ML20211N557
| ML20211N557 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/26/1986 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ACRS-T-1526, NUDOCS 8607030153 | |
| Download: ML20211N557 (199) | |
Text
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O UNinD STATES lWCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF:
DOCKET NO:
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS SUBCObtMITTEE ON GAS COOLED REACTOR PLANTS O
LOCATION:
WASHINGTON, D.
C.
PAGES:
1-144 DATE:
THURSDAY, JUNE 26, 1986 ACRSOFRSECOPY MaiRemove fmm ACRS 00 ice ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
OfficialL* porters 444 North Capitol Street Washington, D.C. 20001 g70 3 860626 (202)347-3700 NATIONWICE COVERACE
O' I
PUBLIC NOTICE BY THE UNITED STATES' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONERS' ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS THURSDAY, JUNE 26, 1986 The centents of this stenographic transcript of the proceedings of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), as reported herein, is an uncorrected record of the discussions recorded at the meeting held on the above date.
No member of the ACRS Staff and no participant at
()
this meeting accepts any responsibility for errors or inaccuracies of statement or data contained in this transcript.
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marysimons 1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 4
SUBCOMMITTEE ON GAS-COOLED REACTORS 5
6 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Room 1046 7
1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.
C.
8 Thursday, June 26, 1986 9
The subcommittee convened, pursuant to notice, 10 at 1:30 p.m.,
Chester P.
Siess, Chairman of the 11 Subcommittee, 12 presiding.
13 O
ACRS MEMBERS PRESENT:
14 C.
SIESS, Chairman 15 P.
SHEWMON J.
EBERSOLE 16 D. WARD G.
REED 17 C.
MARK 18 COGNIZANT ACRS STAFF ENGINEER:
19 J. McKINLEY 20 NRC STAFF AND INDUSTRY PRESENTERS:
__i 21 K.
HEITNER M. NIEHOFF 22 H.
BREY R. WALKER 23 M.
HOLMES C.
FULLER 24 J.
CALVO i
N.
WAGNER 25 O
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marysimons PROCEEDINGS 1
MR. SIESS:
The meeting will come to order.
2 4
3 This is a meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Gas-0 4
Cooled Reactors, formerly named the Subcommittee on Fort St.
5 Vrain.
6 At the moment gas-c'boled reactors are st,ill in the 7
singular and the plural in the name of the subcommittee may 8
represent a certain degree of optimism.
9 I am Chet Siess, Chairman of the Subcommittee, and 10 at the moment the other members in attendance, Mr. Ebersole 11 on my right and Mr. Reed on my left, and we do expect some 12 other members at sometime during the afternoon.
13 The ACRS Staff Member for the committee is John 14 McKinle:y.
15 The rules for participation in the meeting have 16 been announced as part of the notice that was published in 17 the Federal Register on June 9th.
18 Since a transcript is being kept, I request that 19 each speaker first identify himself or herself and then 20 please try to use a microphone so that everybody can hear 21 you.
22 The representatives from Fort. St. Vrain, if they 23 sit over there at that table where there is a microphone, we 24 would be glad to have you do it.
25 We have received no written comments or requests
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for time to make oral statements from members of the public.
2 This meeting in one sense is a continuation of the 3
meeting we held at the site on April 2nd, which was expected 4
to be continued on April 3rd and was aborted *because of a 5
beautiful snow storm.
6 We could have met at the airport on April 3rd.
7 That is where Mr. Ward and I spent the day.
We didn't get 8
out until the next day.
So we have decided that the next 9
meeting at the site we will try to make it in June.
10 (Laughter.)
11 MR. MARK:
No skiing.
12 MR. SIESS:
I'll tell, there wasn't much skiing in 13 April after that snow storm or during it.
O 14 (Laughter.)
15 The purpose of the meeting is chiefly 16 informational and educational.
That is, we expect to be 17 informed and I hope educated on a number of things about the 18 Fort St. Vrain plant and the staff's review that is going on '
19 at the present time.
20 There are, to my knowledge, no licensing actions 21 that are underway that require any ACRS approval, and it is 22 not our intention at the moment to take anything to the full 23 committee.
This is, as I sa[d, chiefly for the information 24 and education of the subcommittee members.
25 Fort St. Vrain is a unique plant, and we try to O
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1 keep informed about what is going on there and why, and this 2
is a part of that process.-
.this meeting has not 3
If anybody has any doubts, 4
4 been, called as a result of the Chernobyl incident.
Fort St.
5 Vrain does have one thing in common with Chernobyl, that is 6
it has graphite, but except for that their differences are 7
tremendously greater than the similarities.
8 I think we have on the agenda a little bit about i
9 the Chernobyl type thing because of a recent request from 4
i 10 the staff to have the licensee do some reanalysis of the i
11 graphite oxidation.
12 I have not seen that report, John.
13 MR. McKINLEY:
I had sent that out almost as soon 14 as we got it.
15 MR. SIESS:
I don't remember seeing it, and I 16 don't know how I missed it.
But-the report on that is in I
17 the status report that McKinley has prepared and it is quite-18 interesting.
19 This meeting was not called because of Chernobyl 20 or any relationship, no matter how akin it is, between Fort _,
4 21
.St. Vrain and Chernobyl.
It is an extension of our previous 22 meeting.
We heard some things there we didn't quite-4
{
23 understand and we thought that with another meeting with 24 some additional time we could explore them a little more and 25 understand what is going on.
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In the meantime we found a few other things we 2
didn't quite understand and we added them to the list.
1 3
We have a tentative schedule which you have before 4
you.
It has two items to be presented chiefly by the NRR 5
staff, and then after a short break we will have the Public 6
Service bring us up to date on some of their activities.
7 Now on the items to be presented chiefly by the 8
staff, that chiefly is intentional, but we would expect 9
general participation.from the licensee whenever he has got 10 anything to input into that.
11 Are there any questions about the items on the 12 tentative schedule?
4 4
13 MR. EBERSOLE:
Chet, I would like to ask a 14 question just from a somewhat general impression I get of 15 Fort St. Vrain for the last few years and maybe where we are 16 today.
17 I for one think that of course it is a unique l
18 Plant and it represents a system type and a class that has a 19 Jct of 'otential which we haven't really realized.
I hear l
20 that this plant has had a somewhat less than profitable 21 h3 story and that its availability is not something to brag 22 about, and yet I think it may represent a configuration of 1
23 design which is plagued by perhaps and hopefully a few 24 detailed aberrations and deficiencies in design whose 25 Performance may have been more or less undesirable.
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I am thinking particularly of those water buffered 2
seals which are absolutely unholy in concept as well as in 3
material realization, and I would get rid of them entirely 4
and even to the extent of asking DOE to subsidize new 5
blowers.
6 I think we have a problem here in recovering a 7
conceptual design which has approached semi-commercial 8
status which may be in jeopardy of dying because of its 9
characterization as being necessary for it to make money.
10 The safety of the plant I think is well known in
)
11 the context of how slow it is to move to trouble.
I hear of 12 a lot of modifications and improvements put on it, some of f
13 which have the favor or a water-cooled reactor.
In short, I 14 think we are putting water-co'oled logic on a gas-cooled j
15 reactor perhaps in some cases improperly.
16 I spent the whole day yesterday listening to the I
l 17 B&W problems, and I. guess most of you are aware of the fact
~
18 that they are having a lot of trouble with that dry i
19 secondary they work with, and there is quite a prodigious i
20 effort going on to understand better and control the
_2 21 dynamics of'the secondary system on that plant.
It is a j
1 l
22 superheat system.
i 23 I see a counterpart here in Fort St.- Vrain in that l'
i 24 if we have what they call a stop trip program and identify
}
i i
25 as best we can the causative factors leading to the poor
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availability and examine the real differences between this 2
and the water cooled reactors, maybe there is a clear course 3
ahead to recover this oystem in its intended state of 4
operability and get on with it.
I 5
MR. SIESS:
Jesse, the first item you mentioned 6
about the circulator bearings.is on the agenda as the first 7
item under the last thing, the helium circulator 8
auxiliaries.
We have heard that story before, but I think f
9 they will be happy to comment on it for you.
10 The thought that somebody other than Fort St.
11 Vrain might defray some of the costs of replacing those 12 circulator systems is one I think Mr. Walker would welcome.
j 13 Whether this has even been explored with GCRA or DOE, I i
14 don't know, but you might want to comment on that.
15 This is a demonstration plant, and it has been a _ !
16 demonstration plant, and we expected to learn from it and to l
17 make improvements in it.
I thin that was the-whole idea.
18 One of the-first problems they had that cost them
^
19 a lot of down time was the -- what did we call it -- the 20 oscillations, the columns moving, and that turned up with a 21 fairly simple fix, but it did take a lot of~ time.
~
22 The water cooled bearings have been a--problem from 23 the beginning, and I am sure they will tell us all the 24 things they are thinking about.
We have heard the DOE 25 people tell us that for the modular HTGR that they are
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looking at under the advanced reactors program that they are 2
simply going to use magnetic bearings.
We got that simple 3
an answer.
Now whether magnetic bearings are all that well 4
Proved out for this kind of service, I don't know.
5 If they are not, it certainly would make some j
6 sense for somebody to put them in a plant and try them out.
7 Whether you would like to be the experimentee, I don't know.
8 Is this something you will cover under that item?
9 MR. WALKER:
Yes.
This is on the agenda later on, o
10 unless you want to cover it now.
11 MR. SIESS:
No, no.
We will cover it under the j
12 agenda item.
13 MR. MARK:
Am I right, Chet, that the trouble with 14
-the oscillations was of course a tremendous nuisance and 15 Puzzle and took a lot of searching to find out just what was 16 causing it and what'it would take to fix it and it may have 17 run into set points of something or_other, but never was in 4
18 any real sense a hazard?
19 MR. SIESS:
I don't think it was ever a safety 20 issue, but it was a problem and it caused an awful lot of, _a_
21 unavailability, and the fix turned out to be relatively '
22 simple, a fix that could easily be put into the next plant l
23
. that uses prismatic alloys, and it is the kind of you really 24 wouldn't learn until you ran a plant,-which is why we have j
25.
demonstration plants.
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MR. EBERSOLE:
I' worked for five years on the 2
predecessor to this plant, and we knew in the beginning that 3
those water buffered were going to be real dogs.
We thought i
4 the major purpose of that whole project would have been hot 5
helium gas handling and not core viability.
It died for
- I l
6 that reason and for a few political reasons.
It didn't have 7
a ceramic core.
8 MR. SIESS:
I think the problem with the seals was e
i 9
somebody figured out that if they made them complicated I
i 10 enough they would work.
'I 11 (Laughter.)
12 And that is the triumph of hope over reason.
13 MR. EBERSOLE:
Are you going to discuss your 14 alternatives to the current impeller drives?
i 15 MR. WALKER:
Yes, the basic alternatives and we 16 will be glad to discuss them.
I 17 MR. SIESS:
They have several alternatives'that 18 they have been exploring now for quite a while, i
19 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, is there a discussion also to 1
20 the uniqueness and the safety context of the gas reactor 21 versus these water cooled jobs in the context of fire 22 protection and environmental qualifications?
23 MR. SIESS:
We are going to get into that.
That 24 is 90 percent of what we are going to be talking about 25 today.
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73410101 10 marysimons 1
Any other questions?
2 (No response.)
3 Okay.
I think we will let Ken Heitner start off.
'~
4 I am assuming Ken knows what these first two items, the two 5
sub-items under the licensing basis item mean.
6 Ken Heitner is Project Manger -- let's see, are 7
you one of two Project Managers?
8 MR. HEITNER:
Right.
The other Project Manager is 9
at the site today inspecting the plant.
10 MR. SIESS:
He is what?
11 MR. HEITNER:
The other Project Manager is at the 12 site today inspecting the plant.
13 MR. SIESS:
Do you share those duties equally, or
(~/
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s-14 do you take certain portions of it and he takes certain 15 Portions, or you stay home and he gets to go to ---
16 MR. HEITNER:
Well, right now it is not shared 17 equally.
I am the Senior Manager and I have the overall 18 responsibility.
What we are doing is on the specific 19 licensing actions that we have, as we process them through 20 in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, he handles some..
21 of them and I handle some of them and we keep each other 22 informed about what we are doing.
23 MR. SIESS:
Did you both of you go to school, the 24 short course ---
25 MR. HEITNER:
No,I haven't gone to that yet.
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1 MR. SIESS:
I was going to ask you if you learned 2
anything.
3 MR. HEITNER:
Well, I am reading the notes.
i 4
The first part of my presentation today is an 5
attempt to review the design basis accident at Fort St.
I 6
Vrain.
I will talk about that in relation to the Chernobyl 7
accident and also to explain the interreaction between the I
8 design basis accidents to the degree that they are 9
considered in fire protection and equipment qualification, 10 two major areas that we are still trying to resolve at Fort 1
11 St. Vrain and are currently working on them.
12 (Slide.)
13 MR. SIESS:
Now are you going to overlap very much 14 into that next item or are you going to try to cover all of 15 that?
16 MR. HEITNER:
The first two items are together.
17 I've changed the order a little bit.
We were still trying 18 to organize this in a way that it flows logically, but it is f
19 a complex subject.
20 MR. SIESS:
So you are going to take the twc items 21 listed for you and combine them in what you think is a 22 logical order?
23 MR. HEITNER:
Right.
24 MR. SIESS:
That's fine.
25 MR. HEITNER:
In the first part I am going to ta1k _
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about the licensing basis, and then I will come back.and 2
talk about the specifics of the equipment qualification 3
Program separately.
4 MR. SIESS:
And the fire protection.
5 MR. HEITNER:
Just for the purpose of review, I 6
want to make sure that everybody clearly understands what we 7
are talking about when we refer to the design basis 8
accidents, and I am using the term " design basis accidents" 9
because that is what they are called in the staff's safety 10 analysis that was generated at the time of licensing of the 11 Plant in 1972.
12 To some degree these are mechanistic beyond design 13 basis accidents because they involved multiple failures.
14 MR. SIESS:
You are saying that DBA-1 and DBA-2 15 are not comparable to what we call design basis accidents in 16 Chapter 157 17 MR. HEITNER:
I am saying that the key. point here 18 is that they involve multiple failures.
19 (Slide.)
20 The first accident, permanent loss of forced 21 circulation cooling has to involve multiple failures of 22 either the circulators, their-support systems or the power 23 supplies for the circulators because they are two fully 1
24 redundant
- systems.
25 MR. EBERSOLE:
Wouldn't a total power supply
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failure, including everything but DC produce this?
2 MR. HEITNER:
yes, but as I will get back to, 3
there is still the. alternate cold cooling method which 4
allows you to limit the damagg to the consequences of this 5
accident.
6 MR. EBERSOLE:
But that still requires AC power, 7
doesn't it?
8 MR. HEITNER:
yes, but it is a separate system in 9
the sense that it is beyond the two diesel generators.
10 MR. EBERSOLE:
And what is the time constant of 11 need on it?
12 MR. HEITNER:
I think you would initiate the ACM i
13 at about two hours after have lost ---
14 MR. EBERSOLE:
Does this say if I have a total AC 15 Power failure that I have got two hours to_ invoke ACM?
16 MR. HEITNER:
yes.
If you have lost offsite 17 power, plus the two normal emergency diesel generators, then 18 you have got epproximately two hours to initiate the ACM.
19 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, that is not much different 20 from a light-water reactor if it has turbine driven 21 feedwater pumps.
22 l MR. SIESS:
Ken, that is two hours before there is 23 plant damage?
24 MR. HEITNER:
No.
The actual damage to the core 25 is going to-occur a lot more slowly'to that, but you have to-O ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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1 begin the sequence ---
2 MR. SIESS:
How long do you have before there is 3
any danger to the health and safety of the public?
As I 4
recall, that is more than two hours.
5 MR. HEITNER:
Yes, I think that time period is 6
more than two hours.
7 MR. EBERSOLE:
I think this is a critical issue.
3 8
If you can't find a consequence, I think the tendency of the 9
staff is to look for it and create a basis for it, you 10 know, I can't find a problem so I will make one by going I
11 further down the road of degradation.
l 12 MR. SIESS:
Well, this was a different kind of 13 Plant and there was stuff done on that basis.
14 MR. EBERSOLE:
How are going to find a concept 15 that is relatively similar in safety logic to the LWR's and 16 it won't let you go further down the road of degradation for 17 you to find it?
18 MR. SIESS:
This is the way this plant was 19 licensed, Jesse.
I was in on it.
20 MR. EBERSOLE:
But that says to me if I can't find 21 trouble now, I will keep going until I do.
22 MR. SIESS:
That's right, to at least another 23 level.
24 MR. EBERSOLE:
And that I think is an unfair 25 proposition.
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1 MR. SIESS:
Nobody said life is fair.
2 MR. EBERSOLE:
I see the staffs zeal and desire to j 3
do that, just as I see the fact that it is going to try to 4
Perpetuate itself forever and it will find something to do, 5
and I am not so sure how much of that logic has been put 6
into this view at this reactor.
I am about to find out I 7
guess.
8 MR. SHEWMON:
I hope so.
You've got to let him 9
talk first.
10 (Laughter.)
11 MR. EBERSOLE:
Yes, go ahead.
12 MR. HEITNER:
Well, as I said, in order to get 13 into this situation of permanent loss of forced circulation 14 and cooling you have to have multiple failures of redundant 15 safety grade systems.
16 What the accident then involves is the forced 17 circulation and cooling,-you have heatup and eventual 18 failure of the coded fuel particles at the licensing basis 19 of 2900 degrees Fahrenheit.
20 However, the liner cooling system which cools the 21 liner and therefore protects the concrete reactor vessel is 22 assumed to remain intact and to continue to operate through 23 this whole period of time.
24 Thus, although the center of the core is getting 25 very hot, the structural integrity of the liner is O
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1 maintained and the structural integrity of the reactor 2
vessel is maintained, and it is also assumed that you are 3
able to operate the depressurization system in order to 4
remove the helium reacto,r and depressurize the reactor.
So 5
you are removing the driving force for pushing fission 6
products out of the reactor.
7 Eventually, however, when the fuel particles fail 8
at the 2900 degrees F or somewhere beyond there because the 9
eventual temperature in the center of the core goes up to 10 about 5500 degrees F, and that is what the model shows, you 11 are releasing the fission products into the reactor.
12 The doses that occur are based on an assumed slow 13 leak rate from the depressurized reactor, and that leaks out
(~
14 into the reactor building, less whatever removal you get of 15 iodine and particulate matter through the reactor building 16 filtration system which is assumed to continue to operate 17 throughout the course of the accident, and it gives you 18 approximately a factor of 10 or 20 dose reductions.
i 19 MR. EBERSOLE:
I cant' see how all these things 20 can operate if I have postulated at the very start a total 21 loss of AC power.
22 MR. HEITNER:
No, that is only one mechanism to 23 start it.
In other words, the circulators could fail for 24 some other reason.
I 25 MR. SIESS:
Jesse, you postulated that, but they nU ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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1 didn't.
2 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, why?
3 MR. SIESS:
Because when we license plants we 4
didn't assume and we still don't assume total loss of AC 5
power.
6 MR. EBERSOLE:
But we have learned that we should.
7 MR. SIESS:
Only for severe accidents.
8 MR. HEITNER:
Well, as I said earlier, even if the 9
normal diesel generators did fail, in other words, you had 10 nominal station blackout conditions, you have got this third 11 diesel generator for the ---
12 MR. EBERSOLE:
The hypothesis isn't a water 13 reactor and it does not extend to severe accidents, Chet.
{'
14 It extends into a requirement to prevent severe accidents.
15 MR. SIESS:
He is explaining the licensing basis 16 for Fort St. Vrain.
17 MR. EBERSOLE:
I guess I am trying to get it in 18 perspective, and I may never get it.
19 MR. HEITNER:
Because the leakage rate is so low 20 in this accident, the calculated doses are well below 10 CFR 21 Part 100 limits.
In fact, the licensee's calculations 22 indicate that they would be at millirem type levels.
The 23 staff's calculations are somewhat higher as they typically 24 are.
25 MR. EBERSOLE:
So you run it out to six months?
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1 MR. HEITNER:
yes, and the doses accumulate over a 5r 2
very long period of time so that you have other options.
1 3
MR. EBERSOLE:
This tells me you would frankly 4
find a dose.
5 MR. SIESS:
It is trying to make people feel 6
comfortable.
7 MR. EBERSOLE:
No, it is trying to find a dose.
8 Well, let me go back to the current practice, which I think 9
is reasonable.
you have steam generators on this plant.
