits review was also conducted.

Ihe fire area determinations were pe rformed concurrent to this effort by evaluating the adequacy of the fire area boundaries.

I New areas and redefined areas were added to existing defined fire l areas to suppo rt this evaluation. The safe shutdown components i and circuits were then reviewed for compliance with the specific separation criteria of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 l0 1-3 4

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F Facility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 i

The Emergency Lighting Review and Alternate Shutdown Capability evaluation were performed once the above-mentioned activities were completed.

The Reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection Syster Review was performed prior to the Section III.G.2 review.

The , methodologies for these reviews are described in their respective sections of this report. All reviews determined the degree of compliance with Appendix R, Sections III.G, III.J, III.L and III.0, as applicable. For those areas not in compliance, studies were completed to determine whether:

1. Revisions to plant procedures or modifications to plant fire protection or safe shutdown features were required to bring the area into compliance; or

2. Alternative or dedicated shutdown capability was required to bring the area into compliance; or,

3. An exemption was justified for the specific fire area in question.

1.5 Summary of Results Within the Appendix R Compliance Assessment Program, the system, component and circuit separation aspects and the existing plant fire protection features have been integrated to achieve compliance to the extent possible, with the requirements of Sections III.G, J, L, and 0 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50. Towards this end, the results demonstrate that Appendix R compliance is achieved in many fire areas. For areas not yet in compliance, the system or component functica potentially jeopardized often only -

contains one circuit or a significantly low number of circuits in that fire area.

The following is a summary, by section, of the results stemming frem the various evaluations which comprise this report:

Section 3 Summary l

The evaluation performed as specified within Section 3 culminated in a list of safe shutdown components and circuits which are required to be addressed for Appendix R Section III.G separation requirements. Also concluded from the Section 3 review is the adequacy of existing plant communications and security.

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Fccility: DB-1 App:::: dix R Dock 2t: 50-346 Compliorce Assassment Report Revision: 2 No. 02-1040-1153 Section 4 Summary ^

O- The analysis confirms that compliance to the requirements of Appendix R Section III.G is achieved in 16 of the 50 fire areas. l Table 4-1 summarizes the method of achieving compliance for the individual fire areas that presently do not meet Appendix R Section III.G.2 requirements. Table 1-1 summarizes the level of existing compliance of all fire areas and the method by which compliance to Appendix R is achieved.

An additional six (6) areas will comply with Appendix R by utilizing l cold shutdown and/or hot standby manual actions specifically identified in operating procedures, once the necessary modifications for compliance to Section III.J " Emergency Lighting" are implemented.

One fire area (Fire Area E) will be in compliance once the exemption request involving the fire area is granted.

For the remaining 27 fire areas for which compliance to Appendix R is not.yet achieved, proposed modifications including the instal-lation of suppression and detection systems, and cable rerouting and raceway wrapping will achieve the necessary compliance.

Exemption requests have been requested from the requirements of '

Appendix R for ten (10) fire areas. The exemption requests are made~

on the basis of detailed fire hazards analyses which conclude that : )

existing features, when combined with additional proposed fire protection modifications and/or procedural modifications, provide functionally equivalent protection of the public health and safety.

These exemption requests have been submitted to the NRC under a separate sover letter. Refer to Table 1-2 for a summary of the exemption requests.

Section 5 Summary The associated circuits review determined those circuits that pose

' common power source, common enclosure, and/or spurious actuation concerns relating to safe shutdown systems. This effort culminated in a list of Associated Circuits (Appendix C) which was factored in the Section 4 fire area evaluations.

Section 6 Susmary The emergency lighting evaluation consisted of systematically reviewing the adequacy of existing emergency lighting against the access / egress routes and the procedural action locations identified from the Section 4 fire area evaluations.

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Appendix 1 Docket: 50-346 Revis$sa 1 Compliance Assessment Report No. 02-1040-1153 l l he adequacy of existing energency lighting, and recommendations for upgrading the system to support the above-mentioned actions, are documented in the tables at the end of Section 6.

,Section 7 Samary ~

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Alternative shutdown capability procedural actions and plant physical modifications, required to comply with the criteria ;

established in Appendix R Section III.C.3, are included in Section 7.

This section provides detailed information on the alternate shutdown capabilities, specifically addressing those items called out in the Clarification to Generic Letter 81-12. The tables in Section 7 provide all such information. '

i Section 8 Summary i

%e adequacy of the existing Reactor Coolant pumps oil collection

, holdup capacity to accommodate the ' entire lubricating oil system ,

inventory, as required by Section III.0 of Appendix R, it

[j discussed in this section. An exemption was requested and j approved from the requisite criteria. i 1.6 Definitions, Abbreviations and Cable Numbering Systes 1.6.1 Definitions ne following definitions are for terms commonly used throughout the report.

i l Active Component -a component used to directly control !

(s tart , regulate or stop) a shutdown or support function, l e.g., a flow control valve, a pump, or a normally closed isolation or stop valve. ,

'j 1 s Associated. Circuit - safety-related and non-safety-related ,

cables that are associated by one of the following with '

equipment which is reauired for shutdown:

1. A common power source with the shutdown equipment.

2. A connection of circuits for equipment whose spurious operation will adversely affect the shutdown capability (e.g., DHR/RCS isolation valves); or

3. A common enclosure (e.g., cable tray, panel, junction i box) with shutdown cables. '

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Fccility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision:- 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Automatic Detection - a system whose detectors are located (usually at the ceiling) in a zone or area that t ransmits a . signal to a remote location (usually the Control Roos) indicating a presence of combustion p roduc ts. Several types of detection devices are commonly utilized, such as smoke (photoelectric and ionization), heat (fixed temperature, rate of rise, or a combination of both) and flame detectors (ultraviolet, visible, or intrared).

Automatic Suppression - a fixed piping system of water or other fire extinguishing agent automatically actuated when the presence of combustion products or heat exceeds the set point established for the system in the area in which it is installed.

Cold Shutdown -

reactor at zero power, K,ff : ass than 0.99 and RCS temperature at or below 200*F.

Common Power Source - a power source which feeds both ' safe shutdown and associated circuits. ,

Coordination - the selectivo automatic operation of. the various protcetire devices by which the interrupting device closest to the fault operates first to isolate the O fault.- As a result, a minimum po rtion of the system is interrupted for a given fault.

Fire Area - that portion of a building or plant separated from other areas by boundary fire barriers (walls, floors, and ceilings) with any openings or penetrations protected with seals or closures having a fire resistance equal to that of the barrier or which have been previously approved.

Fire Barrier - a continuous membrane either vertical or horizontal, such as a wall or floor / ceiling assembly, that has a specified fire resistance rating to limit the sp read

, of fire.

f Fire Brigade -

the team of plant personnel assigned to fire-fighting and who are equipped for and trained in .the fighting of fires.

Fire Loading - the amount of combustible material present l

in a gf ven room, zone, or area, usually expressed in the total heat released (Btu) per square foot of floor area.

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1 Fccility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 01 Fire Rating - the time in minutes or hours that materials or assemblies have withstood a standard fire exposure as i established in acco rdance with test procedures of ASTM E-119 (NW A 251).

Fire Stop - a feature of construction that prevents fire propagation along the length of cables or prevents spreading of fire to nearby combustibles within a given fire area or fire zone.

Fire Zone - a subdivision of a fire area designated as , a potential fire hazard zone for convenience of analysis and design of fire suppression systems.

Fixed Suppression - any water or gaseous supp ression system activated either automatically or manually, but excluding manual hose stations and portable fire extinguishe rs.

Hot Shutdown -

reactor at zero power, K less than 0.99 and RCS average temperature (T,yg) ,fgf rea te r than 200*F and less than 280'F.

Hot Standby -

the initial safe shutdown state with the reactor at zero power, K,ff less than 0.99 and RCS average temperature (Tavg) equal or greater than 280*F.

Intervening Combustibles - Incervening combustibles are considered any significant quantity of in-situ materials which will ignite, burn, support combustion or release flamesble vapors when subjected to fire or heat. Neithe r transient materials nor cable in conduit are considered as an intervening combustible.

Manual Supp re s sion -

a means of controlling or extinguishing a fire requiring manual actuation and application.

! Safe Shutdown System - A system identified as required to

! place the plant in a safe hot standby and/or cold shutdown l

condition as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix R. A safe shutdown system includes all components, panels, cables, cable t rays , conduits, etc., necessary for the system to pe rfo rm its safe shutdown function. Necessa ry supporting auxiliary systems are included.

l Standpipe and Hose System -

a fixed piping system with hose outlets, nozzle and hose connected to a reliable water supply to p rovide effective fire hose s t re ams to l

specific areas inside the building.

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a network of piping similar to a sprinkler system except that it utilizes open-head sp ray nozzles and protects a specific hazard.

1.6.2 Abbreviations The following are abbreviations for terms commonly used throughout the report:

AFP - Auxiliary Feedwater Pump AFWS - Auxiliary Feedwater System A0V - Air-Operated Valve ADV - Atmospheric Dump Valve

. ARTS - Anticipatory Reactor Trip System ASP - Auxiliary Shutdown Panel BWST - Borated Water Storage Tank CACS - Containment Air Cooling System CAR - Compliance Assessment Report CCWS - Component Cooling Water System CFS - Core Flood System CSS - Containment Spray System CST - Condensate Storage Tank CTMT - Containment s CREVS - Control Room Emergency Ventilation System DERS - Decay Heat Removal System ECCS - Emergency Core Cooling System EDG - Emergency Diesel Generator ESS - Essential FHAR - Fire Hazards Analysis Report KPIS .- High Pressure Injection System HVAC - Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning LP IS - Low Pressure Injection System MCC - Motor Control Center MDFP - Fotor Driven Feedwater Pump MOV - Motor-Operated Valve MSS - Main Steam System MU - Makeup MUP - Makeup and Purification NEPA - National Fire Protection Association LNI - Nuclear Instrumentation NNI - Non-Nuclear Instrumentation PORV - Pilot-Operated Relief Valve P WR - Power RCP - Reactor Coolant Pump RCS - Reactor Coolant System R? S - Reactor Protection System SFAS - Safety Features Actuation System SFRCS - Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System SG . Steam Generator

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SOV - Solenoid-Operated Valve SV - Safety Valve SWS - Service Water System SWGR - Switchgear USS - Unit Sub-Station VAC - Volts, Alternating Current VDC - Volts, Direct Current In Appendices B and C of this repo rt , when designations are given for electrical components (motor operators for valves or solenoid valves), the electrical numbe ring system is used (e.g. MV106 or SV1428, respectively). In

.. all other sections of the re po rt , the system designation is used, e.g. MS106 or SW1428, respectively, meaning a Main Steam (MS) valve or Service Water (SW) valve.

1. 6. 3 Equipment Numbering System Prefix Letter -

The equipment location numbers are developed by using a letter prefix on each numbe r to designate the particular type of equipment, where cables te rminate. The designations are as follows:

A - 4.16 KV AC System Switchgear h B - 480V AC System Switchgear, Motor Control Ce nte r or Distribution Panel C - Control Panel or Cabinet D - D.C. System and Equipment E - Local Terminal Box F - Digital (Switc h) Output Ins t rument (Flow, Level, Pressure, Temperature)

G - Generating Equipment including Driver, Excitation or Grounding Equipment J - Terminal Box or Pull Box -

K - Station Annunciator System L - Low Level Instruments (Transducer, The rmocouple , RTD, etc.) -

M - Motor i N - Local Control Station or Device P - Penettr eion Te rminal Box R - Instrument Rack or Panel RC- Relay Cabinet SV- Solenoid Valve V - Valve W - Welding Receptacle (WR), HVAC Duct Heater (WE) or Misc. Receptacle (ZSR)

X - Transformer Y - 120V AC Power Supply O

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- 1.6.4 Cable Numbering System The scheme number is used to identify each individual control and/or instrumentation network, including the associated wire, terminal, and equipment numbers. Where practical, the scheme - number - will be identical to the equipment number of the cont roller. .A unique scheme number will be assigned when a controller is not an outstanding part of the circuit (such as for example 'a turbine trip circuit or communications system). Cable numbers consist of the cable classification number followed by the corresponding scheme number plus a letter suffix. The letters will be assigned in a systematic o rde r.

1 C B E 1.2 4 2 F Cable Channel O Classification Number Function (P 4 owe r, C= Cont rol, L= Low Level Instruments)

Scheme rLow-Voltage Prefix Number LController -MCC Number Unit Sub No.

Number L equential S No.

-MCC Compartment .

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Facility: DD-1 Appendiz R Docket: 50-346. Compliance Asseessent Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1133

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FIRE AREA COMPLIANCE OVERVIEW I I I l .I Alternatal I /'

l Procedural l Modification l Shutdown l I I Exemptions I l Fire l Existing i Revision l Required ICapabilityl to I- to I i Area lCompliancel Required lIII.G IIII.J l Requittd l III.G.2 I III.G.3 I i l i I l l I I I l i

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TABLE 1-1 (continued) j FIRE AREA COMPLIANCE OVERVIEW '

I l l l l Alternatel I l l l Procedural IModification i Shutdown i Exemptions I t i Fire l Existing l Revision i Requi gd ICapabilityl to i to ~l I Area ICompliancel Required lIII.(1 1III.J l Required l III.C.2 l III.G.3 I l l l 1 I I I I I DD l No I X l X l X l I ,

I I I I I I i 1 l DE I No l X l l 'l l l I I I I I I ,

I I I I I DF l No I X l X lX l l I I I I- 1 I I I I I I I Do I Yes i I I I l 1 I I l. I I I I I I i l DH I No i I l X l l l l l l l 1 1 I I I I I I DJ l No I X lX iX l. 1 I I I I I I i l I .I E I No l l l ~l l X l l 1 1 I I I I I I I

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Ezesption was previously requested and approved 1-1-2

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FIRE AREA COMPLIANCE OVERVIEW I I I I I Alternatal l I I l Procedural IModification l Shutdown l Exemptions l 1 Fire l Existing l Revision i Required !Capabilityl to l to I l Area ICompliancel Required IIII.G IIII.J l Required i III.G.2 ' III.G.3'l l l l l l l l l l 1L I Yes .I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I IM i Yes i I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I P l No l X lX l X l .I I I a l I 'l I I I I I f PP I Yes l l l l 1 I i 1 1 I I I I I I e& m I X lX l X l i i I

. ; 'l i I I I I I I i QQ l Yes l I I I I l- 1 I I I l l I I l I l R No I X l X l X X l X l s l Yes l I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I l X l X X *

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TABLE 1-2

SUMMARY

OF EXEMPTION REQUESTS The following is a summary of the exemptions requested from certain requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Sections III.G and III.J. These exemption requests are being submitted under a separate cover letter and serve to support the analysis contained in this Revision 1 of the Appendix R Compliance Assessment Report.

1. Fire Area A - (CAR Section 4.6.A)

An exemption is requested from Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 to the extent it requires full fixed fire suppression in an area where credit is taken for 20 feet spatial separation with no intervening combustibles between redundant trains of safe shutdown circuits.

2. Fire Area AB - (CAR Section 4.6.AB)

An exemption is requested from Section III.G.3 of Appendix R to 10 CER 50 to the extent it requires fixed fire suppression and detection in an area where alternate shutdown capability is provided. Specifically, alternate shutdown capability is provided for circuits controlling ECCS Room Cooler Fans C31-1 and C31-2 within Fire Area AB. The alternate shutdown capability is physically and electrically independent of Fire Area AB.

3. Fire Area D - (CAR Section 4.6.D)

An exemption is requested from Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 to the extent it requires 20 feet 'of horizontal separation between redundant safe shutdown components (Containment Air Cooling System Fans) ~

with no intervening combustibles inside containment.

l l 4. Fire Area DA - (CAR Section 4.6.DA)

An exemption is requested from Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 to the extent it requires the installation of an automatic suppression system where redundant safe shutdown cables are separated by 20 feet free of intervening' combustibles. Specifically, redundant trains of safe shutdown cables in the containment annulus space are separated by greater than 100 feet free of intervening combustibles and are protected by a detection system. However, automatic fire suppression is not provided in this area.

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TABLE 1-2

SUMMARY

OF EXEMPTION REQUESTS (Continued)

5. Fire Area EE - (CAR Section 4.6.EE)

An ' exemption is requested from Section III.G.3 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 to the extent it requires area-wide fixed fire suppression in an area where alternate shutdown capability is provided. Specifically, alternate shutdown capability is provided for circuits and electrical components for

- the Main Steam Inlet Isolation Valve MS106 for the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine 1. The alternate shutdown capability (hotor Driven Feedwater Pump) is physically and electrically independent of Fire Area EE.

6. Fire Areas E and F - (CAR Sections 4.6.E and 4.6.F)

An exemption is requested from Section III.G.3 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 to the extent it requires the separation of redundant safe shutdown cables and equipment by 20 feet free of . intervening com'bustibles and protection by complete area-wide automatic suppression and detection systems.

- Specifically, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Rooms 237 and 238 have an

- unprotected vent opening in their ceilings, leading to a common area above. This area above the pump rooms is also common to the third Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump.

7. Fire Area HH - (CAR Section 4.6.HH)

An exemption is requested from Section III.G.3 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 to the extent it requires area-wide fixed fire suppression in an area where alternate shutdown capability is provided. Specifically, alternate shutdown capability is provided for the Control Room Emergency Ventilation Systems circuits routed through Fire Area HH. The alternate shutdown capability is physically and electrically independent of Fire Area HH.

8. Fire Area R - (CAR Section*4.6.R)

An exemption is requested from Section III.G.3 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 to the- extent it requires fixed fire suppression in an area where alternate shutdown capability is provided. Specifically, alternate shutdown capability is provided for circuits controlling the Service Water Weps and Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Governor Valves within Fire Area R.

The alternate shutdown capability (in the form of the Backup Service Water Pump, and the Motor Driven Feedwater Pump) is physically and electrically independent of Fire Area R.

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TABLE 1-2

SUMMARY

OF EXEMPTION REQUESTS (Continued)

9. Fire Area U - (CAR Section 4.6.U)

An exemption is requested from Section III.G.3 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 to the extent it requires fixed fire suppression in an area where alternate shutdown capability is provided. Specifically, alternate shutdown capability is provided for circuit for the CCW Pump Room Vent Fan and

- Louvers within Fire Area U. The alternate shutdown capability is physically and electrically independent of Fire Area U.

10. Emergency Lighting - (CAR Section 6.2.3)

An exemption is requested from Section III.J of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 to the extent it requires self-contained emergency lighting units with at least an 8-hour battery power supply in all areas needed for the operation of safe shutdown equipment, and in access and egress routes thereto.

Specifically, an exemption is requested to utilize existing "hard-wired" AC/DC essential lighting in portions of the Auxiliary and Turbine Buildings, and to utiliae hand-held portable units in outside plant areas.

11. Embedded Conduits - (CAR Section 4.3)

An exemption is requested from the requirement to have a rated 3-hour barrier separating embedded conduits in concrete from redundant trains of safe shutdown circuits and associated circuits required by Section III.G.2 of Appendix R.

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TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT NO. 1 I

APPENDIX R COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT SECTION 2.0 REFERENCES f

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2.0 REFERENCES

2-1 2.1 Drawings 2-1 2.2 Procedures 2-2 2.3 Reports 2-2 2.4 NRC Documents 2-3 2.5 Letters 2-3 2.6 Calculations 2-4 0

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2.0 REFERENCES

f This section serves to identify those references that were utilized in

the development of the Appendix R Compliance Assessment Report (CAR),

Revision 1. The references identified in this section do not constitute t all documents used in the CAR Revision 1 effort, but represent the most pertinent sources of information. These documents are referenced throughout the sections of this report.

The revision status of the documents are noted in most cases. In the case of the drawings (Section 2.1), those utilized for this effort are valid as of their revision status on August 1,1985. Revisions to the

, drawings issued after this date are not incorporated in this revision of the CAR. The design input cut-off date for incorporation of information in the CAR Revision 1 is August 1, 1985.

2.1 Drawinas A. DB-1 Pipina and Instrument Distrams (P& ids), M-001 through M-499.

B. DB-1 AC Electrical System One-Line Disarams, E-1 through E-29.

C. DB-1 Elementary Wirina Disaraas, E-308 through E-65B.

D. DB-1 Fire Protection Drawinas, A-201F through 210F.

E. DB-1 General Floor Plan Drawins, A-3 through A-9.

F. DB-1 Liahtina & Cosaunications Drawinas, E-381 through E-409.

. G. DB-1 Raceway Drawings, E-300s and E-400s.

H. DB-1 General Arranaement, and Equipment Location Drawings, M-100s.

I. DB-1 Electrical Circuit Schedule, E-200B.

J. DB-1 Electrical Raceway Schedule, E-3003.

K. ' DB-1 Equipment Circuit Schedule, E-500B.

1 L. DB-1 Fire Protection Pipina Drawings, M-269-A through M-269-ZS.

M. DB-1 Fire Protection Modification - Knowool Listing, E-899A.

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Facility: DB-1 App:ndix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 2 No. 02-1040-1153 2.2 Procedures A. DB-1 System Procedures (SP1103.05 through SP1107.11).

B. DB-1 Abnormal Procedure, AB1203.02.00, " Serious Plant Fire".

C. DB-1 Abnormal Procedures, AB1023.26.00, " Serious Control Room Fire".

D. DB-1 Emergency Procedure, EP1202.02.20, " Station Blackout".

E. DB-1 Emergency Procedure, EP1202.01.01, "RPS, SFAS, SFRCS Trip or SG Tube Rupture".

2.3 Reports A. Evaluation of Kaowool As a Fire Resistant Barrier, Revision 4, dated June.1985 (Impell Report No. 01-1040-1262).

B. Emergency Lighting Review (for a fire in the Control Room / Cable Spreading Room), Revision 0, dated December 19, 1983 (Impell Report No. 02-1040-1145).

C. Emergency Lighting Assessment (for a fire outside the Control Room / Cable Spreading Room), Revision 0, dated June 25, 1985 (Impell Report No. 02-1040-1318).

D. SFRCS/SFAS Evaluation for Appendix R Impact, Revision 0, dated September 3, 1986 (Impell Report No. 02-1040-1319). I E. I.E. Information Notice 85-09 Appendix R Impact Review, Revision 0, dated June 1985 (Impell Report No. 02-1040-1321).

F. DCN/FCN Review - I, Revision 0, dated August 8, 1985 (Impell Report No. 02-1040-1320).

G. DCN/FCN Review - II, Revision 0, dated August 8, 1985 (Impell Report No. 02-1040-1329).

H. Safe Shutdown Component List Development Matrix, Revision 2, dated March 1986.

I. DB-1 Fire Hazards Analysis Report (FHAR), Revision 7, dated February 1986.

J. DB-1 Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR), Volumes 1-12, Docket No. 50-346, Revision 2.

K. Fire Protection Handbook, 14th Edition, dated September 1980.

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' 2.4 NRC Documents A. U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50, Appendix R.

B. U.S. NRC I.E. Information Notice 84-09, " Lessons Learned from NRC Inpsections of Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Systems (10CPR50, Appendix R), dated February 13, 1984.

C. U.S. NRC I.E. Information - Notice 85-09, " Isolation Transfer Switches and Post-Fire Shutdown Capability", dated June 1985.

D. U.S. NRC Generic Letter 81-12, " Fire Protection Rule (45 FR 76602, November 19, 1980)", dated February 20, 1981.

E. U.S. NRC Memorandum (R. Mattson to D. Eisenhut), " Clarification of Generic Letter 81-12", dated March 1982.

F. U.S. NRC Generie Letter 83-33, "NRC Positions on Certain Requirements of Appendix R to 10CPR50" dated October 14, 1983.

G. U.S. NRC Generic Letter 85-01, " Fire Protection Policy Steering Committee Report", dated January 9, 1985.

H. U.S. NRC 'Resulatory Guide 1.97, " Instrumentation for Light Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident", Revision 1.

I 2.5 Letters A. NRC (J.F. Stolz) to TED (R.P. Crouse) Letter, "Appendir R to 10CFR50 - Staff Positions Regarding Instrumentation Required i and Allowable Repairs for Alternative Shutdewn" dated March 7, 1983, Log No. 1231 .

~

l B. Bechtel (J.W. Fay, Jr.) to TED (J.F. Helle) Letter, " Task No.

l 284305 -

Operating Criteria Study for Q HVAC Systems",

BT-14445, dated March 2, 1984.

C. Bechtel (J.W. Fay, Jr.) to TED (J.F. Helle) Letter, "ECCS Pump

( Rec =: Heat Load Study", BT-13708, dated March 24, 1983.

D. TED (L.E. Roe) to NRC (R.N. Reid) Letter, " Evaluation of l Transient Behavior and Small Reactor Coolant System Breaks in l the 177 Fuel Assembly Plant", Serial No. 506, dated May 22, 1979.

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Fccility: DB-1 App ndix R D:ckst: 50-345 Complitnce A stssment R: port Revision: 2 No. 02-1040-1153 E. TED (L.E. Roe) to NRC (H.R. Denton) Letter, " Analysis of a Complete Loss of Feedwater Transient for DB-1", Serial No.

517, dated June 15, 1979.

F. NRC (J.G Keppler) to TED (R.P. Crcuse) Letter, " Inspection Report", dated August 30, 1987, Log No. 1024.

G. NRC (A. DeAgazio) to TED (.R.P. Crouse) Letter, " Exemption

'From Certain Requirements of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50",

dated August 23, 1984, Log No. 1586.

H. TED (R.P. Crouse) to NRC (D. Eisenhut) Letter, " Evaluation of July 25-29, 1983 NRC Appendix R Audit Findings and Corrective Action Plan", dated September 13, 1983, Serial No. 986.

I. TED (R.P. Crouse) to NRC (D. Eisenhut) Letter, "III.G.2, III.L.1 and III.0 Exemption Requests", dated September 30, 1983, Serial No. 991.

J. TED (R.P. Crouse) to NRC (J. Stolz) Letter, " Backup Service Water Capability", dated April 29, 1982, Serial No. 815.

K. NRC (J. Keppler) to TED (R.P. Crouse) Letter, "Results of the Inspection and Enforcement Conference on Fire Protection",

dated August 30, 1984, Log No. 1024.

L. NRC D.G. Eisenhut) to TED (R.P. Crouse) Letter, " Exemption from Certain Technical Requirements", dated November 23, 1982, Log No. 1138.

2.6 Calculations A. Fire Loading Summary Calculation C-EE-013-002. I

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3-TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT NO. 1 APPENDIX R COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT SECTION 3.0 SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS, COMPONENTS AND CIRCUITS i

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TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE 3.0 SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS, COMPONENTS AND CIRCUITS 3-1 3.1 Introduction 3 -1 3.2 Performanco Goals 3-1 3.3 Safe Shutdo n Functions 3-2 3.4 Requirements and A4."unptions 3-5 3.5 Safe Shutdown Systems Determination 3-6 3.6 Safe Shutdown Systems 3-8 3.7 Safe Shutdown System Components 3-27 3.8 Safe Shutdown System circuits 3-28 3.9 Plant Communications and Security 3-30 l TABLES Table 1 Safe Shutdown Systems i

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.s 3.0 SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS, COM ONENTS AND CIRCUITS 3.1 Introduction Paragraph 50.48(b) of 10 CFR 50 became effective on February 17, 1981 and requires all nuclear plants licensed to operate prior to January 1,1979 to comply with the requirements of Section III.C of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, regardless of any previous approvals by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of other design features. Section III.G.1 requires that fire protection features be provided for those systems, st'ructure s and components important to safe shutdown.

These features must be capable of limiting fire damage so that:

a. One t rain of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot standby conditions from eithe r the Control . Room or Eme rgency Control Station (s) is free of fire damage, and

b. Systems necessa ry to achieve and maintain cold shutdown from either the Control Room or Emergency Control Station (s) can be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

Section III.L of Appendix R, Enclosure 1 " Staff Position" to Generic Letter 81-12 (Reference 2.4.D), Generic Letter 83-33 (Reference 2.4.F) and IE Information Notice No. 84-09 (Reference 2.4.B) provide additional guidance on the NRC Staff's requirements for safe O shutdown capability. .

3.2 Pe rformance Goals The performance goals for the shutdown func tions as specified in Appendix R are:

a. The reactivity control function shall be capable of achieving and maintaining cold shutdown reactivity conditions.

b. The reactor coolant makeup func tion shall be capable of maintaining the reactor coolant level within the level indication in the pressurizer. ,

c. The reactor heat removal function shall be capable of achieving and maintaining decay heat removal.

d. The process monitoring function shall be capable of providing direct readings of the process variables necessary to pe rf orn and control the above functions.

e. The supporting functions shall be capable of providing the process cooling, lubrication, etc., necessa ry to pe rmit the operation of the equipment used for safe shutdown functions.

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3.3 Safe Shutdown Functions The specific safe shutdown functions necessary to satisfy the performance goals, stated in Section 3.2 above are discussed below:

3.3.1 Reactor Reactivity Control Safe shutdown of the reactor is performed by a manual trip from the control room. An automatic trip will occur in the event of loss of offsite power. After a reactor trip, the reactivity control function must be capable of achieving and maintaining at least a 1% reactivity shutdown margin ( A k/k) from cero power hot standby to cold shutdown. The function must be capable of compensating for any reactivity changes associated with xenon decay and the reactor coolant tempe rature dec rease which occurs during cooldown to cold shutdown conditions.

The Makeup and Purification System (MUP S ), High P ressure Injection System (HPIS) and Low P ressure Injection System (LP IS) provide boron injection for subsequent reactivity control during cooldown. The Makeup Pumps take suction f rom the Makeup Tank or Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST). The HPI and LPI Systems take suction f rom the BWST.

3.3.2 Reactor Coolant P ressure and Level Control Reactor coolant pressure cont rol is required to assure that the reactor coolant system is operated:

a. Within the technical specifications for reactor coolant system pressure-temperature requirements;

b. To prevent peak reactor coolant systen pressure f rom exceeding 110% of system design pressure;

c. With a sufficient subcooling margin to minimize void formation within the reactor vessel.

The reactor coolant make-up control function shall be capable of assuring that sufficient make up inventory is provided to compensate for Reactor Coolant System (RCS) fluid losses due to identified leakage from the Reactor Coolant System water volume during cooldown from hot standby to cold shutdown conditions, and to compensate for contraction volume of the RCS. The same injection systems are used for this protective function as those previously mentioned for the reactor reactivity control function (Section 3.3.1).

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Reactor Coolant pressure control is provided by the Pilot-Operated Relief Valve (PORV) or the Pressurizer Vent Header (as a backup), if available.

3.3.3 Secondary System Pressure and Level Control The Secondary System pressure in the steam generators shall be maintained within allowable limits by operation of the Atmospheric Vent Valves. . The steam generator water - level shall be maintained by the Auxiliary Feedwater System or the Motor Driven Feedwater Pump (as an alternate). Normally, steam generator water level is maintained by the Feedwater System. However, on a loss of offsite power, this system is not available.

3.3.4 Reactor Heat Removal The reactor (decay) heat removal function shall be capable of transferring fission product decay heat from the reactor core at a rate such that specified acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded. The function shall be capable of achieving cold shutdown.

i -Decay heat removal in hot standby is accomplished by natural circulation through the use of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps supplying water to the Steam Generators from the Condensate Storage Tanks and rejecting heat from the Steam Generators to the atmosphere through the Atmospheric Vent Valves or the Main Steam Safety Valves as a backup. In the event of a long term plant cooldown, a backup supply of auxiliary feedwater is provided from the Service Water System, or by manual alignment from the Fire Water System. No credit is taken for ~

the Fire Water System for this function in this Appendix R evaluation.

Decay heat removal in cold shutdown is provided by the Decay Heat Removal System (DHRS) through the Decay Heat Coolers.

The Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) provides cooling to the Decay Heat Coolers, and is in turn cooled by the Service Water System (SWS).

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3.3.5 - Process Monitoring When information on process variables is required by operators to modify safe shutdown system alignments or to control safe shutdown equipment, such monitoring information must be available from the Control Room or local control stations. The process monitoring function shall be capable cf providing direct readings of those plant process variables necessary for plant operators to perform and/or control the identified safe shutdown functions.

3.3.6 Containment P,ressure and Temperature Control The containment pressure and temperature shall be maintained within allowable limits. Containment pressure and temperature is controlled by the Containment Air Cooling System (CACS).

3.3.7 Control Room Habitability The Control Room atmosphere shall be conditioned to ensure habitability to operating personnel and to assure proper operation of Control Room instrumentation. This function shall be provided by the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS). In the event that all ventilation for the Control Room is lost, the Control Room may be evacuated and the shutdown functions performed locally and/or at emergency control stations.

3.3.8 Supporting Systems The systems and equipment used to perform the previous functions require miscellaneous suppo rting functions. The supporting functions required are process cooling (CCWS and SWS), area cooling for ce rtain rooms (HVAC) and Essential -

AC/DC power. Lubrication is covered as part of the safe shutdown system components. The suppo rting functions below shall be available and capable of providing the support necessary to assure acceptable performance of the previously identified safe shutdown functions:

o Component Cooling Water System o Service Water System o Essential Power o HVAC O

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Fccility: DB-1 Apptr. dix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1- No. 02-1040-1153 0 3.4 Requirements and Assumptions For the purpose of this review and report for which safe shutdown capability,will be demonstrated for DB-1, the following requirements and assumptions must be set:

3.4.1 Requirements

1. An exposure fire involving either transient or in-situ combustibles is postulated to occur in one given fire area within the plant at a time.

2. The possibility of a loss of offsite AC power in conjunction with the fire must be considered.

3. The plant shall be capable of achieving and maintaining hot standby. In fire areas where the Essential Pressuriser Heaters may not be available, the plant would gradually cooldown at such a rate that hot standby conditions would exist for an extensive pe riod of time (refer to Section 3.6.3).

4. The plant shall be capable of being brought to a cold shutdown condition within the time frame as discussed in

' 7,\ Toledo Edison's exemption request to the NRC, Serial No. 991 (Reference 2.5.1), as approved by the NRC on August 20, 1984, log no.1586 (Reference 2.5.G).

5. Fission product boundary integrity shall not be affected, i.e., there shall be no fuel clad damage, rupture of any primary coolant bounda ry or rupture of the containment bounda ry.

