ML20214G572
| ML20214G572 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 05/18/1972 |
| From: | Knuth D US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Boyd R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| CON-WNP-0126, CON-WNP-126 NUDOCS 8605220287 | |
| Download: ML20214G572 (12) | |
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I Dochet Be.30-397 MAY 81972 Baser says, Asessamma assesser ser assums amese asemesse, Basseteesee ist usessass m S W LEC S M ER m 8 5E 5. E m I, 30 m W. W 397 Ma emelseed list of t===*h (Red est) une pseposed by the Lam, Ilastriest, Instrumentaties and Seatsel Systems 3sensh. Insledad to this list are ptione identified with the esse neuter as une mood in i
sur eristasi regaaet for additimest Amesemattam trem the applisant.
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Docket 1:o. 50-397
.M/ ! $ ]372 Roger Boyd, Assistant Director for Boiling Unter Reactors, Directorate of Licensing WASilI!;GTO:I PUBLIC P0;7ER SUPPLY SYSTEll, llA IFORD 2, DOCKET 1:0. 50-397 The enclosed list of questions (2nd set) was prepared by the L:RS, E1cetrical, Instrucentation and Control Systens Branch. Included in this list are questions identified uith the sanc number as was used in i
our original request for additional information from the applicant.
}:-gtcJ-f%%fI jh'hDonaldF.Rnuth ESB-66 L:RS:EILCSB :DT I
Assistant Director for Reactor Safety Directorate of Licensing Enclusure:
Questions cc w/cncl:
E. J. Bloch, DR S.11.11anauer, DRTA E. G. Case, DDR J. }!.11endric, DDTR F. Schroeder, ADTR A. Giambusso, DDRP R. Clark, L:GCRB S. Miner, L:GC 3 V. Moore, L:EI6CS D. Tondi, L:EI&CS W. G. !!cDonald, L:PS, w/o encl.
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t 7.0. Instrumentation and control Systems 7.1 The following additional information is required to fully answer the questions of information Guide-2.
1.b Several ESF systems have been omitted from this listing i
identified as provided by other than the NSSS. Complete j
the listing.
f 1.c You have not stated that your design conforms to the IEEE-279 (1971) Std, nor have you identified exceptions f
and justified them. Complete the response, I
3.
G.E. supplied equipment was divided into three groups.
Group 1 and 2 were tested while group 3 was analyzed.
i Identify the components and equipment cf group 3 and s ubmit your justification for not requiring their testing.
(Para 1.A) Also, state your justification for assuming that seismic testing of instrumentation and
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control devices at frequencies below 5 H, is not required.
Address part (a), the cable derating concern.
1 State your Design requirements for barriers between rooms and at entries to panels in response to part (d).
5.
The wiring separation criteria for the G.E. supplied i
equipment such as panels and relay packs is unacceptable.
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Provide physical separation distances in response to part (f) of this question.
The cable separation criteria for areas where the potential for mechanical damage exists (paragraph 8.8.3.21) are un-acceptable. Provide physical separation distance.
The cable separation criteria for extreme fire hazard areas (paragraph 8.8.3.2.2.a) are unacceptable. Either clearly state that redundant cabling will not be routed i
in these areas or provide minimum physical separation distance for redundant circuitry.
6.
Your response indicates that there is no G.E. supplied equipment in Containment required for the design basis accident or for post-accident monitoring. Clarify. You have not addressed the effects of radiation on ESF equip-ment such as RHRS, etc., which are used for operating modes in addition to the DBA. Respond to this concern.
Your references to documentation for applicant and AE supplied equipment do not contain the information re-quested by this question. Respond to this concern.
7.
You state that environmental specifications for G.E.
supplied equipment are supplied in Table 7.1-2 a & b.
The PSAR does not contain these tables. You also reference the PSAR Section 7.19 as a source of information. This section has not been submitted either.
Your part B answer to this question contains only general-izations regarding qualification of required safety re-lated equipment in the reactor building and in other locations. Specific criteria and commitments to qualify
.he equipment are required. Also, identify all safety related systems and equipment to which the ccmmitments apply.
8.
The information you reference in the PSAR Gection 10.10 does not provide criteria for ESF equipment rooms, their switchgear rooms, nor the battery roots. Provide this information. State the limiting environmental condi-tions for these areas and equipment.
10.
Identify and justify any exceptions in meeting the testing requirements of IEEE-338-1971. Also, include additional information in response to your intent to meet the require-ments of AEC Safety Guide-22.
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12.
The required power sources, number of recorders, parameters required to be monitored, etc. have not been identified.
