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MONTHYEARML20117N1611985-05-10010 May 1985 Advises That Discussion Re Qualification of 75 Masonry Walls Per IE Bulletin 80-11 Will Be Submitted by 850923,per NRC 850312 Request.Linear Elastic Working Stress Analysis & Results for Four Walls Will Be Discussed Project stage: Request ML20132C7081985-09-23023 September 1985 Forwards Masonry Wall Reevaluation Rept in Response to IE Bulletin 80-11,providing Method of Qualifying Masonry Walls by Linear Elastic Working Stress Analysis & Addressing Four Specific Issues,Per NRC Request at 850425 Meeting Project stage: Meeting ML20138R0001985-12-17017 December 1985 Forwards Rev 1 to Masonry Wall Reevaluation Response to NRC IE Bulletin 80-11,Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, Reflecting Further Analysis for Wall 5367.Fee Paid Project stage: Other ML20210C1661986-03-0707 March 1986 Masonry Wall Design,Davis-Besse Unit 1, Technical Evaluation Rept Project stage: Other ML20212C9231986-08-0404 August 1986 Sser Supporting Util Reanalyses of 74 Masonry Walls Project stage: Other ML20212C9191986-08-0404 August 1986 Forwards Sser Re Util 850923 & 1217 Reanalyses of 74 Masonry Walls.Walls Can Be Qualified If Conservatisms Eliminated from Analyses.Ie Bulletin 80-11,Items 2(b) & 3 Fully Implemented Project stage: Other 1985-09-23
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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20211B0271999-08-13013 August 1999 SER Accepting Second 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Requests for Relief RR-A16,RR-A17 & RR-B9 for Plant, Unit 1 ML20212H9961999-06-22022 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 233 to License NPF-3 ML20195K2871999-06-16016 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20207G6661999-06-0808 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 232 to License NPF-3 ML20206U7371999-05-19019 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 231 to License NPF-3 ML20206U2441999-02-0909 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 229 to License NPF-3 ML20199H5931999-01-20020 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Thermo-Lag Re Ampacity Derating Issues for Plant ML20198K7671998-12-21021 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 228 to License NPF-3 ML20155B6781998-10-28028 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Reduction in Commitment Changes in QA Program Matl Receipt Insp Process ML20236R1441998-07-15015 July 1998 SER Related to Quality Assurance Program Description Changes for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20236M9411998-07-0707 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 225 to License NPF-3 ML20236K4321998-06-30030 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 224 to License NPF-03 ML20236K3981998-06-30030 June 1998 SER Accepting in Part & Denying in Part Relief Requests from Some of ASME Section XI Requirements as Endorsed by 10CFR50.55a for Containment Insp for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20236K5131998-06-29029 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Alternate Emergency Operations Facility Location for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20249A7551998-06-11011 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 223 to License NPF-3 ML20249A7661998-06-11011 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 222 to License NPF-3 ML20216B9401998-04-15015 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 221 to License NPF-3 ML20216B8381998-04-14014 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 220 to License NPF-3 ML20202C6131998-02-0303 February 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 219 to License NPF-3 ML20199J9511998-01-30030 January 1998 SER Related to Exemption from Section Iii.O of App R,To 10CFR50,for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20198R4771998-01-13013 January 1998 SER Approving Second 10-year Interval Inservice Inspection Program Plan Requests for Relief for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20203B2141997-12-0202 December 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 218 to License NPF-3 ML20203C1401997-12-0202 December 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 217 to License NPF-3 ML20203C2701997-12-0202 December 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 216 to License NPF-3 ML20137G5721997-03-24024 March 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 215 to License NPF-3 ML20138L0491997-02-11011 February 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 214 to License NPF-3 ML20138L0661997-02-10010 February 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 213 to License NPF-3 ML20134J7781996-11-0808 November 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 212 to License NPF-3 ML20128L3001996-10-0202 October 1996 SER Supporting Dbnp IPE Process of Identifying Most Likely Severe Accidents & Severe Accident Vulnerabilities ML20107K3131996-04-23023 April 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 211 to License NPF-7 ML20107J6371996-04-19019 April 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 201 to License NPF-3 ML20101Q5951996-03-29029 March 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 209 to License NPF-3 ML20100L0561996-02-27027 February 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 207 to License NPF-3 ML20095E3571995-12-0808 December 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 204 to License NPF-3 ML20095E3271995-12-0808 December 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 203 to License NPF-3 ML20094M4031995-11-17017 November 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 202 to License NPF-3 ML20094L4821995-11-14014 November 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 201 to License NPF-3 ML20092A1721995-09-0505 