ML20213C828
| ML20213C828 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 12/12/1978 |
| From: | Rosa F Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| CON-WNP-0244, CON-WNP-244 NUDOCS 7812210353 | |
| Download: ML20213C828 (23) | |
Text
_.
w(
{
DEC 1 M
+
}
l i
ME!'0AANDUM FOR:
S. Varga, Chief, Light Water Reactors Branch 4. DPM FROM:
Faust Rosa, Chief, Power Systems Branch, DSS I
l'
SUBJECT:
FIRST RCU!!D ll6 QUESTS FOR tlPPSS U!!!T 2 l..
t l'
Plant Name: WPPSS Unit 2 Docket No: 50-397 Licensing Stage: OL Milestone No: 05-01 l
j Responsibic Branch: LUR-4 T,
ar.d Project flanager:
H. D. Lynch Recuested Corr.pletion Cate: 12/1/78 P.eview Status: Complete The enclosed first roind requests for additional infqmation covers-sere electrical positions and those mechanical portions of the FSAR
)
for which the Power Systems Branch (PSC) has primary review res-pensibility.
I Cur review is based en information in the FSAR up to and including Amendment No.
, the general guidelines provided by Regulatory Guide 1.70, Revision 2 cf' the Standard Format and the Standard Review Plans.
Stynificant arear uhere additional informatica is requested include l
the following:
1.
Containment electrical penetrations 2.
Degraded offsite power systett protection 3.
RPS m-set perfomance
}
4.
DC power systems j
5.
Communications 6.
Lightning g
[
7.
Diesel generator auxiliary systers y'eo j
8.
Turbine generator 9.
\\
- 10. Turbiro by. pass 7812210353 L
tentl9353 U 23 pf
~
S. Varga.
Because of higher priority casework and manpower constraints, PSB has not completed the 01 review of FSAR section 3.10, 3.11 and parts of section 8.0.
1herefore, we anticip3te that additional Ql's will be transmitted prior to the scheduled Q2 milestone, or will te in-corporated in our Q2's.
We'would also like to point out that Appendix C of the FSAR cn con-formance with regulatory guides does not yet address all of the guides in the PSB scope of review. Further first round questions may be rcouired when the missing infomation is finally provided.
B Faust Rosa, Chief Power Systems Branch Division of Systems Safety 5
Enclosure:
l As stated 5
cc:
S. Hanauer R. Mattson R. Boyd W. Mcdonald
[
C. G. Long f4. D. Lynch R. Satterfield V. Benaraya I
R. Fitzpatrick A. Ungaro
\\
l t
I i
DISTRIBUTION:
CENTRAL FILE NRR READING PSB READING I
RFITZPATRICK READING AVNGARO READING i
A
?
.osB.!8. boss.;esa............oss.:ess. Q t
.nat itk si o
FP.osa
= = a >...
.12// /78' 12/h/78 12, 1/78
==>
unc romu sne o.m meu one k..... n.
..es......,..
l
P o
UNITED STATES 8
NUCt. EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
$ *+
WASH!NGTON, D. C. 20555 a
s,...../
,12 ss MEMORANDUM FOR:
S. Varge, Chief, Light Water Reactors Branch 4, DPM FROM:
Faust Rosa, Chief, Power Systems Branch. DSS
SUBJECT:
FIRST ROUND REQUESTS FOR WPPSS UNIT 2 Plant Name: WPPSS Unit 2 Docket No: 50-397 Licensing Stage: OL Milestone No: 05-01 Responsible Branch: LWR-4 and Project Manager:
M. D. Lynch Requested Completion Date:
12/1/78 Review Status: Complete The enclosed first round requests for additional infomation covers some electrical positions and those mechanical portions of the FSAR for which the Power Systems Branch (PSB) has primary review res-ponsibility.
Our review is based on information in the FSAR up to and including Amendment No.
O, the general guidelines previoed by Regulatory Guide 1.70, Revision 2 of the Standard Format and the Standard Review Plans.
Significant areas where additional infomation is requested include the following:
1.
Containment electrical penetrations 2.
Degraded offsite power system protection 3.
RPS MG-set perfomance 4.
DC power systems 5.
Conmiunications 6.
Lightning 7.
