Text

Forwards FEMA Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Exercise,Conducted on 851113 Final Rept.No Deficiencies Noted,Although 18 Items Require Corrective Actions.Util Should Work Closely W/ State & Counties in Development of Next Exercise Scenario
	ML20212N992
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	08/14/1986
From:	Zech G; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	White S; TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
References
	NUDOCS 8609020128
	Download: ML20212N992 (2)
	v • d • e

{{#Wiki_filter:... AUG 14 1966 i 'Decket Nos. 50-259, 50-260, 50-296 License Nos. OPR-33, DPR-52, DPR-68 fennessee Valley Authority l VATTN: Mr. S. A. White Manager of Nuclear Power 6N 38A' Lookout Place 1101 Market Street l Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 1 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

FEMA FINAL REPORT - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY EXERCISE OF NOVEMBER 13, 1985 Enclosed is a copy of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's Final Report for-the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Emergency Exercise of November 13, 1985. As described in the enclosure, FEMA has not identified any deficiencies; however, eighteen items have been' recognized which require corrective actions. The items r:oted range from failure to effectively use the EBS system to inadequate training of county personnel on radiation exposure control. We encourage you to assist the appropriate organizations in resolving the weaknesses identified by FEMA. Resolution of these items should be completea prior to the next full scale emergency preparedness exercise. We also encourage you to work closely with the State and counties in the development of a scenario for the next full scale exercise that will effectively ~ test the areas in which the above items were disclosed. Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated. Sincerely, Gary G. Zech, Director TVA Projects

Enclosure:

FEMA Final Report cc w/ encl: (See page 2) 8609020128 860314 PDR ADOCK 05000259 I F PDR Q\\ p as~

Tennessee Valley Authority -2 ' fc w/, enc 1: VH. P. Pomrehn, Browns Ferry. Nuclear j Plant Site Director vR. L. Lewis, Plant Manager [.W.Whitt, Director, Nuclear f Managers Review Group VD. L. Williams, Jr., Supervisor Licensing Section-IR.E. Rogers,ProjectEngineer y. ' pCC W/ encl: JJ. N. Grace- /R. D.: Walker v/H. R. Denton, NRR ./ti. L. Thompson, NRR- /J. M. Taylor, IE B. B. Hayes, 0I S. R. Connelly, OIA

/ R. J. Cla'rk, Licensing Project Manager,-NRR

/M.Grotenhuis, Project j Manager, NRR VW. E. Cline-JNRC Resident Inspector State of Alabama . Document Control Desk RII RII RII RII RII y ~ a ka TDec r DCo li AJo n FCan 11 nc 8///86 8/ 86 8/ //86 8//) /86 8/g/86 8/g/86 / /

e ,e g 9,Ff g Federal Emergency Management Agency f Washington, D.C. 20472 i,p s .A M 2 0 8 86 MEMORANDJM FOR: FIlward L. Jordan Director, Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Of fice of Inspection and Enforcement U. Nucl r latory Conmission FKM: cha W. Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs SUBJECI': Exercise Report for the November 13, 1985, Exercise of the Offsite Radiological Emerijency Preparedness Plans for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant Attached is one copy of the Exercise Report for the November 13, 1985, full-participation joint exercise of the offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant. W e Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant is located in Limestone County, Alabama, alorg the Tennessee River, approximately 30 miles west of the City of Huntsville. l he State of Alabama, and Linestone, Lauderdale, Lawrence, and Morgan Counties, which are' located in the 10-mile plune emergency planning zone (EPZ), participated in the exercise. We exercise report, dated November 25, 1985, was submitted on March 5, 1986, by Region IV of the Federal Dnergency Management Agency (FEMA) and includes the comments resulting fran the Regional Assistance Ccmnittee review. i There were no deficiencies identified as a result of this exercise. He l report identifies areas requirirg corrective action in Section III, as well as several areas reconr: ended for imprcuement in Section II. Many of the I identified inadequacies can be resolved throtgh additional trainirg, equipnent acquistion, and plan or procedures modification. Rese inadequacies did not detract fran the overall capability demonstrated by the State of r Alabama, and Limestone, Lauderdale, Lawrence, and Morgan Counties, to protect .the health and safety of.the public.in the event of.a radiological emergency. FEMA Region IV has furnished a copy of this exercise report to the State of Alabama and requested a schedule of corrective actions. W e Region will assure coupletion by the State of the necessary corrective actions. If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Robert S. Wilkerson, Chief, Technolcgical Hazards Division, at 646-2860. Attachments i As Stated _b/dM Cr1j_df o o u T g.co g i'

c BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT EXERCISE / I d A 4 g ~:, $h O O a FEDERAL-EMERGENCY 1 MANAGEMENT AGENCY REGION IV -86G'D3pl9 y

r 1 1 4 ,. ; Federal Emergency Management Agency = .m f Region IV 1371 Peachtree Street, NE Atlanta, Georgia 30309 EROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT EXERCISE ~. e Conducted on November 13, 1985 f Exercise Report November 25, 1985 Utility: Tennessee Valley Authority Plant Location: Limestone County, Alabama Participating State and Local Governments: State of Alabama Lauderdale County Lawrence County Limestone County 11 organ County Madison ~ County' p

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r TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1 1. Exercise Summary 8 11. Detailed Discussion 8 Introduction 10 State of Alabama 10 State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) 10 Central Emergency Operations Center (CEOC) 12 Radiological Health Laboratory 13 Field Monitoring Teams 14 Near-Site Media Center 15

j Risk Counties 15 Medical Services 16 Transporta' tion / Evacuation 16 Lauderdale County 20 Lawrence County 22 Limestone County 25 Morgan County 29 Host County 29 Madison County

~ 32 Summary Listing of'Inadeq'uaci'es' III. 36 IV. Appendices A. Evaluator List and Assignments B. Exercise Objectives C. Exercise Scenario ~

F I. EXERCISE

SUMMARY

On November 13, 1985, a Full Participation exercise was conducted at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. This exercise was observed by three Federal evaluators representing six Federal agencies twenty NRC, DOE, USDA, DOT and HHS/FDA). The State of Alabama and (FEMA, local governments demonstrated their off-site preparedness by implementing the Alabama Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Nuclear Power Plants. The Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant is located in Limestone County, Alabama, along the Tennessee River. The 10-mile Emergency Planning '** Zone (EPZ) includes Lauderdale, Lawrence, Limestone and Morgan Counties. Madison County participated as a Host County providing shelter support for evacuees. The 50-mile ingestion pathway was not tested during this exercise. Many superior items and suggestions for improvements are identified in Section II, Detailed Discussion. Seventeen areas requiring corrective actions were identified and these are listed in Section III of this report. The following is a brief summary of the exercise activities. l l t I d 3 A-6 w s,y q y g 3 s y, s 4 s ,, - - ~

r 2-State of Alabama State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) The State EOC has adequate space, good furnishings, displays and equipment, and was well directed. State agency representatives were knowledgeable of their responsibilities and performed their duties well. State Central Emergency Operations Center (CEOC) 9 An increase in staff positions for the AEMA Director's immediate staff, operational staff and public information staff in the CEOC greatly enhanced this operation. A high degree of professionalism was the CEOC staff. Standard operating procedures displayed throughout for CEOC and P10 activities were recently revised and were used throughout the exercise. A comp 1.ete shift change was demonstrated at 1300 hours in an efficient manner which provided for a continued Communications were enhanced to each county through smooth operation. This the use of a high spee,d telecopier located in the PIO work area. allowed for no interruptions in the use of the " hoot and holler" conferencing system. All CEOC objectives were met. Communications and coordination between representatives of TVA, State and other key State agencies were EMA, Radiological Health, assessment was conducted by the State Health excellent. Accident in a professional and timely fashion. Appropriate Department protective action recommendations were developed, coordinated and isplemented in'a manner to insure public health and safety. Radiological Health Laboratory Procedures Operation of the radiological health lab was proficient. used were correct for providing radiocesium and radioiodine analyses of environmental samples to CEOC personnel. No inadequacies were noted in the laboratory operation which would cause a finding that off-site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of Browns The exercise objective to demonstrate the capability to Ferry.- p2rform laboratory analyses was effectively achieved Field Monitoring Teams The county teams were activ3te'd"promptiy,'b0t'2(-hbur" cap'ab'ility was' +- .2

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e., back-up. Plastic gloves were not not fully demonstrated by Statt Radio communications and protocol were available in the county kits. The county teams had adequate, as were dosimetry and record keeping. K1 in their kits but the State team did not.

. Near-Site Media Center The near-site media center was effectively activated and staffed. All individuals were knowledgeable of job responsibilities and Several areas which need to officiently implemented the procedures. improved include the coordinat, ion of Emergency Broadcast System be(EBS) messages and county public information activities. Risk Counties Medical Services Exercise objective number 9 states that a " medical drill will be conducted as part of this exercise." satisfactorbay e The Limestone County Emergency Medical Services did not Although staff were aware of necessary demonstrate procedures. training is needed as well as appropriate dosimetry. procedures, more The participating hospital, Athens-Limestone, recently agreed to eccept patients with low-level contamination. The hospital personnel were not trained prior to this exercise. The necessary supplies were not consolidated and some items were not readily available. The supervising physician did not participate. The hospital personnel did not demonstrate the ability to receive and decontaminate an injured person. Transportation / Evacuation The Tennessee Valley Authority has adequately posted public areas with signs informing the public of protective actions that will be taken if an accident should occur at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. Evacuation route signs are needed along the designated routes for the Once route signs are posted, the Browns Ferry area public to follow. will be adequately marked to assist local residents and transients in the event of an evacuation in the area. Lauderdale County suffered While"Lau'derdale County demonstrated strong. capabilities, itActivation of the staff T I a number of inadequacies. The number of the volunteer agencies participated enthusiastically. Civil Defense Director is a strong, knowledgeable and committed t of space, ' person. <Ther EOC -itself. is. generally,exg. ellen....wi th..a lot'

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s 4 Communications were o kitchen, bunks, showers, and backup power. virtually flawless, with a model broadcast booth for EBS activation. The new County P10 did an excellent job in coordinating EBS messages with the State and then activating the system. The County school representative was well prepared to evacuate school children. The inadequacies were observed during the exercise.

However, designated EOC Director (the County Commission Chairman) did not most of the staff left before participate and, perhaps as a result, the General Emergency.

