ML20214G904
| ML20214G904 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 04/18/1978 |
| From: | Israel S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Vassallo D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| CON-WNP-0207, CON-WNP-207 NUDOCS 8605230021 | |
| Download: ML20214G904 (3) | |
Text
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APR 181978 RSB Rdg.
Docket No. 50-397 Orr chron MEMORANDUM FOR:
D. B. Vassallo, Assistant Director for LWRs, DP!!
THRU:
T. M. Novak, Chief, Reactor Systems Branch, DSS FROM:
S. L. Israel, Section Leader, Reactor Systems Branch, DSS
SUBJECT:
ACCEPTANCE REVIEW - WPPSS UNIT NO. 2 Plant Name:
WPPSS Unit No. 2 Docket Number:.
50-397 Licensing Stage:
OL fl11estone Number:
01-21 Responsible Branch LWR-4 and Project Manager:
D. Lynch Systems Safety Branch Involved: Reactor Systems Branch Description of Review:
Acceptance Review Requested Comoletion Date:
April 19,1978 Review Status.
Complete Reactor Systems Branch has reviewed Sections 3.5.1.2, 4.6, 5.2.2, 5.2.5, 5.4.6, 5.4.7. 6.3, 6.x, and 15.0 of the WPPSS UNIT No. 2 draft FSAA.
These sections are acceptable for docketing.
During the review items were identified which recuired additional infomation. Those items are presented in the enclosure.
Original s!ssed by:
Sanford L. Israel, Section Leader Reactor Systems Branch Division of Systems Safety
Enclosure:
Infonnation Request ec:
S. Hanauer T. Novak R. Mattson G. !!azetis D. Ross S. Israel S. Varga R. Frahm D. Lynch F. Orr 86o523o021 780418
Contact:
Frank Orr, NRR PDR ADOCK O y7 A
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212-1 212.0 REACTOR SYSTE.'iS BRANCH 212.1 The discussion of internally generated missiles does not include (3.5.1.2) the potential for damage to safety systems and/or the generation of secondary missiles inside containment as a result of a falling object.
The discussion also does not address the potential for failing of safety systems inside containment by secondary missiles generated by primary missiles impinging on a component or structure inside containment.
These concerns should be discussed in the FSAR.
212.2 A discussion of intersystem leakage should be presented to (5.2.5) address back-leakage to ECC systems through isolation valves and show compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.45.
212.3 The discussion of single failures does not adequately address (6.3) the following branch position and should be amended to include ECCS passive failures during long-term cooling.
Leak Detection Requirements for ECCS Passive Failures Reactor Systems Branch reviews postulated passive failures during long-term cooling following a postulated LOCA. The passive failures considered are limited to leaks resultant from failures to valve stem packing and pump seals. These leak rates range up to the equivalent of the sudden failure of the seal of the largest ECCS pump (about 50 gpm).
It is the Reactor Systems Branch position that detection and alarms be provided to alert the operator to passive ECCS failures during long-term cooling which allow sufficient time to identify and isolate the faulted ECCS line. The leak detection system should meet the following requirements:
(1)
Identification and justification of maximum leak rate should be provided.
(2) Maximum allowable time for operator action should be provided and justified.
(3) Demonstration should be provided that the leak detection system will be sensitive enough tc initiate (by alarm) op' rator action, permit identification of the faulted line, e
and isolation of the line prior to the leak creating undesirable consequences such as flooding of redundant equipment. The minimum time to be considered is 30 minutes.
(4)
It should t'e shcwn that the leak detection system can identify the faulted ECCS train and that the leak is isolable.
212-2 (6.3)
(5) The leak detection system must meet the following standards:
(a) Control room alarm (b)
IEEE-279, except single failure requirements.
212.4 Provide a list of all valves in the ECCS and their positions (6.3) during normal operation, all ECCS modes of operation, and all shutdown modes of operation. The valve identification should be consistent with the P&ID's.
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