ML20213G623

Forwards marked-up Pages of Proof & Review Tech Specs & Fsar,Reflecting Current Boron Dilution Analysis Performed to Demonstrate Compliance W/Section 15.4.6 of Srp,For Review

ML20213G623
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	11/14/1986
From:	Bailey J GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:	Youngblood B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
GN-1183, NUDOCS 8611180234
Download: ML20213G623 (25)

Text

'8

-4 Georgia PowIt Company Fbst Office Box 282 Waynssborn Georgia 30830 Telephone 404 554-9961 404 724-8114 Southern Company Services, Inc.

Rost Office Box 2625 Birmingham, Nabama 35202 Telephone 205 870-6011 y

g g gg November 14, 1986 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation File:

X7N16 Attention:

Mr. B. J. Youngblood Log:

GN-ll83 PWR Project Directorate #4 Division of PWR Licensing A U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 NRC DOCKET NUMBER 50-424 CONSTRUCTION PERMIT NUMBER CPPR-108 V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PIANT - UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Dear Mr. Denton:

Enclosed for your staff's review are marked-up pages from the Proof and Review Copy of the VEGP Unit 1 Technical Specifications and the VEGP FSAR. The purpose of these revised pages is to reflect the current boron dilution analysis performed to demonstrate compliance with Section 15.4.6 of the Standard Review Plan.

If your staff requires additional information, please do not hesitate to call.

S neerely,

• b*

GA $

J. A. Bailey Project Licensing Manager JAB /caa Enclosure xc:

R. E. Conway NRC Regional Administrator R. A. Thomas NRC Resident Inspector J. E. Joiner, Esquire D. Feig B. W. Churchill, Esquire R. W. McManus (w/o enclosure)

M. A. Miller (2)

L. T. Gucwa B. Jones, Esquire (w/o enclosure)

Vogtle Project File G. Bockhold, Jr.

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8611180234 861114 PDR ADOCK 05000424 i

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3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

& BLEW m 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL MODES i APJO /.

SHUTOOWN MARGIN - T C"L*TER T"'f: 200"i avg LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to 1.3% ak/k for four loop operation. g APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1

[, ad 4. " "

ACTION:

With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than 1.3% ak/k, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 7000 ppm boron or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 1.3% Ak/k:

Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after detection of an inoperable control rod (s) and a.

at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter while the rod (s) is inoperable.

If the inoperable control rod is immovable or untrippable, the above required SHUTOOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increa' sed allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod (s);

b.

When in MODE 1 or MODE 2 with K,ff greater than or equal to 1 at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by verifying that control bank withdrawal is within the limits of Sp,ecification 3.1.3.6; With K,ff less than 1, within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> prior to achieving reactor c.

criticality by verifying that the predicted critical control rod position is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6; d.

Prior to initial operation above 5% RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading, by consideration of the factors Of Sp::i'ic:-

ti a 2.1.1.1.1;. below, with the con rol banks at the maximum inser-tion limit of Specification 3.1.3.

• See Special Test Exceptions Specification 3.10.1.

V0GTLE - UNIT 1 3/4 1-1 SEP1 9 m

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS M&gg@

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

" :r '- "^0E 2 er i, ;t le;;t ;n;; ;;r 24 hcur:-by ::,7;ider; tier ;$

2.

tt.; f;ilerir.; f a to,a.-

1)

Reactor Coolant System boron concentration, 2)

Control rod position, 3)

Reactor Coolant System average temperature, 4)

Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation, 5)

Xenon concentration, and 6). S.am.arium concentration.

4.1.1.1.2 The overall core reactivity balance shall compared to predicted values to demonstrate agreement within i 1% ak/k at least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD).

This compar leastthosefactorsstatedinSpecification4.1.1.1.1/jsonshallconsiderat

., above.

The predicted reactivity values shall be adjusted (normalized) to correspond to the actual core conditions prior to exceeding a fuel burnup of 60 EFPD after each fuel loading.