The emergency classification level was not The configuration of the prompt alerting system would have displayed. two hours to notify the public had it been needed. required about No effort was made to plan for access control. No coordinated planning was demonstrated to evacuate the mobility impaired. Additionally, less serious problems were observed. The organization., i in the county plan is inconsistent with the one the county chart The staff needs additional. training on the plan. A actually used. The damaged new system for message handling should be considered. radio link to the There were very few briefings of the staff. A status board and several needed maps were not available. and objectives In summary, objectives four and five were fully met, two, and three were partially met.

one, the Brooks High Lauderdale County activated a Reception Center atRegistration was done_

School and processed 61 high school students. by personnel from the State Department of Pensions and Securities and Monitoring was performed by officers from the Florence Red Cross. Police Department. The facility has ample space for parking and processing evacuees. Monitors were equipped with survey meters and dosimetry instruments. Proper communication was available. Security and traffic control for the center were not demonstrated. It was evident that all personnel need training. A siren vehicle was used to alert residents of one sector and is considered adequate.'to prcvide notification. The ability to cover the portion of the EPZ in Lauderdale Cou'ntyin the' required-time is +, ~. m-questionable. activated and -A traffictcontrolspoint.that~ had been p'lanned was not -3 V e therefore not obse r v e'd. ~ ' ' ' ' ~ ~ i a

c . Lawrence County Activation and staffing was performed according to planned procedures Command and control of the emergency response was in real -time. excellent. Overall, the facilities are outstanding. Primary and secondary communications were demonstrated and used in a variety of situations. Public alerting and instruction was performed in accordance with planned procedures and within the specified time frame. Three traf fic control points were observed in Lawrence County. and the Personnel from the Lawrence County Sheriff's Department Hillsborough Police Department were aware of their responsibilities, fully cognizant of evacuation routes, and location of Reception Center. Activation of the Lawrence County Coliseum as a Reception Center was. . Twenty-seven lith graders were accomplished in a prompt manner. processed through monitoring, registration, and assignment'to aof Pensions and Se shelter. Six Department Moulton Fire Department people were on hand. Their participation they had put in a lot of IcVel was high, and it was apparentMore monitor training is needed, and ~ preparation for this exercise. Decontamination more practice in procedural details is recommended. demonstrated at the Center, and no security, law enforcement, was not traffic control, or health personnel were present. i Limestone County and dedicated performance of duties by the staff in Despite excellentthe Limestone County EOC, and their appropriate use of the many resources of the outstanding physical and communication facilities a number of objectives of the exercise could throughout the exercise, Objective number two was not fulfilled because not be fully achieved. staff shortages and financial constraints do not permit provision of relief personnel for each position (i.e., no roster was shown forObj 2 backup staff). coordination among counties as to the time of activation of The' county liaison to the Near-Site Media explicit the public alerting system. Records of Center (provided by the State) was not called upon. the county level personnel exposure readings were not. maintained atto a breakdown in comm due in part Thus, objective number 14 was not fulfilled. State Health Officer. lb

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F , The Limestone County and volunteer personnel established TCP's and relocation centers in a prompt and professional manner. Law the EOC and in the field established traffic enforcement personnel at control at the 2-mile and 5-mile perimeter as the incident unfolded. of Pensions and Security and Red Cross personnel Department established a reception center, demonstrated processing o'f evacuees, and identified resources for.long-term congregate care. Radiological exposure control and personnel monitoring are areas of weakness. EOC and field personnel received no guidance or significant training on reporting and recording of radiological exposures, The exposure limits, or procedures for authorizing excess exposure. l county EOC director and RADEF officer would rely on guidance from the State Health Department during an incident. Staff at the relocation center and self-protection station were not trained in monitoring procedures and in determining the need for decontamination. Additional training in personnel monitoring is needed. Morgan County The Decatur-Morgan County emergency response to the Browns Ferry exercise was adequate to protect the public. The following elements were observed to be very good: (1) the EOC facility, (2) message handling system, (3) communications. The following elements were observed as needing some improvements: (1) FNS/EBS Standard Operating Procedures, (2) briefings and use of charts and maps; and (3) evacuation procedures for schools. activate the emergency worker self-protection Morgan County did not station to survey and decontaminate emergency workers, or equipment and vehicles, and therefore did not fully demonstrate the capability to continuously monitor and control exposure for workers. the one traffic Traffic and access control was well demonstrated at control point. The emergency worker had complete knowledge of the evacuation route and the location of the reception center, as The emergency worker had mid-range and designated in the plan. high-range dosimeters and a TLD but did not know pro'cedures for reading and recording dose measurements, taking KI, or'It is recommended that em decontamination. receive training in these areas, as well as relying on accident i teams to determine when they should be called back. assessment 4< .-c. ,,a,,,,, 9 b o }

F , The Priceville School relocation center was staffed by competent and knowledgeable individuals. Registration and monitoring of evacuees Contaminated and were accomplished efficiently and capably. non-contaminated persons were separated, and contaminated persons were Procedures for handling contaminated clothing sent to the shower. were unclear and should be clarified. While not demonstrated, the capability for congregate care was described by staff. Host County Madison County Madison County effectively demonstrated their ability to serve as the host county to evacuees from adjacent risk counties. This the exercise objective. The EOC was promptly demonstration met staf fed and the participants were well prepared to manage the infld1' the reception and care of evacuees anticipated on local-roads and at centers. All of the field activity objectives were fully demonstrated in Excellent coordination between agencies was observed Madison County. The and contributed significantly to a successful demonstration. level of participation by all agencies was excellent. Traffic and access control was efficient and timely by both the county and city police officials. Special evacuation problems, route alerting and worker exposure ~ control were not applicable t'o the host county. Activation and staffing of the reception center was effective and all i SOP's were followed precisely. In addition, registration and conitoring of evacuees was demonstrated. Staff personnel were well informed and knowledgeable. Congregate care of evacuees was also observed and demonstrated thoroughly. h i . In,sev,eral instances, agencies went beyond the scope of t e scenar o to demonstrate full knowledge and training within their.. jurisdiction. l ..~ ~ :.e 8 -w. ..,.,c,. ,.. ~

II. DETAILED DISCUSSION The Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant is located in Limestone County, Alabama, along the Tennessee River. The 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) includes the counties of Lauderdale, Lawrence, Limestone Madison. County is identified as a Host County to receive and Morgan. The 50-mile ingestion pathway was not tested during this All, risk counties and one host county participated with the evacuees. exercise. State of Alabama in the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Exercise. The exercise was a Full Participation exercise conducted on November and observed by twenty-three Federal evaluators representing 13, 1985, six Federal agencies (FEMA, NRC, DOE, USDA, DOT and HHS/FDA). The **

for State and local governments in the Browns exercise was a test Ferry area and response was conducted in accordance with the Alabama Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Nuclear Power Plants.

Criteria used to evaluate the exercise are contained in the " Modular for Uniformity of Radiological Emergency Preparedness' Exercise (For Format Observations and Evaluations" issued by FEMA on August 5, 1983. a detailed listing of evaluators and assignments, see Appendix A). for the off-site The exercise objectives establish a full-system test (See Appendix B--Exercise Objectives).~. All response plan. The scenario objectives were incorporated in the exercise scenario. 8:00 a.m. established exercise activity on November 13th beginning at CST and terminating-at 3:30 p.m. CST. (Refer to Appendix C for a core detailed time line of the scenario), The exercise activity included the following participants: ~ i Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Tennessee Valley Authority Emergency Centers - Muscle Shoals, Alabama, Chattanooga and Knoxville, Tennessee, d Alabama Emergency Management Agency y . Alabama Department of Public Health j ~ Lauderdale County- .n .,,;...,.+.,... .g...,,..... a. :. ., ~ :,.

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~. Lawrence County ~ Limestone County Morgan County

r . Madison County Alabama Department of Agriculture and Industries Alabama Military Department Alabama Departmen't of Public Safety Alabama Department of Pensions and Security Alabama State Highway Department Alabama Department of Conservation American Red Cross ~. e U.S. Coast Guard Emergency Broadcast System following detailed discussion highlights the specific activities The demonstrated during the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Exercise. demonstration, beginning Activities are discussed by location of thewith tjhe local governments. with the State of Alabama and concluding t l I i o ^ s, 1 ..s,. ,v s v.- o l I t a

. State of Alabama State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and The State EOC is well arranged, has adequate space and equipment,in was well directed. Map displays and status boards were present They were both the operations room and the communications area. easily read and updated promptly as significant events occurred. status and Security was established following notification of alert A sign-in was maintained by a member of the Capitol Police Force. roster and badging procedure was strictly enforced. Capable leadership was demonstrated by the Director of Operations. at appropriate times, and Consultations with assistants were sought Ten State agency representatives briefings were given frequently. were present and were called upon for reports during the briefings... The Chief Executive Assistant to'the Governor was present during the exercise and kept the Governor's Office informed by telephone. the State EOC The two amateur radio operators (RACES) on duty at established satisfactory contact with all EPZ counties during the Site Area Emergency. the State EOC Three public information staff members were located at and demonstrated their responsibilities during the early hours of the Questions and rumor calls were placed to the State EOC by exercise. the P10's counterparts in Decatur and were answered appropriately by the State E0C P10 staff. The " Standard Operating Procedures for Nuclear Power Plants", revised in September of this year, were closely followed by the State EOC staff. State Central Emergency Operations Center (CEOC)

However, The CEOC staff was prepositioned in the city of Decatur.

they did not arrive at the CEOC until the Site Area fmergency classification was declared. This is in accordance with the State 11:45 a.m. A Plan.. The.CEOC.was fully staffed and assumed control at shift change was demonstrated In's timely ~and' efficient-mannerA total of 41 State personne ~ providing a continued smooth operation. signed in at the CEOC during this exercise. The smooth operation of - the..CEOC.wase.the..responsibili.ty. of the Director of Operations during 4 each shift'. ~~ Briefings 'weri ~ held" as"rfdeded*fo' apyrise the staff-of ~ N r .m the plant and possible needed protective changing situations at The staff had new operating procedures for both PIO and actions. operational activities. Message logs were completed and copies of cessages I

