ML20212C356
| ML20212C356 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 12/22/1986 |
| From: | Wallace P TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM) |
| References | |
| 86-07, 86-7, NUDOCS 8612300157 | |
| Download: ML20212C356 (3) | |
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Post Office Box 2000 Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379 December 22, 1986 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAll NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 AND SPECIAL REPORT 86-07 O
The enclosed special report provides details concerning a fire door breach greater than seven days. This event is reported in accordance with the special report requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.12.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Jm A
e' P. R. Wallace i i Plant bbnager 1
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Enclosure cc (Enclosure):
J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 2900 101 Fbrietta Street, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339 NRC Inspector, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 8612300157 861222 PDR ADOCK 05000327 5
PDR e d I
An Equal Opportunity Employer
8 t
SPECIAL REPORT 86-07 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
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s DESCRIPTION OF EVENT At 0747 CST on December 7, 1986, with both units in cold shutdown (mode 5),
fire door D-1, Diesel Generator Building 2B-B, was determined to have been nonfunctional for greater than seven days. Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.12 requires fire doors to be functicnal at all times.
Submittal of a special report is required for any door which cannot be restored to i
s functional status within a seven-day Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) g period.
s l
Door D-1 was opened on November 30, 1986, under a breaching permit in accordance with plant procedures for performing scheduled major maintenance on the diesel. It is a large, hinged double door installed for equipment access. A concrete missile shleid is moved in place over the door after it is closed. The diesel generator maintenance required more than seven days to complete, ending on December 8, 1936.
After completing the maintenance, tho fire door and missile shield were closed and sealed, and an assessment by the plant fire protection engineer determined the door to be functional.
l No other plant systems or functions were affected.
CAUSE OF EVENT The root cause for exceeding the LCO was the fact that maintenance on diesel I
generator 2B-B required more than seven days to complete. This work was the scheduled six-year preventatite maintenance. As such, the work was extensive in nature, requiring considerable time and eff ort by maintenance personnel.
The same preventative maintenance was recently performed on the other three plant diesels.
In each case, the work was completed and the fire doors restored to a functional state within seven days.
Rushing the work on diesel 28-B in order to meet the LCO was not considored to be as important as performing thorough adequate diesel maintenance.
i i
l ANALYS.TS OF EVENT At the timo the fire door was breached, the TS 3.7.12 LCO was entered and the regairea continuous fire watch was initiated. The fire watch continued throughout the time the door remained nonfunctional. Additionally, TS allowed the diesel generator to be inoperable during the time maintenance was in progress. Daring this time, there were no fires which posed a threat to the diesel generator. Had such a threat occurred, it would have been recognized by the contlauous fire watch, and appropriate action would have l
been taken. Also, during the time of maintenance on the diesel generator, l
the complement of dissel generators required for mode 5 were operable and l
would have been able to respond, as required, to plant-related events.
1 Therefore, these occurrences are considered not to have posed a hazard or
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potential threat to the health and safety of the public.
CORRECTIVE ACTION There is no identified correctivo action for this event.
It is recognized that on an infrequent basis, these special purpose access doors may be I
opened to allow for diesel maintenance. In this case, using the necessary amount of time to achieve a thorough, adequate job !s considered more important than meeting the seven-day requirement. Also important to note is that throughout the entire time period, the diesel was not required by TS to f
be operable.
While every effort is taken to meet all LCO requirements, there may be times when required or preventative maintenance will necessitate the breching of fire doors in excess of seven days. In these cases, the appropriate compensating actions will be maintained and special reports submitted.
0264Q
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