6. Unless they are an integral part of, or interface with, other .

1 existing safety systems, shutdown systems installed to provide post-fire shutdown capability need not be designed to meet the Seismic Catego ry I c rite ria, single failure criterion, or other design basis event criteria.

7. Those components whose spurious operation (due to the fire) would threaten safe shutdown system capability must be identified and evaluated.

8. No concurrent or sequential design basis accidents or transients which would not occur as a direct result of these '

assumptions need be assumed.

9. No random single failures other than those which occur as a direct result of the postulated fire need be assumed.

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Facility: DB-1 Apprndix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 2 No. 02-1040-1153 3.4.2 Assumptions

1. At the onset of a fire, both trains of systems required operable for safe shutdown are functional (i.e. none of the safe shutdown system components, except spare or standby components, are assumed to be under maintenance or test).

2. The plant is operating at 100% power. This assumption is made because this plant operating mode is the most limiting condition for evaluation of safe shutdown systems due to the fact that this condition calls upon the most systems to achieve safe shutdown, and involves the most decay heat.

3. For the purpose of developing the SSCL, it was converstively assumed that the fire-induced failure of circuits for all safe shutdown components (including spurious components) causes the component to assume the most detrimental position for proper operation of the safe shutdown system. 'However, in the fire area evaluations (Section 4.6), the failure mode of safe shutdown components, due to fire damage to its circuits, was evaluated.

4. In the absence of all normal and auxiliary feedwater, the plant will not realize any core damage until at least 30 minutes af ter the loss of all feedwater.

(Reference 2.5.D and 2.5.E).

5. No operator actions are assumed to take pla'ce in the fire area where the fire is postulated for at least one hour, unless specifically analyzed and described in the CAR.

3.5 Safe Shutdown Systems Determination 3.5.1 Introduction Various analytical approaches could be taken to assure that sufficient plant systems are available to perform the previou uy identified plant safety functions. Numerous plant systems are available, alone and in combination with other systems, to provide these required functions.

Futhermore, the exact location and specific effects of exposure fires cannot be precisely determined.

In general, recognizing the confined physical location of such fires and the operational flexibility and physical diversity of systems available to achieve safe shutdown, it is probably that appropriate plant fire protection features will limit fire damage to the extent that unaffected plant systems will be able to attain safe shutdown. An extensive effort would be required to identify the effects of postulated fires in all potential plant locations on all the plant systems which are normally available to support safe shutdown.

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Facility: DB-1 .

App:ndix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: l' No. 02-1040-1153 The shutdown analysis utilized herein identifies a minimum set of plant systems (Safe Shutdown Systems) and components necessary to achieve the functional goals and assure compliance to the requirements of Appendix R. These systems can achieve and maintain safe shutdown in spite of the location of the fire event, concurrent with the loss of offsite powe r. An assessment was then made to demonstrate that there is adequate protection of this minimum set of systems from the effects of postulated fires. This approach yields an adequate and conservative demonstration of the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire at DB-1.

3.5.2 Methodology The specific steps utilized to determine the safe shutdown systems, and their operational configurations, for the '

! development of an Appendix R compliance assessment, are as follows:

1. Delineated the protective functions which must be achieved ' to safely shutdown the plant by reviewing the requirements to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R (Reference 2.4.A),

O Generic Letter 81-12 (Reference 2.4.D) and the Staff's V Clarification to Generic Letter 81-12 (Reference 2.4.E).

2. Established the systems utilized at DB-1 to achieve the protective fur.ctions by reviewing Emergency Procedure EP1202.02 " Station Blackout" (Reference 2.2.D).

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3. Determined the operational configuration of each system by i reviewing the Updated Safety Analysis Report (Reference 2.3.J) and the System Procedures (Reference 2.2.A).

4 4. Identifed those systems, and po rtions thereof, that provide the same system function as those previously identified as safe shutdown systems. These are te rmed "alte rnate shutdown" systems and are also included as safe shutdown systems.

(

5. Identified those systemt that provide a support function for the primary safe shutdown systems. These systems are known as " supporting systems" and are included as safe shutdown systems.

1 The safe shutdown systems necessary to accomplish the required protective functions are delineated in Table 3-1 and a re discussed below.

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Fccility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assess 1ent Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 O'

3.6 Safe Shutdown Systems The following is a brief overview of the individual safe shutdown systems used at Ob1 and the functions they provide. This overview covers the basic feature s of the systems, as applicable, to this Appendix R report. For a more detailed descriptica of the systems, their controls and modes of operation, the DB-1 Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) and System Procedures should be consulted.

Toledo Edison does not intend to update the system descriptions included below. The USAR and System Procedures update will reflect changes to these systems.

3.6.1 Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFWS)

The purpose of the Auxiliary Feedwater System is to provide feedwater to the steam generators (SGs) for the removal of decay heat in the absence of main feedwater and to promote natural circulation in the reactor coolant system on a loss of all four reactor coolant pumps.

The Auxiliary Feedwater System consists of the following components: two steam turbine-driven feedwater pumps (AFP),

two Condensate Storage Tanks (CST), suction and discharge water piping, steam piping, valves and associated instrumentation and controls.

The turbines can take steam from either the main or auxiliary steam system. The auxiliary steam system will not be available concurrent with a loss of offsite power and was not considered as part of this analysis. Opening of the main steam inlet valves allow operation of the auxiliary feed pump turbines from either their respective SG or the opposite SG.

The auxiliary feed pumps can take suction from eithe r the Condensate Storage Tanks, Service Water System, or by manual -

alignment from the Fire Water Systems. Each pump is capable l

of discharging the auxiliary feedwater either to its l

respective SG or the opposite SG through a set of isolation and cross-tie valves discharging into the SGs through the auxiliary feedwater header.

Reactor decay heat removal after coastdown of the reacto r coolant pumpa is provided by the natural ci'rculation i characte ristics of the reactor coolant system. Use of the l Auxiliary Feedwater System for cooldown can be discontinued when the reactor coolant system tempe rature decreases to about 350*F and RCS pressure is less than 250 psig; further cooldown is accomplished by the Decay Heat Removal System.

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L Fccility: DB-1 ' App:ndix R .

I Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report P.evision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153

A b

The capacity of the auxiliary feedwater pumps was determined by the decay heat removal requirements af ter reactor trip at full power (assuming infinite irradiation at 2,772 MWt) .. An auxiliary feedwater flow rate of 800 spa is required af ter a loss of all main feedwater to achieve a smooth transition to natural circulation if the four . reactor coolant pumps lose active power. Each pump is a horizontal, centrifugal pump with 1050 spa capacity at 1050 psi head. One pump meets the capacity requirement.

Both steam-driven ~ auxiliary feedwater pump turbines are provided with a governor used for variable pump speed control. The gove rnor is equipped with a small DC motor which changes the speed setpoint on the turbine control valve, thereby controlling steam flow which regulates the turbine and pump speed.

The minimus Technical Specification volume of water in the condensate Storage Tanks (CST) is 250,000 gallons, which .'

approxi' mates the amount required to remove decay heat for 13 hours1.50463e-4 days 0.00361 hours 2.149471e-5 weeks 4.9465e-6 months plus a subsequent cooldown to 280*F.

Each AFW pump takes suction from the CSTs which are normally cross-connected.

A full capacity Motor Driven Feedwater Pump (MDFP) has been installed at DB-1 to provide a backup seans of supplying water to the steam generators in the event of a total loss of-all main feedwater and auxiliary feedwater capability.

Normal pump suction is from the CST. An additional supply of water is available via a manual transfer to the Demerator Storage tanks. Cooling water for the MDFP lube oil cooler is taken from a tap on the pumps first stage discharge when suction is from the CST. Service water to the lube oil ^

coolers and seal water coolers is required when suction is from the Deserstor Storage ~ Tank. Level control for the selected steam generator is - accomplished with an electric motor-operated control valve.

The MDFP is powered from the 4160V AC Non-Essential Switchgear Bus D2. With offsite power available, this bus can be manually loaded onto either the A or B buses. Following a loss of offsite power, the D2 bus can be manually loaded onto

. either emergency diesel generator (EDG).

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Facility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-?46 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 0

3.6.2 Main Steam System (MSS)

For the post-fire scenario, maintenance of the main steam inventory and control of st.eam generator pressure are required for both hot standby a-d subsequent primary and secondary system cooldown to support the decay heat removal function within the applicable operational limits.

The Main Steam System (MSS) consists of two parallel flow paths, one from each steam generator to the main turbine of the unit. The MSS is also designed to deliver motive steam to the turbine d river of the turbine-d riven auxiliary feedwater pumps in the event that all main feedwater is lost. Steam to a d river turbine is supplied by a branch connection upstream of the main steam line isolation valves.

In accordance with supporting USAR analysis (Reference 2.3.J, Chapter 15), control of one steam generator is sufficient to provide the reactor heat removal function during natural circulation conditions.

Maintenance of the steam generator water level during the period of auxil!.a ry feedwater operation involves automatic (or remote manual) positioning of the auxiliary feedwater valves and operation of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump based on steam generator level inf o rmation.

Steam generator water level and pressure indication are available in the Control Room and on the Auxilf ary Shutdown Panel.

On each steam line, a bank of nine ASME code safety valves are installed outside the containment. The nine safety valves (two set at 1100 psig, two at 1070 psig, two at 1050 psig, and three at 1090 psig) on each line are installed to protect the MSS against overp ressure and to p rovide a combined relieving capacity greate r than the maximum steam flow rate.

Up st ream of the main steam supply valves, an 8" connection exists for an atmospheric vent valve on each main steam line. The atmospheric vent valves provide secondary pressure control by automatically lifting at 1015 psig or by manual (hand) control f rom the Control Room or locally in Fire Area EE. The operation of this valve is required to maintain hot standby.

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Fccility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 3.6.3 Reactor Coolant System (RCS)

The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) consists of two similar heat transfer loops connected in parallel to the reactor vessel. a Each loop contains two reactor coolant pumps and a steam gene rator. In addition, the system includes a pre'ssurizer with associated code safety valves and a pilot-operated relief valve (PORV). Reactor Coolant System instrumentation includes cold- and hot-les temperatures (wide range),

pressure (wide range) and pressurizer water level.

The natural ' circulation capability of the plant provides a means of decay heat . removal when the reactor coolant pumps are unavailable. Natural circulation flow rates are governed by the amount of decay heat, subcooled margins and steam generator levels. The objectives during natural circulation are to maintain adequate primary to secondary heat transfe r, subcooling and inventory.

Since one steam generator is sufficient to provide the necessary heat removal function during natural circulation conditions, only the instrumentation for the applicaole RCS loop need be assured available at all times to ensure that natural circulation is established and maintained.

While in natural circulation, adequate heat transfer and coolant flow are dependent on adequate inventory and pressure control in both the primary and secondary systems. Reactor Coolant System invento ry control is normally based on the operation of the Reactor Coolant Makeup and Purification System. For the majority of this Appendix R evaluation, RCS inventory control is provided by the High Pressure Injection System (HPIS) and by the capability to depressurize the RCS either by the operation of the PORV or the Pressurizer Vent .

Header letdown from the Reactor Coolant System. Only in those cases where both trains of the HPIS are impacted by a fire within a specific fire area, will the Makeup System be utilized as the redundant to the HPIS.

High pressure seal water from the Makeup System is normally injected into the RCS pump cavity to prevent leakage of high temperature reactor coolant along the pump shaft. The injection flow splits in the cavity with a portion flowing up through the seals and exiting the controlled bleed-off. The remaining portion flows down the shaf t and into the Reactor Coolant. System. The Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) provides cooling to the reactor coolant pump heat exchanger.

The pump heat exchanger is a " tube within a tube" design and O

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Facility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 2 No. 02-1040-1153 can provide adequate cooling without seal injection when the pump is running. In a post-fire scenario, it has been determined that Makeup System RCS seal injection and seal cooling via the CCWS is not required to be maintained in order to preserve the integrity of the RCP seals, if controlled seal staging is isolated.

Normally, subcooling within the RCS is maintained by controlled operation of the pressurizer heaters and monitoring of RCS pressure and loop hot-leg temperature (Th ). For this Appendix R analysis, the Essential Pressurizer Heaters do not need to be assured for main-taining hot standby. In the event of a loss of offsite power and both trains of Essential Pressurizer Heaters are damaged by a fire, RCS depressurization and subsequent cooldown is controlled by the rate of pressurizer heat loss to the Containment atmosphere. In order to prevent the formation of steam void in the upper reactor vessel head, the cooldown rate is limited to no more than 1.5'F/ hour. The hot standby temperature region corresponds to pressurizer temperatures greater than 280'F. Hence, following the maximum cooldown rate of 1.5*F/ hour from normal operating temperatures, the reactor would be in a hot standby state for approximately 193 hours0.00223 days 0.0536 hours 3.191138e-4 weeks 7.34365e-5 months . Although a constant temperature and pressure in the pressurizer cannot be maintained for this scenario, lh the pressurizer cooldown rate is so gradual that the plant can be said to be in a " quasi-stable" hot standby.

During and following a postulated fire concurrent with a loss of offsite power, the RCS will be cooled down by natural circulation. Cooldown will be controlled so as to ensure that subcooling within the RCS is maintained.

Overpressurization protection of the RCS is assured by two '

pressurizer code safety valves. The two pressurizer safety valves are spring-loaded, self-actuated and have a set pressure of 2500 psig. The combined capacity of the valves is equal to or greater than the maximum pressure surge resulting from.a complete loss of load without reactor trip. The pressurizer PORV is an electrically controlled, pilot-operated, pressure relief valve which has a setpoint of 2425 psig.

For this Appendix R analysis, the availability of the PORV for RCS depressurization is assured in the majority of the fire areas. In those instances where the PORV may be disabled, either the Pressurizer Vent Header is assured for RCS depressurization to the RPI System shutoff head, or the Makeup System is assured for high head RCS injec-tion. Hence, a means of assuring RCS inventory control for hot standby is maintained in all fire areas.

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Fccility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report

' Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153

O 3.6.4 Containment Air Cooling System (CACS)

The Containment Air Coolin's System consists of three air cooling units and fans. In order to achieve cold shutdown with the RCPs tripped, only one Containment Air Cooling (CAC)

. Unit is required to operate. For the Appendix R analysis, only one CAC unit is to be assured.

3.6.5 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS)

The Control Room Emergency Ventilation System consists of two

, recirculation centrifugal fans (3300 CFM), two dual condenser

air cooling units (water cooled and air cooled), two motor-1 operated f resh air intake dampers, two sets of filter banks .

(prefilter, high efficiency absolute filter, and charcoal absorber) and the associated dampers and ductwork.

I During normal operation, the CREVS is held on standby. The system is monitored and alarmed for high radiation and equipment asifunction. In the event of a fire with a loss of offsite powe'r, the Control Roon Normal Ventilation System is shut down automatically, due to the fact that it is powered solely from offsite powe r. The CREVS is initiated manually O from the Control Room in a closed complete recirculation mode in which outside air is not introduced due to the normally i

closed position of the outside air dampers. All Control Room

! No rmal Ventilation System outside air dampers will l automatically close to minimize the possibility of inhalation j

of smoke to operating personnel. In the event all Control Roon ventilation is lost, the Ope rators may evacuate the Control Room and perform . the necessary shutdown actions locally and at emergency control stations. Procedures are in place to provide guidelines for these actions.

3.6.6 High Pressure Injection System (HPIS) l-The HPI System is designed to inject borated water into the RCS to provide RCS level and reactivity control.

HPI pumps will be automatically started at an RCS pressure of approrisately 1600 psig or can be manually s ta rted. To protect the pumps from ove rheating , a minimum flowpath is provided for each HPI pump to recirculate 35 GPM through restriction orifices back to the BWST.

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Facility: DB-1 Appendix R Docke t: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 9

In the " piggyback" mode, the operator aligns suction for the HPI pumps to the .DHR pump discharge via the LPI/HPI cross-tie valves if makeup to the RCS is required at a pressure higher (approximately 1800 psig) than the HPI discharge pressure.

The piggyback mode of operation is not to be accredited for shutdown for this Appendix R evaluation.

For purposes of this Appendix R evaluation, the HPIS, taking suction from the Borated Water Storage Tank, will be used to provide reactor coolant makeup to maintain water inventory in the RCS. Normally, the Makeup and Purification System is used to maintain water inventory in the RCS. In those cases where the HPI System is not available, the Makeup System provides a redundant means of maintaining RCS inventory control.

In addition to its normal duty to supply borated water to the refueling cavity for refueling operations, the BWST provides borated water to all the ECCS pumps. The capacity of the BWST is based on the requirement for ECCS injection and for shutdown reactivity control.

3.6.7 Decay Heat Removal / Low Pressure Injection System (DHRS/LPIS)

The Decay Heat Removal System is designed to remove decay heat from the core and reduce the tempera ture of the RCS during the cold shutdown phase of plant shutdown.

The DHR system consists of two DHR coolers, two DHR pumps and the associated piping, valves and instrumentation necessary for operational control.

During cold shutdown operations, reactor coolant flows from the RCS to the DHR pumps through the tube side of the DHR coolers and back to the RCS. The heat load is transferred by the DHR coolers to the Component Cooling Water System which circulates on the shell side of the heat exchange rs. The inlet line to the DHR system is located on the hot leg of the reactor coolant system loop 2 while the return line is connected to the reactor vessel through the core flooding lines. l l

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3-14 9 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _

Fccility: DB-1 Appandix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Two motor-operated valves (DHil and DR12) in se ries isolate the inlet line to the Decay Heat Removal System f rom the RCS.

The return lines are isolated by check valves in se ries in each line. To avoid potential RCS boundary leakage at this high/ low pressure inte rf ace , both motor-operated valves in the DHR suction line will be kept closed (pre-fire condition) with the corresponding motor control center breaker in the open position. These valves can be bypassed by local manual operation of valves DH21 and DH23.

A minimum flow return line f rom the downstream side of each DHR cooler to the corresponding pump's suction line is provided to assure that the DHR pumps do not overheat under low flow conditions.

The DHR System can be placed in operation when the pressure and temperature of the RCS are less than 280 psig and 350*F, re spectively, at the DH Cooldown line. If one of the pumps and/or one of the heat removal coolers is not operative, safe operation of the plant is not affected; however, the time for cooldown is extended.

Two decay heat removal pumps exist in the Decay Heat Removal

,T System. Each pump is sized to deliver sufficient reactor

\ coolant flow through the decay heat removal coolers to meet the plant cooldown requirements.

A seal heat exchanger for each pump is supported by operation of the Component Cooling Water System.

The DHR safety relief valve PSV4849 is located on the DH suction line to provide RCS cold leg overpressure protection whenever the DHR system is in operation. The valve is located inside containment, and discharges to the containment emergency sump. The valve is set at 320 psig.

l Makeup to maintain RCS inventory is also provided by the DHR System operating in the LP I mode for a post-fire scenario when the RCS pressure is below 200 psig.

\ '

l 3.6.8 Makeup and Purification System (MUPS)

The Makeup and Purification System is normally operated during all phases of plant operation, including s ta rtup ,

power operation, and shutdown. The system is also operated during refueling by employing the purification equipment through interconnections to the Decay Heat Removal System.

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Fctility: DB-1 Appendir R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 O

The Makeup and Purification System is used as a redundant system for shutting down the plant in fire areas where both trains of the HPI System may be damaged by a fire.

During normal operation, one makeup pump continuously supplies high pressure water from the makeup tank to the seals of the reactor coolant pumps, and to a makeup line which is connected to the reactor inlet by a high pressure injection line. This line is the only interconnection between the Makeup and Purification System and the High Pressure Injection System.

Makeup flow to the Reactor Coolant System is regulated by the makeup control valve, which operates on signals from the liquid level controller of the Reactor Coolant System pressurize r. In the event inventory in the makeup tank is depleted suction can be switched to the Borated Water Storage Tank via a three-way valve.

There are two makeup pumps, each capable of supplying the required reactor coolant pump ceal and makeup flow. One is normally in operation while the o the r, kept on standby status, is used as needed.

Normal seal water injection to the Reactor Coolant System requires a continuous letdown of reactor coolant to maintain the desired coolant inventory. In addition, letdown of reactor coolant is required for removal of impurities and boric acid from the reactor coolant and to accommodate volume changes in the Reactor Coolant System during changes in tempe rature.

For the Appendix R evaluation, it has been determined that only the RCS injection portion of the Makeup System is required operable. Makeup letdown must be isolated by operating one of several letdown isolation valves. .

Additionally, it has been determined that cold shutdown can be achieved without providing Makeup System RCP seal injection.

3.6.9 Component Cooling Water System (CCWS)

The Component Cooling Water System is a closed loop supporting system to other safe shutdown systems. Two redundant trains are available, each consisting of one pump and heat exchange r and associated valves, piping and local instrumentation. The CCW System is provided with three centrifugal pumps which are no rmally lined up such that one is operating, one is in standby, and one is an installed spare which can be utilized in place of either of the other two CCW pumps.

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Fccility: DB-1 App 3ndix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153

{

V The CCWS serves as an intermediate heat transfer loop between the various safe shutdown components and the Service Water System (ultimate heat sink).

The CCWS provides cooling for the following safe shutdown equipment:

1. Decay heat removal coolers

2. HPI pumps bearing oil coolers

3. Decay heat removal pumps bearing housing coolers 4 Eme rgency diesel generator jacket cooling water heat exchange rs

5. Makeup pump bearing and gear '

lube oil coolers (non-essential heade r).

One pump and one component cooling heat exchanger fulfill the heat removal function during no rmal full load operation for various components located in the Auxiliary and Containment Building s. During plant cooldown in the DHR mode, two pumps and two heat exchangers are normally utilized to remove the decay heat. If one of the loops is not operative, one DHR loop is capable of cooling down the primary system. For the purposes of this Appendix R review, only one CCW loop is required operable to achieve cold shutdown.

The two component cooling loops e.re interconnected downstream f rom the heat exchangers to service one supply header for non-essential loads. The loads required to be serviced on the non-essential portion of the CCWS are the makeup pump bearing and gear lube oil coolers for those fire areas where the Makeup System is acc redited for RCS inventory cont rol.

It has been determined that CCW the rmal cooling to the RCP seals is not required to assure shutdown capability. In order to ensure the necessary CCW cooling to the essential header and - the above-mentioned non essential load, utilizing one CCW pump, isolation of CCW to the Auxiliary Building Non-Essential header, by ope ration of inlet valve CC1495, must be performed.

CCW to the HPI pumps bearing oil coolers and the DHP pumps bearing housing coolers are normally valved open to the supply header and they discharge to the suction .of the CCW

, pump with which they are no rmally associated, so that

! component cooling water is circulated continuously through

( these essential loads during normal operation.

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Fccility: DB-1 App;ndix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 ,

O 3.6.10 Service Water System (SWS)

The Service Water System provides cooling for the following s L shutdown heat transfer equipment:

1. Component Cooling Water heat exchangers

2. Control Room Eme r8ency Ventilation System (CREVS) condenser units

3. Containment air coolers 4 ECCS Room cooler coils The system also provides a backup supply of water to the AFW System in the event that the Condensate Storage Tanks are depleted.

The three 6C0 HP Service Water Pumps are piped to two separate interconnected, but isolated supply paths.

Normally two of the three Service Water Pumps and their associated automatic mo to r-ope rated strainers will be in operation. One pump will be electrically aligned to the C1 bus and the other to the D1 bus. The Service Water Pumps and strainers are located in the intake structure.

To achieve cold shutdown or to maintain hot standby, one Service Water Pump (primary side) provides water to one CCW Heat Exchange r and one Containment Air Cooler (CAC). This pump is also lined up to one CREVS Condenser Unit and its respective train ECCS Room Coolers (Pump 1 supplies Coolers 1-4 and 1-5; Pump 2 supplies Coolers 1-1, 1-2 and 1-3; Pump 3 supplies either train).

In order to assure that one Service Water Pump will provide the necessa ry cooling for the above mentioned essential loads, the connection to the TP CW Heater Exchangers must be isolated. The Appendix R evaluation assures the availability of one of the three Service Water Pumps (or Backup Service Water Pump) at all times.

An alternate sbutdown method, in accordance with Section III.G.3 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, has been installed in a separate fire area to provide service w'ater to the plant if a fire disables all three existing service water pumps located in the service water pump room. The details of this backup service water pump modification were submitted to the NRC on April 29,1982 (Reference 2.5.J).

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Fccility: DB-1 App:ndix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 0 3.6.11 Heatina. Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC)

At DB-1, essential HVAC is provided for area cooling for safe shutdown systems / components that generate a large heat load to assure a suitable environment for equipment and personnel.

The systems are safety grade and seismic Class I. A review of safe shutdown systems, plant HVAC, and HVAC analysis performed for Toledo Edison (Reference 2.5.B and C) concluded t hat the availability of room cooling for the following rooms should be assured:

1. ECCS Pump Rooms 2 Low Voltage Switchgear Rooms

3. Battery Rooms 4 Emergency Diesel Generator Rooms

5. AFW Pump Rooms

6. CCW Pump Rooms 7 SW Pump Rooms The following is a brief description of the Safe Shutdown Ventilation Systems:

1. ECCS Rooms -

The Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) rooms cooling units maintain a suitable environment for the electric motor d rive rs of the high pressure injection pumps and decay heat pumps, as well as the decay heat coolers. The cooling units are autoestically energized by an increase in the room temperature.

2. Low Voltage Switchgear Rooms -

The low voltage switchgear rooms have independent outside air intakes and ventilation fans to maintain a suitable environment for essential equipment during eme rgency conditions. The operation of the system is controlled by a temperature control system.

3. Batte ry Rooms -

Each battery room is ventilated by p roviding an air intake and an independent exhaust fan for no rmal operation. One Q-listed fan motor for each room ir supplied f rom an essential motor control center.

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4 Emergency Diesel Generator Rooms -

The emergency diesel generator rooms are each ventilated by two half-capacity supply air fans to ensure adequate ventilation and safe eteration of the diesel generators.

The supply fans in the emergency diesel generator rooms are interlocked with the diesel generators so that the fans operate at any time the diesel generators are operating. The air f rom the diesel generator rooms is discharged directly to the atmosphere through the roof.

5. AFW Pump Rooms -

The ventilation system for the AFW pump rooms consists of one 100 percent capacity essential exhaust fan and ductwork per pump room. Each exhaust fan is automatically started by its pump room temperature switch.

6. CCW Pump Room -

The CCW Pump Room Ventilation System consists of two 100 pat rcent capacity essential ventilation fans, motor-operated exhaust and recirculation dampers and motor-operated supply air louvers. Temperature switches automatically start the ventilation fans at a specific temperature setpoint, open moto r-ope rat ed louvers, and modulate exhaus t and recirculation air dampers in order to maintain proper room temperature.

7. SW Pump Room -

The SW Pump Room Ventilation System consists of four essential ventilation fans and associated temperature switches.

3.6.12 Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG)

The plant eme rgency power system includes an onsite independent, automatically or manually starting emergency power source which supplies power to safe shutdown equipment if the normal or off site power sources are unavailable.

The eme rgency power source consists of two redundant emergency diesel generator units, one connected to the essential 4.16 kV Bus C1 and the other connected to the essential 4.16 kV Bus D1. The emergency diesel gene rato rs are provided as onsite standby power sources to supply their respective essential buses upon loss of the normal and the e

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1 Facility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 U,R reserve power sources. Bus load shedding and isolation, bus transfer to the emergency diesel generator, and pickup of critical loads, is automatic.

Each diesel generator is rated at 2600 kw (continuous rating). The emergency diesel generator is capable of obtaining rated frequency and voltage approximately 10 seconds af ter the engine start signal is received.

Each diesel engine is equipped with its own auxiliaries.

These include starting air receivers, fuel oil, lube oil, cooling water, intake and exhaust system, voltage regulator and controls. Cooling water is provided from the Component Cooling Water System while electric power for each engine's auxiliaries is provided by its own generator and station batte rie s.

Cranking power for each diesel is supplied from its respective high pressure starting air system. Air for starting a diesel is derived from two air receivers each containing enough high pressure compressed air to provide for five consecutive starts without recharging.

O There are two fuel oil storage tanks physically separated from each other (each tank is of, 40,000 gallon capacity).

Each storage tank supplies fuel to one emergency diesel generator's day tank. One fuel oil transfer pump per diesel generator provides transfer capability from the storage tank to the individual diesel generator day tank.

3.6.13 Essential Electrical Distribution System (ESS PWR)

The Essential Electrical Distribution System corisists of Essential 4160V, 480V, 240V, and 120V AC power, as' well as 125V DC power. The following is a brief description of the various power supplies:

1. 4160 Volt Auxiliary System -

Power supply to the 4160 voit system is f rom two 12/16 HVA bus tie transformers which step down the voltage from 13800 volts to 4160 volts. Each bus tie transfo rmer normally supplies one essential and one nonessential 4160 volt bus and is available as a reserve source for the other two 4160V buses.

The 4160V auxiliary distribution system consists of four 4160V, 2000 amp buses.

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Facility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Two essential buses C1 and D1 provide power to engineered safety feature equipment for safe shutdown. The essential 4160V buses supply the followie 1 cads:

o Service Water pumps o High Pressure Injection pumps o Decay Heat Removal pumps o Component Cooling Water pumps o Essential 4160V-480V Unit Substation Transformers o Makeup pumps In addition, a third 600 HP S ervice Water pump and a third 400 HP Component Cooling Water pump are provided.

Each of these two pumps is connected to two 4.16 kV mechanically interlocked, manually controlled transfer switching breakers. The mechanical inte rlock permits only one breaker to be closed at a time. Each breaker of a motor pair is connected to a separate essential 4.16 kV bus.

The 4160 Volt non-essential switchgear buses C2 and D2 supply power to the Backup Service Water Pump and Motor Driven Feedwater Pump, respectively. Buses C2 and D2 can be manually aligned to essential buses C1 or D1.

2. 480V AC Essential Distribution System -

The s ta tion essential 480V AC dis tribution system consists of two 1000kVA 4160-480V AC essential unit subs ta tions (El and F1) for the supply of power to the 480V AC safety loads.

Each essential 480V AC unit substation is supplied f rom ,

its corresponding 4.16 kV essential bus through redundant 1200 ampere circuit breakers; one feeder is connected to the primary side of each transfo rme r. The transfo rme r secondary side is connected to the 480V, 1600 amp bus through a 1600 amp circuit b reake r. Du ring no rmal ope ra tion , both of the essential unit subs ta tion transformers are energized with one transfo rmer carrying the load and the second transformer carrying no load.

Transfer f rom one transformer to the other is by manual control only; automatic transfer is not provided.

The essential 480V AC system con tains approxima tely 30 motor cont rol centers which supply essential station loads. The motor control centers are supplied f rom the unit substations (El and F1).

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3. 240V and 120V AC Essential and Nonessential Distribution System -

The station essential and nonessential 240V and 120V AC system consists oft o Four essential instrument channels each supplied from a 125V DC/120V AC inverter.

o Two 120V AC uninterruptible instrumention distribution panels (YAU and YBU), each supplied from a 250V DC/120V AC inverter.

o Two essential 120V AC MCCs (YE1 and YF1).

o Two essential 240V AC MCCs (YE2 and YF2).

4. 125V DC Distribution System -

The station DC equipment consists of o Two 250/125V DC motor control centers.

o Four station batteries.

o Six battery chargers.

o Four 125V DC essential distribution panels o Four 480V AC/125V DC rectifiers.

o Four 125V non-essential distribution panels.

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\- The system is designed to provide a continuous, reliable, and redundant 250/125V DC power source for control.

instrumentation and DC loads required for normal operation and orderly shutdown and control of the station. The systes is arranged to form two completely independent load groups. The DC equipment is classified as Class 1E except for non-essential distribution panels.

3.6.14 process Honitoring The operator requires indication of various plant parameters to perform required system transitions and essential operator actions. A discussion, by safe shutdown function, of the necessary instrumentation is provided below.

For the fire scenarios assumed in this analysis, inventory make-up to the Reactor Coolant System will be f rom the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) through the High Pressure Injection (HPI) System, or the Makeup System, into the reactor vessel.

Sufficient negative reactivity exists in the Reactor Coolant Systen (af ter rod insertion) for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months without the need for additional boron addition.

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Facility 2 DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 01-1040-1153 O

Fu rthe rmo re , the negative reactivity added by inse rtion of the cont rol rods and the BWST water injected by the HPI system (to compensate for the RCS volume decrease) will maintain the core suberitical while cooling down from the RCS -

average temperature at full power to a cold shutdown value, assuming no letdown is available. Current plant procedures require the Group 1 safety rods to be withdrawn to ensure an adequate safety margin for negative reactivity control when going to cold shutdown. No operator actions are expected or anticipated based on direct-reading neutrun monitoring to ensure an adequate safe shutdown negative reactivity margin.

Howeve r, core source range flux monitors are available for core activity monitoring in the Control Room. A non-safety grade, non-seismic source range flux channel will also be added outside of the Control Room fire area to provide this information for areas requiring alternative shutdown f rom outside the Control Room.

Various process monitoring functions must be available to adequately achieve and maintain the reactor coolant makeup, pressure control and decay heat removal functions. For the assumed fire scena rio, maintenance of hot standby requires that p res surizer level and RCS pressure and tempe ra ture instrumentation be available. Reactor Coolant System temperature is maintained during hot standby by proper decay heat removal via steam generators and self-actuation of the main steam code safety valves, controlled operation of the atmo sphe ric vent valves, or turbine bypass valves (if available) depending on reactor power at the time of the trip.

Operations pe rsonne l, by monitoring of RCS p ressu re and hot-leg temperature (Th ) instrumentation will maintain RCS pressure to assure that appropriate subcooled margin is achieved for the RCS t empe ra ture, which exista during this pe riod. Maintenance of pressurizer level control is achieved by monitoring pressurizer level inst rument ation , by manual control of HPI or Makeup system flow.

Maintenance of hot standby or initial pressurizer cooldown in the absence of pressurizer heaters also requires the control of the secondary syntem to compencate for variations in the prima ry system pe rfo rmance. Monito ring of steam gene ra to r level and pre ssu re are available to assure adequate and controlled decay heat removal. The level control is achieved by automatic (or remote manual) control of AFW system flow, based on steam generator level indication.

