ML20213E436
| ML20213E436 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 05/10/1983 |
| From: | Knight J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Novak T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| CON-WNP-0589, CON-WNP-589 NUDOCS 8305200703 | |
| Download: ML20213E436 (10) | |
Text
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w EQB Rdg. File N 10 Iggy Docket No. 50-397 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Thomas M. Novak, Assistant Director for Licensing Division of Licensing FROM:
James P. Knight, Assistant Director Components and Structures Engineering Division of Engineering
SUBJECT:
WASHINGTON NUCLEAR PROJECT 2 INPUT FOR SUPPLEMENTAL SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT Plant Name:
Washington Nuclear Project 2 Docket No.:
50-397 Licensing Stage:
OL Responsible Branch:
Licensing Branch No. 2 Responsible Project Manager:
R. Auluck Requested Completion Date:
January 15, 1983 Review Status:
Continuing The enclosed Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) was prepared by DE:C&SE, Equipment Qualification Branch.
This covers the following topics.
- 1. ) Seismic and Dynamic Qualification of Seismic Category I Mechanical and Electrical Equipment.
2.) Pump and Valve Operability.
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James P. Knight, Assistant Director Components and Structures Engineering Division of Engineering
Enclosure:
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A. Schwencer J. Jackson y
R. Auluck R. Wright a
V. Noonan J. Singh, INEL 3x G. Bagchi M. Reich, BNL 38 D. Reiff C. Miller, INEL 3c3 A. Lee B. Miller, BNL
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EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION BRANCH INPUT FOR SUPPLEMENTAL SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT WASHINGTON NUCLEAR PROJECT 2 DOCKET NO. 50-397 3.10 Seismic and Dynamic Qualification of Seismic Category I Mechanical and Electrical Equipment l
3.10.1 Seismic and Dynamic Qualification Our evaluation of the applicant's program for qualification of safety-related electrical and mechanical equipment for seismic and dynamic loads consists of (1) a determination of the acceptability of the procedures used, standards followed, and the completeness of the pro-gram in general, and (2) an audit of selected equipment items to develop the basis for the staff judgement on the completeness and adequacy of the implementation of the entire seismic and dynamic qualification program" The Seismic Qualification Review Team (SQRT) consists of engineers from the Equipment Qualification Branch (EQB) and the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL, EG&G).
The (SQRT) has reviewed the equipment dynamic qualification information contained in the pertinent Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)
Sections 3.9.2 and 3.10 and made a plant site visit on November 16 through November 19, 1982 to determine the extent to which the quali-fication of equipment as installed at Washington Nuclear Project 2, meets the current licensing criteria as described in IEEE 344-1975, Regulatory Guides 1.92 and 1.100, and the Standard Review Plan Section 3.10.
Conformance with these criteria are required to satisfy the applicable portions of the General Design Criteria in 1, 2, 4, 14, and 30 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, as well as Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 and Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100.
A representative sample of safety-related electric and mechanical equipment, as well as instrumentation, included in both NSSS and B0P scopes, was selected
2 for the audit.
The plant-site visit consisted of field observations of the actual, final equipment configuration and its installation.
This was immediately followed by the review of the corresponding test and/or analysis documents which the applicant maintains in his central files.
Observing the field installation of the equipment is required in order to verify and validate equipment modeling employed in the qualification program.
Based on the audit, the SQRT concluded the applicant expended great effort in implementing the seismic and dynamic qualification pro-gram.
However, some concerns, both plant generic and equipment speci-fic remain, and are delineated in the trip-report of the SQRT plant site visit.
These concerns must be satisfactorily resolved before fuel loading.
The plant generic concerns are more significant, in that they apply to all safety-related equipment and potentially can affect a large number of components and systems.
The applicant must develop an acceptab1'e approach and plan to resolve the plant generic findings.
The audit identified the need to provide additional information on certain plant generic findings as well as to clarify the details of qualification for some pieces of equipment.
These findings are summarized below:
A.
Plant Generic Findings 1.
A unique feature of the containment design is that the reactor building foundation is not integral with the containment foundation.
Hydrodynamic loads inside containment are included in the qualification of equipment.
Outside containment, but inside the reactor building, hydrodynamic loads are not con-sidered as the unique design of containment is alleged to attenuate these loads.
The staff review in this area is continuing and will be resolved in additional meetings with the applicant.
3 2.
When the valve operator B0P-12 was qualified an assumed g-value was used.
