ML20214G747
| ML20214G747 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 05/31/1977 |
| From: | Benaroya V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| CON-WNP-0179, CON-WNP-179 NUDOCS 8605220473 | |
| Download: ML20214G747 (5) | |
Text
I DISTRIBUTION h0CKETFILES
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V. BENAR0YA 8& 3 2 s77 i
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I Docket No. 50-397 EMORANDUM FOR:
S. Varga, Chief, Light Water Reactors Branch No. 4, DPit FROM:
V. Benaroya, Chief, Auxiliary Systems Branch, DSS
SUBJECT:
ACCEPTANCE REVIEW, WPPSS UNIT-NO. 2 I
Plant Name:
Washington Public Power Supply
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System Nuclear Project No. 2
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Licensing Stage:
OL r
Docket Number:
50-397 Milestone Number:
01-02 Responsible Branch LWR 4 and Project Manager:
M. Lynch Requested Completion Date:
April S,1977 Review Status:
Complete t
I By memorandum from V. Benamya to S. Varga dated May 17,1977, we in-formed Pmject Management that the portions of the applicant's FSAR for which the Auxiliary Systems Branch has primary responsibility was 90 percent complete and recommended that it be accepted. Prior to the May memorandum we infomed Project Management that the acceptance review request for additional information would be transmitted at a later date.
We have evaluated the applicant's FSAR for its content only. The infor-mation requested is that necessary to start our-safety review. The enclosure identifies areas where we need additional information. These areas include missile protection, fuel handling system, fuel handling ilVAC system, fire protection system, main steam system and the cir-culating water system.
Original Signed by E.Mattberg Victor Benaroya, Chief Auxiliary Systems Branch Division of Systems Safety
Enclosure:
As stated
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NRC Form 318 (2 76) NRCM 02040 c u.s. GO V ERNMEN T P RIN TIN G O P Pf C E r 9 9 h 6 -0 3 4-78 2 8605220473 770531 PDR ADOCK 05000397 A
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cc:
S. Hanauer R. Heineman R. Boyd W. Mcdonald R. Tedesco M. Lynch P. Matthews D. Fischer D. Vassallo J. Glynn P. Hearn FILE: WPPSS 2 l
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Form NRC 318 (7.75) NRCM 0240 tr u a sevan=us=7 ***ntime orries. ms me-des
Section n, Auxiliary Systems dranch 010.0 AUXILIARY SYSTEfiS BRANCH 010.1 Provide a tabulation of all safety related components which (3.5) are located outdoors and describe the protection to be afforded to these components to prevent their being damaged by tornado generated missiles, turbine missiles, or a seismic event.
In-clude in this tabulation all HVAC system air intakes and ex-haus ts.
Identify the locations of the safety related components, air intakes and exhausts on the plant arrangement drawings.
010.2 Expand Section 3.6.1 to include piping layout drawings for (3.6.1) areas containing high and moderate energy lines whose failure can effect the performance of safety related equipment. Pro-vide also a detailed analysis that demonstrates the method used to protect the RHR system from the effects of postulated piping system failures.
Include the assymptions used in your analysis such as flow rates through postulated cracks, pump room areas, sump capacities and floor drainage system capacities.
010.3 Provide a tabulation of all valves in the reactor pressure (9.0) boundary and in other seismic Category I systems (per Reg-ulatory Guide l'.29) whose operation is relied upon either to assure safe plant shutdown or to mitigate the consequences of a transient accident e.g., safety valves, stop valves, relief valves, stop-check valves, and control valves.
The tabulation should identify the system in which it is installed, the type and size of valves, the actuation type (s), and the environment of conditions to which the valves are qualified.
01C.4 Provide the results of an analysis, to demonstrate that a (9.1.4) postulated cask drop will net cause damage to spent fuel or any safety related system or ;omponent which may be located under the travel path of the cask. Provide drawings that show the pathway of the cask in the vicinity of the spent fuel pool.
010.5 Compa're the outdoor humidity and temperatures th'at were used (9.4) as the basis for the design of safety related heating, ven-tilating and air conditioning system to the extreme temperatures and humidity that may occur at the site. Justify any differences E
between the extreme conditions and the outdoor conditions used for the design of the HVAC systems.
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010-2 010.6 Provide the design basis, description, safety evaluation, (9.4.2) testing and inspection requirements and drawings of the spent fuel pool area ventilating system.
010.7 Section 9.5.1 does not contain sufficient information to (9.5.1) determine that fire protection system design meets the guide-lines in Appendix A of BTP APCSB 9.5.1.
Provide a comparison of the criteria used in the design of your proposed fire pro-tection system to the guidelines given in Appendix A of the BTP and justify any differences. Provide a fire hazards analysis for WPPSS Unit 2 and a description of the method of fire pro-tection used for the power generation control console.
010.8 Provide additional description of the MSIVs including type of (10.3) valve, operator type, method of control, failure mode in the event of loss of compressed air, and other essential data.
This information should demonstrate that the operation of the MSIVs for safe plant shutdown is supported by safety grade compressed air supply and power supply.
010.9 Expand Section 10.4.5 to provide the detailed evaluation of the (10.4.5) effects of possible circulating water system failure inside the turbine building.
Include the following:
(1) The potential for and the means provided to detect a failure in the circulating water transport systen barrier such as the rubber expansion joints.
Include the design and operating pressures of the various portions of the transport system barrier and their relation to the pressures which could exist during malfunctions and failures in the system (rapid valve closure).
(2) The time required to stop the circulating water flow (time zero being the instant failure) including all inherent delays such as operator reaction time, drop out times of the control circuitry and coastdown time.
v (3) Fur each postulated failure in the circulating water transport system berrier give the rate of rise of water in the associated spaces and total height of the water when the circulaing water flow has been stopped or overflows to site grade.
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010-3 010.9 (4) For each flooded space provide a discussion, with the (Cont'd) aid of drawings, of the protective barrier provided for all essential systems that could become affected as a result of flooding.
Include a discussion of the con-sideration given to passageways, pipe chases, and/or the cableways joining the flooded space to the spaces containing safety related system components outside the turbine building. Discuss the effect of the flood water on all submerged essential electrical systems and com-ponen ts.
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