10 that is the normal means of heat rejection.
Does the loss 11 of AC power cause them to dry up?
.2 12 MR. HEITNER:
Well, they are once-through steam
)
13 generators and they will dry out if you. supply any feedwater fg 14 to them ---
15 MR. EBERSOLE:
And is that done by electric pumps?
16 MR. HEITNER:
There are two ways of supplying 17 water to the steam generators, but the safety grade method i
18 is with electric pumps.
19 MR. EBERSOLE:
And what is the other way?
20 MR. HEITNER:
The plant has oil-fired auxiliary.. _
i.
21 boilers that are not safety grade equipment, and it has i
22 turbine powered boiler heat pumps.
That would be another i
23 way of-supplying ---
i i
24
.MR.
EBERSOLE:
That is equivalent to the pulse 25 feed or the RCIC/HPCI?
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1 MR. HEITNER:
Except that they are not safety 2
grade systems.
3 MR. EBERSOLE:
So you have alternate ways to keep 4
the boilers full of water?
5 MR. HEITNER:
Fort St. Vrain will tell you there 6
are many ways ---
7 MR. EBERSOLE:
Now having done that with steam 8
Power with I guess DC controls, which you must maintain, am 9
I ccrrect?
10 MR. HEITNER:
Yes.
11 MR. EBERSOLE:
And how long is your battery good 12 for?
13 MR. HEITNER:
I don't know the answer to that.
14 MR. EBERSOLE:
You don't know the answer to that?
15 How can we get along without knowing that?
16 MR. HEITNER:
Oh, I am sure it has been analyzed 17 and accepted by the staff, but I just don't know offhand.
18 MR. SIESS:
Can the licensee answer that question?
19 MR. EBERSOLE:
How long can you get along without 20 charging the batteries in a shutdown mode?
Am I finding a 21 whole new world in this gas reactor?
22 MR. HOLMES:
I am Mike Holmes, the PSC Nuclear 23 Licensing Manager.
I need to back up here a minute.
The 24 turbine driven heat water pumps that we do have are DC power 25 controlled.
I think the essential safety grade piece of..
P) u.
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gear that we_we have for dealing with the circumstance you i
2 are mentioning would be the engine driven fire water pump 3
that can supply fire water to the liner cooling system.
a 4
MR. EBERSOLE:
No, no, no.
I am not that far down 5
the road yet.
I am at the secondary cooling supply level.
i.
6 MR. HOLMES:
It can supply fire water to the steam I
7 generator that you are talking about as a backup if all the 8
AC methods don't work.
l~
~~~-~9-
~
MR. EBERSOLE:
Right, but you have a way to steam 10 drive aux feed pumps to the steam generators.
11 MR. HOLMES:
They aren't aux feed pumps.
They are 12 DP pumps.
13 MR. EBERSOLE:
And they will do that, but they do 14 require some electrical control-source, which is normally 15 the station batteries, and if I am using that, how long will f
16 I last before I have to go to this engine driven cold water 17 system?
i 18 MR. HOLMES:
I don't know of an analysis that we 19 have done or accident conditions where the batteries are i
20 supplying the controls for the normal power plant.
l 21 MR. EBERSOLE:
So you don't have for this point in i
l 22 time a basis for saying I need or I do not need the t
23 batteries ---
24 MR. SIESS:
Jesse, you started off with a loss of-
)
25 all AC power ---
b J
l
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MR. EBERSOLE:
I did, and then I stepped to the 2
presence of DC power and wanted to know how long I would 3
last on ---
4 MR. SIESS:
What you really want to know is how 5
long they can operate in station blackout, right?
6 MR. EBERSOLE:
That is correct.
That is one of 7
our worst problems.
8 MR. SIESS:
Can you answer that?
9 MR. HOLMES:
If we are talking about a station 10 blackout that goes beyond the five offsite transmission 11 lines and beyond the two diesel generators and beyond the 12 ACM, the third onsite ACM power source ---
13 MR. SIESS:
I think you have to stop with the main
(')
(/
14 diesels.
15 MR. EBERSOLE:
Yes, the main diesels.
16 MR. HOLMES:
If you stop it at the main diesels, 17 we would fall back on this ACM ---
18 MR. EBERSOLE:
What does that mean?
19 MR. HOLMES:
Alternate cooling method.
20 MR. EBERSOLE:
And what is that, electric?
21 MR. SIESS:
It's a dedicated diesel.
22 MR. HOLMES:
It is a dedicated diesel that was put 23 in originally for fire protection purposes that supplies all 24 of the AC needs to the complete list of design basis 25 accident No. 1 equipment.
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(,
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1 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, the analogy to that is the 2
GE's high-pressure core spray diesel which is said to be c
3 more or less independent in bus work and industrial design.
l 4
So it stands clear of all interties.
5 Does this diesel stand clear of all interties?
t t
6 MR. HOLMES:
It relies on a completely separately l
i 7
run set of cables from this ACM diesel generator to all the 8
users in the plant outside of the three-room control l
9 complex.
10 MR. EBERSOLE:
So it is completely independent.
11 Is it a'different engine design?
12 MR. HOLMES:
Yes.
13 MR. EBERSOLE:
Does it take fuel from a different 14 place?
15 MR. HOLMES:
Yes.
16 MR. EBERSOLE:
What horsepower is it?
17 MR. HEITNER:
2500 kilowatts.
18 MR. EBERSOLE:
So it is a fairly large diesel, but 19 it stands clear of all of the electric apparatus?
20 MR. HOLMES:
Yes.
21 MR. EBERSOLE:
Has the staff taken it to be true 22 that this electric power source is not a part of the total 23 blackout?
Is it or is it not?
24 MR. SIESS:
The total blackout is not a licensing 25 issue now.
<~
(_)
1
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1 MR. CALVO:
I think you are going beyond the 2
design basis.
You are assuming that you lose the offsite 3
power and also you are assuming that you lose the two 4
redundant diesels.
You are assuming all those things and 5
then you are asking the question what else is there.
t 6
MR. EBERSOLE:
That is a standard LWR question.
l 7
MR. SIESS:
Not for licensing, Jesse.
8 MR. EBERSOLE:
Oh, I know, but we have to answer 9
that question.
10 MR. CALVO:
I don't know that we have reviewed 1
11 that aspect for Fort St. Vrain.
What we are doing today is 12 we are looking at it only on the licensing basis.
Now when 13
.that thing will be looked at, I don't know.
14 MR. EBERSOLE:
That is one of the highest 15 potential accidents we have today.
16 MR. CALVO:
Your questions are well taken.
You 17 are worrying about if you don't have any offsite power to
,i 18 recharge the batteries how long will the batteries last with 19 that diesel.
We have to look at what happens when you have 20 a blackout at this plant and if what you have there is good 21 enough, but I don't think so far we have looked at it from 22 that standpoint as far as I know.
23 MR. EBERSOLE:
Okay.
Well, anyway, I was only 24 trying to find out how long the batteries would serve to 25 bring secondary cooling water into the boilers.
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MR. SIESS:
They don't need the batteries for 2
that.
3 MR. EBERSOLE:
You don't need them.
4 MR. SIESS:
Let me'just say for those that don't 5
know.
Fort St. Vrain had a problem on fire protection 6
because of the three-room control complex,_which was the 7
switchgear and in the upper-20 feet of that was spaghetti 8
and above that was the control room, and there was no way j
i.
9 that they could get that thing separated out.
4 10 So they decided to put in an alternate cooling i
11 method that starts with-a-diesel driven generator and ends 12 up running everything they need if that three-room control l
13 complex is wiped out, and they cool the core by cooling the 14 liner.
This core is small enough that you can take the heat 15 out with the liner cooling system which is pipes on the
}
16 outside of the liner embedded in the concrete.-
i 17 MR. EBERSOLE:
.That is you maintain it i
]
18 Pressurized.
19 MR. SIESS:
It: is one step in between the modular t
f I
gas-cooled reactor, which can be cooled without a liner.
20 21 cooling system simply by radiation, and the large HTGR that j
J 22 we originally saw for some at Fulton, which could not be 23 cooled that way because the core is too large.
24 MR. EBERSOLE:
Don't they require maintenance of 1
25 helium pressurization?
l ()
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MR. SIESS:
This is DBA-1 we are on, which'is also 2
forced circulation.
The next one is rapid depressurization, 3
and we will take that up when we come to it.
4
.MR.
EBERSOLE:
For this first one, do we maintain 5
Pressurization of the helium?
6 MR. HEITNER:
The delivery of the depressurized 7
reactions move the driving force for pushing the ---
8 MR. EBERSOLE:
You move the thermocoupling to the 9
liner?
10 MR. HEITNER:
Well, it also, if you maintain the 11 reactor pressurized, the heat transfer rate to the liner is i
12 beyond the liner cooling system's capacity.
i 13 MR. EBERSOLE:
Oh, I didn't know that.
(~%
\\)
14 MR. HEITNER:
You also want to depressurize to 15 reduce the rate of heat transfer to the liner cooling 16 systems.
17 MR. EBERSOLE:
You are going to force the heat to 18 be stored in the reactor.
19 MR. SIESS:
Before you can get it out through that 20 particular system.
21 Incidentally, for DBA-1 philosophically we say i
22 Fort St. Vrain doesn't have a containment, but for DBA-1 in 23 effect the PCRV is the containment, plus the reactor 24 building like you have on a boiler to do some filtration.
25 Now that is not true for DBA-2.
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'MR. HEITNER:
Right.
2.
MR.-EBERSOLE:
You are forcing the storage of heat j
3 in the core t:o keep it from getting to the liner?
4 MR. HEITNER:
Right, limiting the rate at which r
5-heat can escape to the liner.
6' MR. EBERSOLE:
That helium goes to the secondary, f
7 or rather the primary containment, the concrete, the liner?
8 MR. HEITNER:
Well, the liner is on the inside.
9 The concrete is maintained at or below its normal operating i
10 temperatures by the fact that the cooling tubes are on the 1
11 inside.
So the heat goes to them as opposed to ---
12 MR. SIESS:
It goes back into the tanks, doesn't i
j 13 it?
i 14 MR. EBERSOLE:
Ybu put helium back in the tanks?
{
15 MR. SIESS:
The helium goes through the 16 reverification system and back into the tanks.
4 I
17 MR. HEITNER:
The-helium can either be put back in 18 the tanks or you can release the inventory to the 19 atmosphere.
You have those two choices.
20 MR. SIErd.
What do-you do with.the. helium when i
21 you depre ssur1F e; i
22 MR. HOLMES:
During the accident condition-r 23 Ldepressurization it is depressurized by its normal pressure
^ '24 feed through the purification train where it is cleaned up, 25 and then it would be released to the atmosphere.
.O 1
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l 73410101 27 marysimons
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l' MR. SIESS:
So it goes throubh the cleanup system.
2 MR. HOLMES:
It goes through the cleanup system i
3 and then is released to the atmosphere.
4 MR. SIESS:
And at that stage of the game you 5
don't have much in it from your fuel failure?
You just have l
l 6
a circulating activity?
I 7
MR. HOLMES:
The failed fission products will be 8
released to the residual pressure which is roughly estimated 9
at five psi.
10 MR. SIESS:
But the helium you are taking out of 11 the depressurizer, you take that out before you have had any 12 fuel failure?
13 MR. HOLMES:
Yes.
14 MR. HEITNER:
The pressurization process is 15 complete before the fuel failure temperature is reached 16 during the heatup phase.
17 MR. HOLMES:
There is a small percentage of fuel 18 that would fail during the depressurization.
It would stop 19 that process prior to any substantial amounts of fuel 20 getting in.
21 MR. SIESS:
Let's move on to DBA-2 then.
You-22 can't get any doses out of DBA-1.
~
23 (Slide.)
24 MR. HEITNER:
DBA-2 is the second accident we talk 25 about, and that is the rapid depressurization accident.
The O\\J ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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4 73410101 28 marysimons
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(_/
1 initiating event for that accident is failure of the inner 2
and outer closures at a single PCRV penetration.
So that 3
the helium can flow from the interior of the reactor out 4
directly into the reactor building.
5 There are significant short-term doses from this 6
mainly from either the fission product inventory that is 7
circulating in the helium at the time the reactor is 8
operating or a fraction of the inventory that is plated out 9
on the interior of the reactor being swept out of the 10 reactor by this particularly violent event.
11 However, the doses again are within the 10 CFR 12 Part 100 guidelines.
13 MR. EBERSOLE:
How does it get through the outer
.4 containment, through leakage or friction or whatever?
\\
15 MR. HEITNER:
No.
It is postulated 16 mechanistically that the closure has failed and this stuff 17 just flows out.
18 MR. SIESS:
What about the reactor building 7
19 itself?
20 MR. HEITNER:
Well, the reactor building i
21 filtration system is not assumed to be effective because 22 either one of two things could happen.
One is a panel could 23 be either be blown out of the reactor building or, second, 24 the louver system could sense the pressure pulse, open and 25 allow that stuff to be released.
So no credit is taken for O
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73410101 29' i
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I the reactor building filtration or the controlled release at 2
the top of the reactor building.
3 Now in actual practice, because of the fact that 4
there has been much better'than assumed in the licensing i
l 5
basis ~ performance-of the fuel, the actual DBA doses would be j.
6 considerably less because.the actual circulating inventory i
7
.and plate-out inventory are a small fraction of what was t
8 assumed at the time.of licensing for that particular 9
accident.
10 Now the staff's analysis of the accident at the 11 time of licensing only considered the doses'that were 12 generated by the initial blow-out.
The staff did not 13 formally review the recovery from this so-called design J
14 basis accident.
i j
15 However, the recovery from this accident, i.e.,
16 the continued cooling of the core to preclude any additional 17 fuel particle failure and any additional release is based on 18 non-safety grade systems.
19 MR. EBERSOLE:
When the plant is depressurized, do
)
l 20 you require the forced convection to maintain a state of no 21 core damage?.
i 22 MR.-HEITNER:
That is right.
t 23 MR. EBERSOLE:
So you have to invoke forced 24 convection to depressurize on helium?
i 25 MR. HEITNER:
Right.
Under normal shutdown you i
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73410101 30 marysimons n()
I wouldn't depressurize.
You would just maintain 2
circulation.
If this event occurs, you would still want to 3
maintain circulation with the coolant at roughly atmospheric 4
Pressure in order to keep the core cool.
5 MR. EBERSOLE:
Do you now squirt water into the 6
system with these crazy seals of yours if you depressurize?
7 MR. HEITNER:
That is not supposed to happen.
8 MR. EBERSOLE:
That would produce some water 9
graphite reactions that are unpopular at the moment.
10 MR. HEITNER:
In the analysis of the plant at the 11 time of licensing, the only water that was assumed to get 12 into the core was from steam generator tube ruptures.
13 MR. EBERSOLE:
What about the experience with the 14 water ingestion under substantial pressure transients like 15 this one with the water buffered seals?
16 MR. HEITNER:
Well, I guess our position is the 17 follows.
If you get water ingress from the helium 18 circulator seal systems during operation, you have still got i
19 the same multiple lines of defense that you have from 20 getting water ingress during a steam generator tube rupture, 21 and in fact, if you have a stream generator tube rupture on 22 the primary system at 2500 psi, you have got much more 23 driving force pushing water in there than you do from the 24 bearing water which is only at about 1000 psi.
.l 25 So any transient that is going to be caused by
)
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73410101 31 g
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water ingress from the circulator seals failing is bounded 2
by the steam generator tube rupture analyses which have 3
already been reviewed and accepted..And there the two lines 4
of defense are the moisture monitors and the overpressure of 5
the plant protective system which senses overpressure in the 6
primary system.
7 MR. EBERSOLE:
Is this low pressure operation pose 8
any threat to the continued operation of the blowers?
They 9
are now operating at atmospheric or near atmospheric 10 pressure.
11 MR. HEITNER:
Well, again, the question that you. -
1 1
12 are postulating is is the water ingress going to happen on 13 one or all four circulators.
14 MR. EBERSOLE:
Yes, right.
15 MR. HEITNER:
Again, you would have to postulate 16 multiple failures ---
17 MR. EBERSOLE:
But'not if they are sufficiently '
18 frequent that you could say they all happened at once, which 4
19 is gather is near the case.
t 20 MR. SIESS:
Excuse me.
I got lost.
You have to 21 operate the circulators after DBA-27.
22 MR. HEITNER:
You have to operate the circulators l
23 after DBA-2.
.In fact, you have to operate two circulators 24 after DBA-2.
25 MR. SIESS:
Have they been analyzed for operating j ()
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73410101 32 marysimons O
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1 at atmospheric pressure?
2 MR. HEITNER:
Yes.
3 MR. EBERSOLE:
And including the seals and the 4
water lubricated bearings?
5 MR. HEITNER:
My understanding is that the 6
circulators are able to operate after DBA-2.
That is in the 7
licensing basis.
It is explicitly called out in the safety 8
analysis of the capability of the circulators to operate ---
9 MR. EBERSOLE:
That does jeopardize the water 10 lubricated bearings to lose pressure on the gas cycle?
11 MR. HEITNER:
I am not aware specifically of a 12 problem.
13 MR. SIESS:
This still again is like DBA-1, it 14 assumes failure of redundant components?
15 MR. HEITNER:
Right.
16 MR. SIESS:
Is it still limited to 100 square 17 inches?
18 MR. HEITNER:
The number I recall, the discharge 19 rate for the helium is 250 pounds per second I believe is 20 the design basis for DBA-2.
21 MR. SIESS:
The 100 square inches ---
22 MR. WALKER:
It is 87, Dr. Siess.
23 MR. SIESS:
What?
24 MR. WALKER:
Eighty-seven square inches.
25 MR. SIESS:
Now that number is only important, as O
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1 I recall in terms of velocity and lift-off, am I right?
2 MR. WALKER:
Yes.
3-MR. SIESS:
So.if-it were greater than that, the g
4-plate-out is not as great as was assumed.
5 MR. HEITNER:
Again, there are specific design 6
features in the penetrations to limit the flow.
7 MR. SIESS:
Now.you were talking about the long-8 term cooling after DBA-2, 9
MR. HEITNER:
You have to drive two circulators 10 after DBA-2, and you have to drive them at a fairly high 11 speed to make up for the reduced density of the helium 12
. cooling.
The way you do that is by using-the boiler feed 13
-pumps, which are a non-safety grade system and are not
.14 capable of being powered by the diesel engines.
You would 15 use the electrically driven boiler feed pump to supply 16 enough high-pressure water to the circulators in order to 17 drive them to have a DBA-2 cooldown.
18 MR. SIESS:
You have got a hole'in'the vessel now 19 and helium stays in there?
20 MR. HEITNER:
Yes.
The rate a which the air is 21 going diffuse back into the reactor vessel is shown to be 22 sufficiently small in the FSAR that a tiny amount of oxygen 23 does get back in there and will reactor with the graphite, 24 but it is very,-very small.
~
25 MR. SIESS:
Now what is the alternate recover from O
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-sarysimons 1
this DBA-27 2
MR. HEITNER:
Just keep circulating what remaining 3
helium is in there ---
4 MR. SIESS:
Do you use.the.ACM at all?
5 MR. HEITNER:
No.
You have to have offsice power 6
because the requirements for the boiler feed pumps exceed I 7
believe the capacity of the ACM or the-diesel generators.
8 MR. SIESS:
And you keep cooling it with helium?
9 MR. HEITNER:
Right.
10 MR. SIESS:
And that includes the steam generators 11 are still working to take heat out?
12 MR. HEITNER:
Right.
13 MR. SIESS:
If they weren't working, could you.use 14 the ACM7 15 MR. HEITNEP.:
I can't answer that question, but I 16 don't think you can.
17 MR. EBERSOLE: 'Well, now wait a minute.
18 MR. SIESS:
Let me get.the answer to that question 19 first.
20 MR.. HOLMES:
There would be a choice that you 21 could use the ACM electricity to keep the aux boilers going, 22 which in turn could keep the turbine driven boiler heat 23 pumps working.
24 MR. SIESS:
But the ACM itself couldn't take out 25 the decay heat?
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1 MR. HOLMES:
Some of this is getting into the 2
sorts of things we looked at for Chernobyl, and the accident 3
consequences are entirely different than DBA-2, but even in 4
that case there were some possibilities for using minor 5
cooling to ultimately protect the public health and safety 6
relative to the 10 CFR 100 guidelines, but it goes beyond 7
the design basis accident.
8 MR. WARD:
What are your emergency operating 9
procedures for shift crews to do in those circumstances?
