ML20213E158

Trip Rept of 820512 & 13 Site Visit to View Installation & Arrangement of Electrical Equipment & Cables,To Verify Implementation of Design Criteria & to Resolve Differences Between Plant Design & NRC Positions.Agenda Encl

ML20213E158
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	05/28/1982
From:	Rhow S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Srinivasan M Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
CON-WNP-0520, CON-WNP-520 NUDOCS 8206090190
Download: ML20213E158 (5)

Text

.

)' .- ,

},(. (? YL 0EO MAY 3 81992 s

h(

MEMORANDUM FOR: M. Srinivasan, Chief Power Systems Branch C[g ,- ,

+ f(g J. E. Knight, Section Leader THRU:

Electrical Section, PSB, DSI e'3.'y,

'; 3. dd3 $c.@ -

.a .

FROM: S. Rhow, Electrical Section D, g- g%

k @

Power Systems Branch, DSI Q j , r,a \,

SUBJECT:

TRIP REPORT ON SITE VISIT OF WNP NO 2 On May 12 and 13,1982, I visited the site of WNP No. 2 to view the installation and arrangement of electrical equipment and cables in the areas identified in the attached sheet. The purpose of the site visit was to verify proper implementation of the design criteria and to resolve differences between WNP-2 design and our technical positions. During my tour, I identified the major differences described in detail as follows:

1. The applicant misinterpreted the requirements of IEEE Standard 384 for Independence of Class lE Equipment and Circuits. With respect to the associated circuits, their definition of the associated circuits is non-Class lE cables / wires which share raceways with Class 1E cables / wires and which are not physically separated from Class 1E cables / wires. I clarified the definition of the associated circuits such as non-Class 1E cables / wires which share raceways with Class lE cables / wires or which are not physically separated from Class lE cables / wires. Non-Class lE cables must be physically separated from Class lE cables in the same manner that redundant Class lE cables are separated from each other or they become associated circuits and must follow the requirements for associated circuits. The applicant committed to exercise the correct definition. Accordingly, necessary modifications and rerouting or separation of wires / cables / raceways will be implemented throughout the plant to bring the installation into conformance with IEEE 384 as endorsed by R.G. 1.75.

2. Separation requirements of non-Class lE circuits from Class lE circuits / associated circuits are the same as separation of redundant channel / division required by IEEE Standard 384 as endorsed by R.G. 1.75. In the WNP-2 Plant, the as found separation between Class lE associated circuits and non-Class lE circuits did not confonn to these requirements. The applicant has begun a thorough evaluation of-t,hg-separation of these circuits. The applicant committed to W x N

8206090190 820529 w ef"._ADOCK 09000397 j cr-omce) .. . . .

sensaue ) .... . . . .. . ,,

oAre ) . . . . . .

moranuatav mo.ncuan r OFFlCIAL RECORD COPY usa >a se,-mu

M. Srinivasan MAY 2 81982 modify the design to bring any deviations from criteria found in the installation into conformance with the criteria identified in IEEE 384 as endorsed by R.G. 1.75.

3. Power Systems Branch Technical Position 1, Item 2, deals with load shedding and load. sequencing of the emergency loads to the bus.

The applicant in the FSAR proposed to retain' the load shedding feature during the sequencing of emergency loads onto the Class lE buses following a loss of offsite power. Load shedding in WNP No. 2 would be instituted only if bus voltage were to drop below 69% of the nominal bus voltage.

I reviewed the WNP-2 design regarding PSB BTP-1 during my site visit and found that the design, as shown on the drawings, automatically prevents load shedding of the emergency buses once the diesel generator is supplying power to the emergency buses. I indicated tc the applicant that the design drawings did not agree with the description in the FSAR.

They admitted that there was a discrepancy in the design due to a lack of communication between the applicant and his consulting company (Burns & Roe). Based on this indicatior of incorrect information in either the FSAR or drawings, tM applicant committed to amend the FSAR.

Subsequent to my site visit, the applicant and I held a conference call on May 21, 1982, during which the applicant stated he had decided to modify the drawings in accordance with the design information of FSAR. I requested that documentation of the drawings and a description of the modifications be provided. I expect this information to be provided shortly.

4. In the FSAR the diesel generator unit design is described as including an emergency override of the test mode to permit response to LOCA signals and return control of the diesel generator unit to the standby mode.

During the periodic testing of a diesel generator, if a safety-iiijection signal occurs, the diesel generator in the test mode is disconnected from parallel operation with the offsite power system and maintained in the emergency standby mode. In the actual design as found in the drawing review at WNP-2, the diesel generator in the test mode remains in parallel operation with offsite power system even though a LOCA signal occurs. The diesel generator unit will be manually tripped at the discretion of operator later on. In the mean time, the diesel generator would supply power to non-emergency loads through the tie breakers and non-Class lE buses as well as the emergency loads.

1 I

I omes > . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........................ . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ... . . . ..

suanee) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . .

care > . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..

C FCPM 318 (10-60) NRCM C243 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY usapo. i ii-335 co

me M. Srinivasan MAY 2 81982 The applicant had comitted to investigate this problem with the AE (Burns & Roe). At a conference call of May 21, 1982, the applicant indicated that this design was their final position. This design is not in accordance with the FSAR description nor with the staff position and is, therefore, unacceptable.

~

Sang Rhow Electrical Section Power Systems Branch, DSI

Enclosure:

Site Visit Agenda cc: R. Mattrsn L. Rubenstein A. Ungaro A. Schwencer R. Auluck DISTRIBUTION:

Central Files PSB RF l

t l

l l

l l

l i

l l

or,,c o .m :...PSB PSB 2 ' s -

sun ~auo #5iF . .. . . . . .

.J,EKni ght oro . 5/J.?./.82.. , ..sp.g82. , , . , , , . . , , , . , , . . . . . . . . . , , , , , ,, . , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , . , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

sac rosu m oa-sa nacu cm OFFICIAL RECORD COPY ucro. u. -mm

~

3 WNP No. 2 Agenda Site Visit

1. Unresolved Items None

2. Control Room

a. Diesel control board, D/G inoperable status alarm

b. ESF initiation and bypass switch arrangement and status panel

c. Annunciator panel

d. D.C. system monitoring and alarm

3. Cab.le Runs and Cable Spreading

a. t .2 of separation

b. Penetrations and cable terminations

c. Identification of cables and raceways

4. Switch Gear Rooms

a. General layout

b. Physical and electrical separation of redundant units

5. Battery and Charger Installations

a. General layout

b. Physical and electrical separation

c. Ventilation independence

d. Monitoring instrumentation and alarms

~

6. Diesel Generator

a. Physical and electrical separation of redundant units

b. D/G local control panels, instruments and control

7. Switchyard

a. General layout

b. Physical and electrical separation of transmission lines, buses, breakers w-

c. Relay house

d. Control power supplies (AC and DC)

8. Reactor Building

a. General layout

b. Separation of piping and cabling to redundant equipment

9. Shutdown Outsite Control Room

a. Remote shutdown panel arrangement, separation and layout b.. Identification of control and monitoring equipment

10. ESF Systems and Pump Rooms

a. General Layout

b. Physical and electrical separation of redundant equipment

c. Identification of cables, raceways and equipment t

11. Vital Instrumentation Power Supply Installation l

a. General layout

b. Physical and electrical separation

c. Monitoring instrumentation

! d. Identification of cables, raceways and equipment

12. Turbine Building l

a. Turbine overspeed protection system, instrumentation arrangement and layout .

l 1

-