September 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 200 to License NPF-3 ML20086M1321995-07-20020 July 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 199 to License NPF-3 ML20083K5641995-05-0303 May 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 198 to License NPF-3 ML20081J2341995-03-22022 March 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 197 to License NPF-3 ML20081H1031995-03-21021 March 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 196 to License NPF-3 ML20080L9501995-02-27027 February 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 195 to License NPF-3 ML20078C1531995-01-17017 January 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 194 to License NPF-3 ML20076J3031994-10-18018 October 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 193 to License NPF-3 ML20076G9421994-10-0707 October 1994 SER Supporting Amend 192 to License NPF-3 ML20071N4211994-07-27027 July 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 190 to License NPF-3 ML20070K9001994-07-22022 July 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 189 to License NPF-3 ML20070C7971994-06-28028 June 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 188 to License NPF-3 Unit 1 ML20065C7791994-03-28028 March 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 185 to License NPF-3 1999-08-13
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217K1231999-10-14014 October 1999 Revised Positions for DBNPS & PNPP QA Program ML20217D5441999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.With 05000346/LER-1998-011, :on 981014,manual Reactor Trip Occurred.Caused by Component Cooling Water Sys Leak.Breaker Being Installed Into D1 Bus cubicle.AACD1 Was Removed from Cubicle1999-09-0303 September 1999
- on 981014,manual Reactor Trip Occurred.Caused by Component Cooling Water Sys Leak.Breaker Being Installed Into D1 Bus cubicle.AACD1 Was Removed from Cubicle
ML20211R0811999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With 05000346/LER-1999-003, :on 990727,failure to Perform Engineering Evaluation for Pressurizer Cooldown Rate Exceeding TS Limit Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Provided Required Reading for Operators.With1999-08-26026 August 1999
- on 990727,failure to Perform Engineering Evaluation for Pressurizer Cooldown Rate Exceeding TS Limit Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Provided Required Reading for Operators.With
ML20211B0271999-08-13013 August 1999 SER Accepting Second 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Requests for Relief RR-A16,RR-A17 & RR-B9 for Plant, Unit 1 ML20210Q8541999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20209E6231999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With 05000346/LER-1998-013, :on 981105,safety Valve Rupture Disks May Induce Excessive Eccentric Loading of Pressurizer Vessel Nozzles.Caused by Failure of RCS Pressure Boundary.Plant Mod Was Implemented in May of 1999.With1999-06-24024 June 1999
- on 981105,safety Valve Rupture Disks May Induce Excessive Eccentric Loading of Pressurizer Vessel Nozzles.Caused by Failure of RCS Pressure Boundary.Plant Mod Was Implemented in May of 1999.With
ML20212H9961999-06-22022 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 233 to License NPF-3 ML20195K2871999-06-16016 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20207G6661999-06-0808 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 232 to License NPF-3 ML20195F4871999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20207E8011999-05-19019 May 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 2 to HI-981933, Design & Licensing Rept DBNPS Unit 1 Cask Pit Rack Installation Project ML20206U7371999-05-19019 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 231 to License NPF-3 ML20207F4351999-05-0404 May 1999 Rev 1 to DBNPS Emergency Preparedness Evaluated Exercise Manual 990504 ML20206M6341999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With ML20205M2931999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.With 05000346/LER-1999-002, :on 990208,both Trains of Emergency Ventilation Sys Were Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Unattended Open Door. Door Was Immediately Closed Upon Discovery.With1999-03-0505 March 1999
- on 990208,both Trains of Emergency Ventilation Sys Were Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Unattended Open Door. Door Was Immediately Closed Upon Discovery.With
ML20207J1461999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20206U2441999-02-0909 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 229 to License NPF-3 ML20199H5931999-01-20020 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Thermo-Lag Re Ampacity Derating Issues for Plant ML20199E2501998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20204J6751998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Annual Rept for Dbnps,Unit 1,PNPP,Unit 1 & BVPS Units 1 & 2 ML20206B0101998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Annual Rept for Firstenergy Corp, for Perry Nuclear Power Plant & Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.Form 10-K Annual Rept to Us Securities & Exchange Commission for Fiscal Yr Ending 981231,encl ML20205K5781998-12-31031 December 1998 Waterhammer Phenomena in Containment Air Cooler Swss ML20198K7671998-12-21021 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 228 to License NPF-3 ML20197J3441998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With 05000346/LER-1998-012, :on 981018,reactor Trip Occurred from Approx 4% Power Due to ARTS Signal.Caused by Inadequate Design Drawing Resulting in Inadequate Procedure.Procedure Revised to Correct Deficiency.With1998-11-17017 November 1998
- on 981018,reactor Trip Occurred from Approx 4% Power Due to ARTS Signal.Caused by Inadequate Design Drawing Resulting in Inadequate Procedure.Procedure Revised to Correct Deficiency.With
