ML20213F900

Suppl to Fourth Partial Initial Decision Re Remanded Contention on Manpower Mobilization at State Correctional Institution at Graterford.Served on 861113

ML20213F900
Person / Time
Site:	Limerick
Issue date:	11/10/1986
From:	Cole R, Harbour J, Hoyt H Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
To:
References
CON-#486-1505 OL, NUDOCS 8611170238
Download: ML20213F900 (25)

Text

N

/ 5 05 SERVED NOV 131986 DOLS.E T Li UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

'86 NOV 13 A10:49 ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD BEFORE ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGES:

[0$ (-[

Helen F. Hoyt, Chairperson w;

Dr. Richard F. Cole Dr. Jerry Harbour A

)

In the Matter of

)

Docket Nos. 50-352-0L

)

50-353-OL PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY (Limerick Generating Station,

)

Units 1 and 2)

)

November 10, 1986

)

SUPPLEMENT TO THE FOURTH PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION RELATING TO THE REMANDED CONTENTION REGARDING MANPOWER MOBILIZATION AT THE STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION AT GRATERFORD APPEARANCES Robert M. Rader, Esq., and Nils N. Nichols, Esq., of Conner A Wetterhahn, P.C., Washington, D.C., for Philadelphia l

Electric Company.

Joseph Rutberg, Esq. and Benjamin H. Vogler, Esq., Office of the General Counsel, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., for the NRC Staff.

Theodore G. Otto, III, Esq., Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, for the Comonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Michael Hirsch, Esq., Office of the General Counsel, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, D.C., for FEMA.

Angus R. Love, Esq., Montgomery County Legal Aid Service, Norristown, Pennsylvania, for the Inmates of the State Correctional Institution at Graterford, Pennsylvania.

I 8611170238 861110 PDR ADOCK 05000352 O

PDR g

2 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I.

Scope of Decision......................................

3 II. Background.............................................

3 I I I. Fi nd i ng s o f Fact.......................................

8 A.

Manpower Needs To Effectuate An Evacuation Of Graterford.......................

8 B.

Procedures And Capabilities For Noti fying Off-Duty Correctionel Officers..........

10 C.

Design And Capacity Of The Commercial Phone Network..........................

12 D.

Reliability Of Commercial Telephone Network For Notifying Off-Duty Graterford Staff...........

16 E.

Events In Northeastern Pennsylvania Involving Overloaded Telephone Circuits...........

19 F.

Corroborating FEMA Testimony......................

21 G.

Effect Of Notification And Mobilization Procedures Upon Evacuation Time Estimates.........

22 H.

Comparability Of Telephone Systems Used To Notify Graterford Staff and Other Emergency Response Organizations..................

23 IV. Conclusions of Law.....................................

24 V.

Order..................................................

24

3 I.

SCOPE OF DECISION This Supplement to the Fourth Partial Initial Decision (PID) addresses the remanded contention on manpower mobilization at the State Correctional Institution at Graterford (SCIG) in the event of the need for an evacuation because of an emergency at the Limerick Generating Station (Limerick). On the basis of the record before it, the Board, in the context of the litigated contention, concludes that there is reasonable assurance that, in the event of a radiological emergency at the Limerick Generating Station that requires the evacuation of the SCIG, the call-up system will achieve its designated purpose to notify off-duty security personnel needed to implement the evacuation.

In considering the effectiveness of the call-up system, and the several available options for mobilizing off-duty correctional officers, the Board also finds that the previous evacuation time estimates made for the SCIG are reasonable and compatible with the notification and mobilization plan.

II. BACKGROUND On August 28, 1986, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board 1

(Appeal Board) issued ALAB-845 in which the Appeal Board decided the 1

Philadelphia Electric Company (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-845, 24 NRC _ (August 28,1986).

