ML20214E188
| ML20214E188 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 05/08/1987 |
| From: | Selman M CONSOLIDATED EDISON CO. OF NEW YORK, INC. |
| To: | Russell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8705210696 | |
| Download: ML20214E188 (3) | |
Text
',.4 00urrey Soemen Ve Precedent.
ConsoWated Edison Company of New York, Inc..
Indian Point Station.
Broadway & Bioakley Avenue Buchanan, NY 10511 Telephone (914) 737 8116 May 8, 1987 Ret ' Indian Point Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-247 Mr. William Russell Regional Administrator Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue-King of Prussia, PA 19406-
Subject:
Special Nuclear Material Inspection
Dear Mr. Russell:
During the recent ' subject inspection, Mr. A.
Della Ratta of your office requested a summary description of the measures instituted to improve control over Special Nuclear Material.
Attachment A hereto contains the requested information.
If you have further questions, please contact Mr. Michael Miele of my staff at (914) 526-5252.
Very truly yours, 2,w-20.190.5.4.3 cc U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Mr. A. Della Ratta U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 Senior Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 38 Buchanan, NY 10511 V
8705210696 870508 0
PDR ADOCK 05000247j p
G PDR
o Attachment A In. January, 1987, the Radiological Assessor, initiated a special review of non-fuel special nuclear material (SNM) inventory. The review was prompted by an account of a suspected loss by another utility, of SNM in the form of fission detectors.
As a result of this review, efforts to - consolidate Indian Point SNM storage, secure and label storage locations, and inventory non-fuel SNM were immediately begun.
Unit 1 ex-core fission counters were individually tagged and : locked in a newly designated storage cabinet in cell 3,
adjacent to the shielded storage room on 53' elevation of the NSB.
A non-routine inventory of these counters was completed by count and by individual counter identification.
The corroborated results of this physical inventory were given to the Perfornance Supervisor.
The Radiation Protection Manager now has as a direct. result of these consolidation efforts control of non-fuel SNM in the shielding storage room and cell 3.
The inventory showed that two of the previously inventoried Unit 1 ex-core counters were not found.
Also, two submersible fission counters used during the 1984 refueling outage were not accounted for in this inventory.
Believing that these counters may still be within the controlled area, station personnel conducted an extensive search of the facilities, waste storage units and vaults in an attempt to locate these items.
The search yielded no devices. A search of scaled solid waste drums also produced no counters. We believe it is possible that the counters were chipped to the waste disposal site in Barnwell, South Carolina.
The inventory deficien-cies and the possibility of shipment to the burial site were reported in late January to the NRC Region I Office.
Following completion of initial corrective control actions, a schedule was established to incorporate improvements in our non-fuel SNM control pro-gram. Several potential enhancemento have been identified from the review of 10CFR70, the facility licenses, and ANSI N15.8.
The schedule of actions to be taken for program improvement are set forth in the station's Nuclear Power Goals and Objectives Program. These actions were discussed with Mr.
Arthur Della Ratta of the NRC during his recent inspection of our Material Control and Accounting program. Areas identified which warrant additional improvement includes o
clarification of responsibility assignments for control and accounting of non-fuel SNM o
disposal of used or depleted devices o
internal physical control for receipt and movement of SNM o
use of inventory data sheet format.
We already have in place the elements of a good control program.
Our target actions now include procedure and station administrative order amendments as well as additionally suitable procedure development.. Train-ing of responsible personnel should follow the written program changes.
Program upgrades are to be implemented by early summer of this year.
l l