V0GTLE - UNIT 1 3/4 1-2 SEP19IllB6

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS Mo p t.s 3, 4 and 5

% & REVIEW CDP SHUTOOWN MARGIN - T L% 0= ""

^d,7 L TO 200'E avo LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.2 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than'or equal to 'l

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Me fowift 3Amt 41 f*jukt 3./-/ and 3./-2 APPLICABILITY:

N MODES 3 4 Md 5 ACTION:

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g gfg With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than 'l n,'k, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 7000 ppm boron or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.

SURVEILLANCE ~ REQUIREMENTS 4.1.1.2 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal l ^.L,'L. -lhe r&f vind fahte:

to '

Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after detection of an inoperable control rod (s) and at a.

least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter while the rod (s) is inoperable.

If the inoperable control rod is immovable or untrippable, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod (s); and b.

Atleastonceper24hoursbyconsiderationofthefollowingfactors) 1)

Reactor Coolant System boron concentration, 2)

Control rod position, 3)

Reactor Coolant System average temperature, 4)

Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation, 5)

Xenon concentration, and 6)

Samarium concentration.

V0GTLE - UNIT 1 3/4 1-3 SEP 19 916

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1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS PROOF & REVIEWm l

FLOW PATHS - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.2 At least tw f the following teemoe boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE: g,7 4due flow path 5from the boric acid storage tank via a boric acid transfer a.

pugan,dge,hargingpumptotheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS),and/or'

b. [4wo flow paths from the refueling water storage tank via charging pumps to the RCS.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

g pg f fi v/t 3./-2 With only one of the above required boron injection flow paths to the RCS OPERABLE, restore at least two boron injection flow paths to the RCS to OPERABLE status with' n 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated P

to a SHUTOOWN MARGIN q & :12 t t: :t 1: n t ltk/k at 200*F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore at least two flow paths to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUT 00WN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.2 At least two of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated.

OPERABLE:

At least once per 7 days when the boric acid tank is a required a.

water source, verify that the applicable portions of the auxiliary building (TISL 12410 or TISL 12411, TISL 12412 or TISL 12413, TISL 12414 or 12415, TISL 12416 or TISL 12417, TISL 20900 or TISL 20901, TISL 20902 or TISL 20903, and TISL 20904 or TISL 29005) and the portions of the flow path for which ambient temperature indication are not provided are >65'F; b.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position; At least once per 18 months by verifying that the flow path required c.

by Specification 3.1.2.2a. delivers at least 30 gpm to the RCS.

I i

V0GTLE - UNIT 1 3/4 1-8 gg

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS M & Ryg g CHARGING PUMPS - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.4 At least two charging pumps shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

nds regv/Yed by $juft d*l~5 ACTION:

With only one caarging pump OPERABLE, restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGI!F:;

l e nt.........

, m at 200 F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.4 At least two charging pumps shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.2.2.c.

V0GTLE - UNIT 1 3/4 1-10 SEP 1 S HIS

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

& REVIEWm BORATED WATER SOURCE - SHUTOOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.5 As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

a.

A Boric Acid Storage Tank with:

1)

Aminimumcontainedboratedwatervolumeof98dfgallons, 2)

A boron concentration between 7000 ppm and 7700 ppm, and 3)

A minimum solution temperature of 65 F.

b.

The refueling water storage tank (RWST) with:

1)

A minimum contained borated water volume of 78832 gallons, 2)

A boron concentration between 2000 ppm and 2200 ppm, and 3)

A minimum solution temperature of 50 F.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no borated water source OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.5 The above required borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

At least once per 7 days by:

a.

1)

Verifying the boron concentration of the water, 2)

Verifying the contained borated water volume, and 3)

When the boric acid storage tank is the source of borated water and the ambient temperature of the boric acid storage tank room is <65'F, verify the boric acid storage tank solution temperature is > 65*F.

b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the RWST temperature when it is the source of borated water and the outside air temperature is less than 50 F.

V0GTLE - UNIT 1 3/4 1-11 si,P161986

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS PROOF & REVIEW COPY BORATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.6 As a minimum, the following borated water source (s) shall be OPERABLE as required by Specification 3.1.2.2:

A Boric Acid Storage Tank with:

a.

