ML20211Q075
| ML20211Q075 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 07/05/1984 |
| From: | Mulley G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR & AUDITOR (OIA) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20197G337 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-86-133 2.206, NUDOCS 8607230489 | |
| Download: ML20211Q075 (3) | |
Text
, NUCt. EAR REGULATCRY COMMISSIO Office cf Inspector and Auditor o.i..v ir.n,.,i,ii.n Jul y 5, i m Report of Interview Ms. Billie Pirner Garde, Director, Citizens Clinic, Government Accountability Project (GAP), Institute for Policy Studies, was interviewed concerning information of possible NRC misconduct contained in a March 19, 1984, 2.206 petition regarding the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station which was submitted by GAP on behalf of the Citizens Association for Sound Energy.
In the petition, GAP stated that Region IV (1) violated confidentiality)of whistleblowers; (2) failed to include affidavits in public reports; (3 provided advance warning of inspections, and that NRC (4) destroyed drafts and tape recordings, created secret files, failed to identify documents under the Freedom of Information Act, and gave confidentiality to utility officials to prevent disclosure of cover ups.
After reviewing with Ms. Garde the four allegations in the 2.206 petition of possible interest to the Office of Inspector and Auditor (01A), the specifics of each were discussed. Ms. Garde stated the concerns listed in the petition were extracted from testimony by GAP to Congressman Edward Markey during a June 20, 1983 Congressional hearing. These issues were listed in the 2.206 petition as arguments in support of the actions requested by GAP and were not intended as new allegations to be investigated by 01A. Ms. Garde stated the three general allegations of possible misconduct by Region IV had already been or were currently being investigated by OIA. The allegation of various improprieties by NRC was the result of previous allegations and investigations at several NRC regions.
Concluding, Ms. Garde stated there were no issues presented in the GAP 2.206 petition which required investigation by OIA.
In the event the ongoing GAP investigation at Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station develops new indications of possible misconduct by NRC personnel, Ms. Garde will notify OIA.
TECA46-133 kg72 g 9 860721 CARDE86-133 PDR J,une 29,1984
,,Bethesda, MD 84-29 1 o.....,
, g.,
- (yk Geo ge A. Mulley Jr.
July 5,1984 o.i. %i.e.o UTS DE THE R EIVING AGENCY WITH UT PE RMISSION OF THE OFF CE F NSP CTO AND AUDITOR (10 826
-==
O o
BRIEFING PAPER 10 CFR 2.206 Petition re Comanche Peak On March 30, 1984, James Lieberman, ELD, forwarded to 0IA a 2.206 Petition dated March 19, 1984, together with a limited appearance affidavit, both of which were submitted by Ms. Billie Garde, GAP, on behalf of the Citizens Association for Sound Energy (CASE). The Petition made no specific allegation against any NRC employee though it did cast aspersion on Region IV in the following manner:
"Also, similar to the Zimer situation, is the Regional Inspection and Enforcement staff's failure to identify the nature and extent of the QA breakdown throughout the life of the plant."
In her affidavit, Billie Garde did not make any specific allegation against any NRC employee nor did she request any investigation by OIA. However, within the portion of her affidavit which addressed Region IV's " quality assurance breakdown of its own inspections," Garde, out of a total of 12 items, did identify four possible bases for allegations, to wit:
that Region IV has -
(1) " violated the confidentiality of whistleblowers, either directly or indirectly;"
e (2) " failed to include affidavits in the public reports when the state-ments contradicted the NRC's party-line on the problems at nuclear plants;"
h)8
o e
(3) "provided advance warning to utilities about where and when Region IV was going to inspect hardware;" and that the NRC has -
(4) " destroyed drafts of reports, significant tape recordings, created secret files, failed to admit the existence of documents requested under the Freedom of Information Act and given confidentiality to utility executives in order to prevent the public from learning how inspection findings were covered up."
l No further detail or explanation was provided for the " regional QA breakdown" or concerning the possible NRC allegation (4., above).
It is quite possible that some or all of these potential allegations have been previously addressed by OIA or the NRC.
In any event, Ms. Garde will be interviewed to determine if that is so or if she has further information which would establish any or all of the above as specific allegations. OIA will then initiate an investigation into the allegation (s), as warranted.
(
O.7 s
' GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTA LITY PROJECT Insprute for Pchey Studies 1901 Que 5:reet. N.W.. Washington. D.C. 20007 (202) 2293c2 March 19,1984 ene Honorable Chairman Munzio Palladino Honorable Victor Gilinsky Honorable James Asseltine Honorable Thomas Roberts Honorable Frederick Bernthal United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washingto'n, D.C.
20555 Re:
Petition pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 2.206 Comanche Peak
Dear Commissioners:
On behalf of the Citizens hssociation for Sound Energy (CASE) and numerous nuclear workers on the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, the Government Acccuntc5ility Project.(GAP) requests that ~the Nuclear P,egulatory Commission (NRC) take im ediate cction to protect the public health and safety cf local Texas residents thecugh the fcilowing actions:
1.
Require a comprehensive management audit of the Texas Utilities and Generating Company (TUGCC) officials by an independent management auditing firm tn assess the cause cf the continuing inability cf TUGC0 and its contractors to imple: rent an acceptable design and construction program for the Comanche Peak site that meets the requirement.c of 10 C.F.R. 50, Appendix D.
2.
Require an independent design and construction verification crogra. (IC7CP) to assess the integrity of the Comanche Peak site quality assurance (QA) program.
This should be accomplished through a Director's Order for:
a.
An immediate Stop Uork Order to ha tt the current destruction, ma nipul a tio n, and alleged falsification cf documents.
.b.
The assignment of an NRC special inspection team 1/ o determins t
the extent of the problems with both the cesign occumentation and the construction deficiencies at the plant. (This should be u is u - / % 1^
~
- ff
'/J(U 1/ ecause of historical and on-gv.lis"Ttrc;;im grd;f.he ability and thu B
willingness of the Pegional Inspection and Enfoicenent (!E) staff to effectively inspcct and audit p.ocies at the Comsnche Peak facility, we specifically rEqwt that the special inspection tearr be comprised of selected.nencces of !.fcR and !E frcm other regions isho have c-xp.orience in deternination of design /constructio.1 probleas at near-ccmpleted facilities.
Cv-
o g
g
~'
March 19,1984 To The Commissioners.
done through an immediate inspection audit of dccumentation in both the permanent vault and the field " satellite" stations, coupled with the requested independent assessment of the hardware on the site through matching documentation to the "as-built" con-dition of the plant.)
3.
Suspend the Comanche Peak Construction Permit until the completion of the special NRC inspection and IDVCP, and an analysis of the results of those inspections which should include public partici-pation, to determine the appropriateness of further audit or other requirements. 2_/
I.
BACKGROUND
, Comanche Peak is a two unit reactor under construction near Dallas, Texas.
It is being built'by the electricity generating branch of the Texas Utilities Electric Company (Texas Utilities Generating Company). The prime contractor for the plant is Brown and Root (B&R)', and there are numerous vendors and sub-contractors engaged in the co'nstruction of the plant.
The architect engineer (AE) is Gibbs and Hill.
The request for a construction permit was filed in 1974, and construction actually began in late 1974.
The plant is now, according to TUGCO, in twc stages of completion:
Unit 1 is allegedly 97 percent complete, and Unit 2 is allegedly 65 percent complete.
Historically, Comanche Peak has had its share of regulatory difficulties.
However, in the past two years, the inside story of the Comanche Peak plant y
has become widely known to the public after Mr. Charles Atchison, a former Quality Control (QC) Inspector, was fired for revealing safety concerns about the vendor QC program.
As you are aware, Mr. Atchison took his complaint to the Department of Labor under the provisions established by Section 19 of the Energy Reorganization Act.
He won his case at every level of D.O.L., but the company refused to hire him back.