10 MR. HOLMES:
To keep the two boiler feed pumps 11 going and circulate helium fast enough that the core cools 12 down and never suffers any fuel damage, that none of the 13 fuel particles fail in this accident.
14 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, in the earlier case where you 15 lost forced circulation cooling, you deliberately 16 depressurized, and you were storing heat in the core for 17 subsequent distribution sometime or other by some means 18 undefined, and I don't know what they were.
19 Now in that case you had no rotative equipment at 20 all, and in this case where you have rapid depressurization 21 you must invoke continued rotational cooling, forced 22 convection cooling and I guess a heat sink, which is the 23 steam generators.
So from the standpoint of the 24 thermodynamic equipment it is pretty much the same as it was 25 when you were running, except you don't need as many, O
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73410101 36 marysimons 1
and the pressure is lower.
2 So on a rapid depressurization you have to keep 3
the blowers going and the secondary side going and you 4
cannot depart from that into DBA-17
{
5 MR. HEITNER:
Without suffering additional doses, 6
yes.
7 MR. SIESS:
Without what?
8 MR. HEITNER:
Without suffering additional doses 9
because the DBA-2 dose is coming from the circulating 10 inventory and the plate-out inventory.
11 MR. EBERSOLE:
WeII, you have already suffered 12 that, and now by rotating equipment it is lost.
13 MR. HEITNER:
Well, then you are going to have an 14 additional dose from the eventual fuel failure.
15 MR. EBERSOLE:
But now I will revert to DBA-1.
16 MR. HEITNER:
In licensing the plant, the staff 17 only analyzed the radiological consequences during the first 18 Phase of DBA-1, and they assumed that the cooling was 19 successful thereafter.
They did not consider the doses from 20 subsequent failure of the ability to cool the core.
21 MR. EBERSOLE:
With forced convection.
22 MR. HEITNER:
With the forced circulation.
23 MR. EBERSOLE:
They didn't descend from DBA-2 to 24 DBA-1 after ---
25 MR. HEITNER:
Right.
O 3
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73410101 37 marysimons
)
1 MR. SIESS:
If you want to know what the doses i
2 are, Jesse, look at the next slide, which is a Chernobyl 3
accident analysis which I think will give you an upper bound 4
anyway.
That postulates a lot of fuel failure.
5 (Slide.)
6 MR. HEITNER:
As a consequence of the Chernobyl 7
accident in early May, we held discussions with PSC about 8
what consequences could be considered beyond the licensing 9
basis of Fort St. Vrain, in other words, the calculations 10 that I have just discussed that were done at the time of 11 licensing, to address the question of what if you had a 12 failure beyond that.
13 The scenario that PSC postulated was a failure of 14 both closures and the largest penetrations on the top and 15 the bottom of the PCRV so that you created a chimney effect, 16 1.e.,
air could come in the bottom of the reactor, go up 17 through the core and then come out the largest penetration 18 at the top.
19 MR. EBERSOLE:
Isn't the failure of one closure in 20 effect a depressurization mechanism that precludes the 21 failure of the other?
22 MR. HEITNER:
As I said, this is a postulated 23 scenario.
At the time we postulated it, I think we both 24 realized that its probability of being a realistic 25 occurrence was very, very low, and I believe that is ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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documented in the PSC's submittal concerning this.
2 MR. SIESS:
I think that was about as close to 3
incredible as I have heard.
4 MR. HEITNER:
However, that was the only way we 4
5 felt we could address the question of what happens to the 6
Fort St. Vrain core if it oxidizes.
So PSC with support 7
from DA carried that analysis to its conclusion.
8 Well, the interesting conclusions are the follows:
4 i
9 First of all, that the graphite oxidation ns an I
10 additional source of heat energy is not very significant.
1 11 In other words, the problem primarily remains that of 12 removing the decay heat from the reactor and the additional i
13 energy, heat, thermal energy contributed by the graphite 4
14 oxidation is not that significant.
In other words, the I
15 scenario doesn't change that much when you consider the i
i 16 graphite oxidation.
I 17 MR. EBERSOLE:
Did the boilers in this case keep i
}
18 running?
j 19 MR. HEITNER:
No, no circulation.
1 20 MR. EBERSOLE:
They were deliberately turned off?__.
21 MR. HEITNER:
Well, I guess my recollection was i
22 that it doesn't make a lot of difference whether the blowers 1
23 run or not because both ends of the reactor are open and you i
24 can't develop a pressure differential across the core to i
25 cause any flow through it.
IO i
i ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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73410101 39 marysimons rx I, j 1
MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, let' see, external to these 2
apertures was air, right?
3 MR. HEITNER:
On both sides.
4 MR. EBERSOLE:
Don't I start to recirculate air in 5
whatever amount of differential I can get from the top to 6
the bottom across the floor?
7 MR. HEITNER:
Again, what the 8
MR. EBERSOLE:
I don't want to have a blow torch.
9 MR. HEITNER:
Okay.
What I am told, when the 10 calculations were done from the models that existed is that 11 you can't develop a very significant pressure differential 12 across the core.
So it doesn't matter whether the blowers 13 are running or not.
14 MR. SIESS:
What they tried to do was get an 15 unlimited supply of air.
16 MR. HEITNER:
And the basic supply of air comes 17 through the reactor from the convection effect.
The cool 18 air comes in the bottom, is heated by the energy being 19 released by the core and then goes out through the top as 20 hot air.
So you have a convection type effect.
21 MR. EBERSOLE:
And that was all done by 22 calculation rather than any model test or combustion test.
23 That is different from many years ago when we were studying 24 the same problem on the gas reactor where it was found that 25 whereas microscopic experimentation showed you it would not O
\\/
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73410101 40 marysimons r
O
\\/
1 ignite, but that if.you looked real closely at the 2
conflagration phenomenon it was autocatalytic and you didn't i
3 really know it.
t 4
MR. SHEWMON:
Jesse, let me say they haven't done 5
any combustion tests, but they have certainly done oxidation l
6 and kinetic studies, and that is the same as combustion the 7
last time I heard.
J 8
MR. EBERSOLE:
I heard you say studies, and I am i
9 talking about experimentation.
10 MR. SHEWMON:
Well, I am sure they did 11 measurements, you certainly don't calculation ab initio.
I 12 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, I recall that was the death 13 knell of the old EGCR.
They found it was autocatalytic.
O 14 MR. SHEWMON:
If you would like to hear about the I
15 oxidation and kinetic studies, I suspect you could_get a 16 report.
17 MR. SIESS:
What do you mean by catalytic?
18 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, I mean it was autocatalytic.
19 It started fires below the visible limit in the microscopic i
20 thermal testing program.
21 MR. SIESS:
But this analysis assumes it burns.
22 MR. EBERSOLE:
A little bit.
23 MR. SHEWMON:
It is a matter of how fast.
24 MR. HOLMES:
For the Chernobyl reactor accident 25 analysis for the two penetrations blown out, it was assumed i
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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73410101 41 marysimons
)
1 that all of the air that entered the core oxidized and 2
turned to 00-2 a hundred percent.
3 Mn. EBERSOLE:
It was limited by the oxygen.
4 MR. HOLMES:
Right.
The process was limited.by 5
the oxygen that entered and there as plenty of graphite to 6
consume all the oxygen.
7 MR. EBERSOLE:
Okay.
I get the picture.
It was 8
started by that.
9 MR. SIESS:
All the oxygen you could get in by the 10 holes.
11 MR. HOLMES:
Right, and that whatever heat was 12 generated by that oxidation was taken into account with the 13 decay heat.
14 MR. EBERSOLE:
Now this is with the blowers turned 15 off?
16 MR. HOLMES:
yes.
17 MR. EBERSOLE:
And you would turn them off?
18 MR. HOLMES:
For the purposes of this particular 19 scenario, we did turn them off and we didn't take any credit 20 for them.
I a
21 MR. EBERSOLE:
And now you are taking the heat to 22 the liner?
23 MR. HEITNER:
Well, some hett is going to the t
24 liner and some heat is going convectively up with the oxygen 25 that is going out the top penetration.
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(~'i
(_/
1 MR. EBERSOLE:
Those steam generators are not 2
functioning?
3 MR. HEITNER:
They can't because the convective 4
flow is the wrong way, and the steam generators are below 5
the reactor core.
6 MR. SIESS:
If you don't do anything, you are 7
going to have a mess, but it can terminated.
8 MR. HEITNER:
The next question was could such an 9
event be terminated.
PSC calculated that they could 10 terminate such an event by flooding the lower half of the 11 reactor building to eventually seal off the lower 12 penetration and that would take about 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
And during 13 that 24-hours the amount of structural damage done by the 14 oxidation of the graphite was negligible.
So the core was 15 going to remain intact.
16 Then they calculated the dose consequences from 17 this event and they found that the dose consequences were 18 again within 10 CFR Part 100 Ilmits with a low population 19 zone, and those calculations are all in the document.
20 MR. SIESS:
That is a 30-day dose.
21 MR. HEITNER:
yes, I believe that is right.
22 (Slide.)
23 Now I would like to proceed to discuss how the two 24 design basis accidents come into consideration in both fire 25 Protection and equipment qualification.
O V
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First I would like to address that in terms of 2
fire protection.
3 Basically in June of 1984, the staff gave Fort St.
4 Vrain a special interpretation of Appendix R because of Fort 5
St. Vrain's unique configuration and design.
~
6 The staff accepted the fact that certain fires in 7
Fort St. Vrain, that the only feasible recovery was with the 8
alternate cooling method, in other words, the normal cooling j
9 methods would clearly be destroyed by the fire and you I
10 couldn't take credit for them.
1 11 In particular, the fires include those in the 12 three-roon control complex, in the congested cable areas and 13 the G and J walls, and I will show you what those are in 14 second.
15 (Slide.)
16 This area in the plant here, the control room and 17 the two rooms directly below it are the three-room control 18 complex.
There is an awfully cabling on the upper levels of 19 these complexes and in the lower levels in the control room.
20 MR. SIESS:
Am I right that it is really two 21 rooms?
22 MR. HEITNER:
Well, there is really a third level 23 in here.
It just doesn't show on this chart.
24 MR. SIESS:
I thought I could stand at the 25 switchgear and see all the way up.
There was something else ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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i 73410101 44
-marysimons 1
above that.
2 MR. HEITNER:
There is.the switchgear room down i
3 here and there is a computer-room with the cable spreading
}
4 area on its ceiling over here.
5 MR. EBERSOLE:
So you have conceded that.that bay i
6 is virtually shut?
7 MR. HEITNER:
Well, I will comment on.that in a 8
minute.
)
9 MR. EBERSOLE:
Okay.
i 10 MR. HEITNER:
Let me just show you where the 1
4 11 balance of the congested cable areas are.
12 (Slide.)
f 13 The congested cable areas are here on the G and J 14 walls immediately adjacent.
These are cables that are 15 Penetrating these walls, i
16 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, I gather there was virtually j
17 no fire considerations by the A/E when he put it together.
i f
18 MR. HEITNER:
The three-room control complex, and l
19 I will turn to fire protection, are these three rooms are t
20 Protected by automatic halon systems to maximize the 1
21 Possibility that any fire in those rooms would be l
22 extinguished as soon as it is detected.
23 MR. EBERSOLE:
That is if it originates in those i
24 rooms.
25 MR. SIESS: _Doesn't that cabling have Flamastic
- O ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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73410101 45
] ~
marysimons l
1 on it?
i l
2 MR. HEITNER:
Yes, the cabling also has a lot of 3
Flamastic on it and there are some provisions for separation 4
in the fact.that the third train instumentation is in 5
conduit I believe within the control complex.
But the i
6 question is the inadequacy of the separation was actually 1
7 realized back in like the
'75,
'76 or '77 time frame.
That i
8 is when the ACM was originally installed as a way of I
j 9
compensating for the lack of separation of the cabling.
7 MR. SIESS:
So the ACM was put in more to l
10 f
11 compensate for the lack of separation than for the lack of 12 fire protection?
j 13 MR. HEITNER:
Yes, but let me explain.
What we 14 have also done is we have tried to maximize the fire l
I 15 protection for these cable areas to minimize the probability i
16 that you will have to call on the ACM.
~
[
17 Now I believe there are full sprays insofar as the i
l 18 fire protection feature for the G and J wall congested cable 19 area.
l l
20 MR. EBERSOLE:
Those are full sprays in the 21 context that they spray fully on all operational channels i
t 22 simultaneously?
i 2J See, I just out of spending a morning on fire 24 protection, and ons of the issues is do you-concurrently I
25 spray all viable channels for shutdown at one time.
I ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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73410101 46 marysimons
./~T
()
1 MR. HEITNER:
I believe what it means is there is 2
a complete spray of that area should any of the detectors in 3
that area detect ---
4 MR. EBERSOLE:
So wetting will inundate all of 5
your apparatus ar.d hope that ---
6 MR. ;fEITNER:
This is just cabling.
7 MX. EBERSOLE:
Oh, just cabling.
8 MR. HEITNER:
Just cabling.
9 MR. EBERSOLE:
Okay.
It is accepted that you can 10 inundate all of the critical cabling simultaneously in 11 generic practice.
12 MR. SIESS:
It is accepted that you can burn it 13 all simultaneously.
'T k' /
14,
MR. EBERSOLE:
That you can burn it all out.
15 MR. SIESS:
you can burn it all out, wipe it out.
16 MR. EBERSOLE:
So you can really lose that bay or 17 the control room I take it.
18 MR. HEITNER:
Well, the cabling on the G and J 19 walls -- if the fire was here on the G wall, you wouldn't 20 lose the cabling in here because this wall is a fire 21 barrier.
But what you are protecting is this area right 22 adjacent to the wall where the cable is all packed together 23 and not adequately separated.
24 MR. EBERSOLE:
Does the cabling enter the control 25 room frr,m tne bottom or the side or the top or all?
O ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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73410101 47 marysimons 1
MR. HEITNER:
It enters the control room from the 2
bottom.
3 MR. EBERSOLE: _ Well, if I turn out:the spreading 4
room, which you.just described, and carry with it the 5
control room, can I safely shutdown?
]
6
.MR. HEITNER:
Yes, with the ACM.
?
7 MR. EBERSOLE:
With the ACM.
So there is some 8
other place yet you haven't shown us.
9 MR. HEITNER:
Well, let me get to the ACM.
I have 10 that a few slides further.
11 MR. EBERSOLE:
Okay.
Go ahead.
12 (Slide.)
13 MR. HEITNER:
Now for those specific fires that 14 the ACM protects you against, the ACM supports reactivity-15 control which is, in addition to the shutdown with the 16 control rods, the insertion of the reserve shutdown material 17 to give you an additional shutdown margin.
18 So continued operation of the PCRV liner cooling 19 system, depressurization of the PCRV, the reactor building 20 exhaust system and the associated monitoring equipment.
i 21 Basically what that. allows you to do is if 22 circulation cooling cannot be restored because of the extent 23 of the damage, the ACM allows you to satisfy all the entry I
24 conditions for the DBA-1 scenario, permanent loss of forced 25 circulation cooling, and appropriate limit the dose from
(}
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73410101 48 marysimons 1
that scenario to the very low levels that are associated 2
with it.
3 Basically what the staff has said is that the ACM 4
is the accepted alternative if you can't restore forced 5 ~
circulation cooling.
6 MR. EBERSOLE:
In calling it acceptable, is it 7
acceptable in the context of now diminishing fire 8
requirements all over the place to be consistent with the 9
notion that you permit the whole bay to go?
10 MR. SIESS:
Just in those three areas, Jesse.
11 MR. EBERSOLE:
What I heard you say is you are 12 going to be able to lose the control room, the spreading 13 room and virtually the whole bay and still shut down 14 safely.
But then I hear the contradictory thing that all 15 over the place you are still putting in fire retardant 16 systems.
17 MR. SIESS:
Let him get to it.
18 MR. HEITNER:
Let's get back to what we are trying i
19 to do here.
What we are trying to do here is the 20 following.
21 The Appendix R requirement would be that you could i
22 shut down the plant without radiological consequences no 23 matter where the fire occurred in the plant.
24 What the staff has done for Fort St. Vrain because 25 of its unique design is the following.
O ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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73410101 49 marysimons n(_)
1 It said for those fires in the control complex or 2
the G and J walls, which would damage the plant to the point 3
where you didn't have forced circulation cooling, do the 4
following.
5 Minimize the possibility of the fire doing severe 6
damage by putting in very good fire protection systems, 7
1.e.,
halon suppression systems and the full sprays so we 8
minimize the possibility of doing the damage.
9 However, if that damage does occur, we then accept 10 the fact that the ACM operation, because that is a separate 11 system, can still shut down the plant in accordance with the 12 DBA-1 scenario and limit the radiological consequences to 13 the very small consequences of that scenario.
14 So what we have done is we have said to reduce the 15 probability of that fire occurring, we have said the 16 consequences if it does occur are small enough to be 17 acceptable.
18 MR. EBERSOLE:
This is a fairly massive fire 19 Problem.
The control room, that contains I presume hundreds 20 of Potentials for starting fires that if you tried to cope 21 with local protection, but you argue in the end it didn't 22 work.
So you go to the ACM, right?
23 MR. HEITNER:
Right.
Now the balance of the i
24 Plant, all the other zones in the plant, we are still going 25 through this analysis that PSC has submitted to us and we ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coserage 800-336-6646
i l'
73410101.
50 l
marysimons 1
are still reviewing it,.but the balance of the plant has to i
2 meet the normal Appendix R requirements.for safe shutdown.
I-i 3
In other words, if a fire occurs here, here or l
4 anywhere else in the plant, they have to have demonstrated 1
l 5
that if it damages components, that it is only components of h
6
.one train and that there is a separate train for shutting i
7 down the plant.
I 8
MR. EBERSOLE:
However, it is still conceded that I
j 9
if that damage occurred, despite of the protection, you can 10 invoke the same thing you did for the large area.
]
11 MR. HEITNER:
For the balance of the plant you are a
j 12 less concerned with the immediate suppression of the fire-1 13 because what you are saying is you can accept the damage to J p j
v 14 one train, but the trains are adequately separated so the i
i 15 other train will remain' undamaged by the fire andLtherefore l
16 you can safely shut down the plant with that other train.
17 M'R.
EBERSOLE:
What I am really trying to analyze
}
18 is why you permitted the-destruction of a very large sector i
i I
19 of the plant and put a catching system for that and 1
i 20 acknowledged that you would lose it, but if.I go out in the..
}
21 boondocks in the turbine hall some place I can't do that.
i l
22 MR. HEITNER:
No.
In the turbine hall the j
23 requirement is more severe.
You can lose one train, but you 24
.have to have another train that is physically separated.
i 25 MR. EBERSOLE:
I am trying to find the logic of I
i j
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~
.~
. ~ = ~
. - ~ _ - - -. -.
2
.73410101-51 marysimons
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I why it is more severe.
6 2
MR. HEITNER:
Well, it is more severe in that you 3'
have to have a second complete train.
i.
4 MR.-EBERSOLE:
Well, you permitted the loss of 5
that in the particular area which was impossible to deal 6
with.
t t
]
7 MR. SIESS:
There was no way they could provide 8
separation ---
9 MR..EBERSOLE:
What I am hearing, Chet, is where 10 they couldn't do anything they were permitted a recourse, i
11 and where they can do something they are trying to do it.
i 12' MR. HEITNER:
Right.
13 There is a chart in there that illustrates the 14 systems supported by the ACM,.but since I have already gone i
15 through the ACM function in detail, I won't go over the i
i 16 actual technical-details of those systems.
l
)
17 (Slide.)
1 18 Let.me go ahead and talk about ---
i
}
19 MR. SIESS:
Ken, is that all you have to say about j
I j
20 the balance of plant fire protection?
i
- 21 MR. HEITNER:
Yes.
The balance of my discussion l
i i
22 now was to talk about the DBA's in terms of equipment i
23 protection and then to go into further topics that are.
i 24 related to it.
t 25 MR. SIESS:
To summarize, the balance of plant, 1
i i
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~-
73410101 52 marysimons 1
other than those three areas, it is the standard fire 2
protection procedures, separation, barriers, plus sprays and 3
all the other stuff?
4 MR. HEITNER:
.Yes.
And after the April 3rd 5
meeting we provided you with copies of the staff's safety 6
evaluation that_ developed that plan.
7 MR. EBERSOLE:
So the general picture is where you 8
couldn't do anything because of the complexity, you built an 9
entity some place to cope with that?
10 MR.-HEITNER:
Yes.