05000346/LER-1998-011, :on 981014,manual RT Due to Ccws Leak Was Noted.Caused by Failure of One Letdown Cooler Rupture Disk. All Letdown Cooler Rupture Disks Were Replaced Prior to Plant Restart.With1998-11-13013 November 1998
- on 981014,manual RT Due to Ccws Leak Was Noted.Caused by Failure of One Letdown Cooler Rupture Disk. All Letdown Cooler Rupture Disks Were Replaced Prior to Plant Restart.With
05000346/LER-1998-009, :on 980909,RCS Pressurizer Spray Valve Was Not Functional with Two of Eight Body to Bonnet Nuts Missing. Caused by Less than Adequate Matl Separation Work Practices. Bonnet Nuts Replaced.With1998-11-13013 November 1998
- on 980909,RCS Pressurizer Spray Valve Was Not Functional with Two of Eight Body to Bonnet Nuts Missing. Caused by Less than Adequate Matl Separation Work Practices. Bonnet Nuts Replaced.With
ML20195D0001998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20155B6781998-10-28028 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Reduction in Commitment Changes in QA Program Matl Receipt Insp Process 05000346/LER-1998-010, :on 980924,manual Reactor Trip Was Noted.Caused by Misdiagnosed Failure of Main FW Control Valve Solenoid Valve.Faulty Solenoid valve,SVSP6B1,was Replaced & Tested. with1998-10-26026 October 1998
- on 980924,manual Reactor Trip Was Noted.Caused by Misdiagnosed Failure of Main FW Control Valve Solenoid Valve.Faulty Solenoid valve,SVSP6B1,was Replaced & Tested. with
05000346/LER-1998-008, :on 981001,documented Proceduralized Guidance for Initiation of Post LOCA B Dilution Flow Path.Caused by Design Analysis Oversight.Revised Procedures to Provide Active B Dilution Flow Path Guidance.With1998-10-0101 October 1998
- on 981001,documented Proceduralized Guidance for Initiation of Post LOCA B Dilution Flow Path.Caused by Design Analysis Oversight.Revised Procedures to Provide Active B Dilution Flow Path Guidance.With
ML20154H5801998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With 05000346/LER-1998-007, :on 980824,CR Humidifier Ductwork Failure Caused Excessive Opening in Positive Pressure Boundary. Caused by Less than Adequate Fabrication.Evaluation of CR Humidifiers Conducted.With1998-09-22022 September 1998
- on 980824,CR Humidifier Ductwork Failure Caused Excessive Opening in Positive Pressure Boundary. Caused by Less than Adequate Fabrication.Evaluation of CR Humidifiers Conducted.With
ML20151W1611998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Dbnps.With 05000346/LER-1998-006, :on 980624,loss of Offsite Power Was Noted. Caused by Tornado Damage to Switchyard.Tested & Repaired Affected Electrical & Mechanical Equipment Necessary to Restore Two Offsite Power Sources1998-08-21021 August 1998
- on 980624,loss of Offsite Power Was Noted. Caused by Tornado Damage to Switchyard.Tested & Repaired Affected Electrical & Mechanical Equipment Necessary to Restore Two Offsite Power Sources
ML20237E3171998-08-21021 August 1998 ISI Summary Rept of Eleventh Refueling Outage Activities for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station ML20237B1681998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20236U5011998-07-23023 July 1998 Special Rept:On 980624,Unit 1 Site Damaged by Tornado & High Winds.Alert Declared by DBNPS Staff,Dbnps Emergency Response Facilities Activiated & Special Insp Team Deployed to Site by Nrc,As Result of Event ML20236R1441998-07-15015 July 1998 SER Related to Quality Assurance Program Description Changes for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 05000346/LER-1998-004, :on 980601,ductwork for Number 2 Control Room Humidifier Found Disconnected from Humidifier.Caused by Less than Adequate Connection at Humidifier Blower Housing. Ductwork Repaired1998-07-13013 July 1998
- on 980601,ductwork for Number 2 Control Room Humidifier Found Disconnected from Humidifier.Caused by Less than Adequate Connection at Humidifier Blower Housing. Ductwork Repaired
05000346/LER-1998-005, :on 980601,both Low Pressure Injection/Dhr Pumps Were Rendered Inoperable During Testing.Caused by Inadequate Self Checking,Communication & Procedure Usage Work Practices.Operations Mgt Reviewed Expectations1998-07-11011 July 1998
- on 980601,both Low Pressure Injection/Dhr Pumps Were Rendered Inoperable During Testing.Caused by Inadequate Self Checking,Communication & Procedure Usage Work Practices.Operations Mgt Reviewed Expectations
ML20236M9411998-07-0707 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 225 to License NPF-3 ML20236K3981998-06-30030 June 1998 SER Accepting in Part & Denying in Part Relief Requests from Some of ASME Section XI Requirements as Endorsed by 10CFR50.55a for Containment Insp for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20236K4321998-06-30030 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 224 to License NPF-03 ML20236N7451998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20236K5131998-06-29029 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Alternate Emergency Operations Facility Location for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
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ENCLOSURE SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT SUPPLEMENT MASONRY WALL DESIGN, IE BULLETIN 80-11 DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-346 In the Safety Evaluation Report (SER), the staff concluded that except for 75 walls (out of a total of 169), qualified by the licensee via the use of the energy balance technique to resist the out-of-plane seismic forces, Items 2(b) and 3 of IE Bulletin 80-11 have been fully implemented at the Davis-Besse facility for the remaining walls. The SER also included a staff position on the energy-balance technique and stated that the implementation of this I
position was required to render the above walls acceptable to the staff.