4 2

appeals of the Inmates from the Licensing Board's Fourth PID and the Licensing Board's earlier rejection of some of the Inmates proffered contentions.3 The Appeal Board affirmed the Fourth PID in all respects except for its rejection of the Inmates' contention concerning manpower mobilization. This one contention was reversed and remanded to the Licensing Board for further consideration. The Inmates' revised manpower mobilization contention alleges that:

[t]here is no reasonable assurance that the call up system to be utilized in the event of a nuclear emergency in order to mobilize the entire work force of the State Correctional Institute [ sic] at Graterford will achieve its designated purpose.

Proposed Revised Contentions (May 13, 1985) at 2.

In the event of an emergency requiring evacuation, the SCIG Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) provides for the mobilization of its off-duty employees through a pyramiding telephone call-up system.

According to the Inmates' contention this plan could fail if the commercial telephone lines become overburdened during an emergency and thus limit the SCIG's ability to carry out its manpower nobilization plan.

In support of their contention the Inmates noted the previous testimony of Richard T. Brown, Chaiman, Lower Providence Township Board of Supervisors, who stated that during a past emergency 2

Philadelphia Electric Company (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-25, 22 NRC 101 (1985).

3 Licensing Board Order of June 12,1985(unpublished),

reconsideration denied, Licensing Board Order of July 2,1985 (unpublished).

5 (Hurricane Agnes), the local commercial telephone network was overburdened and its service impaired. Tr. 18,149-150.

In the opinion of the Appeal Board:

The contention clearly raises an issue that can be the proper subject for litigation in an operating license proceeding -- the adequacy of the communications system to be used in the event of an emergency.

(footnote omitted) ALAB-845 at 8.

The Appeal Board concluded that the overall adequacy of the public telephone network had not been directly addressed at the hearing, nor had Mr. Brown's testimony been refuted.

ALAB-845 at 11. Therefore, the Appeal Board reversed the Licensing Board's rejection of this contention and remanded the natter for further action consistent with the Commission's Rules of Practice and its opinion.

See, ALAB-845 at 12-13.

In this regard, the Appeal Board noted that some means to notify the off-duty SCIG personnel in the event of an emergency did exist, i.e.,

the telephone call-up system.

It was only the adequacy of this telephone call-up system in the event of an overload that was in question. The Appeal Board, in affirming the Licensing Board's decision as to the Estimated Time of Evacuation (ETE) for the SCIG issue, also directed the Licensing Board and the parties in the course of their consideration on remand of the Inmates' manpower mobilization contention to determine what effect, if any, the resolution of that issue had on the ETE for the SCIG. ALAB-845 at 41.

In response to the Appeal Board's remand order, the Licensing Board held a conference call with the parties on September 3, 1986. During the conference call the Licensing Board sought the views of the parties

6 and then advised that it would hold a hearing on the remanded contention in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on September 22, 1986.4 The Licensing Board also advised that no prefiled testimony would be ordered; that witness lists should be exchanged no later than September 12, 1986; and that discovery should begin immediately.5 The hearing was held in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on September 22, 1986, and pursuant to the Licensing Beard's Order of September 4, no prefiled testimony was presented. A total of five witnesses presented

" live" testimony at the hearing.

Richard A. Buell, District Manager, Network Technical Services, Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania, and Charles A. Zimmerman, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Graterford, testified on behalf of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections.

Richard T. Brown, Chairman of the Board of Supervisors, Lower Providence Township, and a Coninunications Technician, American Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, and William Miller, Manager, Switching Services, Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania, testified at the request of the Inmates. Mr. James R. Asher, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), testified on behalf of FEMA.

4 As we noted at that time, the schedules of the Board members for other hearings would not pertnit a hearing for this remand issue until next year, unless it were heard promptly.

5 Philadelphia Electric Company (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), Order at 1 (September 4,1986).

7 The Board has considered all of the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law presented by the parties. Those not incorporated directly or inferentially in this Supplement to the Fourth PID are rejected as unsupported by the record of the case or as being unnecessary to the rendering of this Supplement to the Fourth PID.