. were appropriately distributed. The CEOC facility will adequately operations for an extended period. The status board was kept support and the classification level was posted. Necessary maps were current posted giving the sectors within the Plume EPZ and the population numbers within the sectors. The t-lephone dedicated circ.uit, " Hoot 6 Holler", was used to provide the State EOC in Montgomery and the County EOC's information on changing situations, public health orders and protective actions as the.y occurred. The back-up VHF Radio System was demonstrated several times during the exercise and'was available for use in the event the primary system failed. TVA deployed several individuals to the State CEOC, located in the to interface with representatives of the Morgan County Courthouse,The TVA representatives were responsible for State Health Department. providing direction and control to the TVA field monitoring teams, and also for providing liaison with the State. The TVA liaison at the CEOC was effective and enabled the State representatives to be aware of plant conditions ie a prompt manner. This liaison also allowed for close coordination in the development, and implementation of appropriate protective action recommendations. the CEOC, the State Emergency Management Agency and Upon arriving at Health Department did not assume command and control until they had a clear understanding of the emergency situation. The presence of the the CEO.C enhanced and greatly facilitated the TVA representatives at ability of the State to assume command and control from the Montgomery EOC in a timely. manner. Communications and coordination between the State Health Department and TVA were excellent. Additionally, the interface between the Health Department and the State Emergency Management Agency was adequate to mitigate the emergency in an effective manner. The State Health Department effectively utilized check lists and maps Effective emergency operation techniques were during the exercise. employed which enhanced the overall evaluation and accident assessment. For examples, 1) A Health Department re,presentative was dispatched from the State CEOC to brief the arriving State field conitoring.. teams befor,e they were deployed, 2) Milk pathway concerns sppropriately considered,propri' ate time,~3~)'The'use of K1'was p '. s. were considered at the ap and 4) The State evaluated the need for, and l l activities. requested, Federal assistance to monitor post accident Har'dUa N kNbfeins "wi th " rad'i'os 'and' f atsimiW equipment. wore w...y e.. _.aq. 3,: experienced, but TVA and the State Health Department were able to work around these difficulties and effectively assess and control the emergency to ensure the health and safety of the public.

I . The only area of suggested improvement is the portion of the CEOC This small which the State Health Department representatives occupy. is occupied also by Morgan County and TVA representatives. crea Consideration should be given to seeking more suitable quarters within the State CEOC so that these organizations can function more effectively. Area Recommended for Improvement: 1. Review the physical layout of the CEOC for the radiological health operations. Radiological Health Laboratory _ The radiological laboratory staff were in-place and set-up by 1:30 for the reception of environmental samples. The CEOC was p.n. notified by phone upon completion of the lab set-up; sample analyses. e Air and were called to the CEOC upon comp.letion of each sample count. milk samples were analyzed primarily for radiocesuim and radioiodines by gamma spectroscopy,.and results were provided to the CEOC in a timely and efficient manner. Laboratory staff concurred that screening of a very large number of environmental samples (300-500) would provide a problem for them in the lab as currently configured. In addition, staff agreed that available since they did back-up communications with the CEOC were notNeither were they aware that back-up not have hand-held radios. radios were available in the Health Department building until the evaluator mentioned this possibility. When they learned of this radio back-up, however, they were not aware of proper radio protocol (i.e. who to call, etc.). Operations of the radiological lab were very timely and effective. No inadequacies were noted in the ~ Procedures used were correct. laboratory operation which would impair public health and safety of Alabama citizens; however, sample screening for a large number of samples and back-up communications with the ti.0C are reoccurring problems which were. identified in the Nove4be - 1983 exercise. Areas Recommended for Improvement: Screening of'large number'of'sampYe's in~thE' lab'as' currently" ~ 1. configured. equipped with -Beck-up-! communications with.4EOChand-held radios; neithei 'were 'i$3 26 which were available in the Health Department building. s

r-- i ,' Field Monitoring Teams Mobilization of the county radiological teams was timely.and adequate. Initial briefings did not adequately address plant Operation field procedures were covered by conditions and status. The county teams were not all replaced by the operations manual. State teams as originally; planned. Therefore, 24-hour staffing was not demonstrated. list. The actual equipment present generally reflected the equipment Plastic glo,ves were unavailable for handling air samples in any of the county kits. (I.8.) In general,2 team members were adequately trained in using the gamma However, most of survey meters and air samplers at fixed locations. the teams were unfamiliar with the procedures for taking gamma (I.8.) Specifically, aalg measurements while traversing the plume. one county team took air samples, written SOPS were used to accomplish this task. Both teams took open window readings at 6" and 6' at locations as directed. However, one team was not familiar with procedures for taking gamma measurements while traversing the plume. Neither team had any difficulty locating these monitoring stations. the window while The county team took readings with the probe out driving from point to point, traversing the plume. The State team said they would stop at periodic intervals to take measurements while only the county team performed' traversing the plume. Therefore,

Further, only one county team knew they according to the procedures _.the windows and turn off the outside ventilation of the should shut The State and county teams each vehicle while traversing the plume.

More traver' sed the plu.me or monitored is it once during the exercise.. training is needed. Maps provided were generally excellent, but one team needed training in reading the map. Team members need mare training in using their own judgment and knowledge of plant conditions to locate and monitor the plume. team members were not kept informed of plant After deployment, the i (1.8.) conditions, emergency status or protective actions taken. j l Radioequipmehtwasgener'aliy~idiquate,although'some-minor-difficulties were noted. Communications protocol was good. Messages were identified as drill or exercise messages. i Te am membe rs had ad e qua t e dos a m, e,try 'ad'd*pddie,"do#, set:ryi wasere'adww Am m.i. m..,.n...,.p.og. t The State team did not hav~e regularly and reported to the dispatcher. whereas the county teams did. (I.8.) KI in its kit,

Near-Site Media Center The media center was effectively activated and fully staffed for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant exercise. The staff was enthusiastic and The new PIO SOP was a marked knowledgeable of job responsibilities.and does establish a system which could sup improvement Th'e operation was located at the Calhoun information program. this facility is Community College in the Fine Arts Building; and provides the resources necessary for an effective Communications were adequate to support the operation. excellent is the primary means for communicating to other facilities. operation. Telephone Hard-copy A two-way radio system was established as the back-up. Only one transmission equipment was available and worked effectively. This caused copy machine was available for both the State and TVA. nt one point delays in reproducing press releases for distribution.this machine did not work an during the exercise, copy machines be available for each We would suggest that organization. Information available to the media was provided by the TVA press kit. information However, this information does not provide State or localinformation would be helpful t about response operations. Local sure the media is aware of State and local capability and resources. This could be included in the TVA kit or provided in a separate kit. Coordination between the State,and TVA was effective. All press ^ All releases were properly coordinated according to procedures. coordination was accomplished in the 15 minute review period. failed to publicize Press releases were developed by the State butPress releases provided very information/ rumor control phone numbers. limited information to the public in the description of protective described in geographical terms, and actions. Sectors were not advised where they should.go. transients were not Four formal press briefings were conducted. State participation in roved as the exercise progressed. State sedia briefings impded representatives from the Goveynor's Office, participation inclu and Public Health Department. Local government Emergency Managementropresentatives.did not' par,t.icipate in the briefings and the not provide local information. More~information regarding~1ocal activities is needed if the joint information concept is to work effectively. @vgg.g g.s,g ~' We would suggest'the State take more initiative -This was effective. in the scheduling of media briefing activities. 1. l l

r 15-A rumor control system was established and phone numbers were Calls were logged and publicized during media briefings. However, information was not effectively oppropriately managed. collected from staff and integrated into press releases and We would suggest that prior to briefings and releases a briefings. check be made to include rucor control information. The emergency information responsibility of the media center was not i effective. (E.6.) The center was not aware of county activations or what messages were released through EBS. The State issued EBS releases which the counties were not aware of; therefore, conflicts and confusion resulted. State'EBS releases did not include the evacuation of J.10. or 1.10., and later this was established as a rumor and disregarded. The existing procedures allow for five points of EBS activation - four county and one State. The media center was aware of the sounding of sirens and was unclear about EBS not The prompt notification system is one of the most importatt sequence. tools for ensuring the protection.of the public health and safety. The use of the prompt notification system needs to be re-evaluated and clearly designed so that all parties understand their part to make the ~ system function effectively. Areas Recommended for Improvement: 1. The coordination of public information was weak in county participation. Improvements to the procedures are needed which will include county coordination and information. Although a rumor control program is in place with phones and I 2. staff, the system was not utilized in preparing media briefings ~ Procedures need to be improved to incorporate or press releases. ( appropriate information from rumor control into the public information activities. information to the media is needed regarding local and State 3. More response operations. Press releases.should be developed which include follow-up 4. contact phone numbers or rumor control numbers. ' t Risk Counties I Medical Services g.g ,g.,. .,j, .,y q.% .,..,-.., %...,s. y, The Emergency Medical Services (EMS) for Limestone County was ~ responsible for transporting the contaminated-injured individual to the hospital for treatment. The crew was familiar with the necessary procedures but had not practiced. Therefore, demonstrations were not satisfactory. Dosimetry was supposedly available but not i ssued to personnel. TLD's were issued to EMS pergonnel in 1981 and had not i been changed since that time. (L.1.) - ~ ~ - - - - - --..,,n.--,-,--,,..,,.,-nn.,---- ,-,.,,,..n

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_ _ _ _ _ _, The Athens-Limestone Hospital has only recently (within two or three The aonths) agreed to accept patients with low-level contamination. hospital has conducted no training to date. The necessary supplies were not available, i.e., radiation tape, signs, plastic bags, etc. Personnel were not able to demonstrate the activities in a satisfactory manner. The attending physician did not participate in the activities. (L.1.) Transportation / Evacuation The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) has erected signs in the designated areas that allow public access to the Elk River and Tennessee River within the ten mile EPZ of Browns Ferry Nuclear These signs are strategically located and contain adequate Plant. information to apprise the public of protective actions that will be taken if an aqcident should occur at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, a Nine public access areas were visited, all of these areas were posted with signs except a State controlled boat ramp located on U. S. Highway 72 at the Elk River. This boat ramp is across Highway 72 from-a State operated rest area, which also has a public boat ramp. Like most bodies of water, access to both rivers can be gained via non-public area. These accesses would probably be used main 1y by local ressidents. The TVA has done an excellent job insuring that users of public access areas are informed concerning protective actions that should be taken if the need arises. Superior Items: The quantity and quality of information signs that have been installed in public access areas. Areas Recommended for Improvement: 1. Put signs on the public boat ramp on US 72 at t,he Elk River, .2. Evacuation route signs need to be installed, especially.now that the warning signs r'fer t'o' evacuation route signs.- e La derdale County u m.ggg.gMfdn*60ihPEOC?procssded vsmoothlyy itwo'dnadequacies in.f. ww.... s this area were observed. In general, activation of the staff went very well. The first of the staff were notified when the Alert was informed by telephone of recched, key officials were kept . When the site area emergency was reached, the entire developments. staff was notified very rapidly. Most of the EOC staff was present before 11:30 a.m.. A large number of volunteers participated, 4 A second shift including the Red Cross, Salvation Army, and RACES. roster was shown to the observer, and some positions were double-staffed. However, the objectives associated with EOC staffing were only First, the person charged with directing the EOC, the partially met. Chairman of the County Commission, or his alternate, did notappear. all of the EOC staff left before the general (A.1.d.) Second, almost emergency had been reached. Had the plume approached Lauderdale there is no assurance that the public could have been protected in the absence of its designated leader and the main body of

County, the staff. (A.2.a.)

