ML20212G926

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Informs Commission of Status & Progress in Implementing Staff Actions to Address Electric Grid Reliability Issues,As Requested in SRM of 970527
ML20212G926
Person / Time
Issue date: 10/23/1997
From: Callan L
NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:
References
SECY-97-246, SECY-97-246-01, SECY-97-246-1, SECY-97-246-R, NUDOCS 9711070209
Download: ML20212G926 (14)


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      • ...e POLICY ISSUE October 23.1997 SECi-97-246 EQE:

The Commissioners FROM L. Joseph Callan Exev.itive Director for Operations SUBJECl:

INFORMATION ON STAFF ACTIONS TO ADDRESS ELECTRIC GRID RELIABILITY ISSUES-WITS NO. 9700205 PURPOSE:

To inform the Commission of the status and progress in implementing staff actions to address the electric grid rehability issues, as requested in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) of May 27,1997, j

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CATEGQBY:

This paper transmits status information to the Commission.

Il&C.}< GROUND:

The impending deregulation of the electric power industry may affect grid reliability and thus, in turn, the availability of offsite power to nuclear power plants. Safe nuclear plant operation requires a source of power capable of maintaining acceptable voltage and frequency limits,.

The preferred power source for safe plant operation is the offsite e:3ctric power system, or the

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CONTACTS: Ronaldo V. Jenkins, DE/NRR NOTE:

TO BE MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE IN 301-415-2985 5 WORKING DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS PAPER Chester Poslusny, DPRE/NRR 301-415-1402

,. m inininiciil

C The Corpmissioners 2

Ir$ 1979, the Nuclear tiegulatory Commission identified the loss of all ac electrical power to a nuclear plant, (i.e., station blackout (SBO)), as an unresolved safety issue. SBO was shown to be an important entributor to the total risk from nuclear power plant accidents. The NRC issued 10 CFR 50.63, 'SBO rule,"in 1988, which required that nuclear power plants be able to withstand an SBO es ent for a specified length of tinie. Experience at that time indicated that for most nuclear pown plant sites, the grid was stable and reliable.

At present, grid contro!is decentralized; that is, each utility or a small group of utilities forms a control area containing a set of customers for which they are Jurisdictional!y responsible. There are approximately 150 of these control areas in the country. These control areas are organized in seven regional reliability councils (e.g., Mid America Interconnected Network (MAIN) or Westem Sy' stems Coordinating Council (WSCC)) or various regional power pools (e.g., New England Power Pool (NEPOOL)).

On April 23 and 24,1997, in separate but related meetings, the Commission was briefed by tho staff and the representatives from the Department of Energy Federal Eloctric Regulatory Commission, the electric power industry, coordinating councils, electric reliability councils, economic regulators, and industry groups on the issues related to electric grid reliability and utility restructuring. These meetings were the basis for the subject May 27,1997, SRM.

Two relatively new factors are emerging: r,on utility generation and deregulation, it is anticipated that, in the future, power suppliers, whether utilities or independent power producers, will actively compete to sell electric power to customers who may be located anywhere on the power grid. Regional grid control would be the responsibility of centralized independent System Operators (ISOs). The responsibilities and authority of an ISO as (Meussed in the referenced Commission meetings have yet to be defined, but it is expected that they will be charged w!tn maintaining grid re:iability to facilitate the marketing of power. It is also uncertain how, or even if, the current method of maintaining reliability through voluntary compliance with guidelines established by consensus will be established in the new utility structure. These uncertainties raise questions about the continued supply of reliable offsite power to nuclear power plants.

QlSGIS$@B Listed below are the acticn items requested in the subject SRM, and the staff's response and planned activitics tc, address each item.

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The Commission asked the staff to give greater urgency to ensuring that related health and safety issues within NRC's jurisdiction are addressed, particularly in reviewing the terms of the licensing basis and validating assumptions about grid reliability.

An action plan (Attachment 1), which coordinates overall staff activities on electric grid issues contains the f odowing task elements: (1) a generic communication regarding licensee design basis; (2) ongoing staff contact with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the Department of Energy (DOE); (3) development of a reliability assessment tool to review load dispatch operations; (4) assessment of the risk significance of potential grid instability due to deregulation; arod (6) evaluation of the need for further regulatory action. In addition, NRR has contracted with Oak Ridge National Laboratories to assist the staff in assessing the impact of electric utility deregulation on grid stability.