1)

A minimum contained borated water volume of3/d,7/ gallons, 2)

A boron concentration between 7000 ppm and 7700 ppm, and 3)

A minimum solution temperature of 65*F.

b.

The-refueling water storage tank (RWST) with:

1)

A minimum contained borated water volume off3/978 gallons, 2)

A boron concentration between 2000 ppm and 2100 ppm, 3)

A minimum solution temperature of 50 F, and 4)

A maximum solution temperature of 120 F.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

R$ fquifE0'by AjkN S'l~S ACTION:

With the Boric Acid Storage Tank inoperable and being used as a.

one of the above required borated water sources, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and borated to a SHUTOOWN MARGIN cf :1=t te at Mrt "" 4W at 200*F; restore the Boric Acid Storage Tank to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />, b.

With the RWST inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

V0GTLE - UNIT 1 3/4 1-12 GEP 19 366

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS D&ggg 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES GROUP HEIGHT LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.1 All shutdown and control rods shall be OPERABLE and positioned within i 12 steps (indicated position) of their group demand position.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1* and 2*.

ACTION:

With one or more rods inoperable due to being immovable as a result a.

of excessive friction or mechanical interference or known to be untrippable, determine that the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and be in HOT STAN0BY'within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

b.

With one rod trippable but inoperable due to causes other t!ian~Sle)0 W addressed by ACTION a., above, or misaligned from its groupW emand height by more than i 12 steps (indicated position), POWER OPEPATION may continue provided that within 1 hour:

1.

The rod is restored to OPERABLE status within the above alignment requirements, or 2.

The rod is declared inoperable and the remainder of the rods in the group with the inoperable rod are aligned to within i 12 steps of the inoperable rod while maintaining the rod sequence and insertion limits of Figures 3.1-/.

The THERMAL POWER level shallberestrictedpursuantto{j Specification 3.1.3.6 during subsequent operation, or 3.

The rod is declared inoperable and the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied.

POWER OPERATION may then continue provided that:

a)

A reevaluation of each accident analysis of Table 3.1-1 is performed within 5 days; this reevaluation shall confirm that the previously analyzed results of these accidents remain valid for the duration of operation under these conditions; b)

The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is determined at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />;

• See Special Test Exceptions Specifications 3.10.2 and 3.10.3.

V0GTLE - UNIT 1 3/4 1-14 EP 1 S E86

j REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS PROOF & Emm LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ACTION (Continued) c)

A power distribution map is obtained from the movable incore detec' tors and F (Z) and F are verified to be q

H within their limits within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />; and d)

The THERMAL POWER level is reduced to less than or equal to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next hour and within the following 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> the High Neutron Flux Trip Setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 85%

of RATED THERMAL POWER.

~

With more than one rod trippable but inoperable due to causes other c.

than addressed by ACTION a above, power operation may continue provided that:

1.

Within I hour, the remainder of the rods in the bank (s) with the inoperable rods are aligned to within i 12 steps of the inopor-able rods while maint.alni tne roa sequence and insertion limits of Figure 3.1-r "f;;., 0.1 1;,, as applicable.

The THERMAL POWER level hall be restricted pursuant to Specifica-tion 3.1.3.6 during subsequent operation, and 3

2.

The inoperable rods are restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

-ysprc=M W j

he 4t-Withmorethanonerodmisalignedfromitsgroupdemandp..h:

d.

... by more than i 12 steps (indicated position), be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.1.1 The position of each f L.f.h rod shall be determined to be within the group demand limit by verifying the individual rod positions at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> except during time intervals when the Rod Position Deviation Monitor is inoperable, then verify the group positions at least once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

i 4.1.3.1.2 Each f ~~ - J. rod not fully inserted in the core shall be determined to be OPERABLE by movement of at least 10 steps in any one direction at least once per 31 days.

i V0GTLE - UNIT 1 3/4 1-15 SEP 19 MHi

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS PROOF & mam CONTROL ROD INSERTION LIMITS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1. 3. 6 The control banks shall be limited in physical insertion as shown in Figure 3.1-J'.

3 APPLICABILITY:

MODES la and 2* **.