One area requiring a plan change also was identified. The plan than contains, on page II-A-5, a somewhat different organization chart The inconsistencies should the one used in the exercise by the staff. be resolved. familiar with some portions of Some of the staff generally were not ' the plan. Annual training, including plan co'ntents, could improve their preparedness. Although the Civil Defense Director is knowledgeable, strong, and committed, he did not supply the leadership necessary for this EOC to be managed well. Briefings were few. Only three short announcements the staff read the posted messages during the exercise suggesting thatwanted to know what was happening.The result from the State if they many of the. staff had no idea what was going on at the plant, yas that what others were doing to respond, or what was expected of them. Corrective action is.needed to assure that management is improved. (A.1.b. and A.2.b.) .In addition, message handling needs to be corrected. Messages were they are received promptly, but no system exists to assure that logged or distributed to the right staff promptly. facility that was flawed because it lacked This EOC is an excellent is spacious and equipped with bunks, showers, a several items. It and back-up electricity. However, it lacked an emergency (D.3.) The only displayed

kitchen, classification display and a status board.

information available to the staff was a bulletin board with the major messages from the State EOC attached and some EPZ maps, but those showing the evacuation routes, relocation centers, access control evident. l oints, and population by evacuation areas were not l *,p( J.10 a. as h e. w..,. o.,...a%,. 9,4.,, . s. > : m;,: v., + 4. y..; 4,;..?.. wm,y in almost all respects. The dedicated ~ Communications were excellentAdditional systems included 2-way radio, telephone worked very well. The broadcast booth allows telecopier, commercial phone, and RACES. live transmission from the EOC l However, according to Co,unty officials, the radio direct T.V. stations. l* I _,-~.--..--- ---

e l ! link to Rogersville was not working because a radio in Rogersville was destroyed last summer by lightning. This should be repaired to provide direct and reliable contact with the County Forward Command Post at the Sheriff's Office. Also, hard-copy of news releases and It would EBS messages was not provided to the State media centers. the State media center to receive a hard-copy of news releases assist so that they know what the County is telling the public. Although the new County PIO did sn excellent job in coordinating the this area was EBS releases with the State and activating the system, deficient because the public could not have been alerted promptly. The siren system is inadequate because some two hours is projected by the C.D. Director to be needed for the entire Lauderdale County EPZ to hear this mobile system. It is not practical to expect that a single automobile-mounted system can be driven over winding and hilly roads to alert the public promptly. (E.5.) ~. a demonstrated because the A capability to control access was not representative of the Sheriff's Office was not familiar with the traffic control points in the plan, did not consider the possibility when questioned by the observer, and left before the general emergency might have made access control necessary. (J,10.j.) Although the County school representative demonstrated excellent preparation to evacuate the single school in the EPZ in Lauderdale County, no pre.parations have been made for the mobility impaired. Evacuation of;the 950-student high school in Rogersville is well planned, with buses 'on school grounds, drivers available, and the reception preparations made for' coping with concerned parents at center to which the students would be sent. However, the County was not prepared with a list of the mobility impaired; the planned The procedure was to respond to telephone requests for assistence. scenario did not bring the plume dose to Lauderdale County. Superior Items: The EOC staff was activated rapidly and smoothly. 1. Many volunteer organizations participated enthusiastically. 2. The Civil Defense Director is knowledgeable and committed. 3. ,4. Communications were almost flawless. %.9.. M 5e 4he nPIOe and. County. SchooA,repr,esen,ta.t.iye,s_d,id,,jpe,i r j obs. particularly well.

19-Arcas Recommended for Improvement: The EOC staff, especially those who are outside the C.D. " core 1. group", need more training on the details of the plan. The radio located in the Sheriff's office in Rogersville should 2. be repaired so that communications do not have to be relayed vis radio in Sheriff's cruisers between the EOC and the forward command post. 3. The P10 should provide hard-copy releases to the media after clearing them with the State and TVA. ) Lauderdale County Outside Activities Lauderdale County activated a Reception Center at Brooks High School,, with personnel from State Pensions and Securities and Red Cross. Sixty-one high school' students were registered and monitored by a team composed of Florence Police officers. The facility has ample parking space and sufficient room for All registering, monitoring and decontamination of evacuees. personnel were provided with dosimetry and survey equipment as required. Security and t affic control were not demonstrated. in discussions with personnel it was revealed that previous training was minimal. Training in all phases of the Reception Center operation is needed for personnel to be proficient in their assigned duties. j All personnel had an excellent attitude and with proper training and instructions could perform in a manner that would provide protection for the population of the county residing in the EPZ. A siren vehicle is provided for notifying the public and was demonstrated in one sector covering a distance of about 12 miles The vehicle provided adequate warning for the requiring 25 minutes. l sector covered but would be unable to cover the entire area of the county in the EPZ. Plans identify that Sheriff's veh'icles would be used for the remai.ning sectors. Traffic control points were scheduled to be activated. However, they L were not established, and therefore, were not observed. 1, cryg*g.pg.g. g.9,.g...g.'shf(Ms ~ hM %f MWM.mipe, ~o y, in providing protection and with proper training could provide a capable emergency team. .7. ~.,--.--.--,--..-.-.,,..---.,.,,-,-,,-,-...,-._,,.y.-,.~...y.--

. Superior _ Items: 1. The attitude of participants was.encellent. Areas Recommended for Improvement: 1. Training of all personnel involved in field activities is a definite need. Lawrence County Activation and double-staffing of the Lawrence County EOC was effectively demonstrated using plahned procedures and real time The staff was generally well trained and knowledgeable of response. Effective emergency operations their respective responsibilities. and coordination with other locations was demonstrated. management However, more briefings involving input from other operations staff would enhance the staff performance. l The physical facilities of the Lawrence County EOC were excellent. Ample space, lighting, tables, and effective noise reduction provided an excellent working environment. Kitchen facilities, dormitories, All and showers were available to support extended operations. primary and secondary communications were demonstrated. Maps and charts were available; however, the posting of maps indicating evacuation routes, po?ulation density, and traffic control points is Althougi Isrge and clearly visible, the status board recommended. could be used more effectively by indicating meteorological c.onditions and protective actions. The Lawrence County EOC participated in public alerting and An EBS message was prepared, the content coordinated notification. with other locations, and a " test" message was broadcast following activation of the siren system. The message was concise in describing the emergency classification level and providing instructions using familiar local landmarks. The entire operation It is suggested, was accomplished within the prescribed' time period. however, that the c'ounty develop an "EBS message forp" to include Freparation, concurrence with other locations, and time of times of broadcast. Hard-copies should be transmitted to the media center. The RDO was responsible for monitoring personnel exposure. Adequate supplies of mid-and high-range dosimeters'and TLD's~were available 4c:,3,,And digtzjputqd,'6'r,The dosimeters were " zeroed" prior to distribution .<w.m..w and'gpe rs onaf ' rec the r conducted personnel and vehicular monitoring demonstrations at of the fundamentals were correctly demor.strated, EOC. Although most For example, emphasis additional periodic training is required. should be placed on the containment of contamination detected during Vehicle monitoring should be more thorough, personnel screening. l, emphasizing areas most likely to be conoaminated. l -~w w,,,.---_ ,,..-v_.- .,,.--,,,,,,,,,___..,w.,,,.-.--

^ . Superior Items: 1. Excellent physical facility. Excellent demonstation of primary and secondary communications. 2. 3. Excellent participation, attitude, and enthusiasm. 4. Strong demonstration of activation and double staffing. Areas Recommended for Improvement: Recommend more briefings including the use of visuals and the 1. involvement of operations staff. 2. Recommend the posting of population densities by sectors, evacuation routes, and traffic control points. i 3. Status board could be used to itemize PA's implemented. 4. P10's require more training on record keeping. Hard-copy releases should be transmitted to the media center. Fire department personnel require in-depth training on radiation 5. control and vehicle monitoring. . Lawrence? County Outside Activities Traffic control points in Lawrence County were staffed by personnel from the County Sher'iff's Department and the Hillsborough Police All personnel interviewed were aware of their Department. responsibilities, fully cognizant of evacuation routes, and knew the location of the Reception Center. All were in possession of dosimeters (issued at the Self-Protection Center), but none knew their purpose, how to read them, anything about maximum dose, etc. Activiation of the Lawrence County Coliseum as a Reception Center was Twenty-seven lith graders were accomplished in a p'rompt manner.' processed through monitoring, registration, and assignment to a " care conter" (shelter). Six Department of Pensions 4 Securities personnel Their cnd two Moulton Fire Department personnel were present.it was apparent they had prepared participation level was high, andMore monitor training is recommended, however. for this exercise. records of contaminated persons. %.gM:nitort...w, erg no,t, prgpared.to keep'eW. '"PerWWn'e1Mwere ensure 'about+% - .+ Decontamination was not*dEinsdstfa't s source of clothing for contaminated. victims and/or disposition of contaminated possessions. More practice in procedural details is recommended. Department of Pensions 4 Securities personnel were unaware of the need to notify the County E0C when the Reception Center became operational. They were also unaware of the need for a First Aid Station at the Center (as required in the Plan). No health i ~

' personnel were present and Department of Pensions 6 Securities personnel, who have overall responsibility, were unaware of department the need to notify the County EOC of the cbsence of required traffic control, or security personnel No law enforcement, personnel. (Item 7 of the Revised State 6 Local Objectives for BFN were on hand.

security, Exercise stated " Registration, monitoring, decontamination, communication, traffic control, and first aid will be demonstrated at all reception centers.")