Therefore, as discussed below, this Licensing Board finds, in the context of the litigated contention, and, on the basis of the record before it that there is reasonable assurance that, in the event of a radiological emergency at the Limerick Generating Station that requires the evacuation of the State Correctional Institution at Graterford, the call-up system will achieve its designated purpose to notify any off-duty security personnel needed to implement the evacuation, and that our previous decision on evacuation time estimates for the SCIG is unaffected.

1 8

III.

FINDINGS OF FACT A.

Manpower Needs to Effectuate an Evacuation of Graterford 1.

Charles A. Zimmernan is the Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Graterford.

Zimmerman, Tr. 21450.

Mr. Zinnerman previously testified in this proceeding on two other contested issues concerning emergency planning and preparedness for the inmates at Graterford. Zimmerman, Tr. 20760-20853.

2.

As Superintendent, Mr. Zimmerman is familiar with the radiological emergency response plan for Graterford, the manpower needs to implement that plan and the number of staff on duty during the available shifts at Graterford. Zimmerman, Tr. 21450.

3.

The total staff employed at the SCIG, including correctional officers and all other categories of personnel except contracted medical staff, presently numbers about 628 persons. Commonwealth Exh.1, at 3; Zinnerman, Tr. 21459-60, 21496.

4 All SCIG staff personnel are trained in prisoner custody, care and control. Zimmerman, Tr. 21453.

5.

Graterford utilizes several manpower shifts. Three correctional officer shifts run from 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.; 2:00 p.m.

to 10:00 p.m.; and 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.

Between 7:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m., other staff shifts commence. The Culinary Department runs on other sifts. Zimmerman, Tr. 21450-51.

6.

Superintendent Zimmerman compared the number of assigned staff on duty at Graterford during these shifts to the manpower needed to

9 evacuate the institution under its emergency plan. During daytime shifts between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m., the on-duty complement of staff is adequate to accomplish an emergency evacuation without mobilizing additional off-duty personnel. Between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. there are in excess of 300 people on duty.

Zimmerman, Tr. 21452, 21469, 21495.

7.

If it were necessary to lock down the Graterford inmates to initiate an evacuation, routine prison operations would cease. This would free enough staff during the two 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. shifts to complete the evacuation according to the emergency plan. Zimmerman, Tr. 21452.

8.

During the 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. shift, the inmates are locked down in their cells. Even during this period of minimum staffing, only fifteen percent of the off-duty staff would be required to supplement the on-duty complement to implement the institution's emergency plan. Zimmerman, Tr. 21451-21454.

Fifteen percent of the total Graterford staff would be less than 100 individuals. Zimmerman, Tr. 21496-97, see Commonwealth Exh. 1 at 3.

9.

If an evacuation were necessary, correctional officers on duty would not be assigned any other responsibilities. Securing the institution would be accomplished by a skeleton crew once evacuation had been completed. Zimmerman, Tr. 21469-70.

10. The Pennsylvania State Police are notified at the time of any emergency situation at Graterford. They could be used, as in other situations, for perimeter assignments.

Zimmerman, Tr. 21491.

10 B.

Procedures and Capabilities for Notifying Off-Duty Correctional Officers

11. As reflected in the Comonwealth of Pennsylvania's plan, the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency ("PEMA") will notify the Department of Corrections if an alert is declared at Limerick. See Commonwealth Exh. E-1 at pp. E-7-E-1 (initial notification procedures) and E-17 (listing the Department of Corrections as among responsible State agencies receiving notification).

12. Upon notification by PEMA at the alert stage, the Department of Corrections would notify off-duty correctional officers to report to Graterford. At the beginning of the alert stage, the general public will not have been advised of any radiological emergency. Therefore, telephone lines should not be overly burdened when correctional officers are summoned. Zimmerman, Tr. 21506; Asher, Tr. 21560; see supra, Finding 11.

13.

Even in a rapidly developing scenario which proceeds imitediately to a sounding of the sirens at the general emergency stage, off-duty personnel would understand that they are required to report.

