ML20212Q396

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Responds to to Zech Expressing Constituent Concerns Re Inferior Bolts Used in Const of Nuclear Plants. Problems from 1982-1986 Concern Loss of Traceability Through Mfg Process.Ie Info Notice 86-025 Encl
ML20212Q396
Person / Time
Issue date: 04/17/1987
From: Stello V
NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To: Cranston A
SENATE
Shared Package
ML20212Q399 List:
References
IEIN-86-025, IEIN-86-25, NUDOCS 8704230485
Download: ML20212Q396 (6)


Text

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, UNITED STATES

  • !' / f, NUCLEAR REEULATORY COMMISSION g ),l w AsHINGTON. D. C. 20665

\,...../ APR 1719EF TFe l'onerable Alan Cranston i United States Senate l Washington. 0.C. 20510

Dear Senator Cranston:

This responds to your letter dated April 1,1987 to Chairman Zech, pertaining to your constituent's concerns regarding " Dangerously inferior bolts...used in the construction of at least 11 nuclear power plants...."

The Jack Anderson articles referenced in your constituent's letter indicate that counterfeit, inferior grade fasteners manufactured in Asia have been used in the nuclear industry. One of Mr. Anderson's articles also states that quality control problems with bolts have been identified by Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspectors at 11 plant sites and sumarites the difficulties of handling and using correct bolts and nuts in specific applications at four sites.

The bolting problems found by the NRC inspectors from 1982 to 1906 at 11 nuclear sites did not involve counterfeit or physically inferior fasteners, but related to loss of traceability back through the manufacturing process.

These problems were described in NRC Information Notice No. 86-25, " Trace-ability and Paterial Control of Material and Equipment Particularly Fasteners," which was issued on April 11, 1986 to inform thu nuclear industry of these potential problems so that appropriate actions could be taken to prevent similar problems from occurring at their facilities.

I A problem with incorrect markinos of SAE bolts has been identified by the IndustrialFastenerInstitute(IFI). Their concern relates to the mismarking and substitution of SAE J429K grade 8.2 bolts for SAE J429K grade C. Grade 8 bolts are primarily used in automotive appiteations, but are occasionally used in safety-related applications at nuclear power plants. For this reason, the NRC issued a supplement to Information Notice 06-25 describino the substitution problem and embarled on a testing program.

l The NRC Vendor Program Branch of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement (ole),

starting in the summer of 19P6. tested and evaluated a random selection of bolts from various nuclear pcwcr plants and bolt suppliers and manufacturers.

The progran was undertaken to verify fastener compliance with applicable l material specifications and to evaluate the potentini presence of counterfeit

! fasteners within the nuclear industry. Results indicated that of 21 bolts marked as SAE grade 0, five were actually SAC grade P.7.

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l The Honorable Alan Cranston SAE grade 8.2 bolts have the same mechanical characteristics as SAE grade 8 at temperatures below approximately 620'F. Using a grade 8.2 bolt in lieu of a grade 8 bolt above this temperature might result in stress relaxation (slight elongation) of the grade 8.2 bolt. Stress relaxation would, for example, be '

expected to result in leakage from a flanged joint. As of this date, we are not aware of any safety-related grade 8 or 8.2 bolts being used in high l tenperature applications at nuclear power plants.

The NRC is continuing to test fasteners designated for safety-related applica-tions and will selectively obtain additional bolts from various nuclear power  !

plants and bolt suppliers and manufacturers and the Vendor Program Branch is continuing to inspect bolt suppliers and manufacturers, t I am enclosing copies of the Information Notices issued to the industry on this subject. Please feel free to contact my office if additional information is required, i

Sincerely.

Oridnal Signed Dy6 James M.Iaylof Victor Stello, Jr.

Executive Director for Operations

Enclosures:

1. Information Notice 86-25
2. Information Notice 86 25 Supplement 1 ,

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The Honorable Alan Cranston DISTRIBUTION:

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SSIMS NO.: 6835

.. IN 86 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 ,

April 11, 1986 IE INFORMATION NOTICEAND N0. 86-25:PARTICULARLY EQUIPMENT, TRACEASILITY AND MATERIAL CONTRO FASTENERS Addressees:

All nuclear power reactor facilities holding a construction permit (CP) or an operating license (OL).

Purpose:

This notice is provide to alert recipients of potentially significant problems identified during NRC Construction Appraisal Team (CAT) inspections of licensee programs for the inspection of material and equipment, particularly fasteners, to prevent the use of incorrect or defective' materials, parts and components.