It would be beneficial if all organizations charged with responsibilities were more familiar with the county plan so that involved understood what is expected of them as well as For example, a written agreement is needed between Department everyone others. of Pensions 6 Securities and the American Red Cross. Areas Recommended for Improvement: ~.. of understanding be developed 1. Recommend a written statemen.tof Pensions 6 Securities and the American between the Department Red Cross (specifically setting forth what DPS expects from Red Cross, and what Red Cross agrees to provide in an emergency at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant). Additional monitor training is needed. 2. More practice in procedural details is needed, i.e., reporting 3. following the flow pattern from the Reception Center to the EOC, through the center ~to insure separation of contaminated from non-contaminated. Familiarization with the plan by all organizations charged with 4. responsibilitics is necessary. Reception Center staffing on future exercises should be fully 5. demonstrated. Limestone County disaster experiences, both real and simulated, in It is obvious that Limestone County have facilitated the development of a skilled and emergency response structure under the director and his deputy. Even though staff at the EOC, when it is operational, is made officient up largely of persons working in a voluntary capacity (i.e., either

- county /citynemployees. st af fing.. pps,i.t.1,on4 ey'ond. their normal delegated b

duties, or auxiliary personnel interrupting t'hFif fegu1 Arlebs eto ' W w e..'- a f l

- serve their fellow citizens in an emergency), they are a cohesive unit that responds well to situations as they evolve. All personnel placed on stand-by at both Alert and Site Area Emergency declarations indicated by the county plan reported to the EOC within the time frameStaff displayed, in general, a high degre ond SOPS. capability with respect to their area of primary responsibility, although a few shortcomings were noted by the evaluator, as discussed below. Throughout the exercise, management (direction and control) at The Director was the county level was clear, concise, and effective. overbearing in that he knew he could trust staff to carry out their responsibilities in each specific situation. Frequent staff not briefings were held. Both The Limestone County EOC facility is a superior physical plant. layout and equipment in the facility (above-and below-ground) should be adequate to meet all county needs in the event of an extended requirement for emergency response. Further, neither internal nor e external communications at the EOC should ever pose a problem (with respect to equipment) due to the excellent quality of both primary and back-up systems. Message preparation and dissemination of EBS and news media releases were promptly and smoothly handled by the PIO. Messages were written (and none, with the exception of the General Emergency declaration, At the time of siren pre-scripted) with the specific events in mind. and tone alert activation (the first evacuation order), there was no explicit coordination with other counties as to the time of activation. However, alert and notification did meet the 15-minute criterion. Although nine EBS messages and amendments were communicated to the.EBS net, EBS was activated only in the one instance of coordination with the sirens. One of three designated the EBS test message on the air immediately after stations put cessation of the siren alert. The other two stations followed after about five minutes while confirming with the PIO that they were not actually to transmit the rest of the prepared exercise message. Due to the, frequent update and notification of EBS by the PIO, the public would have been kept well informed about developments related to the However, according to the EM Director, there is no formal i scenario. in a real EBS agreement in place whereby the stations will transmit, caergency, all messages from the EOC as they are received. l l Although the county performed all appropriate protective act' ions identified in the plan and the SOPS in a timely and-efficient manner, is not known just how long a full evacuation (including relocation It ) ld t j '"CO %dbility<impairedeand. institutlona,lize.d.,pergons,,yoy, a e. 2 v--- ,-w-----,- in need of corrective action in the area of I The coun y is still County personnel radiological exposure control for emergency workers. sufficiently trained to function on their own to protect themselves from potential harmful exposure if they are needed in the are not Although the State Health Officer is the EPZ for an extended period. official advisor on exposure control, this communication link may not Additional local personnel trained in be available at all times. exposure control is necessary. media relations nor recovery / reentry procedures were Neither direct exercised at the Limestone County EOC. the Limestone County EOC exhibited the capability tothe In summary,and follow up on all appropriate measures to protect public in a thorough and efficient manner consistent with established implement However, some objectives of the scenario which should procedures. fully tested both county resources and State / county coordinationIn th have on protective actions.were not fully met. communications with State radio case during this exercise, the county did not demonstrate that it its emergency workers in the could, on its own, adequately protect field. Superior Items: Coordination of emergency response measures in the EOC. 1. 2. Communications equipment and physical plant. Areas Recommended for Improvement: Messages describing shelter and/or evacuation areas transmitted over to EBS should use familiar landmarks to describe the limits 1. of such areas (roads, junctions, rail lines, topographical features, waterways, structures, etc.) rather than relying on a specification of distance and direction in relation to the Browns (Item E.6.) Ferry Nuclear Plant. Limestone County Outside Activities at the.EOC and in the Limestone County law enforcement personnelfield, coordinated an'd ' e perimeter (at Site Area Emergency) and 5-mile perimeter (Gene wcre._fgmili,ar wi @.the anticipated directions of evacuation traffic Emergency). 4.u w .s. g...u,, and wi th accc'iis 'rou't'eTWb'e' rontro14 ed i ev s-~ ,-.m..s, i

. _ _ _ - County Pensions 6 Security Department (PSD) and American Red Cross The reception (ARC) volunteers were dedicated and knowledgeable. Registration center was established promptly and with adequate staff. cctivities were fully demonstrated. Procedures for isolating and decontaminating individuals were effective. However, staff for inadequate in number. 'The one monitor monitoring evacuees were (J.12.) was inadequately trained in monitoring procedures. present the same East Limestone High School location was Congregate care at demonstrated by presentation of the ARC " Disaster Plans and Resources" Resources for long-term feeding and housing of for that location. evacuees as identified in the ARC plan seem appropriate for several hundred individuals, rather than the 3000+ capacity listed in the The State, county and ARC should re-evaluate capacities county plan. for congregate care centers and establish consistent and realistic These resources should then be estimates of available resources. correctly identified in the plan. Radiological exposure control is'an area in which additional training The county should develop capability to control exposure is required. Training is required in the use of dosimetry, to emergency workers. (K.3.b.) EOC staff including reporting and recording of doses. require training in exposure limits for emergency workers, and inthe reception Monitors at procedures for authorizing excess exposure. center and personnel monitorin and in identifying the need for decontamination. aonitoring equipment l (K.S.a.) Superior Items: The law enforcement personnel established complete access control 1. at the 2-mile and 5-mile radii. PSD and ARC personnel established relocation centers in an 2. effective and timely manner. . Areas Recommended for Improvement: and county and ARC should develop consi, stent The State, realistic estimates of resources available for long-term care at 1. congregatecarecenters,includingcenterc,apacitiesjorfeeding and housing. Morgan County -ne..e +Ample space and a good work e,nvirotament' a're pie'se11t Min 'the< Morgenf..gmeer-r.yoye:. 4..m. u and sustain a radiological emergency response at County EOC to direct ~ The director operates with two full-time Browns Ferry' Nuclear Plant. The individuals did not provide assistants and a back-up director.the day of the exercise but definitely operations managementin coordinating the various agencies and their response, direct had a role l l I

. Over 47 individuals representing 15 agencies responded following The activation was prompted due to a message received cctivation. stating " contamination was suspect," this occurred before Site Area Energency. Message directives were prepared for the major industrial concerns of the county, advising them of the status of the plant. This was an excellent procedure. Incoming messages were logged, photocopied, distributed and posted. This was a definite improvement from the previous exercise. The use of the dedicated open line followed by a hard-copy message worked well. critical, do require corrective The following areas, while not 1) The PNS/EBS system currently in place seems to allow for cction: The five counties to generate messages without proper coordination. or six EBS county releases were coordinated with the liaison assigned This information did not appear to reach the, Other county releases over EBS never reached Morga,n, at the media center. other counties. Morgan County was unaware of the three State-generated EBS County. activations. The siren activation occurred after the EBS cnnouncement. No EBS announcement followed the siren activation. (E.6.) Hard copy could have been sent to all entities involved to effect coordination. 2) The evacuation of schools did not appear to follow a prescribed SOP. This may currently be under development; however, no messages were originated stating that the schools should ovacuate af ter " contamination was suspect." Procedures are needed to ensure that school children's parents living outside the 10-mile EPZ, but whose children attend schools inside the 10-mile EPZ, have written instructions including when evacuation will occur and where children will be relocated. Also, exercise messages said nothing about the The same procedure is needed for the evacuation or pick-up points. County schools were not mentioned or discussed during county schools. the exercise. No messages were generated directing county school evacuation. (J.10.c.) Superibr Items: 1. EOC facility. l Areas Recommended for Improvement: i' l '. Briefings are needed that will allow for-all agencies to openly exchange information. O' , [. (

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(, 4, [ t t s ( ' l

27-Charts, maps and status boards need to be utilized and explained 2. periodically to the staff. Many agency representatives were unfamiliar with radiological terms. The emergency classification should be posted in full view. Morgan County Outside Activities activate the emergency worker self-protection Morgan County did not station to survey and. decontaminate emergency workers, vehicles and thereby not demonstrating the objective to continuously equipment,d control exposure for workers. In addition, EOC personnel conttor an the facility would be located in a building across the said that from the Morgan County Courthouse while the plan states the street The plan should facility is in the Morgan County Courthouse basement. be revised to reflect this change. (K.5.b.) Traffic and access control was wel'1 demonstrated at the one traffig, The officer had complete knowledge of the correct control point. cvacuation route and the location of the reception center designated He had radio communication with the Morgan County EOC in the plan. and could have communicated with other personnel at other control points if they had been activated. the traffic control ?oint had a mid-range and 1 The emergency worker at However, he had no knowledge of a high-range dosimeter and a TLD. The emergency dosimetry, KI, or. procedures for decontamination.to the EOC when he completed his tra worker did know to report .cccess control duties.- The procedures, as described by the EOC have the state accident assessment team determine the director doseage In an area and decide when emergency workers in that area should be called back based on the team's readings. However, it i s recommended that emergency workers receive training in reading and recording dosimetry measurements, KI and decontamination procedures. This would preclude the need for relying only on state accident teams for determining when emergency workers should be assessment called in. Priceville School serves as both a reception center and a congregate The' center was staffed by the Pension and Securities care center. Department which coordinates all of the shelter activities, thelaw enforcement which .American Red Cross (including a nurse),hich provides evacuee security, the State Health Department w monitoring and decontamination and Civil Defense RACES volunteers for j' The staff were competent in background and training, communications. in additional personnel resources would be brought W w.and Li pdig.a,,t.ed, t hy, I6 t',"tief'06rs%fd Ft'o4fpec t@ly vabout440.;...r:m.wmw, as necessary'."'Hbwe evacuees.. l 1 m e s-- me----- ,-,e,,.-.,,-w-,-,m. -,--n.----,-,-,-,,,,--.,.,----,--en-,-v.--,--,----,--m---,--------.--w ,,-.-,-------------,-,w