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Facility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 O

V The transition f rom hot standby to cold shutdown will utilize the instrumentation discussed above for monitoring of natural circulation conditions, subcooling margin, heat removal and compliance with the plant's pressure / temperature limits as it pertains to the low temperature ove rpressure protection of the Reactor Coolant System (cold les temperature in conjunction with RCS pressure).

IE Information Notice No. 84-09 (Reference 2.4.5) provides a list of the minimum monitoring capability the NRC staff considers necessary to achieve safe shutdown. For pressurized water reactors, the list is as shown below:

a. Pressurizer pressure and level

b. Reactor coolant hot les temperature or exit core thermocouples, and cold les temperature

c. Steam Generator pressure and level (wide range)

d. Source Range Flux Monitor

e. Diagnostic instrumentation for shutdown systems

f. Level indication for all tanks used (e.g., CST)

A review of Information Notice 84-09 has been performed to ensure the availability of instrumentation outside of the control Room that must be monitored based upon a postulated O

d fire within the Control Room. RCS pressure and temperature and pressurizer level indication exist both inside and outside the Control Room to satisfy categories a and b above.

The following instrumentation at DB-1 for categories e, d, e -

and f is provided to monitor the necessary variables:

1. Steam cenerator pressure monitor -

Indication of steam generator outlet pressure exists f rom both the Control Room and Auxiliary Shutdown Panel.

2. Steam Generator level (wide ranae) monitor -

The preferred mode of operation is to use the startup range monitors which are provided f rom both the Control Rcom and Auxilia ry Shutdown Fanel because they are safety grade, and in the cooldown mode the AFW System will be operating such that the steam generator (s) level is to be maintained within this monitoring range. Should the steam generator level rise above the specified range AFW will be eutomatically or manually stopped (from the Control Room or Auxiliary Shutdown Panel) to bring down the level.

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3. Source range flux monitor - Core sou rce range flux monitors are available for core activity monitoring in the Control Room. A non-safety grade source range flux channel will be provided outside the Control Room to provide this information for areas requiring shutdown f rom outside the Control R,oom.

4. Diagnostic instrumentation for shutdown systems -

o AFWS diagnostic instrumentation consists of startup range level and steam generator pressure indication from the Control Room or Auxiliary Shutdown Panel.

This instrumentation provides indication to the ope rator that the AFW System is injecting into the steam generator (s).

o Primary injection diagnostic monitoring ( i.e. ,

CHRS/LPIS flow and makeup flow) can be pe rfo rmed by monitoring primary pressura, hot leg temperatures and pressurizer level from the Control Room or Auxiliary Shutdown Panel to verify adequate primary injection.

o Additional diagnostic instrumentation for the HPI System, in the form of flow indication, is available in the Control Room assured to assist Ope rations personnel and to satisfy Appendix R requirements. A modification is proposed to install an alternate means of monitoring HPI flow at the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel.

5. Level indication for tanks - Level indication for tanks is provided locally.

3.7 Safe Shutdown System Components 3.7.1 Int roduction Section 3.6 described the specific systems which will be utilized to achieve safe shutdown. This section discusses the method of selection of safe shutdown components at DB-1.

The ef fort resulted in the Safe Shutdown Components List (SSCL) which is included as Appendix A to this report.

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Facility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153

,a (v) 3.7.2 Methodology For the safe shutdown systems established in Section 3.6, the following steps were utilized in developing a list of safe shutdown components:

1. The primary flow pa ths and operational characteristics

> required to accomplish safe shutdown were established from the USAR, system procedures and piping and instrument diagrams (P& ids).

2. All active and passive components that are required to function were identified from the P& ids. Active components comprise all those that have some type of electrical int e rface , including valves, pumps, blowers, dampe rs and heaters. Passive components comprise all those that do not have an electrical interface (such as coolers, tanks and receivers).

3. The normal flow paths for those systems identified as safe shutdown systems were traced on the P& ids.

a) Those components identified on the main path such as pumps, valves, blowers, and dampers, which are O(/ required to actuate in order to achieve the system function, are designated Minimum Complement.

b) Any piece of equipment which does not normally perforn that function but can be used as a substitute for another component and still achieve the system function, is designated an Alternate.

c) Any piece of equipment whose prima ry purpose is to provide the same function as that piece of equipment under consideration, is designated a Backup.

d) Branching lines coming off of the main path that could provide flow diversion were traced to identify those components providing isolation for the main path. Any component that could spuriously actuate in a position detrimental to proper system operation (either on the main flow path or branch lines), or whose maloperation could result in a breach of the reactor coolant boundary, were called out under the heading of Spurious Actuation.

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Fccility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 0

4. The minimum instrumentation necessa ry to satisfy the requirements of Appendix R was identified. NRC Regulatory Cuide 1.97 (Reference 2.4.H) was reviewed to identify those Cont rol Room inst ruments that are utilized to monitor the required plant variables from normal operatin8 conditions down to cold shutdown. Additionally, those components located outside the Control Room which serve to monitor the same variables were also identified. A letter f rom the NRC to TED dated 3/7/84 (Reference 2.5.A) and IE Information Notice No. 84-09 (Reference 2.4.B) further delineated the minimum instrumentation necessary to satsify Appendix R.

5. The minimum components required for assuring essential power to energize cafe shutdown components in the event of a loss of offsite power were identified.

The activities perfomed in the five above-mentioned tasks culiminated in the Safe Shutdown Components List (SSCL). All components on the list were designated as required for hot standby and/or cold shutdown, as applicable. The Safe Shutdown Components List is included as Appendix A to this document.

3.8 Safe Shutdown System Circuits 3.8.1 In t roduc tion The Safe Shutdown Components List (SSCL), as per the discussion in Section 3.7, was the basic irput for the identification of elect rics1 circuits essential to ensure proper equipment pe rfo manc e. The identification of the corresponding safe shutdown elec t rical circuit : was based upon the elec t rically-dependen t components listed in the SSCL. The circuits identified included those for power, control and instrumentation.

3.9.2 Methodology The following is a discussion of the specific steps that were pe rf o rmed to identify the aafe shutdown circuits and their routings throughout the plant 1.' For each component identified in the SSCL (Appendix A) which has an ciec t rical interface, a review of its Elementary Wiring Diagram (EWD) (Reference 2.1.C) was pe rfo rmed . The block diagram for each component identifies all circuits related to that component. For each component, all circuit cables, that ensure operability 3-28

Facility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 A

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'O of the component were identified as required for safe shutdown. Those circuits that are not required for safe shutdown include annunciator, compute r, and external sonitoring circuits that are electrically isolated f rom the electrical circuits of concern.

2. The physical cable routings for power, cont rol and instrumentation circuits were identified by reviewing the DB-1 Electrical Circuit Schedules (Reference 2.1.I) and Electrical Raceway Schedules (Reference 2.1.J). Also included in the identification p rocess were sub-components, such as junction boxes, terminal boxes, local control panels, relay cabinets. switches and transmitters.

3. We fire area boundaries we re identified on Electrical Raceway and Grounding Drawings (Refe rence 2 .1. G ) . The boundary information was de rived from the Fire Haza rds Analysis Repo rt.

4. The cable routing information, identified f rom Step 2, was then utilized to trace chase cables on the electrical raceway and grounding drawings. Consequently, those fire areas in which safe shutdown circuits traverse, were so

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identified per circuit.

5. We tracing of all safe shutdown circuits culminated in the development of a database that identifies all raceway routings (by fire area) for all circuits associated witn safe shutdown components.

From this database, the "Ci rcuit /Sub-Componen t" Location Su:: mary by System" (Appendix B-1) was generated which includes the following data in a column listings o System performing the safe shutdown function o Component, and circuits for the component o Circuit description o Fire areas in which the component and circuits are located o Conduit identification o Cable tray identification o Electrical raceway and /or raceway and grounding drawing reference O

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Facility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 9

6. ne computer database listing of components, conduits and cable trays was then sorted to list the components and circuits within each fire area by system. nis resulted in the "Ci rcuit /Sub-Componen t Location Summary by Fire Area" ( Appendt

B-2). nis sorting by fire area of the computer database was used in the evaluation of the separation of safe shutdown system components and cables against the Appendix R. Section III.G.2 criteria (see Section 4.6).

3.9 plant Communications and Security 3.9.1 Int roduction The DB-1 Plant Communications and Security Systems have been evaluated as to their adequacy to suppo rt safe shutdown in the event of a fire anywhere in the plant. The discussion below provides a description of these systems related to safe shutdown, and the basis for the conclusion of their adequacy for a postulated fire in any area.

3.9.2 Plant Communications

a. Overview There are several communications systems used at DB-1 which are used for normal da y-t o-da y communications as well as for use in emergency situations.

b. Cai-Tronics In te rnally, DB-1 utilizes a system primarily composed of individual, so li d-s ta t e amplifier units. The system functions for paging, alarm signaling, and party-line-type voice communications. Five channels are provided for regular communications and an additional five channels are provided for establishing maintenance circuits. Ltch station has individual amplifiers for the handset and local speaxe r( s) . Should a station fail, its modular design allows for rapid replacement of components to return it to service. Power is supplied f rom either of two c hannels of the non-essential interruptable power supply system using a manual transfer switch.

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c. Telephone System Leased telephones f rom Ceneral Telephone Company of Ohio have been provided for in the no rmally manned a rea s ,

including the station Lunch and Assembly Room. These phones serve as a backup to the main internal station communications system (Cai-Tronics) and as the primary offsite administrative circuit. The system is powered separately f rom the Gai-Tronics system.

d. UHF Radio System An additional communications system in the form of Ultra High Frequency (UHF) radio is provided. The re a re four separate radio systems at Davis-Besse. These aret (1) the two-way mobile radio with pages (2) the security radio system with intercoat (3) the operations radio with intercoal and (4) the maintenance radio system.

All station radio systems to some extent share a common set of fixed remote control consoles with separate base stations located in the station. They are located in the Control Room, Central Alarm Station (CAS), Seconda ry O Alarm Station (SAS), and Technical Support Center (TSC)

() as well as several other areas. The majority of consoles have the capability to communicate ove r the two-way mobile radio, security or operations channels. Only two (Maintenance Shop and Control Room) have the capability to communicate on the esintenance channel. In addition to the base stations, t he re a re a numbe r of portable radios. Each is c rystal controlled to ope ra te with a particular system.

e. Appendix R. Post-Fire Communications Reliable in plant communications is desirable if not essential to shut down the plant. For a fire outside the Control Room, the amount of communication is minimal because the rajority of operator' actions are in the Control Room. No rmally, this communication is p rovided by the Cai-Tronics system. Initially, in the event of a fire immediately disabling the Cat-Trontes System, operator guidance is provided to contact or return to the Control Room in the event that lifting of the code safety valves is hea rd. During a fire, the availability of the Cal-Tronics System cannot be guaranteed due to the fact that equipment and/or circuits could be damaged.

Therefore, a backup must be provided.

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This backup is provided by the ope rations radio system.

It allows the Shift Supervisor to keep in contact with his operators as well as the fire brigade. This system has direct connection be tween neven (7) remote control consoles which are all connectad to a fixed repea te r located on the roof of the Auxiliary Building and powered f rom an uninterruptable power supply (Panel YAU) which in turn, is backed by station batteries. Also installed in the Auxiliary Building and Containment is a passive-antenna system. This is used to f acilitate transmission and reception in the reinforced concrete structures.

The portable radios provided are capable of operating in two modes. The first mode, full duplex, is used to communicate from one portable to the repeater then to portable or base station. This code re qui re s that circuits for the re pea te r be intact since all communication will be through the re peate r. A review of circuits for the re peat e rs shows that they will be available in all but a few fire areas.

The second mode, full simplex, is used to communicate f rom portable to portable. Its advantage is that It is not susceptible to cable f ailure or loss of the AC power supoly. The porrable radios have their own inte rnal rechargeable battery which is kept constantly charged.

A unique solution was requi red for the problem of communications in the event of a serious Control Room fire. This involved installing a dedicated sound powe red phonc system. This will potuit ope rato rs to maintain constant communication with Operators at the Au ril la ry Shutdown Panel.

f. Conclusion DB-1 is provided with reliable communications in the Cat-Tronics system which is backed up by the Operations radio system and/or other systems as re qui red . Toledo Edison believes that this will be adequate for a postu1Ated fire in any area.

3.9,3 Plant 9ecurley To demons t ra t e the adequacy of existing operator actions to mitigate the ef fects on safe shutdown of DB-1 during a fire in any given a re a , the following inf o rma t ion is presented relative to the potential inoperability of the niant security compute r.

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Fccility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 In the event that the plant security computer is lost due to a fire in a given area, all fire doors f ail in the closed and locked position. This prevents unauthorf red entry into rooms or areas of the plant which contain nuclear safety-related equipment or equipment critical to maintaining safe reac to r ope ra tio n.

Operators carry master keys for all room doors in the plant, thus ensuring access to all areas of the plant where local actions are required. Control of the emergency key rings is maintained in accordance with Locked Key P rocedure AD1808.06.

Based on the above, during conditions when the plant security computer is inope rable , access to areas required to safely shut down the plant would be available.

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Facility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket 50-346 Coop 110 co Assessment R:pset Revisions 1 No. 02-1040-1153 O TABLE 3-1 SAFE SNUTDOWN SYSTEMS Auxiliary Feedwater System ( AFWS)

Main Steas Systes (MSS)

Reactor Coolant System (RCS)

Containment Air Cooling System (CACS)

Control Roon Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS)

Emergency Diesel Generators (EDC)

Essenital Electrical Distribution Systes (ESS PWR)

Process Monitoring (NI, NNI)

High Pressure Injection Systes (It'IS)

Decay Heat Removal / Low Pressure Injection Systes (DHRS/1215) .

Makeup and Purification System (MUPS)

Component Cooling Water System (CCWS)

Service Water Systes (SWS) lleating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) 9 O

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Fc3111ty: DB-1 Apperdia R Docket 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 O

TOLED0 EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT No. 1 APPENDIX R COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT SECTION 4.0 APPENDIX R, SECTION III.0 EVALUATION O

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Facility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report vision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION E&gg 4.0 APPEND X R, SECTION III.G EVALUATION 4-1 4.1 Introduction 4-1 4.2 Requirements 4-1 4.3 Assumptions 4-2 4.4 Evaluation Methodology 4-3 4.5 Methods of Achieving Compliance 4-3 4.6 Fire Area Ivaluations 4-4 ,

4.6.A Fire Area A 4.A-1 thru 4.A-37 4.6.AA Fire Area AA 4.AA-1 thru 4.AA-3 4.6.AB Fire Area AB 4.AB-1 thru 4.AB-16 4.6.AC Fire Area AC 4.AC-1 thru 4.AC-6 4.6.5 Fire Area B 4.5-1 thru 4.A-10 O' 4.6.85 Fire Area BB Fire Area BD 4.BB-1 thru 4.BB-7 4.BD-1 thru 4.BD-4 4.6.BD 4.6.BE Fire Area BE 4.BE-1 thru 4.BE-4 4.6.BF Fire Area BF 4.BF-1 thru 4.BF-10 4.6.BM Fire Area BM 4.BM-1 thru 4.BM-4 4.6.BN Fire Area BN 4.BN-1 thru 4.BN-4 4.6.C Fire Area C 4.0-1 thru 4.C-5 4.6.CC Fire Area CC 4.CC-1 thru 4.CC-16 4.6.D Fire Area D 4.D-1 thru 4.D-23 4.6.DA Fire Area DA 4.DA-1 thru 4.DA-16 4.6.DB Fire Area DB 4.DB-1 thru 4.DB-11 4.6.DC Fire Area DC 4.DC-1 thru 4.DC-7 4.6.DD Fire Area DD 4.DD-1 thru 4.DD-71 4.6.DE Fire Area DE 4.DE-1 thru 4.DE-10 4.6.DF Fire Area DF 4.DF-1 thru 4.DF-16 4.6.D0 Fire Area DG 4.DG-1 thru 4.DG-6 4.6.DH Fire Area DN 4.DH-1 thru 4.DH-6 4.6.DJ Fire Area DJ 4.DJ-1 thru 4.DJ-26 4.6.E Fire Area E 4.E-1 thru 4.E-5 4.6.II Fire Area EE 4.EE-1 thru 4.EE-11 O

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Facil'ity: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessmet Report ecvision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 O TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

SECTION . EAQE 4.0 4.6.F Fire Area F 4.F-1 thru 4.F-6 4.6.FF Fire Area FF 4 FF-1 thru 4.FF-25 4.6.G Fire Area G 4.G-1 thru 4.G-24 4.6.HA Fire Area HA 4.HA-1 thru 4.HA-13 4.6.HH Fire Area HH 4 HH-1 thru 4.HH-7 4.6.I Fire Area I 4.I-1 thru 4.I-4 4.6.II Fire Area II 4 II-1 thru 4.II-14 4.6.J Fire Area J 4.J-1 thru 4.J-3 4.6.K Fire Area K 4 K-1 thru 4.K-5 4.6.L Fire Area L 4.L-1 thru 4.L-3 4.6.M Fire Area M 4.M-1 thru 4.M-3 4.6.P Fire Area P 4.P-1 thru 4.P-12 4.6.PP Fire Area PP 4.PP-1 thru 4.PP-3 4.6.Q Fire Area e 4.Q-1 thru 4.Q-7 4.6.QQ Fire Area QQ 4.0Q-1 thru 4.QQ-3 4.6.R Fire Area R 4.R-1 thru 4.R-20 4.6.S Fire Area S 4.8-1 thru 4.S-6 0 4.6.T 4.6.U Fire Area T Fire Area U 4.T-1 thru 4.T-13 4.U-1 thru 4.U-23 4.6.UU Tire Area UU 4.00-1 thru 4.UU-3 4.6.V Fire Area V 4.V-1 thru 4.V-16 4.6.W Fire Area W 4.W-1 thru 4.W-3 4.6.X Fire Area X 4.X-1 thru 4.X-6 4.6.Y Fire Area Y 4.Y-1 thru 4.Y-5 l

4.6.Z Fire Area Z 4.Z-1 thru 4.Z-3 4

TABLES

Tcble 4-1 Appendix R,Section III.G Compliance Summary 1-12 i

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Facility: DB-1 Appendiz R Docketr 50-346 Complicnco Assac t nt Roport Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 O 4.0 APPENDIX R, SECTION III.G EVAI.UATION 4.1 Int roduction The purpose of this section is to evaluate the fire protection features that assure safe shutdown capability as required by Section III.G of Appendix R to 10CFR50. The components and circuits required for safe shutdown were identified by the methodology described in Section 3. Section 5 provides a discussion of the identification and routing information for associated circuits. Le circuit routing information for safe shutdown circuits and associated circuits was then sorted by fire area (Refer to Appendices B-2 and C-2, respectively). This made possible the evaluation of safe shutdown system components and circuits, as well as associated circuits, to the requirements of Section III.G criteria.

De existing plant configuration of one and three hour barriers, as well as the fire suppression and detection systems located throughout the plant, were considered when reviewing the fire areas for Section III.G compliance. This information is provided for each fire area in Section 4.6 when credit is taken for barriers outside of those defining the fire area. Specific non-compliances to Section' III.G, as well as their resolutions, are identified.

4.2 Requirements The requirements for fire protection of safe shutdown capability is defined in Appendix R,Section III.G. Section III.G of Appendix R requires that fire protection be provided to ensure that one t rain of equipment necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown remains available in the event of a fire at any location within the plant.

For hot standby conditions, one train of the necessary systems must be f ree of fire damage (III.G.1.a). For cold shutdown conditions, both trains of equipment necessa ry to achieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions may be damaged by a single fire, including an exposure fire, but damage must be limited so that at least one train can be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months using "in place" procedures and materials available onsite (III.G.I.b). Section III.G.2 lists specific options to provide adequate protection for redundant trains of safe shutdown equipment. For any fire area outside of prima ry containment, the options are as follows:

o Separation by a fire barrier having a three hour rating (III.G.2.a), or o Separation by a horizontal distance of at least 20 feet with no intervening combustibles and with fire detection and automatic fire suppression installed in the fire area (III.G.2.b), or O

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Facility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report No. 02-1040-1153 e

Revision: 1 o Enclosure of one train in a fire barrier having a one hour raticg in addition to having fire detection and automatic suppression installed in the fire area (III.G.2.c).

For a non-inerted primary containment,Section III.G.2 specifies one of the above three protection options, or any of the following:

o Separation by a horizontal distance of at least 20 feet with no intervening combustibles or fire hazards (III.G.2.d).

o Fire detection and automatic fire suppression installed in the fire area (III.G.2.e).

o Separation of redundant trains by a non-combustible radiant ene rgy shield (III .G.2.f) .

If the protection required by Section III.G.2 is not provided or the systems of concern are subject to damage from fire suppression activities,Section III.G.3 of the rule requires that an alternate or dedicated shutdown capability be provided which is independent of the area of concern.

For situations in which fire protection does not meet the requirements of Section III.G, plant modifications or plant procedural changes must be made to achieve compliance. However, if existing protection is deemed to be adequate for the specific situation, the rule allows the licensee to request an exemption on a case-by-case basis. Such exemption requests must be submitted to the NRC for review and approval and must be justified by the licensee on a technical basis.

4.3 Assumptions In the course of performing the Section III.G separation analysis, several positions or assumptions needed to be established, as follows: .

1. For those valves whose spurious operation is the sole concern and for those who fail in their safe shutdown mode due to fire damage to their circuits, the availability of valve indication need not be assured.

2. Unless they are ignition sources, passive mechanical components are assumed to remain functional during and af ter a fire. These components include heat exchange rs , manual and check valves, piping and tanks.

3. NFPA Handbook (Reference 2.3.K) has been utilized as guidance in dete rmining that 80,000 Btu /ft2 of class A combustibles constitutes a one hour fire loading.

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Fccility: DB-1 Appindix R Dockett 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 O 4. DB-1 components that have been determined not to be required for safe shutdown (i.e. not required to be operable or not a spurious actuation concern for Appendix R considerations), and hence, are not included on the SSCL (Appendix A), are not to be addressed for consequences of fire-induced failures.

5. Cables located in conduit embedded in concrete walls, floors and ceilings need not be considered as part of any fire area until they exit the concrete (Reference Table 1-2 Exemption Request 11).

4.4 Evaluation Methodology In orcer to pe rform an evaluation of the availability of safe shutdown system components and circuits for a fire in a particular fire area, the safe shutdown components and circuits first needed to be identified. Having identified the safe shutdown and associated circuits, they then were routed on the plant Electrical Raceways and Groun, ding Drawings (Reference 2.1.G) to identify in which fire areas the ' circuits are located. The specific details of this task are described in Section 3.8.

On the same raceway drawings, the fire area boundary walls were also p delineated. The safe shutdown circuits and -associated circuits of Q concern were identified by color coding the corresponding conduits /

cable trays. These marked-up physical drawings were used to support the separation evaluation described below.

Fire protection features information was derived from the FRAR and fire protection drawings (A-201F through A-210F, Reference 2.1.D),

and Fire Protection System Sprinkler Drawings (M-269 series, Reference 2.1.L).

With the amount of separation identified and the existence (if any)

of detection and suppression in the area, a method of compliance with Appendix R, 'Section III.G criteria was developed. Any modifications that were required were documented.

4.5 Methods of Achieving Compliance The results of the detailed separation analyses described in the preceding sections indicate:

1. The fire areas which meet the c riteria of Appendix R, Section III.G,

2. The fire areas requiring procedural revisions or physical modifications to meet the criteria, and n

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Fccility: DB-1 App 2ndix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 0

3. ne fire areas that incorporate equivalent protection and for which exemptions are requested.

A summary of the results of that analysis are documented in Table 4 -1.

4.6 Fire Area Evaluations The evaluation of each fire area is presented in this subsection.

Each fire area evaluation includes (1) the basis for the conclusions of compliance, (2) the procedural revisions or physical modifications proposed to achieve compliance, and/or (3) a summary of the proposed exemption requests previously submitted. ,The Fire Area Compliance Summary results for each fire area is tabulated in Table 4-1.

Each of the 50 fire area evaluations included in this subsection were developed using a standard format as follows (note that the "~ "

refers to the Fire area designation):

4.6._.1 Fire Area Description This subsection provides an overview of the room numbers and descriptions that comprise the fire area in addition to the fire protection features and the combustible loading.

he purpose of ths subsection is to provide the above information at a glance. For detailed information relating to the fire area boundaries and fire protection systems, refer to the appropriate section of the FHAR.

4.6._.2 Safe Shutdown Systems in the Fire Area This subsection provides an overview of the shutdown systems and components whose circuits pass through the fire area. The component train, type and description are also provided.

The purpose of this subsection is to provide at a glance l information as to which safe shutdown systems and I

components could be impacted by a fire in this fire area.

4.6._.3 Fire Area Compliance Summary This subsection summarizes the non-compliances identified in the fire area to 10CFR50 Appendix R Section III.G whose resolution consists of a modification or procedural change.

Exemptions requested from certain requirements of Appendix R, which were considered in the evaluation, are referenced

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herein.

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Fccilitys DB-1 App 2ndix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report

-Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 O The summa ry specifies which train is being assured for shutdown and the reason for selection of the train. The !

l availability of certain critical safe shutdown components required operable for providing RCS pressure and Pressurizer level control and for maintaining hot standby are identified for a fire in the particular fire area. The summary concludes with a statement on the level of compliance to Section III.G.

Table 1 Appendix R Non-Compliances Resolution

This table provides the disposition of each potential non-compliance identified in the fire a re a. It provides information concerning each potential non-compliance resolution with regard to: 1) a modification, 2) procedural revision and/or 3) justification for, existing compliance.

The table also references. the notes that specifically explain the nature of the non-compliance and the corresponding resolution.

The safe shutdown and associated circuits database, from which the table is derived, is formatted such that for the train being ' assured for shutdown (or the train being

evaluated for separation), all circuits relating to that train automatically appear on Table 1. These circuits and I

components are referred to as " potential non-compliances".

l This is not to say that the circuits pose an Appendix R concern, but that they need to be - considered as possible non-compliances. By evaluating the impact of a fire on the

! individual circuits, the level of compliance can then be determined. If the circuit in question does not comply

with Appendix R, a " proposed modification" or " procedure" change is identified as being necessary, in Table 1.

Should the circuit presently meet Appendix R requirements, -

a " justification" for existing compliance is provided in Table 1.

Certain safe shutdown components serve as either Train 1 or Train 2 components depending on which train the component is supporting. For example, CCW Pump 3 is a " swing" pump in that it may either service Train 1 or Train 2 of the CCWS. ,

All such components are designated as "1/2" components. The circuits for these components will print out when either Train 1 or Train 2 is identified as the train accredited for j shutdown in Table 1. These components may have Channels 1, 2 and 3 circuits. If Train 1 was being assured for shutdown and circuits for such a component passed through the fire area under consideration, only the Channel 1 and 3 circuits would appear on Table 1. Channel 2 circuits would not O appear since no credit is taken for these circuits.

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Fccility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 O

Certain safe shutdown components are identified as " boundary valves" which means that the valve is required to remain closed to preclude flow diversion. Such components need to

'u e evaluated for all fire areas where circuits for the c~2ponent are located regardless of the train being assured for shutdown. As an example, the Pilot-Operated Relief Valve (PORV), despite having Train 2 circuits, must be addressed for all fire areas so that the possible spurious actuation of the valve does not result in RCS blowdown.

The components are denoted by a "B" in the " Comp Info" column of Table 1.

Table 1 also provides component specific information as follows:

Column

1. System - Safe shutdown system (e.g. HPIS, RCS, etc.)

2. Tyye - Nature of component (e.g. SOV, PUMP, MOV, etc.)

3. _ Component - Plant I.D. Number (e.g. SW1382)

4. Comp Loc (Component Location) -

Fire area that the component is physically located.

5. Component is a Backup for - Specifies if the component under consideration is a backup for another component which would be identified in this column.

6. Comp Info (Component Information) -

This column receives single and double letter designators which reference the legend on the bottom of the page.

Hence, letters H, S, FC, for example, states that the component is required for hot standby (H), is a spurious actuation concern only (S), and it fails closed (FC).

7. Normal Mode - Specifies the position of the component during normal plant operation.

8. Shutdown Mode - Specifies what the desired position of -

the component is if the component was to be utilized for shutdown. It does not necessarily state what the position will be for a fire in a particular' fire area.

For example, the shutdown mode of the SW Pumps 1, 2, and 3 is "on" since that is their desired operational mode if credit was taken for the individual pump.

Howeve r, in actuality, only one of the pumps would be operated for shutdown while the other two would be off.

9. Circuit - Circuit (s)/Sub-components of concern in the fire area.

10. Ckt Info (Circuit Information) - Provides information on whether the valve can spuriously close (SC) or open (S0) due to a fire-induced failure of the particular ci rcuit .

11. Circuit Interlock -

Identifies various circuit interlocks. .

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Fecility: DB-1 Appandix R l

Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report

! Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 DO Table 1 Fire Area Potential Non-Compliance Review Notes These notes delineate the system, component, circuits and raceways of concern for the potential non-compliances under consideration. Each note contains a discussion as to ,the ,

nature of the potential non-compliance and the resolution alleviating the potential non-compliance.

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Facility : DB-1 Appendix R Docket : 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report (r~'s),

Revision : 2 No. 02-1040-1153 FIRE AREA APPENDIX R EVALUATION FIRE AREA : A

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TRAIN ACCREDITED FOR SHUTDOWN : 1/2 4.6.A.1 FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION Room numbers and fire protection features for this fire area are as follows :

ROOM DETECTION SUPPRESSION

_Sgt ____6995_ggSqBIEIIgs_____ ___yty___ _g6Nf6UIQ._

CABLE CHASE Y MAN 110 PASSAGE Y MAN 110A PASSAGE Y MAN 112 DECON AREA Y MAN 114 MISC WASTE MNTR TNK/PMP N MAN 115 ECCS PMP RM 1-2 Y MAN 116 MISC WASTE EVAP RM N MAN 117 WSTE EVAP STRG TNK/PMP RM N MAN 117A COND TNK & PMP RM N MAN

[~') 119 DEGASIFIER RM N MAN

\s / 120 VALVE RM N MAN 121 WASTE GAS SRGE TNK RM N MAN 122 VALVE ACCESS RM N MAN 123 CLEAN WASTE RECVR TNK RM N MAN 124 CLEAN WASTE RECVR TNK RM Y AUTO 125 DET WSTE DRN TNK RM N MAN 126 MISC WASTE TNK RM N MAN Area Combustible Leading (BTU /SqFt) : 8228 l

4.6.A.2 SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS IN FIRE AREA A Circuits for the following S/D components are located in Fire Area A :

1!SIED 18918 G9dEg5ENI I!EE ______ggSC81EIlgd. ______

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l AFWS 1 AF3869 MOV AFWP 1 DISCH TO SG2 l 1 AF3870 MOV AFWP 1 DISCH TO SG1 2 AF3872 MOV AFWP 2 DISCH TO SG2 2 AF388 MOV AFWP 2 DISCH ISO VLV 2 AF599 MOV AFW TO SG2 ISO VLV

("'S 2 ICS032A MOV AFPT 2 GOV CTRL VLV t

_, ) 1 ICS0389 MOV AFPT 1 GOV CTRL VLV 4.A-1 l

r-Cactist, : D :- - i Accenct4 F Docket : 5 9-! i: Cosolt ance Assessrent Feo:r, Reviston : 1 No. 02-1649-1153 FIRE AREA APPENDIX R EVALUATION FIRE AREA : A TRAIN ACCREDITED FOR SHUTDOWN : 1/2 4.6.A.2 SAFE SH'JTDOWN SYSTEMS IN FIRE AREA A (Cont.i C.ec.its 'or the f ollowing Ss 0 comconents are located in F:re Area A :

jfj!gy IBAJy CODEgygyI Iffg ______DESCfjf!J0y____,,,_

1 MS106 M0V AFPT 1 MS IN ISO VLV 1 M51064 MOV AFPT 1 MS IN t-CONN 2 MS10" MOV AFPT 2 MS IN ISO VLV 2 M5107A MOV AFPT 2 MS IN (-CONN 1 MS5SG:A SOV AFPT 1 STE*M ADNISS VLV 2 HS5sd9B SOV AFFT 2 STEAM ADMISS VLV 1,2 P;41 PUNF MTR DRIVEN :EED PUMF C C'a i !/2 CC14:0 iDV CC TO MU FMP HDR IN !LV

CC14e: 5 0', DHR CLP GUT ISO JLV 1 CL1471 50v DG h T Cw *X 1 007 /L .

2 CC147A 50V DG JKT Ca Ms : CLT <tV 1 CC2545 MOV CC FET:.FN H D R 1 '. w v

CC;e44 MOV CC RETURN HDR I 'iLv 1 CC5045 MOV CC HDR 1 IN 153 VLV 2 CC501 MOV CC HDF 2 IN: 50 VLV 1 :-3-1 US CCa " UMP 1

F43-2 ;UMF CCW FUMP 2 1/2 P43-3 POMP CCW FUMP 3 CCE 5 1 33!-1 A,C CTRM EMERG A/C UNIT 1 -

CS: CS1531 MOV CONT SFRAY ISO VLV

. P5o-1 FUNG CS PUMP 1

Fim-2 FUMP CS PUMP 2 C**.

CH01A MOV LFI t!NE 2 7tv 2 DH07A M 0'/ CTMT SUMP 150 sLV A - '

2 DH1! MOV DH NORM 5UC T L I NE V'.'/ I ,

2 DH1:a 50v DH CL; ; E + F A3 3 v..V 2 Dm14e 50V De CLF : 007 ,L;

iM1515 MDV DH N]RM SUCT L;NE: V L .-

DH 734 M 0'/ DH FUNF

EwS7 5bCT VtV

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0 '. LFI HFI C;0SS-TIE '.L>

1 :4:-1 FUMc DHF'LFI F;MF 1 DHR LPI FUMP 2 F42 ~ FUMP EGG 1 OA114'A/B 30V EDG 1 AIF 5 TART Vu'.'