Further, only general statements are given regarding channel range verse expected transient range. Provide your design bases for post-accident monitoring instrumentation.
v 7.2.b Interpretation of Section 4.17 of the IEEE Std 279-1971 does not lend itself to acceptance of the methods you proposed to provide for redundant manual reactor trip which would meet the single failure criterion. We believe that redundant manual scra, capability should nect the single failure criterion (which items 1 and 2 do not) and that nanual scram capability should be provided for from the centrol room location (which itens 3 and 4 do not). Provide a design to meet-the intent of the manual scram requirement of Section 4.17 of IEEE Std 279-1971.
7.2.c Your justification for acceptance of the present ESF system level manual actuation capability is unacceptabic. Provide a design to meet the intent of Section 4.17 of IEEE Std 279-1971.
7.3 Include a description of the Standby Cas Treatment system instrunentation in Section VII of the PSAR. Also, include infor-mation for other ESF systers not presently described in Section VII.
7.4 You indicated that the use of RHR punps to supplement fuel pool cooling is required under only unusual circumstances. You have not identified the circunstances, nor have you discussed the interlock concern presented in the question. State whether it is procedurally possible with the electrical interlocks incorporated
. to provide fuel pool cooling while taking suction from the reactor vessel and discharging into the fuel pool. Identify the required system configuration (s).
7.5 You have elected to provide a design other than that proposed by this question. We stated that this would be acceptabic providing you submitted your justification for concluding that your design provides an equivalent degree of protection. Provide your j us tification.
7.7 You state that the Recirculation Run Back (RRE) Control System tends to have a negligibic effect on the peak heat flux and Minimum Critical Heat Flux Ratio (MCHFR). Resubmit Table 7.15-1 MCHFR values without including the contribution of RR3.
7.11 Your justification for removal of the condenser low vacuum scram is unacceptable unless i t is your intention to provide a condenser low vacuum indirect scram by tripping the turbine stop valves or the main steam line isolation valves. The condenser low vacuum trip circuitry should be designed to meet IEEE-279.
State your intentions.
8.0 Electrical Systers 8.1 State whether your Electric Power System will be designed to meet the requirements of CDC-17 and -18.
Justify any exceptions.
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8'.l.b Identify the,rIdYndant and independent cor:munication systems and power sources provided so that the WPPSS operator.and required switching station operators can cornunicate to restore offsite power to llanford-2.
8.1.c It is not clear ti2at. vou have the capability to clear faults and restore offsite power to IIanford-2 in the event of singic failures of circuit breaker tripping devices or of their control power sources., Clarify.
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8.3 hahle8.321, Amendment _3lofthe'PSARisadequatefortheDiesel-Generator connected to vital bus 7.
Include equivalent 4
information for $ ital buses 4 and 8.
Identify the standby power system initiation signals and the events they initiate.
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New Questions--Hanford-2 1.
On page 8.3-2, Amendment 2 of the PSAR, you state that an interlock is provided to prevent closure of the diesel-generator supply breaker when the incoming circuit breaker is closed. This interlock is bypassed to permit testing of the diesel-generator. Describe how you meet the bypass requirement of IEEE-279, paragraphs 4.12 and 4
4.13.
2 State whether the cooling tower substation loads are required for j
safe shutdown of the plant or for postulated accidents. Justify not providing emergency power to those that are safety related.
3.
Correct the discrepancies between the values assigned to diesel-generator loads shown in Tabic 8.3-2 and on Figure 8.2-1 of PSAR Amendnents 3 and 2, respectively. Also, state whether two or four service water pumps will be provided and correct the PSAR for consistency.
4.
Your design on Fig. 8.6-1 showing redundant feeders from the 250 Volt de buses supplying power through inverters and a static switch to the UPS panel is unacceptable and does not.reet the requirements of Safety Guide No. 6.
Correct this design to satisfy Safety Guide 6.
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. 5.
Provide criteria and a description of the d!esel-generator fuel oil supply system. Provide justification of any portion of this system that is not designed to meet seismic Class I requirenents.
6.
State the criteria for installation of safety related cabling which is routed through other than scismic Class I structures. For example, include a description of the cable installation from the switchgear to safety related equiprent in the pump house and in the turbine building.
7.
In paragraph 1.9,19, you state that certain seismic Class I instru-mentation for Engineered Safety Features will meet the required seismic design requirements. Several systems such as service water, Standby Gas Treatment, Containment Isolation, etc., are not included. Add all ESF systems.
8.
Provide the Hydrogen Control System (HCS) electrical and instru-mentation safety design bases. Also, describe in Section VII of the PSAR, the HCS instrumentation required to provide for operation and post-accident nonitoring of system perfornance. Identify the HCS vital power requirements (loads) and power sources.
9.
Describe the circuitry provided to preclude the spent fuel shipping cask from traversing over fuel storage areas.
4 10. Table 1.5-3 and Section 8 are inconsistent and do not accurately describe the IIanford-2 plant. Correct the inconsistencies.
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