l Registration and monitoring of evacuees was accomplished efficiently and competently. Each evacuee was monitored using a CDV-700. If an to be evacuee was found to be contaminated, they would be sent decontaminated in the shower facilities, thereby separating contaminated from non-contaminated persons, an area identified as suggested for improvement in the 1983 exercise. However, the staff did not know what to do with contaminated clothing. (EOC staff said that the State Health Department staff at the center knew the the shelter staff procedures for handling contaminated materials but did not ask him and this was not observed). While the congregate care facility was not activated, discussions with staff indicated a capability to house people at the Priceville School and open additional shelters as required. Staff indicated they have or can get facilities and supplies, including food. Communications were demonstrated by the RACES operators. A nurse was on-site and a ~ information officer would be on-site, if needed. The stafE.. e public said 2,000 people could be accommodated in the shelter; the plan states 1,355. This should be clarified.The staff said they would This handle 7,500 people in an evacuation; the plan states 5,644. also should be clarified. Superior items: Registration and monitoring of evacuees at the Priceville 1. relocation cent'er were accomplished efficiently and capably. Staff at the center were competent and knowledgeable. Areas Recommended for Improvement: 1. EOC staff said that the self-protective station for emergency from workers would be located in a building across the street the Morgan County Court House while the plan states it is in the Morgan County Court House. The plan should be revised to reflect this change. Emergency workers involved in traffic and access control should 2. be trained in reading and recording dosimetry measurements, KI and decontamination procedures. The staff said 2,000 people co61d be accommodated in th'e 3. Priceville Shelter; the plan states 1,355. This should'be-clarified. 4. .vThe.Pricevl.4e: relocat(pn staf f.said they would handle 7,500 peopic in"an evacua tion; thellEis's tatbs '5 f 6440'"This"shet:1-d -be~$ awn .. <. e...,. 3 clarified. Procedures for disposing of contaminated clothing should b'e 5. explained to all relocation center staff.

, Host County Madison County 4 and The EOC Director was promptly notified by the State of the Alert the EOC was staffed by two emergency management personne.1 (8:18 a.m.). At both the Alert and Site Area Emergency, all required cunicipal and county staff were alerted and placed on standby. required to report to th.e EOC until a General Emergency, Although not the County Sheriff and Huntsville police liaisons manned the EOC atThe police office the Site Area Emergency declaration. they need sufficient.. time to plan for the management of evacuation traffic and to organize the available staff and equipment that may be They provided an excellent demonstration of needed in the field. traffic control'along the evacuation routes and at the reception and care centers. =. e The EOC was effectively managed by the director designated in the The available plan and SOPS were utilized and all messages . plan. logged and distributed. Message flow was well coordinated. The EOC director interacted with the participating staff and participants There was a demonstrated excellent knowledge of their assignments. i good demonstration of this county's emergency response capabilities. The Madison County EOC is located in the basement of the Huntsville The facility is adequate to support emergency City Hall Building.All required maps and displays were posted or operations. information was promptly posted on the event available. Significant board. The primary communication systens in the EOC is the State Radio Network with back-up from the TVA dedicated line. Supplemental The EOC communications room bac'k-up is available with the telecopier. has additional radios and dedicated lines available for emergency use. Madison County participated in a limited demonstration of traffic and access control. Squads from the County Sheriff were placed on l j the Alert and 11 units were dispatched at Site Area stand-by at During the, evacuation, 18 Emergency along the evacuation routes. units from the county and 3 from the city were involved in managing i 'the evacuation traffic and directing. individuals to the desi'gnatedThe capab reception and care centers. was excellent. N ~ sExposur.e. control.procedurep.a,r,e,nok, "r.eguired to be implemented by the ~^***"^'"*FM ep wmp y host county. Superior Items: l program is in place for the management of evacuation An excellent 1. traffic for both the county.and City of Huntsville. I

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,. -., -. - -. - - - _ -, - - - - - - - - =. - - - - -, Madison County Outside Activities Since Madison County is a host county for evacuees from portions of occur until the Limestone and Morgan counties, activities did notCounty and city police were notified Gcneral Emergency was declared. stage and called into the EOC when the Site' A of the Alert The county police set up traffic control Energency was declared.the county line on the two major highways entering the points at on alert for the traffic The Huntsville police were put the reception and congregate care centers would county. control in the event be activated. the same time the General Emergency was declared, Madison County The-county and city police At was informed of a spontaneous evacuation. The county added units at coordinated efforts for traffic control. points from the county line to the city limits at 3-5 mileThe Huntsville po intervals. A city police officer was also stationed at ot the reception center. the entrance to the reception center. Throughout the simulation, SOPS were followed and knowledge of traffic and access control thoroughly demonstrated. the General Emergency was declared, the Director of After a concise As soon as Pensions and Securities was called into the EOC. briefing by the EOC Direc' tor, the decision was made to open the reception center and Red Cross.was notified to open the congregate care fa,cility. A deputy director was dispatched to the registration center, located with registration forms, logs and two at the old Huntsville airport,communications with the EOC was portable radios. Constant the reception center, the Pensions and demonstrated. Upon arrival at Securities Department staff was briefed on the use of the radio and Activation and staffing were accomplished maintenance of the logs. effectively according to the SOPS within 35 minutes of the General Emergency notification and within 20 minutes of the decision to open the centers. the registration center were well-trained and The personnel at Two evacuees were registered, the knowledgeable of t.he SOPS. Radiological Registration and Evacuation Records were filled out . efficiently and thoroughly. ., w. u.~: 4 >...q.. e.. ;.,n. e, n.:.~.... u. v., w. :. s > > e n m a n n.~ m.s n. v.s.. n n o. m u >. w...v.. r +. s w s. w. < 2.... e. a f ,_r ..,_,,_e .._,._.__.mm. ,,,___,___-.,,_-_,,.m -,_o county for evacuees from Although Madison County is designated a host outside of the 10-EP2, facilities are available for monitoring andIf decontamination. hed not been monitored, he would be taken to a decontaminationTh l handling area. The would be monitored and decontamination performed, if necessa a of the exercise and demonstrated exceptional registration and monitoring activities. taken to the mass After evacuees were registered, they were transportation waiting area' to be bused to the congregate care Everyone is bused to the facility operated by the Red Cross, the reception If a person had left his personal vehicle at facility. conter, he could return on the shuttle to get the vehicle. The congregate care facility observed was in the armory on Johnson.. The facility is adequate.to accommodate approximately 800 of all reception and care facilities is attached to Road. The Red A list the SOPS along with the number of people they could handle. people. only in the congregate care Cross is experienced and knowledgeable notalso able to provide help in unusual s procedures, but For example, agreements are in effect an emergency shelter operation. ' Agreements have with local veterinarians to provide animal shelter.been made with The Rapid Responder Cardiac the hospital for emergency treatment.The Red Cross is aware of local health In .j Care Unit is also available. ordinances which they follow when setting up the facility.odd t a fire inspection of the facility. contacted by the EOC to conduct In summary, all field activity objectives were demonstrated instances went beyond. offectively and in several Superior Items: people evacuating The county police office'r was concerned aboutand began county access control 1. when the news releases were sentthe Site Area Emergency rather than at Emergency. required to have decontamination and w yhile Madison County is not i< and could be performed 2. monitoring facilities, they do exist l efficiently if necessary.

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~ l i 111.

SUMMARY

LISTING OF INADEQUACIES Areas Requiring Corrective Action Comments / Corrective Actions ~ Activities NUREG ltem E.6 - Notification The use of the EBS system was not mergency uroadcast Methods and Pro-effectively demonstrated. The cur-Systes cedures rent procedures are vague, con-fusing and appear ineffective. In-EBS) structions were being given to the public by four risk counties and ehe * . State without coordination or aware-ness of messages aired. It is recommended that procedures be reviewed and corrections made to ensure coordinated, accurate and timely information is transmitted to the public. Staff should be trained and new procedures demon-strated in a remedial drill. 71cid I.8 - Accident The teams (county and State) were not, familiar with the proper procedures fonitor-Assessment for measuring the plume while traver-ing Teams sing it in a vehicle. Training on the use of procedures for minimizing potential radiation inside the vehicle and properly making measure-ments wh.ile-traversing the plume is recommended. 4 9 fge = .,e

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__ Comments / Corrective Actions ~ Activities NUREG Item I.8. - Accident Teams (county and State) should continue to be thoroughly briefed Assessment concerning plant conditions and radiological exposure control while in the field. The county teams did not have plastic Accident I.8. These should be available gloves. Assessment for handling air and ingestion path-way samples.' The State teams did not have K1 in their kits. KI should be provided to field team members giving them the option of taking it under conditions which might warrant. This was inconsistent with county a teams which had KI. Medical L.1.'- Medical and A minimum of ten hours of carefully Public Health Sup-programmed instruction is necessary to initially train the personnel to port and Services demonstrate proficiency. The train-ing should lead to a drill including transportation and hospital treat-4 ments of a contaminated injury. Lauderdale A.1.b. 6 A.2.b. - Staf f briefings were essentially;non-County Assignment of existent. The EOC Director needs Responsibility training. Message handling was in-efficient. The system needs to be re-evaluated. The designated EOC Director (the I A.I.d. - Assignment at of Responsibility County Chairman) was not present the exercise. He should demonstrate his capability at a future exercise. Most of the EOC, staff left the EOC A.2.a. - Assignment before the General Emergency. They of' Responsibility should. demonstrate'their ability t~o handle an entire exercise in'the ' future. The organization chart in - the plan is not the same as what the

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.cor r ec t, i n f o r.m.a t.l on....,,.,,, m.,. w.,.,p. ..,,,+..~. The emergency classification was Classification never posted. No usable status board D.3. - Emergency Information boards need was present. System to te available and posted in each work area. 1 i.