ACTION:

With the control banks inserted beyond the above insertion limits, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2:

Restore the control banks to within the limits within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, or a.

ReduceTHERMALPOWERwithin2hourstolessthanorequaltothat b.

fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER which is allowed by the bank posi-tion using the above figure, or c.

Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.6 The position of each control bank shall be determined to be within the insertion limits at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> except during time intervals when the rod insertion limit monitor is inoperable, then verify the individual-rod positions at least once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

l l

• See Special Test Exceptions Specifications 3.10.2 and 3.10.3.

• • With K,ff greater than or equal to 1.

V0GTLE - UNIT 1 3/4 1-21 SEP19 M6

3 PROOF & REVIEW COP FIGURE 3.1-/

ROD BANK INSERTION LIMITS VERSUS THERMAL POWER FOUR LOOP OPERATION e

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V0GTLE - UNIT 1 3/4 1-22 SEP 191ll86

PROOF & REVIEW COPY 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL 3/4.1.1.1 and 3/4.1.1.2 SHUTDOWN MARGIN A sufficient SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensures that:

(1) the reactor can be made subcritical from all operating conditions, (2) the reactivity transients asso-ciated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and (3) the reactor will be maintained sufficiently subtritical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown conditionfos h1 ODES 1and2.

life as a function of SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements vary throughout core fuel depletion, RCS boron concentration, and RCS T,yg. Ufhe most restrictive condition occurs at EOL, with T,yg at no load operating temperature, and is associated with a postulated steam line break accident and resulting uncon In the analysis of this accident, a minimum SHUTDOWN trolled RCS cooldown.

MARGIN of 1.3% ak/k is required to control the reactivity transient.

Accordingly, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement is based upon this limiting condition and is consistent with FSAR safety analysis assumptions. !!!" ' avg less th:n 200*F, the reactivity tr n:icnts resulting Un= = pertel ted ste:m lir,e t,reck 00ld;wn :re =4ai==1 :nd : l'.

tk/k SHUTDOW u^DGL" provid:: -

-:d:q :te prot::tien.

.Essert 1 - o 8 3lY l-1 l

3/4.1.1.3 MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT The limitations on moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) are provided to ensure that the value of this coefficient remains within the limiting condition assumed in the FSAR accident and transient analyses.

The MTC values of this specification are applicable to a specific set of plant conditions; accordingly, verification of MTC values at co order to permit an accurate comparison.

The most negative MTC, value equivalent to the most positive moderator density coefficient (MDC), was obtained by incrementally correcting the MDC These corrections used in the FSAR analyses to nominal operating conditions.

I 1

B 3/4 1-1 V0GTLE - UNIT 1

Erwf f lo 8 3,/4' /-/.

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BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

MARGIN from expected operating conditions - ' * " after xenon decay and cooldown to 200*F.

The maximum expected boration capability requirement occurs at EOL from full power equilibrium xenon conditions and requires J/7@M gallons usable volume of 7000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or E43v6 gallons f 2000 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank (RWST).

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With the RCS temperature below 200*F, one Boron Injection System is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single Boron Injection ystem becomes nogrbl.36 J,wc/ftut/in 3/4././.Z (MAdfS)

The bocen capab y required b ow 200*F is sufficient to provide a SHUTOOWN MARGIN :? '__ r 'k after xenon decay and cooldown from 200*F 140 F.

This condition requires eitherV574 gallons usable volume of 7000(j ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or/2 R ogallons usable volume of 2000 ppm borated water from the RWST.

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,g gjyg,jy The contained water volume limits nclude allowance for water not available because of discharge line location and other physical characteristics.

The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 8.5 and 10.5 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA.

This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mec*ianical systems and components.

The OPERABILITY of one Boron Injection System during REFUELING ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES The specifications of this section are necessary to ensure that the follow-ing requirements are met at all times during normal operation.

By observing that the RCCAs are positioned above their respective insertion limits during normal operation, 1.

At any time in life for MODE 1 and 2 operation, the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN will be maintained.