DA1148A,8 SOV EDG 2 AIR STA9T vtV 1 65-1 EDG ENERG DIESEL GENERATOR 1 h

2 >5-; EDG EMEFG DIESEL GENEPATOC 2 E55FWR 1 C1 SWGP 4.16tV AC SaGF C1 s

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Factitty : 05-1 Appendts F.

Docket 1 50-!4 Compliance Assesseer.t se port

Revtsion : 1 No. 02-1040-1152 v

FIRE AREA APPENDIX R EVALUATION FIRE AREA : A TRAIN ACCREDITED FOR SHUTDOWN : 1/2 4.6.A.2 SAFE SHUTDOWN SfSTEMS IN FIRE AREA A (Cont.-

Circutts for the following S/D components are located in Ftre Area A :

!!SIEN IBAJN C9MfghENI IlfE ______9EjCE]f!]9Ll._______

1 C2 SWGR 4.16tV AC SWGR C2 2 D1 3WER 4.16KV AC 5WGP D1 1 dip FNL 125VDC DIST PY.

2 D2 SWGR 4.16kV SWGR D2 2 D2P PNL 125VDC DIST FNL 2 DBP PNL 125VDC OIST P9NEL 1 El USS 400VAC USS El 2 F1 USS 480VAC USS F1 2 F11E MCC 400VAC MCC f- s

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r1 Y2 PNL PNL 120VAC DIST FNL L20VAC DIST PNL MPis 2 F 'v 1 H P 03 A IND hPI FLOW Ii4DIC ATION 2 F71HP0:0 IND HPI FLOW [NDICATION 1 FtlHPG!C I N,0 HPI FLOW INDICATION 1 FYIHP030 IND HP! FLOW INDICATION 2 HP02A MOV HPI 2 DISCH 150 VLv 2 HP02B M0V HPI 2 015CH ISO VLV 2 HP;1 MOV HP! PMF 2 EECIRC VLV 1 P147-1 FOMP HPI GNP 1 AC LO 8dMe 1 P197-2 PUMP HPI FMP 1 DC LO PMP -

2 P198-1 FUMP HPI FMF 2 AC L0 FMP 2 P198 ~ PUMP HPI PMP 2 DC LO PUMP i P!Q-1 GUMP HFI PUMP 1 2 P56-2 PUMP HFI FUMP 2

. ; 2 C31-1 FAN ECC3 RM 115 CLR FAh 1

. C71-2 FAN ECCS RM 115 CLR CAN 2.

1 C71-1 FAN LV SWGR PM VENT FAN !

2 C75-2 FAN CCW FMP RM VENT FAN 2 2 HV5144- CMFR CCWP GM CAN 2 BVPA35 DMPa HV54445 DMPR CCWP RM FAN 2 !N EMAC 2 HV5444C DNPP CCWP RM OA .00sEP :

MSS 2 M5603 MOV SG 2 DFAIN LINE 150 VLV 1 NSc11 MOV SG 1 DGw!N LINE ISO VLV MUPS 2 Mu93 SOV RC LETDOWN ISO 9LV

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12 MU32 MU39 FCV 30V RC MU 150 VLV RCF SEA'. RETURN 150 VLs F-!7 0 Puno MOP 2 AV/ LO PUMP

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1 Sactittv DB-! Apoendt< R Oochet 1 50-346 Compitance Assessment Report Revtston : 1 No. 02-1040-1153 i l

FIRE AREA APPENDIX R EVALUATION FIRE AREA A TRAIN ACCREDITED FOR SHUTDOWN : 1/2 4.6.A.2 SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS IN FIRE AREA A (Cont.:

Circuits for the following S/D commonents are located in Fire Area A :

!!!IED IB61N CgDfghENI IyfE _ _ _ _ _ _ DE_5 Cf]f!] Qy_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

2 P-372D PUMP MUP 2 AUX GEAP LO PUMP 2 P3'-2 PUMP MU PUMP 2 NNI 1 LI-RC14-3 IND PPZR LEVEL IND 1 LI-SP04B1 IND SG1-1 START-uP LEVEL IND 1 LIRC14-1,3 IND PRZR LEVEL IND 1 LISP 09B3,1 I,N D $61-1 START-UP LEVEL IND 2 PI-RC2A3 IND RCS LOOP 2 FRESS IND 1 PI-RC2B5 IND RCS LOOP 1 FRESS IND 1 P!-SP12B IND SG1-1 OUTLET FPESS IND 1 FISP12B,91 IND SG1-1 OUTLET FRESS IND 1 TI-PC3B2 IND PCS LOOP 1 HOT LEG tea:

2 TI-RC4A2 IND RCS LOOF 2 COLD LEG TEMP FC5 2 RC239A MOV PIR VAPOP 3MFt VLV 2 RC239B MOV PIP LIQUID SMPL VLV 2 RC2A 50V PlR POPV 2 FC4e32 50V COLD LEG SGi-2 SMPL VLV 5>3 1 P3-1 PUMP SW PUMP 1 2 P3-2 PUMP SW PUMP 2 1*2 P3-3 PUMP SW PUMP 3 2 SW1357 SOV CAC 2 OUT ISO VLV 1/2 SW1350 SOY CAC 3 OUT ISO VLV 2 SW1367 MOV CAC 2 IN ISO VLV 1/2 SW13o8 MOV CAC 3 IN ISO VLV 1 SW1322 MOV AFP 1 SUCT VLV FROM !W 2 SW1383 MOV AFP 2 SUCT VLV FFOM SW 2 SW1375 MOV TPCW Hi IN HEADEF ISO JLV 1 SW1397 MOV TFCW H) IN HEADER ISO VL /

l 1/2 SW142C 50V SW FROM CC HY Z 150 VLV 2 SW1434 SOV SW FROM CC Ha 2 ISO VLV 1 SW2929 MOV SW TO INT STRU VtV 2 SW2930 MOV SW TO INT F0FEBAy Vtv 1 iW2931 MOV SW TO ctg TDWER MO VLV l 2 5W2932 MOV SW TO COLLECT BA3IN VLV O

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' Facility: DB-1. Apptadix R t

Dockat: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report

. Revision: 2 No. 02-1040-1153 j 4.6.A.3 FIRE AREA A COMPLIANCE

SUMMARY

{ ' Fire Area A is comprised of 17 rooms (Rooms 110 through 126, with some ;

exceptions). It has partial fire detection and an automatic suppression system solely in Room 124. Combustible loading in the fire area is 8,228 g BTU /ft2 i

A review of Appendices B-2 and C-2 showed that there are a greater number of Train 2 safe shutdown and associated circuits in this fire area than there are Train 1. Moreover, an examination of the potentially impacted safe shutdown systems (and their circuit routings) showed that Train 1 would be the most practical train to evaluate for spatial spearation.

Due to the fact that spatial separation between redundant trains is 4

accredited for achieving compliance to Appendix R, a particular train cannot be said to be assured for shutdown for the reason that the

, specific location of the fire is indeterminabl,e. Hence, this fire area l is termed a 1/2 area.

As a result of the Appendix R evaluation performed for this fire area, modifications need to be performed. They are: 1) the installaiton of an isolation switch for valve DH09A, 2) the installation of a three hour fire barrier around Conduits 36008B and 36009B, 3) upgrading the wall j separating Rooms 123 and 124 from Room 115 to a three-hour fire rating, and 4) the installation of redundant SG 1 Outlet Pressure indication in the Control Room.

Additionally, procedural revisions are necessary to meet Appendix R requirements. Guidelines will be provided in AB1203.02 for the manual ,

operation of valves MS106, SW1382, CC1460, CC5095, DH21 and DH23.

j For a fire in this fire area, one train of the Makeup System and SG i- Atmospheric Vent Valve remain available for providing RCS pressure and Pressurizer level control. Both the Pilot-Operated Relief Valve and the j Pressurizer Vent Path via valves RC200 and RC239A may be unavailable for RCS depressurization. However, RCS depressurization capability is not l necessary since a high head Makeup pump is available for RCS injection.

An exemption is requested from the provision to have full fire area .

suppression in the fire area as required by Appendix R,Section III.G.2 in that credit is taken for 20 feet spatial separation with no inter-

, vening combustibles and localized automatic fire suppression exists. -

Once the modifications and procedural revisions are implemented, Fire i Area A will be in compliance with Appendix R requirements, assuming the exemption request is granted.

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4

I Fccilityt DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153

/3 V

Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA A POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW Note System Component Circuit Raceway 1 AWS AF3869 1CBE1146B, H 27142B, ICEB IPBE1146A 48257A Discussion:

The AFWP 1-1 Discharge to SG2 Valve AF3869 is normally closed and is opened when the AW Pump 1-1 is utilized to feed SG2. For a fire in this fire area, adequate separation is assured between redundant trains of safe shutdown systems, including AFWS. Valve AF3869 f s not required to be operable to feed SG2. Since no credit is taken for operation of valve AF3869 for a fire in this fire area, it needs only to be considered as a spurious actuation concern.

The AFW Pump capacity is such that even if this valve did spuriously open, and thereby divert flow to Train 2, adequate auxilia ry feedwater supply would still be available to maintain the inventory in SG1. Therefore, the position of this valve will not impact the capability of achieving safe shutdown. Fire damage to the above-mentioned circuits is not a concern.

Resolution:

None Required.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 2 AFWS AF3870 1CD107E 27573A, 1CFB Discussion:

The AFW Pump 1-1 Discharge to SG1 Valve AF3870 is normally closed and is required open to provide AFW to SG1 when Train 1 of AFWS is utilized. A fire-induced failure to the above-mentioned circuit would result in the inability to open the valve.

A review of Raceway Drawing E-335 indicates that cable Tray 1CEB has 35 feet separation from any Train 2 safe shutdown and associated circuits with automatic suppression and detection in the localized area of concern and no intervening combustibles. Hence, it presently complies with Apppedix R,Section III.G.2 requirements. Conduit 27573A does not presently have adequate separation from Train 2 circuits due to an unrated barrier separating Rooms 123 and 124 f rom Room 115. This barrier is to be upgraded to a three-hour fire rating to alleviate the non-compliance. Once the modificatien is made, Valve AF3870 will be in compliance with Appendix R. Note that credit cannot be taken for the MDFP since circuits for it pass through this fire area.

An exemption is requested from the provision to have full fire area suppression ph in a fire area where credf t it taken for 20 feet separation between circuit 1CD107E and Train 2 circuits in Room 115.

4.A-12

Facility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA A POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW Resolution:

The barrier separating Rooms 123 and 124 from Room 115 will be upgraded to a three-hour rating.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 3 AFWS ICS038B ICAFPT01B 27112, ICEA 1CAFPT01H 27123A, 1CEA Discussion:

The AFPT 1 Governor Control Valve ICS038B is required to modulate to regulate the turbine speed when AFWS Train 1 is utilized.

A review of Raceway Drawing E-335 indicates that the above-mentioned conduits and cable tray are routed such that they have separation of approximately 35 feet from any Train 2 safe shutdown or associated circuits, with no intervening combustibles. Additionally, automatic suppression and detection exist in the localized area of concern.

As a result, the above-mentioned circuits are in compliance with the requirements of Appendix R,Section III.G.2. No modifications or procedural actions are required.

Resolution:

None Required.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway -

4 AFWS MS106 1CD135F, K 27517A, ICEA 1CD135P, R 27517B, ICEA l

1CD135L, M 27142A, 1CEB 1CD135H, V 27142B, 1CEB Discussion:

The AFPT 1-1 Main Steam Inlet Isolation Valve MS106 is normally closed and is required open in order to provide steam to the AFP Turbine 1. A fire-induced failure of any of the above-mentioned circuits would result in the inability to open the valve when required for AFWS Train 1 operation.

A review of Raceway Drawing E-335 indicates that Cable Trays 1CEA and 1CEB have 35 feet separation from any Train 2 safe shutdown and associated circuits l with automatic suppression and detection in the localized area of concern and ll l no intervening combustibles. Hence, they presently comply with Appendix R,Section III.G.2 requirements.

4.A-13 t

Fccility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assesament Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA A POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIAM:ES REVIEW However, the above-mentioned conduits do not presently have adequate separation from Train 2 circuits. Hence, in the event offsite power is lost, resulting in loss of normal feedwater, and valve MS106 is not o pe rable, the Operators have at least 30 minutes to open valve MS106 (in Fire Area EE) before any detrimental impact to the plant is realized. As a result, upon detection of a fire in Fire Area A, the operator will locally operate valve MS106 if remote operability of the valve is lost. This action can easily be performed in the specified time frame. Guidelines are to be provided in procedure AB1203.02 for this action.

Note that credit cannot be taken Tor the Motor-Driven Feedwater Pump since circuits for it pass through this fire area.

Resolution:

Guidelines will be provided in procedure AB1203.02 fo r the local manual operation of valve MS106 (designated an amargency control station) in Fire Area EE.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 5 AFWS MS106A 1CBE1271K 27142B, 1CEB ,

MS107A 2CBF1188K 2CFA, 2CEB 1 Discussion:

The AFPT 1-2 Main Steam Inlet Cross-Connection Valve MS107A is normally open to provide a steam supply to AFPT 1-2 from SG1 in the event the AFPT 1-2 Main

Steam Inlet Isolation valve MS107 is inoperable. For a fire in this fire i area, adequate separation is assured between redundant trains of safe shutdown systems, including AFWS. Valve MS107A is not required to be operable to feed AFPT 1-2. Since no credit is taken for the availability of valve MS107A for a fire in t his fire area, it needs only to be considered as a possible flow diversion path.

Howeve r, the steam output from SG1-1 is such that the output capacity is sufficient to run the AFW Pump Turbine 1-1 even if valve MS107A was open the reby dive rting some steam to Train 2. The re fo re , the position of this valve will not impact the capability of achieving safe shutdown. Fire damage to the above-mentioned circuits is not a concern.

The AFPT 1-1. Main Steam Inlet Cross-Connection Valve MS106A is normally open to provide a steam supply to AFPT 1-1 from SG2 in the event the AFPT 1-1 Main Steam Inlet Isolation Valve MS106 is inoperable. For a fire in this fire area, adequate separation is assured between redundant trains of safe shutdown systems, including AFWS. Valve MS106A is not required to be operable to feed AFPT 1-1. Since no credit is taken for the availability of valve MS106A for a O fire in ' this fire a re a , it needs only to be conside red as a possible flow U dive rsion path.

4.A-14

Facility: DB-1 Appendiz R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 FIRE AREA A POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW However, the steam output from SG1-2 is such that the output capacity is sufficient to run the AFW Pump Turbine 1-2 even if valve MS106A was open thereby diverting some steam to Train 1. Therefore, the position of this valve will not impact the capability of achieving safe shutdown. Fire damage to the above-mentioned circuits is not a concern.

Resolution:

None Required.

~

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 6 AFWS MS5889A 1CV5889AB, C 27115, 1 CEC Discussion:

The AFWP Turbine 1 Steam Admission Valve MS5889A is a solenoid-operated valve which is normally closed and is required to open when utilizing AFWS Train 1.

A review of EWD E-46B, Sheet 71, has determined that a fire-induced failure of the "C" cable could preclude the capability to de-energize the valve open (which is its safe shutdown position).

l However, a review of Raceway Drawing E-335 indicates that the above-mentioned l conduit and cable tray are routed such that they have separation of approximately 35 feet from any Train 2 safe shutdown or associated circuits, with no intervening combustibles. Additionally, automatic suppression and l detection exist in the localized area of concern.

l As a result, the above-mentioned circuits are in compliance with the l requirements of Appendix R,Section III.G.2. No modifications or procedural actions are required.

Resolution ,

None Required.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 7 AFWS P241 BCAD210D, E BCGK, BCGL l

l Discussion:

The Motor Driven Feedwater Pump P241 provides a backup means of supplying the

~

Steam Generators in the event that normal feedwater and both trains of AFWS are not available.

l 4.A-15 1

A Fccility: DB-1 App:ndiz R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revisions- 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes FIRE ARIA A POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW However, for a fire in this fire area, Train 1 of AFWS is assured operable for shutdown. As a result, no credit is taken for this pump for a fire in this fire area. Hence,- fire damage to the above-sentioned circuits is inconsequential.

Resolution:

None Required.

l Note Systes Component Circuit Raceway 8 CCWS CC1471 1CV1471A 27112, 1CEA Discussions The Diesel Generator Jacket Cooling Water Heat Exchanger 1 Outlet Valve CC1471 l 1s a solenoid valve which is normally closed and is required to go open in the i case where Loss of Offsite Power is present. It provides cooling water to the

!' EDG 1 Jacket Cooling Water Heat Exchanger. The valve' is required operable to 1 achieve and maintain hot standby and subsequently for going to cold shutdown.

I Upon starting EDC 1, this valve automatically goes open.

! A review of Raceway Drawing E-335 indicates that the above-sentioned conduit j and cable tray are routed such that they have separation of approximately 35 I feet from any Train 2 safe shutdown or associated circuits, with no intervening combustibles. Additionally, automatic suppression and detection l exist in the localized area of concern.

l As a result, the above-mentioned circuit is in compliance with the j requirements of Appendix R,Section III.G.2. No modifications or procedural j actiona are required. -

I Resolution:

None Required.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 9 CCWS CC2645 1CBE11610, I 27510C, 1CEA CC1460 2CV1460D, E 37450A, 2CEA O

4.A-16

Facilityg DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA A POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIA?CES REVIEW Discussion:

The CCW Return Header 1 Valve CC2645 is normally open or closed depending on which train of CCWS is being used during normal operation. The CCW Makeup Pump Header Inlet Valve CC1460 is normally open when the Makeup System is in operation. Both valves are only required to be open in those fire areas in which credit is being taken for the Makeup System for RCS inventory and boration control. These valves provide inlet and outlet flow for the Makeup Pump Gear and Pump Lube Oil Coolere (P37-1 and P37-2).

A review of Raceway Drawing E-335 indicates that the above-mentioned conduit and cable tray for valve CC2645 are routed such that they have separation of approximately 35 feet from any Train 2 safe shutdown or associated circuit s ,

with no inte rvening combustibles. Additionally, automatic suppression and detection exist in the localized area of concern. As a result, the circuits are in compliance with the requirements of Appendix R,Section III.G.2. No modifications or precedural actions are required.

A review of EWD E-50B, Sheet 12A, has shown that the fire-induced failure to the circuits for CC1460 could disable the valve closed. This valve needs to be assured open. In the event that valve CC1460 cannot be remotely assured open, Operations personnel will manually open the valve locally in Fire Area T.

Guidelines will be provided in procedure AB1203.02 for this action.

Resolution:

Guidelines will be provided in procedure AB1203.02 fo r the local manual opening of valve CC1460 (designated an emergency control station).

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 10 CCWS CC5095 1CBE1226B, I 37593A, ICEC 1PBE1226A 46088B Discussion:

The CCW Line 1 Inlet Isolation Valve CC5095 is normally open or closed depending on which train of CCW is being used during normal operation. This valve is only required to be open in those fire areas in which credit is being taken for the Makeup System for RCS injection. This valve provides inlet flow to the Makeup Pump Gear and Pump Lube Oil Coolers for Train 1.

Fire damage to the above mentioned circuits for valve CC5095 could disable the valve closed if it we re in the normally closed position. For a fire in this fire area, Operations personnel will manually open the valve locally in Fire Area T. Guidelines will be provided in procedure AB1203.02 for this action.

O 4.A-17

Fccility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes FIRE ARIA A POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW L

Resolutions Guidelines will be provided in procedure AB1203.02 for the local manual j opening of valve CC5095 (designated an emergency control station).

Note Systes Component Circuit Raceway 11 CCWS P43-1 1CAC1135, C, E 27111, 27111A, 1CEA P43-3 1CAC108B, C, H, I 27111, 27111A, 1CEA 1CACD2C 27111, 27111A, 1CEA

! ICAC108E. F 37481A, ICEA 1CAC108G 37481A, ICEC 1CAC108K 37593A, 1 CEC l Discussions i Component Cooling Water Pump 1 (P43-1) or 3 (P43-3) is required operable during all phases of shutdown utilizing Train 1. One of the two pumps will nonsally be lined up for servicing Train 1 of CCWS. A fire-induced failure of

one of the above-sentioned circuits would disable the respective pump.

- A review of Raceway Drawing E-335 indicates that the above-mentioned conduits

! and cable trays are routed such that they have separation of approximately 35 feet from any Train 2 safe shutdown or associated circuits, with no intervening

combustibles. Additionally, automatic suppression and detection exist in the I localized area of concern.

As a result, the above-mentioned circuits are in compliance with the j - requirements of Appendir R,Section III.C.2. No modifications or procedural i actions are required.

Resolution:

None Required.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 12 CREVS S33-1 1CCEACIC 27121A, ICEB Discussion

5 The . Control Room Energency Air Conditioning Unit S33-1 is required to be operable to maintain Control Room habitability for achieving and maintaining j hot standby and for going to cold shutdown. A fire-induced failure of this circuit could result in the loss of Control Room area cooling.

4.A-18

Facility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 FIRE AREA A POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW A review of Raceway Lawing E-335 indicates that the above-mentioned conduit and cable tray are routed such that they have separation of approximately 35 feet from any Train 2 safe shutdown or associated circuits, with no intervening combustibles. Additionally, automatic suppression and detection exist in the localized area of concern.

As a result, the above-mentioned circuit is in compliance with the requirements of Appendix R,Section III.G 2. No modifications or procedural actions are required.

Resolution:

None Required.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 13 CSS CS1531 2CBF1147F 37472E, 37518A, 2CEA, 2CEG, 2CEH P56-2 2CBF111D 46114C, E, F 2CBF111F 2CEA 2PBF111A 46113C, E EV1531 NP0562 MP0562 Discussion:

The specific concern related to Appendix R is whether the Containment Spray Valve CS1531 could spuriously open in conjunction with the spurious starting of the Containment Spray Pump 2 P56-2. This would cause cold water to be

~

sprayed onto the reactor, thereby potentially resulting in rapid RCS cooldown.

CS1531 is normally closed and is required closed for shutdown. P56-2 is normally off and is required to remain off in the event that CS1531 spuriously opens. A review of EWD E-52B, Sheets 21A and B, has determined that a. fire-induced failure of Circuit 2CBF1147F could not result in the spurious opening of valve CS1531.

Consequently, fire damage to any of the above-mentioned circuits would not result in inadvertent containment spray. Hence, no modifications or procedural revisions are required.

Resolution:

None Recc. red.

O 4.A-19

Fccility DB-1 Appendix R Docket 50-346 Complicnco As csstent R port Reviston 1 No. 02-1040-1153

/O Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA A PCTIENTIAL NON-COMPLIA?CES REVIEW Note System Componen t Circuit Raceway 14 CSS P56-1 1CBE111D, F 46014C 1PBE111A 46013C Discussion:

The specific concern related to Appendix R is whether the Containment Spray Valve CS1530 could spuriously open in conjunction with the spurious startina of t he Containment Spray Pump 1 P56-1. This would cause cold water to be sprayed onto the reactor, thereby potentially resulting in rapid RCS cooldown.

CS1530 is normally closed and is required closed for shutdown. P56-1 is normally off and is required to remain off in the event that CS1530 spuriously opens.

However, a review of Appendix B-2 revealed that no circuits for containment Spray Valve CS1530 pass through this fire area. Hence, even if P56-1 were to .

spuriously start, inadve rtent containment spray is not possible due to the fact that valve CS1530 remains closed.

] Resolution:

[O None Required.

Note System Component Ci rcuit Raceway 15 DHRS DH09A 2CBF1142E, F, H 2CEG Eme rgency Sump Isolation Valve DH09A is required closed at all times to preclude the inadvertent blowdown of BWST water into the Containment Emergency Sump. If t his we re to occur, the Containment Emergency Sump could fill up with water to the point that water would come in contact with the reactor and thereby possibly cause thermal shocking. Hence, this valve must be assured closed.

A review of EkD E-52B, Sheet 19B has shown that a fire-induced failure (hot short) of the "H" circuit could spuriously open DH09A.

Resolution:

A modification will be made to install an isolation switch in the circuit scheme for valve DH09A such that fire damage to the above-mentioned circuits cannot spuriously open the valve.

O 4.A-20

Facility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assesscent Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA A POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW Note System Componen t Circuit Ra ceway 16 DHRS DH11 2CBF1130K 37806B, 2CEA Discussion:

The Decay Heat Removal Suction Valve DH11 is normally closed and de powered during normal plant operation. When cooling down to cold shutdown, the valve is remotely opened to initiate the DHRS mode. A fire-induced failure of the above-mentioned circuit would disable the capability to remotely open the valve.

However, the bypass valves DH21 and DH23 can be locally manually operated inside Containment in the event that the remote operability of valve DR11 is lost. Ample time is available to perform this function since DHRS is only required operable for going to cold shutdown. irocedure AB1203.02 will provide guidelines for the local manual operation of valves DH21 and DH23.

Resolution:

Guidelines are to be provided in procedure AB1203.02 for the local manual operation of valves CH21 and DH23 inside Containment.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 17 DHRS P42-1 1CAC112B, C, F 27113, 1CEA ICAC112E 36008B 1 PAC 112A 36009B Discussion:

DH Pump 1 P42-1 is required operable to go to cold shutdown. A fire-induced failure of any of the above-mentioned circuits would result in dicabling the pump.

A review of Raceway Drawing E-335 resulted in the observation that Conduit 27113 and Cable Tray 1CEA for P42-1 have approximately 35 feet of separation f rom Train 2 safe shutdown and associated circuits with automatic suppression and detection and no intervening combustibles in the localized area of concern.

Thus, no modifications for these circuits.are required.

Conduits 36008B and 36009B (Room 114) do not have adequate separation from Train 2 circuits. These conduits are to be provided with a three-hour fire barrier thereby assuring compliance with the requirements of Section III.G.2.

Resolution:

Conduits 36008B and 36009B will be protected with a three-hour wrap.

4 . A-21

F Fccility: DB-1 App:ndix R Docke t: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153

N y ). Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA A POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW Note System Component Circuit Raceway .

18 EDG DA1147A/B 1CGD104B, C 27113, ICEA 1CGD104E 27120A, 1CEB Discussion:

The EDG 1 Air Start Solenoid Valves DA1147A and B are normally closed and are required to open to provide starting air to the Air Motors which thereby start the EDG 1.

A review of Raceway Drawing E-335 indicates that the above-mentioned conduits and cable trays are routed such that they have separation of approximately 35 feet from any Train 2 safe shutdown or associated circuits, with no intervening combustibles. Additionally, automatic suppression and detection exist in the localized area of concern.

As a result, the above-mentioned circuits are in compliance with the requirements of Appendix R*, Section III.G.2. No modifications or procedural actions are required.

() Resolution:

None Required.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 19 EDG KS-1 1CGD101L, N 27112, 1CEA 1CGD105A, ICCD106A 27112, 1CEA Discussion:

The Emergency Diesel Generator 1 (EDG1-1) is required operable for achieving and maintaining hot standby and for going to cold shutdown in the event that Offsite Power is not available. A fire-induced failure of the above-mentioned circuits would result in disabling the emergency diesel generator.

However, a review of Raceway Drawing E-335 has concluded that the above-mentioned conduit and cable tray have approximately 35 feet of separation from any Train 2 safe shutdown and associated circuits with automatic suppression and detection and no intervening combustibles in the localized area of concern.

Thus, no modifications or procedural revisions are necessary.

Resolution:

None Required.

. O 4.A-22

Facility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA A POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW Note System Component Circuit Ra c.way 20 ESSPWR SWGR C1 1CAC101C, D and 1CGD103E, F 27112, 1CEA 1CAC1033A, B 27111, 1CEA 1CAC103A 27115, 1 CEC 1CABDC1C L 27120A, 1CEB Discussion:

Circuits 1CAC101C and D provide control power for Breaker AC101 which feeds 4160V AC Essential Switchgear Bus Cl from EDG 1. Circuits 1CAC1033A and B provide Bus C1 voltage indication and form part of the synchronizing circuit.

Circuits 1CDC103E, F and ICAC103A provide control of the EDG 1 Under Voltage Auxiliary Relays 27/C1 and 27A/C1. Circuits ICABDC1C and L provide control power for Breaker ABDC1, which is the incoming feeder from 13.8KV AC Switchgear B to.4.16KV AC Switchgear C1.

A review of Raceway Drawing E-335 indicates that all of the above-mentioned conduits and cable trays are routed such that they have separation of approximately 35 feet from any Train 2 safe shutdown or associated circuits, with no intervening combustibles. Additionally, automatic suppression and I detection exist in the localized area of concern. As a result, the above-mentioned circuits are in compliance with the requirements of Appendix R,Section III.G.2. No modifications or procedural actions are required.

Resolution:

l None Required.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 21 ESSPWR SKGR C2 1CAC110C 27120A, 1CEB Discussion:

4160V AC Switchgear Bus C2 serves to power only one safe shutdown corponent,

~

that being the. Backup Service Water Pump, P180. For a fire in this fire area, Train 1 of SWS is being assured for shutdown. Hence, fire-induced damage to the above-mentioned circuit for Switchgear Bus C2 is not detrimental to sa fe shutdown.

Moreover, a review of Raceway Drawing E-335 indicates that the above-mentioned raceways are routed such that they have separation of approximately 35 feet from any Train 2 safe shutdown or associated circuits, with no intervening combustibles. Additionally, automatic suppression and detection exist in the localized area of concern. As a result, the above-mentioned circuits are in compliance with the requirements of Appendix R,Section III.G.2. No modifications or procedural actions are required.

4.A-23

Fccility:. DB-1 AppIndix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153

) Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA A POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW Resolution None Required.

I Note System Component Circuit Raceway 22 - ESSPWR Panel D1P 1CD1P21B 27122A, ICEB

. ICD 1P23A 37481A, 1CEA Discussion:

Circuit ICD 1P21B provides 125V DC control power to Relay Cabinet RC3601 which

, is not required for safe shutdown. However, Cable ICD 1P21A (also part of the same circuit) supplies 125V DC control power to RC3701 which in turn provides i the power for CAC1 Inlet Isolation Valve SW1356 and CAC3 Inlet Isolation Valve SW1358. These valves, however, fail in their shutdown mode (open) on loss of power. In addition, Cable 1CD1P21D (also part of the same circuit) supplies 125V DC control power for Component Cooling Water Valve Auxilicry Relays.

O Circuit 1CDIP23A-provides control power to Junction Box JT3720 which, in turn, supplies control power for the flow indicating switches (FIS1422C, FIS1427C and FIS1432C) used in the control of the CCW Pumps P43-1 and P43-3.

A review of Raceway Drawing E-335 indicates that the above-sentioned conduits and cable trays are routed such that they have separation of approximately 35 feet from any Train 2 safe shutdown or associated circuits, with no intervening 4 combustibles. Additionally, automatic suppression and detection exist in the localized area of concern.

As a result, the above-mentioned circuits are in compliance with the requirements of Appendix R, Section III.G.2. No modifications or procedural actions are required.

Resolution: ,

None Required.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 23 ESSPWR USS El ICAC11CED, F 27111, 1CEA ICAC12CED, F 27111, 1CEA Discussion:

480V AC Unit Substation El is reqyired to be operable to supply all the Train 1

Essential 480V AC Motor Control Centers. Loss of the above-mentioned circuits s,,/ due to a fire could result in a failure of the source breakers at the 4.16KV SWGR C1 which supply the 480V AC USS El.

4.A-24 1

i f

. - - -~ - - _ . _ - . _ _ - , _ _ _ . - . _ _ . , _ . _ . . , . . _ , - _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ , . . . . . , _ _ _ _ - - _ _ . , _ , . , _ . _ , _ , . _ , _ _ , , , , , ',, , . - . . _ . . _ _ _ . , , , , ,. _7_.__..' _.y _ _ , _ .

Facility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 FIRE AREA A POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW A review of Raceway Drawing E-335 indicates that the above-mentioned conduits and cable tray are routed such that they have separation of approximately 35 feet from any Train 2 safe shutdown or associated circuits, with no intervening combustibles. Additionally, automatic suppression and detection exist in the localized area of concern.

As a result, the above-mentioned circuits are in compliance with the requirements of Appendix R, Section III.G.2. No modifications or procedural actions are required.

Resolution:

None Required.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 24 ESSPWR PNL Y1 1CY117A 27617A, 1CEA Discussion:

Circuit 1CY117A provides 120V AC control power to RC3704 which feeds the CC Surge Tank Level Switch Auxiliary Relays. In addition, Cable ICY 117B (part of the same circuit) supplies 120V AC power to relay cabinet RC3706. Likewise, Cable 1CY117C (part of the same circuit) feeds disconnect switch cabinet CDE-11B which provides indication for the Core Flood Isolation Valve CF01B.

However, a loss of power to the CC Surge Tank auxiliary relays would only result in a failure to automatically close certain non-safe shutdown valves in case of low level at the CC Surge Tank. Additionally, a loss of power to RC3706 or CDE-11B would not impact safe shutdown. Therefore, a failure of .

Circuit 1CY117A is inconsequential.

Resolution: -

l None Required.

Note System Component Circuit. Raceway l

l 25 HPIS FYIHP03C 1LHP03CA, B 36273A, 37031A FYIHP03D ILHP03DA, B 36273A, 37031A l

l G

~

l 4.A-25

Fccility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 (A) v, Table 1 Notes FIRE AFIA A POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIA}CES REVIEW Discussion:

The HPI Flow Indicators FYIHP03C and D provide information on Train 1 HPI system injection flow s ta tus . The indication is required available for maintaining hot standby and fo r going to cold shutdown when HPI System injection is being utilized. It provides information on HPI flow to assure the proper operation of the system and to ensure RCS inventory is being maintained. A fire-induced failure of the above-mentioned circuits would disable HPI flow indication in the Control Room.

However, for a fire in this fire area, the Makeup System is accredited for RCS

-inventory and boration control in lieu of th HPI System. Since HPI System operation is not accredited for a fire in this fire area, HPI flow indication need not be assured. As a result, fire damage to the above-mentioned circuits is not a concern.

Resolution:

None Required.

19 V Note System Component Circuit Raceway 26 HPIS P197-1 1CBE1296C 27115, ICEC P197-2 1PD106A 47060A, D Discussion:

The HPI Pump 1 AC Lube 011 Pump P197-1 is normally off and is required to be operable to assure a constant circulation of lube oil to the HPI Pump 1 (P58-1) when the pump is operating. The pump is required operable for maintaining hot standby and for going to cold shutdown.