Now you have to realize the 11 ACM exceeded Appendix R.
What we did was-we said since we 12 essentially accepted the ACM back in the
'75, 76, or '77 13 time frame, we did not apply any new requirements ---
14 MR. EBERSOLE:
Appendix R came_along, and 15 certainly the area that you decided was lost could not 16 comply, but these more simple isolated areas they could.
So 17 you invoked that they had to meet Appendix R even though you 18 had this recourse not normally available.
19 MR. SIESS:
Did you start working on Appendix R at 20 the beginning?
That is not something new.
I mean when 21 Appendix R came out you recognized that you had the areas 22 covered by it.
23 MR. HOLMES:
When Appendix R came out, there was a 24 short-term amount of confusion related to alternate cooling 25 methods and whether credit could be taken for the ACM or not O
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1 73410101 53 marysimons 1
relative to the question of cable separation.
2 In the case of Appendix R we were audited early on i
3 with fire protection engineers and we reached a common 1
3 4_
understanding as to what the scope of the regulation was and 5
what applied and what didn't apply and worked out this set j
6 of ground rules that Ken is talking about that we have been 7
implementing since about June of
'84.
I 8
MR. SIESS:
It took that long to get that far 9
along?
10 MR. HOLMES:
Appendix R came out in about February 11 of
'83.
)
12 MR. SIESS:
Well, that is not bad.
13 MR. HOLMES:
It took a while to sort things out.
14 MR. SIESS:
It took everybody a while to sort 15 things out on Appendix R.
16 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, just this morning we had this i
17 discussion on this very topic on a broad base and it was i
i 18 argued that if you had a really reliable and dependent means 19 to maintain safety, which I don't really whether this 20 boundary cooling system is, that one could make concessions i
21 and not be so rigorous in the application of Appendix R 22 throughout the plant approaching commercial grade safety.
23 As long as you had a good system to protect the 24 safety which was isolated and diverse and really know to be l
25 competent.
In short, it says if you had a virtually perfect _,
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}
73410101 54 marysimons I
and conservative system out here in the cooling system, you 2
could go back and approach commercial standards in the 3
application of Appendix R.
4 4
You all are not there yet, are you?
you are doing 5
the rigorous Appendix R standards wherever you can.
6 MR. HOLMES:
In the balance of plant we are doing 7
the rigorous application.
1 8
MR. EBERSOLE:
I think what was expressed in this 9
meeting this morning, which was an important one, was that I,
10 there is a degree of moderation at least to be considered in l
11 trying to approach the Appendix R problem if you have got
]
12 this good backup system.
l 13 MR. SIESS:
Ken, when you go out into the balance 14 of the plant and look at fire protection what is the success i
15 criteria if the fire takes out two trains?
Two trains of 16 what, something that the ACM can't take care of?
What can 17 happen in the balance of plant that the ACM can't take care 18 of?
19 MR. HEITNER:
The ACM would still nominally be 1
20 available to take care of a fire in the-balance of plant, f
21 but what wa are asking PSC to do is to demonstrate that
{
22 there is more than the ACM, that you have the capability of i
i 23 doing forced circulation cooldown with no core damage in the i
24 balance of plant.
I 25 MR. SIESS:
A-forced circulation cooldown.
i
()
i
+
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()
1 MR. HEITNER:
In other words, they have to be able 2
to supply water to one steam generator and operate one 3
circulator in that loop.
4 MR. SIESS:
So your success criterion then for i
5 fire '1:s to be able to reach a forced circulation cooldown 6
with what, no core damage?
l 7
MR. HEITNER:
No core damage, j.
8 MR. SIESS:
Why do you care about core damage?
9 MR. HEITNER:
Because the Appendix R requirement 10 is that you are not allowed to have any radiological 11 consequences.
12 MR. SIESS:
Well, that doesn't' mean core damage.
13 It has to get out first.
14 MR. HEITNER:
I understand that.
15 MR. SIESS:
Are you talking about no offsite doses 16 or no core damage?
It seems to me core damage is their 17 problem.
Our problem is people.
1 I
j 18 MR. HEITNER:
I guess you.could interpret that to j
i i
19 mean dose.
l 20 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, ACM does lead to core damage.
J 4.
21 MR. HEITNER:
And to dose consequences, d
~
22 MR. EBERSOLE:
It is a less than perfect system by J
23 a long shot.
24 MR. HEITNER:
That is right.
I
-25 MR. SIESS: 'It will shut.you down well within Part
()
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73410101 56 marysimons 1
100.
2 MR. EBERSOLE:
Yes, but it poses a challenge to 3
contain whatever damage occurs, and I guess the core is lost 4
forever and so is the project.
Am I correct?
5 MR. HEITNER:
Right.
6 MR. EBERSOLE:
Then you have to bury it.
7 MR. SIESS:
Well, they bury it anyway bit by bit.
8 (Laughter.)
9 MR. EBERSOLE:
So the ACM is less than a core 10 protector.
11 MR. SIESS:
Is that right?
It is a people i
12 Protector and not a core protector.
13 MR. HOLMES:
ACM keeps the fission product 14 barrier, the liner and the concrete both intact, but not the 15 core.
The graphite would be still there in block form.
16 MR. EBERSOLE:
This morning we were talking about 17 something that protected the core, too, something better 18 than ACM.
e 19 MR. HOLMES:.ACM would not keep the. fuel particles 20 from failing.
21 MR. SIESS:
So the staff's philosophy in wanting 22 to protect the core is to prevent a challenge.
23 MR. EBERSOLE:
Yes.
It is like GDC-17 or the main 24 feedwater system, to make it good.
25 MR. SIESS:
Now is that success criterion.that you C)
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73410101 57 marysimons
(
1 have stated clearly understood on both sides now?
2 (No verbal responses.)
3 Okay, next item.
4 I think I understand where you stand on fire 5
protection, and I think Jesse does.
6 Does Dr. Mark have any more questions about this?
7 MR. MARK:
No.
8 MR. SIESS:
How about you, John?
Do you think you 9
understand it?
l 10 MR. McKINLEy:
Yes.
t 11 MR. SIESS:
We are making progress, t
12 Go ahead.
13 (Slide.)
14 MR. HEITNER:
Now I would like to talk about 15 design basis accidents in relation to equipment 16 qualification compliance with 10 CFR 50.49 17 PSC and the staff have gone back and forth on 18 this.
PSC's position is as follows:
19 For a design basis accident No.
1, permanent loss 20 of forced circulation cooling, a harsh environment is not 21 created because there is no heatup of the reactor building.
22 There is some radioactivity released into the reactor 23 building, but the total dose is less than in the order of a 24 thousand rads.
The staff has said that doses lower than 25 1000 rado, you don't have to consider in terms of equipment O
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73410101 58 marysimons
(
1 qualification.
2 So the equipment that is used to mitigate that J
3 particular accident is functioning in its normal ambient 4
environment for all intents and purposes of the rules' 5
consideration and therefore doesn't have to come under the 6
rules and requirements for qualification.
In other words, I
7 equipment is continuing to operate in its normal environment 8
and therefore you don't have to put it into your equipment 9
qualification.
10 MR. EBERSOLE:
You are speaking in the limited
)
i 11 context of the radiation requirement.
What about 12 temperature and hot gases?
13 MR. HEITNER:
There is no hot gas released.
The 14 depressurization train is seeing its normal design function.
15 MR. EBERSOLE:
There is no active equipment inside 16 the liner?
1 17 MR. HEITNER:
There is no active equipment inside I
18 of the liner, with the exception of the circulators, and 19 they are qualified to operate.
.They are operating in the 20 normal environment.
We aren't taking credit for that.
21 MR. EBERSOLE:
Speaking of the ACM, what is-it, i
l 22 embedded pipes in concrete?
i 23 MR. SIESS:
I will explain that later.
)
24 MR. HEITNER:
Are you talking about the cooling 1
I 25 coils in the liner?
i
($).
i i
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1 MR. EBERSOLE:
Go ahead.
He will get to it later.
2 MR. SIESS:
I will explain it to him later.
3 MR. HEITNER:
They are square pipes that are 4
welded on the outside of the liner.
5 MR. SIESS:
I'll educate-Jesse later.
6 MR. HEITNER:
Okay.
The next act that this 7
involved here is the high-energy line break.
This is a 8
break of a high-pressure feedwater line, of a primary main 9
streamline, of a cold reheat line or the hot reheat line 10 going back to the turbine, any of those four classes of 11 lines.
12 Now for the high-energy line break, and I will get 13 into this later when I come back and talk about the 14 automatic isolation system that has been proposed, that high-15 energy line break is going to be automatically isolated in 16 the future operation of the plant.
17 So it leads you, because the circulators are steam 18 driven, the isolation of the steamlines leads to a loss of 19 forced' circulation cooling that is temporary.
you have to 20 restore of course circulation cooling by then going to the 21 water drive for the circulators, to the pelton wheels, and 22 you also still have to supply water to the steam generators 23 to remove the decay heat.
24 That whole system falls under the scope of the 25 equipment qualification program, and they are going to have O
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I when they are done with the EQ program a qualified system to 2
do that.
In other words, all the systems that do that will 3
be covered by the EQ program.
4 MR. EBERSOLE:
In designing the chases for these 5
pipes-there was no attempt to vent or discharge the 6
hypothetical burst pipe to open atmosphere and clear th'e I
7 problem that way, was there?
8 MR. HEITNER:
Well, let me just say that the 9
reactor building is not designed to withstand a great deal i
10 of pressure.
It has a louver system that can relieve it and 11 it has blowout panels.
It is not designed to be pressure 12 restraining.
The front of the turbine building is all j
13 glass.
So in doing the calculations for what happens after 14 a steamline break, we find that you can't develop very much
]-
15 pressure in these buildings simply because they are not very 16 substantial.
17 MR. EBERSOLE:
It is not compartmentalized.
18 MR. HEITNER:
No, there are no compartments.
19 Basically there are two compartments that are considered.
?
20 One is the reactor building and the other is the turbine
)
21 building, and neither of them at break creates a high 22 temperature environment.
)
23 MR. EBERSOLE:
A transient 1 you propose to make 4
24-right by rapid closure?
25 MR. HEITNER:
Right, and I am going to get back to
~()
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that in a minute.
s 2
MR. EBERSOLE:
Now that involves valving which can 3
close against dynamic heads and will guarantee closure?
4 4
MR. SIESS:
Wait until he gets to that, Jesse.
5 MR. EBERSOLE:
All right.
6 MR. SIESS:
Ken, are you sure the cure isn't worst 7
than the illness here?
8 MR. EBERSOLE:
That is what I was wondering.
9 MR. SIESS:
You have a high-energy line break and 10 some equipment might fail, but what you are sure in hell 11 going to do is cut off the steam supply to the circulators.
12 MR. EBERSOLE:
Whenever the ventilation system 13 fails because you are going to detect it on temperature.
(
14 MR. SIESS:
Has anybody ever done a risk analysis 15 on this?
f 16 MR. HEITNER:
No.
17 MR. SIESS:
I mean we are taking what I think is a 18 drastic measure because right now when I turn off those darn a
19 circulators I've got a good chance of water getting in 20 there.
21 MR. EBERSOLE:
What has been found in this attempt 22 in other plants is that in order to detect this break and 23 start some action they have put temperature detectors and 24 flow detectors.
But the temperature detectors respond to 25 loss of cooling and they stop the steam flow when you need O
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it when you have a high ambient when there is no steam 2
break.
It is a system interactive effect which has rather 3
common across the industry.
4 MR. HEITNER:
I will get back to describing this 5
event.
6 Let me continue to just about how this relates to 7
the design basis accident.
8 MR. SIESS:
Let's go ahead because we are coming 9
back to the steamline and leak detection and isolation 10 system or whatever it is called.
11 MR. HEITNER:
12 (Slide.)
13 Design basis accident 2, the reactor C_D
/
14 depressurization accident, is a little bit more complex.
It 15 creates a harsh environment in the reactor building because 16 the hot helium comes out into the reactor building.
17 Therefore, the equipment that is used to mitigate DBA-2 in 18 the reactor building is considered to be within the scope of 19 the EQ program and will be qualified.
20 However, the harsh environment that is created by __
21 that design basis accident is enveloped by the high-energy 22 line break, the steamline or feedwater line breaks.
So that 23 those envelopes, those temperature profiles are the ones 24 that PSC is qualifying all of the equipment to.
25 MR. SIESS:
For the high-energy line break, is O
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that environment based on the isolation in a certain time?
2 MR. HEITNER:
Right, and I will get back to that 3
in a minute.
Now in the turbine building there is no impact 4
from DBA-2.
It doesn't create a harsh environment in the 5
turbine building.
So the equipment that is in the turbine 6
building that is used to mitigate DBA-2'is operating in its 7
normal environment and therefore doesn't have to be 8
qualified under the rule.
9 The staff has said to PSC that we accept this 10 position.
We haven't said it formally, but we have said it.
11 to them and it is documented that we have said this.
12 MR. EBERSOLE:
Let me ask a question about this 13 automatic response to this break.
,s 14 MR. SIESS:
Jesse, out of order because he has got 15 a wnole section on this.
16 MR. EBERSOLE:
Okay.
All right then.
17 MR. SIESS:
The staff is still reviewing it for 18 one thing.
19 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, I heard the word automatic, 20 Chet, and I was wondering if there was a manual option.
21 MR. SIESS:
Just wait.
22 MR. HEITNER:
At this point I have one more slide 23 on the ACM, but I think we have gone through that thoroughly-24 enough.
So I skip over that.
No, there is one thing on 25 this slide that I wanted to say about the ACM.
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1 (Slide.)
2 I think we have gone over the ACM's role in fire 3
Protection.
I was going to just say because this question 4
was asked by Mr. McKinley, is there any role for the ACM in 5.
EQ.
And, no, the ACM has no role in EQ.
It hasn't been 6
Proposed to have any role in EQ.
It is solely for fire 7
Protection considerations.
8 Let me go ahead now and talk a little bit more 9
about some details of the equipment qualification program, 10 and mainly how the harsh environments are selected, what is 11 the safety significance of the EQ to Fort St. Vrain, and 12 because the ACRS asked us at the last meeting on June 3rd 13 about the basis for the 35 percent power limitation that PSC
(
14 operated under from February to May of this year, I will go 15 back and explain that one.
16 (Slide.)
17 Let's start with the harsh environment.
As I said 18 before, the harsh environments are created by high-energy 19 line breaks.
Fort St. Vrain,.because it creates superheated 20 steam and has the high temperature reheat cycle, which again_,
i 21 reheats the steam to 1000 degrees, is in a unique position i
1 22 to create very high temperature environments, higher than we 23 have found in equipment qualification programs in water 1
24 reactors.
25 MR. EBERSOLE:
In this connection let me ask about O
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I the ongoing program about leak before break and whether you 2
are not. violating part of that set of considerations now.
3 Paul, I am glad you are here.
I understand we are 4
talking about extending the concept of leak before break up
!~
5 to secondary systems and pipes outside of containment, but 6
in no case did we ever get up to these temperatures and 2
^
7 pressures.
Am I correct?
1 8
MR. SHEWMON:
If we do it, we would do it very 9
gingerly.
That is right, there is no experience here.
10 MR. EBERSOLE:
So even if we accept the LWR's in 11 their saturated steam condition, that wouldn't be i
12 extrapolated to this state anyway.
13 MR. SHEWMON:
Not for the steamline break.
What j
14 is the steam pipe material?
j 15 MR. HOLMES:
There are some assorted different l
16 materials and fabrication methods.
17 MR. SHEWMON:
Is it two and a quarter chrome one
}
18 moly?
l 19 MR. HOLMES:
yes, a lot of it is two and a quarter l
j 20 one moly, yes.
J 21 MR. SIESS:
Longitudinal seams?
I 22 MR. HOLMES:
There are some of the reheat pipes at 23 Fort St. Vrain'that have longitudinal seams, yes.-
24
.MR.
HEITNER:
However, the staff required prior to 25 this last stretch of operation, we did a-sampling inspection i
- ()
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of all four high-energy lines and the pipe appears to be in 2
good shape on the basis of that inspection.
3 MR. SHEWMON:
And that inspection was what?
4 MR. HEITNER:
UT inspection.
5 MR. SHEWMON:
The people at Monroe had done a UT, 6
inspection, as I recall, fairly soon before their's blew.
7 So if it is creep porosity, what you look for with UT is a 8
big crack of some kind.
It is not clear that when you 9
develop these creep porosity failures that there is a big 10 crack to see.
It certainly isn't leak before break because 11 it didn't leak at all there before it broke.
12 MR. HEITNER:
Let me continue.
13 PSC has elected to use an automatic isolation 14 system, a steamline rupture detection isolation system, 15 SLRDIS, to limit the environment that is created by 16 steamline breaks by detecting them and closing off the 17 sources of steam.
18 MR. EBERSOLE:
Even if you don't succeed in this, 19 you can still invoke this, what 'is it called, ACM, am I 20 correct?
21 MR. SIESS:
I didn't hear you.
22 MR. EBERSOLE:
I said even if this system doesn't 23 work and the steam continues to flow, can I still invoke 24 ACM7 25 MR. HEITNER:
Well,-the situation would be the O
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1 following:
Some of the components that would be driven by 2
the ACM would be in the Zion standard in the areas where the 3
harsh environment is created.
So in order to invoke the ACM 4
you would have to demonstrate that all the cabling and 5
controls and components that you require that are exposed to 6
the harsh environment are qualified.
7 MR. EBERSOLE:
Are you telling me the ACM 8
circuitry, apparatus and the wires or whatever are buried 9
next to these steamlines?
10 MR. HEITNER:
I am saying that some of those 11 components are either in the reactor or the turbine building 12 and therefore subject to the harsh environment.
13 MR. EBERSOLE:
Right.
14 MR. HEITNER:
And what I am saying is that PSC has 15 not elected, as far as I know, to try to take credit for the 16 ACM for qualifying those components by saying we are 17 deliberately putting those components within the scope of 18 the EQ so we can take credit for the ACM in accidents where 19 a harsh environment is created.
They are only assuming that 20 it is operable and taking credit for it as a fire protection 21 feature.
22 MR. EBERSOLE:
So ACM then is dependent on i
23 adherence to Appendix R -- or in this case it is not j
24 Appendix R, but high-energy line break phenomena.
25 MR. HEITNER:
As I said, in order to take credit O
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1 for it under these conditions you have to qualify all of the 4
2 components that are exposed to harsh environment.
3 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well suppose I have a high-energy 4
line break like this and I have equipment left not involving 5
the ACM7 6
MR. HEITNER:
Excuse me?
7 MR. EBERSOLE:
I have a break like this which is I
8 in some part of this building, but it doesn't degrade the 9
equipment at large sufficient to even require invoking ACM.
10 Do I have any residual equipment not involved with the ACM 11 to cool down?
12 MR. HEITNER:
When PSC completes its equipment 13 qualification program, the normal safe shutdown equipment 1
14 will be available probably.
So there is no reason to need 15 the ACM.
16 MR. EBERSOLE:
But what I am asking is this.
Is 17 this steamline breaks at one place, does it now because of 18 the absence of environmental qualification get both trains 19 or cooling systems?
i 20 MR. HEITNER:
If the systems are not qualified, 21 yes.
22 MR. EBERSOLE:
And the ACM, too.
23-MR. HEITNER:
And the ACM, too.
24 MR. SIESS:
Is you don't.have'the isolation, do 25 you end up with a whole building being heated up to the same 4
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,j i
temperature and everything in the reactor building exposed i
2 to that same environment?
3 MR. HEITNER:
Yes.
Basically you have common mode
}
4 failures.
5 MR. SIESS:
Everything in the containment.
- See, 6
there is no compartmentalization here.
So if they have a 7
steamline break that isn't terminated within a certain time, 8
the whole area is heated up and then everything in there, if 9
it isn't qualified is assumed to fail.
One problem is that 10 they have got a temperature of twice that in any other plant 11 and equipment that has been qualified for other plants, even 12 if they have got the same equipment, they still have to 13 worry about it because it is 1000 degrees instead of 500.
14 MR. SHEWMON:
Can't they put a blowout panel in 15 the wall?
16 MR. SIESS:
Well, they have blowout panels, but we 17 have got a figure here later that talks about the 18 temperature, and I am never quite sure now that is arrived 19 i at.
20 MR. HEITNER:
Let me get into that next.
21 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, you have run the fire hose 22 through the barn that was going to put the barn fire out, 23 haven't you?