Diesel generator auxiliary systems 8.
Turbine gene:rator 9.
Main cor. denser
- 10. Turbine by-pass
Contact:
A. Ungare R. Fitzpatrick x27276 S
S. Varga
' DEC 12 SM Because of higher priority casework and manpower constraints, PSB has not completed the Q1 review of FSAR section 3.10, 3.11 and parts of section 8.0.
Therefore, we anticipate that additional Ql's will be transmitted prior to the scheduled Q2 milestene, or will be in.
corporated in our Q2's.
We would also like to point out that Appendix C of the FSAR on con-formance with regulatory guides does not yet address all of the guides in the PSB scope of review. Further first round questions may be required when the missing information is finally provided.
[t Q
Faust Rosa, Chief Power Systems Branch Division of Systems Safety
Enclosure:
As stated cc:
S. Hanauer R. Mattson R. Boyd W. Mcdonald C. G. Lorg M. D. Lynch R. Satterfield V. Benaroya R.'Fitzpatrick A. Ungaro
4 A
a A
e e-y J--.*S--he 4
4i me4.h5-3-
aAy--.1=-e6 E4
- 4 A E----
8 4-94 4
h
&.4--4--
- 4 d'.
4r F#14Ma3' 4
4 A- - -
-- *4iAhe4b m
b 9m g--
4 4
1 1
i
)
i 1
b.
)
ENCLOSURE POWER SYSTEMS BRANCH FIRST ROUND REQUESTS FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-397 e
b O
e t
i i
k i
040.34 Provide a listing of the following for the containment electrical 2
penetrations by voltage class: I t ratings, maximum predicated fault currents, identification of maximizing faults, protective equipment setpoints, 'and expected clearing times.
040.35 Your description of conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.63 re-garding containment electrical penetrations in Appendix C of the FSAR does not provide sufficient infomation to allow an independent evaluation of your design.
Provide the details of how your design is in compliance with IEEE Std. 279 as stated.
040.36 In addition to the undervoltage scheme currently provided to detect loss of offsite power at the safety busses, we require that a second level of voltage protection be provided with a time delay in order to protect the onsite power system frem any adverse effects that could restilt from a sustained degraded voltage condition on the off-site power system. This seccad level of voltage protection shall satisfy the following criteria:
a) The selection of voltage and time set points shall be determined from an analysis of the voltage requirements of the safety-related loads at all onsite system distribution levels;
. b) The voltage protection shall include coincidence logic to pre-clude spurious trips of the offsite power source; j
c) The ti:na delay selected shall be based on th following conditions:
(1) The allowable time delay, including mamgin, shall not exceed the maximum time delay that is assumed in the FSAR accident analyses; (2) The time delay shall minimize the effect of short duration dis,turbances frt:en reducing the availability of the offsite power source (s); and (3) The allowable time duration of a degraded voltage con-dition at all distribution systam levels shall not result in failure of safety systems or components; p
d) The voltage sensors shall autcmatically initiate the disconnection of offsite power sources whehenver the voltage set point and time delay limits have been exceeded; e).The voltage sensors shall be designed to satisfy the following l
requirements:
l l
l l
.- 1) Class 1E equipnent shall be utilized and shall be physically located at and electrically connected to the emergency switch-gear.
- 2) An independent scheme shall be provided for each division of emergency power.
3)
Capa5 fifty for test and calibration during power operation shall be provided.
- 4) Annunciation must be provided in the control room for any by-passes incorporated into the design; and f) The Technical Specifications shall include limiting condition for operation, surveillance requirements, trip set points -
with minimum and maximum limits, and allowable values for the second level voltage protection sensors and associated time delay devices.
l 040.37 We require that the diesel generator bus load shedding design auto-matica11y prevent load shedding of the emergancy bus once the diesel generator is supplying power to the emergency bus. The design shall also include the capability of the load shedding feature to be autcmatically reinstated if the diesel generator supply breaker
f is tripped.
It is not clear from your response to Item 040.02.
as to exactly what is your design. Provide the details of your design and state your intent to comply with this position or provide justification for any exceptions taken.