Enough Graterford personnel live in the EPZ to supply the additional staff required to effect the evacuation. The entire Graterford staff has been trained to report or inquire as to the need to report for any number of emergencies. Zimmerman, Tr. 21506.

14. All off-duty officers would be called as required by means of a call-up system which is utilized for notifying Graterford staff l

11 whenever they are needed for any emergency situation. Zimmerman, Tr. 21454.

15. Although the capacity exists to utilize a " pyramid" system of notification by which off-duty administrative and management staff notify each other in turn over their residential phones, Graterford authorities have found it more practical and efficient to notify their correctional officer staff directly from a centralized control center within the institution. Zimmerman, Tr. 21454, 21473.

16. Under the Graterford call-up system, all management officers have telephone lists of their staff. A checkoff list is utilized.

Zimmerman, Tr. 21471.

17. At Graterford, there is a total of 66 telephone lines present in the institution.

Zimmerman, Tr. 21456; Commonwealth Exh. I at 1.

18.

Five of these are private or direct lines, one of which is a hot line to the Pennsylvania State Police. Zimmeman, Tr. 21a57; Commonwealth Exh. I at 1; Buell, Tr. 21435. There are also ten lines which are part of the Comonwealth telephune network, a system which is utilized by departments and agencies of the Comonwealth for official business, and which is switched in Philadelphia. Zimmerman, Tr. 21457-58; Buell Tr. 21390-92, 21403-04, 21440-41.

19. Additionally, Graterford has a combined law enforcement assistance network, or " CLEAN" machine, which could be used to notify the Department of Corrections office in Harrisburg to make telephone calls to notify support personnel. Zimennan, Tr. 21462. By use of the CLEAN system, Graterford has the capacity to notify the central office, l

12 other law enforcement agencies and all other institutions simultaneously.

Zimmernan, Tr. 21470.

20. Fifteen key supervisory staff at Graterford carry personal pagers, which would be used in an emergency. Zimmerman, Tr. 21459; Commonwealth Exh. I at 1-2.

21. The call-up system at Graterford is tested regularly.

It is also routinely implemented because of incidents at the institution requiring off-duty staff to report. During such incidents, more than enough support staff have reported. Zimmerman, Tr. 21462-63.

22. The "in house" lines of the Graterford phone system are dependent upon the institution's own power supply. During power failures, backup generators supply power to those lines. Thus, power outages at Graterford only affect "in house" phones not outgoing calls on the five phones in the institution's Administration Building which would be used for notifying off-duty correctional officers. Zimmerman, Tr. 21475, 21485-90.

l C.

Design and Capacity of the Commercial Phone Network

23. Telephone calls over the commercial telephone network are handled by local switching systems located at a Bell Telephone of Pennsylvania (" Bell") switching station, also called a central office.

The central office for the State Correctional Institution at Graterford is lccated in Collegeville, Pennsylvania. Buell, Tr. 21388.

i l

13

24. The Collegeville central office presently utilizes a No. 2 Electronic Switching System ("ESS"). This system is scheduled to be upgraded in February 1987 to a No. 5 ESS. Buell, Tr. 21388. The No. 5 ESS is the state-of-the-art system utilized by Bell at this time.

Buell, Tr. 21406. Four other central offices contiguous to the Collegeville central office utilize or will be upgraded in the near future to utilize the No. 5 ESS. Buell, Tr. 21406-07.

25.

Each central office is engineered to provide a grade of service estimated to meet demand for a projected service period of about two to three years. This projection is based on the number of customers expected to be served f om a particular office and the known load that i

those customers will place on the switching system. Buell, Tr. 21389.

26. Business customers normally generate a heavier calling demand during the business day than residential customers for the same period of time. This is a factor in engineering the demand capacity of the switching system. Buell, Tr. 21390.

27. Telephone service is designed for the busy hour of the busy season, which is nonnally the winter.

Buell, Tr. 21424; Miller, Tr. 21539.

Bell's engineered objective is to provide a dial tone during the " busy hour" to 97% of its customers within three seconds.