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- - - -s.a The Cornmissioners 3

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The staff should make appropriate contacts with other agencies to ensure that the NRC remains informed and (as applicable) Involved on these issues. Staff should inform the Commission of actions by Federal and State economic regulators in establishing membersh5 requirements in the North America Electric Rehability Council (NERC).

This shonc include's staff assessment of any requirements and the effectiveness of such requirements and enforcement policies relating to reliability.

At this time, grid reliability is controlled nationally through a voluntary governance structure under the NERC and the regional reliability councils with limited Federal oversight at FERC and DOE. DOE has created a task force to study the reliability of the U.S. electric system and to consider whether efforts to date to maintain reliability are sufficient to ensure reliable operation in the future and whether there is a need for Federal legislation to increase Federal authority in this area. In the absence of any legislation, NERC membership requirements and enforcement policies are voluntary. Attachment 2 describes recent staff activities to keep abreast of government and industry changes, as well as several independent astessments by the staff of regional conditions this past summer.

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The staff is asked to provide more information on followup actions to the event at Summer Nuclear Power Station. transmits the requested information regarding the followup actions taken subsequent to the July 11,1989, grid disturbance at the Summer Nuclear Power Station.

IV.

The Commission asked that appropriate representatives from each regional office visit a power pool and reliability council with jurisdiction in their region, to establish appropriate contacts, and achieve better understanding of regional grid reliability issues.

A letter was sent to the regional administrators (Attachment 4) asking each regional office to select a representative and to participate in visits arranged by NRR to the appropriate power pool and/or regional reliability council. Earlier this year, NRR and Regional staff made several visits to power pools and load dispatch centers. The staff intends to integrate the information gathered during these visits with the information that will be obtained from the visits to be scheduled as noted above.

L. I seph Callan Executive Director for Operations Attachments:

1. NRR Task Action Plan on Grid Reliability
2. Summary of Staff Activities--Grid Reliability
3. Status of Followup Actions Regarding the July 1989, Event at V.C. Summer
4. Letter to Regional Administrators dated September 3,1997 (w/o attachments)

DISTRIBUTION:

Commissioners OPA EDO OGC OCA SECY OCAA CIO OIG CFO

STAFF PLAN FOR ADDRESSING GRID RELIABILITY ISSUES OBJECTIVE Determine what, if any future regulatory actions are needed to ensure risk for commercial nuclear power plants operation remains acceptable. In order to accomplish the above objective, the following issues are identified for further study and action:

Assess and evaluate the risk significance of potential grid instability due to deregulation.

SPSB will utilize the inputs provided from EELB and AEOD studies to determine the overall risk significance.

To reassess the risks arid effectiveness of the SBO rule for reducing risk to public health and safety due to grid centered loss of offsite power initiators. This item is an extension of the ongoing staff effort (Item 1.7 of the PRA Implementation Plan).

Issue generic communications to reemphasize the need for licensees to maintain their design basis with respect to the stability and reliability of offsite power and to maintain a process for ensuring that they continue to meet their design basis for the remainder of their license.

Assess any requirements and the effectiveness of such requirements (with respect to reactor safety) imposed by the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC).

PROPOSED ACTIONS i

The following actions will be taken to achieve the above objective:

Task 1:

Develop technicalinformation to assess and evaluate the risk significance of potential grid instability due to deregulation.

Milestone Date a.

Complete survey of electric grid performance 2/98 b.

Assess projected risk from grid-centered loss of offsite power events by conducting a bounding case study 4/98 c.

Inform Commission 11/98 ATTACHMENT 1 1

Etjsource Reautrements:

1.0 FTE/NRR; 0.5 Contractor Staff i

nipooriina Oraanizations: NRR/DE/EELB; NRR/DSSA/$PSB; ORNL Tad 2:

Monitor Industry deregulation and its impact on the reliability of offsite power to nuclear power plants. Develop and implement ongoing staff sevel contacts with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) anti the Department of Energy (DOE). Assist Regional personnelin establishing contacts with power pools and reliability councils in their area.

Milestone Qalg a.

Conduct meetings with NERC, Regional Reliability Councils. FERC and DOE ONGOING b.

Develop staff reliability assessment tool to review load dispatch operations 1/98 c.

Inform Commlrslon 11/98 Resource Reautrements: 0.5 FTE/NRR; 0.2 FTE/ REGIONS; 0.5 Ce 1 tractor Staff Year Supportina Oraanizationt: NRR/DE/EELB; RI thru R!V; ORNL Task 3:

Evaluate design baslo requirements and issue generic communication.