' Comments /Ctrrective Actions .ctivities NUREG Item 1he prompt' ate'rting system cannot E.5. - Notification the 15-minute notification meet Methods 6 Procedures standard according to the exercise Thorough reconsidera-participants. tion of the design of this system is needed. J.10.a. - Protective Proper maps were not present or posted. These support materials are

Response

needed in the EOC. Controlled access to a contaminated Protective J.10.j. area was not demonstrated. EOC staff needs to be thoroughly trained

Response

and ac' cess control demonstrated in a future exercise. The monitor at the reception center Protective was poorly trained in radiological Licestone J.12. County

Response

monitoring procedures. County or volunteer staff-should be trained in monitoring and decontamination procedures. Improve the instructions provided K.3.b. - to workers on proper use of self-Radiological reading dosimeters, including howi Exposure often to read them and at what level the RDO should be notified. The monitor at the Self-Protection K.5.a. - Station was inadequately trained in Radiological personnel monitoring and in deter-Exposure mining the.need for decontamination. Control Additional training for staff should be provided. i 'm .c

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4 Comments / Corrective Actions activities NUREG ltem E.6. - Notification A better system to promote coordina- ' Morgan 'Ocunty Methods 6 Procedures tion among media center, State and all four counties is needed. The use of hard copy te transmit announce-ments for coordination could be im-4 plemented. Protective lhe evacuation of schools was not ef-J.10.c. fectively followed through. No

Response

messages evacuating the schools oc-curred. The anticipated system needs to be put in writing. Brochures stating at what point evacuation will occur and where the children will he, relocated is needed. K.5.b. - The county did not fully activate the Radiological Self-Protection Station for emergency workers and therefore did not fully i Exposure demonstrate the ability to continu-Control -ously monitor and control exposure for workers. The proposed action was l to activate the Self-Protection l ~ This capability was no,t Station. established through demonstration. i.- l e 5 e e n a e , b, ' =

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IV. APPENDICES A. Evaluator List and Assignments B. Exercise Objectives C. Exercise Scenario . e t 1 F e t g .MN<..a,.(< e..er

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.6 ).9 p,. 3?. : ki s. ? nf, b, V. 7 6f. i,u.,su 4 gk 1.,.. 'y'.a ? E h IV APPENDICES A. Evaluator List and Assignments FEDERAL _ EVALUATOR ASSIGNMENTS BROWN 5 FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT EXERCISE November 13, 1985 CHIEF OF EVALUATORS AND RAC CHAIRMAN Glenn Woodard-(FEMA) STATE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER (MONTGOliERY) Tom Hawkins (FEMA) STATE CENTRAL EOC (DECATUR) John Heard (FEMA) Dot Nevitt (USDA) Jere Dumas (DOE) Bob Trojanowski (NRC) RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH LABORATORY (DECATUR) Ray Boyett (FEMA) NEAR SITE MEDIA CENTER - CALHOUN COLLEGE (DECATUR) Cheryl Stovall (FEMA) FIELD MONITORING TEAMS Don Hulet (FEMA) Jim Opelka (FEMA) Bill Knoerzer (FEMA) TRANSPORTATION / MOBILE Al Hall (DOT) MOBILE RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH / MEDICAL SERVICES Brad Eichorst (HHS/FDA) LAUDERDALE COUNTY (FLORENCE) Ed Tanzman (FEMA) Russ Yarbrough (FEMA) LAWRENCE COUNTY -(MOULTON) Jim Levenson (FEMA) Viirginia. Baker (FEMA) At.o. x t g.+ 4,.:r. e w ;,,<t:,u; ac c.dv. LY MESTONE 3GOUuTXs,( ATHENS Le; tie.n,rd s* <de C 4 e.w. *., WW.e Chris Saricks (FEMA) l^,*' ,'Yehiida Kl'ein.,(FEMA) ' l,' MORGAN COUNTY (DECATUR) Brad Loar (FEMA) Phyllis Becherman (FEMA) I MADISON COUNTY (HUNTSVILLE) Sue Ann Curtis (FEMA) Dec'Demmitt (FEMA)

IV APPENDICES B. Exercise Objectives REVISED STATE r. LOCAL OBJECTIVES FOR BFN EXERCISE The following objectives will be tested or demonstrated during the'1985 (Fy 86) Browns Ferry NPP exercise: Decisi>n making capabilities of the local executive branch of each of the four This will include expenditure of funds 1. risk counties will be demonstrated. for evacuation and sheltering, overtime compensation if appilcable and equip-ment acquisitloa if appilcable. Alert and notification of emergency response agencies will be demonstrated. This will include staffing of the local and State Emergency Operations Centers 2. (EOCs) and the Central Emergency Operations Center (CEOC).. Capability to,, provide 2's-hour staffing will be demonstrated for State by a shift change. The capability to maintain 24-hour staffing at the local level will be simulated with a staffing roster of relief personnel. This will Activation of the Prompt Notification System will be demonstrated. include the dissemination of information via the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) 3 The use and ef fectiveness of the various communication systems will be demon-strated between the utility and the State government and local agencies and 4. This will include telephone, dedicated between various agencies of the State. / circuits, and the State UHF system. 7 The ability of the local Emergency Management Agencies to generate and dis-This will include 5 seminate emergency public information will be demonstrated. Emergency Public coordination with adjoining counties and with the State EMA. Information releases from the Media Center will be simulated. The operation of the Near Site Media Center will demonstrate the coordinated effort of the State and utility to provide the media with accurate and timely 6. The local P10 personnel will be Invited to participate in all However, because the local resources do not normally information. Media Center activities. allow for adequate numbers of Pl0 personnel, the State gill provide personnel er the counties. All press at the Near Site Media Center to act as IIalson b{% WL24. MA will be prepared in the CE,0C. gle , AR,. W WY%% elItlwc.-- The capability of the host county (Madison co.) to respond to a large influx This will 7 of people due to a spontaneous evacuation will be demonstrated. NNt: o.v.,%.W In"additltirFtb dehe demoresefsted ab.U.}tgA cA ),s(og gjgognges (Lauderdale,4* f l Lawrence, Limestone and Morgan) to activate reception and care facTfTtG%i .. Registration, monitoring,i.decontaminatlon, security, communication.. traffic., control and first aid will be%mo'ns'trated at all reception' centers. . a.. Access and traffic control for the evacuated areas in the risk counties w 8. be demonstrated as appropriate. A roedical drill will be conducted as a part of this exercise to demonstrate the ability of the personnel at Athens / Limestone Hospital to treat a patient l 9 with an injury who has been exposed to the plume and is possibly contaminated.

Browns feriy Objectives Pcge 2 The capability to perform accident assessment and the prote 10. release information and/or plant conditions will be demonstrated. The capability to verify offsite predicted doses by radiological field moni-11. toring will be demonstrated. The capability-to perform laboratory analysis will be demonstrated. 12. f The ability to exchange technical information and data will be demonstrated. 13 This will include Exposure control for emergency workers will be demonstrated. Also the ability 14. personal dosimetry, record keeping and Kl distribution.to continuou They will State personnel will be prepositioned in the local area of the CEOC. l.oeel

not respond to the CEOC until the designated time of " Site Area Emergency".

tmergency response personnel will be called to respond at the time designated in the local 50P. At the present time, there is no intent to demonstrate protective actions involving No off-site fire demonstration mobility - Impaired or schools within the plume EPZ. is planned. S g V 4 . g* v (d Pe"N /et* ';4 e pal

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IV APPENDICES f C. Exercise Scenario SCENARIO NARRATIVE - All times are Central Standard Time At approximately 0815, the AEHA Duty Officer should receive a call from R:diological Health of the declaration by TVA of " Alert" at the Browns Ferry NPP. The counties affected by this declaration (Lauderdale, Lawrence, Limestone, Madison and Morgan) will then be notified by the Duty 0,fficer. The State EOC will then be staffed at the minimum level as outlined in the 50P. County EOCs should also be staffed at levels outilned in their respective SOPS. RCA in Montgomery will activate. At 0930 local Environmental Monitoring teams dispatched. ' The Emergency Action Level will escalate to " Site Area Emergency" at approxi-mately 1015 This will result in the full staffing of the State EOC and will ccuse the simulated activation and dispatch of the CEOC team (These personnel will b2 prepositioned in Morgan County and will arrive at the CEOC in the Decatur/ Morgan County EOC at approximately 1000). The CEOC team will monitor activitieT*

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'and get an update briefing by the State EOC Director of Operations, and act vate the CEOC at approximately 1100. During this interim period, control will remain at the State EOC. The Near Site Media Center will not activate until 1100 conse-quently all State PIO activities will remain at the State EOC. At approximately Also at this 1100, all control and P10 activities will be transferred to the CEOC. time the Pl0 team will be arriving at the Hear Site Media Center. At 1000 the SRMAC shift will arrive in Decatur and will prepare to activate. At approximately 1100, one of the Field Monitoring Teams will discover a farmer who has been injured by contaminated debris from the plant. At 1200 the RCA S, tate laboratory capability will be established in Decatur, and at approximately 1230., the State Environmental ~ ~. Monitoring Teams will be brlefed and dispatched from Decatur. At 1300 the Emergency Action Level will be upgraded to " General Emergency". Notification will be received from the SRMAC. The CEOC team will be advised of any protective actions determined by the RCA team in Decatur. Registration Centers should be preparing to open at this time, they will notify their respective EOCs when they are operational. After the local personnel and teams have demonstrated th'e capability of res-ponding and fulfilling their assigned tasks and responsibilities, they will be released to return to their normal activities. They will remain available for l immediate recall. Exercise activitles wil'1 terminate at appro'ximately'1530.

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I 1 SEQUENCE OF EMA EVENTS FOR BROWNS FERRY NPP EXERCISE 0800 first call goes out from the plant - declaration of " Alert". 0815 Counties notified of " Alert" condition at Browns Ferry NPP. 0830 State EOC should be staffed at minimum level's as required by SOP. 0845 Local EOCs should be staffed at minimum levels as required by local SOPS. 0845 EOC Staff should be briefed and first press release should be in preparation for release. Also, emergency response agencies should be notified as appropriate. State EOC should be notified of any change of plant status by RCA. Counties 0900 should be contacted and advised of plant status. 0915 First press inquires should be coming in to State EOC and Cour.ty EOCs. 0930 Press inquires continue to come in to the State EOC and County EOCs. RCA notified by TVA of declaration of " Site Area Emergency." - RCA arrives 1000 at SRMAC and AEHA arrives at CEOC. 1005 State EOC notified by RCA of'" Site Area Emergency". 1015 Counties notified of " Site Area Emergency".' I State EOC should be fully staffed and emergency response agencies briefed. 1030 Also counties should be at staffing levels required by SOPS. 1030' PIO activities continue from State EOC. - Possibly another press release. Sometime during this period the counties will probably activate EBS to 1030 put out an advisory to residents. 1045 Media requests for information - calls con e in f rom private citizens and politicians. (Both State EOC & County EOC). CEOC in Decatur activated - Control for operations. switches from State 1100

r EOC to CEOC 1100' Near Site Media Center is activated.

