ML20214F978

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Submits Info Re IE Bulletin 86-003, Potential Failure of Multiple ECCS Pumps Due to Single Failure of Air-Operated Valve in Min Flow Recirculation Line, Per 861008 Request. Concern in Bulletin Inapplicable to HPCI Sys
ML20214F978
Person / Time
Site: Hatch  
Issue date: 11/11/1986
From: Gucwa L
GEORGIA POWER CO.
To: Grace J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
IEB-86-003, IEB-86-3, SL-1544, NUDOCS 8611250511
Download: ML20214F978 (2)


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Georg!a Power Company 333 Piedmont Avenue Atlanta, Georg a 30308 Telephone 404 5260526 Mad ng Adjrea Post Office Box 4545 Atlanta, Georgta 30302 Georgia Power

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Manager ruea, sar.ny end Licensmg SL-1544 0884C November 11, 1986 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

REFERENCE:

Office of Inspection and Enforcement RII: JNG Region II - Suite 2900 50-321/50-366 101 Marietta Street, N.W.

IE Bulletin Atlanta, Georgia 30323 86-03 ATTENTION: Dr. J. Nelson Grace Gentlemen:

In NRC IE Bulletin 86-03, " Potential Failure of Multiple ECCS Pumps Due to Single Failure of Air-0perated Valve in Minimum Flow Recirculation Line," dated October 8, 1986, the HRC inforned addressees of " single failures of minimum flow recirculation lines containing air-operated isolation valves which could result in a comon-cause failure of all emergency core cooling system (ECCS) pumps in a system." Addressees were requested to

" determine whether or not their facility has a

single-failure vulnerability in the minimum ficw recirculation line of any ECCS pumps that could cause a failure of more than one ECCS train."

Addressees were further instructed to take appropriate action.

In response to IE Bulletin 86-03, Georgia Power Company submits the following information for Plant E. I. Hatch, Units 1 and 2.

At Plant Hatch, three Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCSs) utilize pumps to provide water to the reactor vessel:

1) the Core Spray (CS) system, 2) the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system, and 3) the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system.

A review of the CS and RHR logic and flow diagrams revealed that no single-failure vulnerability which could cause a failure of more than one ECCS train exists in either system's minimum flow reci rculation lines.

The minimum flow bypass valves and the associated instrumentation for each RHR system loop, as well as each CS system loop, are both physically and electrically separated.

Therefore, the failure of more than one CS system or RHR system train, as described in IE Bulletin 86-03, has been precluded.

Since the HPCI system for each unit is a single-train system versus the mul tiple-train system addressed in IE Bulletin 86-03, the concern presented in the subject bulletin is not applicable to the HPCI system.

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Georgia Power d U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region II - Suite 2900 Novembr:r 11, 1986 Page Tvo in conclusion, we believe that the situation discussed in NRC IE Bulle:in 86-03 is not a problem pertinent to the ECCSs at Plant Hatch, and na further actions are planned.

If you should have questions in this regard, please contact this office at any time.

fir. L. T. Gucwa states that he is authorized to execute this oath on behalf of Georgia Power Company, and to the best of his knowledge and belief, the facts set forth in this letter are true.

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY By:

  1. F Me L. T. Gucwa Sworn to and subscribed before me this lith day of November 1986.

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h Pubhc. Clayton County, Georgo My Commission Empires Dec.12, ;939 MJB/lc c: Georgia Power Company U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. t. T. Beckham, Jr.

Mr. P. Holmes-Ray, Senior Resident Mr. H. C. Nix, Jr.

Inspector-liatch G0-NORMS Document Control Desk 0884C 70017$