Milestone Qatt a.

Draft Generic Communication 9/97 b.

Office Concurrent.es 10/f 7 c.

ACRS Review (if necessary)

NA d.

CRGR Raview (if necessary) 12/97 e.

EDO Concurrence (if necessary) 1/98 f.

Commission Approval (if necessary) 2/98 g.

Issue Generic Communication 3/98 Resource Reauirements: 0.4 FTE/NRR Supportina Oraanizations: NRPJDE/EELB; NRR/DRPE/PDI 2 Task 4:

Evaluate, based upon Task 1.b results, the need for regulatory actions. Evaluate method (s) to identify grid centered event precu' sors. Evaluate the impact of deregulation on SBO risk reduction goals. Assess any requirerments and the effectiveness of such requirements and enforcement policies as imposed by NERC.

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O Mitestone DAt!!

a.

Review the results from AEOD JC E8247, Tasks 18 25 to revise NUREG-1032 for in Stications regarding grid-centered LOOP events 10/97 b.

Complete feasibility study on methods to identify glid-center loss of offsite power (LOOP) ever:t precursors 8/98 c.

Assess the implications of grid centered LOOP events to 800 alsk reduction goals. Analyze additional case studies as needed.

9/98 d.

Determine what additional regulatory acth 4 ties are necessary(if any).

10/98 e.

Infomi Commission 11/98 n

Resource Reaulrements: 1.0 FTE/NRR; 0.5 Contractor Staff Year Supportino Oraanizations: AEOD/SPD/RRAB; NRR/DE/EELB; NRR/DSSA/SPSB; ORNL o

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SUMMARY

OF STAFF ACTMTIES-GRID RELIABILITY 4

On Januar/15,1997, NRC staff from the Electrical Engineering Branch (NRR) and the Rea: tor Analysis Branch (AEOD) met with Department of Energy (DOE) staff to discuss offsite power issues at DOE's Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The group met to discuss the role and responsibilities of Federal agencies for the performance and reliability of the U.S. electric power transmission system, also called the " power system grid.' The group also discussed how deregulation may change the reliability of the power system grid.

On February 13,1997 NRC staff from the Electrical Engineering Branch (NRR) and the Reactor Analysis Branch (AEOD) met with Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) staff to discuss offsite power issues at FERC Headquarters. The group met to discuss the role and responsibilities of Federal agencies for the performance and reliability of the U.S. electric power system grid, in addition, the attendees discussed how deregulation may change the reliability of the power system grid.

On February 13,1997, NRC staff from the Electrical Engineering Branch (NRR) and the Reactor Analysis Branch (AEOD) met with North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) staff to discuss offsit:t powerissues at NERC headquarters in Princeton, NJ.

The group met to discuss the role and responsibilities of NERC and other electric utility groups concoming the performance and reliability of the U.S. electric power system grid.

In addition, the group discussed how deregulation may change the reliability of the power system grid.

On February 28,1997, NRC staff from the Electrical Engineering Branch (NRR) and the Reactor Analysis Branch (AEOD) met with Department of Energy (DOE) policy staff to discuss the ongoing restructuring of the U.S. electric power inoustry and implications for existing nuclear generating capacity. EELB discussed the regulatory basis and presented the staffs concems regarding offsite powerissues. DOE staff discussed ongoing efforts through its Task Force on Electric System Reliability as well as other restructuring concems (e.g., adequacy of decommissioning funds, spent fuel and radioactive waste increase due to early plant retirements). DOE staff also discussed the possible application of DOE's economic model of the U.S. electric power industry to problems of mutualinterest to DOE and NRC.

On March 20,1997, NRR, RES, and Region til staff met with Comed staff to discuss offsite power issues at Comed's Bulk Power Operations Center in Lombard, IL. The group discussed staff questions regarding the capacity and voltage security of the Comed power system for the upcoming summer, given the number of nuclear units expected to be shut down in the region as well as the role cnd responsibilities of Comed and industry reliability councils with respect to the performance and reliability of the ATTACHMENT 2 l

4 local power system grid. The following items were discussed: (1) control cor, tor o'perations; (2) transmission system oparations(specifically dispatcher coordination, operating studies, and outage scheduling of transmission equipment); (3) emergency load conservation procedures; and (4) plans for a Midwest !ndependent system operator (ISO).