Buell, Tr. 21393.

28. Bell is able to measure the number of calls that are placed on each trunk line to each central office and the duration of each call on each trunk route during the busy hour. Buell, Tr. 21402-03. From this subscriber use data, Bell derives the number of calls during the busy l

14 season which are normally placed between one central office and another.

Bell provides the switching capacity and the number of trunks between each central office necessary to handle the expected load during that busy hour. Buell, Tr. 21399, 21432-34.

29. AT&T long-distance phone service, like Bell's local service, is engineered to handle the busy hour of the busy day, which typically occurs during the winter months. Brown, Tr. 21511. Once a call goes beyond a certain area served by local switching equipment, usually between area codes, a long-distance line is necessary. Brown, Tr.

21527.

30. Emergency (or essential) service lines, termed Class A lines, can be assigned to a customer. Bell assigns Class A lines to no more than approximately ten percent of its subscribers, but has never been requested to assign that many at Collegeville. This affords a customer priority service in obtaining a dial tone if there is a severe overload.

This service is necessary only under the gravest of ccnditions and is very seldom invoked. Buell, Tr. 21393, 21410.

f

31. Class A lines are made available by computerized scanning of all lines available for service to provide priority for the Class A line. This information is stored in the operating instructions of the computer which operates the ESS. Buell, Tr. 21437-38.

32. During an emergency where there were competing requests for i

l service between Class A and regular lines, the priority afforded Class A subscribers would enhance their chances of completing their calls first.

Buell, Tr. 21439, 21448; Brown, Tr. 21528.

l l

15

33. Class A service gives a priority in obtaining a dial tone, but not in completing a call through a central office. Buell, Tr. 21393-94.

The design of any switching system is such, however, that it attempts to complete a call prior to attempting to originate a new call.

Buell, Tr. 21394-95, 21410; Miller, Tr. 21550.

34.

If one central office's circuits are overloaded, other offices in the locale would not be affected. Buell, Tr. 21397. Bell has no way, however, to estimate the exact number of calls that can be handled at one time by any particular central office. Buell, Tr. 21411.

35. As noted in Finding 18, supra, there are ten lines which run out of the Graterford switchboard to Philadelphia that are part of the Commonwealth's telephone network. These ten lines pass through the Collegeville central office, but are switched at Philadelphia.

Switching problems, or an overload, at the Collegeville central office would not affect the pass-through of these 10 lines to Philadelphia switching localities.

Buell, Tr. 21391-92, 21398. The Commonwealth's network is comprised of five major switching centers in the State which utilize state-of-the-art equipment comparable to the No. 5 ESS. Buell, Tr. 21440.

36. Once calls over the Commonwealth network lines from Graterford are switched in Philadelphia, they could be routed over the Commonwealth network or directed to a line off the network and terminated at any l

other central office.

In other words, Graterford could use Commonwealth network lines to call the Department of Corrections in Harrisburg or Graterford staff at their private residences. Buell, Tr. 21404.

16 D.

Reliability of Commercial Telephone Network for Notifying Off-Duty Graterford Staff

37. Normal phone usage within the hours of 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.

in a typical service area is so " minimal" as to be incomparable to other times. Brown, Tr. 21532; Buell, Tr. 21409-10; Miller, Tr. 21550-51

38. At the Pottstown office, for example, where there are about 20,000 lines, calls during 10:00 p.m. through 6:00 a.m. are so few in number that they could be counted by the office operator listening to the mechanical equipment. Miller, Tr. 21548.

39. Because Graterford's ten Commonwealth network lines are switched at Philadelphia, outgoing calls over those lines would not be affected by overloaded circuits at the Collegeville central office unless they were routed back to that office. Buell, Tr. 21391-92. Of the 628 Graterford staff, it appears that 110 officers reside in areas served by the Collegeville central office. Commonwealth Exh. 1 at 3.

40. The dedicated line connecting Graterford with the Pennsylvania State Police would not be affected by overloaded telephonc circuits.