It is expected that the recipients will review the information for applicability

'to their facilities and consider actions, if appropriat6t, to preclude similar problems from occurring at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written resoonse is required.

Description of Circumsunces:

DuringNRCCATinspectionsconductedsince1982,deficienciesinmaterial traceability and control of fasteners were identified at 11 sites. This raised questions regarding the adequacy of controls to prevent ne use of incorrect or '

A brief summary of findings for each site is defective fastener materials.

attached. See Attachment 1.

Discussion The deficiencies in material traceability and control of fasteners identified at 11 sites mentioned above were attributed to ineffective site inspection programs and vendor surveillence activities by the licensees. Deficiencies were found in fasteners for large vendor-supplied mechanical and electrica; equipment I (e.g., pump-motor assemblies mounted.on skids) and in bolting fcr battery racks and electrical equipment cabinets at many sites. These and other deficiencies are described in Attachment 1.

Because fastener deficiencies, if uncorrected, could adversely affect opera-tional safety and/or safety in case of seismic events, recipients of this notice should review the information presented to avoid similar deficiencies at their facilities.

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.- 'IN 86-25 April 11. 1986 Page 2 of 2 It is important that particular attention be given to Itcensee prograr,is for ensuring the traceability of material and equipment and toItprevent the usethat is important of incorrect or defective materials, parts and components.

the licensee be aware of 10 CFR 50. Appendix 8. Criterion VIII - Identification and Control of Materials. Parts and Components and applicable codes and spect. j fications and that measures have been established and implemented for identifi.

cation and control of materials, parts and components and for traceability It is important both that required to the approved design basis and to the source.

identification of the item is maintained by heat number. part number. serial number, or other appropriate means, either on the item or on records traceable to the item as required, and that recuired markings are on the ites.

The licensee has the' responsibility to use qualified individuals to examine markings on material and equipment and verify that the markings represent material and equipment as specified by the design drawings and specifications.

In the case of fasteners. compliance with the applicable material specification (e.g.. ASTM or ASME material and grade) is verified by required markings on bolts and nuts and certified material test reports or certificates of con-formance as required by the applicable procurement drawings and specifications and/or by the applicable codes and specifications. In the case of vendor-supplied equipment assemblies containinj fasteners, it is important to verify compliance with approved vendor drawin.gs and specifications and other information such as materials used for equipment qualification tests and/or analyses. It is important that caution be exercised to ensure that the required markings on material and equipment, including fasteners, not only exist but that the markings indicate the correct material and grade as specified.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If ycu have any cuestions regarding this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office, er this' office.

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. wa I&

L Jordan, Director Divisio of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement Technical

Contact:

Henry Phillips. IE (301) 492-4531 Attachments:

1. Sumary of Deficiencies Found During NRC CAT Inspections at Various Sites
2. List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices

Attachment 1

' IN 86-25 April 11, 1986 Page 1 of 3

SUMMARY

OF DEFICIENCIES FOUND OURING NRC CAT INSPECTIONS AT VARIOUS SITES .

South Texas Project Units 1 and 2 During the NRC CAT inspection conducted at the South Texas Project in and November 1985, lack of traceability was found for fastener meterials fo certain vendor-supplied large mechanical equipment It also was found that engineeringassemblies had mounted on and for certain electrical equipment.

deleted the requirement of the specified national standard for manufacturers .

l marking of fasteners intended for electrical cable tray t l andand conduit trace- supports.

which contributed to the resulting uncertainty of fastener con roFor details refer to Cons ability during and after installation.50-498/85-21 and 50-499/85-19.

Appraisal Team Inspection Report Byron Unit 2 Station During the NRC CAT inspection conducted at the 8yron Unit 2 Station in A and September 1985, significant lack of traceability was found for fastener materials, including assembly and mounting bolts for large vendor-supplied i ent; pumps / motors; bolts for battery racks, electrical switchgear and other equ p and bolts attaching heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) duct For details refer to Construction Appraisal Team Inspection sections.

Report 50-455/85-27.

Clinton Power Station I Curing the NRC CAT inspection conducted at the Clinton Power Station in i

r:aterials, including bolt.s 'or large pump-motor For details refer and sk assemblies, and mounting bolts for HVAC control cabinets.50 461/85-30.

to Constructibn Appraisal Team Inspection Report Millstone Unit 3 During the NRC CAT inspection conducted at the Mills supplied fastener materials, including bolts for mounting large pump motors, bolts for battery racks, and bolts for interconnecting adjac  ;

center cabinets.