A review of Raceway Drawing E-335 indicates that the above-rentioned conduit l and cable tray are routed such that they have separation of approximately 35 feet from any Train 2 safe shutdown or associated circuits, with no intervening combustibles. Additionally, automatic suppression and detection exist in the localized area of concern. As a result, the above-mentioned circuit is in full compliance with the requirements of Appendix R,Section III.G.2. No modifications or. procedural actions are required.

The HPI Pump 1 DC Lube Oil Pump P197-2 is normally off and is only required to be operable in the event the AC Lube Oil Pump P197-1 fails when called upon to supply lube oil to HPI Pump 1.

Howeve r, for a fire in this fire area, the AC Lube Oil Pump P197-1 is assured operable (and presently meets Appendix R separation requirements). Hence, the loss of this circuit due to a fire in inconsequential.

O 4 . A-26

Fccility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA A POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIA)CES REVIEW For a fire in this fire area, credit is taken for the Makeup System to provide high head injection fo r RCS inventory and boration control. Hence, the operability of the HPI System need not be assured even though Appendix R requirements are met for the above-mentioned circuits.

Resolution:

None Required.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 27 HPIS. P58-1 1CAC111B, C, F 27123A, 1CEB 1 PAC 111A 36007B Discussion:

The HPI Pump 1 P58-1 is normally off and is required operable for RCS inventory and boration control when maintaining hot s tandby and for going to cold shutdown. A fire-induced failure of the above-mentioned circuits would disable the pump.

For a fire in this fire area, the Makeup System is accredited for RCS inventory and boration control in lieu of the HPI System. As a result, fire damage to the above-mentioned circuits for HPI Pump 1 is not a concern.

Resolution:

None Required.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 28 HVAC C71-1 1CBE1217E 27142A, 1C EB Discussion:

The Low Voltage Switchgear Room Ventilation Fan C71-1 assures adequate cooling in the room in the case of kas of Offsite Power when the Normal Ventilation System is inoperable. The fan is normally off and is required to operate to achieve and maintain hot s tandby and for going to cold shutdown when offsite Power is not available. A fire-induced failure of the above-mentioned circuit would result in disabling the fan.

O 4.A-27

. Facility: DB-1 Appendix R

. Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: . 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA A POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIAPCES REVIEW A review of Raceway Drawing ,E-335 indicates that Cable Tray 1CEB has 35 feet separation from any Train 2 safe shutdown and associated circuits with automatic suppression and detection in the localized area of concern and no inte rvening combustibles. Hence, it presently complies with Apppedix R,Section III.G.2 requirements. Conduit 27142A does not presently have adequate separation from Train 2 circuits due to an unrated barrier separating Rooms 123 and 124 from Room 115. This barrier is to be upgraded to a three-hour fire barrier to -alleviate the non-compliance. Once the modification is made, fan C71-1 will be in compliance with Appendix R. -

Additionally, an exemption is requested from the provision to ha,ve full fire area suppression in the fire area as required by Appendix R, Sec' tion III.G.2 in that credit is taken for 20 feet spatial separation with no intervening combustibles between circuits for C71-1 and Train 2 circuits in Room 115.

Resolution:

The barrier separating Rooms 123 and 124 from Room 115 will be upgraded to a three-hour fire rating.

O Note System Component Circuit Raceway 29 MSS MS611 1CBE1294K 18051A 1PBE1294H 18052A Discussion:

The S01 Drain Line Isolation Valve MS611 is normally open to provide SG1 blowdown to the high and low pressure condensers in Modes 1 and 2 (Startup and Power Operation). This valve is in series with a normally closed valve MS4531.

For shutdown purposes, the sole concern with respect to this valve is for providing SG1 blowdown isolation. Valve MS611 is required to close in the event valve MS4531 spuriously opens and cannot be closed. However, no circuits exist' in this fire for valve MS4531. Hence, spurious actuation of MS4531 is not possible. As a result, fire damage to the above-mentioned circuits is inconsequential.

Resolution :

None Required.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 30 MUPS MU32 BLC0F532A BUK O

4.A-28

Fccility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA A POIENTIAL NON-COMPLIAICES REVIEW Discussion:

The Reactor Coolant Makeup Isolation Valve MU32 is normally open or closed and is required to be open if the Makeup System is being utilized for RCS injectiotr. The valve provides for RCS injection to maintain RCS inventory and boration control. Valve MU32 is a non-essential solenoid-operated valve.

Fire damage to its circuits results in the de-energizing open of the valve, which is its safe shutdown mode. Hence, a fire-induced failure to the above-mentioned circuits would, at worst, position the valve to the desired position.

Failure of Circuit BLC0F532A is therefore not a concern.

Resolution:

None Required.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 31 MUPS MU38 2CSF1747A 2CED, 2CEG Discussion:

O RCP Seal Return Isolation Valve MU38 is normally open or closed and is required to be closed for RCP seal return isolation when shutting down to isolate letdown from the reactor.

A review of EWD E-49B, Sheet 19, indicates that a fire-induced failure of the above-mentioned circuit could result in the failure of the interlock (PSLLMU38) which detects pressure at the air volume tank. The failure of Circuit 2CSF1747A would not inhibit the closure of MU38 since it me rely provides a pe rmissive interlock with PSLLHJ38 to open the valve. Hence, no -

modifications or procedural revisions are necessary.

Resolution:

l None Required.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 32 NNI LI-RC14-1,3 lLRC143B 37725A LI-RC14-3 lLRC143C 37726A O

4. A-2 9

Fccility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report

~ Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes v

FIRE AREA A POIENTIAL NON-COMPLIA)CES REVIEW Discus'sion:

Indicators LI-RC14-3 and LI-RC14-3 provide Pressurizer Level indication from the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel and the Control Roca respectively. For a fire in this fire area, only the availability of LI-RC14-3 in the Control Room is of concern. This monitoring capability is required to be available to achieve and maintain hot standby and for going to cold shutdown. Fire-induced damage to the above-mentiosed circuits would result in the loss of Train 1 Pressurizer level indication.

A review of the safe shutdown circuits in the fire area resulted in the finding that no circuits for Train 2 pressurizer Ievel Indicator LI-RC14-4 nor the Pressurizer Level Recorder LRS-RC14 pass through the area. Although these indications are Train 2 powered, they would still remain available despite the loss of Train 2 circuits in this area (i.e. their power supplies still remain available). Hence, credit can be taken for the redundant indication provided by the Train 2 indicator and recorder.

Resolution:

None Required.

v Note System Component Circuit Raceway 33 NNI LI-SP09B1 1LSP09B3C 37726A LI-SP09B3,1 1LSP09B3B 37725A Discussion:

Indicators LI-SP09B1 (in the Control Room) and LI-SP09B3 (at the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel) provide means of monito ring SG1 Start-up level ino rde r to achieve and maintain hot standby and for going to cold shutdown. For a fire in this fire a re a , the sole concern is indicator LI-SP09B1 since shutdown functions would be monitored from the Control Room.

However, the re exists redundant means of monitoring Startup level indication in l the Control Room via Train 1 indicators LI-SP09B8 and LI-SP09B9. The redundant level indicators are located at Cabinets C5736 and C5739, respectively. The circuits for these indicators are ILSCLT11B, D and ILSGLT31B, D, respectively.

These circuits do not paso through this fire area. Thus, a fire within Fire Area A would not impact the redundant . indication and hence no modifications l are necessary. As a result, the loss of the above-mentioned circuits due to fire damage is inconsequential.

Resolution:

None Rcquired.

m 4.A-30 1

Fccility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA A POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIA?CES REVIEW Note System Component Circuit Ra ceway 34 NNI PI-RC2B5 1LSF3011A 37726A Discussion:

Indicator PI-RC2B5 monitors RCS Loop 1 Pressure from the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel. For a fire in this fire a re a , Train 1 of this monito ring va riable remains available in the Control Room via indicator PI-RC2B4. Since shutdown functions are to be performed from the Control Room, fire damage to Circuit 1LSF3011A is inconsequential. The monitoring function in question presently meets the requirements of Appendix R,Section III.G.2.

Resolution:

None Required.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 35 NNI PI-SP12B 1LSP12B1B 37726A PI-SP12B1,B 1LSP12B1A 37725A Discussion:

Indicators PI-SP12B and PI-SP12B1 provide SG1 Outlet Pressure indication from the control Room and Auxiliary Shutdown Panel, respectively. For a fire in this fire area, PI-SP12B is the indicator of concern since shutdown functions are to be monitored from the Control Room. A fire-induced f ailure of Circuit 1LSP12 BIB would result in the loss of SG 1 Outlet Pressure Monitoring .

capability from the Control Room.

Resolution:

A modification will be performed to install a redundant means of monitoring SG 1 Outlet Pressure indication from the Control Room. The redundant indicator will receive input signals f rom Pressure Transmitter PI-SP12B2. The circuit routing will be such that Appendix R Compliance is met.

Note _ System Component Ci rcuit Raceway 36 NNI TI-RC3 B2 ILRPSB07B 37726A O

4.A-31

Facility: DB-1 App:ndix R Dockett 50-346 Complicnco A:lessraent Raport Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA A POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW Discussion:

Indicator TI-RC3B2 provides RCS Loop 1 Hot Les Tempe rature Monitoring capability at the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel. For a fire in this fire a re a, shutdown functions are to be performed in the Control Room. RCS Loop 1 Hot Lag Temperature indication is available in the Control Roos via TI-Rc385. As a result, RCS Loop 1 Hot Les Monitoring capability remains available in the Control Room for a fire in Fire Area A and presently meets the requirements of Appendix R,Section III.G.2.

Resolution:

None Required.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 37 RCS RC239A 2CBF1126H 18402A RC239B 2CBF1127G 18402A Discussion:

The Pressurizer Vapor Sampling Valve RC239A and-the Pressurizer Liquid Sampling Valve RC239B are both normally closed and are required closed for shutdown to preclude RCS blowdown in the event that the Pressurizer Vent Header Valve RC200 spuriously opens. No credit is taken for RCS depressurization via the Pressurizer Vent Path (valves RC239A and RC200) since the Makeup System is available for high head RCS injection for a fire in this fire area. As a result, the valves are strictly a spurious actuation concern.

A review of EWD E-52B, Sheets 14 and 14A, resulted in the finding that the above-mentioned circuits are required only for indication at cabinet C1708 and i

their loss would, at worst, result in blowing the fuse for the control power

! thus losing indication and the ability to open the valve.

Howeve r, these valves need not be operated and the only concern is that of j spurious opening of the valves. Since spurious operation would not result if 1 the control circuits for these valves which pass through Fire Area A were to l burn, no modification, or further analysis need to be performed. Moreover, no i circuits for Valve RC200 pass through. this fire a re a . Hence, spurious actuation of RC200 is also not possible.

, Resolution:

None Required.

1 1

' 4.A-32 i ,

r, . -- ..--.. , _ , . - , . . _ , . , , _ _ _ , , . , . , _ _ ,_ _

Freility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA A POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIAM:ES REVIEW Note System Component Circuit Ra ceway 38 RCS RC2A BCVRC2B BCJD Discussion:

The Pilot-Operated Relief Valve (PCRV) is normally closed and is required to open for providing RCS depressurization to the HPI System shutoff head.

However, for a fire in this fire area, the Makeup System is available for high head injection to maintain RCS inventory and boration control. The PORV need not be assured available for RCS de pre ssuriza tion. As a re sul t , spurious actuation of the valve is the sole concern.

A review of EWD E-52B, Sheet 13 determined that a fi re-induced failure of Circuit BCVRC2B will not spuriously open the PORV, but will disable the capability to remotely open the valve, if desired. Howeve r, the opening of the valve is not accredited for achieving shutdown. Fire damage to the circuits is, therefore, not a concern.

Resolution:

None Required.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 39 RCS RC4632 2CV4632B, D 18402A Discussion:

Cold Leg SG1-2 Sample Valve RC4632 is normally closed and is required closed .

for shutdown to prevent inadve rtent RCS blowdown should the Pressurizer Vent Header Valve RC200 spuriously o pen . A review of EWD E-52B, Sheet 11 has dete rmined that a fire-induced failure of either of the above-mentioned circuits would not spuriously open the valve. Thus, t hese circuits do not pose an Appendix R concern. No further analysis or review is required.

Moreove r, no circuits fo r Valve RC200 pass t hrough this area, t he reby precluding the possibility of spurious opening of the valve.

Resolution:

None Required.

O 4.A-33

Iccility: DB-1 App:ndix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153

-q-t j Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA A POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW Note System Component Circuit Raceway 40 SWS P3-1 1CAC107B, C, F 27121A, 1CEB P3-3 1CAC1098, C, D 27121A, 1CEB 1CACD4E 27121A, 1CEB Discussion:

Eithe,r Service Water Pump 1 (P3-1) or 3 (P3-3) is normally aligned to service Train 1 of SWS. For a fire in this fire area, the aligned pump needs to be assured operable to maintain operability of SWS Train 1. A fire-induced failure of any of the above-mentioned circuits could render the respective pump inoperable.

A review of Raceway Drawing E-335 indicates that the above-mentioned conduit and cable tray are routed such that they have separation of approximately 35 feet from any Train 2 safe shutdown or associated circuits, with no Jutervening combustibles. Additionally, automatic suppression and detection exist in the localized area of concern.

As a result, the above-mentioned circuits are in compliance with the I\ requirements of Appendix R,Section III.C.2. No modifications or procedural actions are required.

Resolution:

None Required.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 41 SWS SW1382 1CBE1218F 27120A, 1CEB .

1CBE1218H, I 27572A, 1CEB 1 CPS 4928D, E, F 27572A, ICEB 1 CPS 4928C 27572A, 27226A, 1CEB, ICEC Liscussion:

The AFP 1 Suction Valve from the SWS SW1382, is no rmally closed and is required open in order to provide a backup supply of water to the SCs when the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) level is depleted.

A fire-induced failure of any of the above-mentioned circuits would preclude the ability to open the valve remotely from the Control Room. However, the CST would not become depleted for many hours when shutting down the plant, thus ample time to manually open the valve locally in Fire Area E would be available. Guidelines will be provided in procedure AB1203.02 for this action.

4.A-34

F;cility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA A POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW ,

Resolution:

Procedure AB1203.02 is to provide guidelines for the local manual operation of valve SW1382 in Fire Area E.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway

. 42 SWS SW1399 1CBE1277E, G 27120A, 1CEB Discussion:

TPCW Heat Exchanger Inlet Header Isolation Valve SW1399 provides service water to the Turbine Plant Cooling Water System. The portions of the Service Water System supplied by this valve is not required for safe shutdown. Therefore, the only concern is that the valve could remain open and provide substantial SWS flow diversion. The valve. in question needs to be secured closed for shutdown in order to assure adequate flow to the essential portion of SWS.

A review of Raceway Drawing E-335 indicates that the above-sentioned conduit and cable tray are routed such that they have separation of approximately 35

'eet from any Train 2 safe shutdown or associated circuits, with no intervening combustibles. Additionally, automatic suppression and detection exist in the localized area of concern.

As a result, the above-mentioned circuits are in compliance with the requirements of Appendix R,Section III.G.2. No modifications or procedural actions are necessary.

Resolution:

None Required. -

Note System Componen't Circuit Raceway 43 SWS SW1429 1CV1429B 27122A, ICEB 3CV1429A, B 36205E Discussion:

SW from CC Heat Exchanger 3 Isolation Valve SW1429 is normally open or closed depending on whether or not CCW Pump 3 is operating at the time of the fire, and is required to be open when CCW Pump 3 is being utilized for shutdown. A review of EWD E-48B, Sheet 31 has determined that a fire-induced failure of any of the above-mentioned circuits would, at worst, de-energize the valve

open (which is its safe shutdown mode). Hence, no modifications or procedural l actions are necessary.

4.A-35

F;cility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 g Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA A POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW Resolution None Required.

Note Systes Component Circuit Raceway 44 SWS SW2929 1CBE1281F 27121A, ICEB SW2931 1CBE1282F 27121A, 1CEB Discussion:

The above-sentioned circuits are for SW Discharge Valves to the Intake Structure (SW2929) and Forebay (SW2931). One of four SW Discharge Valves (SW2929 through SW2932) is normally open and depowered (controlled administratively) to ensure SWS discharge at all times.

2hus, there exists no concern of the possiblity of spurious actuation precluding SWS discharge capability. The other three valves remain closed.

Resolution None Required.

Note System Component Circuit Power Supply Raceway 45 ASSCKI AF3869 IPBE1146A HCC EllE 48257A CC5095 1PBE1226A HCC E12A 460888 HV5097 1PBE1227A HCC E12A 46088B HS611 1PBE1294H MCC E12E 18052A -

MV2001 1PBE1123A HCC EllA 28093A Discussion:

The above-eentioned circuits, with the exception of IPBE1123A and 1PBE1227A, are for safe shutdown components which have been addressed in this fire area evaluation and alternatives to protecting its circuits were identified.

lioweve r , their power circuits still need to be considered as associated circuits of concern for a high impedance ground fault. Circuits 1PBE1123A and 1PBE1227A were the only Train 1 associated circuits of concern identified from Appendix C-2.

O 4.A-36

Facility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Noten FIRE AREA A POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW Circuit IPBE1146A for valve AF3869 will be adequately separated from Train 2 circuits once the barrier between Rooms 123 and 115 has been upgraded. The Containment Isolation Valve MV2001 would not be required to operate to achieve safe shutdown as a result of a fire. Hence, its power circuit would not be energized and does not pose an associated circuits concern. Likewise, power circuits for valves CC5095, MV5097 and MS611, are not normally energized and are not expected to be remotely operated. Hence, these circuits also do not pose associated circuits concerns. Appendix R compliance is presently met for these associated circuits. As a precautionary measure, procedure AB1203.02 will include guidelines for tripping the breakers for valves CC5095, MV5097, MS611 and MV2001 in the event of a fire in this fire area. Guidelines are provided in procedure AB1203.02 to locally operate valve CC5095 manually, as necessary (refer to Note 10).

Resolution:

None Required.

O O

4.A-37

Factitty . 09-1 Aopendtn R Docket i 50-34e Compliance Assesseent a eptet Reviston : No. 02-1040-1153

( 1 FIRE AREA APPENDIX R EVALUATION FIRE AREA : AA TRAIN _ACCRE0tl,ED FOR SHUTDOWN 1 1 4.6.AA.! ,

FIRE AREA _Q11CRIPit0N Poon numbers and fire protection features for this fire area are as follows :

ROOM DETECTION SUP8RES$10N

.526 . .. .BQQU .Q Li(P.1&IlQB..... .. 1LB... .56016V1Q..

420B N0.1 ELECT ISOLATION RM N MAN Area Coebustible Loading (BTU / Soft) : 4690 9AFE 340f00WN SYSTEMS IN FIRE AREA AA O 4.6. AA.2 .

Ctecutte for the following 3/0 components are located in Fire Area AA:

i!1If5 IB3]N $Q3[QU{yl Jjgj ,,,,,,9[j$$joJJQ3 ,,,,,,,

Ei3FWR 2 02N PNL 125VDC DIST PNL 2 DC MCC 2 MCC 250/125VOC MCC 2 f4 PNL 120VAC DIST PNL 2 /V4 INV 125VOC INVERTER

...........e............................

4.AA-1

Facility: DB-1 Appendix R Dockett 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision 1 No. 02-1040-1153 V

4.6.AA.3 FIRE AREA AA COMPLIANCE

SUMMARY

Fire Area AA is comprised of the Number i Electrical Isolation Roca, No. 4288.

It has no fire detection or automatic suppression. systems. Combustible loading in the room is 4,690 BTU /ft2 ,

A review of Appendices B-2 and C-2 indicated that there are no Train 1 safe shutdown or associated circuits in Fire Area AA. The only sa fe shutdown components and circuits in this fire area are for Train 2 of the Essential Power System. As a result, Train 1 was assured for shutdown.

For a fire in this fire area. Train 1 of the HPI System and SG1 Atmospheric Vent Valve, as well as the Pilot-Operated Relief Valve, remain available for providing RCS pressure and Pressurizer level control.

Due to the fact that there exists no Train 1 safe shutdown or associated circuits in Fire Area AA, the fire area is presently in compliance with Appendix R,Section III.G.

O O

4.AA-2

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Facility : 09-1 Appendte S.

DocFet : 50-346 Compliance Assessment Geocr'.

(~'NPovision : 1 No. 02-1040-1153 k- s FIRE AREA APPENDIX R EVALUATION FIRE AREA : AB TRAIN ACCREDITED FOR SHUTDOWN : 2 4.6.AB.1 FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION Roon nunoers and fire protection features for this fire area are as follows :

POOM DETECTION SUPPRESSION

.5et ....EQQ5.QtiGELEILQ5..... .. 165... .565C8410..

105 ECCS FUMP RM t-1 Y MAN 113 DECAY HEAT COOLER ROOM Y MAN 113A HATCH AREA Y MAN Area comoustible Loading (BTU /SqFt) : 4448 h

4.e.AB.2 SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS IN FIRE AREA AB Ctreetts for the following S/D conoonents are located in Ftee Area AB:

515I!5 IS315 59Mf99fMI IJE5 ..... 95598!2Il9N AFW3 : AF599 N G'i AFW TO SG2 ISO JLV 1 AF600 MOV AFW TO SGI ISO VLV CCWS 1 CC1467 SOV DHR CLR 1 OUT 150 Vtv CC1469 SOV DHR CLR 2 OUT ISO VLV -

CS3 1 P5o-1 PUMP CS PUMP t

, JbFi 2 DH13A 50V DH CLR 2 BVPASS VLV 1' DH1*B SOV DH CLR 1 8VPAS3 VLV 2 DH14A SOV DM CLR 2 OUT VLV 1 DHl4B 30V DM CLP 1 OUT VLV 1 DHl517 MOV DH NORM SUCT LINE 1 VLV 2 DH1516 NOV DH NORM SUCT LINE 2 VLV 1 DH2773 MOV DH FUMP 1 9WST SUCT VLV 2 DH2734 MOV DH AUMP 2 BW3T 50CT VLV 2 Dh62 MOV LPl/HPl CROSS-TIE VLV

1 DH64 MOV LFinHP! CP.0is-TIE VLV 1 F42-1 PUMF DHR/LPI PUMF 1 E!5PWR I Et:E MCC 400VAC MCC

. 2 *ttE MCC- 480VAC NCC

/ 'T H915 2 HP31 MOV HP! PMP / PECtRC ':LV

( -/ i HP32 N0v Hel FMP 1 FECIFC /Lv i Pti7-1 PUMP HP! FMF 1 AC LO FUMP 4.AB-1

Factitty : DE-1 Appendix R Docket 50-74: Coeoltance Assessment Repor Revtston i 1 No. 02-1040-1153 FIRE AREA APPENDIX R EVALUATION FIRE AREA : AB TRAIN ACCAEDITED FOR SHUTDOWN : 2 4.6.AB.2 SAFi SkUTDOWN SYSTEMS IN FIRE AREA AB

' C o r. t . I Circutts for the following S/D components are located in Fire Area AB Sy}JEM IEbjd C9 f9ygNJ Jjfg ,,,,,,pgjg3]@Jjgy,,,,,,,,

L P197 ~ PUMP HPI PMP 1 DC LG PMP 1 P53-1 PUFP HPI PUMP 1 HVAC 2 C31-1 FAN ECCS PM 115 CLP FAN 1 2 C:1-2 FAN ECCS RM 115 CLF FAN 2 1/2 C31-3 FAN ECCS RM 113 CLR FAN 3 1 C31-4 FAN ECCS AM 105 CLR FAN 4 1 C31-5 FAN ECCS PM 105 CLR FAN 5 MSS 1 MS611 MOV SG 1 DP AIN LINE ISO '/LV O

4.AB-2

Fccility: DB-1 Appendix R Dockst 50-346 Cceplicnco As: css ent R2 port Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 4.6.AB.3 FIRE AREA AB COMPLIANCE

SUMMARY

Fire Area AE is comprised of Rooms 105, 113 and 113A. It has fire detection but no automatic suppression system. Combustible loading in the fire area is 4,448 BTU /ft2 ,

A review of Appendix B-2 showed that there is a greater number of Train 1 circuits located in this fire area than there are Train 2. Moreover, the Decay Heat Removal Pump 1 and High Pressure Injection Pump 1 (as well as supporting pumps) are located in this fire area. As a result, Train 2 was assured for shutdown.

As a result of a review of the Train 2 components and circuits in Fire Area AB, procedural actions in the form of manual operation of valves DH63, DH1518, DH2734 and HP31, as well as establishing temporary ventilation in Rooms 113 and 115, are to be included in procedure AB1203.02.

Additionally, modifications are proposed for insta11 sting ground fault protection at Breakers BF1146 and BF1189.

For a fire in this fire area, Train 2 of the HPI System and SG2 Atmospheric Vent Valve, as well as the Pilot-Operated Relief Valve, remain available for O providing RCS pressure and Pressurizer level control.

Due to the fact that an alternate shutdown capability, in the form of temporary ECCS Pump room ventilation, is accredited for shutdown in this fire area, an exemption is requested from the Section III.G.3 requirement to have installed in Fire Area AB an automatic suppression system.

Once the above-mentioned procedural actions are incorporated in AB1203.02 and the modifica tions are completed, Fire Area AB will be in compliance with Appendix R requirements, provided the exemption request is granted.

O 4.AB-3

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Facility: DB-1 Appendix R Dockett 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Reviaion: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 b

V Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA AB PJrENTIAL NON-COWLIA!CES REVIEW Note System Componen t Circuit Raceway 1 AFWS AF599 2CBF1118H, J. L, M. P, T 18218A 2CBF1118V 17155A 2CBF1118W 182165 2PBF1118A 18215D 2PBF11188, Z 182158 Discussion:

AFW to SC 2 Isolation Valve AF599 is normally open and is required open for hot standby and for cooldown to cold shutdown. It is strictly a spurious actuation concern. AF599 has two separate starters (one at MCC Fila and one at HCC Fi1E). Both starters are required to be energised for the valve to go closed from its normally open position. Based on a review of Ele E-448, Sheet 4, hot shorts to one of the L, M, N and U circuits could energize the starter at MCC F11E. Likewise, hot shorts to one of the F, G, I and S circuits could energize the starter at MCC Fila. Since no circuits that would energise the starter at MCC Fila pass through Fire Area AB, the starter at MCC Fila Q

v cannot spuriously operate. Hence, a fire in this area could not spuriously close valve AF599. The re fo re , the above-amationed circuits do not pose an .

Appendix R concern. No modification or procedural action is required.

Resolution:

None Required.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 2 CCWS CC1469 2CV1469C, E 17607A 2CV1469A, D 17607C 2CV14698 Nipple EV1469, NV1469 SV1469 Discussion:

The DHR Cooler 1-2 Outlet Isolation Valve CC1469 is normally closed and is required to be opened in order to cooldown to cold shutdown utilizing the CHR Systen.

A review of EWD E-508, Sheet 11, determined that a fire-induced failure of any of the above-sentioned circuits would result in de-energizing the solenoid valve open (which is its safe shutdown mode). As a result, no modification or procedural revisions are necessary.

d 4.AB-8

Facility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA AB POTENTIAL NON-COWLIANCES REVIEW Resolution:

None Required.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 3 CSS P56-1 1CBE111D 46014E, F. JB1804 1CBE111F 46014E,11, JB1804 IP BE111A 46013D EV1530 NP 0561, W 0561 Discussiont The specific concern related to Appendix R is whether the Containment Spray Valve CS1530 could spuriously open in conjunction with the spurious starting of the Containment Spray P ump 1 P 56-1. This would cause cold water to be sprayed onto the reactor, thereby potentially resulting in rapid RCS cooldown.

CS1530 is normally closed and is required closed for shutdown. P56-1 .i s normally of f and is required to remain of f in the event that CS1530 spuriously opens.

However, a review of Appendix B-2 revealed that no circuits for Containment Spray Valve CS1530 pass through this fire area. Hence, even if P 56-1 were to spuriously start, inadvertent containment sp ray is not possible due to the fact that valve CS1530 remains closed.

Resolutfont None Required.

Note System Component Ci rc uit Raceway 4 DilRS Dill 3 A 2CVDill3AA 17093A 2CVDil13AB, C 17607A 2CVDill3AC 176070

. 2CVDil13 AD Nipple EV1469 NVDil13A, SVDill3A O

4,AB-9

Facility: DB-1 Appendix R Dockets 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision 1 No. 02-1040-1153 m

Table i Notes (v)

FIRE AREA AB POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW Discussion The Decay Heat Cooler 2 Bypass Valve DH13A is normally closed and is required to remain closed when cooling down to cold shutdown to preclude bypassing the DHR Cooler 2 when in the Decay Heat Removal mode. Hence, the valve is strictly a spurious actuation concern. A review of EWD E-528, Sheet 25, has determined that a fire-induced failure of the above-mentioned circuits would, at worst, de-ene rgize the valve to remain in the normally closed position. Spurious opening of the valve is not possible. Hence, no modification or procedural revisions are necessary.

Resolution None Required.

Note Systes Component Circuit Raceway 5 DHRS DR14A 2CVDR14AA 17095A O, 2CVDH14AB, E F 17607A C) 2CVDR14AC 2CVDH14AD 176078 Nipple EV1469 NVDR14A, SVDR14A Discussion:

The Decay Heat cooler 2 Outlet Flow Control Valve DH14A is normally open and is required to remain open when cooling down to cold shutdown to assure DHR flow through the coolers when in the Decay Heat Removal mode.

A review of EWD E-528, Sheet 25 has determined that a fire-induced failure of the above-mentioned circuits would de-energize the valve to remain in its normally. open position. Hence, spurious closure of the valve is not possible. Consequently, no modifications or procedural revisions are necessa ry .

Resolution None Required.

I3 O

4. A B-10

Fccility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision : 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA AB POIENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW Note System Comp on ent Circuit _Rac m y 6 DHRS DH1518 2CBF1129G 27444A, 17358A Discussion:

The Decay Heat Removal (DHR) Suction Line 2 Valve DH1518 is closed during normal plant operation. When in the DHR mode , the valve is required to be opened to provide the capability to recirculate RCS inventory through the DHR Cooler 2. In the LPI mode. DH1518 is required to be closed to preclude BWST flow diversion. Hence, the valve is required to be operable (both positions) when cooling down to cold shutdown.

Based on a review of EWD E-52B, Sheet 22, a fire-induced failure of the above-mentioned circuit would disable the capability to remotely operate the valve.

However, since the valve is only required operable to achieve cold shutdown, adequate time is available to locally operate the valve manually in Fire Area DB. . Procedural guidelines will be provided in TED procedures for this action.

Re solutien t Procedural guidelines are to be provided in AB1203.02 for the local manual operation of valve DH1518 in Fire Area DB.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 7 DHRS DH2734 2CBF1134D, G 27444A 2CBF1134E Nipple 2CBF1134F 17358A 2PBF1134A 27443A EV2734, NV2734 DH2734 Discussion:

The Decay Heat Pump 2 BWST Suction Valve DH2734 is open during normal plant ope ration. When in the DHR mod e , the valve is requi red to be clos ed to preclude RCS inventory diversion. In t he LPI mode, DH2734 is required to be open to provide BWST suction to DH Pump 2 for injection into the RCS. Hence, the valve is required to be ope rable (both positions) when cooling down to cold shutdown. Based on a re view of EWD E -5 2 B , Sheet 22, a fi re-induced failure of t he above-ment ioned circuits would disable t he capability to remotely operate the valve.

O 4.AB-11

Facilitys DB-1 Appendix R.

Docket:- 50-346 Compliance: Assessment Report Revision: 1. No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA AB POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW However, since the valve is only required operable to achieve cold shutdown, adequate time is available to extinguish the fire and then locally operate the valve manually in Fire Area AB. Procedural guidelines will be provided for this action.

i Resolution:

Guidelines 'are to be provided in procedure AB1203.02 for the local manual operation of valve CH2734 in Fire Area AB.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 8 CHRS CH63 2CEF1195C 18226A 2CBF1195D 18227A 2PBF1195A 18225A Discussion:

O The LPI/HPI Crosstie Valve DH63 is normally closed and is opened when the

" Piggyback" mode of the HPI System is utilized for shutdown. In this mode, the LPI Pump 2 is aligned in series with the HPI Pump 2 to raise the HPI Syste=

discharge pressure approximately 150 psig. However, no credit is taken for the piggyback mode of operation in this Appendix R evaluation. The Pilot-Operated Relief Valve (PORV) remains available for rapid RCS depressuri:ation to bring down the RCS pressure, as necessary, so that the HP System can be put into operation without the need of the piggyback mode.

In the LPIS or CHRS : ode, the concern of valve DH63 is that it remain closed.

However, if the valve did spuriously open, the ' blowdown would at worst be through the 1 1/2" HPI Pump 2 Recirculation Line. This should not result in -

substantial flow diversion. Nonetheless, this valve can be secured by a procedural action. Adequate ti=e is available to perform this action since the OHR and LPI : odes are only required operable to cooldown to cold shutdown.

Resolucice Guidelines will be provided in procedure AB1203.02 to assure that valve DH63 is closed when in the LPI or DHR code.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 9 ESSPWR MCC F11E 2PBF1189A 18215B O

q 4.AB-12 6

-s

Fccility: DB-1 App:ndix R Dock t: 50-346 Complicac9 A2s:ssment R: port Revision: 2 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA AB POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW Discussion:

The above-mentioned circuit is the power feeder from 480V AC MCC Fila to MCC F11E. MCC F11E supplies power to motor-operated valves DH63 and HP31 (Notes 8 and 10 respectively) for the HPI System and ECCS Room Cooler Fans C31-1 and C31-2 (refer to Note 11). For a fire in this fire area, this power supply need not be available due to the fact that local manual operation or an alternate shutdown capability is provided for HP31, DH63, C31-1 and C31-2. Hence, power to the components is not required. Refer )

to the applicable notes. L Therefore, the power feeder to MCC F11E may be lost and not impact safe {

shutdown capability. However, a fire-induced failure of this circuit could result in the loss of all Fil MCCs since they are not coordinated for a high impedance ground fault (refer to Note 12).

