ML20211K575

Rev 1 to Generic Concern Task Force Employee Concern IN-85-289-001,IN-85-894-001,XX-85-093-002,WI-85-060-001 & IN-86-209-013, 'Operator Training.'

ML20211K575
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	04/22/1986
From:	Mashburn F TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
Shared Package
ML20211K566	List: ML20211K561 ML20211K575
References
NUDOCS 8606300184
Download: ML20211K575 (8)

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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT i

GENERIC CONCERN TASK FORCE EMPLOYEE CONCERN # IN-85-289-001

1. IN-85-894-001

1. XX-85-093-002

1. WI-85-060-001

1. IN-86-209-013

Subject:

Operator Training Date of Investigation: April 22, 1986 Investigator: __ p -(( e:cd -

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F Rsvision 1 4/22/86 r,

I. BACKGROUND The Sequoyah Generic Concern Task Force (GCTF) has identified as a potential generic concern the inadequacy of licensed operator training.

This issue was generated as a result of five separate employee concerns forwarded to Sequoyah from other TVA sites.

Concern number IN-85-289 ,001 was related as follows:

Operators have.already made errors during hot functional testing in Unit 1 approximately one year ago (1984), which would have been significant if plant had been operating. CI expressed concern regarding the inadequate qualification and training of operators.

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Concern number IN-85-894-001 was related as follows

, plant operators are inadequately trained for their positions.

The CI listed several incidences as examples. 1) An oil ring l blew up while ' replacing filters in mechanical maintenance, due i to head pressure. 2) Women operators do not have enough

. strength to open and close isolation valves. CI had to help many times. 3) While hot functional testing about a year ago, Hydrazine spilled all over people and the floor in south valve room, Unit 1, auxiliary building, elevation 737' 0" due to operator erpor.

I Concern number XX-85-093-002 was related as follows:

l Shift Engineers (SE) and Assistant Shift Engineers (ASE) are

! inadequately trained in electrical station operation

! (switchyard, offsite power feed, etc.) such that there could be an excessive delay in restoring offsite power feed to the plant

, in the event-of an emergency. CI feels that SE/ASE personnel should receive better training in this area.

Concern number WI-85-060-001 was related as follows:

i SEs and ASEs are inadequately trained in electrical station operation (switchyard, offsite power feed, etc. such that there cculd be an excessive delay in restoring offsite power feed to the plant in the event of an emergency. CI feels that SE/ASE personnel should receive better training in this area.

And concern number IN-86-209-013 was related as follows:

Since the plant operator training was conducted at the same training center, under the same management as the STA (Shift Technical Advisor) program; the quality of the operator training that started approximately 10 years ago may have been as inadequate as the STA training.

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. i II. SCOPE A. The scope of this investigation was determined from the i concerns of record to be three specific issues requiring investigation. In addition, two general concerns were identified.

The three spe,cific issues requiring investigation are:

' 1. Is the training received by operators on hold orders and clearainces adequate to prevent unanticipated transients and assure personnel safety?

2. Is the training received by SEs and ASEs on electrical station operation adequate to assure correct responsive action in case of loss of offsite power? '

3. Can women operators adequately dispense their duties? If '

not, what potential impact could this have on safe plant operat' ion?

The generql issues expressed in these concerns are:

1. Does TVA, Sequoyah, adequately train their licensed, and non-licensed operators, to perform their expected duties? -

2. What' assurances can be provided to document this -

contention? ,

B. To accomplish this investigation, GCTF reviewed Sequoyah training procedures and requirements from the policy establishing level (area plans) to implementing procedure level. -

Further, GCTF interviewed members of SQN Compliance Staff and checked licensee event reports (LERs) and potential reportable  ;

occurrence (PRO) reports for Sequoyah to identify the frequency of occurrence of events caused due to inadequate clearances (specific issue 1).

i Three individuals from operations were contacted and discussed capabilities of women ir. operations.

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SUMMARY

OF FINDINGS A. Requirements and Commitments

1. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Energy Part 55,

" Operator's Licenses" is the basic implementing regulation for licensing reactor operators and senior reactor operators. ,

, 2. TVA, Office of Nuclear Power, Nuclear Training Program, ProgramM'anual 2, Program Procedure 0202.05, " Nuclear Plant Operator Iraining Program" consolidates training requirements for all nuclear operations personnel.

B. Findings ,

1. Operations personnel are trained thoroughly on the use and issuance of clearances as described in SQN Administrative Instruction, AI-3 (Reference 6). This training occurs at several levels during the training progress betwe'en AUO and SE.

OperationsSectionLetter,OSLT-1," Training"(Neference 3), gives a detailed description of the phases of operator training.

2. Members of Sequoyah's Compliance Staff were intseviewed .

about events caused by mishandling of clearances. A ,

search of compliance's computer data base was also .

performed. No evidence was accumulated either from the interviews or the computer search identifying any event caused by improper handling of clearances which were reported, or potentially reportable, under 10CFR50.72 or

.73. This means that any events caused by mishandled clearances are not of significant safety impact.