On March 25,1997, NRR staff attended the second meeting of the DOE sponsored Task

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Force on Electric System Reliability to discuss NERC policy r.no institutionalissues and power marketing organizations.

On April 1,1997, NRC staff from the Electrical Engineering Branch (NRR), visited the

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New England Power Pool (NEPOOL)in Holyoke, Massachusetts, as part of an assessment of the adequacy and reliability of the electrical power supply in New England for late spring and summer of 1997. EELB also visited the New England Power Exchange (NEPEX) which manages the central dispatch power throughout New England via four satellite control centers viz., Connecticut Valley Electric Exchange (CONVEX);

Rhode Island - Eastem Massachusetts Vermont Energy Control (REMVEC); New Hampshire Control Center; and Maine Power Exchange.

On April 23,1997, the staff briefed the Commission on the findings in AEOD Report

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C97-01,

  • Grid Performance Factors," and presented its course of action in response to the rapid changes arising from deregulation.

On May 7,1997, EELB staff developed a report entitled "New England Power

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Pool-1997 Summer Capacity Assessment,"in response to management concems about the impact that summer electric peak conditions would have on the offslie power sources for those nuclear power plants operating in the New England region.

On June 3,1997. NRC staff from the Electrical Engineering Branch (NRR) attended the

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third meeting of the DOE sponsored Task Force on Electric System Reliability.

Discussions included the roles of FERC, a proposed National Reliability Organization, Regional Independent System Operator and States and Regional Reliability Agencies.

On June 12,1997, EELB staff developed another report, entitled "Mid America

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Interconnected Network (MAIN)-1997 Summer Capacity Assessment," to review anticipated summer conditions for the Midwest region.

On June 19,1997, NRR staff and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) staff met at a public

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meeting in Rockville, MD, to discuss emerging issues concoming the reliability of electric power grids in the United States. NRR staff told NEl about its concems regarding the impending deregulation of the power system grid and the potential effect on the reliability and stability of offsite power sources to nuclear power plants.

On July 10,1997, NRC staff from the Electrical Engineering Branch (NRR) attended a

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presentation at DOE Headquarters (Washington, D. C.) conceming transmiss!on access ISOs.

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On July 21,1997, NRC staff met with members of the University of Califomia Energy

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lhstitute (UCEI) ar.d discussed the status, details, and expected impart of the Califomia Public Utility Commissien's p'an for the reorganization and deregulation of the State's electricity industry (public utilities and independvnt power producers). NRC staff reviewed j

a list of studies that the UCEI has conducted for the Public Utility Commission and the staff obtained and will review several UCEI reports regarding post-deregulation el6ctric power reliability.

On July 22,1997, staff from NRR and Region IV met with Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) staff to discuss offsite power issues for Diablo Canyon at PG&E headquarters in San Francisco. The group discussed grid operation, plant modifications, and grid

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procedure changes precipitated by the grid disturbance event of August 10,1996; the j

impact of deregulation on the PG&E grid operation; and interface with the independent i

i system operator (ISO) and the Power Exchange, two organizations that are scheduled to l

begin operations in January 1998.

On July 23-24,1997 NRR staff attended a public meeting of the DOE sponsored Task e

Force on Electric System Reliability. The current draft Task "orce Interim Report, which includes recommendations on the security of the U.S. bulk power system (generation and transmission, and control facilities), was discussed.

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STATUS OF FOLLOWUP ACTIONS REGARDING THE JULY 1989 EVENT AT V.C. SUMfAER Backaround on July 11,1989, Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station was operating at 100-percent power during a record power demand on the South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) system.

During maintenance activities, the generator stator cooling water signal was inadvertently lost, causing a turbine trip and a reactor trip. This turbine trip caused an unexpectedly large voltage disturbance on the grid; subsequently, several other generating stations were lost within the SCE&G system, resulting in an estimated loss of about 1500 megawatts. This significant loss of power resulted in a degraded grid voltage condition at Summe,.

Licensee Actions:

A licensee evaluation of the event showed that a grid instability after the turbine trip and subsequhit cascade tripping of other generating stations occurred because the SCE&G system could not compensate for the loss of the 440 megavars (MVARs) being delivered by Gummer.