Resolution _ :

None Required.

Note System Components Circuit Raceway 10 HPIS HP31 2CBF1194C 18226A 2CBF1194D 18227A 2PBF1294A 18225A Discussion:

The HPI Pump 1-2 ?.ecirculation Stop Check Valve HP31 is normally open and is required open when the HPI Pump 2 is operating in order to assure a rectreulation path to the BWST until RCS pressure is low enough to promote HPI flow into the RCS.

A review f EWD E-52B, Sheet 65, has shown that a fire-induced failure of Circuits 2CBF1194C and D could result in the spurious closure of the valve. The valve operability is required to maintain hot standby and to lo to cold shutdown. Hence conduits 18226A and 18227A will be provided

.tth a three hour barrier. Circuit 2PBF1194A is considered an associated

rcutt as .ti.scussed in Note 12.

Resolution:

Conduits 18226A and 18227A will be provided with a three hour barrier. l 4.AB-13 O

Fccility: DB-1 Appsndix R Docket: 50-346 Complicaca Amstssment Report R visien: 2 No. 02-1040-1153

,- Table 1 Notes d FIRE AREA AB POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCE REVIEW Note System Component ~ Circuit Raceway 11 HVAC C31-1 2CBF1192B, C 18216A 2PBF1192A 18217A C31-2 2CBF1193B 18216B 2CBF1193C 18216A 2PBF1193A 18217A C31-3 2CBP1157B 27032C 2CBF1157C 17360A, 27031C JB1737, EV5423 2PBF1157A 27034C FTS5423 MC0313, NC0313 Discussion:

ECCS Room Cooler Fans C31-1 and C31-2 are required to be operable when the HP1 Pump 1-2 is operating to remove the heat load from Room 115.

Both cooler fans are required to operate to maintain the room temperature below 122*F when the service water temperature is greater than 75 F.

In the event that Cooler Fans C31-1 and C31-2 are disabled, alternative ECCS Room 115 cooling will need to be provided. This function will be

("'N performed by introducing portable fans and elephant trunks in Room 115

( ,) from Room 236 to remove the heat load. TED procedure AB1203.02 will I provide guidelines for this local manual action in Fire Area A.

Additionally, a fire 'in this fire area could disable ECCS Cooler Fan 3 (C31-2) which is normally required to be operable when the DHR coolers are being utilized for plant shutdown. However, since the DHR coolers (located in Room 113) are only operated to go to cold shutdown, adequate time' exists to set up temporary ventilation in Room 113 by providing portable fans after the fire in Fire Area AB has been extinguished.

Guidelines for this action are also to be included in procedure AB1203.02. _

An exemption is requested to the Section III.G.3 requirements to have full fire area suppression in an area utilizing an alternate shutdown capability (temporary ECCS Pump Room 115 ventilation).

Resolut on:

Procedure AB1203.02 will include guidelines for establishing temporary ventilation in Room 115 (Fire Area A) and Room 113 (Fire Area AB). .

l t Y U

4.AB-14

Fccility: DB-1 Appandix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA AB POTENTIAL NON-CON LIANCEE REVIEW Note System, Component Ci rcuit Power Supply Raceway 12 ASS CKT AF599 1. 2PBF1118A MCC Fila 18215D AF593 2. ZP BF1118B MCC Fila 18215B AF599 3. 2PBF1118Z MCC Fila 18215B DH2734 4. ZP 3F1134A MCC F11C 27443A MP 892A 5. ZP3F1153A* MCC F11D 27403A MP 892B 6. ZP BF1154A* MCC F11D 27404A MV5423 7, 2P3F1163A* MCC F11D 27030C,.JB1737 MV5441 8. 2P3F1178A* MCC F11D 27415A MV5442 9. P3F1179A* MCC F11D 27413A MV830 10. 2P3F1185A* MCC F11D 17133A MCC F11E 11, 2PBF1189A MCC Fila 18215B C31-1 12. 2P3F1192A MCC F11E 18217A C31-2 13. :P BF1193A MCC F11E 18217A C21-3 14 2?3F1157A MCC F11D 27034C HP 31 15. 2PBF1194A MCC F11E 18225A DH63 16. :P BF1195A MCC F11E 18225A MCC F11F 17. BPBF1196A* MCC F11E 18409A

These circuit s were identified as associated circuits from Appendix C-2. All other circuits are safe shutdown circuits which have been add ressed in this fire area evaluation and alternatives to protecting the ci. ruits were identified. However, these circuits still need to be considered as associated circuits of concern.

Discussion:

The above mentioned circuits are identified as associated circuits of concern due to the lack of ground fault protection downstream of the Unit Substation (USS). As a result, the fire-induced failure of these circuits could potentially trip the source breaker at the USS and thereby cause a loss of power to the MCCs fed from that breaker. A review of Appendix C-2 indicates that the najority of Train 2 associated circuits are fed f rom either MCC F11D o r F;;E. Neither or these MCCs is required operable for a fire in this f i re area.

MCCs F11D and F11E are powered f rom MCC Fila. The circuit breakers at M,CC F11a which need to isolate f aults downstream of MCCs F11D and Fi1E are SF1146 and 3F1189. The re f o re , the installation of g,round fault protection is being proposed for these b reake rs. Once ground fault protection is installed at breakers BF1189 and BF1146, a failure of any of the above listed associated ci rcuit s would, at wo rst, result in the loss of MCC F11D or MCC Fi1E.

The remaining powe'r circuits, for valves AF599 and DH2734, are only a concern if they are energized in conjunction with a high impedance ground fault. The power circuit for AF599 would not be energized since this valve is required to f' remain in its normally open position for shutdown.

4.AB-15

l' Fccility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes FIRE _ AREA AB POTENTIAL NON-CCWLIANCES REVIEW Circuit 2P BF1134A for valve DH2734 would also not normally be ene rgized.

Hence, Appendix R compliance is presently met for these circuits. As a

precautionary measure, procedure AB1203.02 will include guidelines for tripping the breakers for valves DH2734 and AF599 in the event of a fire in this fire area. Operators will manually operate valve DH2734 locally for cooldown to cold shutdown (refer to Note 7).

Resolution:

The proposed resolution for each circuit is summarized as follows:

3 o Associated circuits 5 through 10 and 14 will be resolved by the installation of ground f ault protection at Breaker BFil46, o Asscciated circuits 11 through 13 and 15 through 17 will be resolved by the installation of ground fault protection at Breaker BF1189 o Associated circuits 1, 2, 3 and 4 are not associated circuits of

concern since they are not normally energized. Appendix R compliance is currently met for these circuits.

r

+

i 4.AB-16 i

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Factiity : DE- Appendt< R Docket 50 *46 Compliance Assessment Recort

' N Revtston 1 No. 02-1040-115' ETRE AREA APPENDIX R EVALUATION FIRE AREA AC i

TRAIN ACC9 EDITED FOR SHUTDOWN 1 2 4.6.AC.1 FIRE AqEA TESCRIPTION Roca numbers and fire protection features for this fire area are as fo. lows t ROOM ,

DETECTION SUPPPE5510N

_Ng., ,,,,EQQQ,0(i(&{El[QN,,,,, ,,,1'N,.. ,Q@NieUlQ,,

l --- BWST PIPE TRENCH N MAN Area Coebustible Loadtng (BTd/SqFt1 655 4

rs 4.e.AC.2 BAFE SHOTDOWN SYSTEMS IN FIFE AREA AC Circuits for the following SiD components are located in Fire area *C 31!IED IBAjN {Qyf93ggj IfCE ,,,,,,pEjCEJEfjQN,,,,,,,,

UnF5 2 DH07A NOV BW5T ISO V'_V a 1 DH079 MOV BWST 150 VLV B 2 DH09A MOV CTMT SUMP ISO VLV A DH09B MOV CTMT SUMP 150 VLV B f

C 4.AC-1

Fccilityt DB-1 Appendix R Dockot 50-346 Co:plience Assecount Raport Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 s

4. 6.AC .3 FIRE AREA'AC COMPLIANCE SUVARY Fire Area AC is comprised of the BWST Pipe Trench. It has no fire detection or automatic suppression systems. Combustible loading in the fire s ea is almost neglible (approximately 655 B1U/f t2 ),

A review of Appendix B-2 showed that an equal amount, and the same type, of

, Train 1 and Train 2 circuits exist in Fire Area AC. A review of Appendix C-2 showed that there are no associatec circuita in Fire Area AC of either train.

Train 2 van chosen to assure for shtudown.

As a result of a review of the Traf n 2 components and circuits in Fire Area AC, it turns out that oaly one procedural action, that being the local manual operation of valve DH07A, is neceseary specifically as a reeult of a fire in this fire area.

For a fire in this fire area, Train 2 of the HFI Systea and SG2 Atmospheric Vent Valve, as well as the Pilot-Operated Relief Valve, remain available for providing RCS pressure and Pressurizer level control.

Once the above-mentioned procedural Fuidelines are in place, Fire Area AC will be in ecupliance with Appendix P.,Section III.G.

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Fccility: DB-1 Appandix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153

'7 Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA AC POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW Note System Component Circuit Raceway 1 DHRS DH07A 2CBF1148B, C 48036C 2CBF1148D 20301A 2CBF1148E Nipple 2CBF1148J 27670C, E 2PBF1148A 48035C EVDH07A, NVDH07A MVDH07A .

Discussion:

The BWST Isolation Valve DH07A is normally open and is required open in order to provide -BWST water to either the Makeup System, HPI System, or LPI System for maintaining hot standby and/or for going to cold shutdown. It is strictly a spurious actuation concern. A review of EWD E-52B, Sheet 19A determined that a hot short to the "B" , "C" or "J" cables could energize the relay to c1cse valve DH07A. Hence, spurious closure of DH07A is possible.

However, despite the fact that the valve is required to be open to maintain

[' hot standby, time is available for operations personnel to manually open the

\ valve locally in Fire Area AC once the fire has been extinguished. Note that the combustible loading is such that a fire should not last more than half a minute.

Resolution:

Procedure AB1203.02 will provide guidelines for the local manual opening of valve DH07A (designated an emergency control station) in Fire Area AC should it spuriously close, once the fire has been extinguished.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 2 DHRS DH09A 2CBF1142J 27670C Discussion:

Eme rgency Sump . Isolation Valve DH09A is required closed at all times to preclude the inadvertent blowdown of BWST water into the Containment Eme rgency Sump. If this were to occur the Containment Emergency Sump could fill up with water to the point that water would come in contact with the reactor and thereby possibly cause thermal shocking. Hence, this valve must be assured closed. However, a review of EWD E-52B, Sheet 19B has determined that a fire-induced failure of the "J" circuit is not a concern since it only serves as a permissive interlock to open DH09A should DH07A go closed. A fire- induced ,

j f ailure of the circuit would not result in the spurious opening of the valve.

4.AC-4

F;cility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Re po rt Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA AC PCPIENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW Resolution:

None Required.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 3 DHRS DH09B 1CBE1112J 27671C Discussion:

Emergency Sump Isolation Valve DH09B is required closed at all times to preclude the inadvertent blowdown of BWST water into the Containment Emergency Sump. If this were to occur the Emergency Sump could fill up with water to the point that water would come in contact with the reactor and thereby possibly cause thermal shocking. Hence, this valve must be assured closed.

However, a review of EWD E-52B, Sheet 19B has determined that a fire-induced failure of the "J" circuit is not a concern since it only serves as a pe rmissive interlock to open DH09B should DH07B go closed. A fire-induced failure of the circuit would not result in the spurious opening of the valve.

Resolution:

None Required.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 4 AS SCKT DH07A 2PBF1148A 48035C Discussion:

l Circuit 2PBF1148A (fed from MCC FilB) is the power supply for _ safe shutdown valve DH07A which has been addressed in this fire area evaluation (refer to l Note' 1) and alternatives to protecting its circuits were identified. However, l the power circuit still needs to be considered as an associated circuit of concern for a high impedance ground fault.

A review of the loads fed from MCC FilB showed that only three power circuits feed safe shutdown components, all of which are strictly spurious actuation concerns. As a result, these three power circuits need not be energized to dchieve safe shutdown. Therefore, since none of the loads serviced by MCC FilB are necessary, the incoming feeder from MCC Fila is to be coordinated so that a limited short to ground fault of Circuit 2PBFil48A will, at worst, result in disabling MCC F118 and will impact no other MCCs.

O 4.AC-5

Fccility: DB-1 Appandix R Docket: 50-346 .

Compliance Assessment Report

: Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 O Table 1 Notes Q

FIRE AREA AC POTENTIAL NON-COWLIANCES REVIEW A' ground fault interrupting - device is already proposed .to be installed at breaker BF1137 as a result of the associated circuits evaluation performed for Fire Area V. As a result, a high impedance ground fault will, at worst, only disable MCC F11B, which is not required for shutdown for a fire in this fire area. Hence, no further modifications are necessary Resolution:

None Required.

r i

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d Factittv i 00-1 Appendit P Docket 50 *Ji Compliance Assessment F+ pert

' Revision : 1 No. 92-1040-115; FIRE AREA' APPENDIX R EVALUATION FIRE AREA : B TRAIN ACCREDITED FOR SHUTDOWN : 2 4.6.B.1 FIGE AGEA DESCRIPit0N Reos nemoers and fire protection 'eatures for this fire area are as follows :

ROOM DETECTION SUFFRESSION

_ f!2 . _ _ .B 0 2 5 . Q E S q R (( [ [ QFj _ _ _ _ _ ___{ch___ ,Q&NL&Q{Q,_

100 E00!PMENT h FIPE CHASE f MAN 101 PIFE T'JNNEL f MAN Area Combustible Loading (BTU /SqFts : 12222 4.5.9.; SAFE SHOTD0dN SYSTEMS IN FIRE AEEA B .

Cteceits for tne following S/D components are located in Fire Area B :

ili!ft IRi13 99 E9BEUI 51EE ______Qj@C2][IJQU________

8F4S 2 AF597 MOV AFW TO SG2 ISO VLV 1 AF608 MOV AFW TO SG1 ISO VLV OHF:

DH07A MOV BWST ISO VLV A 1 DH07B MOV BW3T ISO VLV B 2 DH03A MOV CTMT SUMP 150 VLV A 1 DH07B MOV CTNT SUHF 150 VLV E 2 DH63 MOV LPI/HPI CROS5-TIE VLV E 5 3 ; .J 1 E12E MCC 480VAC MCC 2 FitE MCC 400VAC MCC

': 2 ~P31 MOV HPI PMP 2 RECIRC VLV 1 HP32 MOV hPI FMG 1 RECIFC VLv 1 F187-1 FUMP HFI PMF 1 AC L0 FUMP H.A. 2 C01-1 AN ECC5 RM i15 CLR CAN t 2 C01-2 FAN ECC5 FM 115 CLF FAN 2

. C31-4 F At4 ECC5 AM 145 CLF ~AN 4

. 1 C31-5 FAN ECCS RM 105 CLF FAN 5 MSi ! MSe11 N07 3G 1 DRAIN LINE 150 VLv

\ ........................................

[O 1

i 4.B-1

.Fccility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report

! Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 l

O 4.6.B.3- FIRE AREA B COMPLIANCE

SUMMARY

4 Fire Area B is comprised of Rooms 100 and 101. It has fire detection but no automatic suppression system. The rooms' configuration and the safe shutdown !

circuit routings are such that they do not meet the separation requirements of

, Appendix R. Combustible loading in the fire area is approximately 12,222 BTU /ft2 ,

A review of Appendix B-2 showed that nearly an equal amount of Train 1 and Train 2 circuits exist in Fire Area B. Howeve r, a review of Appendix C-2

- showed that there are substantially more Train 1 associated circuits in Fire

Area B than there are Train 2 associated circuits. As a result, Train 2 was assured for shutdown in Fire Area B.

Based on a review of the Train 2 components and circuits in Fire Area B, it turns out that only one modification, that being the installation of a ground fault interrupting device for Breaker BF1189, needs to be performed.

4 Procedural guidelines,for local operation 'of valves DH07A, DH63 and MU3971, as .

well as providing temporary ventilation for the ECCS Pump Room 115, are to be

! included in TED Procedure AB1203.02 " Serious Plant Fire".

For a fire in this fire area, Train 2 of the Makeup System and SG2 Atmospheric Vent Valve, as well as the Pilot-Operated Relief Valve, remain available for

providing RCS pressure and Pressurizer level control.

l Once the above-mentioned ' modification and procedural revisions are perfo rmed ,

l Fire Area B will be in compliance with Appendix R,Section III.G.

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4 Fccility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA B POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIAEES REVIEW Note- System . Component Circuit Raceway 1 AFWS AF599 2CBF1118H, J, L, M. P, T 18218A 2CBFH18V 17155A 2CBF H18W 18216B 2PBFH18A 18215D 2PBF11188, Z 18215B Discussion: ,

AFW to SG 2 Isolation Valve AF599 is normally open and is required open for maintaining hot standby and for cooldown to . cold shutdown. It is strictly a spurious actuation concern. AF599 has two separate starters (one at MCC Fila and one at MCC Fi1E). Both starters are required to be energized for the valve to go closed from its normally open position. Based on a review of EWD E-445, Sheet 4, hot shorts to one of the L. M, N and U circuits could energize the starter at MCC Fi1E. Likewise, hot shorts to otet 'u f the F , G , I and S circuits could energize the starter at MCC Fila. Since no circuits that would energize the starter at MCC Fila pass through Fire Area B, the starter at .MCC

~

Hence, a fire in this area could not O Fila cannot spuriously opera te.

spuriously close valve AF599. Therefore, the above-mentioned circuits do not pose an Appendix R concern. No modification or procedural action is required.

Resolution:

None Required.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway l

i -

, 2 DHRS DH07A 2CBF1148J 27670C I

f' Discussion:

The BWST Isolation Valve DH07A is normally open and is required open in order l

to provide BWST water to either the Makeup System or 3PI System to maintain ho t . s tandby , or LPI System for going to cold shutdown. It is strictly a spurious actuation concern. A review of EWD E-525, Sheet 19A determined that a hot short between conductors for the "J" circuit could energize the relay to

! close valve DH07A. Hence, spurious closure of DH07A is possible due to a fire-

! induced failure of Circuit 2CBFH48J.

However, fot a fire in Fire Area B, ample time is available to manually secure I open/open DH07A locally in Fire Area AC. Guidelines will be provided in procedure AB1203.02 for this local operation.

I 4.B-5 i

Facility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA B POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW Resolution:

TED procedure A31203.02 is to provide guidelines for the local manual opening of valve DH07A (designated an emergency control station) in Fire Area AC.

Note S ys tem Component Circuit Raceway 3 DHRS DH09A 2CBF1142J 27670C -

Discussion:

Emergency Sump Isolation Valve DH09A is required closed at all times to preclude the inadvertent blowdown of BWST water into the Containment Emergency

. Sump. If this were to occur the Containment Emergency Sump could fill up with water to the point that water would come in contact with the reactor and thereby possibly cause thermal shocking. Hence, this valve must be assured closed. However, a review of EWD E-52B, Sheet 19B has determined that a fire-induced failure of the "J" circuit is not a concern since it only serves as a permissive interlock to open DH09A should DH07A go closed. A fire-induced failure of the circuit would not result in the spurious opening of the valve.

Resolution:

None Required.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 4 DHRS DH09B 1CBE1112J 27671C Discussion:

Emergency Sump Isolation Valve DH09B is required closed at all times to preclude the inadvertent blowdown of BWST water into the Containment Emergency Sump. If this were to occur the Emergency Sump could fill up with water to the point that water would come in contact with the reactor and the re by possibly cause thermal shocking. Hence, this valve must be assured closed.

However, a review of EWD E-52B, Sheet 19B has determined that a fire-induced failure or tne "J" circuit is not a concern since it only serves as a permissive interlock to open DH09B should DH07B go closed. A fire-induced failure of the circuit would not result in the spurious opening of the valve.

Resolution:

None Required.

4.B-6

Fccility: DB-1 App 2ndix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA B POTENTIAL NON-COWLIANCES REVIEW Note System. Component Circuit ,

Raceway 5 DHRS DH63 2CBF1195C 18226A 2CBF1195D 18227A 2PBF1195A 18225A BFil95 Discussion:

The U I/W I Crosstie Valve DH63 is normally closed and is opened when the

" Piggyback" mode of the WI System is utilized for shutdown. In this mode, the UI Pump 2 is aligned in series with the HP I P ump 2 to raise the HPI System discharge pressure approximately 150 psig. Howeve r, for a fire in this fire area, the Makeup System is accredited for RCS inventory and reactivity control in . lieu of the W I System. As a result, since the W I System is not required for a fire in this fire area, the operability of DH63 does not need to be assured.

In the U IS or DHRS mode, the concern of valve DH63 is that it remain closed, m However, if the valve did spuriously open, the blowdown would at worst be through the 1 1/2" HPI Pump 2 Recirculation Line. This should not result in substantial flow diversion. Nonetheless, this valve will be secured by a procedural action. Adequate time is available to perfona this action since the DHR and DI modes are only required operable to cooldown to cold shutdown.

e Resolution:

Guidelines will be provided in AB1203.02 to assure that valve DH63 is closed when in the UI or DHR mode.

I Note System Component Ci rcuit Raceway 6 ESSPWR MCC File 2P BFil89A 18215B MCC File Discussion:

MCC File supplies power to the following safe shutdown loads:

1. ECCS Room 115 Cooler Fans (C31-1 and C31-2)

2. HPI Pump 2 Recirculation Valve (HP 31) l 3. MI/HPI Cross-tie Valve (DH63)

I 4.B-7 i

i

Fccility: DB-1 Appsndix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA B POTENTIAL NON-CONLIANCES REVIEW Valves HP 31 and DH63 are only required operable for operation of the HPI System. Since the Makeup System is accredited for shutdown, in lieu of the HP I System, for a fire in this fire area, the availability of these loads is not required. In the case of Cooler Fans C31-1 and C31-2, they would only be required for room cooling when in the DHR mode of IPIS, since the HPI system is not to be used for shutdown. If necessary, portable fans would be utilized to maintain Room 115 cool. Since DHRS is only required for going to cold shutdown, adequate time would be available to pe rf orm this ection. TED procedure AB1203.02 will provide guidelines for this local manual action (refer to Note 8).

Howeve r, Circuit 2P BF1189A (power feed to MCC F11E) still needs to be add ressed f rom an associated circuits standpoint. A fire-induced failure of this circuit could result in the loss of Fil MCCs (refer to Note 9).

Resolution:

None Required.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 7 HP IS HP 31 2CBF1194C 18226A 2CBFil94D 18227A 2P BF1194A 18225A BF1194 Discussion:

HPI P ump Recirculation Valve, HP 31 is a motor-operated check valve which is normally open and required open for maintaining hot standby and for going to -

cold shutdown when the IPI System is utilized. This valve provides a minimum recirculation path to the BWST when the B?I Pump is operating and the RCS p re ssure is greater than the HP I P ump discharge pressure, thereby preventing pump damage. The valve is strictly a spurious actuation concern. Howe ve r ,

due to the fact that the HP I System is not being assured for shutdown for a fire in this fire area, damage to circuits for EP 31 is inconsequential. The Makeup System will provide the necessary RCS inventory and reactivity control.

No safe shutdown circuits for the Makeup System and suppo rting systems that could impact'the Makeup System, except for Essential Power Train 2 (which is assured), pass through this fire area. Thus, the Makeup System can pe rfo rm the shutdown function that the HP I System would despite a fire in this fire a re a. Since only Train 2 of Essential Power is to be a s su red , the Makeup Suction Select Valve MU3971 (powered off Train 1 Essential Power) might have to be manually operated locally since Train 1 of Essential Power could be lost due to the presence of Train 1 Essential Power circuits and Train 1 associated circuits in this fire area. Howe ve r, ample time would be available to manually control the valve locally in Fire Area RA.

4.B-8

Fccility: DB-l' Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1- Notes FIRE AREA B POTENTIAL NON-COWLIANCES REVIEW Resolution:

Guidelines are to . be provided in procedure AB1203.02 for the local manual eperation of valve MU3971 (designated an emergency control station) in Fire Area HA.

Note Sys' tem Component Circuit Raceway 8 HVAC C31-1 2CBF1192B, C 18216A 2P BF1192A 18217A BF1192 C31-2 2CBF1193B 182168 2CBF1193C 18216A 2P BF1193A 18217A BF1193 Discussion:

. ECCS Room Cooler Fans C31-1 and C31-2 are required to be operable when the HPI Pump 1-2_is operating to remove the heat . load from Room 115.- Both cooler fans are required to operate to maintain the room temperature below 122*F when the service water temperature is greater than 75'F.

However,_since the Makeup System is to be used to cooldown . to cold shutdown for a fire in this fire area until the point G IS is initiated, and the HPI Pumps are not accredited for shutdown, the ECCS Room Cooler Fans 1-1 and 1-2

.would only be required operable for Room 115 cooling for the - DHR mode of G IS. The heat load ' generated when in the DHR mode in Room 115 is such that it most probably would not be great enough to require the operability of the ECCS room coolers. However, for conservatism, portable fans will be utilized to maintain Room 115 cool. Since DERS is only required for going to cold shutdown, adequate time would be available to perform this action. TED procedure AB1203.02 will provide guidelines for this local manual action in Fire Area A.

Resolution:

P rocedure AB1203.02 will include guidelines for establishing temporary

-ventilation in Room 115 (Fire Area A).

Note System Component Ci rcuit Raceway 9 'ASSCKT MCC F11F *BP BF1196A 18409A AF599 2P BF1118A 18215D O 2P BF1118B 2P BF1118Z 18215B 18215B 4.B-9

Fccility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA B POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIAICES REVIEW MCC Fi1E 2PBF1189A 18215B El *2PBF1194A 18225A DH63 *2PBF1195A 18225A C31-1 *2PBF1192A I8217A C31-2 *2PBF1193A 18217A .

Discussion:

Circuit BPBF1196A is the power feeder from MCC Fi1E to MCC F11F. It is the only associated circuit identified from Appendix C-2. The circuit is not required to remain intact for safe shutdown, due to the fact that MCC F11F powers no safe shutdown loads, but must be addressed from an associated circuits standpoint.

The remaining associated circuits are for safe shutdown components which were provided with alternatives to protecting the circuits. Howeve r, the power cicruits fo r t hese components still need to be considered as associated circuits of concern for a high impedance ground fault.

The overriding concern from an associated circuits standpoint surfaced in the Essential Power discussion (refer to Note 6) in which a high impedance ground fault of Circuit 2PBF1189A (power feed to MCC Fi1E) could result in the loss of all Fil MCCs. Wrapping or rerouting the circuit is not a viable alternative in this case due to the fact that MCC F11E is located in Fire Area B. Consequently, Circuit 2PBF1189A must be coordinated at MCC Fila. This modification will in turn resolve any concerns relating to the above-mentioned associated circuits fed off of MCC Fi1E. These are denoted by an "*".

Additionally, Circuits 2PBF1118A, B and Z for valve AF599 (fed from MCC Fila) are also routed in the are a. Howeve r, as discussed previously (refer to Note 1), an evaluation of the circuits has determined that the valve will not spuriously actuate, due to the existence of a redundant s tarte r at MCC F11A.

Hence, these circuits should not pose an associated circuits concern and presently comply with Appendix R requi rements. As a precautionary measure, procedure AB1203.02 will include guidelines for tripping the breaker for valve AF599 in the event of a fire in this fire area. Operators may manually operate any of these above-mentioned valves locally if desired.

Resolution:

A ground fault interrupting device will be installed at breaker BF1189 thereby preserving the availability of all Fil hCCs outside of MCCs F11E and F, which are not required for safe shutdown for a fire in this fire area.

O

'4.B-10

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1 Facittty : l55-1 Apoenaix R Docket 50-34: Conoliance Assessa.ent Eeocet w Pevision 1 No. 02-1040-1153

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- FIRE AREA APPENDIX R EVALUATION FIRE AREA : BB TRAIN ACCPEDITED FOR SHUTDOWN : 2 s : .,

4 4.o.55.1 FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION Roon numbers ano fire protection features for this fire area are as tollows :

ROOM DETECTION SUFFFESSION i Ngt _ _ _ _EQQM ,qE S C R [E1[QN ,,,,, ,,,((N,_, ,qdN {ty[C _,

429A 40.2 ELECT ISOLATION RM N MAN Area Combustible Loading (BTU /Sof t) : e90o

, ,_ 4.a.EB.2 3_4FE iHUTD0wN SYSTEMS IN FIRE AREA BB Circutts for the following S/D components are locatec in Fire Aree EE:

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CACS 1,2 Cl-3 FAN CAC FAN O 125VOC DIST GHL' E5sFWR 1 DIN FNL 1 DC MCC 1 MCC 250/125VDC MCC 1 E15 NCC 480VAC MCC t/2 EF15 MCC 400VAC MCC 2 FIS MCC 480VAC MCC ,

1 f3 FNL 120VAC DIST FNL

, I vv3 INV 125VDC INVERTER

-3 W i 1/2 SW1358 30Y CAC ; 00T [50 VLV 1/2 SW13o8 MOV CAC 3 !N 150 VLV i

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Fccility: DB-1 Appsndix R

'Dockett 50-346 Corplicace Asceaantat Raport Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 4.6.BB.3 FIRE AREA BB CCMPLIANCE

SUMMARY

Fire. Area BB is comprised of the Number 2 Electrical Isolation Roow, No. 429A.

It has no fire detection or automatic suppression systems. Combustible loading in the fire area is approximately 6,806 BTU /f t2, A review of Appendices B-2 and C-2 showed that the majority of safe shutdown and associated circuits in Fire Area BB are . Train 1 circuits. As a result, Train 2 was assured for shutdown. The only exception was that CACS Fans Cl-1 (Train 1) 'and Cl-2 (Train 2) were both assured available for shutdown, q including their supporting systems.

As a result of a review of the Train 2 components and circuits in Fire Area 4 BB, it turns. out that one modification, that being the installation of a f ground fault interrupting device at breaker BE1221 is necessary (refe r to Note 6).

For a fire in this fire area, Train 2 of the HPI System and SG2 Atmospheric Vent Valve, as well as the Pilot-Operated Relief Valve, remain available for providing RCS pressure and Pressurizer level control.

Once the above-mentioned modification is performed, Fire Area BB will be in compliance with Appendix R,Section III.G.

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Fccility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA BB PorENTIAL NON-COPFLIAEES REVIEW Note System Component Circuit Raceway 1 CACS Cl-3 2PBF1501A 46078A 2PBF1501B 46079A 3PBEF15A 46071A 3PBEF15B 46069A BEF153 Discussion:

The Containment Air Cooling System (CACS) Fan 3 C1-3 may be either normally on or off depending on which ' two of the three CACS units are being utilized during nomal operation. One CAC Cooler Fan is required operable .for shutdown purposes. For a fire in this fire area, Train 2 of safe shutdown systems is to be assured. In the case where Fan Cl-3 is normally operating in lieu of Fan Cl-2 Train 2 of CACS could be disabled due to a fire in this fire area.

Hence, the availability of CACS Fan Cl-1 needs to be assured for this worst case scenario. As a result, to assure the operability of one CAC fan, both trains of CAC fans (1.e. Cl-1 and Cl-2) need to be assured.

In addition, the other supporting systems for' the CAC Cooler Fans _ Cl-1 and O Cl-2, namely the Essential Powe r System and S ervice Water System, remain available despite a fire in Fire Area BB.

Resolution:

None Required.

i Note Systea Component Circuit Raceway

[

2 . ES SPWR NCC'EF15 Discussion:

MCC EF15 aay be either powered f rom MCC F15 or MCC E15. The only load coming off of MCC EFIS is CACS Fan 3 Cl-3. As discussed in Note 1, Cl-3 is not accredited ' for a fire in this fire area. Hence, loss of MCC EF15 due to a ;

fire is inconsequential.

5 l Resolution:

i l None Required.

l I 4.BB-4 i 1

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1 Fccility: DB-1 App;ndir R l

Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision : 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA BB POTENTIAL NON-C0hPLIAFCES REVIDI Note System Component C_i rcuit Raceway 3 ESSPWR MCC F15 2CBF105B 46072A Discussion:

The above-mentioned circuits are control circuits for feeder breakers to 480V AC Essential FCCs E15 and F15 from 480V AC Essential Unit Substation Bus El and F1, respectively. The only load supplied by either MCC is MCC EF15. Since MCC EFIS is not accredited for a fire in this fire area (refer to Note 2), loss of this circuit due to fire damage is inconsequential. Hence, no modifications or procedural revisions are necessary to meet Appendix R requirements..

Resolution:

None Required.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 4 SWS SW1358 2CV1358BH, J 46072A Discussion:

The Containment Air Cooler (CAC) 3 Outlet Valve SW1358 is normally open or closed depending whether CAC Fan Cl-3 is operating at the time of the fi re.

It is required open for achieving and maintaining hot standby and for going to cold shutdown only in those instances where credit is taken for Cl-3. For a fi re in this fire area, credit is taken for CAC Cooler Fans Cl-1 and Cl-2.

The re fo re , the above-mentioned circuits may be lost due to a fire without any detrimental impact on safe shutdown. No further analysis is necessary.

Resolution:

None Required.

Note System Component Ci rcuit Raceway 5 SWS SW1368 2CEF1224B 46072A 2CBF1224K 46173A 2PBF1224A 46536A 3PBE1207 H 46075A O

4.BB-5

Fccility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 n

/ Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA BB POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW Discussion:

The Containment Air Cooler (CAC) 3 Outlet valve SW1368 is normally open and is required to remain open when CAC 3 is in operation. For a fire in this fire area, credit is taken for the operability of CAC Fans Cl-1 and Cl-2. Since no ,

credit is taken for Fan Cl-3, operability of the valve need not be assured.

Consequently, fire damage to the above-mentioned circuits will not have an adverse impact on shutdown capability.

Resolution:

None Required.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 6 ASSCKT SW1368 1PBE1207A 46490A 2PBF1224A 46536A 3PBE1207H 46075A T YRF3 1PBE1221A 46529A Note: Train 1 associated circuits identified do not meet the separation requirements of Appendix R and need to be evaluated to assure the availability of Train 1 Essential power. niis in turn assures the availability of CACS Train 1.