You have got the critical cables ---
24 MR. SIESS:
There are only two places you can put 25 the equipment, and that is in the turbine building and the U
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marysimons k,s) i reactor building, and both of them have steamlines in them.
i 2
ACM was put in to take care of a fire in certain areas.
3 MR. EBERSULE:
I know,-a point problem.
It was 4
not a generalized requirement.
5 MR. SIESS:
An area problem.
6 MR. EBERSOLE:
Right, an area problem, but anyway 7
it was a point accident type thing.
4 8
Let me ask you this.
Suppose we have some way of r
9
' putting all this equipment you are talking about, the 10 automated closure, and we are now I guess subject to double 11 valves to guarantee closure, automatic apparatus ---
12 MR. HEITNER:
Let me go to the next slide and I i
13 will explain ---
I I
v 14 MR. EBERSOLE:
I want to talk about the l
15 reliability.
I 16 MR. HEITNER:
If you will let me go forward, I l
l 17 will get back and talk about SLRDIS and how SLRDIS is 18 designed and what it does because you specifically asked me U
L 19 to address that.
l 20 Let me just summarize in the overview by saying j
that with the automatic isolation system, the large-breaks 21 22 are going to be automatically terminated on a rapid rate 23 with temperature rise.
SLRDIS will sense temperature rise 24 versus time and terminate on threshold or at excessively 25 rapid temperature rise.
4
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73410101 71 marysimons 7(_)
1 MR. EBERSOLE:
It won't see a loss of clean chase 2
cooling as a result of a ventilation failure.
3 MR. HEITNER:
No.
It is solely based on detecting l
4 the ambient temperatures in the rector building and the 5
turbine building.
6 Large breaks are taken care of automatically 7
because they create a very rapid temperature rise.
Small 8
breaks are more likely to be sensed by the operators because 9
the temperature rise is very slow, but the operators after a 10 while see that something is going on and they can take 11 manual action to remote manually close the isolation valves 12 from the control room and isolate those breaks.
13 MR. EBERSOLE:
These first systems have to 14 themselves be environmentally qualified?
15 MR. HEITNER:
Right.
16 I will discuss what the spectrum of breaks looks 17 like and the environment that they are creating, but I will 18 just comment to say that we are reviewing all of PSC's 19 calculations.
20 Let me give you a sample of what those 1
21 calculations look like, a
22*
(Slide.)
23 For the very largest break PSC does a series of 24 calculations for a full double ended rupture of the 25 steam 11nes and the feedwater lines.
You have to start with
()
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's-)
I the main feedwater, the main steam, hot reheat, cold reheat 2
and those are all abbreviated, hot reheat, main steam, cold 3
reheat and main feedwater.
4 They do a number of calculations in a number of 5
areas to find out which one is most limiting, in other 6
words, which one creates the highest temperature 4
7 environment.
8 Now these full offset double ended ruptures create 9
a very rapid temperature rise, but then the SLRDIS system 10 isolates it and the temperature drops back down again.
11 Then they do a series of calculations for smaller 12 breaks that are some fraction of that full flow, because for 13 the smaller breaks, although the' temperature rise isn't as j
14 rapid, the longer term temperature for many hours may be 15 higher because you will actually dump more total steam and 16 more heat energy into the environment in the building.
17 Ss once it gets hot, it gets hot and stays hot for 18 a longer ptriod of time and this may be more detrimental to 19 the equipment than the short rapid peak.
20 MR. SIESS:
Ken, are these calculations for the 21 isolated system?
22 MR. HEITNER:
Yes.
These calculations take into 23 account the automatic isolation system in the short time 24 frame and the remote manual closure of these isolation 25 valves by the operators in the long term.
Separate 1
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73410101 73 marysimons q(/
1 calculations are done for the reactor building and the 2
turbine building and a sample of those is in your package.
3 MR. EBERSOLE:
I thought we had had to comply as 4
of 1972 high-energy line breaks outside of containment.
How 5
could we escape th'is at Fort St. Vrain for low these 14 6
years 7 7
MR. HEITNER:
Well, it is not in the original 1972 8
safety evaluation, but there is a supplemental safety 9
evaluation ---
10 MR. EBERSOLE:
I am talking about the generic 11 Problem.
12 MR. HEITNER:
Let me explain.
It was not 13 considered in the original licensing safety evaluation in k_
14
'72, but the supplemental safety evaluation that I think was 15 done in June of 1973 reviews supplemental submittals that 10
. were made by PSC at the time concerning qualification of 17 equipment to withstand high-energy line breaks. A whole 18 analysis was done at that time and accepted by the staff at 19
, that time concerning the ability of Fort St. Vrain to 20 survive high-energy line breaks.
21 I will get back and mention that'again when I talk d
22 about the history of the steamline detection and isolation
\\
23 l systems.
24 MR., SIESS:
There is a difference of the time i
25 allowed, Jesse.
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1 MR. EBERSOLE:
I was just trying to find out why 2
we apparently stood vulnerable for 13 years.
3 MR. HEITNER:
What I am saying is that the staff --
4 well, let me just go ahead a little bit.
5 What the staff did in 1973 analysis and again in 6l 1977, they accepted the fact that the operators could limit 7
the environment by becoming aware of steamline breaks 8
through the existing ruptured protection system, and that is 9
just an alarm system, and then manually manipulate the 1
10 l controls in the control room to isolate the steamline break.
11 MR. EBERSOLE:
That was good enough then for 13 12 i years.
13 4 MR. HEITNER:
- Right, l
c.
14 MR. SIESS:
How long did that take?
15 [
MR. HEITNER:
The assumption was based on the l
16 j isolation being completed in four minutes.
i 17 MR. EBERSOLE:
Are the maneuvers that the operator 18 has to do, are they simple and are the signals clear and 19 unambiguous?
See, that old 10 minutes was pulled out of the 20 sky about 1960, and it was a composite which didn't account 21 for complexity or lack of it.
Now I wondered to what extent 22 this is a variable or negotiable time according to the 23 simplicity or complexity of the action.
24 MR. HEITNER:
Let me just say that we have gone i
25 back and forth about this over the last year from let's say O
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)
1 late 1984 through the fall of 1985 about the acceptrability 2
of those assumptions that the operators could tr.ke action in 3
four minutes, and the staff doubted the Icag-term 4
acceptability of that system based on human factors 5
considerations and the experience with plant operations and 6
the TMI accident.
7 The staff's position on operators taking manual 8
action is now that they don't want to give credit for 9
operators taking the action in less than 10 minutes.
10 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, does that give due regard to 11 the simplicity or complexity of the accident?
12 MR. HEITNER:
Yes.
The staff was very reluctant 13 to just clearJy reaccept, or continue to accept I should
(
(_)
14 say, to continue to accept what was accepted in 1973 and 15 accept it again in 1977, but in 1985 the staff was reluctant 16 to continue to accept the assumption that For' St. Vrain 17 operators could recognize the steamline break and isolate in 18 the required 10 minutes.
19 MR. EBERSOLEY Let me ask this then.
That sounds I
20 like it might be a unique judgment by a very few people and 21 doesn't represent a staff position at large if you put the 22 question to the whole staff.
In short, it is not a holy 23 I cou, this 10 minutes and it should be considered in the 1
24 light of the degree of complexity and reversibility and a 1:
25 '
host of other things.
I don't know where the consensus
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73410101 76 marysimond 1
Opinion of the staff is relative to the unique position 2
taken here.
3 MR. HEITNER:
I understand.
The staff did two 4
things.
One option we considered was the fact, you know, 5
could you demonstrate it by tests on the operators.
6 Fortunately, Fort St. Vrain does not have a full-7 scale simulator where you can have the operator who is 8
operating the simulator and,you flash to them the signals 9
that would indicate that this event is taking place and see 10 how long and how quickly they can respond correctly to that 11 sort of event in terms of a test.
12 MR. EBERSOLE:
You used the qualifier full-scale 13 simulator.
It sounds to me like this is a very extremely 14 limited simulation that you could have.
15 MR. SIESS:
Let me read a sentence from a document 16 I have here referring to this.
It says " Based on a walk-17 through of the control room, we determined that the actions 18 necessary to isolate a steamline break are few in number and 19 easily performed and therefore can be performed in a 20 relatively short time," and a relatively short time was not 21 defined.
But it seems to me that engineers ought to be able 22 to decide what is a relatively short time without picking an 23 arbitrary number.
I mean if we weren't on the decimal 24 system it wouldn't be 10.
25 This is a statement from the staff by somebody O
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1 that had a reason.
What does it take to demonstrate 2
something can be done?
I tend to have a great deal more l
l 3
faith in the operators going through a few simple steps than 4
that God awful complicated temperature rise detection, 20-f l
5 foot long and the major valves that have to close.
I have' 6-got more trust in the operators than I have in valves right i
7 now.
8 MR. EBERSOLE:
We have got lots of BWR's running 9
with face an ATWS and they have got to move faster than 10 that.
4 I
11 MR. HEITNER:
I guess my feeling is that PSC l
12 elected to go.to the SLRDIS system because that eliminated 13 any doubts as to whether this system was adequate, and also 14 buys them the additional advantage that even with the four-4 15 minute isolation, you still have temperatures, and I don't:
)
16 have the curves with me, of up to 500 degrees F.,
17 It could be very difficult for them to demonstrate 18 the adequacy of the components and the cabling in that 19 environment.
By comparison, the peak temperature here for 20 the SLRDIS is typically between three'and four hundred 21 degrees F.
That brings it back into the range that is found 22 in light-water reactors and enables them to utilize the 23 entire data base for qualification of components and and i
24 cabling for light-water reactors to help them qualify their 25 own components for cabling.
([)
l ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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73410101 78 marysimons
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1 MR. SIESS:
How long did it take to isolate using i
2 the SLRDIS?
1 3
MR. HEITNER:
Well, in the case of a very rapid 4
break, I think isolation occurs in a couple of seconds for 5-the largest possible break, and then for smaller breaks it l
6 takes longer.
And for the smallest breaks, once you have 7
gotten to the 10 minute point here, then you assume that the 8
operator does the isolation and don't worry about whether 9
SLRDIS does ---
10 MR. SIESS:
But for the large breaks what you are 11 saying is that if they could do it in four minutes that 12 thing would peak up a lot higher than what you have got 13 there?
14 MR. HEITNER:
Yes.
They would be at temperatures i
15 more like 500 degrees and you would hear the steamline.
16 MR. EBERSOLE:
It would seem a lot better if the 17 building walls would blow away and you could create a 18 depressurization capability.
19 MRl'$IkES:
They won't blow away fast enough.
I 20 MR. HEITNER:
The options in proposing measures to._
21 mitigate the environment are in the hands of the licensee.
l j
22 So all of those options are open to PSC, but PSC did not 23 chose to ---
24 MR. EBERSOLE:
They didn't elect to take down a i
25 brick wall and put up a tin wall.
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-1 MR. HEITNER:
Well, the reactor building and the 2
turbine building have tin walls on them now.
In fact, the 3
turbine building, the front half is glass.
It doesn't have 4
very much pressure retaining capability.
5 MR. SIESS:
You can still dump a lot of steam.in 6
there before you build.the pressure up enough to take a wall 7
out.
That is the trouble.
t j
8 MR. EBERSOLE:
And that' glass blows out in how j
9 many seconds?
10 MR. HEITNER:
I don't know.-
l l
11 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, it would depend on the size 12 of the break.
I 13 MR. HEITNER:
I think the. assumption is that there 14 is only an additional half a pound of pressure above l
15 atmospheric generated in the turbine and reactor buildings.-
1 16 The differential is very, very small.
17 MR. EBERSOLE:
Once they put in this intercept 18 valve, and I guess it is two valves in series safety grade?
19
.MR. HEITNER:
Let me get to that, because it is 20 based on existing valves, the valves that are already in l
21 there.
1 22 MR..EBERSOLE:
Oh, I~see.
Are the valves known to.
l 23 to be competent against dynamic heads?
l 24 1 01. HEITNER:
Well, those are the existing valves 25 that have been there ever since ---
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1 MR. EBERSOLE:
That doesn't cut any ice.
They may j
2 have not ever been designed to intercept the flow that we i
3 are talking about.
I 4
MR. HEITNER:
We are not rechallenging the 1
2 5
capability of these valves.
1 i
6 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, if you are depending on valve i
7 closure, it seems to me that it is very critical that you i
8 now re-examine the design basis of the valves and be sure, i
9 as we had to in the LWR business that the valves will in 10 fact do their thing with a margin of force to do so.which is 4
11 maintained over the life of the valve.
I 12 Did you hear the latter part?
There is this 13 notion of the margin of force to accomplish the function 14 which has been invoked ever since Salem.
Valves in these 15 early days were now known to have been incompetent to'stop 16 high mass flows due to guillotine breaks.
i 17 MR. SIESS:
Would Public Service (like to respond 18 to that either now or later?
19.
MR. EBERSOLE:
Just to automate it is not the T
20 whole picture.
l 21 MR. SIESS:
Given a big hole in the pipe will the f
22 valves still close?
23 MR. HOLMES:
'A lot of these valves were-designed 24 to shut against very large mass flows or'the existing high-F 25_
energy line break accidents that went'back to the'early 70's l ()
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73410101 81 marysimons 1
and so forth.
2 The work we are doing right now on the valves is 3
largely an electrical area for the solenoids that control 4
the hydraulic fluid that is used to open and shut the valves i
j 5
with non-dual electrical operators so that we are sure that 4
L 6
with a single failure the valves still do move.
l I
7 MR. EBERSOLE:
I cee.
Are these the old valves in 8
ceries?
I am asking the single failure criteria.
9 MR. NIEHOFF:
The way we considered single failure i
~
i 10 was to, yes, consider that if you had two valves 1n series 11 that one of them failed and we had to go back and rely on 12 the next valve.
I 13 MR. EBERSOLE:
So the flow occurs to two valves l
14 which of which will serve as an intercept?
1 15 MR. NIEHOFF:
That is correct.
16 MR. EBERSOLE:
So that answers the single failure 17 criteria?
j 18 MR. NIEHOFF:
That is correct.
Now a majority of l
19 the valves in'the system are valves that are'normally closed 20 under plant protected functions.
21 MR. EBERSOLE:
Are they routinely exercised?
22 MR. NIEHOFF:
Yes.
23 MR. EBERSOLE:
Do you know the margin of i
24 competence to close?
25 MR. NIEHOFF:
I would not know that offhand.
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MR. EBERSOLE:
And its rate of change with time 4
2 and maintenance and' wear, et cetera?
I am thinking about 3
the -- what is it, the program on valves we have got, 4
MOVATS.
5 Are you acquainted with the MOVATS program in 4
6 which we are looking at this aspect of valve operation?
1 7
MR. FULLER:
The time assumptions that are in the t
8 FSAR, and there is a table in the FSAR, we meet those 9
criteria on a routine basis by performance of surveillance 10 tests, and we also have surveillance tests and exercises of 11 valves on a periodic basis.
}
12 MR. EBERSOLE:
But on the1 surveillance test all l
13 you really do is swing the valves back and shut without any 14 dynamic loads on them, and that is not a proof of continued 15 performance to meet dynamic loads.
16 MR. FULLER:
That is true.
We cannot under normal i
17 circumstances shut those valves entirely because they are in 18 the process flow path.
19 MR. EBERSOLE:
Yes, but you do occasionally ---
20 MR. FULLER:
So we exercise them, and shut them 21 typically like 10 to 15 percent and then_ reopen them.
i 22 MR. EBERSOLE:
Is it series parallel configuration 23-when you can shut part of them fully?
24 MR. FULLER:
Let me think.
No.
v 25 MR. EBERSOLE:
You can never shut them fully.'
()
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1 MR. FULLER:
And not maintain operation.
-2 MR. EBERSOLE:
They are not in that kind of a 3
series parallel array?
4 MR. FULLER:
That is correct.
5 MR. EBERSOLE:
So you really never test them to 6
see that they will fully shut once the original test is 7
done?
8 MR. FULLER:
Except on lube shutdowns and 9
circulator trips.
10 MR. EBERSOLE:
And that is done without a load on 11 them?
12 MR. FULLER:
Oh, no.
That is during operation so 13 we have assurance that they will in fact shut, because we 14 have experienced situations, for example, like lube 15 shutdowns and circulator trips ---
16 MR. EBERSOLE:
I'll bet they close easier when 17 they are nearly shut, am I correct?
1 18 MR. FULLER:
They close easier when what?
19 MR. EBERSOLE:
When they are nearly shut.
When 20 they are nearly shut the torque load is just about gone.
21 MR. FULLER:
These are typically open/ shut valves, 22 fully open or fully shut valves.
There are a few that would 23 be in a mid position like speed control valves, but other 24 than that they are mostly open valves.
25 MR. EBERSOLE:
So you are going to automate these
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I good valves you have already got?
2 MR. FULLER:
Yes.
'3 MR. EBERSOLE:
And the automation gear will 4
survive the local accident scene I take it and it won't be a 5
victim of its own accident?
If I have an accident in the 6
vicinity of the valve itself are you going to armor it or 7
whatever?
8 MR. NIEHOFF:
Again, that was the reason to move 9
to the next valve downstream and to consider two valves in 10 series.
1.1 MR. EBERSOLE:
If your pipe failure occurs in the 12 vicinity of one valve do you hypothesize that that valve.is 13 gone anyway and you will get it with the second?
14 MR. NIEHOFF:
Yes.
15 MR. EBERSOLE:
Are are there barriers or just 16 space?
17 MR. NIEHOFF:
Space.
18 MR. SIESS:
Okay, Ken, onward.
19 MR. HEITNER:
Let me go ahead.
20 (Slide.)
21 You asked about what is the safety significance of 22 EQ at Fort St. Vrain.
I guess my feeling in order to reply 23 to that is that the best measure of what is involved here is l
24 to take a look at the weaknesses in the plant that were j
i 25 uncovered by Fort St. Vrain's EQ program, and in particular GV ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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what components they have decided cannot meet the 2
qualification and therefore have to be replaced.
3 The component replacement that they have reported 4
to us involves about 350 solenoid valves, a whole series of 5
transmitters, thermocouples and a few motors.
6 MR. SIESS:
These are components that could not 7
survive those temperatures or are they components that you 8
don't know whether they could survive those temper *nres?
i 9
MR. HEITNER:
Right.
You can't demonstrate the 10 capability of the component to survive the temperature, 1
11 which is what 10 CFR 50.49 is all about.
The thesis is if 1
12 you can't demonstrate it, then you haven't met the rule.
j 13 MR. SIESS:
So they can't demonstrate it, but no 14 tests have been made on those components?
15 MR. HEITNER:
Right.
16 MR. SIESS:
We don't know that they will fail, but 17 neither do we know that they won't fail.
i i
18 MR. HEITNER:
Well, in-some cases I think,,like i
19 the solenoid valves, I think it has beer, demonstrated pretty 20 clearly that some of the solenoid valves found in'a wide i
21 variety of nuclear plants were made with certain materials 1
{
22 that just simply couldn't take the temperatures, and I guess 23 Fort St. Vrain is in the same situation.
In other cases 24 Fort St. Vrain had to go back and examine for older i
25 equipment over the years when their maintenance activities
()
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l j -
73410101 86 marysimons I
had.somehow invalidated the original assumptions that were 2
made for qualification.
They did an. extensive check on 3
their maintenance records to see whether over the course of i
4 the years they had somehow invalidated the original 5
qualifications for some components.
6 But this gives you a measure of the uncertainty 7
that you would have if you didn't go through the EQ program.
8 MR. EBERSOLE:
What I see here is interesting. It 9
is terminus of certain circuits, solenoid valves and 10 transmitters.
What about the supply side?
11 MR. HEITNER:
The offsite power system is largely 12 external to the plant.
In other words, the switchyard and i
13 the three step-down transformers that bring electricity into 14 the plant are external.
Also, a lot of the switchgear is in i
]
15 the three-room control complex that is not part of the harsh 4
16 environment.
The diesel generators are also in separate 17 rooms so that they are not part of the harsh environment.
l 18 MR. EBERSOLE:
So I am Just looking at the-I 19 incoming cables and these termini here.
I i
20 MR. HEITNER:
Right.
Well, let me get back to i
21 cabling in a minute.
i 22 MR. EBERSOLE:
Before you leave that, what 23 fraction of those up there, which lis a large number, are 24 integral parts of the ACM system?
!~
i 25 MR. HEITNER:
I can't really' answer that j
()
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73410101 87 marysimons 1
question.