For operational MODES 3, 4, 5, and 6, the reactivity condition consistent with other specifications will be main-tained with all FCCAs fully inserted by observing that the boron concentra-tion is always greater than an appropriate minimum value.

2.

During normal operation the enthalpy rise hot channel factor, F3g, will be maintained within acceptable limits.

V0GTLE - UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-3 w

Justification Specifications 3/4.1.1.1 and 3/4.1.1.2 were revised to include variable shutdown margin requirements for Modes 3, 4 and 5.

This is based on our boron dilution analysis which is performed to demonstrate compliance with 15.4.6 of the Standard Review Plan. The Standard Review Plan recommends that at least 15 minutes from the time that the operator receives an alarm to the time of loss of shutdown margin be available for operator action.

In order to maintain at least 15 minutes for operator action time, shutdown margin for Modes 3, 4 and 5 must be maintained greater than or equal to the limits shown in Figures 3.1-1 and 3.1-2.

Since the calculations on which these requirements are based are a function of RCS volume, Mode 4 shutdown margin requirements appear on both figures. When at least one reactor coolant pump is running the active volume is larger than with an RHR pump running and the limits of Figure 3.1-1 are appropriate. With one RHR pump running, the limits of Figure 3.1-2 are appropriate due to the smaller active volume.

The Action Statements of Specifications 3/4.1.2.2, 3/4.1.2.4, and 3/4.1.2.6 were revised to reference Figure 3.1-2 for the required shutdown margin.

VEGP-FSAR-15 15.4.6 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION THAT RESULTS IN A DECREASE IN THE BORON CONCENTRATION IN THE REACTOR COOLANT 15.4.6.1 Identification of Causes and Accident Desbription Reactivity can be added to the core by feeding primary grade tor coolant system (RCS) vir th

• ==-tar water into the re g'the chemical and volume control system

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Boron difution is a manual operation under strict (CVCS).

administrative controls with procedures calling for a limit on the rate and duration of dilution.

A boric acid blend system is provided to permit the operator to match the boron concentration of reactor coolant makeup water during normal charging to that in the RCS.

The CVCS is designed to limit the potential rate of dilution to a value which, after indication through alarms and instrumentation, provides the operator sufficient time to correct the situation in a safe and orderly manner.

r CF The opening of the primary water makeup control valve provides makeup to the RCS which can dilute the reactor coolant.

Inadvertent dilution from this source can be readily terminated by closing the control valve.

In order for makeup water to be added to the RCS at pressure, at least one charging pump must be running in addition to a reactor makeup water pump.

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LNormally, only one prim,ary grade water supply pump is operating while the other is on standby.

The boric acid from the boric acid tank is blended with primary grade water in the blender, and the composition is determined by the preset flowrates of boric acid and primary grade water on the control board.

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The makeu ntrol switch must laced in a start l3 g

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1 u..._ ttir; ei-th.6.;;p unuld erevent dilution.

I Information on the status of the reactor coolant makeup is continuously available to the operator.

Lights are provided on the control board to indicate the operating condition'of the l

pumps in the CVCS.

Alarms are actuated to warn the operator if.

15.4.6-1 Amend. 3 1/84

i VEGP-FSAR-15 3.

Failure to secure chemical addition.

l 4.

Boric acid flow control valve (TV-110A) fails closed 17 during make-up.

Initiator 4 was found to be the most limiting event for modes 3,

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4, and 5.

The parameters used in the calculation of time available for operator response are listed in table 15.4.6-1.

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15.4.6-2a Amend. 17 7/85 i

VEGP-FSAR-15 A minimum water volume (9757 ft8) in the RCS is used.

This volume corresponds to the active volume of the RCS minus the pressurizer volume.

15.4.6.2.2 Results,

The calculated sequence of events is shown in table 15.4.1-1.

15.4.6.2.2.1 Dilution During Refueling.

Dilution during refueling cannot occur cue to administrative controls.

(See paragraph 15.4.6.2.1.1).

17 15.4.6.2.2.2 Dilution During Cold Shutdown.

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EMERT A 15.4.6.2.2.3 Dilution During Hot Standby and Hot Shutdown.

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[A/.$6 Q T 15.4.6.2.2.4 Dilution During Startup.