Report 50-423/85-04 l

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. - Attachment 1 IN 86-25 April 11, 1986 Page t of 3 l

Shearon Harris Unit 1 the Shearon Harris Unit 1 site intified During the NRC CAT inspection ddedconducted d

anchor bolts at and NRCequipment Region II mounting October fastener materials,andincluding November large i s andembe 1984, correctiveproblems actions were inwere i e bolts and nuts.had previously identified such deficienc eFor det progress by the applicant.50 400/84 41.

Inspection Report River Bend Unit 1 h River Bend Unit 1 site in July During the NRC CAT inspectionin l materialattraceability conducted te and controlco and August 1984, deficiencies were found Also, work or rework of some of some safety-related fasteners, piping f angeQC or engineering control of weld filler material storage ovens.f material control. l flange joints was being acconiplished tion Report 50 458/84-23. withoutconcurr refer to Construction Appraisal Team inspec-Seabrook Station Seabrook Station in April and eability of embedded anchor During the NRC CAT inspection l conducted nd nuts, flange atfasteners the and May 1984, problems were identified regarding bolt / nut assemblies, equipment mounting boReport ts a traci ls in seism Inspection the use of indeterminate fastening mater aFor detafis r Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit _3 Electric Station f rd Steam Curing the N,RC CAT inspection conducted deficiencies i ment mountingat were the bolts found Water

/ studs, for o Unit 3 in February and dMarch nuts.

0 382/84-07.

1984, traceabilitysu nuts and washers; and flange joint studs anConstruc Nine Mile point Station Unit 2 i Mile Point Station Unit 2 deficiencies were found During the NRC CAT inspection conducted at the N ne h reactor coolant recircula-in November and December 1983, material traceabilit for ASME III Class 1 ifnear NF hanger parts for t el were tion system, and a number of examples o Inspection Report safety-related fasteners and unused weld mater

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.- Attachment 1 IN 86-25 April 11, 1926 Page 3 of 3 perry Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2 Nuclear Power Plant During the NRC CAT inspection sconducted at_the For Perryficiencies were and small components.50 440/83-31, Units 1 and 2 in August and September 1983; detracea details refer to Construction Appraisal Team 50-441/83-30.

Washineton Nuclear Plant Number 2 (WNP-21 d June 1983, problems During the NRC CAT inspection conducted i h respectat to WNP-2 fastener in May anSpecif core identified in the areai of f Report astener traceability.or u 50-397/83-29.

quality on pipe flanges, valve bonnets, mechan caFor de

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ACT ON OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR 86-591 2. DATE: 10/20/86

1. IE ACTION NUMBER A DE 8.2 BOLTS FOR SAE GRADE 8
3.

SUBJECT:

Dingell (Ltr., Zech to Dingell, 10/10/86)

4. REQUESTOR:

W'.will consider further inspection / testing efforts. Starostecki

5. ACTION REQUESTED t . .i3c . .

to contact / staff to establish exchange of significant information developed in this area; we will advise of our decision on further action.

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Grime

6. ASSIGNED TO:

11/7/86 for tracking purposes--advise Claudine of realistic

7. EXPECTED COMPLETION DATE: cue date.
8. EXTENDED COMPLETION DATE:
9. C0fiPLETION DATE:
10. DOCUMENTATION OF C0ftPLETION:
11. RETURN THIS FORT 1 TO DEPUTY DIRECTOR'S OFFICE WITH COMPLETED ACTI0ft l

s .

. SSINS No.: 6835 i

IN 86-25, Supplement 1 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COP 9tISSION '

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 October 15, 1986 IE INFORMATION NOTICE N0. 86-25, SUPPLEMENT 1: TRACEA8ILITY AND NATERIAL CONTROL OF MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT, PARTICULARLY FASTENERS Addressees:

All nuclear reactor facilities holding an operating license or construction permit.

Purpose:

This ' notice is to supplement IN 86-25 with information provided by the Industrial Fastener Institute (IFI) concerning an example of improperly marked fasteners.

It is expected that the recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude similar 4

problems from occurring at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

I Discussion:

The IFI issued a news release on May 2, 1986 expressing its concerns about intentionally missarked SAE J429K grade 8 bolts. According to IFI, these i falsely marked bolts (grade 8.2 for grade 8) could undergo stress relaxation i i when subjected to temperatures above 500*F, and such relaxation could result '

in equipment failure and injury. I The IFI news release states that 75% of the foreign imported bolts (mainly from the Far East) have incorrect "headmarkings," indicating that they are SAE J429K grade 8 rather than grade 8.2. Grade 8 is a fine grain, medium carbon alloy steel (quenched and tempered), and grade 8.2 is a low carbon quenched and tempered martensite steel. The mechanical properties of both grades are l essentially identical. For both grades, the tensile and yield strengths are 150 ksi and 120 ksi, respectively. However, the two grades of bolts are heat treated differently. Grade 8 bolts are quenched in oil and tempered at 800*F while grade 8.2 bolts are quenched in water or oil and tempered at 650*F.