This evaluation also showed that the setpoints of the generator backup relays at other generating stations, McMeekin and Saluda, were lower than the standard settings. These setpoints were established many years ago and were never reverified. As a result of the subject event, the licensee 1.

limited V.C. Summer MVARs generation to a max! mum of 300 MVARS, 2.

recalculated and reset generator backup protection relays throughout the SCE&G system, 3.

generated MVARS at other system locations so that station voltage levels were maintained at appropriate levels, 4.

directed Fairfield pump storage units to be operated in the condensing mode to support maintenance of the system voltage,'

5.

directed PARR station gas turbines to be used to, as necessary, offset peak loading periods,* -

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' Note: Temporary actions that were discontinued after the 115/7.2 kv emergency safety features transformer voltage regulator was installed.

ATTACHMENT 3 1

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use the Summer station to generate MVARS" after exhausting other offsite sources,

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Installed a vol; age regulator for the 115/7.2 kV emergency safety features transformer, 8.

added 270 MVARS of switeNble capacitors to the grid in the Columbia area, 9.

added a 410-MW Cope plant to the SCE&G system, 10.

upgraded the excitation systems at the Saluda Hydro with a faster response static excitation system, 11.

maintelnsd the 300 MVAR lim!t until October 1996.*

Staff Actions:

In response to the July 1989 event at the V.C. Summer nuclear power plant, the NRC staff Issued information Notice 89-83," Sustained Degraded Voltage on the Offsite Electrical Grid and Loss of Other Generating Stations as a Result of a Plant Trip," and reviewed the licensee's corrective actions which were documented in Licensee Event Repost 89-012, " Turbine Trip /Rx Trip Due to inadvertent Shorting of Stator Water Cooling Signal"(see licensee actions).

MVARs in excess of 300 would need Plant Manager approval.

The limit was withdrawn after a System Stability Analysis Study indicated the limit was no longer necessary due to corrective actions 1 10.

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UNITED STATES I}

NUCLEAR REGULATERY C2MMissl!N Ok

", [e WAsHINQ1oN, D.c. sue 6H001

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Septernber 3,1997 MEMORANDUM TO:

Hubert J. Miller, Regional Administrator, Region I Luis A. Reye*, Regional Administrator, Region ll Arthur B. Beach, Regional Administrator, Reston ill Ellis W. Merschoff, Regional Administrator, Region IV FROM:

rian W. Sheron, Acting Associate Director for Technical Review Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

STAFF ACTIVITIEG RELATING TO ELECTRICAL GRID RELIABILITY AND STABILITY This memorandum requests your participsilon in accordance with the direction r,rovided by the staff ter,uirements memorandum (SRM) of May 27,1997 (Attachment 1) regcrding regional electrical grid stability and reliabi!ity issues. This matter was discussed with your Division of Reactor Safety Director or his representative on August 21,1997. One initiative in the SRM asks that pppropriate representatives from each regional office visit a power pool and reliability council with jurisdiction in their region, to establish appropriate contacts, and achieve better understanding of regional grid reliability issuee and the reladonship bety. en the North Americari Electric Reliability Council (NERC) regions and the three interconnected networks (or grids) i that comprise the U.S. bulk power systam.

Background and guidance on this issue fo!iow.

The Public Utiitty Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 and the Energy Policy Act of 1992 have opened the way for a number of Stata public utility commissions (PUCs) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to initiate actions leading to the deregulation of the electric utility industry. The industry is moving away from traditional rate based regulation toward inert.ased competition. Over the past year, the staff has begun assessing whether deregulation has an effect on the reliability and stability of the electrical grids and if so, to what extent. The objective l

of this assessment is to determine if any further regulatory actions are needed to ensure continued offsite power reliability.

Factors that contributed to the staffinitiating this assessment include the findings and l

recominondatione from the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AEOD) Case Study C97 01, " Grid Performance Factors," dated March 20,1997; the electric grid power outages in the westem United States that occurred in July and August of 1996, which resulted in the interruption of service tu some 4 million customers in that area; the number of nuclear CONTACTS:

R. Jenkins, NRR,415 2985 C. Postusny, NRR,4151402 AT1ACHMENT 4

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Hubert J. Miller, et al 2

plants'in the Northeast and in the Midwest that were not operating this summer, and isstly, the -

nature of the changes that deregulation may have on the availability and reliability of offsite power for nuclear plants. Headquarters staff have initiated a number of actions to try to deter ';ne the sensitivity and vulnerability of the electric grid systems to deregulation and how regulatoryissues such as station blackout (SBO) and individuallicensing bases for offsite power reliability may be affected.