Buell, Tr. 21391.

41.

If there is an overload at one particular switching system, i

calls would not be handled as quickly as they would during normal I

conditions. Buell, Tr. 21392. But this does not mean that the telephone system is inoperative.

Even if all local central offices in and around the Limerick area experienced overloaded circuits, the systems are still working. Calls are generated and completed within the l

capability of the system. Some callers would experience a delay in l

t i

1

O 17 completing their calls, but others would get through. Eventually, all callers would be served. Buell, Tr. 21430-31.

42. There are approximately 6300 telephone subscribers who utilize the Collegeville central office. Buell, Tr. 21403. Approximately 630 lines switched at the Collegeville central office could be predesignated for emergency use by Class A subscribers. Buell, Tr. 21405.

43. Although Superintendent Zimmerman stated that Graterford had never experienced a need for priority telephone service, he stated his intention to obtain such service. Zimmerman, Tr. 21458, 21464.

44. If Graterford experienced delays in telephone service, other means are available to notify off-duty correctional officers. Besides the dedicated line to the State Police, Graterford could utilize its radio system to contact Montgomery County emergency officials and other agencies. These agencies could notify the news media or other radio systems (including the Emergency Broadcast System) to make a public announcement for off-duty correctional officers to report. Zimmerman,

Tr. 21461. Graterford could also request the Department of Corrections office in Harrisburg to notify correctional officers by telephone.

Zimmerman, Tr. 21461.

45.

If necessary, the Pennsylvania State Police telephone network could be utilized to initiate off-duty staff notification by the central office in Harrisburg. Zimmerman, Tr. 21461.

46.

It would also be possible to utilize correctional officers at other state institutions who could arrive on the buses supplied for evacuation of the inmates at the time of an actual emergency. Those

18 arriving staff could provide all or most of the additional staff necessary to implement an evacuation. These officers routinely carry out assignments of loading and unloading inmates on buses because inmates are routinely transferred from one institution to another for various reasons.

Zinsnerman, Tr. 21461-62, 21467.

47. Of the 628 total Graterford staff, only 257 reside within areas which may be inside the emergency planning zone plume exposure pathway ("EPZ") for Limerick, i.e., Skippack Township /Graterford area; Boyertown Township; the Borough of Phoenixville/Royersford Township; Borough of Pottstown; and Borough of Collegeville. Zimmennan, Tr.

21459; Coninonwealth Exh. I at 3.

While these areas within the EPZ would have the greatest potential for telephone overloading, if such were to occur during an emergency at Limerick, the areas also are those covered by the emergency notification siren system. Thus, those Graterford employees from these areas, and not already on duty, would receive timely notification along with the general public, in tne event of a fast-breaking emergency at Limerick, even if not notified at the alert stage.

See supra, Finding 13.

48.

Seventy-two Graterford employees live at distances from the institution such that their estimated response time equals or exceeds two hours, i.e., 25 in the Central Pennsylvania Area, 39 in the North Eastern Pennsylvania Area, and 8 in the Western Pennsylvania Area.

Even adding these to the 257 employees living within the EPZ and subtracting from the total complement of Graterford staff (628) leaves a pool of 299 l

l staff personnel available from other areas outside the EPZ from which to i

19 draw the less-than-100 personnel required to augment an evacuation during the period of minimum staff on hand at SCIG. Comr.onweal th Exh.1, at 3; see supra, Finding 8.

49.

It is the Board's view that the residential areas under consideration outside the Limerick EPZ are sufficiently dispersed from the plant and each other that telephone circuit overloading in an emergency at Limerick would not delay notification of such personnel, if at all, for any unacceptable duration. Commonwealth Exhibit 1 at 3.

In all, the number of staff residing outside the Limerick EPZ who would be unaffected by congested telephone service at the time of an emergency, and have reasonable response times, far exceeds the maximum of fifteen percent of all off-duty guards necessary for an evacuation. Zinnerman, Tr. 21467.

