ML20212G935
| ML20212G935 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 02/26/1987 |
| From: | Gucwa L GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 0119M, 119M, SL-2079, NUDOCS 8703050435 | |
| Download: ML20212G935 (3) | |
Text
~
Y f.
.333 Piedmont Avenue p C J. '
Attinta, Geo60la 30308 c m.
Tel: phons 404 5264526 M
- Mailing Address:
- Post Office Box 4545 ~
-Atlanta, Georgia 30302 c..
f Georgia Pbwer.
a ag uclear Safety SL-2079
- and Licensing 0119m -
l
' February 26, 1987 U. S. Nuclear Regulatiory' Commission -
. ATTN: Document Control Desk.
Washington, D.C. 20555 NRC DOCKET 50-424' OPERATING LICENSE NPF-61 V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT UNIT 1 o
DEFERRAL OF TECHNICAL-SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS -
EXTENDED RANGE NEUTRON FLUX MONITORS Gentlemen:
e
.. This letter documents Georgia Power Company's (GPC's) verbal request
- and the-NRC staff's. agreement to _ temporarily defer certain Vogtle Unit l -
p
- Technical -Specification requirements.
The specific requirements are Techni_ cal
- Specifications.
3/4.3.3.5.1, Remote Shutdown System 2 of Table - 3.3-7), ' and. 3/4.3.3.6, - Accident -
Instrumentation '(Item
~
Monitoring Instrumentation (Item 18 of Table 3.3-8), which ~ specify -the number of required operable Extended Range Neutron Flux Monitoring channels in Operating Modes 1,
2, and
- 3. -
In a February.25, 1987 conference call with NRC Region II and NRR personnel, GPC requested a deferral of these requirements until prior to:the initial entry into Mode-2, provided that certain compensatory measures would be taken.
Verbal:
i approval by Mr. Sinkule and Mr. Brownlee of the NRC staff was given in a g
i-February 25, 1987, telephone call to Mr. W. E. Burns of Georgia Power 1.
Company.
This relief request was necessitated by problems in achieving initial operability of the subject instrument channels.
While still in Mode 4,
_ one channel ~was inoperable due to a suspected circuit card failure while the other channel was inoperable because of a malfunctioning remote shutdown panel indicator.
The VEGP Technical Specifications allow advancement into Mode 3 in these circumstances, provided that one channel nis returned to operable status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> and the second within
- seven. days.- Because GPC believed that these action requirements could be satisfied,- Mode 3 was entered 'at 4
- 30 P.M. EST on February 23, 1987.
When neither channel could be made operable by 8:00 A.M. on February 25,
'1987, GPC evaluated the deferral of the associated Technical
- Specification requirements until the initial entry into Mode 2 and concluded that no adverse safety consequences would result, given certain 8703050435 870226 PDR ADOCK 05000424 i
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.U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission February 26, 1987
.Page Two
- compensatory measures as-explained in. this letter.'
Since failure to defer the Technical. Specification - requirements would delay the power ascension of.lVEGP Unit 1, it was decided to pursue a relief request.-
The safety function performed 'by the - Extended Range Neutron Flux Monitors Ein Mode 3 is to enable flux monitoring, (both in the main -
control room and at the_ remote shutdown panels) for postulated secondary system line ' break accidents.
The limiting accident is the main -steam line rupture which is discussed in FSAR Section 15.1.5.. Mitigation of
- the-' effects of a steam line rupture is provided by injecting 2000 ' ppm
- boron solution -from 'the Refueling Water Storage Tank.
.The need for
-injecting ' the.. boron ; solution during. the transient can be 3 precluded, however, by maintaining.the RCS boron concentration at the refueling level as required by Technical Specification 3/4.9.10. ' GPC committed to the'NRC to maintain such a--boron concentration while in Mode 3 or until operability of' one or 'more - channels of the subject instrument is established.
The capability for monitoring neutron flux in Mode 3 is-also provided by the-Source Range-Monitors (both in the main control room and at the remote. shutdown panels).
Given the above compensatory measures, no _ undue safety cancerns result from the Technical Specification deferral to Mode 2.
.The probability or1 consequences of an. accident or malfunction analyzed in.the FSAR are not increased because compensatory measures obviate the need for the inoperable monitors.
The-possibility of an accident or malfunction
-i of a -different type than any analyzed in the FSAR:is not created because no new operating configurations or modes of failure are introduced.
The c.
inoperable monitors perform no control or trip functions.
The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is - not reduced because alternate instrumentation will
= provide accident
' monitoring capability.
Please contact this office at any time if you have any questions.
l Sincerely, r
L
^
L. T. Gucwa J
-JH I
. ~.
- ~ ;;,;
- Georgia Power A U. S. Nuclear-Regulatory Commission.
February 26,;1987' Page Three :
+
-c(w): Georria Power Company Mr.
F.. E. Conway Mr.- J. P.' 0'Reilly Mr. 'G..Bockhold, Jr.
GO-NORMS Southern Company Services, Inc.
Mr. J. - A. Bailey
.Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge Mr. B. W. Churchill, Attorney-at-Law Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman & Ashmore Mr. J. E. Joiner, Attorney-at-Law U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Dr. J. N. Grace, Regional Administrator
~-
Mr. H. H. Livermore, Senior Resident Inspector-Construction, Vogtle Ms. M. Miller, Licensing Project Manager, NRR Mr. J. F. Rogge, Senior Resident Inspector-0perations, Vogtle Georgians Against Nuclear Energy
- Mr. D. Feig Ms. - C. Stangler d
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- _ -.