ML20213G252

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Confirms 870501 Discussions W/Nrc Re Potential Loss of Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Seal Thermal Barrier Cooling & Injection Concurrent W/Potential Loss of RCP Trip Capability from Control Room for Fire in Fire Zone CB-FA-1
ML20213G252
Person / Time
Site: Three Mile Island Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 05/07/1987
From: Hukill H
GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
5211-87-2095, NUDOCS 8705180204
Download: ML20213G252 (2)


Text

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, GPU Nuclear Corporation g g7 Post Office Box 480 Route 441 South Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 0191 717 944 7621 TELEX 84 2386 Writer's Direct Olal Number:

May 7, 1987 5211-87-2095 U.S. fluclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (Tril-1)

Operating License No. DPR-50 Docket No. 50-289 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Thermal Barrier Cooling and Injection Additional Information This letter confirms discussions with HRC on May 1,1987, regarding potential loss of reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal thermal barrier cooling and injection concurrent with potential loss of RCP trip capability from the control room for a fire in fire zone CB-FA-1.

A review of fire zones CD-FA-2d and CB-FA-2f was initiated to determine the extent of modifications necessary to protect the circuits associated with RCP seal thermal barrier cooling and injection, and RCP trip capability in these zones (previously approved exemption granted by NRC letter dated March 19, 1987). During this review a similar situation was identified in CD-FA-1.

The operator actions required for a fire in CD-FA-1 are the same as those actions specified for a fire in CD-FA-2d or CD-FA-2f. An operator is immediately dispatched to the Remote Shutdown Panels (RSP) upon confirmation of a fire. This operator is available to restore RCP seal cooling, if required. The only operator action not previously included in the emergency procedure for CB-FA-1 was to trip the RCP's if seal cooling could not be restored. The emergency procedure for CD-FA-1 has been revised to include the additional requirement to trip the RCP's if seal cooling is not restored.

Even without this procedural requirement, we believe that the operators are sufficiently trained such that they would trip the RCP's if both seal cooling and injection are lost and cannot be immediately restored. In addition, existing operating and abnormal procedures specify tripping the RCP's if seal cooling and injection are lost and cannot be restored.

The procedural requirements for CB-FA-1 are the same as the actions previously approved by HRC in zones CB-FA-2d and CD-FA-2f. The RSP provides an alternative capability for restoration of seal cooling independent of CB-FA-1. Suppression and detection are also provided. On this basis, we believe that the requirements specified in III.G.3 are met and an exemption from 10 CFR 50 Appendix R is not required for this case.

OPU Nuclear Corporation is a subsidlary of the Gonoral Public Utilities Corporation 0705180204 070507 0 PDR ADOCK 05000289 6

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5211-87-2095 May 7, 1987 GPUN requests that the condition described above in fire zone CB-FA-1 be addressed in the updated NRC Safety Evaluation Report on THI-1 compliance to Appendix R based on the TMI-1 Fire Hazards Analysis Report, Revision 9 to be submitted by October 31,1987. ,

Sincerely, I Vice Presid'nt and Director, TMI-1 HDH:DJD:jh 0874A cc: J. Stolz, USNRC G. Edison, USNRC D. Kubicki, USNRC j W. T. Russell, USNRC Region I i R. Conte, USNRC TMI-1 Site l l

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