Discussion:

The above-mentioned circuits for valve SW1368 hake been addressed in this fire area evaluation and alternatives to protecting the circuits were identified ~

(refer to Note 5). However, the power circuits still need to be considered as associated circuits of concern for a high impedance ground fault.

Circuits 1FBE1207A and 2PBF1224A supply power to MCC EF12D which in turn provides power to valve SW1368 from MCC EF12D via circuit 3PBE1207H. The

- concern is that a limited short to ground fault of any one of these circuits would result in disabling the E12 or F12 MCCs (depending which train was aligned at'the time. However, these power circuits are not normally energized and should not. be called upon to operate to achieve plant shutdown since the valve is strictly a spurious actuation concern. Hence, since the circuit will not be ene rgized , no associated circuits concern exists and Appendix R compliance is presently met for these circuits. As a precautionary measure, instructions for tripping the b reaker for valve SW1368 in the event of a serious fire in this area, will be included to TED proc ~ dure e AB1203.02.

O 4.BB-6 1

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Facility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 ,

Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA BB POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIAtCES REVIEW Circuit 1PDP1221A for Regulated Rectifier YRF3 is also identified as an associated circuit of concern since its fire-induced failure could result in disabling the E12 HCCs. This circuit is no rmally ene rgized and hence, a limited short to ground fault of this circuit disabling a string of MCCs is possible.

Resolution:

Ground fault pro tection will be installed at breaker BE1221 for Circuit IP BE1221A.

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4.BB-7

Fecilit! DE-: Accenots R m

Docket': .50 ~4 Conol:ance Assessment Fe or+.

) Revision 1 No. 02-1940-1155

. {J FIRE AREA APPENDIX R EVALUATION FIRE AREA BD TRAIN ACCREDITED FOR SHUTDOWN : 2 s.

4.c.BD.1 FIPE AFEA DESCRIPTION Roon rupoers and fire protection features for this fire area are es follows -

R00M DETECTION SUFPFESSION

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i 50 SCPEEN WASH FUMP ROOM N MAN 54 STAIRWAY t< PAN' Area Coaoustible t.oading (BTU SqFt) : 12384 4.e.BD.2 3E E 3 HUT 90hN SYSTEMS IN F!PE AFEA 90 Ctecuits for the tollawing S/D components are located in Cire Area ED:

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Fccility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 4.6.BD.3 FIRE AREA BD COMPLIANCE SUMPARY .

Fire Area BD is comprised of Rooms 50 and 54. It has no fire detection or

'Ihe combustible loading in the fire area is automatic suppression systems.

12,384 BTU /f t .

A review of Appendices B-2 and C-2 shcwed that there are no Train 2 safe shutdown or associated circuits found in Fire Area BD. As a result, Train 2 4 was assured for shutdown.

The only safe shutdown circuits present in this fire area involve the Backup Service Water Pump capability. 'Irain 2 of the Service Water System, as well as Train 2 of all other safe shutdown systems, remain unaffected by a fire in

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this fire area.

For a fire in this fire area, Train 2 of the HPI System and SC2 Atmospheric Vent Valve, as well as the Pilot-Operated Relief Valve, remain available for providing. RCS pressure and Pressurizer level control.

. Hence, as a result of the Appendix R evaluation performed for- circuits in Fire

( Area BD, the fire area is determined to be in compliance with Appendix R,Section III.G.

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Fccility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Repo rt Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 g

( Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA BD POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW Not e System Component Circuit Raceway 1 SWS CT4690 ACBE1204B, C Numerous raceways, ACBE1206B, C Refer to APBE1206A Appendix B-2 C3016, PDIS4691 MV4690 Discussion:

The Backup Service Water Pump Strainer Drain Valve CT4690 is normally closed and is required to remain closed to preclude service ' water flow diversion in the case where normal Service Water is not available and credit is taken for the Backup Service Water Pump P180. The valve is strictly a spurious actuation concern.

However , for a fire in this fire area. Train 2 of the Service Water System remains unaffected. Hence , there is no need to rely upon the Backup Service Water capability. As a result, fire damage to the above-mentioned circuits is inconsequential.

p Resolution:

None Required.

Note S ystem Component Circuit Raceway 2 SWS P180 APAC1201A 36012H APAP1800A, B 30841B AP1800, MP1800 Discussion:

The Backup Service Water Pump P180 is required to be operable in the case when all three Service Water Pumps are unavailable. The pump is normally off and is run on high speed when it is used in place of the normal Service Water Pum ps.

I_ However, for a fire in this fire area, Train 2 of the Service Water System remains available for shutdown purposes. He nc e , there is no need to assure the availability of P180. As a result, the fire-induced failure of the above-l mentioned circuits is inconsequential.

Resolution:

None Required.

%J 4.BD-4 l

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Facility : '09 ._ Acoersts F Occhet : SC - : Cosoltance assessment Feoc-t

~'s Reststor. : .t1 No. 02-1440-1150 FIRE AREA APPENDIX R EVALUATION FIRE AREA : BE l

TRAIN ACCFEDITED FOR 5HUTDOWi4 t 2 !

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.4.6.EE.1 FICE AREA DE5CFIFT!ON fcom r.uebers and fire protection features for tnis fire area are ae folicws :

I. F001 DETECTION iuPFFE55!Oh

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Fccility: DB-1 Appsndix R Dockot 50-346 Coxpliance AssassRent Raport Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 O

4.6.BE.3 FIRE AREA BE COMPLIANCE

SUMMARY

Fire Area BE is comprised of Rooms 51 and 55. Both rooms have fire detection but only Roon 51 has automatic suppression. Combustible loading in the fire area is 113,705 BTU /ft2, A review . of- Appendix B-2 showed that there are no Train 2 safe shutdown circuits in this fire area. Additionally, Appendix C-2 indicated that only one associated circuit which could potentially be fed from Train 2 is found in Fire Area BE. As a result, Train 2 was assured for shutdown.

For a fire in this fire area, Train 2 of the HPI System and SG2 Atmospheric Vent Valve, as well as the Pilot-Operated Relief Valve, remain available for providing RCS pressure and Pressurizer level control.

The one non-compliance identified, that being the associated - circuit for Train 2, will be alleviated by the installation of ground fault protection at Breaker BF1280. Once the modification is implemented, Fire Area EE will be in compliance with Appendix R requirements.

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i Facility: DB-1 Appsndix R Docksts 50-346 C:mplianco Asc0cceent R2 port No. 02-1040-1153 Revision: .1 I

.l Table 1 Notes ;

1 v FIRE AREA BE POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIFW i

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 1 SWS CT4690 ACBE12045, C 30843A ACBE1206B, C 30843A APBE1206A 30842E BE1204, BE1206 Discussion:

The Backup Service Water Pump Strainer Drain Valve CT4690 is normally closed and is required to remain closed to preclude service wa'ter flow diversion in the case where normal Service Water is not available and credit is taken for the Backup Service Water Pump P180. The valve is strictly a spurious actuation concern.

However, for a fire in this fire area, Train 2 of the Service Water System remains unaffected. Hence, there is no need to rely upon the Backup Service Water capability. As a result, fire damage to the above-mentioned circuits is inconsequential.

. Resolution:

.O

! V None Required.

Note System Component Circuit Raceway 2 ASSCKT MP0060 CPBEF123A 30571C

- Discussion:

Associated Circuit CPBEF123A supplies power to the Jockey Fire Pump MP0060. .

This circuit 'is powered off MCC EF12C which can either be fed from MCC E12C (Train 1) or MCC F12C (Train 2). If MCC EF12C is powered off Train 2 (MCC F12C) and if Circuit CPBEF123A were to develop a high impedance ground fault -

as a re sult of a fire , all of the F12 MCCs 'could be disabled. Thus, this circuit needs to be addressed to ensure the availability of Train 2 Essential Power.

} Resolution:

Circuit CPBEF123A will be coordinated by the installation of ground fault protection at Breaker BF1280. As a result, a limited short to ground fault would, at wo rst , disable MCC EF12C, which is not required to achieve safe 1 shutdown.

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Facility 09-1 A:cendra R Occbet i 50-04: Compitance Assessment Pepert

%Rovtston : 1 No. 02-1040-1153

(Y Q

FIRE AREA APPENDIX R EVALUATION FIRE AREA : BF TR4!N ACCP(QITED FOP SkUTOOWN : 1 4.o.9F.1 FIPE AREA DESCRIPTION Rcom nuaters and fire prctection features for this itre area are is 'o!:cws A00M OETECTION 500P P EiS I O'i

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Fecility: DB-1 _ Appsndix R Docket: '50-346 Compliance Assessment. Report Revision: 2 No. 02-1040-1153-4.6.BF.3 FIRE AREA BF COMPLIANCE

SUMMARY

Fire Area BF is comprised of the Service Water Pump Area, Roon 52. It has fire detection and an automatic suppression system. The rooms' configu-ration and the safe shutdown circuit routings are such that they do not

= presently meet the separation requirements of Appendix R. Combustible loading in the fire area is approximately 16,512 BTU /ft ,2 A review of Appendices B-2 and C-2 showed that nearly equal quantities of Train 1 and Train 2 safe shutdown and associated circuits are located in Fire Area BF. However, there are two Train 2 motor control centers in the fire area which would make a resolution difficult. As a result, Train I was assured for shutdown.

As a result of a review of the Train 1 components and circuits in Fire Area BF, it turns out that modifications are necessary to meet Section III.G requirements. They are the installation of a ground fault'protec-tion device for Breaker BE1202 and the installation of isolation devices for Circuits ICAC107E and ICAC109F.

Procedural guidelines for the local operation of valve SW1399 and the starting of the Backup Service Water Pump P180 are to be included in procedure AB1203.02 " Serious Plant Fire". The Backup Service Water Pump is an alternative shutdown capability. However, since automatic suppres-sion and detection presently exist in Fire Area BF, the Backup Service

. Water capability presently meets Appendix R,Section III.G.3 requirements.

() , For a fire in this fire area, Train-1 of the HPI System, and SG1 Atmo-spheric Vent Valve, as well as the Pilot-Operated Relief Valve, remain available for providing RCS pressure and Pressurizer level control and for l

maintaining hot. standby.

'Once the above-mentioned modification and procedural revisions are per-formed, Fire Area BF will be in compliance with Appendix R,Section III.G.

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1 Fac111ty: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Repo rt

Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 ,

Table 1 Notes l

FIRE AREA BF POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW '

i l

Not e System Component Circuit . Raceway 1 HVAC C99-1 ' 1GE12128 306200, F

1CBE1212C 30620E, F

)

1PBE1212A 30620C i TS4688, NC9901 i

i MC9901

C99-2 1CBE12055 30620D, F 1CBE1205 C 30620E, F 4

NC9901, TS4688' Discussion:

i Train 1 of safe shutdown systems is being assured for a fire in this fire area. Ioss of SWS lump Boon ventilation may be realised since circuits and j electrical components for both Train 1 SWS Pump Roca Exhaust Fans (C99-1 and l C99-2) are found in this fire area. These fans may or may not be running j during normal plant operation depending on the temperature of the room and the i train that is being utilized at the time of the fire. Both 50% capacity fans are required operable to maintain the room temperature within design limits.

? Ioss of the above-eentioned circuits / components due to a fire would, disable l- area cooling for this roca, which could render the Se rvice Water Pumps

, inoperable after a period of time.

However, the Backup Service Water Pump P180, which is located outside of this ,

! fire area (in Fire Area BD), remains available in the event that the Service ;

i Water Pumps are disabled. A fire in this area does not impact any circuits

{ for the Backup Service Water Ibap nor supporting components and circuits.

j The Backup Service Water- Pump is an alternative shutdown' capability. Howeve r ,

l since automatic suppression and detection presently exist in Fire Area BF, the .

i Backup Service Water capability presently meets Appendix R,Section III.G.3 '

i requirements.

l Resolution: .

{

1 l Guidelines will be provided in procedure AB1203.02 for the starting of the l Backup Service Water Pump P180 in Fire Area BD.

j Note S yst em Component Circuit Raceway 2 SWS P3-1 1CAC107E 36004E,F,G, JB3014 j iPAC107A 36005D NP0031, MP0031

~

I P3-3 1CAC109F 36004E F,G, JB3014 3PACD6A 36201D NP0033-1, MP0033 l

4. BF -6 i

Facility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 FIRE AREA BF POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW Discussion:

The Service Water Pump 1 OP 3-1) may or may not be normally operating depending on which two of the three SWS pumps is operating at the time of the fire. Only one of the SW pumps is required operable to achieve safe shutdown. Both SW Pumps 1 and 3, and Train 1 circuits for the pumps, are found in this fire area.

However, the Backup Service Water Pump P180 remains available as an alternate to the three SW pumps for a fire in Fire Area BF. P180 is in Fire Area BD and its ope ration is not affected by a fire in Fire Area BF. Thu s , no modifications to the SW Pumps or their circuits are required.

The backup service water capability has been provided as an alte rnative shutdown method, in accordance with Section III.G.3 of Appendix R to provide service water to the plant if a fire disables all three existing Service Water Pumps located in the Service Water Pump Room (Reference 2.5.J).

However, since the above-mentioned Train 1 control and power circuits exist in this fire area for SW Pumps 1 and 3, the concern exists of the possibility of disabling all Train 1 Essential Power. The fire-induced failure of the control circuits for either pump (powered off Train 1) could result in the loss of control power for the 4.16KV breakers AC107 or AC109. As a re sult ,

the automatic trip function provided by the phase time and instantaneous ove rcurrent relay and the instantaneous ground sensor relay would not be available. Since either of these pumps could be operating during a fire, the power circuits could develop a fault. Consequently, the up st ream breaker supplying power to the 4.16KV AC SWGR C1 may trip prior to these load breakers and thereby cause a loss of all Train 1 Essential Power.

Resolution:

Guidelines are to be provided in procedure AB1203.02 for the starting of the Backup Service Water Pump P180.

Additionally, for the concern of losing control power for the 4.16KV breakers, an isolation device (i.e. fuse) will be provided for Circuits 1CAC107E and ICAC109F thereby assuring isolation f rom the influence of a fire in this fire a re a.

Note System Component Ci rcuit Raceway 3 SWS SW1379 1CBE12748, C, F, H Numerous Raceways 1CBE1275B, C, D, E Refer to IP BE1275A Appendix B-2 BE1274, C3017, EV1379 RC3013, FP SH2917A, FP DIS 1379A, MV1379 4.BF-7

Facility: DB-1 Appendix R i Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Taele 1 Notes FIRE AREA BF POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW SW1381 3CBEF1248, C, F H Numerous Raceways 3GEF1255, C, D, E Refer to 3PBEF125A Appendix B-2 BEF125, C3019. EV1381, RC3015, FPDIS1381A, FPSH2919A, MV138L Discussion:

Service Water Strainer i Drain Valve SW1379 and Strainer 3 Drain Valve SW1381 are both normally closed and are required to remain closed to preclude inadvertent service water flow diversion in the event that the associated service water pump is ' operating. These valves are strictly a spurious actuation concern.

A review of EWD E-488, Sheet 8 has determine'd that a failure of any of the above-eentioned circuits (exclusive of the power circuit), could spuriously open the respective valve.

However, for a fire in this fire area, all three Service Water Pumps could be disabled. Credit is taken for the Backup Service Water Pump P180 to provide O service water to the essential loads. Consequently, even if the Strainer Drain Valves did spuriously open, thereby resulting in some flow diversion, it would be inconsequential since P180 would supply all necessary loads. As a re sult ,

no modifications or procedural actions are necessary aside from assuring operability of P180.

Resolution:

Guidelines are to be provided in procedure AB1203.02 for the starting of the Backup Service Water Pump P180.

Note S yst em Component Circuit Raceway 4 SWS SW1399 1CBE12773 30596A, JB3021, j 30601A

1CBE1277E 30599A, JB3014, 36004E i 1CBE1277G 30594C, JB3014, i 36004E l 1CBE1277H 30601A, JB3021, 30739 A i

l i

l O

l 4.BF-8

i i

Fccility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA BF POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW Discussion:

TPCW Heat Exchanger Inlet Header Isolation Valve SW1399 provides service water to the Turbine Plant Cooling Water System. The valve may either be normally open or closed depending which train of SW is being utilized at the time of the fire. The portion of the Service Water System supplied by this valve is not required for safe shutdown. Therefore, the only concern is that the valve could remain open and provide substantial SWS flow diversion. The valve in question needs to be secured closed for shutdown in order to assure adequate flow to the essential portion of Train 1 SWS. The fire-induced failure of the above-mentioned circuits could disable the valve open.

Howeve r, if the valve was not in the desired closed position Operations personnel would manually close the valve locally in the Fire Area II, in the event remote operability of the valve is disabled.

Resolution:

Guidelines are to be provided in procedure AB1203.02 for the local closure of Valve SW1399 (designated an emergency control station) in Fire Area II.

O Note System Component Circuit Raceway 5 SWS SW2929 1CBE1281B 30675A, B, JB3014 1CBE1281F 36004E, JB3014 Sh2931 1CBE1282B 30675A, B, JB3014 1CBE1282F 30594C, 36004E, JB3014 Discussion:

The above-mentioned circuits are for SW Discharge Valves to the Intake Structure (SW2929) and Forebay (Sk2931). One of four SW Discharge 'laive s (SW2929 through SW2932) is no rmally open and depowered (controlled administratively) to ensure SWS discharge at all times. The sole concern is that at least one of these valves remains open, thereby assuring service water outlet flow. Since one of the valves is normally open and depowered, there is no concern associated with the possibility of spurious closure of SW2929 or SW2931 precluding SWS discharge capability.

Resolution:

None Required.

O 4.BF-9

Fccility: .DB-1 -App 2ndix R Docket s . 50-346 Compliance Asses'sment Report Revision: 1 - No. 02-1040-1153

-(,/~')s Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA BF POTENTIAL NON-COM'LIANCES REVIEW Note System Component Circuit Power Supply Raceway 6 ASSCKT C99-1 LPBE1212A MCC E12C 30620C SW1379 IPBE1275A MCC E12C 30597A SW1381 3P REF125A MCC EF12C 30578A MF0151 *IPBE1274A MCC E12C 30598A EF12C *EPRE1280A MCC E12C 30600A MF0153 *3P BEF124A MCC EF12C 30573A HP0060 *CP BEF123A MCC EF12C 30571A

These circuits were identified as associated circuits of concern from Appendix C-2. The other three circuits are for safe shutdown components which have been addressed in this fire area evaluation and alternatives to protecting its circuits we re identified. However, their power circuits still need to be considered as associated circuits of concern for a high impedance ground fault.

Discussion:

The concern with the associated circuits involves the possibility of a high

' impedance ground fault occuring f rom a fire-induced f ailure of these circuits.

As a result, the source breaker at the Unit Substation (USS) may trip (f rom detecting a high impedance fault) prior to any downstream breaker. This would cause a loss of power to the MCCs from which these circuits are fed including any load fed f rom the USS breaker.

The above-mentioned circuits are all fed f rom either MCC E12C or MCC EF12C.

A review of the loads fed from these MCCs indicates that a loss of power to either MCC EF12C or MCC E12C would not impact safe shutdown. The only safe shutdown components which would normally require power are the Service Water Pump Room Exhaust Fans C99-1 and C99-2 and TP CW Heat Exchanger Inlet Header -

Isolation Valve SW1399. These loads are fed from MCC E12C. However, circuits for each of these components are routed in this fire area and alternatives to protecting them have been identified.

Consequently, since MCC E12C is not required to be available for a fire in this fire area, only the power circuit which feeds MCC E12C' needs to be coordinated to preclude the loss of MCC E12A due to a limited short to ground fault. B reake r BE1202 would need to be coo rdinated for a high impedance ground fault.

Resolution:

The addition of ground fault protection is proposed for breaker BE1202 at MCC E12A. This would ' ensure the availability of MCC E12A in the event of a fire-induced failure to any of the associated circuits in this fire area.

O 4.BF-10

N 1

fact!!ty : D3-1 Apoenet< R 1

. Doc 6et t 50-74: Commitance Assessment ;ecort l Pevtston : 1 No. 02-1944-1157 FIRE AREA APPENDIX R EVALUATION FIRE AREA BM T, RAIN ,ACCEEDITED FOR SHUTDOWN : 2 4,

4.e.0M.* . F-- I R.E.. A A.E.A

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Fccility: DB Appandix R Docket 50-346 Corpliance Assasszent Raport Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 4.6.BM.3 FIRE AREA BM COMPLIANCE SUMPARY Fire Area BM is comprised of ' the - Diesel Oil Pump House. It has no fine detection but has an automatic suppression system. Combustible loading in the fire area is approximately 9,865,003 BTU /f t2, A review of Appendix B-2 showed that there are no safe shutdown circuits routed in this -fire area. Appendix C-2 indicated that both Train 1 and train 2 associated circuits are located in this fire area. Circuits of both trains are for similar components. Hence, the minority train (Train 2) was assured for shutdown.

The Appendix R non-compliances identified, as a result of this fire area evaluation, are four associated circuits fed from a _ Train 2 common power supply MCC F12P. These non-compliances will be alleviated by the installation of ground fault protection at breakers BF1257, BF1267, BF1268 and BF1269.

For a fire in this fire area, Train 2 of the HPI System and SC2 Atmospheric Vent Valve, as well as the Pilot-Operated Relief Valve, ressin available for providing RCS pressure and Pressur'izer level control.

Once the above-mentioned modifications are implemented, Fire Area BF will be O in compliance with Appendix R requirements.

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r_. 3 Fccility: DB-1 As.pendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Repo rt Revisions. 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table i Notes FIRE AREA BM POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW Not e System Component Circuit Raceway 1 ASSCKT MP0032 BPBF1257A 36169B, C, D, JB2072, JB3052 MP1592 .BPBF1267A 361698, C, E, JB2072. JB3052 MP1738 BPBF1268A 361698, I, J, 36035D, JB3052, JB3057, JB2702 WE1092 BPBF1269A 36169B, C, F, JB2075, JB2072, JB3052, FLEX Discussion:

The above-mentioned associated circuits are all powered from 480V AC Essential .

MCC F128. MCC F125 feeds five safe shutdown loads that are required to be available to achieve and maintain hot standby. As a result, loss of this MCC would be detrimental to safe shutdown.

p A review of the circuits under consideration determined that any one of the four could be normally energized at the onset of a fire (refer to Appendix C-2 i

v for the description of the loads). Therefore, a fire-induced limited short to ground fault could result in tripping the source breaker at Unit Substation F1 l which feeds MCC F12A, thereby possibly disabling a string of F12 MCCs.

Resolution:

Each of the load side breakers, namely BF1257, BF1267, BF1268 and BF1269, will l . have installed a ground fault interrupting device.

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. FIRE' AREA' APPENDIX R EVALUATION t FIRE AREA t BN t i

! T P A I N i(,Qf_E D I T F,,,0 F O R S H U T D 0 dN t i !

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FOOM DETECTION SU:FFEdi':li .

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Circuits in the foll wing 5/D cosconerts are locatec tn airs wr e, 6ti:

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Fccility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket 50-346 Complicnco Assassrent Raport Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 O

4.6.BN.3 FIRE AREA BN COMPLIANCE

SUMMARY

Fire Area BN is comprised of the Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tanks located in the no rth ya rd . It has no fire detection or automatic suppression- systems. The i tanks are totally underground covered by soil. Combustible loading in the tanks is 4,104,628 BTU /ft .

i A review of Appendix B-2 showed that both trains of the Diesel Oil Storage and Transfer pumps and their local controllers are located in this fire area. No other components are impacted by a fire in this fire area. Additionally, Appendix C-2 indicated that no associated circuits for either train are routed t

in Fire Area BN. Train 1 was chosen to assure for shutdown.

l For a fire in this fire area, one procedural action is specifically required in AB1203.02, that being the filling of ~ the FDG Day Tanks via the .esergency fill connection. ,

l For a fire in this fire ares, Train 1 of the HPI System and SG1 Atmospheric j Vent Valve, as well as the Pilot-Operated Relief Valve, remain available for

! providing RCS pressure and Pressurizer level control.

Once the procedural revision to provide a backup supply of diesel fuel oil via j the emergency fill connection is incorporated into procedure AB1203.02, this fire area will be in compliance with Appendix R,Section III.G.

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Facility Du-l Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 01-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA BN POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW Not e System Component Circuit Raceway 1 EDG P195-1 MP1951 NP1951 P195-2 MP1951 NP1952 Discussion:

This fire area is located in the north yard approximately 200 feet north and 400 feet west of the plant. The components in the fire area are two diesel fuel oil storage tanks each of 40,000 gallons capacity. These tanks are pa rtially buried below grade and are completely covered with structural backfill to a minimum depth of five feet. A diesel oil transfer pump (of the submersible type) is located inside each tank. These components supply fuel oil to the energency diesel generator day tanks which are located inside the -

plant. The two tanks are 12 feet in disseter and separated by 15 feet centerline-to-centerline distance. Hence, there is a miniaua of 3 feet separation. between the surfaces of the tanks; the 3 feet is filled with soil. The circuits for the transfer pumps are routed in embedded conduits.

O. This physical arrangement makes it improbable that a fire in the yard area would affect these components. In addition, it is highly unlikely that the buried tanks themselves could be ignition sources.

An alternate source of fuel oil to the day tanks exists by means of an emergency fill connection. In the event of an extreme emergency, the day tanks can be filled directly from a supply facility through the emergency fill connection. Each energency diesel generator day tank has sufficient capacity (6,000 gallons gross) to operate its associated diesel generator for 20 hours2.314815e-4 days 0.00556 hours 3.306878e-5 weeks 7.61e-6 months at the continuous rated load. This is sufficient time for a backup supply of diesel fuel oil to be obtained and delivered locally.

From the above discussion, it is concluded that at least one train of the buried diesel oil storage components (tank, transfer pump, circuits) would remain available for safe shutdown of the plant.

Proposed Resolution:

Guidelines are provided in procedure AB1203.02 for providing a backup source of fuel oil to the day tanks by means of the emergency fill connection.

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Factitt, a Gi-; Accenot- 5 Docket 5 '. - :4- Compli6nce Assessment Feco t 4eviston i t No. 02-1040-115!

V FIRE AREA APPENDIX R EVALUATION FIRE AREA : C T R A I N ,s,Q,C,2,Ql,T E D F O R S HU T DO WN : 1

- 4 . e . i! ~. 1 F I5E 48E A DESCP!F TIO'4 Eoca numbers #nd 4tre crotection teatures for this fire area are as foll:as .

400M OETECTION SWcFE5510re

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192 SPENT RESIN ST4G TNK Pd N MAN 10; iPENT REi!N (FER PMP CM N MAN 104 DECONTAMINATION AREA N MAN 104A MON 0 PAIL AREA N MAN 106 PADICACT!vE EQFT STRG RM N n4H 106A SAMPLING H000 ROOM N DAN 10' RC DRAIN TAN > F00M N MAN LOG RC DRN THK PNF RM N MAN 100 MAINTENANCE WGPV AREA N NAN tus* Pr53/ GE f4 n r.

111 f.)NC ST00 AGE TANE POOM N *a4 i

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4.:.C.. F ATE .w'tNwn 5 /3f EN9 in FIRE AREA _C s .

i o n., . s e r the f ollcwing 5/ D comeonent s are tocat ed in Fire Ar ea C iti:C IE6B C'2 t't9NEL4! lits ......M %titiHL*........

l E' i 2 FC2 := M01 F IR 'i APGP 3MF' a. .

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Fecility: DB-1 App 2ndix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 0

4.6.C.3 FIRE AREA C COMPLIANCE

SUMMARY

Fire Area C is comprised of Rooms 102 through 111 (excluding 105, 110 and 110A). It has no fire detection or automatic suppression systems. The in the fire area is negligible (approximately combustibig).

838 BTU /fe loading A review of Appendices B-2 and C-2 revealed that the re are no Train 1 safe shutdown or associated circuits located in this fire area. Thus, Train 1 was assured for shutdown in Fire Area C.

Only a few circuits for safe shutdown components (RCS boundary valves) pass through this fire area. An evaluation of these circuits determined that inadve rtent actuation of these components is not possible and hence, no Appendix R non-compliances exist.

Train 1 of the HFI System and S01 Atmospheric Vent Valve, as well as the Pilot-Operated Relief Valve, remain available for providing RCS pressure and P ressurizer level control.

This fire area is presently in compliance with Appendix R,Section III.C.

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Facility: DB-1 Appendix R - Docket: 50-346 Coepliance Assesameat Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 i Table 1 Notes , FIRE AREA C POTENTIAL NON-00MPLIANCES REVIEW I f Not e Systes Component Circuit Raceway ; 1 RG RC239A ' 2CBF1126H 18402A , C1708 ! RC 2398 2CBF1127G 18402A C1708 , Discussion: The Pressurizer Vapor Sampling Valvw RC239A and the Pressurizer Liquid Sampling Valve RC2395 are both normally closed and are required closed for shutdown to preclude RCS blowdown in the event that the Preesuriser Vent Header Valve RC200 spuriously opens. No credit is taken for RCS depressurization via 'the Pressurizer Vent Path (valves RC239A and RC200) since the PORV is available for ! RCS depressurization for a fire in this fire area. As a result, the valves are : strictly a spurious actuation. i A review. of EWD E-525, Sheeta 14 and 14A resulted in the - finding that the above eentioned circuits are required only ~ for indication at cabinet C1708 and their loss would, at worst, result in' blowing the fuse for 0.he control power thus losing . indication and the ability to open the valve. O However, these valves need -not be operated and the only concern is that of spurious opening of the valves. Since spurious operation would not result if the control circuits for these valves which pass through Fire Area C were to burn, no modification or further analysis need to be performed. Moreover, no circuits for valve RC200 pass through this fire area. ' Resolution: None Required. Note Syst em Component Circuit Raceway i , 2 BCS RC4632 2CV4632B, D 18402A C1708 f Discussion. r i . Cold I4g SGL-2 Sample Valve RC4632 is normally closed and is required closed for shutdown to.. prevent' inadvertent RCS blowdown should the Pressurizer Vent Header Valve RC200 - spuriously open. Hence, the valve is strictly a spurious actuation concern. A review of EWD E-568, Sheet 47B has shown that a fire-induced failure of either of the above-mentioned circuits would not spuriously - [ open the valve. The failure of these circuits would, at worst, result in a ! blown fuse which would cause a loss of indication and fail the valve closed. l Thus, these circuits do not pose an Appendix R concern. No further analysis . or review is required. l t j Moreover, no circuits fo'r valve RC200 pass through this fire area. 4.C-4 l

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Facility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Repo rt Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA C POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW Resolution: None Required. O G

4. C-5

g _ Factitt/ :- DE-; Accendt1 5 Cocket : 50 *4: Compliance Assessment Reecet

                       ;-                                                                   No. 02-1040-115!
   .[]Revtston U

FIRE AREA APPENDIX R EVALUATION FIRE AREA : CC TRAIN ACCREDITED FOR SHUTDOWN : 2

4. .CC.t FIGE AFEA DESCRIPTION Acom numDers anc fire protection features for this fire area are as 'cIlows :

ROON DETECTION 505 P 5 E 5 510 ?> _ %. ____SQ9r!. MICE!E112ti..... .. 1[N,,, ,%N L6y10 _ _ 411 C0FRIDOR Y MAN 41; ROBING APEA Y MAN 41 A D;5ROBItiG AREA i MAN 413 LAUNDRY ROOM Y MAN 414 HP MONITOR POOM 't MAN 415 CORRIDOR Y ;1AN 417 HOT TOILET ROOM V MAN 413 HOT JANITOP'S CLOSET N MAN 4*i CLEAN JANITOR's CLOSET N dAp fx I V (G 420 420A CLEAN TGILET ROOM SHOWER AREA H

a. A N 14 321 LOCKER F00M - hen 42 VESTIBULE k MAN 4: H LA00ER SPACE N M <4 A2. aF REC STRG & IRST 410 -<

1AN 44 HOT ABOPATORY Y 1Ah 424A CHP SUPERVISOR'S OFFICE N MAS 4'4B COLO LAB 05ATORY Y Mem 4: 4C C00NTIN6 ROOM f MAN d25 !NST CALIB ROCM i MAN . 42: FER50NEL LOC) AREA 't MAN Pi :; s ti bl e t.o adi ng BT0/ soF t) : 22105 A.: ' .: )_ E Mf 30u a 5 5TEMS !4 FIPE AREA C~ Circ n ts ice the f eli: wing 5/0 conconents are locatec in F:re Area 0:- _313Is0 If 91*J E9dE95501 IIE5 __....pEj$5]E!))D,,,,,,,_

                    -F4i                  1            AF3665              MOV         AFWP t 015CH TO 5G:

1 AF3670 HOV AFWP 1 DISCH TO Ssi

AF605 MOV AF4 70 351 [50 >

1 iC50385 M 0'/ AFET 1 GOV CTSL M 4.CC-1

Factitt< : 05-1 Appeadir R Docket : 50-34e Compliance Assesseent :ecor Reviston i 1 No. 02-1040-115! FIRE AREA APPENDIX R EVALUATION FIRE AREA CC TRAIN ACCPEDITED FOR SHOTDOWN : ' 4.3.CC.2 S Af,E_ S HU T D0wN S,3TEMS IN FIGE AR(A CC Cont., Circuits for tSe following 3,0 components are located in Fire Area CC: 515I50 !!3]N CgyfgNgNI Ilfs ______gEigfjf!]gy________ 1 MS106 NOV AFPT 1 MS IN ISO VLV 1 MS106A MOV AFPT 1 MS IN t-CONN CCWS 1 CC14o7 SOV DHR CLR 1 00T ISO VLV 1 CC1495 SOV CCW TO NON-ESSEN IN ISO 1 CC2o45 MOV CC RETURN HDR 1 VLV 2 CC2645 MOV CC RETURN HDR 2 VLV 1 CC5095 NOV CC HDR 1 IN ISO VLV CFS 1 CF01B MOV CORE FLOOD TK 1 ISO VLV CREVS 1 S33-1 A/C CTRM EMERG A/C UNIT 1 CS5' 1 CS153v MOV CONT SFRAv 150 VLV OHES 1 DH010 MOV LPI LINE 1 VLV 1 DH075 MOV BWST ISO VLV B 1 DH0GB MOs CTMT 5dMP I5O VLV B 1 DH12 MOV DH NORM SUCT LINE VLV 1 DH1:B 30V DH CL9 i BrPAS5 VLV 2 DH14A SOV DH CLR 2 00T VL" DH145 50V Dh CLP 1 007 VLV 1 DH151- M0J DH NORM SUCT LINE 1 VLV 1 DH27 2 M 0'! DH PUMc 1 BWST SUCT VLV 2 DH:3 MOV LPIIHPI CROSS-TIE VLV Eii;*A 1 C1 5WGR 4.16KV AC 5WGR C1 1 C2 5WGP 4.16KV AC SWGR C2 1 D1P PNL 125VDC DIST FNL 2 D2P PNL 125VDC DI5T Pill 1 fl PNL 120VAC DI5T FNL HF?! 1 F91HF0!C IND HPI FLOW INDICATION 1 FVIwPi:0 IND HPI FLOW INDICATION

                              !         HFO;C           MOV       HPI 1 DISCH ISO !LV 1         MP02D           MOV       HFI 1 DI5CH ISO VLV 2         sF31            MOs       HFI PMF 2 PECIFC JL.

