ML20211Q140
| ML20211Q140 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 02/20/1987 |
| From: | Davis A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Sylvia B DETROIT EDISON CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8703030025 | |
| Download: ML20211Q140 (2) | |
Text
o bm8 FEB 2 01987 Docket No. 50-341 The Detroit Edison Company ATTN:
B. Ralph Sylvia Group Vice President Nuclear Operations 6400 North Dixie Highway Newport, MI 48166 Gentlemen:
This refers to inspections perfonned at your facility and to a subsequent investigation performed by the NRC Office of Investigations (01). The routine inspection reports, numbered 50-341/84-59 and 50-341/85-11, were previously transmitted to you. A copy of the synopsis of Investigation Report 03-84-019 is enclosed with this letter.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules and Practices," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
We will gladly discuss any questions you may have relative to this letter or the referenced material.
Orlstral et: mi by A tw: Lub A. Bert Davis Acting Regional Administrator
Enclosure:
01 Investigation Report 3-84-019 Synopsis cc w/ enclosure:
F. H. Sondgeroth, Licensing Engineer P. A. Marquardt, Corporate Legal Department DCS/RSB(RIDS)
Licensing Fee Management Branch Resident Inspector, RIII Ronald Callen, Michigan Public Service Commission
- 'm Harry H. Voight, Esq.
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o SYNOPSIS On November 28, 1983, NRC Region III requested the Office of Investigations (01)) investigate the alleged falsification of nondestructive examination (NDE records and the failure to notify NRC of a potentiall construction deficiency at Detroit Edison Company's (DECO) y significant Femi 2 Nuclear Construction Project.
In July 1984, 01 began to investigate those allegations of wrongdoing against Nuclear Energy Service Company (NES), the NDE contractor at Femi 2.
An NES NDE Inspector, at his tennination exit interview with the Deco SAFETEAM, stated that he identified two ultrasonic examination (UT) inspection reports which contained his name; however, those inspections were performed and signed by some unknown individual. DECO Nuclear Security conducted an investigation of that NDE record falsifi-cation, identified one of the alleged falsified documents, and detemined that inspection report to have been forged. 01 investigated further by reviewing all UT inspections performed by the alleger, and although no additional forgeries were identified, testimony was received from the alleger whose name was forged, stating that he would on occasion pre-sign blank inspection documents to allow uncertified NDE inspectors to complete inspections in his absence.
It is suspected that the alleger was aware of, and in fact, a willing participant in the record falsification incidents reported to the DECO SAFETEAM by requesting that an uncertified NDE inspector perfom the subject inspection and suggesting that he use a pre-signed inspection document to report the results.
The extent of the falsification via the use of pre-signed documents is indeteminable, although it was stated by the alleger to have been only a couple of instances.
01 also investigated an alleged failure to notify the NRC of a construc-tion deficiency in that Daniels International Corporation (DIC) general contractor at Femi 2. required NES to trim radiographic (RT) film of the reactor jet pump RT inspections to remove the presence of potentially defective welds. 01 detemined that DECO addressed the jet pump weld issue approximately one year before the allegation surfaced.
At that time General Electric Company (GE), the reactor designer, analyzed the allegedly defective jet pump diffuser to adapter welds and concluded those welds were not pressure boundary welds and not subject to ASME code requirements. GE also concluded that the presumed deficient tail pipe to diffuser manufacturer's welds were approved at the factory and thus were not subject to RT NDE. However, this was contrary to what the NES inspectors believed both at the time they perfonned the jet pump NDE, and when they were directed to remove the jet pump tail pipe to diffuser welds by triming them from the RT film.
Case No. 3-84-019 1