In brief, the staff position required that the use of the energy-balance technique be supplemented by a plant-specific comprehensive test program or, alternatively, the walls should be reanalyzed using the linear working stress criteria. The licensee chose the later option as discussed below.
The licensee met with the staff and its consultant, Franklin Research Center (FRC),onApril 25, 1985, to discuss its proposed approach to respond to the staff position. The licensee clarified at the meeting that only 74 walls were qualified using the energy-balance technique. The proposed approach was to reexamine the original seismic analysis of the auxiliary building which contains 73 masonry walls in question and the analysis of the masonry walls themselves to identify existing excessive conservatisms above and beyond the current staff acceptance criteria in the area of the seismic analysis. The intent was, then, to account for these excessive conservatisms in the wall analysis and qualify the walls on the basis of linear elastic (working stress) methodology consistent with the staff acceptance criteria (Appendix A of the 8600120209 060004 PDR ADOCK 0500 6
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TER attached with the SER). One wall in the control building was also analyzed using the similar approach.
Based on the information presented at the meeting the staff found this approach to be acceptable.
By letters dated September 23, 1985 and December 17, 1985, the licensee has now provided the details and results of its evaluation using the above approach. The FRC, as a consultant to the staff, has reviewed these results and prepared a technical evaluation report (TER) (Attachment 1).
The staff has reviewed this TER and concurs with its technical findings.
These technical findings form the basis for the staff supplement safety evaluation.
The following is the summary of major technical findings:
(1) The licensee has examined two sources of excessive conservatisms in the seismic analysis of the auxiliary building, namely seismic input and damping.
The original seismic analysis of Davis-Besse Unit 1 was based on the 1935 modified Helena, Montana time history and modified Newmark spectrum.
A comparison of the floor spectra from the original analyses with the spectra obtained from using Regulatory Guide 1.60 spectrum (with the peak ground acceleration of 0.2g rather than 0.15g design basis) as l
input motion and Regulatory Guide 1.61 damping exhibited that peaks of the floor response spectra from RG 1.60 input can be up to 40% less than peaks of the original floor response spectra.
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(2) The licensee examined the following four aspects of the masonry wall analysis for further excessive conversatisms:
1 Boundary Conditions - In the previous analysis the licensee did not account for the partial restraint which exists at the boundaries of all walls based on the 'as-built' boundary conditions. When this is taken into consideration, the maximum moment at the center of the wall is significantly reduced.
Material Properties - In the reanalysis, the licensee used the minimum yield strength for the reinforcing steel based on the certified material test rest.lts rather than the specified nominal strength.
Plate Action - The licensee examined the conservative assumption of the one-way action (beam analysis) used in the original analysis versus the two-way (plate action) analysis.
The licensee used the results of the two-way analysis to qualify some walls.
Damping Values - In the reanalysis, the licensee used the damping value of 7% consistent with the staff acceptar.ce criteria rather than the damping value of 4% used in the oritinal analysis.
As discussed in the TER, it is reasonable to account for the above four conservatisms in the wall analysis and the wall analysis apprcach is consistent with the staff acceptance criteria.
A number of other licensees have analyzed walls in their plants using the similar approach.
(3) As discussed on p.11 and p.25 of the TER, the licensee's use of the joint reinforcement as a structural element is acceptable on the basis of the construction of the walls at the Davis-Besse facility and the material test data. The joint reinforcement is well anchored and physical restraint exists all around the walls such that the capacity of the reinforcement can be developed.
Figures 8 and 9 of the TER indicate i
that the joint reinforcement exhibits yield strength in excess of 60 ksi with indication of the ductility.
1 Based on the above findings, the staff concludes that issues related to the use of the energy-balance at the Davis-Besse facility are satisfactorily resolved and Items 2(b) and 3 of IE Bulletin 80-11 are now considered fully implemented at the Davis-Besse facility.
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e ATTACHMENT 1 l
FRANKLIN RESEARCH CENTER DIVISION OF ARVIN/CALSPAN i
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TECHNICAL REPORT I
20TH & RACE STREETS PlHLADELPHIA. PA 1910,1 twx 710 670 I889 TEL (215)4481000
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