ML20211Q488
| ML20211Q488 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 12/12/1986 |
| From: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Mccarthy W DETROIT EDISON CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8612190271 | |
| Download: ML20211Q488 (3) | |
Text
Y, DGs DEC 12 1986 Docket No. 50-341 The Detroit Edison Company ATTN: Walter J. McCarthy, Jr.
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 2000 Second Avenue Detroit, MI 48226
Dear Mr. McCarthy:
Thank you for your letter dated December 5,1986, updating me on your current plans and the projected schedule for plant startup.
I am pleased to see that Detroit Edison and the Independent Overview Committee (IOC) share the NRC's view that further operating experience at or below 20 percent power is advisable.
Your staff had previously discussed the benefits of such increased operating experience with Mr. Edward Greenman of my staff on December 4,1986. During those meetings the facts that the plant has operated only four days with the main generator synchronized to the electrical distribution grid and that you have experienced continuing weaknesses in operational performance between September 12 and November 7, 1986, were discussed.
Further, while both the NRC and your own overview committee recognized that some operational problems would be encountered during the initial phase of power operations, you have experienced a number of problems that, frankly, I did not expect.
I share your view that an additional period of operation at power levels up to 20 percent is necessary. This should allow you to establish the reliability of plant systems, to continue improving operator performance through the accumulation of additional operating experience, and to make additional program enhancements based on lessons learned during these initial operations.
The types of problems at Fermi 2 which reinforce the need to continue the current power restriction are as follows:
1.
The plant has encountered a number of equipment problems including the main condenser boot seal failures, rod sequence control system malfunctions, binding of containment vacuum breakers, malfunction of a containment isolation valve, failure of a non-safety related electrical power supply, some continued vibration in the main steam bypass system and most recently the condensate storage tank (CST) failure.
I also note that this latter problem was an avoidable event.
8612190271 861212 PDR ADOCK 05000341 P
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Walter J. McCarthy, Jr. DEC 12 196 2.
The rate of reportable events (LERs) continues to be high. More signi-ficantly, about half of these events are attributable to personnel errors with some involving multiple personnel errors. We look forward to positive results in this area from the efforts of your recently formed LER Task Force.
3.
The surveillance testing program is not yet fully effective. The most notable problem in this area has been the simultaneous inoperability of the High Pressure Coolant Injection System and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System.
4.
While operator performance has shown some encouraging improvements, several events have occurred which reflect specific weaknesses attributable to the lack of operating experience. These events are not considered safety-significant by themselves, but they indicate a need to continue efforts to upgrade operator performance and to gain operating experience at restricted power levels.
Four specific events exemplify the NRC's concerns reflected in Item 4.
The first occurred when the administrative limit on plant cooldown rate was exceeded following a reactor scram, although the Technical Specification limit was not exceeded.
The second incident involved two control rod mispositionings by an operator during a single shift. This event was particularly disconcerting in light of the extensive actions you took following a similar event which occurred earlier.
The third event involved minor damage to a recirculating pump motor generator set which occurred when it was started with electrical brushes removed.
The last event involved the recent damage to the condensate storage tank, and the loss of 283,000 gallons of water, as a result of an improper valve lineup following maintenance.
During routine full power operation, the condensate storage tank water would be radioactively contaminated; fortuitously, there was no detectable radioactivity in the water lost in this instance because of the limited plant operations to date.
While none of these events was of major safety significance, they indicate a trend that is of concern to us.
. U' Walter J. McCarthy, Jr. DEC 12 1986 During your continued operation at the 20 percent power level plateau, we will be monitoring your progress through our augmented restart inspection effort and, as we have been doing in the past, continue our practice of holding periodic meetings with you to discuss your performance.
It is particularly important during this period that you continue to maintain a low threshold in communicating events and problems to the NRC and to the overview committee and that these communications remain as open and candid as they have been in the past.
If you have any comments or concerns with the views I have outlined above, we will be pleased to discuss them with you. Please feel free to contact me or Mr. Edward G. Greenman of my staff.
Sincerely, Cr ctcal c!?wd by
& ; 2 c. Vs;M er James G. Keppler Regional Administrator cc:
J. E. Conen, Licensing Engineer P. A. Marquardt, Corporate Legal Department DCS/RSB (RIDS)
Licensing Fee Management Branch Resident Inspector, RIII Ronald Callen, Michigan Public Service Commission Harry H. Voight, Esq.
Nuclear Facilities and Environmental Monitoring Section Monroe County Office of Civil Preparedness Jennifer Puntenney 0FC :Rll
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