We further require that the Technical Specifications include a test requirement to demonstrate the full functional operability of the bypass and reinstatement feature at least once per 18 months during shutdown. Proper operation shall be determined by:
Verifying that on interruption of the onsite sources the loads arr. shed from the emergency buses in accordance with design requirements and that sub-sequent loading of the onsite sources is through the load sequencer.
040.38 The voltage levels at the safety-related buses should be optimized for the full load and minimum load conditions that are expected throughout the anticipated range of voltage variations of the offsite power sourca by appropriate adjustment of the voltage tap settings of the intervening transfonners. We require that the adequacy of the design in this regard be verified by actual measurement,
t
. Provide a description of the method for making this verification and the coordination of the results with the response to Item 040.01.
Provide the documentation required to establish that this verification will be acccmplished.
t
' 040.39 Provide a description of the physical arrangement utilitized in your design to connect the field cables ins ~ide containment to the containment penetrations, e.g. connectors, splices, or terminal blocks. Provide supportive documentation that these physical interfaces are qualified to withstand a LOCA or steam line break environment.
040.40 Provide a listing of a11 motor operated valves within your design that require power lack out in order to meet the single failure criterion and provide the details of your design that accomplis 1 this requirement.
040.41 Provide a description of the capability of the emergency power system battery chargers to properly function and remain stable upon the disconnection of the battery.
Include in the description any forseen modes of opeation that would require battery discon-nection such as when applying an equalizing charge.
040.42 Provide the details of your design of the DC power system that assures equipment will be protected frem damaging overvoltages from the battery chargers that may occur due to faulty regulation or operator error.
, Provide the results of a review of your operating, maintenance, and 040.43 testing procedures to detemine the extent of usage of jumpers or
{
other temporary foms of bypassing functions for operating, test-(
ing, or maintaining of safety related systems.
)
Identify and justify any cases where the use of the above methods cannot be avoided.
Provide the criteria for any use of jumpers for testing.
040.44 We request that you perfom a review of the electrical control circuits for all safety related equipment, so as to assure that disabling of one component does not, through incomoration in other inter locking or sequencing controls, render other cenponents inoperable. All modes of test, operation, and failure should be
~
considered. Describe and state the results of your review.
040.45 During the Hatch 2 review the staff identified certain potential problems with the RPS MG sets in relation to exceeding the allowed envelopes of voltage and frequency and thus adversely affecting the connected loads. State if your design is the same as the Hatch 2 design.
If the same, state whether you will commit to the generic resolution of this item or will justify the WPPSS Unit 2 design on some other basis.
l l
1 l
l 1
.. ~
k 040.46 The information regarding the onsite consnunications system (Section l
(9.5.2) 9.5.2) does not adequately cover the system capabilities during transients and accidents. Provide the following inferination:
(a)
Identify all working stations on the plant site where it say be necessary for plant personnel to communicate with the control room or the emergency shutdown panel during and/or following transients and/or accidents (including fires) in order to mitigate the consequences of the event and to attain a safe cold plant shutdown.
(b)
Indicate the maximum sound levels that could exist at eacP of the above identified working stations for all transients and accident conditions.
(c)
Indicate the types of conmunication systems available at each of the above identified working stations.
(d)
Indicate the maximum background noise level that could exist at each working station and yet reliably expect effective comunication with the control room using:
1.
the page party comunications systems, and 2.
any other additional comunication system provided that working station.
(e)
Describe the pe'rformance requirements and tests that the above onsite working stations connunication systems will be required to pass in order to be assured that effective communication with the cortrol room or emergency shutdown panel is possible under all conditions.
(f)
Identify and describe the power source (s) provided for each of the conmunications systems.
(g)
Discuss the protective measures taken to assure a functionally operable onsite comunication system. The discussion should include the considerations given to component failures, loss of power, and the severing of a comunication line or trunk l
as a result of an accident or fire.
l l
040.47 Identify the vital areas and hazardous areas where emergency (9.5.3) lightning is needed for safe shutdown of the reactor and the evacuation of personnel in the event of an accident (including fire). Tabulate the lightning system provided in your design l
to accomodate those areas so identified.
040.48 Section 9.5.4.1 emergency diesel engine fuel oil storage and (9.5.4) transfer system (EDEFSS) does not specifically reference ANSI Stan-dard N195 " Fuel Oil Systems for Standby Ofesel Generators".