Later, in the us-built and as-installed condition an analysis confirmed that the g value used in the qualification was indeed adequate.
This is also the case with other equipment in this category as far as loads are concerned.
A procedure, reportedly, is in place to verify assumed g-values for each case.
For the motor operator, the g-value was confirmed to be adequate.
The appli-cant is to confirm the adequacy of all assumed g-values and inform the NRC in writing of the results when this is completed.
3.
The motor control center was qualified through single frequency, biaxial input tests.
The motor control center has more than one natural frequency below 33 Hz.
This technique, in the absence of adequate justification, is not acceptable.
A review of cases where single frequency tests have been used in spite of the presence of multiple natural frequencies of the system within the range of 33 Hz is to be made by the applicant.
In each case a justification for single frequency testing is to be provided.
4.
All safety-related equipment should be qualified and installed before fuel loading.
At the time of the audit some safety related equipment remained to be qualified and installed.
Before fuel loading the applicant must state in writing that all (100%) of the plant safety related equipment is qualified and installed.
4 B.
Specific Issues 1.
Pressure Switch (B0P14)
The panel on which this item is mounted was qualified by test.
The tests consisted of multi-frequency, multi-axis, random inputs.
Test Response Spectra (TRS) from these tests enveloped the initial Required Response Spectra (RRS).
Subsequently, based on further investigation, the RRS's were changed resulting in the TRS's not enveloping the RRS's in different regions.
An effort was made to analyze this apparent inadequacy based on the natural frequency of the system.
From this analysis, the lowest natural frequency of the system is estimated as 7.5 Hz.
One unenveloped region is around 6.5Hz which is too close to the system frequency.
As a result, the adequacy of the qualification test is in doubt.
The applicant is to justify his present qualifi-cation or requalify the equipment.
In conclusion, based on the SQRT audit findings as well as the submittals from the applicant, with the exception of the concerns mentioned above and discussed in the trip report, the staff concludes that an apporpriate seismic and dynamic qualification program has been~ defined and substan-tially implemented, which provides adequate assurance that such equipment will function properly during and after the excitation from vibratory forces imposed by the safe shutdown earthquake.
Resolution of the specific and generic plant items as they progress will be reported in a future supplement to the Safety Evaluation Report.
3.10.2 Operability Qualification of Pumps and Valves To assure that the applicant has provided an adequate program for qualifying safety related pumps and valves to operate under normal and accident conditions the Equipment Qualification Branch (EQB)
5 performs a two step review.
The first step is a review of Section 3.9.3.2 of the FSAR for the description of the applicant's pump and valve operability assurance program.
This information is compared to Section 3.10 of the Standard Review Plan.
The information provided in the FSAR however is general in nature and not sufficient by itself to provide confidence in the adequacy of the licensee's overall program for pump and valve operability qualification.
To provide this confi-dence, the Pump and Valve Operability Review Team (PV0RT), in addition to reviewing the FSAR, conducts an on-site audit of a small,represen-tative sample of safety related pumps and valves supporting documen-tation.
The on-site audit includes a plant inspection to observe the as-built configuration and installation of the equipment, a discussion of the system in which the pump and valve is located and of the normal and accident conditions under which the component must operate, and a review of the qualification documentation (stress reports, test reports, etc.)
The two-step review is performed to determine the extent to which the qualification of equipment, as installed, meets the current licensing criteria as described in the Standard Review Plan 3.10.
Conformance with these criteria 1, 2, 4, 14, and 30 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, as well as Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50.
The on-site audit for WNP-2 was performed November 16-19, 1982.
A representative sample consisting of 7 valves and 3 pumps was chosen for review.
The sample included both NSSS and BOP equipment.
During our review a number of concerns were raised.
Some of these concerns were satisfactorily resolved by the applicant during the audit by either supplying additional information or providing additional commitments as appropriate.
The remaining concerns and generic findings are summarized below.
i 6
Generic Findings No generic operability concerns resulted from the evaluation of the WNP-2 qualification program for pump and valve operability.
One minor area of concern relating to the permanent tagging of plant equipment was discussed with plant personnel and resolved.
Permanent tags were in fact being installed on some equipment during the week of the audit.
The results of reviewing the document packages for the unannounced compo-nents indicate that the applicant has a good central file system from which he can retrieve documents in a relatively short time.
This conclusion was further substantiated after reviewing the applicant's quality assurance filing system.