E.

Events in Northeastern Pennsylvania Involving Overloaded Telephone Circuits 50.

Two Bell witnesses were asked to testify about instances, such as severe snow storms, during which telephone circuits had been overloaded. The witnesses testified that such occurrences were infre-quent. They were unable to provide specific information as to the severity, duration or geographical extent of delay in telephone service during those events. Buell, Tr. 21426-28, 21442, 21444; Miller, Tr.

21540-41.

51. An AT&T employee testified that there were dial tone delays of up to half an hour in the Pottstown area during Hurricane Agnes in 1972.

20 (Brown, Tr. 21518). The witness acknowledged, however, that downed telephone lines and equipment problems may have contributed to these delays. Brown, Tr. 21530; Buell, Tr. 21405-06. Also, flooding in certain areas resulted in lines shorting out. To the phone user in the area, the dead line from downed or shorted lines would have been indistinguishable from a delay in receiving a dial tone. Brown, Tr.

21531. Thus, the witness could not state the degree to which dial tone delays in the Pottstown area during Hurricane Agnes were attributable to overloaded circuits or shorted or downed lines. Brown, Tr. 21535.

52. During Hurricane Agnes, many central offices utilized older, less efficient types of switching system equipment than in place today.

Buell, Tr. 21395-96. The switching system most commonly in use throughout most of southeastern Pennsylvania was either the

" step-by-step" or No. 5 Crossbar system. The step-by-step switching machine is antiquated equipment, which was replaced by the No. 5 Crossbar and in turn replaced by the ESS equipment. Brown, Tr. 21514.

The No. 5 Crossbar is an electromechanical system, as opposed to the No.

5 ESS, which is a computer digital system. Buell, Tr. 21396, 21409, Brown; Tr. 21532.

53. At the time of the Three Mile Island accident, there were dial tone delays in the Middletown central office for an extended period of time. That office, however, was using antiquated " step-by-step" equipment.

Brown, Tr. 21529, 21533.

Also, the witness providing this testimony was unable to state even roughly what number or proportion of all subscribers experienced a dial tone delay. He stated his belief

21 that, during the overall period of dial tone delay, the longest delay to an individual subscriber was up to 30 minutes. Brown, Tr. 21534. As with the other testimony noted, the Board is unable to translate this limited information into specific projections of the severity, duration or geographical extent of any circuit overloading that might result from an emergency at Limerick.

F.

Corroborating FEMA Testimony

54. While FEMA did not observe the use of the Graterford call-up system during the exercise of its emergency plan (Asher, Tr. 21552-53),

the FEMA witness was present to hear the testimony of Superintendent Zimmerman as to plans for notifying off-duty correctional officers at Graterford. Based upon that testimony and his knowledge of Graterford planning, he agreed that there is reasonable assurance that off-duty correctional officers needed to implement the plan can and will be notified in the event of a radiological emergency at Limerick. Asher, Tr. 21554-55.

55. Further, the Board has had extensive testimony on this narrow issue and therefore has an adequate record upon which to base its evidentiary conclusions. We reiterate the views expressed in our earlier decision that FEMA's evaluation of offsite emergency planning exercises and its testimony during hearings provides only part of the evidence comprising the record. Limerick, supra, LPB-85-14, 21 NRC at 1229. Aside from FEMA's corroborative testimony, the evidence adduced at hearing is sufficient to establish that the Commission's regulatory i

i

3 22 requirements and guidance criteria have been met for notification and mobilization of off-duty correctional officers at Graterford.

56. The Board agrees with FEMA that changes in any emergency plan should be acknowledged and incorporated in the plan. Asher, Tr. 21561.

Accordingly, the Board has ordered the Department of Corrections to incorporate within its emergency plan the call-up system for notifying off-duty correctional officers which is actually in use now and would be used in the event of a radiological emergency at Limerick.

Hoyt, Tr.

21564-66.

By letter dated October 1,1986, counsel for the Department of Corrections confirmed that this action has been taken.