Consequently, using an 8.2 grade bolt in lieu of an 8 grade bolt at temperatures near 650'F could result in stress relaxation of the grade 8.2 bolt resulting from a change in the original tempered microstructure. Although SAE grade 8 and 8.2 bolts are not commonly used for high temperature safety-related appli-cations in nuclear power plants, this situation provides an example of the type 4

of problem which can result from anything less than a rigorous approach to the

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f IN 86-25, Supplement 1

- October 15, 1986 Page 2 of 2 procurement of any safety-related component. Substitutions of this type could be detected by an effective receipt inspection program if the receipt inspections went beyond visual inspection requirements and included, on a sample basis, chemical analyses, nondestructive testing such as eddy current or conductivity testing, or destructive testing such as metallographic analyses.

No specific action or written response to this notice is required. If you have any questions regarding this matter, contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional office or this office.

I s-d ord'an,' Director Divisic of Emergency Preparedness and E gineering Response  !

Office of Inspection and Enforcement 1 I

Technical

Contact:

J. C. Harper, IE '

i (301) 492-7568 1

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices 1

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~ Attachment 1 IN 86-25, Supplement 1 October 15, 1986 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION NOTICES Date of '

Information Issue Issued to Notice No. Subject 10/15/86 All power reactor 86-88 Compensatory Measures For facilities holding Prolonged Periods of Security an OL or CP; fuel System Failures fabrication and processing facilities

)

All power reactor 86-87 Loss of Offsite Power Upon An 10/10/86 facilities holding (

Automatic Bus Transfer an OL or CP Clarification Of Requirements 10/10/86 All registered users 86-86 of NRC certified For Fabrication And Export Of Certain Previously Approved packages Type B Packages Enforcement Actions Against 10/3/86 All NRC medical 86-85 licensees Medical Licensees For Willfull Failure To Report Misadministrations 9/30/86 All NRC medical 86-84 Rupture Of A Nominal institution licensees 40-Millicurie Iodine-125

- Brachytherapy Seed Causing Significant Spread of Radioactive Contamination .

9/19/86 All power reactor 86-83 Underground Pathways Into facilities holding Protected Areas, Vital Areas, an OL or CP; fuel Material Access Areas, And fabrication and Controlled Access Areas processing facilities Failures of Scram Discharge 9/16/86 All power reactor 86-82 facilities holding Volume Vent And Drain Valves an OL or CP All power reactor 86-81 Broken Inner-External Closure 9/15/86 facilities holding Springs On Atwood & Morrill an OL or CP Main Steam Isolation Valves Unit Startup With Degraded 9/12/86 All power reactor 86-80 facilities holding High Pressure Safety Injection an OL or CP Systes OL = Operating License CP = Construction Permit i

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. %y'o, -

UNITED STATES

. E o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 5 E WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 5 .. / 2 bd$gg EDO PRINCIPAL CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL FROM: DUE: 04/22/87 EDO CONTROL: 002714 DOC DT: 04/01/87 SEN. ALAN CRANSTON FINAL REPLY:

TO:

OCA FOR SIGNATURE OF: ** GREEN ** SECY NO: 87-341 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR DESC: ROUTING:

ENCLOSES LETTER FROM CLYDE JOHNSON RE USE OF DENTON INFERIOR BOLTS IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANT CONSTRUCTION DATE: 04/07/87 l ASSIGNED TO: IE CONTACT: TAYLOR '

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:

RETURN INCOMING WITH REPLY.

MARK ENVELOPE ATTN: JIM KOHLENBERGER.

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  • - OFFICE OF.THE SECRETARY CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL TICKET I

PAPER NUMBER: CRC-87-0341 LOGGING DATE: Apr 6 87 l ACTION OFFICE: EDO AUTHOR: A. CRANSTON AFFILIATION: ,

LETTER DATE
Apr 1 87 FILE CODE:

SUBJECT:

Constituent's concerns re use of inferior bolts in nuclear plant construction ACTION: Direct Reply DISTRIBUTION:

SPECIAL HANDLING: OCA to Ack.

NOTES: Clyde Johnson DATE DUE: Apr 20 87 SIGNATURE: . DATE SIGNED:

AFFILIATION:

    1. 6)y N.

i EDO - 002714

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