ML20212H026
| ML20212H026 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 01/15/1987 |
| From: | Corbin McNeil Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM) |
| References | |
| IEB-86-003, IEB-86-3, NLR-N87002, NUDOCS 8701210263 | |
| Download: ML20212H026 (4) | |
Text
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Public Service Electric and Gas Company
.Corbin A. McNeill, Jr.
Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.C. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 609 339-4800 Vice President -
Nuclear January 15, 1987 NLR-N87002 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Attention:
Document Control Desk Gentlemen:
FINAL RESPONSE TO IE COMPLIANCE BULLETIN 86-03 SALEM GENERATING STATION DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311 Public Service Electric and Gas Company'(PSE&G) hereby provides a final response to IE Compliance Bulletin 86-03 (Potential Failure of _ Multiple ECCS Pumps Due to Single Failure of Air-Operated Valve in Minimum Flow Recirculation Line) dated October 8, 1986 for the Salem Generating Station (SGS), Units 1 and 2.
PSE&G J-provided an initial response in a letter from C. A. McNeill, Jr.,
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PSE&G, to T.
E. Murley, NRC, dated November 20, 1986.
In accordance with statements made in Attachment 2 of the referenced letter, this submittal provides the results of the evaluation which resolves the concerns identified for the Charging / Safety Injection (C/ST) pumps.
At issue are the two in-series, motor-operated valves serving the l
common minimum flow recirculation line for the C/SI system (CV-139 and CV-140).
The control logic design for each valve is l
such that a contact failure in the control circuit causing a short circuit, could generate a signal resulting in the closure l
of either of the referenced valves (or an inability to reopen l
either of the closed valves) which would isolate the common minimum flow recirculation line for the C/SI systen.
PSE&G has reviewed the sequence of events required to occur in order for such a failure to pose a risk to plant safety.
In summary, an accident transient must be postulated in which a Safety Injection occurs, the reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure is increasing and the power-operated relief valves (PORVs) are unavailable.
Coupled with these three conditions must be a failure of the type identified above in order for a condition to exist where the C/SI W{
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pumps may operate deadheaded.
Since valves CV-139 and CV-140 are maintained in the open position, with power available and fail as is, and the C/SI pumps have a shutoff pressure of approximately 2520 psig, it is improbable for the plant to encounter the cbove-described conditions for which 'deadheading is a concern.
PSE&G concludes that further consideration of the postulated accident sequence within the design basis of SGS is not warranted.
This conclusion is based on an engineering assessment of the accident sequence as well as the conservative assumptions employed within the evaluation.
In justification of the conservative nature of the evaluation, a
review of the operating history at SGS identified over 14 million valve-hours of operation for safety related motor-operated valves with no known failure in the control circuit causing a spurious closure signal.
Secondly, the above accident sequence analysis does not take credit for the operability of the PORVs since the PORVs are not environmentally qualified.
However, there is reasonable assurance that the PORVs can be expected to perform their relief function since they have Class lE control logic, j
they are redundant and electrically independent, they are provided with separate air accumulators to ensure high reliability, and sufficient operator attention is already directed toward operability of the PORVs.
Additionally, since the overpressurization of the RCS is expected to be of a short duration during the initial course of an accident transient, availability of the PORVs during this time is not expected to be affected by the environmental conditions in the containment.
In conclusion, PSE&G is confident that the review for applicability to SGS of the issues raised in the subject bulletin has been suf ficiently detailed to assure that the intent of 10 CFR 50, Appe.
A, General Design Criterion 35 is satisfied for v
the Safety Injection, Residual Heat Removal and Charging / Safety Injection Systems.
The information contained within this submittal, and the submittal dated November 20, 1986, represents the complete PSE&G response to IE Compliance Bulletin 86-03 for SGS. contains an af fidavit which af firms the conclusions reached and information contained within this submittal.
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. To the Document-Control Desk 3
1-15-87 Should you have any questions regarding this information, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Sincerely, Attachments P
C Dr. T.
E. Murley, Regional Administrator USNRC, Region I Mr. T. J.
Kenny USNRC Senior Resident Inspector Mr.
D. C. Fischer USNRC Licensing Project Manager
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ATTACHMENT 1 Reft IE Bulletin 86-03 Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311 STATE OF NEW JERSEY
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SS.
COUNTY OF SALEM
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Corbin A. McNeill, Jr.,
being duly sworn according to law deposes and says:
I am Vice President of Public Service Electric and Gas Company, and_as such, I find the matters set forth in our letter dated January 15, 1987, concerning IE Compliance Bulletin 86-03 for i
Docket Nos. 50-2.72 and 50-311, is true to the best of my knowledge, information-and belief.
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Subscribed and Sworn to before me this /5 "
day of de~-
1987 U
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-potary P<ublic of New Jersey Y;BMRD R
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