The PVORT was given an orientation lecture on the WNP-2 computer-based maintenance and surveillance program by the supervisor of maintenance.
The program appears to be very comprehensive and incorporates many excellent features.
Some of these include:
(a) performing maintenance on all components prior to pre-operational testing, (b) integrating all pertinent qualification information, (e.g., aging information for age degradable parts) into the maintenance program, and (c) analyzing sub-components upon removal to aid in determining changes in replacement schedules.
In keeping with the latter idea, WNP-2 voluntarily participating in the Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System, (NRPDS).
It is concluded that the WNP-2 Supply System Equipment Qualification Group is dealing with the equipment qualification issue in a very positive manner and the results of their efforts are evident in the applicant's Pump and Valve Operability Assurance Program.
7 Specific Concerns 1.
Suppression Pool Outlet Valve, HPCS-V-15, High Pressure Core Spray Suction Isolation Valve The plant walk-down revealed that the horizontal clearance between the actuator and an adjacent pipe restraint was possibly too small, such that it might affect the operability of the valve under dynamic loads.
Also a review of the documentation revealed that the valve was originally qualified to the interim piping criteria.
When the final piping analysis was completed and compared to the interim load, a review by the utility found that the loads for this component exceeded those calculated using the interim criteria.
The valva is currently being reanalyzed to the loads specified by the final piping analysis.
Confirmation that the valve has been requalified to the new loads must be provided to the staff prior to fuel load.
In addition, the applicant must provide justification that clearance between the valve actuator and the adjacent pipe restraint will not affect valve operability during dynamic loads.
2.
Rockwell 26-Inch Globe Valve, MS-V-22C, Main Steam Isolation Valve During the plant walk-down several problems were noted:
(a) the accumulator was not installed, (b) the installed solenoid valves were not qualified for the environment and (c) the valve was scheduled to be completely disassembled for cleaning.
These pro-blems were discussed with the start-up engineer and it was determined that the valve, as viewed, was obviously not ready
a 8
for operation.
The valve, having been on-site for a number of years,(note:
valve was built in 1973), was to be completely refurbished prior to testing.
This would include installation of environmentally qualified solenoid valves.
The documentation review revealed that the qualification of the assembly for operability under accident conditions was based on two analyses by Rockwell, RAL-2006, Rev.1 and RAL-1002, Rev. 2.
A test report, RAL-1004, Rev. O, was also provided for a similar valve, (i.e., a 20-inch Rockwell Model 1612Y).
RAL-1004 stated that the valve had operated with a 0.820-inch deflection.
An analysis of the WNP-2 valve calculated a maximum deflection of only 0.270 inches.
In addition, it was learned that a seismic test on a similar actuator for a Rockwell 24-inch valve was being reviewed by General Electric to determine if the results of that test could be used to qualify the WNP-2 actuator by similarity.
A discussion with the engineer in charge of power ascension testing added confidence concerning the operability of the valve assembly under design conditions.
He stated that the valve is to be tested (i.e., closed against flow) at three different power levels-approximately 30%, 50% and 85%.
In addition, all the MSIVs will be closed simultaneously at 100% steam flow.
A complete report on the results of the power ascension tests will be available th'ree months after completion.
While MS-V-22C is presently not operable, our findings indicate that adequate plans are in place to ensure that the valve assembly will be qualified for operability prior to the power ascension tests.
The power ascension tests will then verify operability under normal plant conditions.
However results of the on going review of a Rockwell seismic test on a similar 24-inch actuator must be provided prior to fuel load.
In addition, confirmation that the solenoid valves for the actuators on all MSIVs have been replaced with qualified units must be provided prior to fuel load.
9 The qualification program for the safety related pumps and valves was not complete for a number of components at the time of the audit.
]
In addition to responding to the concerns addressed above the applicant should provide a schedule for completion of this program.
We will complete our review when the applicant has provided the required information as stated above and has documented the comple-tion of their Pump and Valve Operability program.
Documentation required to close each of the open items addressed in this report is discussed above.
Satisfactory resolution of all the open items discussed should be accomplished prior to fuel load.
A final evaluation of the Pump and Valve Operability program will be performed following satisfactory resolution of the open items discussed above as well as notification that the pump and valve operability assurance program has been completed for all safety-related pumps and valves. We will report on the results of our final evaluation of the applicant's program in a future supplement to the Safety Evaluation.9eport.
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