As far as I know, no components associated with 2
the ACM system are specifically being included in the EQ 3
program as a way of preserving the capability to operate 4
with the ACM.
e
{
5 MR. EBERSOLE:
In other words, they are not 6
selectively picked to be better than'anything else?
7 MR. HEITNER:
That's right.
Am I correct in 8
that?
you-know, there is nothing to prevent Fort St. Vrain 9
from electing to put those components into this program, but 10 they have not consciously elected to do that, t
11 MR. EBERSOLE:
So this is all of them and not just 12 that select few that have to work.
13 MR. MARK:
I am a little surprised perhaps that 14 you have got 50 thermocouples on that list.
A thermocouple i
15 is probably likely to survive a 300 or a 500 degree 16 temperature if it is measuring temperature.
The only things 17 that could be thought of as giving trouble would be the 18 leads.
And besides, in an accident I am sure you don't need 19 50 thermocouples working, but perhaps about three.
20 MR. SIESS:
Would you like to address 1that?
21 MR. HOLMES:
On the ACM question, if anything from 22 ACM is being environmentally qualified, it is probably 23 coincidental that it also happens to be used for-ACM as well 24-as for the equipment for environmental qualification in a i
25 high-energy line break accident.
1i O i
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-73410101 88 l
marysimons
)
1 MR. EBERSOLE:
But wouldn't you sort be inclined 2
to take that fraction which is devoted-to the ACM and say I
3 these I am really going to do right?
4 MR. HOLMES:
Given the overall criteria for the 5
program, when we are-trying to maintain forced circulation i
6 cooling 1to prevent core damage, we are qualifying the forced.
7 circulation' system and not paying any particular' attention' i
8 to the ACM equipment that would support liner cooling and 9
not meet the no core damage criteria.
i 10 One thing I need to point out relative to the 11 selection of equipment and.how much of it is being replaced 12 and so forth, there was an original Fort St. Vrain i
13 environmental qualifications program that went back to the 14 early 70's that Ken has alluded to, that there was a great 15 deal of equipment testing that went on to these very high
^
16 temperatures of 500 plus degrees that Ken mentioned.
17 The difficulty we had was those tests only ran for 18 30 minutes, they went up to a high temperature'and then 19 cooled off for 30 minutes while they were still functioning 1
and still relatively, you know, several hundred degrees hot.__
20 21 and not five or six hundred degrees hot, and while the i
22
-temperature was still up there the test was terminated.
i 23 When it came time to look at the new environmental
=
24 qualification regulations where we'had to pre-age the 25 equipment, that it had to operate for certain amounts:of i
s
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73410101 89 marysimons
(~
1 time and so forth, rather than try to rerun those tests for 2
adequate amounts of time at the. higher temperatures and so 3
forth, it was a clearer choice to go with something like the 4
SLRDIS isolation system and use the industry qualification 5
data.
6 MR. EBERSOLE:
All right.
Thank you.
7 MR'.
SIESS:
What about the thermocouples?
Is 8
there anybody here who can answer that?
9 MR. NIEHOFF:
Agr.an, in the normal redundancy in 10 the plant with four circulators and two loops and various 11 redundancies within those loops it turns out to be quite a 12 large number, but in any particular loop or possible 13 shutdown method, the number would not be 50.
It has to be 14 some number substantially less than that.
I 15 MR. EBERSOLE:
Are these devices hermetically 16 sealed?
17 MR. HEITNER:
Excuse me?
j 18 MR. EBERSOLE:
Are they hermetically sealed?
19 MR. HEITNER:
What?
20 MR. EEERSOLE:
Are these devices hermetically 21 sealed, motors, solenoid valves, the transmitters, are they 22 sealed boxes?
23 MR. HEITNER:
I would think so, but I can't be i
24 sure of that.
1 25 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, one of the reasons I mention O
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73410101 90 marysimons
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1 that is there is a lot of trouble going on now because 2
hermetically sealed boxes have been punctured with holes to 3
drain condensation.
4 MR. HEITNER:
That is a problem.
At Fort St.
5 Vrain none of these components have to operate submerged.
6 There is no flooding.
7 MR. EBERSOLE:
No. I am talking about internal 8
condensation.
9 MR. HEITNER:
I couldn't specifically answer that 10 question.
11 MR. EBERSOLE:
What has happened, and let me 12 mention it, is they have found some boxes unable to sustain 13 external pressures.. So they bored holes in water-tight 14 boxes to permit vapor entry, and that then because of the 15 prior condition of the box and terminal is cold, relatively 16 speaking, and internal condensation takes place and shorts 17 out whatever.
18 MR. HEITNER:
Well, the pressure won't be a 19 problem here because you are not going to develop any 20 k pressure.
21 MR. EBERSOLE:
But it is a Turkish bath 22 envirgnment.
23 MR. HEITNER:
Right, and I guess as part of the 24 qualification program they will have to demonstrate *.he 25 capability to take temperature and to the degree that
(}
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73410101 91 marysimons
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1 humidity _and. condensation are a problem, that will have to 2
be ---
3 MR. EBERSOLE:
It_is not just humidity, but it is 4
temperature in-a transient where the condensation surfaces l[
5 are additionally cooled which leads to surface condensation 6
which leads to terminal box failures.
7 (Slide.)
8 MR. HEITNER:
Let me just also point out tha' in 9
addition to the components that I have mentioned, the 10 original ~ construction to standard for Fort St. Vrain 11 involved the use of tape splices in a great deal of the 12 Plant.
So the cable junctions that involved those tape 13 splices are vulnerable because they can't withstand the 14 harsh environment.
t 15 So there is a need to replace a very large number.
16 of tape splices with qualified splices that have been 17 demonstrated to withstand the environment.
18 There is also a need-to correct and identify 19 deficiencies.
Last August Fort St. Vrain did a lot of 20.
walkdowns through the plant and they identified a lot of 21 deficiencies.
They found junction boxes where hydraulic oil 22 from the valves had leaked in and places where the junction 23 boxes had leaky gaskets.
So there is a lot of cleanup and 24 component correction that has to be done as part of the EQ 25 Program.
O ACE-FEDERAL' REPORTERS, INC.
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73410101' 92 marysimons 1
MR. SIESS:
What about the cable itself?
2 MR. HEITNER:
Are you talking about the process 3
for qualifying the cable?
4 MR. SIESS:
What is the status?
5 MR. HEITNER:
The status on that is as follows.
6 We have had several discussions with PSC a their J
7 methodology for qualification of the cables.
Their key 8
Problem still is their inability to specifically identify 9
the exact cables at the exact locations in the plant.
10 What they are trying to do is do an enveloping 11 qualification where they demonstrate that all of their cable 12 is capable of taking the worst environment in the plant.
13 MR. EBERSOLE:
Do they do that in the context of 14 suffering damage which they can identify, but it is really a 15 degree of damage that they are concerned about?
4 16 MR. HEITNER:
Again, the cables are qualified.
i i
17 The individual specific types of cable are qualified by a 18 testing process that demonstrates that the cable retains its 19 design properties after being subjected to the harsh 20 environment.
21 MR. EBERSOLE:
With no significant external 22 degradation.
23 MR. HEITNER:
With no significant degradation.
24 Now for PSC there are several situations.
Some cables they i
25 have got in there are already identified by a specific (1) i ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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73410101 93 marysimons O)
(_
1 manufacturer type and test data exist for those specific 2
cables.
Some cables they know the manufacturer and the 3
material, but they hav e to demonstrate a similarity to other 4
cables that have been tested.
J 5
In some cases they know only the materials but 6
they cannot tell exactly which manufacturer made the cables, 7
but again they have tried to show by a more generalized 8
analysis that other test data support the qualification of 9
cables made of those materials and therefore the 10 qualification of their cables.
11 This problem has again been observed at other 12 plants and they consulted people like TVA about their 13 problems.
So they have done I think as much as I can see 14 that is possible in doing this.
15 We are at the point now where probably in the next 16 couple of weeks we will meet and we will examine their 17 binders, their documentation that supports the qualification 18 of their cables, and at that time we will have a really 19 better idea of whether they have done an acceptable job.
20 MR. SIESS:
Do you know at this time whether they 21 are going to have to make additional tests to qualify cable?
22 MR. HEITNER:
I think I will have to defer until 23 we have an opportunity to examine the binders.
24 MR. EBERSOLE:
Your comment on oil contamination 25 suggests a potential problem.
Are there any oil type
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73410101 94 marysimons j
(
~ 1 switches-throughout this area that you happen to know of?
I 2
will go on and tell you why I ask this.
}
3 It.was found long ago that. oil type switches which 4
have a membrane over the buttons make pretty efficient
,5 Pressure switches in the presence of modest pressures, i
6 That leads te.the second question.
I guess this i
7 Plant has looked at the depressurization -- well, I don't i
.i
{
8 know, in Colorado maybe not, but the tornado l
1 5
i 9
depressurization and repressurization mode.
In this I
10 transient pressure case have the internal compartmental 11 structural designs been shown to be able to sustain the
-12 transient differential pressures that will occur until the j
i 13 walls go?
I don't want internal structural failures due to O
14 walls falling down I don't think.
i 15 MR. HEITNER:
I am really not prepared to address i
16 that.
I would have to go back and review the FSAR.
i i
17 MR. EBERSOLE:
What sort of internal pressures are j
18 we talking about in the building,-half a pound?
19 MR. HEITNER:
I just don't-know the' answer to 20 that.
21 MR. EBERSOLE:
Is it half a pound.
Do you have i
22 any concern about something analogous to tornado pressure 23 differentials?
24 MR. NIEHOFF:
No, I don't believe we do.
The i
25 pressure relieving devices, of example, in the reactor
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95 marysimons
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I building, the louvers which would operate in the first 2
couple of seconds during this event, are about three inches l
3 water gauge or.11 psi.
The walls above the refueling floor 4
are 10 inches water gauge or.36 psi ---
5 MR. EBERSOLE:
Have they got relief panels?
6 MR. NIEHOFF:
Yes, and the walls below the 7
refueling floor are 22 inches water gauge or
.8 psi.
8 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, having relieved are there any 9
gradients then that would threaten any structures that you 10 are interested in due to the continued flow?
11 MR. NIEHOFF:
No, we don't believe there are.
12 MR. EBERSOLE:
Did you have to look at Tornado 13 differentials up in Colorado?
[>
\\_/
14 MR. NIEHOFF:
Yes.
15 MR. EBERSOLE:
That was 3 psi in 8 seconds, or 5 16 psi.
Are these the same vent panels for tornado relief?
17 (No response.)
+
18 Well, it doesn't matter.
That is another matter.
19 MR. HOLMES:
Like, Ken, I can't recall the 20 Specific ocquence of structural interactions with 21 tornadoes.
I do know we are designed for a 3OO-mile-an-hour 22 type wind, but what exactly happens to which walls, I don't 23 know.
24 MR. SIESS:
The only wall that is designed for 25 tornadoes is the tornado wall between the reactor building in N-]
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73410101 96 marysimons
14 MR. SIESS:
Now is this list an elaboration on the 15 list Ken had up there of so many solenoids and transmitters?
16 MR. NIEHOFF:
The list that Ken had up there were 17 equipment items that we were replacing up front in the 18 program.
19 MR. SIESS:
Up front?
20 MR. NIEHOFF:
yes.
This effort excluded those 21 items because they were being replaced.
22 MR. SIESS These are the items that resulted from 23 the maintenance review?
24 MR. NIEHOFF:
That is correct.
25 MR. SIESS:
Thank you.
9, O
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1 MR. NIEHOFF:
We saw the need to inspect and test j
i 2
some 16 components at eight applications and to look for 3
further documentation for four components or four 4
applications.
5 The next two slides I have furtter details on that 6
that I won't go into unless you want me to.
7 MR. SIESS:
That is what you got out of searching l
8 5,000 records?
9 MR. NIEHOFF:
Yes.
The impact would have been 10 perhaps a lot more with the several hundred components that 11 we replaced, but they were eliminated from our review.
12 (Slide.)
13 Just a brief note on the outage schedule.
Whon we 14 met with the staff on June 13th we were using a September 15 19th date.
We have now had time to evaluate some various 16 plant tests in terms of our hydraulic oil system and have 17 looked into the necessity for some other plant modifications 18 and our schedule now shows a rise to power date of October 19 2nd.
20 MR. SIESS:
Your outage started when, May ---
21 MR. NIEHOFF:
May 31st.
22 MR. SIESS:
And you are predicting back to power 23 on October 1, but you think that might slip a little?
24 MR. NIEHOFF:
Chuck, do you want to address ---
25 MR. SIESS:
No, that is all right.
It is not O
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1 important.
2 Any questions 7 3
(No response.)
4 Thank you.
5 MR. WALKER:
The next item on the agenda had to do 6
with our performance enhancement program, which is our 7
Program to improve conduct of operations, procedures and 8
organizational things 9
We do give quarterly reviews to the staff and we 10 did do this out at the site.
In the interest of time, and 11 this is kind of a non-technical issue, we are prepared to go 12 into that on the status.
13 Let me just indicate that it is moving along 14 fairly well and the part that we added with the training 15 company on the involvement of most of the people in the 16 Plant in the grass-roots approach on things that needed to 17 be done to make our plant run better and to change employee 18 attitude is moving along very well.
19 The first two phases of it are done and we are 20 into the third phase of implementing the solutions that the 21 People have come up with.
22 MR. SIESS:
At the meeting in April you mentioned 23 that you were still having some difficulty getting people 24 onboard and there were in particular seven or eight 25 positions you were still trying to fill.
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1 MR. WALKER:
If I am right, and this is Larry 2
Brey's area, your licensing area is the toughest, isn't it, 3
Larry, and you have got five or six openings in licensing?
4 MR. BREY:
Yes, that is right.
We have had a 5
great deal of difficalty in getting people that have had a 6
good background in licensing.
We have five openings, and 7
have had five openings for over a year now.
We have gone i
8 through literally hundreds of resumes and have had many, 9
many interviews, and we have not been able to bring the l
10 people in.
11 MR. SIESS:
Maybe you ought to advertise in ski 12 magazines.
~
13 (Laughter.)
14 MR. WALKER:
I don't know that skiers make good i
15 licensing people.
i 16 (Laughter.)
17 What we do is we use a great number of 18 consultants.
Of course, if we can't hire employees for our 19 staff, why this just makes us go outside and hire a great j
20 deal of consultants.
In areas like this we would like to 21 have our own people so we don't have to rely on consultants..
22 MR. EBERSOLE:
May I ask you a question and sort 23 of in hindsight.
If you had-now the benefit of what you now 24 know about this plant in the context of the thesis you might j
25 have better peripheral equipment like seals and blowers and
()
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1 you wouldn't have the problems with all this design and 2
distribution of hazards and so forth and you would have had 3
compartmentalized designs, you know, the way we look at them 4
today, would you argue that that core as an entity and a pre-5 stressed concrete vessel, et cetera, that you could build a 6
plant with better peripheral equipment and reconsideration 7
of design layouts that in fact you would want to build?
8 MR. WALKER:
That is certainly a good $64 9
question.
10 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, I am just asking, you know, 11 if the basic engine of our plant is a good one?
12 MR. WALKER:
Well, from where I stand today and 13 based on my some 30 years of experience in this field, I 14 guess I would really opt for what we are doing in the 15 modular gas-cooled reactor concept of a great percent of the 16 equipment not even being safety grade and the ability to 17 fabricate within a production facility as we have proposed 18 to do in the modular reactor, and you are relying on passive 19 systems and not active systems.
20 Any nuclear plant can be made to work and work 21 well if you have enough active systems that are qualified to 22 work properly.
23 But you can do it another way, you can get a 24 system that is a lot more passive and you don't need near as j
25 many systems.
(~h NJ R
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MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, speaking of passive systems, 2
suppose that your liner cooling system were designed not to 3
protect the liner but to reject heat better than it now 4
does.
5 MR. WALKER:
In the modular case we would just 6
have convection cooling.
They wouldn't use a pre-stressed 7
reactor vessel.
You would just have convection cooling 8
right to the ground.
9 I think if I had to do it over again that I 10 wouldn't want to be the first one to do it possibly this 11 time.
12 (Laughter.)
13 The modular holds a lot of appeal to me because im 14 you have these 140 megawatt electric modules that you can 15 treat as loops and you could program them in and you could 16 have most of the work done in a factory and 80 percent of it 17 would be non-nuclear grade and essentially no active systems 18 have to work.
You would have more power density and you 19 would have walk-away cooling capability.
20 I hope I live long enough to see that kind of 21 concept.
It does capture the real good characteristics of 22 the high-temperature gas-cooled reactor, the materials 23 compatibility, the power density and all those things we j
24 talked about, and we have just made it too complicated I 25 think.
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(_,3 1
MR. SIESS:
That is real hindsight, because 15 2
years ago nobody would bought it.
3 MR. WALKER:
Right, including myself.
I wouldn't 4
have wanted it either because we all wanted bigger plants.
5 One other item that was on the agenda, as you 6
know, since last December I have been carrying the burden of 7
trying to run my company as well as carry on the nuclear 8
work, and I am not asking for sympathy because I like to do 9
it and I have had a lot of fun and it has been nice for the 10 last six months for me to be directly involved.
11 But in the interest of my company, my directors 12 and my shareholders, I have been actively seeking a person 13 to run the nuclear operation and to do some other changes in
((_)
14 our company.
15 At our Board meeting on Tuesday our Directors did 16 approve the hiring of a new Vice President of Nuclear 17 Operations.
This man will have only nuclear operations.
He 18 will report directly to me as the CEO of the company, and 19 the man happens to be, Bob Williams, who is a retired 20 executive from Rockwell International.
21 Bob is kind of a rare breed.
He got a nuclear 22 engineering degree back in 1952 from the University of North 23 Carolina.
He also has a master's degree in sociology and he 24 has done graduate work at UCLA, including teaching cours" 25 in writing.
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1 He originally went to work for Westinghouse at 2
Bettis, and in 1954 joined Rockwell International.
He has 3
had various kinds of positions there, including running all 4
of their nuclear reactor systems, the old sodium, the i
5 organic moderated, the Piqua and all their fast breeder 6
work, their Santa Susanna work as well as their space 7
nuclear program.
8 I got to.know Bob when Rockwell took over the f
9 Rocky Flats Plant from Dow and they brought Bob Williams in 10 because that was at a time when Rocky Flats was experiencing 11 a great deal of problems with protesters, publicity and that 12 sort of thing.
13 Bob came in there in '75 as Vice President and 14 General Manger of the Rocky Flat Weapons' Facility.
He held i
15 that job until 1981 when he was promoted to President of the i
16 Energy Systems Group of Rockwell, which. included not only 17 the Rocky Flats Plant, but their Hanford operation, their-18 experimental Santa Susanna work, their Atomics International 19 work and their environmental and fossil work.
He had 11,000 20 employees at that time and a budget of some $800 million.
21 So he has a very good background.
He took early 22 retirement from Rockwell in January of thistyear.
I knew 23 Bob because I had worked with him in Denver and asked him, 24 but at that time he said he wanted to do consulting work and 25 kind of relax after all of the things he had been through.~_
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f 1
We did get together around the 1st of May and he 2
said he was looking for a real challenge and wanted to ge't 3
back in and do one more great thing in his life, and I said 4
I have got just the thing for you.
5 (Laughter.)
6 So I have loaded him up with material, we have 7
made the deal and he will come to work next Tuesday morning 8
with his feet on the ground, and I have very, very pleased
^
9 to have him.
He is 59 years old, but he has got a world of 10 eXPerlence and he has probably forgotten more about the 11 nuclear business than I ever knew having worked since 1952 12 in this.
So we are looking forward to getting him onboard 13 and I think he will bring some real expertise.
14 He doesn't suffer from being an ex-utility 15 Person.
He came from the industrial community and he does 16 have a great background in nuclear.
So I am looking forward 17 to that arrangement with great anticipation.
18 One other change that was made, and I really took 19 care of my activities because I lost my job as President'on 20 Tuesday also.
I did pick a young man in our company to be 21 our President and Chief Operating Officer and he will run 22 the rest of the company essentially.
23 As I said, the nuclear will report to me, the new 24 President and Chief Operating Office will report to me and 25 the-Executive Vice President and General Counsel will report
-s
(_)
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i to me.
So I will get my span of control down to three 2
people and this will give me ample opportunity to work with 3
Bob Williams as we do make this transition and he will report directly to me.
4 5
So I think this is in the best interests of my 6
company and everybody and I.am looking forward to this new 7
arrangement.
i 8
So I thought you would be interested in knowing 9
about that.
