ML20211N951

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Responds to Util 861124 Request for Approval to Defer Completion of One Commitment in Involving Mods to Switchgear Room Halon Sys Until Outage of at Least 8 Wks Duration After 870101.Deferral of Date Acceptable
ML20211N951
Person / Time
Site: Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date: 12/15/1986
From: Harold Denton
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Mroczka E
CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO.
References
NUDOCS 8612180355
Download: ML20211N951 (3)


Text

_ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ .

~

~

  1. $naq% "

lf UNITED STATES y" #^

n NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

{ .

WASHINGTON D. C. 20555

g. ,/ December 15, 1986 e....

Docket No. 50-213 Mr. Edward J. Mroczka, Senior Vice President Nuclear Engineering and Operations Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company Post Office Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270

Dear Mr. Mroczka:

SUBJECT:

DEFERRAL OF COMPLETION DATE FOR SWITCHGEAR ROOM HALON SYSTEM FIRE PROTECTION MODIFICATIONS By letter dated August 25, 1986, the NRC granted the Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPCo) an exemption from the schedular requirements of 10 CFR 50.48 for the Haddam Neck Plant. This exemption was granted con-tingent on, among other things, the implementation of the commitments in the July 3, 1986 CYAPCo letter by January 1, 1987. By letter dated November 24, 1986, CYAPCo requested NRC approval to defer completion of one comitment involving modifications to the switchgear room Halon system until an outage of at least 8 weeks duration after January 1,1987, or until the 1987 refueling outage.

CYAPCo identified three specific concerns regarding modification of the switch-gear room Halon system while the plant is operating. CYAPCo concluded that there was a significant potential for damage to sensitive safety-related equip-ment such as motor control center 5 (MCC-5), feederbreakers to MCC-5 and the semi-vital power-regulating transfonners. MCC-5 is the only safety-related motor con-trol center which automatically receives power upon a loss of nonnal power and is not single-failure protected. CYAPCo also concluded that there was high poten-tial for dust or debris to become lodged in a relay contact or armature which might result in an undetectable relay failure. This failure mode actually occurred at the Haddam Neck Plant following plant modifications in the control j room performed during the most recent outage. Lastly, CYAPCo concluded that work on the Halon system would require the system to be disabled. In addition, a large amount of combustibles, such as lumber, rags, solvents, etc., would be brought into the switchgear room and there is also the potential that some welding would need to be performed. CYAPCo concluded that the introduction of additional combustible materials and ignition sources into the switchgear room Nk2gD0h k3 F

Edward J. Mroczka with the installed Halon system disabled were undesirable conditions for power operation with potential adverse safety implications.

The staff has reviewed the information provided by CYAPCo and concurs with the CYAPCo assessment. With the deferral of the implementation date for system modification, the staff concludes that adequate fire protection of the switch-gear room will still be provided by the currently installed and operable Halon system, the existing fire detection system and by the current fire watches (one full-time continuous and one roving watch) supplemented by manual fire fighting equipment in the area.

Based on the above and in accordance with the provisions of the schedular exemp-tion, the staff concludes that-deferral of the implementation date for the switch-gear room Halon system modifications to a date no later than the completion of the 1987 refueling outage is acceptable.

Sincerely, Original Si2ned BD Richard H. Mmu harold R. Denton, Director U.S. Nuclear Reactor Regulation cc: See next page DISTRIBUTION:

Docket File)

NRC PDR Local PDR ISAP RDG Frank Miraglia OELD EJordan BGrimes JPartlow NThompson FAkstulewicz PAnderson

$ 4 Y ACRS (10)

  • See pr vious concurrenc .. d B DD:6 N: / D ,t / OGC 4

. Ia RVollmer ' HRenton0 WShields 12/7/86 12/[*/86 12// F/86 12/f/86 ISAPD:* ISAPD:* D:ISAPD:* PEICSB:* AD:DPLB*

FAkstulewicz:dj PAnderson CGrimes JCalvo DCrutchfield 12/02/86 12/03/86 12/03/86 12/03/86 12/05/86

~ ,

Mr. Edward J. Mroczka Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company Haddam Neck Plant cc:

Gerald Garfield, Esquire Kevin McCarthy, Director Day, Barry & Howard Radiation Control Unit Counselors at Law Department of Environmental City Place Protection Hartford, Connecticut 06103-3499 State Office Building Hartford, Connecticut 06106 Superintendent Haddam Neck Plant Richard M. Kacich, Supervisor RDF #1 Operating Nuclear Plant Licensing Post Office Box 127E Northeast Utilities Service Company East Hampton, Connecticut 06424 Post Office Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270 Wayne D. Romberg Vice President, Nuclear Operations Northeast Utilities Service Company Post Office Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270 Board of Selectmen Town Hall Haddam, Connecticut 06103 State of Connecticut Office of Policy and Management ATTN: Under Secretary Energy Division 80 Washington Street Hartford, Connecticut 06106 Resident Inspector Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Station c/o U.S. NRC P. O. Box 116 East Haddam Post Office East Haddam, Connecticut 06423 Regional Administrator, Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ . . _ _