ML20211P670

LER 97-S01-00:on 970914,unattended Weapon Was Left in Security Post.Caused by Failure to Follow Procedural Instructions.Inventory of Security Post Performed & semi- Automatic Rifle & Ammunition Secured

ML20211P670
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	10/14/1997
From:	Marks D, Overbeck G ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
192-01001-GRO-D, 192-1001-GRO-D, LER-97-S01-01, LER-97-S1-1, NUDOCS 9710210107
Download: ML20211P670 (6)

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m Canuwinest. anos,etum fewy Gregg R. Overbeck Mail Station 7602 Palo Verde Nuclear Vice President TEL 602/393-5148 P.O. Box 52034 Generating Station Nuclear Producten FAX 002/393-6077 Phoenix. AZ 85072-2034 192-01001-GRO/DGM/ RAS October 14,1997 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Mail Station P1-37 Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)

Unit 2 Docket Nos. STN 50-529 License Nos. NPF-51 Report of Safeguards Event 97-S01-00 Attached please find Safeguards Event Report 97-S01-00 prepared and submitted pursuant to 10CFR.73.71(b)(2). This report describes the details of the September 14, 1997 event where a Palo Verde Security Officer left a weapon unattended in a Protected Area compensatory post. If you have any questions, please contact Daniel G.

Marks, Section Leader, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs, at (602) 393-6492.

Sincerely, GRO/DGM/ RAS /rlh Attachment cc:

E. W. Merschoff (all with attachment) r/Q'/

K. E. Perkins e

J. H. Moorman INPO Records Center

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L6CENSEE CONT ACT FOft THis LER(12) l NAME ILLLPHONE NUMBLR l

Daniel G. Marks, Section Leader, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs l

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A On September 14, 1997, at approximately 0840 MST, Palo Verde Unit 2 was in MODE 6 (REFUELING) when a Palo Verde Security Officer left a.223 caliber semi-automatic rifle and five magazines of.223 caliber ammunition unattended in a Protected Area compensatory post (trailer) located north of the Unit 2 Containment Building equipment hatch.

On September 14, 1997 at approximately 0841 MST, another Palo Verde Security Officer secured the unattended weapon and ammunition, performed an inventory and notified Security Department Management. At 0939 MST, September 14, 1997, Unit 1 Operations personnel reported the event to the NRC via the Emergency Notification System as a 1-Hour Non-Emergency event (ENS 32925) in accordance with 10CFR73.71.

An investigation of the event revealed the Security Officer assigned to the post was unaware the rifle and ammunition were in the security trailer and when he was subsequently assigned to a different location, unknowingly left the weapon unattended.

The investigation also revealed that poor verbal communications and supervisory methods contributed to the event.

There have been no LERs reporting similar events in the past three years.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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==

Introduction:==

On September 14, 1997, at approximately 0840 MST, Palo Verde Unit 2 was in MODE 6 (REFUELING) with the Reactor Core (AC) partially off-loaded to the spent fuel pool (ND). The 140' Containment Building (NH) equipment hatch (DR) (PEN) was sealed by the inner equipment hatch cover.

The 100' 4

elevation Containment Building emergency personnel airlock (AL)(PEN)

Automated Control Access Terminal (ACAT) status was changed to " monitored access" to allow unencumbered access for plant outage personnel. A Security Officer, hereafter referred to as Officer-1, was positioned outside the 100' Containment Building emergency personnel airlock (post C-401) to control ingress and egress while the ACAT was oisabled. Another Security Officer, hereaf ter referred to as Of ficer-2, was positioned at the bottom of the stairwell leading to the 140' elevation Containment Building equipment hatch, hereafter referred to as post 12/22/32, approximately 40' west of post C-401.

Both of these posts were responsible for responding in the event of a Design Basis Threat.

At approximately 0840 MST, Officer-2 received radio communications from a C1 Central Alarm Station (CAS) Operator, hereafter referred to as CAS-1, to report to Zone 17, a Unit 2 Protected Area (PA) vehicle gate (GATE) to assist with an incoming crane.

At this time, CAS-1 was unaware that Officer-2 had assumed post 12/22/32. Officer-2 acknowledged the instruction and proceeded to Zone 17, unaware that a.223 caliber semi-automatic rifle and five magazines of 223 caliber ammunition were in the compensatory post he was leaving.

At approximately 0841 MST, another Security Officer, hereafter referred to as Officer-3, secured the unattended weapon and ammunition. Officer-3 performed an inventory of post 12/22/32 and notified the CAS, requesting assistance from the Unit 2 Security Sergeant. At 0939 MST, September 14, 1997, the Unit 1 Station Technical Advisor (STA)(other utility personnel) reported the event to the NRC via the Emergency Notification System as a 1-Hour Non-Emergency event (ENS 32925) in accordance with 10CFR73.71.

Prior to-the event, at approximately 0815 MST, Officer-3 requested that Officer-2 to relieve him at post 12/22/32 for approximately 20 minutes while Officer-3 obtained dosin_try.

Officer-3 briefed Officer-2 on the post requirements, however, Officer-2 was not aware: 1) the.223 semi-automatic rifle (and ammunition) were in the mobile security trailer he was assuming and 2) the post was responsible for defending against a Design Basis Threat.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION hi' WL DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE YEAR 6toutwin atvso O

Palo Verde Unit 2 0l5l0l0l0l5l2l9 9l7 Sl0l1 0l0 0l3 of 0l5 1 EXT APS, through review of 10 CFR 73 Appendix G, Regulatory Guide 5.62, NUREG-1304 and NRC Generic Letter 91-03, determined that this event should be reported pursuant to 10 CFR 73, Appendix G, section I(a) (3), even though there was no interruption of rormal operation of a licensed nuclear poser reactor through the unauthorized use of or tampering with its machinery, components, or controls including the security system.

1.

Date and time of event:

The event occurred on September 14, 1997, at approximately 0840 MST.

2.

Location of actual threatened event in a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area, or other (specify area).

The Security post where the rifle and ammunition were left unattended is located at the base of the stairwell leading to the Unit 2 Containment Building equipment hatch.

9 3.

For power reactors, the operating phase, e.g.,

shutdown, operating.

Palo Verde Units 1 and 3 were in Mode 1, POWER OPERATION, operatina at approximately 100 percent pcwer.

Palo Verde Unit 2 was in Mode 6, REFUELING, with tne core partially off-loaded to the Spent Fuel Pool.

4.

Safety systems af fected or threatened, directly or indirectly.

No safety systems were affected or threatened during this event.

5.

Type of security force onsite (proprietary or contract).

The event involved APS proprietary security personnel.

6.

Number and type of personnel involved, e.g.,

contractors, security, visitors, NRC personnel, other (specify).

The event directly involved two APS Nuclear Security. Officers and one CAS Operator, all of which are APS proprietary personnel.

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Method of discovery of incident, e.g.,

routine inspection, test, maintenance, alarm, chance, informant, communicated threat, unusual circumstances (give details).

Security Officer-3 heard radio communications directing Officer-2 to Post 17 and after notifying CAS, he proceeded to Post 12/22/32 and took possession of the weapon and ammunition.

8.

Procedural errors involved, if applicable.

The responsible Security Officer did not follow procedural instructions which would have ensured he did not leave the post until he was properly relieved and the weapon and ammunition were secured by the oncoming Security Officer.

9.

Immediate actions taken in response to the event.

An inventory of the Security post was performed and the semi-automatic

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rifle and ammunition were secured.

J Palo Verde Unit 1 Operations personnel reported the event to the NRC via the Emergency Notification System as a 1-Hour Non-Emergency evant (ENS ID 32925) pursuant to 10CFR73.71.

0.!ver-2 and Officer-3 received training to ensure they understood the resaonsibilities for staying on post, controlling assigned equipment, post turnover and communicating with CAS.

10.

Corrective actions taken or planned.

A PVNGS Security Shift Briefing was conducted detailing the procedural requirements and management's expectations for post turn-over.

11.

Local, state, or federal law enforcement agencies contacted.

No local, state, or federal law enforcement agencies were contacted.

12.

Description of media interest and press release A press release was not made, and there has been no known media interest in this event.

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Indication of similar events, v

i There have been no similar events reported in the past three years.

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