I think it will certainly help the situation at 10 Fort St. Vrain immensely.
11 That is about all I had to say on the personnel 12 and the performance.
I wanted you to be up to speed on 13 that, and if you had any questions on that, we could answer 14 them.
i 15 Early somebody brought up the matter of the helium 16 circulators.
Our water ingress problem over the years has 17 certainly been a thorn in our side and contributed to a lot 18 of our outages.
19 We had done certain system modifications, loop 20 split and we have done some other things, and certainly it 21 is my feeling that the occurrence of water ingress has been 22 reduced, but the probability has not been eliminated.
We 23 have all recognized that that has been our No. 1 problem.
24 So we have been looking at some alternates and 25 some things that might be done.
Larry'Brey, who is our
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1 Manager of Licensing, is handling this area.
2 So, Larry, do you want to tell them about the 3
helium circulators.
4 MR. BREY:
I would like to start back in late 5
1984.
Mr. Walker brought together a new committee, the Fort 6
St. Vrain Improvement Committee, whose primary purpose was 7
to formulate and review proposed improvements to enhance the 8
operation of Fort St. Vrain.
9 Primarily this is to enhance Fort St. Vrain to 10 make it a better electricity producer, and really overall, 11 not from a safety standpoint, but from a capacity factor 12 standpoint.
13 (Slide.)
v 14 Obviously, the very first thing that we started 15 into to try and improve the capacity factor is.to try and 16 find out is there something out there in the world that we 17 can do to replace our existing helium circulators primarily 18 to get rid of that high pressure bearing water source of 19 moisture into the primary system.
20 I have put this slide up to just briefly go over a._.
21 circulator at Fort St. Vrain.
Each circulator has a shaft 22 of about three feet long.
There is a helium impeller, a 23 single stage steam turbine and a Pelton wheel, a water wheel 24 backup, there are journal bearings and thrust bearings on 25 the circulator and those journal and thrust bearings O
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1 utilize approximately 180 gallons per minute of water at a 2
Pressure between six and seven hundred pounds above the i
3 Primary coolant pressure.
4 MR. EBERSOLE:
Where is the pressure break taken j
5 in that design?
~
6 MR. BREY:
Water pressure comes into this area, 7
and this is not a very good graph to show you as far as the 8
bearing water system is concerned, but it comes into this 9
area and there is a buffer helium supply and return system
[
r l
10 up here.
But in a matter of just maybe two or three inches 11 you have a breakdown of pressure of six to seven hundred I
1 12 Pounds delta P of pressure.
I I
13 MR. EBERSOLE:
It is still a water buffered seal, 14 isn't it?
15 MR. BREY:
Yes.
The seal -- well, it depends.
I _
l l
16 don't understand your. question quite ---
17 MR. EBERSOLE:
I am saying you stop helium I
i 18 effluent by driving water toward it and draining it.
t 19 MR. BREY:
Our buffered helium comes in at just a
)
z 20 Pound or tw,o above our primary coolant pressures.
It splits i
I 21 Part of the buffer system and buffered helium goes up the L
22 shaft into the primary system and the other part goes down r
23 and combines with water that is around the shaft and goes 24 out the helium water drain.
r 25 MR. EBERSOLE:
But sometimes the water-goes too r
i I
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I far towards the main system.
2 MR. BREY:
Exactly.
It doesn't take much of an 3
upset to put water up the shaft ---
4 MR. EBERSOLE:
It is what I call a water buffered 5
dynamic seal.
6 (Slide.)
7 MR. BREY:
The circulator auxiliaries, and that is 8
the way it is listed on the agenda, the circulator 9
auxiliaries are much too complex for a reliably operating 10 power plant.
What I did do here was just put a few of the 11 modifications up to show that we have in the past worked on 1
12 the circulator auxiliaries.
13 In fact, if you go back over the past 15 years, I
(~)h
(_
14 would say it was by far the biggest effort in the plant as 15 far as improving the plant.
There is in excess of 2,000 16 change notices or work requests in from the time that GA was 17 building the plant up until now just on the circulator 18 auxiliaries.
19 They are very, very complex, but we have to live 20 with them until we find either another type of circulator or _
21 improve the existing circulators that we have.
22 But here are a few of the improvements that we 23 have made, new electronic main drain controls to give us a 24 better response speed as well as a more accurate response 25 speed on our main drain valve.
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1 We put in a new circulator simulator.
This is for 2
Operator training.
We are going to upgrade that to make it 3
a more inclusive simulator to take -- instead of just one of 4
the circulators in a loop, to take both circulators in a 5
100P-6 We have improved the high-pressure separator drain 7
and controls.
Particularly, we increased the size of the 8
drain on each high-pressure separator.
9 We got rid of a loop seal and we have relocated 10 the drain location from the high-pressure separator into the 11 surge tank.
12 For better information and better understanding of 13 what is happening, particular during a transient, we
(_)
14 increased our circulator data logger input and sampling 15 frequency to get rid of a lot of the spurious trips that we 16 have had on our plant protective system from noise spikes.
17 We have brought a new shielded cabling from our input 18 switches to the plant protective system.
19 And, lastly, but certainly not all of the changes, 20 we introduced an improved control system whenever we go from 21 say normal bearing water to backup bearing water or vice 22 versa.
23 It seems as though that when we have a trip of our 24 normal bearing water system and we have to rely on backup 25 bearing water, which is fed of the emergency feedwater T'N V
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header, we get a surge in there, a pressure surge which puts 2
some moisture up the shaft that we trip off and we have to 3
then start cleanup of the primary syntem which is always a 4
delay on the plant.
5 The primary emphasis that I want to talk about 6
today is what is the Improvement Committee doing as far as 7
looking at major circulator improvements?
8 In late 1984 the very first thing that we looked 9
at was a brand new helium circulator, one that would feature 10 all of the bearings would be magnetic bearings.
It would be 11 a motor driven unit, hermetically sealed and the first thing 12 that we did was ask is this a feasible type of thing for our 13 vessel.
(/
14 MR. EBERSOLE:
I would like to ask you, when you 15 said hermetically sealed, does this mean something analogous 16 to the old PWR hermetically sealed pumps in which you 17 equilibriate pressure in the motor barrel with the helium 18 system and you in fact use helium as a cooling gas?
19 MR. BREY:
Yes, sir.
20 MR. EBERSOLE:
So essence it is a cam rotor pump __
21 and it is going to use helium gas which may be water cooled 22 with a static system, and then are you going to drive it 23 with high frequency solid state frequency changes?
24 MR. BREY:
Yes, sir.
25 MR. EBERSOLE:
I mean this sounds to me like the rx V
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1 only way to go.
2 MR. BREy:
Well, let me go into this just a little 3
bit because our first reaction is, first of all, is it 4
feasible and can we built a motor that will fit in that 42-5 inch penetration in the bottom of our PCRV that will deliver 6
55 hundred horsepower.
7 MR. EBERSOLE:
At what rpm?
8 MR. BREy:
All the way up to about 11,000 rpm.
9 MR. EBERSOLE:
With the frequency changes.
10 MR. BREY:
yes.
The answer came back, yes, we 11 can.
However, we went further on in our questioning.
Are 12 there problems with possible licensing issues?
And it was 13 felt that we could probably license this type of a 14 circulator, but certainly not without problems and without a 15 great deal of investigation.
16 MR. SIESS:
No alternate source of ---
17 MR. BREY:
Well, in this case the motor would be a 18 dual winding motor.
We would have a Class 1 winding in 19 there for backup to cool for decay heat purposes.
20 But if we tried to apply say DBA-2, which you 21 heard about today, a very fast depressurization of the 22 primary system, and here is this motor operating at 700 23 pounds pressure in the primary system, and all of the sudden-24 in less than a couple of seconds you are down to atmospheric 25 pressure, will the motor hang together, and how do we O
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73410101 128 marysimons g-)s
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1 license that?
2 MR. EBERSOLE:
Could you relieve it through relief 3
diaphragms so that the differential would never be 4
realized?
Oh, you are still trying to cool the motor?
5 MR. BREY:
Yes.
The motor has to hang together.
6 So there were licensing issues like that.
7 Also, there is a cost issue.
To go in this 8
direction we were looking at in excess of $40 million.
That 9
was the cost as we looked at it in late 1984.
But basically 10 the information that we received back was that, yes, there 11 could be such an animal built and installed in Fort St.
12 Vrain, but it would take a great deal of effort and a good 13 deal of money and quite a few problems I would say from a 14 licensing standpoint.
15 I guess where I am going is there are other 16 options that we are considering and we have opted to set 17 this one aside to look at some of the other options.
18 MR. SIESS:
What is being considered for the 19 modular HTGR7 20 MR. BREY:
The modular HTGR is looking at a 21 magnetic bearing motor driven circulator.
22 MR. SIESS:
Motor driven?
23 MR. BREY:
Yes, sir.
24 MR. EBERSOLE:
Hermetically sealed?
25 MR. BREY:
I believe that is the case.
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1 MR. EBERSOLE:
So it will face that same problem.
2 MR. BREY:
I believe that in the initial design 3
they will be able to take into account speed, for instance, 4
where right now we have got to backfit into a set of 5
conditions that already exist in the plant.
We have to 6
backfit into a fixed sized impeller that we have to operate 7
up to 11,000 rpm.
We have to backfit into a hole that 8
already exists in our PCRV.
Here we can start from scratch 9
in the modular.
10 MR. EBERSOLE:
This matter of losing pressure of 11 the helium coolant in the motor case, won't you be operating 12 cn that secondary winding at such a low power level that you 13 will have adequate cooling margins in the low pressure 14 helium case?
15 MR. BREY:
Then the next question will be with 16 this rapid depressurization and with the ability of helium 17 to permeate everything, including the insulation, what will 18 happen?
19 MR. EBERSOLE:
Will it explore?
20 MR. BREY:
Will it pop-corn out?
21 MR. EBERSOLE:
Yes.
22 (Slide.)
23 MR. BREY:
Actually these aren't in order, but 24 what we are also looking at -- and by the way, we just let a 25 contract for a third of a million dollars to GA Technologies
,~
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73410101 130 marysimons 1
on this -- but to look at our existing circulators and make 2
some very substantial changes in them.
3 The addition of a scavenging jet pump to the 4
helium water drain is to pretty well make the high pressure 5
separator area a lower pressure sink than it is right now so 6
that we can drain out water faster out of the helium water 7
drain than we can now.
8 Going to a fixed orifice main drain, which would 9
be to get rid of our control valves on the main drain which 10 seem to be a continual source of problems as far as 11 transients in bearing water systems.
12 Plugging of the lower helium water drain ports.
13 In the initial design of the circulator General Atomic put (3
(_/
14 in some balancing ports and-they were to balance the 15 circulator through all speed ranges, zero to 11,000.
16 During the operation of the plant they have come 17 to the conclusion that we don't need these lower drain 18 Ports, and by plugging them it would really cut back on the 19 amount of water into the helium water drain which would 20 allow it, in case we have a transient to take more water 21 than it has been taking in the past.
22 The addition of a positive water ingress 23 detector.
Right now we use differential pressure switches 24 or transmitters that look at buffered helium versus bearing 25 water drain pressure, and any kind of water in those sensing i
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1 legs tends to make the transmitter inaccurate.
The operator 2
gets fault information and he does not know if he has got a 4
3 good reading or a bad reading, and I think in a lot of cases 4
this has prolonged the operation of the circulator while the i
circulator continues to feed water up the shaft into the j
6' primary system.
~
7 MR. EBERSOLE:
You are planning to have a dump 8
logie in case you have a tube failure where you pick up the 9
first failure, and then it is a rapidly disappearing signal 10 and you must identify the failed steam generator and dump it~
11 quickly before your signal goes away?
12 MR. EREY:
If we have a steam generator leak, 13 right now at the top of each circulator there is a moisture l
14 pickup point that feeds into our plant protective system and 15 it will sense an increase in moisture level and trip in a 16 matter of eight seconds at full load, j
17 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, at that time isn't the signal i
18 diminishing because of mixing?
19 MR. BREY:
It depends on the. size of the leak.
We 20 have had them so small.
In fact, the first leak that we had 21 was so small that it literally took hours in order to see f
22 any kind of a substantial change in moisture, and certainly I
i 23 there was mixing between loops in that case.
24 The last four bullets really go towards drastic 25 improvements as far as getting rid of'a lot of the O
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1 circulator auxiliaries.
2 If we go to three drain water pumps with 3
uninterruptible power supplies for each circulator and we 4
complete the separation of the bearing water and buffered 5
systems so that each circulator stands alone, we will in 6
essence I think provide the necessary redundancy so that we 7
can get rid of the high pressure separators, the backup 8
bearing water and the accumulator systems.
It is the backup g
bearing water and the accumulator systems that give us a lot 10 of problems as far as moisture ingress.
11 MR. EBERSOLE:
In the matter of this pop-corning, 12 wouldn't it be just the rotor which is virtually a cooper 13 steel forging -- I mean not a forging but certainly a made 14 up rugged piece of machinery that is not like windings?
15 There wouldn't be any windings in the helium, would there?
16 MR. BREY:
It really goes one step further as I 17 understand this type of motor.
I understand that there are 18 to be solid state diodes on it.
19 MR. EBERSOLE:
You mean it is going to be a DC 20 machine?
21 MR. BREY:
No.
It is going to take a frequency 22
- change, 23 MR. EBERSOLE:
Okay.
24 MR. BREY:
But according to General Electric, 25 there is going to be diodes in there within the high i
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1 pressure helium compartment.
2 MR. EBERSOLE:
Why is that?
3 MR. BREY:
You have reached the limit of my ---
4 (Laughter.)
5 MR. EBERSOLE:
I was just trying to envision 6
nothing more than a squirrel cage rotor running at 11,000.
7 MR. BREY:
I am afraid I can't answer it.
8 MR. SIESS:
Well, it is in the PCRV.
So it is 9
subjective to 10 MR. BREY:
The information that I have from GE is 11 that, for instance, these diodes, the helium will permeate 12 into the diode.
13 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, the question is are the 14 diodes in the right place.
15 MR. BREY:
This is an ongoing effort with GA 16 Technologies.
They are in the process of making this 17 evaluation.
I estimate this evaluation will go on 18 throughout the next year.
19 Now in conjunction with that, we have looked at a 20 number of other areas.
21 (Slide.)
22 Brown Duvery Corporation came-in with a suggestion 23 on a proposal for an-initial look at utilizing the existing 24 steam and Pelton water drives like we have them on the 25 circulators now but going completely to magnetic bearings __
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i for the journal and the trust bearings.
2 We have essentially set this one aside and have 3
not acted on it based on what we are doing down here.
4 Before I get to this item, I would like to just 5
mention that we are also utilizing Westinghouse to look at 6
the existing circulators and change the sealing arrangement 7
around to install hydrostatic seals.
8 MR. EBERSOLE:
How can you have hydrostatic seals 9
when one part is rotating at another station area?
10 MR. BREY:
Well, as I understand the sealing 11 system, what would happen is you would put on a slinger type 12 arrangement on the rotating part and you would have a fixed 13 counterpart on the stationary housing of the circulator, and 14 that fixed counterpart would sense the differential of 15 Pressure between our buffer system and the bearing water 16 Pressure just under that fixed ---
17 MR. EBERSOLE:
Would you still use water?
18 MR. BREY:
It would sense the pressure of the 19 water or helium, depending on what is in there, but it would 20 sense that pressure and as long as the buffered helium 21 Pressure was higher than the sensed pressure underneath, it 22 would run.
In other words, the circulator would operate 23 okay, but as soon as you start getting an upset, your 24 underneath pressure or the bearing water pressure pushing up 25 against the fixed part of this seal would start pushing it O
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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73410101 135 marysimons
.f~h
(_)
I towards the rotating slinger and essentially start shutting 2
you off.
3 As water kept coming up the shaft it would shove 4
against the slinger and start sealing off.
Of course, that 5
would mean that the rotating circulator would end up 6
rubbing, there would be a rubbing situation with the 7
sealer.
But Westinghouse says that if they choose the type 8
of material properly, and I think they are looking at a 9
tungsten carbide or a tungsten carbon type arrangement, they 10 feel they can get many, many hours of rubbing on that type 11 of seal without any problem.
12 So we are having Westinghouse look at this.
They 13 have given us an initial evaluation which is presently being
(
14 considered within our' engineering organization.
The Fort 15 St. Vrain Improvement Committee has not heard of a 16 recommendation one way or another.
17 MR. REED:
This seal almost sounds like an 18 adaption of the Stein seal as it used to be called on the 19 Westinghouse shaft seal LWR pump.
Is it an adaption of 20 that?
21 MR. BREy:
I believe it is, but I am not familiar 22 with the LWR pump.
From what I have heard, it is adaption.
23 They are using the people as well as the technology that 24 they have used for that seal in helping us with our problem.
25 MR. REED:
I was sitting here and thinking before O
I ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 80 4 336-6646 4
4 73410101 136 marysimons 1
you got to that that the Stein seal arrangement could be 2
adapted to your problem.
I guess it is a possibility.
3 MR. BREY:
This an area that we are looking at.
4 This is under investigation.
5 The last item I have here is to go with new e
6 circulators which still utilize the same impeller and the 7
same single stage steam drive and the same Pelton wheel l
8 drive, but replace the thrust bearings with magnetic 9
bearings.
Rather than a complete replacement of all th,e 10 bearings from water bearings to-magnetic bearings, just 11 replace the thrust bearings.
12 It is the thrust bearings on our existing 13 circulators which require the high pressure water supply and 14 require the high flow.
It is felt that just by replacing 15 the thrust bearings that we will get rid of our problem 16 because we could go and still supply the' journal bearings 17 with low pressure water and essentially water that is only 18 15 or 20 pounds above primary coolant pressure and still 19 adequately supply the journal bearings..And if we go to 20 magnetic bearings on the thrust, we can do away with that 21 high pressure water supply.
22 MR. SHEWMON:
I have never seen a magnetic bearing 23 on this scale.
Is it permanent magnets or does it have a 24 current running through it?
25 MR. BREY:
It is my understanding that on the
()
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
73410101 137 marysimons
(~
(_%)
1 rotor it is a permanent magnet.
With the solid state 2
technology *the way it is, S2M Corporation from France has 3
come up with any number of applications.
In fact, at KFA in 4
Germany they now have a magnetic bearing drive, motor drive 5
in'a helium atmosphere, in a helium loop.
6 We have checked on what is happening worldwide 7
with the use of maanetic bearings, and there are any number 8
of applications worldwide that use them consistently in 9
applications that take us to the same kind of speeds that we 10 have on our circulator as well as the same type of loadings.
11 MR. SHEWMON:
But they are permanent magnets?
12 MR. BREY:
It is my understanding they are 13 Permanent magnets.
14 MR. SHENMON:
There have been a lot of advances in 15 that area and I don't see why the speed would influence 16 whether or not it would -- well, okay.
17 MR. BREY:
It is on the fixed side that you have-10 All sorts of control that you need to look at.
19 MR. EBERSOLE:
But you would still have buffered 20 water, wouldn't you?
21 MR. BREY:
Yes.
What would happen here is 22 different than what we have gotten from Brown BeVery who 23 would replace all.of the bearings with magnetic bearings.
j 24 There is a need to have some medium between that 25 rotating circulator shaft and the housing.
It is a
,J
\\
l ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646.
73410101 138 marysimons
,.(,)
1 sealant.
2 MR. EBERSOLE:
Let' me hypothesize that you fix 3
these things until they have about the same availability as 4
the main feedwater system.
How would your project,look 5
then?
6 MR. BREY:
Oh, great.
7 MR. EBERSOLE:
This is what I was trying to say 8
earlier.
Is this a good project that has got a millstone 9
around its neck in the form of the circulators?
10 MR. BREY:
Yes, sir.
11 MR. EBERSOLE:
And is it justifiable to say now 12 that aspect of this design is the Achilles Heel system and 13 it should be even subsidized to be fixed?
p i-)
14 MR. BREY:
I can't speak of the subsidized, but I 15 can tell you that it is the Achilles Heel of Fort St. Vrain.
16 MR.,EBERSOLE:
I had thought that was the case.
17 MR. SIESS:
Well, it would be the Achilles Heel of 18 an advanced reactor design.
19 MR. EBERSOLE:
Of course I haven't heard yet what 20 the modular type is going to be.
21 MR. BREY:
Let me briefly addreso that.
22 MR. EBERSOLE:
Let my hypothesize the modular type 23 is going to need some new seals and not like the ones you 24 have got.