G.

Effect of Notification and Mobilization Procedures upon Evacuation Time Estimates

57. One component of the overall evacuation time estimates for Graterford previously approved by this Board was the 1-to-2 hour (normal conditions) and 2-to-3 hour (adverse conditions) estimate for off-duty personnel to report. Limerick, supra, LBP-85-25, 22 NRC at 111.

In considering the effectiveness of the call-up system for Graterford and the various options available for notifying off-duty correctional officers, Superintendent Zimmerman determined tFat these previous estimates remain accurate. Zimmerman, Tr. 21468.

1 23 H.

Comparability of Telephone Systems Used to Notify Graterford Staff and other Emergency Response Organizations

58. James R. Asher is an Emergency Management Program Specialist i

in the Natural and Technological Hazards Division, Region III, FEMA, and Chief of the Technological Hazards Branch. Mr. Asher is also FEMA's representative to the Regional Assistance Comittee ("RAC") and Chainnan of that Comittee. Asher, ff. Tr. 20150 (Professional Qualifications).

~

Mr. Asher previously testified, along with another FEMA representative, at other hearings on off-site emergency planning and preparedness for Limerick.

See Asher, Tr. 20131-20332, 21278-21289.

59. Mr. Asher is familiar with emergency response plans for other nuclear power plants throughout the country, including organizational chains of comand and the means of notifying off-duty emergency workers.

From his experience, he testified that other plans utilize comercial telephone lines in the same manner they are utilized for Graterford.

In fact, Mr. Asher is unaware of any nuclear power plant which does not utilize commercial lines to notify off-duty emergency workers. Asher, i

Tr. 21554.

60. Since its inception, FEMA has utilized group comercial phone lines to notify its emergency response teams.

Its call-down system is very similar to that in use at Graterford. Asher, Tr. 21556. To Mr. Asher's knowledge, there has never been an instance in which FEMA has been unable to notify its off-duty emergency response teams by means s

of comercial telephone lines. Asher, Tr. 21557.

i f

24 4

IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW In reaching this decision on the remanded issue of off-duty Graterford staff notification and mobilization, the Board has considered all the evidence of the parties and the entire record of this proceeding, including all proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law filed by the parties. Based upon a review of that record and the foregoing Findings of Fact, which are supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence, the Board, with respect to the issue in controversy before us, reaches the following conclusion pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 52.760a.

Arrangements in place at the State Correctional Institution at Graterford for the notification and mobilization of off-duty correctional officers in the event of a radiological emergency at the Limerick Generating Station meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 550.47, and Appendix E to 10 C.F.R. Part 50, as well as the criteria of NUREG-0654, and provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures for the Graterford inmates can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.

V.

ORDER WHEREFORE, in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Rules of Practice of the Commission, and based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, IT IS ORDERED that:

Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 52.760(a) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, this Supplement to the Fourth Partial Initial Decision will

r a

25 constitute the final decision of the Connission forty-five (45) days from the date of issuance, unless an appeal is taken in accordance with 10 C.F.R. 52.762 or the Comission directs otherwise. See also 10 C.F.R. 592.764, 2.785 and 2.786.

Any party may take an appeal from this Decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within ten (10) days after service of this Decision. Each appellant must file a brief supporting its position on appeal within thirty (30) days after filing its Notice of Appeal (forty (40) days if the Staff is the appellant). Within thirty (30) days after the period has expired for the filing and service of the briefs of all appellants (forty (40) days in the case of the Staff), a party who is not an appellant may file a brief in support of or in opposition to the appeal of any other party. A responding party shall file a single, responsive brief regardless of the number of appellant briefs filed. See 10 C.F.R. 62.762(c).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICEN NGB0gRD k Y.

-a v v

HelW F.~ ifoyt Chairpbrpn ADM ISTRATIVE JUDGE

.,. l Y Richard F. Cole ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

/

'e-f elfwf Jerry Harbour ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 10th day of November 1986.