3. During weeks three and four Requalification Training, Sequoyah licensed operators are anr.ually retrained on the

• procedures for use and issuance of clearances. Tests and 7 lesson plans documenting coverage of this subject.are kept on permanent file by TVA, OSLT-1, section XI.D.2 (Reference 3) describes the commitment made by Sequoyah to annually update training for operators on safe clearances. v 0001c 3

Rtvision 1 4/22/86 III. _

SUMMARY

OF FINDINGS (continued) ,

4. TVA's Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS) has conducted an investigation for a Sequoyah specific employee concern (XX-85-093-001) which addresses training and qualification of SE's and ASE's on switchyard operation. This investigation (Report #I-85-619-SQN, Reference 4)

, concludes that Sequoyah SE's and ASE's are fully trained in switchyard operations. Further, it states that Sequoyah's training program meets NRC requirements and is accredited by TNPO as documented in Reference 5.

5. Sequoyah employs, and will continue to employ, as part of its commitment to Equal Employment Opportunity Act, women

, in its Operation Section.

Three indi'viduals were contacted ftom Sequoyah Operations Staff. Individuals A and B are licensed reactor operators (RO) and individual C is a licensed Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) and an ASE. When interviewed, each of these individuals stated that they had experienced no

, greater incidence of occurrence with women operators being physically incapable of performing in-plant duties than with males in the same positions.

Each individcal stated.that as licensed operators (RO and SRO) they were fully aware of the problem areas in the plant and the capabilities of the Assistant Unit Operators (AUO's) on their staff. If necessary, the AUO (male or female) may at any time request assistance in performing a manipulation. Individual C further stated that in the case of a plant emergency it is common practice to dispatch more than one AUO to a job for personnel safety reasoris .

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6. Scquoyah's training programs for operators at all stages meet or exceed all applicable guidelines. As such, INPO has accreclited Sequoyah's training program as of January i 1984. INPO continues to teview accredited programs on a regular basis to ensure the training meets their standarca (Reference 5).

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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS A. Conclusions These issues were not validated by this investigation because:

1. Sequoyah SEs and ASEs are given extensive training on the use and issuance of clearances. This training includes detailed examination process assuring the competence of licensed operators (ASE or SE) to issue safe clearances.

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2. Sequoyah cperators at all levels receive training on the use of clearancas.

., 3. No evidence could be accumulated either by interview or computer data base search of potentially reportable occurrences (10CFR50.72 or .73) caused by mishandled clearances at Sequoyah.

4. TVA NSRS issued a report, I-85-619-SQN, which supports the adequacy of Sequoyah's electrical switchyard training for SEs and ASEs.

5, Sequoyah operators receive training that meets NRC requirements and Sequoyah's training program has received INPO accreditation.

6. Interviews with operators (UO and ASE) accumulated no

evidence of physical incapability of women to adequately perform AUO duties.

It is the interpretation of the investigator that the concerned individual who referenced the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) program may have been concerned with the relative depth and l

1ength of STA training as compared with the Licensed Operator Training Program. The concern as stated does not present a safety problem with the STA training or performance of the STA functiocs, therefore, addressing the adequacy of STA training

falls outside the scope of this issue.

l B. Recommendations l None i

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DOCUMENTS REVIEWED IN INVESTIGATION OF ISSUE " OPERATOR TRAINING" AND N ES, .,

1. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10 Energy, Part 55 " Operator' Licenses", 1985 Edition I 2. TVA, Office of Nuclear Power, Program Plan " Nuclear Training Program"

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Area Plan 0202.05 " Nuclear Plant Operator Training Program" revised March 15, 1985

3. TVA, SNP Operations Section Letter - Training OSLT-1 Operator Training Revised January 6, 1986 s

4. TVA, NSRS Investigation Report, I-85-619-SQN, Transmitted December 10, 1985, subject " Training of Sequoyah Shift Engineers and Assistant l Shift Engineers on Electrical Station Operation"

5. Letter from E. P. Wilkinson (INPO) to H. G. Parris (A02 840116 016)

"INPO Accreditation" dated January 13, 1984

6. SQN Administrative Instruction AI-3 " Clearance Procedure", revision 28 dated August 7, 1985 r

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M.emorandum '

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY T 2 5"86 0 62 3 845 TO  : H. L. Abercrombie, Site Director, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant ONP FROM  : R. P. Denise, Program Manager, Employee Concerns Task Group Watts Bar Nuclear Plant ONP DATE  : June 23, 1986 .

SUBJECT:

EMPLOYEE CONCERNS TASK GROUP (ECTG) APPROVAL OF SQN GENERIO CONCERN TASK FORCE (GCTF) INVESTIGATION REPORT - OPERATOR TRAINING - EMPLOYEE CONCERNS IN-85-289-001, IN-85-894-001, IX-85-093-002, WI-85-060-001, AND IN-86-209-013.

The Watts Bar ECTG has completed review of the subject report and file produced at SQN. The Category Evaluation Group Head for Operations has signed the report as approved.

The scope of the SQN investigation covered operator training and qualifications. Employee concern IN-86-209-013 implied that Shift Technical Advisor (STA) training was inadequate; this matter will be investigated and resolved by the ECTG, We also note that Employee concern XI-85-093-002, which was specific to BLN, is precisely the same as XI-85-093-001 which was specific to SQN, and that this concern was investigated by NSRS.

We are returning the complete file for your records. A copy of this memorandum and a copy of a transmittal letter, which conveys the report to the NRC, are included in the file. You are expected to maintain the complete file at Sequoyah.

No additional corrective action is required based on our review.

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WRL:JGL Attcchment ec: RIMS, MR 4N 72A-C W. R. Lagergren, Jr. IOB, Watts Bar ONP C. C. Macon, LP 6N 37A-C R. C. Sauer, IOB, Watts Bar ONP l

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