(Subsequently, he secured two other positions with nuclear industry subcontractors, and immediately lost his jobs because of the " blacklisting" done by B&R.) The Atchison case has become the test case of the whistleblower protection act.
Recently, B&R took its arguments to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
GAP recognized the importance of this case, and' filed an Amicus Curiae Brief explaining to the Court the importance of the whistleblower protection act as it plays a role in the day-to-day life of a nuclear power plant construction project.
Unfortunately for both the workforce and the public, Mr. Atchison's plight is not an isolated incident.
Since his firing, more workers have filed 0.0.L.
complaints against their employers at the Comanche Peak site.
Some former workers have also volunteered to testify in the Operating License hearings.
In particular, two former Comanche Peak engineers, Mr. Mark Walsh and Mr. Jack Doyle have participated in the Operating License hearings on the subject of the inadequate and flawed concept that was employed in the design and construction of the Comanche Peak facility.
This " iterative" design process is currently the subject of a major contention before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Coard (Board).
i l
- The public participation should be modeled after the Diablo Canyon prec4 dent
i h
March 19,1984
- N The Commissioners O In December,1983, the Board issued an Order which found that the " iterative" design process was not acceptable.
They have required TUGC0 to file a plan which would assure the Board that the plant "as built" could-operate without endangering the public health and safety.
Hearings on the various proposals for that review are on-going.
It is TUGCO's position that the CYGNA Co~rpora-tion, a company which performed an Independent Assessment Program (IAP) through the past eight months, should also be allowed to do an appraisal which would alleviate the Board's concerns. The intervenors, the Citizens Association 'for Sound Energy (CASE), reject that suggestion, on a variety of grounds.
These include the recent admission that CYGNA had pre-notified TUGC0 about the design packages it was going to review as a final check on its appraisal, and its refusal of CYGNA to produce any engineers to explain the report conclusions.
Intervenors maintain CYGNA's review was neither independent nor adequate.
Since the disclosure about CYGNA, GAP has been involved in reviewing the problems at the Comanche Peak site on a full-time basis.
Our own preliminary investigation will' take approximately another 60 days. -However, the information that we have received to this point convinces us that the requests for immediate action by the Commission are the minimum necessary to begin to get the Comanche Peak site under regulatory control.
II.
LEGAL BASIS A.
Legal Reouirements The law gives the Commission broad discretion tp revoke, suspend, or modify the constructions permit of an NRC licensee.
42 U.S.C. S2236 states that:
A license or construction permit may be revoked, suspended, or modified in whole or in part, for any material false statement in the application for license or in the supplemental or other statement of fact required by the applicant; or because of conditions. revealed by the application for license of statement of fact or any report, record, inspection, or other means which would warrant the Commission to refuse to grant a license on an original application; or for failure to construct or operate a facility in accordance with the terms of the construction permit of license or the technical specifications in the application; or for the violation of or failure to observe any of the terms and provisions of this chapter or of any regulation of the Commission.
i Part 50.100 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations states the same criteria for the revocation, suspension, or modification of a construction permit.
The NRC has a mandatory duty to exercise this authority when necessary.
According to the decision in Natural Resources Defense Council vs. U.S. Muclear Regulatory Commission, 528 F.2d 166 (2ndCir. 1978), under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the NRC is required to determine that there will be adequate protection of the health and safety of the public.
The issue of safety must be resolved before the Commission issues a ccnstruction permit.
(Porter City' Ch. of Izaak Walton Leane vs.
Atomic Energy Commission, 515 F.2d 513, 524 (7th Cir.1975).)
l To/The Commissioners g March 19,1984 B.
Criteria to Exercise Discretion According to 10 C.F.R. 52.206 the NRC "May institute a proceeding to modify, suspend, or revoke a license or for.such other action as may be proper by serving cn the licensee an order to show cause which will:
(1) allege the violations with which the licensee is charged, or the potentially hazardous conditions or other facts deemed to be sufficient ground for the proposed action." As interpreted by the Proposed General Statement of Policy and Procedure for Enforcement Action, published in the Federal Register, 44 Fed. Reg. 66754, Oct. 7,1980 (10 C.F.R. j2.202, 2.204), suspending orders can be used to remove a threat to the public health and safety, the common defense and security or the environment.
More specifically, suspension orders can be issued to stop facility construc-tion when further work would preclude or significantly hinder the identification and correction of an improperly constructed safety-related system or component; or if the licensee's quality assurance program implementation is not adequate and effective to provide confidence that con.struction activities are being properly carried out.
More-over, orders can be issued when the licensee has not responded adequately to other enforcement action or when the licensee interferes with the conduct of an inspection or investigation or for any reason not mentioned above for which the license revocation is legally authorized.
In order to help determine the significance of violations within this list, the Commission established " severity categories" ranging from the most serious structural flaws (Severity I), to minor technicalities (Severity yI).
44 Fed. Reg. at 66758-59.
~
GAP cites as precedent in this case the November 12, 1982, Show Cause Order issued by the Commission to the Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company regarding the Zimmer Nuclear Power Plant.1/
i In that case, the Commission ordered the utility to "show cause" why construc-tion should not be halted.
At the time the Zimmer plant, similar to Cemanche Peak, was nearing completion when the discovery of numerous quality assurance problems in con /
struction were brought to the attention of the agency by whistleblowers through GAP.
In this case, a similar situation has developed with the recent discovery of numerous construction and design quality assurance deficiencies at the site.
F Also, similar to the Zimmer situation, is the Regional Inspection and inforce-
' ment staff's failure to identify the nature and extent of the QA breakdown throughout the life of the plant.
~
C.
Specific Bases for Suspension The Commission clearly has both the duty and the discretion to suspend the Comanche Peak Construction Permit at this time.
1/ ee Order to Show Cause and Order Immediately Suspending Construction, S
Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company, et al., (Zirner Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-22-33, (November 12,1982).
4/
- Id, at 1.
h March 19,1984
- To The Commission:rs During the past several months, TUGC0 has demonstrated an unwillingness to pursue the minimum necessary commitment to comply with the laws and procedures surrounding the construction of nuclear power plants.
The Government Accountability Project (GAP) has been indirectly monitoring the Comanche Peak oroject since Janu:ry,1003, when the firing of Chcrlas Atchisen.ps brought to our attentica by MSI and.':r. Atchison.
Our initial review of the documents surrounding that incident, the inadequacy of the NRC staff's resolution, and the staff and TUGCO's failure to recognize the seriousness of the underlying causes and results of company actions taken against Mr.
Atchison caused our initial concern.
In recent weeks, our role at the Comanche Peak site has increased dramatically.
Former and current workers have sought GAP's legal and investigative services in unprecedented numbers.
Incorporated in this Petition is a summary of the issues presented in affidavits which are being submitted to the NRC's Office of Investigation (01).
Those affidavits represent only the first group of completed statements from former and current workers who wish to make the NRC aware of serious construction and documentation deficiencies on the site.
However, because of the serious and immediate nature of the allegations that are contained in these affidavits, we have decided that it is critical we submit them to the agency as soon as possible to prevent further destruction or falsification of documents, harassment and intimidation, termination of employees, and to insure that -the NRC OI investigators have every opportunity to take necessary immediste action if our request for an immediate Stop Work Order is granted.
In the event that such an order is granted, GAP commits to immediate and full cooperation with the 01 staff investigators and to supplying information, affidavits and sugporting documentation which we are provided with by the Comanche Peak work-force. /
In the event that a Stop Work Order is not granted immediately, we will con-tinue to supply the same information.
However, we will proceed according to GAP's normal (and unfortunately slower) procedures of presenting the agency only fornalized affidavits and sworn statements under grants of confidentiality.
Further, GAP recognizes that the burden of proving the need for the requested relief is ours.
We have balanced that need, with the concern over a timely submission to the agency of information of immediate relevance to the 01 investigators.
There-fore, in deference to the latter, we request that the Commission allow GAP to supplement thi's request at a later date, not to exceed 60 days, at the completion of GAP's preliminary investigation into the Comanche Peak project.
III.
SUMMARY
OF ISSUES RAISED IN AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED TO THE NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATION
'The following list is a summary of the issues raised in the affidavits submitted today to the NRC's Office of Investigation.
These affidavits have been submitted to b! s the Commission is well aware, GAP investigators negotiate separately with A
each witness the terms and conditions under which he/she will provide information to us and, in turn, to.the NRC.
See generally, Consumers Power Company (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), Docket Numbers 50-329/330 0!!&OL.
~ - - -
'To The Commissioners O
O March 19,1983 the Director, Mr. Ben Hayes.
We expect that the affidavits, and subsequent 01 and IE investigations and inspections will be reviewed by the Commission and/or the Director in making the determination whether or not to grant both the immediate relief sought in this matter, as well as the suspension of the construction permit until such tine as the Commission is able to detemine the extent of the problems at the Comanche Peak facility and the appropriate solutions.
We feel a need to communicate a sense of urgency to the Commission in regard to the deterioration of conditions on-sitt at Comanche Peak.
Within the past few months, several major " players" in the QA and documentation breakdown have resigned or left the site.
Mr. Ron Tolson, the QA project Manager, and Mr. Frank Strand, a Document Control management official, are no longer in the positions of authority after abrupt and unexpected staff changes.
Our sources indicate that documents are being altered and shuttled around in a whole, sale manner as the company scrambles to erase traces of falsification, mis-matching, and other problems with documentation.
The summary list follows:
I 1.
Assignment of heat numbers in the field to materials used in safety-related construction.
2.
Back-fitting of allegedly final components ready for turnover.
3.
Downgrading safety-related material to non-safety-related to avoid ANI review (material is actually still in a safety-related system).
i 4
Improper use of inter-office memos (IOM) to disposition non-cenformance reports, or make changes that would be otherwise unauthorized.
5.
Lack of material traceability for numerous hardware components.
6.
Lack of proper QC inspector training, and evidence of widespread 1
cheating on QC tests.
7.
Institutionalized lack of independence of the QA/QC function from production.
8.
Use of uncontrolled drawings and other design documentation to inspect and build the plant.
9.
Lack of vendor document control.
10.
Undocumented repairs (" bootlegging"), af ter the final QC signoff, 11.
Harassment and intimidation of QC inspectors.
12.
Falsification of safety-related documentation.
I 13.
Failure to follow blueprints followed by "as-built" program to legitimize the practice.
14 Pre-notification to areas and of documentation to be inspected by audit teams, and by the NRC,
.jn Th2 Commission 2rs
[} ({}
March 19,1984
- 15. Totally out-of-control documentation.
16.
Failure to protect permanent records in fire-proof valuts.
17.
Upgrad.ing non-safety-related material to safety-related through the use of informal inter-office memos, and other unacceptable procedures.
- 18. Material false statements by plant management to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.
19.
Unauthorized issuance and use of the " controlled" stamps by the QC Department used to indicate valid inspections of safety-related materials.
20.
Inadequate staffing of document ' control offices, making it impossible to keep up with the demands of craft and QC.
21.
Intentional cover-up of known deficiencies in the document control system.
22.
Inadequate and unreliable documentations of design changes and s
drawings.
23.
Lack of control of safety-related drawing documentation by allowing craft to obtain portions of document packages instead of the complete package, as required by procedure.
24.
Widespread drug abuse and management inattention to the problem.
25.
Alteration of final design drawings.
26.
Failure in the cleanliness inspection program for component maintenance.
IV.
CONCLUSION By separate letter, we have provided the Director, Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, with a copy of this request and asked for his immediate response to those items identified in this letter.
The affidavits will be supplied to 01, and we have provided copies of this request to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ~with a Limited Appearance Statement filed today.
We look forward to completing our own preliminary investigation and providing further information to the Commission.
Sincerely, bS l ba.h Billie Pirner Garde Citizens Clinic Director O
e