ML20211N528
| ML20211N528 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 02/20/1987 |
| From: | Partlow J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | White S TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8703020102 | |
| Download: ML20211N528 (5) | |
Text
.,
hj#""'%s3 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION UNITED STATES g
j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 e
February 20, 1987 D:cket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328 Tennessee Valley Authority ATTN: Mr. Steven A. White Manager of Nuclear Power 6 North 38A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801 Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
SAFETY SYSTEMS OUTAGE MODIFICATIONS INSPECTION AT THE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR POWER PLANT A special announced inspection of specific plant modifications accomplished during the current outage was conducted by the NRC staff at the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant on January 12-23, 1987.
The staff discussed the inspection findings / observations with Mr. H. L. Abercrombie and other members of your staff during this inspection and at the exit meeting on January 23, 1987.
These items are as follows:
1.
Concerns exist regarding the Flamemastic cable insulation:
The 1/4" nominal installed thickness used in the TVA ampacity a.
evaluations appears to be nonconservative.
b.
The evaluations by TVA of bearing pressure on contacted surfaces for long vertical cable runs may not cover the most severe cases.
2.
Two cases were found in which safety-related ASME Code class equipment was procured to non-code requirements and installed:
a.
Isokinetic probes, which are used to collect post-accident air samples.
b.
A Helicoil threaded insert, which is installed in the primary side head of a steam generator.
3.
Although the same issue was identified by TVA a year ago and cited by NRC last October, TVA has continued to routinely issue QA Level II material which does not have the required certifications.
4.
A weld rod identification problem has existed since May 1986 in which 308 and 308L weld rods cannot be distinguished from each other.
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Tennessee Valley Authority February 20, 1987 5.
A number of significant deficiencies were identified relative to the installation of the number five 125V vital battery:
a.
Gaps of up to 1/2 inch were found between the poured foundation and the battery rack structural supports.
The seismic analysis assumed solid restraint.
b.
Although vapor / explosion proof fixtures are required, the installed lights are standard incandescent fixtures.
c.
Cable separation violations involving A and 8 train cables were identified in battery board 5.
d.
Intercell connection cables between cells 52 and 53 had bend radii less than that required by specification.
The HVAC dampers for battery room 5 appeared to be inadequately e.
supported.
6.
A number of instances were identified in which nonconforming or untraceable materials were issued and installed in safety-related applications:
a.
144 of 145 diesel generator foundation anchor bolts inspected did not have the required material certifications.
b.
Examples were found in which the material issue document (Form 575) was incomplete and bulk quantities of materials taken from stores were not traceable.
Nuts and bolts used as fasteners for the battery racks in battery c.
rooms 1, 2 and 5 were not traceable.
d.
Four 8-inch butterfly valves in the diesel generator building had valve serial numbers and TVA mark numbers which did not match the numbers in the relevant drawings.
For one case, based on a limited sample, the internal wiring on a e.
limitorque valve operator was found to be not qualified to 1E requirements.
7.
A number of isolated discrepancies were observed, including:
a.
Loose and broken flexible conduit installations.
b.
Lack of thread engagement on Foxboro and Barton transmitters.
c.
Missing pull test records for concrete anchors.
t d.
Discrepancies between as-built drawings and installed structural l
supports.
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Tennessee Valley Authority February 20, 1987 This letter is being provided to you in advance of the formal inspection report, so that prompt and appropriate corrective actions can be factored into your planning for completion of the outage.
Each of the above concerns should be addressed prior to plant startup.
Some of these issues, such as Items 1 and 3 above, may impact. ongoing reviews by the TVA and NRC staffs. With regard to the flamemastic insulation concerns expressed in Item No.1, we have received verbal commitments from Mr. H. L. Abercrombie that Sequoyah will take specific actions to resolve those concerns. With regard to Item No. 3, which involves issuance of QA Level II materials from stores without required documentation, we are aware that you are currently developing a program to resolve this issue; however, we remain concerned that issuance of nonconforming materials appears to be continuing on a routine basis and that the time which would be required to bring the installed nonconforming materials into conformance does not appear to be consistent with the current outage schedule.
No response is required to this letter since a report detailing the inspection findings and concerns will be issued in the near future.
Sincerely, s
James
) art ow, Director Divis on of Inspection Programs Office of Inspection and Enforcement cc:
See next page
.f Tennessee Valley Authority February 20, 1987 cc: Mr.
R. W. Cantrell County Judge ATTN:
D. L. Williams, Jr.
Hamilton County Courthouse Tennessee Valley Authority Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402 400 West Summit Hill Drive, W12 A12 Knoxville, Tennessee 37902 Mr. R. L. Gridley Tennessee Valley Authority SN 1478 Lookout Place Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801 Mr. R. Harding Tennessee Valley Authority Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Post Office Box 2000 Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379 Mr. H. L. Abercrombie Tennessee Valley Authority Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Post Office Box 2000 Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379 Tennessee Department of Public Health ATTN:
Director, Bureau of Environmental Health Services Cordell Hull Building Nashville, Tennessee 37129 Mr. Bob Faas Westinghouse Electric Corporation Post Office Box 355 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 Resident Inspector /Sequoyah NPS c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2600 Igou Ferry Road Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379 Regional Administrator, Region II l
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street, N.W., Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Mr. Michael H. Mobley, Director Division of Radiological Health T.E.R.R.A. Building 150 9th Avenue North Nashville, Tennessee 37203 l
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February 20, 1987 Distribution DCS DI Reading RCPB Reading JGPartlow RLSpessard JEKonklin KRHooks SRStein RLLoyd TVA0G ((3) SRichardson, AR-5029)
K. Barr, RII K. Jenison, RII NRC PDR Local PDR JHolonich BYoungblood JTaylor JAxelrad 1
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- RSpe' ard DATE $02/2/87
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