P10 functions switch from State phe w-t-1GE0Ci to$ecatucM.,Coor.dj nate)w,iJh cogat (es gg;g.yu g 7 . p,11.15. ..P.ress. ; releases gen,erated f rom CEOC to Near Site Media Center. w.- 1130 inquiries to Rumor Control At Media Center. 1130 Requests for informetion called into th,e CEOC and Ccunty EOCs. 1145 Concerned citizens place several calls for information at the county level.

5EdVENCEOFEVENTS Pcge 2 Pl0 activities at Media Center and Counties continue. 1200 1200 Second shif ts for CEOC arrives. Calls continue to come in from concerned citizens and politicians. D 30-1300 " General Emergency" notification from RCA. 1300 Counties notified of upgrade in Emergency Action Level. 1315 Activation of Prompt Notification System by counties followed by EBS 1315 notification. 1315 Protective actions ordered. Counties activate the Registration Centers and prepare to receive evacuees. . e 1330 1400 Evacuees processed through Registration Centers. Media Center Activity - Requests for information through Rumor Control - 11400-1530 Requests for information at CEOC and County EOCs. 1530 Terminate exercise. 4

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SEQUENCE OF RCA MAJOR EVENTS FOR BROWNS FERRY NPP EXERCISE " Alert" notifications to appropriate. emergency response agencies. 0800 Activation of the Montgomery RCA Operations. 0800 Local Environ.nental Monitoring Teams dispatched. 0930 " Site Area Emergency" notifications to appropriate emergency response 1000 agencies. 1000 First SRMAC shift arrives in Decatur. Low level RAD waste is found by monitoring team in tornado debris in 1100 Limestone County. Injured farmer is found acong debris. =. e State laboratory capability is established in Decatur. 1200 State Environmental Monitoring Teams briefed and dispatched from Decatur. 1230 1300 " General Emergency" notification. ~. 1400 Air sample cartridges eva)uated by State laboratory. 1400 Second SRMAC shift arrives in Decatur. I -$ Terminate Plume Exposure portion of' exercise. 1530 4 ~ s-L%.er%ren.wi-.v.jM.y,A y ;env.p.w30.sve d.ydmp ;w.vv.sa.np e.a.n ;;u ?;e;.es1 v.a.,9?,:....e;.;,<.ssy.si >..,.,,..kw,..,..... .~.:.,.~. ....n .c... .,.,...c. .c...,. ,..m. Ir l

6-Initial Conditions: Unit 1: Head off, fuel in vessel Unit 2: No fuel in vessel Unit 3: 100% power Site under Dry storage cask being positioned into unit 2 spent fuel pool. tornado watch Sequence: Tornado strikes the plant, causes the following damage: T=0 0800 CST

1) Radwaste Building exhaust

2) Reactor building panel blown off

3) Debris 'causes damage to two radiation monitors on refueling floor which isolates primary ventilation system

4) Crane operator is injured

5) Loss of 500 kV lines Unit 3 scrams (normal shutdown using 161'.kV offsite power)

DGs start due to momentary loss of power, but do not load. DG 3EA fails to start. Unit 3 condensate pumps trip, condensate booster pamps and feedwater pumps trip on Unit 3 RPCI fails to start, RCIC does start and low NPSH. comes up to rated flow Standby Gas Treatment System starts declared based on tornado striking plant ALERT Tornado warning lifted. Unit 3 RCIC restored level, DGs secured. Efforts T=1 hr throttled to maintain water level. are underway to restore the unit 3 condenser as a heat 0900 CST sink Fire.was-reporte.d in Service Building (EL 580) T=1'hr 15 min 0915 CST Refuel Zone (RFZ) crane determined to be inoperable tappagg,,jpg939,; gigi. cask suspended in refueling T=1 Jr 30 min Unit ' 3 condenser res t'8rFd',"hSTVs'.tbotenetre usir.tsy;;:tas.;; 4 '^v 4. w...-w.p z,,gg3 g,.05T'% 7*.wY due.g 4c pit. are underway to reestablish feedwater ~- .r..+,. t c. s :.,,..., t. N 4 --.4 ..o Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGTS) determined to be ' Need to monitor T=2 hrs inadequate to pull vacuum in RFZ. Unit 3 releases (if any) from the RTZ is recognized. 1000 CST feedwater flow reestablished, starting to depressurizefire Recirculation pumps restarted; using the condenser. on elevation 580 is extinguished.

, SITE AREA EMERGENCY declared based on major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public Repair crews start on crane and building panels Loss of sump drain seal in radwaste building results in T=2.5 hrs release of 500 ci of noble gases to the environment. 1030 CST Release duration is 5 minutes and results in a dose rate of 9 mR/hr at the site boundary. Radwaste exhaust inope rati ve. Unit 3 RHR loop I started in torus cooling mode. Cooldown continuing contaminated debris is discovered offsite by T=3 hrs 1100 CST environmental field teams. This debris was deposited by the tornado after it had blown it out of the RFZ. Unit 3 # RHR loop II prepared for operation in shutdown cooling *" mode Unit 3 feedwater pump secured, using condensate booster T=4 hrs 1200 CST pump in startup bypass mode Crane repaired, during movement of fuel cask the T=5 hrs cask is dropped causing extensive damage to the spent 1300 CST fuel. Unit 3 HPCI isolates on low-steam pressure GENERAL EN$RGENCY declared based on loss of two of three fission product barriers or building release rate greater than 3.4 E6 uCi/s Post accident monitoring activated. High release of radioactive material from building Maintenance crews evacuated from the RFZ due to high radiation T=5 hrs 30 min Unit 3 RCIC isolates on low-steam pressure 1330 CST His'i offsite releases out of building continue T=6. hrs. ~ 12100 CST Unit 3.RRR loop'II' placed 'in service in shut'down cooling Condensate, coridensate booster pumps secured. mode. y.?,;r. Control Rod. Drive Pumps secured vy.,% w, h.p.;,g..e>.s?p %. ms.wn,m .yp.,.,. Unit 3 torus pumped down to normal level. RHR loop I T=6 hrs 30 min -'1430 CST-secured. Cooldown continuing on.shu down coolin.g t ' ^~ ~ .y. Unit 3120-Vac power spike causes isolation of RHR l T=5 hrs 45 min shutdown cooling line suction valves l 1445 CST l 2

r . T=7 hrs 3 min Unit 3 back on shutdown oooling T=7 brs 15 min Crane is repaired 1515 CST Release terminated when fuel cask is lifted'or fuel and ~ T=7 hrs 30 min put in a stable configuration 1530 CST Pl ant activities terminated T=8 hrs 1600 CST Phase two now begins which will consist of offsite recovery activities Simulated EP A plume deposition plots are distributed. T=8 hrs 30. min State Rad Health briefs State Department of Agriculture

a.. s Day one activities are concluded DAY TWO State Ag. teams dispatched T=24 hrs 0800 CST Lab results start to be received T=25 hrs 0900 CST

. j s Terminate exercise T=27 hrs 1100 CST V. Narrative Summary _ The initial plant conditions are as follows: Head off,' fuel in vessel core has just been removed Unit 1: Unit 2: Head off, no fuel in vessel; U, nit 3: 100 percent power The A dry storage cask is being positioned into unit 2 sp5nt-fuel pool. ~ " site is ~under a tornado. watch, which was. issued at 0740 CST by the Nationa a.. . eather Service. W y. The exercise begins when a tornado strikes the plant, resulting in the o.h'%svefic4Qy.M$ing'tdam'ege t.>.$hduaate41149g.4pippst.is. h the . environment, debris causes damage to two radiation monitors on refueling flodr 'widch ' isolates "the

primary ventilation. system.,.the.. crane

-~ Unit 3 scrams. Normal operator is injured; loss of all 500 kV lines. An ALERT is declared based shutdown proceeds using 161 kV offsite power. on a tornado striking the plant.

9 As the seqJence continues, a The tornado warning is lif ted at C900 CST. fire is reported in the damaged warehouse and the fire brigade is The crane operator is found to have only minor dispatched to fight it. injuries with no further action required. An inspection of the refuel zone crane reveals that it is inoperative due to damage sustained. during the The fuel cask is suspended in the unit.2 spent-fuel pool. tornado. As the scenario mntinues, the standby gas treatment system is determined A SITE AREA to be inadequate to pull vacuum in the refueling zone. is declared based on major failures of plant functions needed EMERGENCY for th) protection of the public. Repair cret,;s start preparations to repair the crane and the building panels. The next mejor event is the loss of the sump drair$ seal in the radwaste building which results in the release of 500 C1. of noble gases to the e nvironment. The release duration it five minutes and results in a dosg, During the response to this release, rate of 9 mR/hr at the site boundary. an environmental field team discovers some contaminated debris outside the plant boundary that was blown out of the refueling zone by the tornado. As the scenario continues, the crane is repaired and the decision is made When this is attempted, the to lower the cask into the final position. crane malfunctions, resulting in the fuel cask tipping over and leaning A major release of radiation in'volving both noble gases on the spent fuel. A GENERAL EMERGENCY is declared based on loss of two and iodines occurs. of three fission product barriers on building release rate greater than ThisJrelease continues for two and one-half hours as 3.4 E6 uCi/s. The panels on pressure from the cask continues to damage additional fuel. the refueling floor are still open so a two and one-half hour release to The release is terminated when the crane is the environment occurs. repaired and the cask is lif ted off the spent fuel and into a stable Plant activities will cease shortly after this point. configuration. It is assumed Phase two now begins which is tne offsite.'ecovery e" fort. that 24 hours has passed. A simulated Environmental Protection Agency Day-one deposition map is distributed in the offsite emergency centers. exercise activities are terminated shortly after this time. State agricultural teams are Second-day activities begin at 08.00 CST. Day-two dispatched with TV A providing support to the, State _ a_s requested.d the ' exercise is' .,aqtivities are, completed at approximately 1100 CST an te rm'inat'e'd I " ' ' "W ' ' ~. e- . %.s'->,,s.9py; jJy,s.f 7 p;,; y,,,, 4 ckMUd*t 4'ptwmfA.,e mpx5t,fg;.,. g,g,;,,7 g,,,?*, s,.,;1 %.3 ? l n..e..c .s, n e. r. m..:,.> ~ ...s-w c.,.. e 6 e}}

ML20212N992

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