In the event of an unplanned approach to criticality or dilution during power escalation while in the startup mode, the operator is alerted to an unplanned dilution by a reactor trip at the power range neutron flux high, low setpoint.

After reactor trip there is at least 19.0 min for operator action prior to loss of shutdown margin.

15.4.6.2.2.5 Dilution During Power Operation.

During full-power operation with the reactor in manual control, the operator is alerted to an uncontrolled dilution by an overtemperature AT reacter trip.

At least 19.0 min are available from the trip for operator action prior to loss of shutdown margin.

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During full-power operation with the reactor in automatic control, the operator is alerted to an uncontrolled reactivity insertion by the rod insertion limit alarms.

At least 36.8 min are available for operator action from the low-low rod insertion limit alarm until a loss of shutdown margin occurs.

i 15.4.6-4 Amend. 17 7/85

INSERT A i

For dilution during cold shutdown, the technical specifications provide the required shutdown margin as a function of RCS boron concentration.

The specified shutdown margin ensures that the operator has 15 minutes from the time of the high flux at shutdown alarm to the total loss of shutdown margin.

INSERT B For dilution during hot standby and hot shutdown, the technical specifications provide the required shutdown margin as a function of RCS boron concentratiori.

The specified shutdown margin O

enlsures that the operator has 15 minutes from the time of the hi'gh s'utdown alarm to the total loss of shutdown margin.

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VEGP-FSAR-15 TABLE 15.4.1-1 (SEEET 2 OF 4)

Time I

Accident Event Isl 2.

Case B Initiation of uncontrolled RCCA O

withdrawal at a small reactivity insertion rate (3 pcm/s)

Overtemperature AT setpoint 33.3 reached Rods begin to fall into core 35.3 Minimum DNBR occurs 36.1 Startup of an in-gt active reactor coolant loop at an incorrect tempera-ture Initiation of pump startup O.0 l'

Power reaches P8 trip setpoint 6.8

(

Rods begin to drop 7.3 Minimum DNBR occurs 8.0

~

Chemical and volume control system mal-function that results in a decrease in the boron concentration in the reactor coolant tion during Dilution begins cold a q

ut n lost 282 2.

D ring Dilution beg n O

ot standby Shutdown margin lost

)fI Dilution during Power range - low setpoint O

),

startup reactor trip due to dilution Shutdown margin lost (if 1,140 dilution continues after trip)

VEGP-FSAR.15 s -

TABLE 15.4.1-1 (SHEET 3 O'l 4)

Time Accident.

Event f 31

2. Af.

Dilution during full-power operation

(

a.

Automatic Operation receives low-low 0

reactor rod insertion limit alarm control due to dilution s

Shutdown margin 1.ost 2,208 b.

Manual Reecter trip on overtemperature 0-reactor AT due to dilution g

Shutdown margin is lost (if 1,140 dilution continues after trip)

RCCA ejection s

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accident 1.

End of life, Initiation.of rod ejection 13.0 full power Power range high neutron fluk O.045 metpoint reached Peak nuclear power occurs

-0.14 4

Rods begin to fall into core 0.54 Peak fuel average temperature 2.02 occurs

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Peak clad temperature occurs 2.12 l

l Peak heat flux' occurs 2.15 2.

Beginning of life, Initiation of rod ejection 0.0 -

zero power Power range high neutron flux 0.205 low setpoint reached Peak nuclear power occurs 0.246 Rods begin to fall into coro 0.705 Peak clad temperature occurs 1.89

4 VEGP-FSAR-15 TABLE 15.4.6-1 PARAMETERS Dilution Flowrates:

Initiator Flowrate (apm) 1 63 4

2 120 q

3 3.5 4

'*E-ISO Volumes:

Mode volume (ft 3)

Volume (cal) 17 g

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Sa (filled)

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55 (d :ir.:d; 0000.0 20700 Worbk ~ 14enetnt sti r : /ppy Boroon Fw c

B_arar C

Co (ppm)

Percent SDM c (ppm) 3, 4 720 0

2-0 N

t T

971 1077 1.--5 a,

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