25 MR. SIESS":
What they are saying for the modular nL:
. ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
73410101 139 marysimons
.m()
I type is they are going to use that thing he had up there on 2
the first list.
3 MR. BREY:
Well, you can start from scratch and 4
use a motorized circulator and have it ride on the primary 5
system pressure.
6 MR. SIESS:
And no water?
7 MR. BREY:
Well, there might be some low-pressure 8
cooling water on the ---
9 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, that carries with it all 10 these problems of pop-corning and whatever, doesn't it?
11 MR. BREY:
No, because right now in order -- it is 12 my understanding that in order to get a 5,500 horsepower 13 motor in the configuration that we have here going at speeds 14 of up to 11,000 rpm that we have to go to a very, very 15 unique design.
16 I am also told from GE that the unique design has 17 been developed but for the Department of Defense 18 activities.
So they won't share it with us.
19 (Laughter.)
20 So I guess what I want to say over again is we can 21 design from scratch with a modular reactor something that we 22 can using using today's technology which doesn't need a lot 23 of advancement.
24 MR. SIESS:
It doesn't even need testing at out 25 Fort St. Vrain?
O ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
I 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6
73410101 i40 marysimons
()
1 MR. BREY:
We are sure that the magnetic bearing 2
part of it needs testing out at Fort St. Vrain.
3 MR. EBERSOLE:
Is Fort St. Vrain a logical test 4
bed for such a circulator?
5 MR. BREY:
I feel it is.
6 (Laughter.)
7 Anyway, what we have here is about'a $2 million 8
evaluation effort.
Right now we are very close to signing 9
the contract so that Electric Power Research Institute will 10 fund about a half a million of that $2 million project to 11 look at this in depth and the final part of the project will 12 be coming up with final design drawings on the circulators.
13
.But it will take us through testing of components, 14 conceptual design through the magnetic bearings and again, 15 it is about a two year or about a year and a half effort at 16
$2 million.
17 MR. SIESS:
And it that works, will it solve all 18 of your problems or only half of them?
19 MR. BREY:
Well, again, we don't know whether we 20 will choose this.
Also, in the effort that is going on now 21 there is a pricing effort to get a solid indication of what i
22 is it going to cost Fort St. Vrain or Public Service of 23 Colorado to completely change out circulators like this.
24 Preliminarily we ---
25 MR. SIESS:
Excuse me, there are four of them?
O ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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i i
73410101 141 marysimons 1
MR. BREY:
Four of them, yes.
2 MR. SIESS:
And they are inside and have to come 3
out through that middle hole?
4 MR. BREY:
No, we lower them out.
5 MR. SIESS:
They can come out through-their own.
6 penetrations.
7 MR. BREY:
We have had a lot of practice with 8
that.
9 MR. SIESS:
I know.
10 MR. BREY-Preliminal'ily it looks like at least 11 S20 million effort and probably up to five years.
12 MR. SIESS:
So if you came up with a new design 13 that would fit in there you could make a change out fairly
('h s,/
14 rapidly, couldn't you?
15 MR. BREY:
Yes, we could.
16 MR. SIESS:
You have got a lot of pre-op testing 17 to do, I am sure.
18 MR. BREY:
Well, we would try to have all of our 19 testing out of the way.
Certainly all the licensing would 20 be out of the way, or at least we would hope so.
21 Then we would take a shutdown I believe, again 22 preliminarily, and we are looking at approximately a half of 23 a year of shutdown total.
If we had everything ready to go, 24 we could take out our old circulators and put in our new 25 ones.
O ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-33& 66*6
73410101 142 marysimons
()
1 MR. SIESS:
It would take six months to do that?
2 MR. BREY:
That is what it looks'like now.
3 MR. SIESS:
How long does it take you to change 4
out one that you do fairly regularly?
5 MR. BREY:
Somewhat over 30 days and I think like 6
five weeks now to change out one, and we would.have to do it i
7 one loop at a time..We would have to continue with the one 8
loop while we worked on the other loop.
9 Well pretty well that wraps up what we are doing 10 as far as major innovative design changes on the 11 circulators.
12 MR. SIESS:
If that works, you would get your-
.)
13 money back in about six months.
14 MR. BREY:
Yes, sir.
15 That is all I have.
16 MR. SIESS:
Thank you.
17 Any questions on this?
18 (No response.)
19 The last item was one Mr. Ebersole was especially 20 interested in, and since he has left, I don't know if 21 anybody knows how to ask the questions.
22 MR. SHEWMON:
Well not the way Jesse does'anyway.
23 (Laughter.)
24 MR. SIESS:
I think some of us at least know the 25 story of how they managed-to get over 35 percent power for ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
R 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646-
73410101 143 marysimons (O
_)
1 an hour or so.
It has been written up rather thoroughly in 2
a couple of places, but if you haven't read it and want to, 3
hear about it, I am sure they would be glad to tells us.
4 MR. WALKER:
We are prepared to talk about it, Dr.
5 Siess, if you want.
6 MR. SIESS:
Would you like to hear about that now?
7 MR. REED:
I don't think it is all that 8
significant, but I am sure the regulatory people do.
9 MR. SIESS:
Well, I share your opinion.
I haven't 10 tried to figure the probability of having a steamline break 11 in that hour.
12 (Laughter.)
13 Well, I think we will skip that.
N(d 14 You may have noticed that when Mr. McKinley made 15 out this agenda, he has got the starting time for each part, 16 but he doesn't have a finishing time.
17 (Laughter.)
18 So I don't know whether we are ahead of schedule 19 or not, having finished the last item on it.
20 Is there anything else the subcommittee members 21 would like to bring up?
22 (No response.)
23 Is there anything that you would like to tell us 24 that we haven't asked you about?
25 MR. SHEWMON:
Out of curiosity, how many thousand O
l ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
I 202-347-3700 Nationside Coverage 800-336-6646 L
73410101 144 marysimons
(/
1 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> are there on your steamlines?
2 MR. SIESS: -Under pressure do you mean?
l 3
MR. SHEWMON:
Yes.
4 MR. BREY:
I think we had about 1/8th of'the 1
=
5 5
number of hours that that pipe had on it.
6 MR. SHEWMON:
You were around 10,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />?
7 MR. HOLMES: ~Either 10 or 12 thousand hours versus i
8 125,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />.
I 9
MR. SIESS:
Do you'have anything.more to say, Ken?
10 MR. HEITNER:
Well, only if you want to answer 11 some questions on the June 30 meeting.
12 MR. SIESS:
He just left..
I don't try to answer 13 Mr. Ebersole's questions when he isn't here.
14 I think he might_have read it, but he had to catch
}
15 a plane.
If you have still got questions, I will tell him i
a 16 to call you.
i i
17 Do any of you backup people here have any comments i
i 18 they want to make?
4 19 (No response.)
}
20 Well, I think we are finished.
21 Thank you, gentlemen.
22 Whereupon, at 5:10-p.m., the subcommittee 23 adjourned.)
i 4
24-I 25.
i 1 ()
4 a
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 '
Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6646
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LICENSING ISSUES FORT ST. VRAIN i
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PRESENTATION TO THE i
ACRS 1
JUNE 26, 1986 i
K. HEITNER
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DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENTS FOR FORT ST. VRAIN
SUMMARY
OF DBA-1 AND DBA-2 CHERN0BYL ACCIDENT VS. FSV i
CONSIDERATION OF DBA'S IN:
FIRE PROTECTION EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION O
i
'O FSV DBA-1 PERMANENT LOSS OF FORCED CIRCULATION COOLING
- CORE HEATUP AND FUEL PARTICLE FAILURE
- PCRV AND LINER REMAIN INTACT
- LINER COOLING SYSTEM FUNCTIONS
- DOSES ACCUMULATED OVER SIX-MONTH PERIOD
- DOSES WELL BELOW 10 CFR PART 100 GUIDELINES l
O
/
'O FSV DBA-2 RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION ACCIDENT
- FAILURE OF INNER AND OUTER CLOSURES ON A SINGLE PCRV PENETRATION
- SIGNIFICANT SHORT TERM DOSES WITHIN 10 CFR PART 100 GUIDELINES
()
- ACTUAL DBA-2 DOSES WOULD BE LESS BECAUSE OF a
GOOD FUEL PARTICLE PERFORMANCE
- RECOVERY IS NOT BASED ON SAFETY GRADE SYSTEMS 1
()
CHERN0BYL ACCIDENT VS. FSV
- EXAMINED A SCENARIO BEYOND LIQENSING BASIS
- FAILED BOTH CLOSURES ON LARGEST PENETRATIONS ON TOP AND BOTTOM OF PCRV g
- INITIAL CONCLUSIONS:
4
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GRAPHITE OXIDATION NOT SIGNIFICANT 4
EVENT COULD BE TERMINATED DOSES WITHIN 10 CFR PART 100 LIMITS FOR LPZ I
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- JUNE 4, 1984, STAFF GUIDANCE ON APPENDIX R
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- FIRES INCLUDED:
Q THREE ROOM CONTROL COMPLEX CONGESTED CABLE AREAS ON G AND J WALLS 6
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HENCE, EQUIPMENT TO MITIGATE DBA-1 IS
()
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4 i
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THE FORT ST. VRAIN IMPROVEMENT COMMITTEE WAS FORMED BY R. F. WALKER ON OCTOBER 23, 1984.
IMPROVEMENT COMMITTEE PURPOSE:
FORMULATE AND REVIEW PROPOSED TECHNICAL IMPROVEMENTS TO ENHANCE THE OPERATION OF FORT ST. VRAIN.
FINANCIAL OR REGULATORY' ASPECTS OF POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS SHOULD NOT BE A PRIMARY CONSIDERATION.
OUTSIDE EXPERTISE WILL BE UTILIZED AS NECESSARY TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.
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FORT ST. VRAIN ELECTRICAL CABLE
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O APPROACH
- REQUIRED CABLES IDENTIFIED CABLES SUPPORTING EQ SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS
- IDENTIFIED CABLES ROUTED THROUGH A HARSH ENVIRONMENT
- GOAL--IDENTIFY MANUFACTURER / MATERIAL FOR ALL EQ CABLES
- HISTORICAL PLANT DOCUMENTS REVIEWED PHYSICAL INSPECTION OF CABLES PURCHASE ORDER REVIEW'
- - RESULTS MATERIALS SUCCESSFULLY IDENTIFIED
()
NOT ALL CABLE MANUFACTURER IDENTIFIED NO CORRELATION BETWEEN CABLE MANUFACTURER AND LOCATION OF CABLE IN PLANT 06 0
O APPROACH TO RESOLUTION
- - QUALIFY CABLES ON A MATERIALS BASIS
- - USE AVAILABLE INDUSTRY KNOWLEDGE CABLE TEST DATA MATERIAL TEST DATA
- - EVALUATE MANUFACTURING PROCESSES AND ADDITIVES
- - TAKE CREDIT FOR LESS SEVERE ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE
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SUMMARY
OF ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES
- - TEMPERATURE (QUALIFICATION BY TEST / ANALYSIS)
RX BLDG. PEAK 371 DEGREES F TB BLDG. PEAK 360 DEGREES F
- - PRESSURE (N/A FOR FSV)
LESS THAN 1 PSI FOR LESS THAN 1 SECOND
- - HUMIDITY (QUALIFICATION BY IPCEA ACCEPTANCE TESTING) 1 g
DROPS BELOW 95% RH BY 15 HOURS RETURNS TO BACKGROUND IN ABOUT 3 DAYS
- - RADIATION (N/A FOR FSV)~
O DBA-2 30 DAY TID = 414' RADS HELB 30 DAY TID = 12 RADS
- - SUBMERGENCE (N/A FOR FSV)
LOCATED AB0VE OR PROTECTED FROM SUBMERGENCE
- - CHEMICAL EFFECTS (N/A FOR FSV)
NO CHEMICAL SPRAYS O
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CONSIDERATION OF OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL PARAMETERS t
- - SYNERGISTIC EFFECTS (N/A FOR FSV)
NONE KNOWN AT FSV RADIATION LEVELS
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- - AGING (QUALIFICATION BY TEST / ANALYSIS)
THERMAL AGING ONLY
- - OPERABILITY (QUALIFICATION BY TEST / ANALYSIS)
FSV EQ PROGRAM UTILIZES 30 DAY OPERABILITY TIME
- - CABLE DESCRIPTION / CLASSIFICATION
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FORT ST. VRAIN CABLES ARE GROUPED INTO THREE CLASSIFICATIONS CLASS I (6 QUALIFICATION BINDERS)
CLASS II (13 QUALIFICATION BINDERS)
CLASS III (4 QUALIFICATION BINDERS) 1 O
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- - CLASS I CABLES MANUFACTURER KNOWN VENDOR CERTIFICATION TO PURCHASE ORDER MINIMUM CAPABILITY TO IPCEA AND ASTM STANDARDS JACKETED CABLE INSULATION AND JACKET MATERIAL KNOWN MATERIAL THICKNESS KNOWN PSC STEAM LINE TEST USED FOR TRANSIENT QUALIFICATION AS APPLICABLE AND SUPPLEMENTED BY MANUFACTURER IEEE 323 TEST REPORT O
- THERMAL LAG ANALYSIS MAY BE USED TO DEMONSTRATE TEST ENVELOPE EXCEEDS PSC REQUIREMENTS
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- - CLASS II CABLES MANUFACTURER KNOWN VENDOR CERTIFICATION TO PURCHASE ORDER
- MINIMUM CAPABILITY TO IPCEA AND ASTM STANDARDS JACKETED CABLE INSULATION AND JACKET MATERIAL KNOWN MATERIAL THICKNESS KNOWN PSC STEAM LINE TEST USED FOR TRANSIENT QUALIFICATION AS APPLICABLE AND SUPPLEMENT BY A IEEE 323 OR 383 TEST REPORT O
SIMILARITY ANALYSIS USED TO DEMONSTRATE INSTALLED VERSUS TESTED CONFIGURATION QUALIFICATION THERMAL LAG USED TO DEMONSTRATE TEST ENVELOPE EXCEEDS PSC REQUIREMENTS
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- SIMILARITY ANALYSIS USED TO ' DEMONSTRATE OPERABILITY OF INSTALLED VERSUS TESTED CABLES
- IEEE 323 OR 383 TEST REPORT WHEN AVAILABLE IF NEEDED THERMAL LAG ANALYSIS USED TO DEMONSTRATE TEST ENVELOPE EXCEEDS PSC REQUIREMENTS t
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- - SIMILARITY ANALYSIS
- CONSIDERED ANALYSIS OF MANUFACTURING TECHNIQUES, COMP 0UNDS, AND ADDITIVES CONSIDERED WORK PERFORMED AT TVA SUBSTANTIATING i
LIKENESS OF MATERIALS
- - THERMAL LAG ANALYSIS USED METHODOLOGY DEFINED BY NRC STAFF IN COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TOPICAL REPORT TAKES CREDIT FOR CABLE JACKET POWER CABLES RESTR'ICTED TO 50% ELECTRICAL
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LOADING BY DESIGN CONTROL PERFORMED THERMAL LAG ANALYSIS ON ACTUAL CABLE CONFIGURATION'FOR SAMPLE PACKAGES 4
ACTUAL THERMAL LAG TEST DATA AVAILABLE TO VALIDATE METHODOLOGY f
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O CONCLUSION PSC METHODOLOGY FOR CABLE QUALIFICATION IS WELL i
DEFINED, BASED ON TYPE TEST, AND MEETS THE i
NRC STAFF'S CRITERIA (DOR GUIDELINES) FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION l
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MAINTENANCE HISTORY REVIEW OBJECTIVE:
IDENTIFY THOSE ITEKS WHICH ARE NOT IDENTICAL TO THE j
AS-PROCURED STATE AND DETERMINE IMPACT ON EQ SCOPE:
REVIEW OF SSR/PTR INITIf,TED PRIOR TO
.l OCTOBER 1, 1985 GUIDELINES:
USE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH IN DETERMINING IF WORK AFFECTS EQ i
EXCLUDE ACTIVITIES COVERED BY SEPARATE DETAILED REVIEWS 4
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- DEVELOP SSR/PTR MASTER LIST (EQ MEL ANNOTATED TO REFLECT COMPONENTS ALREADY BEINC REPLACED OR MODIFIED)
- PERFORM REVIEW IN REVERSE CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER COMPARE COMPONENT LISTED ON SSR/PTR TO SSR/PTR MASTER LIST RECORD APPLICABLE SSR/PTR'S AND COPY APPROPRIATE DOCUMENTS PHASE II - DETERMINE EQ IMPACT ASSEMBLE SSR'S/PTR'S COPIED INTO SYSTEM PACKAGES REVIEW & CATEGORIZE SSR'S/PTR'S COPIED AS FOLLOWS:
1.
WORK EFFECTS EQ 2.
WORK POTENTIALLY EFFECTS EQ i
3.
WORK DEFINITELY DOES NOT EFFECT EQ PHASE III - FINAL REPORT
- DOCUMENT RESULTS OF PHASES I & II PROVIDE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EACH ITEM THAT EFFECTS OR POTENTIALLY EFFECTS EQ
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PHASC III RESOLTS
- 1. REPLACE 21 COMPONENTS (4 APPLICATIONS) TOTALLY
- 2. REPLACE 7 COMPONENTS (6 APPLICATIONS) PARTIALLY
- 3. PERFORM VERIFICATION OF 39 COMPONENTS (5 APPLICATIONS)
- 4. INSPECT & TEST 16 COMPONENTS (8 APPLICATIONS)
- 5. OBTAIN DOCUMENTATION FOR 4 COMPONENTS (4 APPLICATIONS) p j
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DETAILS OF PHASE III RESULTS 1.
REPLACE 21 COMPONENTS COMPLETELY:
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TWELVE (12)VICKERSSOLEN0IDVALVES(#)
B.
FOUR (4) PARKER-HANNIFIN SOLEN 0ID VALVES (*)
C.
TWO (2) MOOG SERVO VALVES (#/*)
2.
REPLACE 7 COMPONENTS PARTIALLY:
A.
ONE (1) ITT VALVE CIRCUIT BOARD (#)
B.
ONE (1) V@GNETROL LEVEL SWITCH CIRCUIT BOARD C.
ONE (1) MASONEILAN LEVEL SWITCH CIRCUIT BOARD D.
ONE (1) MASONEILAN GASKET COVER E.
TWO(2)BARTONSWITCHES(*)
F.
ONE (1) MOTOR (#)
- CURRENTLY BEING REPLACED OR BEING EVALUATED FOR REPLACEMENT FOR OTHER REASONS
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PERFORM VERIFICATION OF 39 COMPONENTS:
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FOUR (4) VICKERS SOLEN 0ID VAVLES (#)
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TWENTY-0NE (21) CIRCLE SEAL SOLEN 0ID VALVES C.
FIVE (5) PARKER-HANNIFIN SOLEN 0ID VALVES D.
SEVEN (7) BARTON SWITCHES E.
TWO (2) ITE MCC COMPARTMENTS 4.
INSPECT AND TEST 16 COMPONENTS:
A.
ONE (1) ITE MCC COMPARTMENT B.
FOUR (4) MASONEILAN I/P CONVERTERS C.
TWO (2) BARKSDALE SOLEN 0ID O
VALVES (#)
r D. ONE (1) COLLINS LVDT (*)
E.
ONE (1) LIMITORQUE TORQUE SWITCH F.
THREE (3) GE SWITCHES G.
THREE (3) MOTORS H.
ONE (1) BA4 TON SWITCH 5.
OBTAIN DOCUMENTATION FOR 4 COMPONENTS:
A.
THREE (3) MOTORS B.
ONE (1) TEMPERATURE SWITCH
- CURRENTLY BEING REPLACED OR BEING EVALUATED FOR REPLACEMENT i
'FOR OTHER REASONS FURTHER DOCUMENTATION SEARCH IN PROGRESS
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RAYCHEM SPLICES APPLICATIONS:
- INSTRUMENTATION CIRCUITS (MILLIAMP & LOW VOLTAGE)
MOTORTERMINATIONS(480V)
I STATUS:
APPR0XIMATELY 700 SPLICES INSTALLED APPR0XIMATELY 3,000 SPLICES IN PROGRAM REVIEW EFFORTS:
- KIT SIZE SELECTION INVOLVES MEASUREMENTS BY Q.C.
KITS SPECIFIED BY ENGINEERING I
IN WORK PROCEDURE INSTALLATIONS INSPECTED / ACCEPTED BY Q.C.
APPR0XIMATELY 75 SPLICES RECENTLT
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