Indicate if you intend to comply with this standard in your design of the EDEFSS; otherwise provide justificatica for non-compliance.
(SRP 9.5.4, Rev. 1, Part II, Item 12).
l
_g.
040.49 Figure 9.5-4 identifies the minimum flow line 1/2" 00(6)-1 as non (9.5.4) safety class G piping. This is not acceptable. We require this line to be designed to seismic Category I, safety Class 3 requirements similar to the rest of the system. Change Figure 9.5-4 accordingly.
6 040.50 In Section 9.5.4.3 you state that diesel fuel oil is available from (9.5.4) local distribution sources.
Identify the sources where diesel quality fuel oil will be available and the distances required to be travell'ed from the source (s) to the plant. Also discuss how fuel oii will be delivered onsite under extremely unfavorable environ-mental conditions.
(SRP 9.5.4, Part III, Item 5b).
040.51 In section 9.5.4.3 you state materials selected for the diesel fuel (9.5.4) oil system assure adequate corrosion protection to minimize fuel oil contamination. This statement is too general.
Expand the FSAR to include a more explicit description of proposed protection of under-ground piping. Where corresion protective coatings are being considered (ptping and tanks) include the industry standards which will be used in their application. Also discuss what provisions will be made in the design of the fuel oil storage and transfer system in l
the use of a impressed current type cathodic protection system, l
l in addition to water proof protective coatings, to minimize corrosion of burried piping or equipment.
If cathodic protection is not being considered, provide your justification.
(SRP 9.5.4, Part II, AND i
l Part III, item 4).
l l
l
m- 040.52 In section 9.5.4.4 you describe testing and inspection of the diesel (9.5.4) fuel oil system.
Provide the specific industry (or other) standards which will be followed to assure a reliable fuel oil supply to the emergency generators.
(SRP 9.5.4, Part III, items 3 and 4).
040.53 You state in section 9.5.4.2 that the diesel generator fuel oil (9.5.4) storage tank is provided with an individual fill and vent line.
Indicate where these lines are located (indoor or outdoor) and the heigh these lines are terminated above finished ground grade.
If these lines are located outdoors discuss the provisions made in your design to prevent entrance of water into the storage tank dur-ing adverse environmental ' conditions.
040.54 Discuss the means for detecting or preventing growth of algae in (9.5.4) the diesel fuel storage tank.
If it were detected, describe the method (s) used to clean the affected storage tank.
(SRP 9.5.4, Part III, item 4).
l 040.55 Describe the provisions made in the design of the diesel engine (9.5.5) cooling water system to assure that all components and piping are filled with water.
(SRP 9.5.5, Part III, item 2).
l l
l
. 040.56 In section 8.3.1.1.8.1.11 you state the diesel generators are (9.5.5) automatically started and run unloaded during LOCA conditions when offsite power is available to the 4.16 kV class 1E buses.
Should a LOCA occur with availability of offsite power, discuss how long the Division 1 and 2 diesel generators can run unloaded without degradation of engine performance or reliability.
Provide a similar discussion on Division 3 (HPCS) diesel generator.
040.57 You ' state in section 9.5.5.2 each diesel engine cooling water system (9.5.5) is provided with an expansion tank to provide for system expansion and for venting air from the system.
In addition to the items mentioned, the expansion tank is to provide for minor system leaks at pump shafts seals, valve stems and other components, and to maintain required NPSH on the system circulating pump. Provide the size of the expansion tank and location.
Demonstrate by analysis that the expansion tank size will be adequate to maintain required pump NPSH and make up water for seven days continuous operation cf the diesel engir.e at full rated load without makeup, or provide a seismic Category I, safety class 3 make up water supply to the ex-pansion tank.
I 040.58 Describe the instrumentation, controls, sensors and alarms provided (9.5.6) in your design of the starting air system to warn the operators when design parameters are exceeded.
Discuss operator actions during alarm conditions.
(SRP 9.5.6, Part III, item
).
l l
1 040.59 Figure 9.5-5 shows the location of the diesel engine air intake (9.5.8) louvers.
Disccss the effect of inclement weather conditions (heavy rain, freezing rain, ice or snow) on the availability of the emer-gency diesel generators when needed.
(SRP 9.5.8, Part III, item 5).
040.60 Describe the instrumentation, controls, sensors and alarms provided (9.5.8) in the design of the diesel engine combustion air intake and exhaust system to warn the operators when design parameters are exceeded.
Discuss operator actions during alarm conditions.
(SRP 9.5.8, Part II, item 1 and 4).
Espand your discussion of,the turbine -speed control and overspeed protection system.
Provide additional explanation of the turbine
~
and generator electrical load following capability for the tur-bine speed control system with tho aid of system schematics l
(including turbine control and extraction steam valves to the heaters). Tabulate the individual speed control protectionlevices (normal emergency and backup).-the design speed (or range of, speed) at which each device begins operation to performs its protective function (in terms of percent o.f normal turbine operatingspeed).
In order to evaluate the adequacy of the control and overspeed protection system provide schematics and include identifying numbers to valves and mechanisms (mechanical l
' and electrical) en the schematics. hescribe in detail, with' references to the identifying numbers, te sequence of events 1
in a turbins trip including response times, and show that the
. turbine stabilizes.
Provide the results of a failure mode and effects analysis for the o'Ye~rspeed protecti~on systems.
~
Show that a single steam valve failure cannot disable the turbine over speed trip from functioning.
(SRP10.2.PartIII, items 1,2, 3 and 4).
040.62 Provide a discussion of the inservice inspection program for (10.2) throttle-stop, control, reheat stop and interceptor steam valves and the capability for testing essential components during tur-bine generator system operation.
(SRP 10.2, Part III, items 5 and 6).
040.63 Provide a complete list of turbine generator protective trips.
(10.2)
Separate these trips into two categories, 1) those that will trip the turbine due to mechanical faults, and 2) those that will trip the turbine due to generator electric faults.
040.64 Provide the turbine generator automatic load following informatica (10.2) omitted in section 10.2.5.6 of the FSAR.
040.65 Discuss the means t; ken to prevert galvanic corrosion cf con-(10.4.1) denser tubes and components.
(SRP 10.4.1, Part III, item 1).
14_
040.66 Discuss the effect of main condenser degradation (leakage, vacuum, (10.4.1) loss) on reactor ~ operation. (SRP 10.4.1, Part III, item 1).
040.67 Discuss the possible mechanisms for hydrogen production in the (10.4.1) exhaust steam side of the condenser and provide expected produc-tion rate of hydrogen in SCFM.
Discuss hc,w you prevent bydrogen buildup (SRP 10.4.1, Part III, item 1).
040.68 Discuss the means for controlling and connecting cooling water (10.4.1) leakage into the condensate (SRP 10.4.1, Part III, item 2).
040.65 Provide the permissible cooling water inlcakage and time of opera-(10.4.1) tion with inleakage to assure that condensate /feedwater quality can be maintained within safe limits.
(SRP 10.4.1, Part III, item 2).
040.70 Indicate and describe the means of detecting radioactive leakage (10.4.1) into and out of the condenser and the means for processing excessive amounts.
(SRP10.4.1,PartIII, item 2).
040.71 Discuss the effect of loss of main condenser vacuum on the operation (10.4.1) of the main steam isolation valves (SRP 10.4.1, Part III, item 3).
- 1 040.72 Indicate what design provisions have been made to preclude failure's (10.4.1) of condenser tubes or components from turbine by-pass blowdown or other high temperature drains into the cendenser shell.
(SRP 10.4.1, Part III, item 3).
040.73 In section 10.4.1.4 you have discussed tests and initial field in-(10.4.1) spection but not the frequency and extent of inservice inspection of the main condenser. Provide this information in the FSAR.
(SRP10.4.1,PartII).
040.74 Assure that a high energy line failure of the turbine by-pass sys-(10.4.4) tem will not have an adverse effect or preclude operation of turbine speed controls or any safety-related components or systems located close to the turbine bypass system.
(SRP 10.4.4, Part III, item 4).
040.75 In section 10.4.4.4 you have discussed tests and initial field (10.4.4) inspection but not the frequency and extent of inservice testing and inspection of the turbine by-pass system. Provide this infor-mation in the FSAR.
(SRP 10.4.4, Part II).
l f
_