1 Ho32 MOV HPI CMP ! RECIRC VLJ

                              !         FI;7-1          PUMP      HP! FMF 1 aC '_0 FUMP 1         9147-2          PUMP      HPI PMP 1 DC L0 PMP MVAC              1         HV5305A         DMFR      LV SWGR RM 429 DAMCER MV5305D         DMPR      LV SWGR CM 424 DAMPER MSS               2         ICS114          50V       MSL 2 ATM VENT VLV i         M5101           SOV       MSL 1 I50 VLV 1         MS611           MOV       SG 1 DRAIN LINE ISO iLV 4.CC-2

Factitty : DE-1 Aopendts P Docket : 50-34: Cosoltance Assessment Reoort No. 02-1040-1153 S Fevision : 1 / 4 V FIRE AREA APPENDIX R EVALUATION FIRE AREA : CC TRAIN ACCREDITED FOR SHUTDOWN : 2 4.6.CC.2 SAFE SHOTDOWN SYSTEMS IN FIRE AREA CC (Cont.) Circuits for the following S/D components are located in Fire Area CC:

                 !!!Ist        18915        Cgreg$gNI       Iffs     _ _ _ _ _ _ p gjS 3 ] ?!J gt4_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

MUPS 1 MUO2A MOV LETDOWN CLR QUT VLV 1 MUO29 MOV LETDOWN CLR IN VLV 2 MUO3 SOV RC LETDOWh ISO VLV 1/2 MU32 FCV RC MU ISO VLV 1/2 MU33 SOV RC MU ISO VLV 2 MU36 SOV RCP SEAL RETURN 150 VLV 1/2 MU3071 MOV MU SUCT SELECT VLV 1 F-371B PUMP MUP 1 MAIN LO PUMP 1 P-371C PUMP MUP 1 AUX LO FUMP F-371D MUP 1 AUX GEAR L0 FUMF (} ( ,/ 1 2 P-3725 PUMP PUMP MVP 2 MAIN to PUNP 2 P-37"C PUMP MUP 2 AUX LO CUMP 2 P-3720 PUMP MUP 2 AUi 3EAS L0 POMP NI 1- NI-Ni2 IND SOURCE FAi4GE IND hh! 1 LI-3:07BS IND 5G1-1 5 TART-UP LEVEL IND 1 FI-PC254.5 IND PCS LOOF ! FRESS IND 1 TI cC3E2 IND PCS LOOP 1 HOT LEG TEMP 2 TI-RC4A4 IND RCS LOOP 2 COLD LEG rgMp RC3 2 PC227A MG/ PZF VAF0F 3MPL VLi 2 RC237B NOV PIR LIQUID SMPL VLV ~ 2 RC2A SOV PZR FORV 1 9C460EA SOV SG 1 HI-PT VENT VLV 1 RC4603E 50V SG 1 HI-?T VENT VLt 2 RC463'2 50V COLD LEG 3Gi-2 SMDL vtV Sai 1 P3-1 PUMP 5W FUMP 1 1/2 P3-3 FuMP SW PUMF 3 1 5W135 SOV CAC 1 OUT ISO VLV 1-2 Skt:55 50V CAC 3 00T 133 VL;/ 1 5W13c= M0v CAC 1 IN 150 VLV l2 SW1362 MOV CAC 3 IN ISO VLV t 5h1332 MOV AFP 1 SUCT VL/ FROM 3d 1 Sw1344 MOV TPCW HA IN HEADEC 150 VL* 1 SW1424 50V SW FROM CC HA 1 !SO /tu

1/2 5W1429 SOV 5W F90M CC w( 150 VL'/ 1 3d 02C M0V SW TO INT STRU VL" 5W2231 MOV Sw TO CLG TOWE; Mu VLs ( 1 4.CC-3

Facilitys: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 O 4.6.CC.3 FIRE AREA CC COMPLIANCE

SUMMARY

Fire Area CC is comprised of 21 Rooms (Rooms 411 through 426, excluding 416). It has fire detection but no automatic suppression system. Combustible loading in the fire area is approximately 22,108 BTU /f t2, A review of Appendix B-2 showed that this fire area contains a majority of Train 1 safe shutdown circuits. A review of Appendix C-2 showed that the re are no Train 2 associated circuits in Fire Area CC. As a result, Train 2 was assured for shutdown. _ The evaluation of the Train 2 components and circuits in Fire Area CC indicates that two modifications are to be performed in order to achieve compliance, that . being the installation of three hour rated fire barriers around cable trays 1CJM, 1CJL, 2CEV, ALDC, and BCHD and providing an alternate power feeder to Disconnect Switch Cabinet CDF-11D. No procedural actions are necessary to comply with Appendix R requirements. For a fire in this fire area, Train 2 of the HPI System and SG2 Atmospheric Vent Valve, as well as the Pilot-Operated Relief Valve, remain available for providing RCS pressure and Pressurizer level control. Once the above-mentioned modification is performed, Fire Area CC will be in compliance with Appendix R, Section III.G. D 4.CC-4 _ _______e._________...___ _ .)

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r Fccility: DB-1 Appsndix R Docke t: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report-Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153

      \                                       Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA CC POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW Note     System    Component     Circuit                         Raceway 1        AFWS      MS106A        1CBE1271L                        47250A, ICJL Discussion:

The AFPT 1-1 Main Steam ' Inlet Cross-Connection Valve MS106A is normally open to provide a steam supply to AFPT 1-1 from SG2 in the event the AFPT 1-1 Main Steam Inlet Isolation Valve MS106 is inope rable. For a fire in this fire area, no credit is taken f or AFPT 1-1. The AFPT 1-2 is assured operable to supply adequate feedwater to SG2 for plant shutdown. Since no credit is taken for the availability of valve MS106A for a fire in this fire a re a , it needs only to be considered as a possible flow diversion path. Howeve r, the _ steam output from SG1-2 is such that the output capacity is sufficient to . run the AFW Pump Turbi.ne 1-2 even if valve MS106A was open thereby diverting some steam to . Train 1. Therefore, the position of this valve will not impact the capability of achieving safe shutdown. Fire damage to the above mentioned circuits is not a concern. Resolution: None Required. . Note System Component Circuit Raceway 2 CCWS CC2649 2CBF1161F, G 2CEV l CC1495 1CV1495C, E 1CJM Discussion: Component Cooling Return Header 2 Valve CC2649 is normally open or closed . (depending which train of CCWS is normally running) and is required to be open l when the Makeup System is being utilized. This valve provides cooling flow l back to the eain header f rom the Makeup Pump Gear and Pump Lube Oil Coolers l (P 37-1 and P 37-2). However, for a fire in this fire area, the HPI System (not ! the Makeup System) is the system utilized for RCS inventory and reactivity l control and ' core cooling. As a re sult , a fire-induced failure of the i above mentioned circuits is inconsecuential. l The CCW to Auxiliary Building Non-issential Inlet Isolation Valve CC1495 is l normally open and is required to go closed to preclude CCW flow diversion to non essential portions of the CCWS. This valve is requi red to be closed for hot. standby and for going to cold shutdown. One CCW pump has adequate flow I capacity to support the essential header and the Containment header. However, it is incapable of also adequately supplying the non essential header. Therefore, the .non essential header must be isolated utilizing CC1495. 4.CC-8 A

Facility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 FIRE AREA CC POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW A review of EWD E-50B, Sheet 15, has she i. that a fire-induced failure of either of the above mentioned cables for this valve would result in the de energization of the valve closed, which is its safe shutdown position. As a result, fire damage to these circuits is inconsequential. Moreover, Cable Tray ICJM will be protected with a 3-hour barrier to address other non-compliances. Resolution: None Required. Note System Component Circuit Raceway 3 CFS CF01B 1CBE1162F ICJL 1CBE1162G 1CJM 1CVCF01BB ICJL Discussion: The Co re Flood Isolation Valve CF01B is normally open and is required to be closed when cooling down to cold shutdown. This is necessary so that Core Flood Tank inventory is not inadvertently ' dumped into the RCS as the RCS pressure falls to approximately 600 psig. A fire-induced failure of any of the above mentioned circuits would result in the loss of remote operability of the valve. Resolution: , Cable Trays ICJL and ICJM will be provided with a 3-hour rated fire barrier. Note System Component Circuit Raceway 4 CSS CS1530 1CBE1156H ICJM 1CBE1156J ICJL Discussion: The specific concern re la ted to Appendix R is whether the Containment Spray Valve CS1530 could spuriously open in conjunction with the spurious starting of the Containment Spray Pump 1 P 56-1. This would cause cold water to be sprayed onto the re ac to r, thereby potentially resulting in rapid RCS cooldown. CS1530 is normally closed and is required closed for shutdown. P 56-1 is normally of f and is required to remain off in the event that CS1530 spuriously opens. 4.CC-9

Fccility: DB-1 Appandix R Docket: ~50-346 Compliance Assessment Report

Revision: 1- No. 02-1040-1153 (D Table 1 Notes g.

FIRE AREA CC POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW A review of EWD E-52B, Sheets 21A and B, has determined that a fire-induced failure of either the "H" or "J" cables could result in the - spurious opening of valve CS1530 However, no circuits for P56-1 pass through this fire area. Therefore, the spurious starting of the pump due to a fire is not possible. Mo reve r, Cable Trays 1CJL and ICJM will be protected by a 3-hour rated fire barrier to address other non-compliances. As a result, a fire in Fire Area CC will have no impact on the above mentioned cable trays. These circuits presently meet Appendix F requirements. Resolution: None Required. Note System Component Circuit Raceway 5 DHRS DH09B 1CBE1112E, F 1CJM 1CBE1112H 1CJL Discussion: v The Emergency Sump Isolation Valve DH09B is normally closed at all times and is required closed for shutdown to preclude the inadvertent blowdown of BUST water to the Containment Emergency Sump. If this were to occur, the Emergency Sump would f~ill up with water to the point that water would come in contact with the reactor and there by possibly cause the rmal shocking. Hence, this valve must be assured closed. Based on a review of EWD E-52B, Sheet 19B, it turns out that of the above-mentioned circuits, a fire-induced failure of the "H" cable could result in the spurious opening of the valve. . Resolution: Cable Trays ICJL and ICJM will be provided with a 3-hour rated fire barrier. Note System Component Circuit Rac eway 6 DHRS DH12 1CBE1183G, J ICJL Discussion: The Decay Heat Removal Suction Valve DH12 is normally closed and de powered during normal plant operation. When cooling down to cold shutdown, the valve is remotely opened to initiate the DHRS mode. A fire-induced failure of the above mentioned circuit would disable the capability to remotely open the valve. 4.CC-10

Facility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 FIRE AREA CC POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW Resolution: Cable Tray ICJL will be provided with a 3-hour rated fire barrier. Note System Component Circuit Raceway 7 DHRS DH14A 2CVDH14AF 2CEV Discussion: The DH Cooler 2 Outlet Valve DH14A is normally open and is required open only .for going to cold shutdown. A review of EWD E-528, Sheet 25, has shown that a fire-induced failure of the above mentioned circuit would not spuriously close the valve. As a result, damage to. this circuit is inconsequential. Moreover, Cable Tray 2CEV will be protected by a 3-hour rated fire barrier to address other non compliances. As a result, a fire in Fire Area CC will have no impact on this cable tray, Resolution: None Required. Note System Component Ci rcui t Raceway 8 DHRS DH63 2CBF1195F 2CEV Discussion: The LPI/HPI Crosstie Valve DH63 is normally closed. The valve is opened when the " Piggyback" mode of HPIS is utilized to shutdown and is required closed in the LPI or DHR modes. The piggyback mode of the HPI System is not accredited for safe shutdown for this Appendix R analysis. Hence, this valve only needs to be addressed for spurious actuation. A review 'of EWD E-52B, Sheet 66, has shotm that a fire-induced f ailure of the above mentioned c i rcui t could result in the spurious opening of the valve. Hence, a resolution is necessary for this circuit. Resolution: Cable Tray 2CEV will be provided with a 3-hour rated fire barrier. O 4.CC-11

Fccility: DB-1 App 2ndix R' Docke t: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes FIPE AREA CC POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW Note System Component Circuit Raceway 9 ESSPWR Panel D2P 2CDZP 20D 2CEV Discussion: The above mentioned circuit supplies 125V DC essential power. f rom Panel D2P to Disconnect' Switch Cabinet CDF-11D. Although this cabinet is not required for safe shutdown, s failure of the above-mentioned circuit could potentially result in the loss of power to Disconnect Switch Cabinet CDF-12A-1. The 125V DC power for both cabinets are fed from a common fuse. Therefore, a failure of Circuit 2CD2P 20D could blow the fuse and result in the loss of power to l CDF-12A-1 as well. The 125V DC control ' power is required at CDF-12A-1 for the ! control of the AFWS Governor Valve ICS038A. A modification is already proposed as a result of the evaluation performed for Fire Area U to isolate Circuit 2CD2P20D from the 125V DC supply to CDF-12A-1 by providing an alternate feed to CDF-11D from a separate fuse. Moreover, Cable Tray 2CEV will be protected by a 3-hour rated fire barrier to address other non-compliances. As a result, a fire in Fire Area CC will have no impact on this cable tray. Resolution: , An alternate power feed will be provided to Disconnect Switch Cabinet CDF-11D. Note System ~ Component Circuit Raceway 10 HP I HP31 2CBF1194F 2CEV , Diseta. iion : ! HP1 P ump 1-2 Recirculation Stop Check Valve HP 31 is a mo to r-ope rated check valve. It is normally open and is required open to provide HPI recirculation i flow back to the BWST when RCS pressure is greater than the HPI shutoff head. A review of EWD E-52B, Sheet 65, has shown that a fire-induced f ailure of the

above men'tioned circuit could result in the spurious closure of the valve.

Hence, a resolution is necessary for this circuit. l Resolution: i- Cable Tray 2CEV will be provided with a 3-hour rated fire barrier. O 4.CC-12 I _r.--._ _ _ . _ . _ , _ . . . . , _ . . _ _ _

Facility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA CC POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW Note System Component Circuit Raceway 11 MSS ICS11A 2CK602BKA, B 2CEV 2CSF1746B 2CEV Discussion: The SGl-2 Atmospheric Vent Valve ICS11A is normally closed and is required to be operable to achieve and meintain hot standby and for going to cold shutdown to control seconda ry side pressure. A fire-induced f ailure of the above-mentioned circuits would disable the remote operability of ICS11A. Hence, a resolution is necessary for the above mentioned circuits. Resolution: Cable Tray 2CEV will be provided with a 3-hour rated fire barrier. Note System Component Circuit Raceway 12 MUPS MUO3 2CVMUO3C, E 2CEV Discussion: The Reactor Coolant Letdown Isolation Valve MUO3 is normally open and provides a backup means of RCS letdown isolation in the event that valves MUO2A, B or MUOlA and B are not available. However, for a fire in this fire area, MUOlA and B (Train 2) are unaffected. Power to operate these valves remains available. Thus, the fire-induced f ailure of the above mentioned circuits is inconsequential. Moreover, Cable Tray 2CEV will be protected by a 3-hour rated fire barrier to address other non-compliances. As a result, a fire in Fire Area CC will have no impact on this cable tray. l Resolution: 1 None Required. Note System Component Circuit Raceway i 13 MUP S MU32 BCNNI264C BCEQ l BCNNI264D BLDE l MU33 1CSF1735A 1CDB ICVMU33C, E 1CDB 4.CC-13

4 Fccility:DB-1 ' App 2ndix R Docket:- 50-346 -Compliance Assessment Report Revision: l' No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA CC POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES- REVIEW Discussion:- The Reactor Coolant Makeup Isolation Valve MU32 and the Makeup Pump Discharge Valve MU33 are normally open or closed and are required to be operable if the 1 Makeup System is being utilized for RCS injection.

        . For a fire in this fire area, the HPI System is the system that is assured for RCS injection (level and reactivity control). Thus, the Makeup System need not be assured since it serves only as .a backup to the HPI System. As a result,

. the fire-induced failure of the above mentioned circuits is inconsequential. Resolution: None Required. 3 Note ' System Component Circuit Raceway 14 MUPS MU38 2CVMU38C, D 2CEV Discussion: , RCP Seal Return Isolation Valve' MU38 is normally open or closed and is

required to be closed for RG seal return isolation when shutting down to isolate letdown f rom the reactor. Howeve r, a review of EWD E-49B, Sheet 19 indicates that fire damage to either of the above mentioned circuits would, at worst, result in the de energizing closed of Valve MU38, which is its safe shutdown mode.

Moreover, operability of the vcive is assured due to the fact that Cable Tray 2CEV will be protected by a 3-hour rated fire barrier. As a result , a fire in > Fire Area CC will have no inpact on this cable tray. These circuits presently j meet Appendix R requirements. I Resolution: l None Required. Note System- Component Circuit Raceway 15 MUP S MU3971 ACBE1127E, G ACEN ACBE1127H ACDA i Discussion: a

;        The Makeup Pump Suction Valve MU3971 is normally closed and is required to be operable if the Makeup System is being utilized for RCS injection.

4.CC-14 P

b

l 1 Facility: DB-1 Appendix R Docke t: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 FIRE AREA CC POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW For a fire in this fire area, the HPI System is the system that is assured for RCS injection (level and reactivity control). Thus, the Makeup System need not be assured since it serves only as a backup to the HPI System. As a result, the fire-induced failure of the above mentioned circuits is inconsequential. Resolution: None Required. Note System Component Ci rcui t Raceway 16 MUP S P-372B BCBF1167B, C BCEQ Discussion: The above-mentioned circuits are for the Makeup Pump 2 Main Lube Oil Pump P-372B. For a fire in this fire area, the RPI System is the system that is assured for RCS injection (level and reactivity control). Thus, the Makeup System need not be assured since it serves only as a backup to the HPI System. As a result, the fire-induced failure of the above mentioned circuits is inconsequential. Resolution: None Requi red. Note System Component Circuit Raceway 17 MUPS P-372C BCD217B, F BCEQ Discussion: The above mentioned circuits are for the Makeup Pump 2 Auxiliary Lube Oil Pump P -3 72C , For a fire in this fire area, the HPI System is the system that is assured for RCS injection (level and reactivity control). Thus, the Makeup System need not be assured since it serves only as a backup to the HPI System. As a re su l t , the f i re-induced failure of the above mentioned c i rcui t s is inconsequential. Resolution: None Required. 4.CC-15

1

            'Fecility: DB-1                                         App 2ndix R                  j Docke t:      50-346                                   Compliance Assessment Report i Revision:     1                                        No. 02-1040-1153

( ,) Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA CC POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW Note System Component Circuit Raceway 18 MUPS P-372D BCBF1168C, D, E, F. BCEQ' Discussion: The above mentioned circuits are for the Makeup Pump 2 Auxiliary Gear Lube Oil Pump P-372D. For a fire _ in this fire area, the HPI System is the system that is assured for RCS injection (level and reactivity control). Thus, the Makeup System need not be assured since it serves only as a backup to the HPI System. As a result, the fire-induced failure of the above mentioned circuits is inconsequential. Resolution: None Required. Note System Component Circuit Raceway 7-s Is~ -) 19 NNI TI-RC4A4 ALNNI833A ALDC Discussion: The RCS Loop 2 Cold Leg Temperature Indicator TI-RC4A4 provides for monitoring of this variable from the Control Room. This indication is required to be available to achieve and maintain hot standby and for cooling down to cold shutdown. A fire-induced failure of this circuit would disable this monitoring capability. Resolution: Cable Tray ALDC will be provided with a 3-hour rated fire barrier. Note System Compocent Circuit Raceway 20 RCS RC239A 2CBF1126H 2CEV RC239B 2CBF1127G 2CEV Discussion: The P ressurize r Vapor Sampling Valve RC239A and the P ressurize r Liquid Sampling Valve RC239B a re both no rmally closed and are ' required closed for s shutdown to preclude RCS blowdown in the event that the P re ssurize r Vent g,,) Header Valve RC200 spuriously opens. 4.CC-16 1

FCcility: DB-1 Appsndix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 Table 1 Notes

                     ' FIRE AREA CC POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW A review of R.O E-52B, Sheets 14 and 14A, resulted in the finding that the above mentioned circuits are required only for indication at cabinet C1708 and their loss would result, at worst, in blowing the fuse for the control power thus losing indication and the ability to open the valve.             Howeve r, these valves need not be operated and the only concern is that of spurious opening of the valves.       Since spurious operation would not result if the control circuits for these valves, which pass through Fire Area CC, we re to burn, no modification, or further analysis need to be pe rformed.         Additionally, there are no circuits routed in Fire Area CC which could spuriously open valve RC200 Resolution:

None Required. Note System Component Circuit Raceway . 21 RCS RC2A BCVRC2E, F, G BCHD Diacussion: The P ilot-Ope ra ted Relief Valve (PORV) RC2A is no rmally closed and may be called upon to operate to depressurize the RCS to the HP I System shutoff-head. A fi re-induced failure of the above mentioned circuits would disable the capability to open the valve. Hence, these circuits need to be addressed. Resolution: Cable Tray BCHD will be provided with a 3-hour rated fire barrier.

 . Note    System     Component     Circuit                       Raceway 22      RCS        RC4608A        1CV4608AC, D                  1CJM RC4608B        1CV4608BC                     1CJM Discussion:

l RCS Loop 1 High Point Vent Valves RC4608A and B are normally closed and are required to remain closed in o rde r to prevent uncontrolled RCS blowdown via the loop 1 high point vent. These valves serve to remove steam bubbles from j the loop 1 hot leg should their formation occur. Void formation in the RCS is not possible due to a fire and is not postulated to occur for this fire scenario. Hence, these valves should not be called upon to operate. As a result, only spurious actuation of the valves is a concern. The two valves are in se rie s and both would be required to open for blowdown to the l Containment atmosphere to occur. 4.CC-17 l

Fccility: DB-1 Appsndix R Docke t: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: .1 No. 02-1040-1153 bh-V Table 1 Notes FIRE AREA CC POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCES REVIEW A review of EWD E-52B, Sheets 71A and B, showed that a fire-induced f ailure of the above-mentioned circuits would result in the de-energizing closed of their

respective solenoid-operated valves. Hence, spurious opening of the valves is not possible.

. Morever, Cable Tray ICJM will be protected by a 3-hour rated fire barrier to 3 address other non compliances. As a result, a fire in Fire Area CC will have no impact on this cable tray. These circuits presently meet Appendix R requirements. Resolution: None Required. Note System Component Circuit Raceway

.                         23       RCS       RC4632            2CV4632B                                 2CEV Discussion:

Cold Leg SG1-2 Sample Valve. RC4632 is normally closed and is required closed for shutdown to prevent inadvertent RCS blowdown should the P ressurizer Vent Header Valve RC200 spuriously open. A review of EWD E-56B, Sheet 47B, has determined that a fire-induced failure of the above-mentioned circuit would not spuriously open the valve. Additionally, there are no circuits routed in Fire Area CC which could spuriously open valve RC200 Thus, this circuit does not pose an Appendix R concern. Resolution: - { None Required. i i

O 1

4.CC-18 4 6

      - - - - - - , - - ,                    -     -,e...  .-w              -                   -. -
                                                                                                           ...y,, ,.--,---,---,,-.,<~--,-,,,-r--- ~ -

Facility : D0-1 Apoendtx A Docket - 50-74: Como11ance Assessment Eec:rt

   '[~'iRevision :       1                                                              N:. 02-1040-1152 b                .

FIRE AREA APPENDIX R EVALUATION FIRE AREA : D TRAIN ACCREDITED FOR 3HUTDOWN : 1/2 4.e.D.1 F!cE APEA DESCRIPit0N Room numbers and fire protection features toe tnis fire ar ea are as +ollows : ROOM DETECT [GN 50FFRE5510h _Ng, ,,,,60 qq ,qE iC i((1[QN ,,,,, ,,,((N,,, _M &tf Lil2 10,, 213 G E A C T O E. AFEA N MAN 214 CORE FLOODING TANK AREA V MAN 215 LET DOWN COOLER AREA Y MAN 21s 5 TEAM GENERATOR AREA N MAN 217 CORE FLOOD TANK AREA N MAN 218 ETEAM 6ENERATOR AREA N NAN 219 LOWER CANAL AREA N MAN 220 INCORE INSTP TRENCH AFEA v MAN s !!5' TANK AREA N MAN MAN q ) :le 317 FLOODING TANT AREA HATCH AREA N ( N. A h

                      !!74         EMEPGENCY LOCK ENCLOSURE                           N                  MAN 407          HATCH AREA                                         N                  MAN 410          FA55 AGE                                           v                  MAN 760          PASSAGE                                            N                  MAN 701          PA5 SAGE                                           N                  MAN Area Combusttele Loacing tsT9isoFti :                    15951 2.:.2.2    543; ; .- .- ) - 5,5T MS IN FIRE AREA D
                      - -        F the following S D components are lecated in :tre A<ea D :

it iIi) IESIN 50ME9Ng[4I Ijfj ,,,,,,Dgis3]PIjgN,,,,_,,, AFai ' M510e MOV AFFI 1 MS IN ISO 'LX 2 M5107 MOV AFFT 2 MS IN liO VLV CAC5 i C1-1 F9e CAC FAN 1 2 C1-2 FAN CAC FAN 2 1/2 Cl-3 FAN CAC FAN 3 C0C.E LOOD TF 2 150 ;L V [ [~'h CFw CFv1A MOV

     \ms                                !             CF019              MOV         COFE CLOOD D ! ii0        'L' 0HF5              2            DH11               MOV          CH NORM idCT LIhE 7L, 4.0-1

Factitty : DB-1 Apoendt< P Docket 50-!3: Compliance Assessment Ee: ort Ra<tston : 1 No. 02-1049-1153 FIRE AREA APPENDIX R EVALUATION FIRE AREA : D TRAIN ACCREDITED FOR SHUTDOWN : t/2 4.6.D.2 SAFE SHUT _D_0WN SYSTEMS IN FIRE AREA D (Cort.: Circuits for the following S/D components are located in Fire Area D : SfiIED IEA]y $90fgh{NI Iff{ ______pESCBJf!JgN,,,,,,,, 1 On12 MOV DH NORM SUCT LINE VLV MUPS 2 MU01A MOV LETDOWN CLR 1 IN VLV 2 MUOIB NOV LETDOWN CLR 2 IN VLV 1 MUO2A MOV LETDOWN CLR OUT VLV 1 NUO2B MOV LETDOWN CLR IN VLV NI 2 N!-nil IND SOURCE RANGE IND 1 NI-NI2 IND SOURCE FANGE IND NNI 2 LI-SP09A8 IND SG!-2 START-U* LEVEL IND 2 LI-SP09A9 IND SG1-2 STAPT-UP LEVEL :ND 1 LI-SF09BS IND SGi-1 STAAT-OP LEVEL 190 i LI-SG03B9 IND 561-1 START-UP LEVEL . r4 D 1 LIRC14-1,3 IND PRIR LEVEL IND 2 LIRC14-2.4 IND PGZP LEVEL IND 2 LIS*0443.1 IND SGi-2 START-OP idVEL IND 1 LISP 0GB3,1 IND SGi-1 STAPT-uP LEVEL I 4C 2 LRS-FC14 FEC PRIE LEVEL FECUFDE; 2 PI DL2A! IND RCS LOOP 2 P&ESS IND 2 P!-RC2A4.5 1ND RC 3 LOOP 2 ERE55 IND 1 FI AC2B3 IND RCS LOOP 1 PRESS IND I P!-PC2B4.5 IND RCS LOOP 1 PRESS IND 2 PISP12A.A1 IN0 SGi-2 OUTLET PF.ESS IND 1 FISF129.91 IND SG1-1 OUTLET PRESS IND i TE-FC4B; IND RCS LOOP 1 COLD LEG TEMP

                          -          'I-PCTA4        IND      RCS LOOP 2 HOT LEG TEMP 2           TI-PC7A5        IND     RCS LOOP 2 HOT LEG TEMP 2          TI-RC3A6         IND     RCS LOOP 2 HOT LEG TEMF 1          TI-PCOB2        IND     PCS LOOP 1 HOT LEG rEMP 1          !!-RC3B5         IND     RCS LOOP 1 HOT LEG TEME 1          TI-RC3Bs        IND     FCS LOOP 1 eCT LEG tea; 2          TI-FCAA2         IND     ACS LO0e 2 COLD LEG TEMP 2           TI-FC4A4        IND     kCS LOOP 2 COLD LEG TEMP 1          TI-RC4B2        IND     FCS LOOP 1 COLD LEG TEMP 1          TI-aC4B4        IND     RCS LOOP 1 COLD LEG TEMP RCi              i         RC11            MOV      PORV BLOC) VLV

RC2io NOV FIP SMPL CTMr VNr HDE <,

2 AC2394 MOV P:F VaP05 SM5t '. _ v

                                                                                             'lf 2          FC2:39          MOV     PIE LIOuiD SMPI '.

4.0-2

Facility : 09-1 Appenotx P

Docket t. 50-34: Coeoltance Assesseert Fe:cet Revision : 1 No. 62-1040-1152 FIRE AREA APPENDIX R EVALUATION FIRE AREA : D TRAIN ACCREDITED FOR SHUTDOWN : 1/2 4.6.D.2 S A_FE _ SkqT00WN SYiTEMS IN FIRE AREA Q, (Cont.)

Cir'.uits for the folicwing S/D conoonents are located in Fire Aree D :

                  !!_3Isd       IEsid         990E99Ey!         Iff!         ______pESsfjfIJ99 _______

2 RC2A SOV PZP PORV 1 PC4300A SOV SG 1 HI-PT VENT VLV 1 RC4e06B SOV SG l HI-PT VENT VLV 2 RC4610A SOV SG 2 HI-PT VENT VLV 2 RC46105 SOV SG 2 HI-PT VENT VLv 2 RC4632 SOV COLD LEG SG1-2 SMPL VL;/ O I 1-i O. 4.5-! l t

Fdcility: DB-1 Appandix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1. No. 02-1040-1153 O 4.6.D.3 FIRE AREA D COMPLIANCE

SUMMARY

Fire Area D is comprised of the entire Containment area (16 rooms). The fire area has fire detection at various locations but no automatic . suppression

                                           ' system.       Coybustible              loading              in       the   fire                 area                     is    approximately 15,981 BTU /ft'.

A review of Appendices B-2 and C-2 showed that there are approximately an equal number of Train 1 and 2 safe shutdown and associated circuits in Fire Area D. In . general, separation of safe shutdown and associated circuits of redundant trains is prevalent throughout most of Containment. This is largely due to the fact that for the most part, Train 1 circuits enter containment from the West penetrations division and Train 2 circuits primarily from the East penetrations i division. Consequently, Train 1 safe shutdown and associated circuits. are basically confined to the West side of Containment while Train 2. circuits are primarily found in the East side. The few exceptions stem from a few Train 1 safe shutdown circuits that were routed into the predominantly Train 2 east penetration area. As a result, Train 1 was the train evaluated for separatica. For those few cases where Train 1 and Train 2 circuits do not have the required separation, modifications or procedural guidelines were established in order to satisfy Appendix R requirements. Modifications are to be implemented to meet Appendix R requirements. These modifications involve the installation of radiant energy shields to segregate - the circuits for the three CACS fans, installation of a radiant energy shield between redundant Pressurizer Level transmitters, and the installation of a ground fault interrupting device at Breaker BE1223. Procedural actions are also necessary for a fire in this fire ares. Guidelines are to be provided in procedure AB1203.02, " Serious Plant Fire" for the local i manual. operation of valves NS106, CF01A, CF01B, DH21 and DH23, as well as the closing of valve MUO3 from the Control Room. i , f For a fire in this fire area, one train of the Makeup System and SC Atmospheric c Vent Valve remain available for providing SG pressure and Pressurizer level

control. The Pilot-Operated Relief Valve (PORV) may be unavailable. However,

! RCS depressurization via the PORV is not necessary since high head RCS injection is available via the Makeup System which remains available despite a fire in this fire area.

An exemption is requested for the lack of twenty feet spatial separation l between the CAC Cooler Fans inside Containment as required per Section III.G.2 l of Appendix R. O 4.D-4 1 l

    ,- _ - - _ _ _ . - . . , , - . _ . _ ,              _ _ _ . . - , - . . - . _ ,    .__.-,,-.m_...,_-              . _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ - _ _ , , . . . . , , . .                        . ~ - , , _ _ _ , . _ _ _

Facility: DB-1 Appendix R Docket: 50-346 Compliance Assessment Report Revision: 1 No. 02-1040-1153 0 4.6.D.3 FIRE AREA D CO)fLIANCE

SUMMARY

(continued) Once the above-mentioned modifications and procedural revisions are performed, and the exemption request is granted, Fire Area D (Containment) will be in compliance with Appendix R, Section III.G. O O 4.D-5

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ML20214J189

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ML20214J189

Text

1.0 INTRODUCTION

SUMMARY

2.0 REFERENCES

SUMMARY

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.0 INTRODUCTION

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SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

2.0 REFERENCES

2.0 REFERENCES

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