The staff of the Electrical Eng!neering Branch (EELB)in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) have taken the leart i.i following grid reliability issues and are developing a task action plan to: (1) monitor industry deregulation and its potentialimpact on the reliability of offsite power being provided to operating nuclear plants; (2) assess and evalusta the risk significance of potential changes in grid reliability resulting from deregulation; (3) reassess risks from SBO events dua to grid-centered loss of offsite power initiators; and (4) issue generic communications to reemphasize to licensees the need to maintain their design basis with respect to the stability and reliability of offsite power and to maintain a process for ensuring that this design bas!s is met throughout the life of the plant. AEOD has a continuing program that monitors grid related events providing information to NRR, and will support the risk significance assessments by NRR.

The Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research will assist in the development of any new regulatory requirements if it is determined that they are needed.

NRR staff has also been active in discussing grid issues during meetings with t.e Department of Energy (DOE), FERC, NERC, and selected grid reliability organizations to gain insight into how power supplies are being managed currently under routine conditions and during projected shor(age periods, and how deregulation will be factored into decisions regarding reliability, NERC has plapd a vital role in promoting a reliable supply of electric power for North America.

It was formed in 1965 as a not for profit corporation owned by the nine regional councils across North America. Attachments 2,3, and 4 are NERC documents that provide background information on that organization.

The May 27,1997, SRM directs ths staff to take a number of initiatives, one of which involves regionalinterface and support. Specifically, each regional office should assign representatives to visit a power pool and reliability council that has jurisdiction over nuclear power plants in each region. EELB will be arranging reliability council and power pool visits in each region, and I vould like each Region to identify an individual who will serve as the reglenal point of contact for thm bitiative. I also request that this individual arrange for regional support for any future staff visits to power pools and/or reliability councils in your region, which will enable you to achiev4 the intent of the May 27,1997, SRM. Attachment 5 contains the guidance we will use for conducting the visits. By the end of October 1997, a schedule of tht. future visits will be provided to you. Please provide the names of your representatives for this activity to Ronaldo Jenkins or Chet Posiusny, the Headquarters contacts. The estimated time to complete each meeting is 2.0 staff days per visit. We do not anticipate that any preparation time or post visii reports will te needed. Direct staff hours for this effort should be charged to TAG No, M98444. After each visit we will discuss with your reprocentat!ve(s) the need to visit any other reliability council and power poollocations in your Region.

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Hubert J. Miller, et al 3

.in addltion, regional support is needed in order to provide management attention to licensee mitigation strategies during periods of projected shortages, sudi as that which occurred in the Midwest and Northeast this summer. The EELB staff had completed independent summer capacity assessments for two regions which concluded that there would be a potential for voltage perturbations in the Midwest and in the Northeast and that the predicted shortfallin energy capacity may lead to rolling blackouts. Accordingly, it is important that resident inspectors at potentially affected plants be sensitive to these conditions and be aware of licensees' plans for discretionary maintenance setivities (i.e., emergency diesel generator maintenance and surveillances) during peak demand periods. The staff is aware that regional reliability councils will take precautionary measures during these vulnerable periods. Resident inspectors at potentially affected nuclear plants should monitor the specific measures being taken by licensees, including contingencies to mitigate the consequences of the loss of offsite power including prompt restoration if such an event were to occur. Any concems should be brought to the attention of their r,egional branch chief, who should coordinate and discuss these concems with the headquarters contacts.

The Commission briefing in April of 1997 and the subject SRM communicated the Commission's interest that the staff accelerate its efforts to ensure that licensing bases relative to grid reliability are maintained during deregulation in the industry. Your assistance and vigilance will be appreciated.

Attachments: 1.

Staff Requirements Memorandum Dated May 27,1997 j

2. Control Area Concepts and Obligations
3. Transmission Transfer Capability
4. Capacity and Demand
5. Guidance for Conduct of Visits cc w/o atts:

S. Collins F. Gillespie R. Zimmerman R. Borchardt T. Martin E. Adensam B. Boger M. Knapp, RES G Lainas C. Posiusny J. Calvo J. Stolz 1

DISTRIBUTION '

File Center EELB\\RF DE/RF (7026)

  • See previous concurrences To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box C= Copy w/o attachment / enclosure E= Copy with attachment / enclosure N = No copy OFFICE EELB:DE E

BC.EELB '

E ADD DE AD:DE A:ADT NAME RJenkins JCalvo JStrosnider GLalnas BSheron DATE 8/22/97*

8/25/97*

8/26/97*

8/26/97*

9/3/97*

Document Name: P;REGVISIT.LTR OFFICIAL FILE COPY

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